Reports
Regulation insights
What this report is about
In this report, we present findings and recommendations relevant to regulation from selected reports between 2018 and 2024.
This analysis includes performance audits, compliance audits and the outcomes of financial audits.
Effective regulation is necessary to ensure compliance with the law as well as to promote positive social and economic outcomes and minimise risks with certain activities.
The report is a resource for public sector leaders. It provides insights into the challenges and opportunities for more effective regulation.
Audit findings
The analysis of findings and recommendations is structured around four key themes related to effective regulation:
- governance and accountability
- processes and procedures
- data and information management
- support and guidance.
The report draws from this analysis to present insights for agencies to promote effective regulation. It also includes relevant examples from recent audit reports.
In this report, we also draw out insights for agencies that provide a public sector stewardship role.
The report highlights the need for agencies to communicate a clear regulatory approach. It also emphasises the need to have a consistent regulatory approach, supported by robust information about risks and accompanied with timely and proportionate responses.
The report highlights the need to provide relevant support to regulated parties to facilitate compliance and the importance of transparency through reporting of meaningful regulatory information.
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Effectiveness of SafeWork NSW in exercising its compliance functions
What this report is about
This report assesses how effectively SafeWork NSW, a part of the Department of Customer Service (DCS), has performed its regulatory compliance functions for work health and safety in New South Wales.
The report includes a case study examining SafeWork NSW's management of a project to develop a realtime monitoring device for airborne silica in workplaces.
Findings
There is limited transparency about SafeWork NSW's effectiveness as a regulator. The limited performance information that is available is either subsumed within DCS reporting (or other sources) and is focused on activity, not outcomes.
As a work health and safety (WHS) regulator, SafeWork NSW lacks an effective strategic and data-driven approach to respond to emerging WHS risks.
It was slow to respond to the risk of respirable crystalline silica in manufactured stone.
SafeWork NSW is constrained by an information management system that is over 20 years old and has passed its effective useful life.
While it has invested effort into ensuring consistent regulatory decisions, SafeWork NSW needs to maintain a focus on this objective, including by ensuring that there is a comprehensive approach to quality assurance.
SafeWork NSW's engagement of a commercial partner to develop a real-time silica monitoring device did not comply with key procurement obligations.
There was ineffective governance and process to address important concerns about the accuracy of the real-time silica monitoring device.
As such, SafeWork NSW did not adequately manage potential WHS risks.
Recommendations
The report recommended that DCS should:
- ensure there is an independent investigation into the procurement of the research partner for the real-time silica detector
- embed a formal process to review and set its annual regulatory priorities
- publish a consolidated performance report
- set long-term priorities, including for workforce planning and technology uplift
- improve its use of data, and start work to replace its existing complaints handling system
- review its risk culture and its risk management framework
- review the quality assurance measures that support consistent regulatory decisions
Read the PDF report.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #390 - released 27 February 2024
Flood housing response
What this report is about
Extreme rainfall across eastern Australia in 2021 and 2022 led to a series of major flood events in New South Wales.
This audit assessed how effectively the NSW Government provided emergency accommodation and temporary housing in response to the early 2022 Northern Rivers and late 2022 Central West flood events.
Responsible agencies included in this audit were the Department of Communities and Justice, NSW Reconstruction Authority, the former Department of Planning and Environment, the Department of Regional NSW and the Premier’s Department.
Findings
The Department of Communities and Justice rapidly provided emergency accommodation to displaced persons immediately following these flood events.
There was no plan in place to guide a temporary housing response and agencies did not have agency-level plans for implementing their responsibilities.
The NSW Government rapidly procured and constructed temporary housing villages. However, the amount of temporary housing provided did not meet the demand.
There is an extensive waitlist for temporary housing and the remaining demand in the Northern Rivers is unlikely to be met. The NSW Reconstruction Authority has not reviewed this list to confirm its accuracy.
Demobilisation plans for the temporary housing villages have been developed, but there are no long-term plans in place for the transition of tenants out of the temporary housing.
Agencies are in the process of evaluating the provision of emergency accommodation and temporary housing.
The findings from the 2022 State-wide lessons process largely relate to response activities.
Audit recommendations
The NSW Reconstruction Authority should:
- Develop a plan for the provision of temporary housing.
- Review the temporary housing waitlist.
- Determine a timeline for demobilising the temporary housing villages.
- Develop a strategy to manage the transition of people into long-term accommodation.
- Develop a process for state-wide recovery lessons learned.
All audited agencies should:
- Finalise evaluations of their role in the provision of emergency accommodation and temporary housing.
- Develop internal plans for implementing their roles under state-wide plans.
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Parliamentary reference - Report number #389 - released 22 February 2024
Driver vehicle system
What this report is about
Transport for NSW (TfNSW) uses the Driver vehicle System (DRIVES) to support its regulatory functions. The system covers over 6.2 million driver licences and over seven million vehicle registrations.
DRIVES first went live in 1991 and has been significantly extended and updated since, though is still based around the same core system. The system is at end of life but has become an important service for Service NSW and the NSW Police Force.
DRIVES now includes some services to other parts of government and non-government entities which have little or no connection to transport. There are 141 users of DRIVES in total, including commercial insurers, national regulators, and individual citizens.
This audit assessed whether TfNSW is effectively managing DRIVES and planning to transition it to a modernised system.
Audit findings
TfNSW has not effectively planned the replacement of DRIVES.
It is now working on its third business case for a replacement system but has failed to learn lessons from its past attempts.
In the meantime, TfNSW has not taken a strategic approach to managing DRIVES’ growth.
TfNSW has been slow to reduce the risk of misuse of personal information held in DRIVES. With its delivery partner Service NSW, TfNSW has also been slow to develop and implement automatic monitoring of access.
TfNSW uses recognised processes for managing most aspects of DRIVES, but has not kept the system consistently available for users. TfNSW has lacked accurate service availability information since June 2022, when it changed its technology support provider.
TfNSW needs to significantly prioritise cyber security improvements to DRIVES. TfNSW is seeking to lift DRIVES’ cyber defences, but it will not achieve its stated target safeguard level until December 2025.
Even then, one of the target safeguards will not be achieved in full until DRIVES is modernised.
Audit recommendations
TfNSW should:
- implement a service management framework including insight into the views of DRIVES users, and ensuring users can influence the service
- ensure it can accurately and cost effectively calculate when DRIVES is unavailable due to unplanned downtime
- ensure implementation of a capability to automatically detect anomalous patterns of access to DRIVES
- ensure that DRIVES has appropriate cyber security and resilience safeguards in place as a matter of priority
- develop a clear statement of the future role in whole of government service delivery for the system
- resolve key issues currently faced by the DRIVES replacement program including by:
- clearly setting out a strategy and design for the replacement
- preparing a specific business case for replacement.
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Parliamentary reference - Report number #388 - released 20 February 2024
Health 2023
What this report is about
Results of the Health portfolio of agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2023.
The audit found
Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all Health portfolio agencies' financial statements.
The number of monetary misstatements increased in 2022–23, driven by key accounting issues, including the first-time recognition of paid parental leave and plant and equipment fair value adjustments.
The key audit issues were
NSW Health identified errors regarding the recognition and calculation of long service leave entitlements for employees with ten or more years of service that had periods of part time service in the first ten years, resulting in prior period restatements.
Comprehensive revaluation of buildings at the Graythwaite Charitable Trust found errors in the previous year's valuation, resulting in prior period restatements.
New parental leave legislation increased employee liabilities for portfolio agencies. The Ministry of Health corrected the consolidated financial statements to record parental leave liabilities for all agencies within the Health portfolio.
A repeat high-risk issue relates to processing time records by administrators that have not been reviewed prior to running the pay cycle.
Thirty per cent of reported issues were repeat issues.
The audit recommended
Portfolio agencies should ensure any changes to employee entitlements are assessed for their potential financial statements impact under the relevant Australian Accounting Standards.
Portfolio agencies should address deficiencies that resulted in qualified reports on:
- the design and operation of shared service controls
- prudential non-compliance at residential aged care facilities.
This report provides Parliament and other users of the Health portfolio of agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- audit observations.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Health portfolio of agencies (the portfolio) for 2023.
Section highlights
- Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all portfolio agencies required to prepare general purpose financial statements.
- The total number of errors (including corrected and uncorrected) in the financial statements increased compared to the prior year.
- The Ministry of Health retrospectively corrected an $18.9 million adjustment in its financial statements relating to long service leave entitlements for certain employees.
- Graythwaite Charitable Trust retrospectively corrected a $4.2 million adjustment in its financial statements related to prior period valuations.
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.
This chapter outlines observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Health portfolio.
Section highlights
- The 2022–23 audits identified one high-risk and 57 moderate risk issues across the portfolio.
- The high-risk matter related to the forced-finalisation of time records.
- The total number of findings increased from 67 to 111 in 2022–23.
- Thirty per cent of the issues were repeat issues. Most repeat issues related to internal control deficiencies or non-compliance with key legislation and/or central agency policies.
- Forced-finalisation of time records, accounting for the new paid parental leave provision and user access review deficiencies were the most commonly reported issues.
- Qualified Assurance Practitioner's reports were issued on:
- the design and operation of controls as documented by HealthShare NSW
- the Ministry's Annual Prudential Compliance Statements in relation to residential aged care facilities.
Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit
Appendix two – Early close procedures
Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting
Appendix four – Financial data
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Transport 2023
What this report is about
Result of the Transport portfolio of agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2023.
The audit found
Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all Transport portfolio agencies.
An 'emphasis of matter' paragraph was included in the Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales' (TAHE) independent auditor's report, which draws attention to management's disclosure regarding proposed changes to TAHE's operating model.
Government's decision to convert TAHE into a non-commercial Public Non-Financial Corporation may impact the future valuation and the control of TAHE's assets.
Transport for NSW's valuation of roads and bridges resulted in a net increase to its asset value by $15.7 billion.
Transport for NSW and Sydney Metro have capitalised over $300 million of tender bid costs paid to unsuccessful tender bidders relating to significant infrastructure projects. Whilst NSW Treasury policy provides clarity on the reimbursement of unsuccessful bidders' costs, clearer guidance on how to account for these costs in agency's financial statements is required.
The key audit issues were
The number of issues reported to management decreased from 53 in 2021–22 to 49 in 2022–23.
High-risk findings include:
- gaps in how Sydney Metro manages its contractors and how conflicts of interest are recorded and managed
- future financial reporting implications to account for government's proposed changes to TAHE's future operating model, including asset valuations and control assessments of assets and operations
- Parramatta Park Trust's tree assets' valuation methodology needs to be addressed.
Recommendations were made to address the identified deficiencies.
This report provides Parliament and other users of the Transport portfolio of agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- audit observations.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Transport portfolio of agencies (the portfolio) for 2023.
Section highlights
- Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all the portfolio agencies’ 30 June 2023 financial statements.
- An 'Emphasis of Matter' paragraph was included in the Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales’ (TAHE) Independent Auditor's Report to draw attention to management's disclosure regarding the proposed changes to TAHE's future operating model.
- The total number of errors (including corrected and uncorrected) in the financial statements increased by 59% compared to the prior year.
- The recent government's decision to convert TAHE into a non-commercial Public Non-Financial Corporation may impact the future valuation and the control of TAHE’s assets.
- Transport for NSW needs to further improve its quality assurance processes over comprehensive valuations, in particular, ensuring key inputs used in the valuations are properly supported and verified.
- Transport for NSW and Sydney Metro capitalised over $300 million of bid costs paid to unsuccessful bidders. NSW Treasury’s Bid Cost Contributions Policy does not contemplate how these costs should be recognised in agency’s financial statements. Transport agencies should work with NSW Treasury to develop an accounting policy for the bid cost contributions to ensure consistent application across the sector.
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.
This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport portfolio.
Section highlights
- The 2022–23 audits identified four high risks and 28 moderate risk issues across the portfolio. Thirty-nine per cent of issues were repeat findings.
- Four high risk findings include:
- TAHE’s asset valuations (new)
- TAHE’s control of assets and operations (new)
- Sydney Metro’s management of contractors and conflicts of interest (new)
- Parramatta Park Trust’s valuation of trees (repeat).
- The total number of findings decreased from 53 in 2021–22 to 49 in 2022–23. Many repeat findings related to control weaknesses over the asset valuation, payroll processes, conflicts of interest and information technology user access administration.
Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit
Appendix two – Early close procedures
Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting
Appendix four – Financial data
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Procurement of services for the Park'nPay app
What this report is about
The report assesses whether the Department of Customer Service (the department) complied with legislation and NSW government policy when it directly negotiated with Duncan Solutions to procure backend services relating to the Park'nPay app.
The Park'nPay app, developed by the department, enables users to locate and pay for parking remotely using their smart mobile device.
The audit found
The department failed to establish the grounds for entering a direct negotiation procurement strategy, without any competitive tendering, for services for the Park'nPay app. It rushed a decision to trial the app in The Rocks, without considering how this might affect its procurement obligations.
There is no evidence that the procurement achieved value for money. Despite being required by legislation, as well as mandatory NSW government policy, the department did not consider how it would ensure value for money, nor did it demonstrate an adequate understanding of what is meant by value for money on this occasion.
The department failed to implement key probity requirements. There was no effective management of conflicts of interest. Key decisions were not documented. There was a lack of clarity, transparency, and oversight of the relationship between the Minister's office and staff in the department.
The audit made recommendations about
- making and retaining complete and accurate records, particularly on decisions to commit or expend public money
- ensuring department staff understand how to exercise their financial delegations and procurement processes
- ensuring that only staff with appropriate delegations are committing or approving the spending of public money
- consistency with the contract extension provisions of the NSW Government Procurement Policy Framework, particularly regarding ensuring value for money
- protocols to guide the interactions between department staff and Minister and Minister's staff
- the need for proper management and oversight of contingent workers, such as contractors.
On 27 February 2019 the then Minister for Finance, Services and Property announced the commencement of a Park’nPay app trial in The Rocks precinct of Sydney.
The app was intended to enable users to locate and pay for parking remotely, using their smart mobile device such as a phone or tablet, rather than needing to physically be at a parking meter.
In July 2019, following a direct negotiation procurement conducted by the then Department of Finance, Services and Innovation, a contract was executed with Duncan Solutions for an estimated value of $1,260,600 over three-years, with three single-year options to extend. The contract required Duncan Solutions to provide development services to link the Park'nPay app to its Parking Enterprise Management System platform and to provide ongoing software support services.
This audit assessed whether the department complied with the procurement obligations that applied at the time it procured these services from Duncan Solutions.
This audit focussed on the department's processes and decision-making relating to:
- the direct negotiation with Duncan Solutions at the exclusion of any other potential supplier
- the negotiation, execution and management of the contract with Duncan Solutions.
As this audit focusses on the department's procurement and contract management processes, it does not comment on the activities of Duncan Solutions. The detailed audit objective, criteria and audit approach are in Appendix three.
The auditee is the Department of Customer Service. As a result of machinery of government changes, the Department of Finance, Services, and Innovation became the Department of Customer Service from 1 July 2019. To avoid confusion, this report simply uses ‘the department’ to refer to either. Where the report refers to the Minister, it relates to the former Minister in office at the time.
Conclusion
The department failed to establish the grounds for entering a direct negotiation procurement strategy for services for the Park'nPay app. It rushed a decision to trial the app in The Rocks, without considering how this might affect its procurement requirements.
As part of a direct negotiation process, the department was required to, but did not:
- undertake a comprehensive analysis of the market and all relevant factors to demonstrate that a competitive process does not need to be conducted
- conduct a risk assessment for the procurement approach
- follow the internal delegation process, including obtaining approval of the department's delegate and endorsement of the Chief Procurement Officer.
There is no evidence that the procurement to support Park'nPay represented value for money. Despite it being required by legislation, as well as mandatory NSW Government policy, the department did not consider how to ensure value for money, nor demonstrate an adequate understanding of what is meant by value for money in this case.
The department issued no tender or expression of interest documents against which any proposal could be assessed, and it had no tender evaluation plan, committee, or criteria. Without any objective standards against which the supplier's proposal could be assessed, it was not possible for the department to determine if value for money was achieved, and no value for money has been demonstrated.
The department failed to implement key probity requirements. There was no effective management of conflicts of interest. Key decisions were not documented. There was a lack of clarity, transparency, and oversight of the relationship between the Minister's office and staff in the department.
No conflict of interest declarations were made by staff until almost one year after the direct negotiations commenced and even then they were not made by all members of the negotiation team and key decision-makers.
The department did not document the reasons for its decisions or minute key meetings, such as when, why and by whom the decision was made to transform the procurement from a 'trial' to a contract of up to six years duration. The department had no policies guiding the interactions between the Minister, the Minister's office and staff in the department (including contractors) in relation to this initiative, resulting in blurred and uncertain roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities.
The department initially sought to withhold information from the Audit Office pertaining to Park'nPay. When questions were raised through external scrutiny, there was little evidence of genuine inquiry or review into its practices to ensure improvement and compliance.
The department deliberately sought to withhold information from the Audit Office of NSW when initial inquiries were lawfully made about the Park'nPay project in the context of the audit of the department's financial statements in May 2021.
There is also limited evidence to demonstrate the department has reviewed the decisions and practices around the Park'nPay project, despite receiving internal legal advice at the time that questioned the characterisation of the procurement as a 'pilot', and external scrutiny via the NSW Parliament's Budget Estimates Committee hearings. This indicates a risk that opportunities to review and improve the department's procurement practices based on learnings from this process have been missed.
Appendix one – Response from auditee
Appendix two – Key requirements of the department's procurement manual
Appendix three – About the audit
Appendix four– Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #387 - released 14 December 2023
Regional road safety
What this report is about
Around one-third of the state’s population lives in regional NSW, but deaths on regional roads make up around two-thirds of the state’s road toll.
Transport for NSW (TfNSW) is responsible for managing road safety outcomes across the NSW road network. This audit assessed the effectiveness of TfNSW’s delivery of road safety strategies, plans and policies in regional areas.
The NSW Road Safety Action Plan 2022–2026 has the stated goal of ‘no death or serious injury occurring on the road transport network’ by 2050.
What we found
There is a disproportionate amount of trauma on regional roads, but there are no specific road safety plans or trauma reduction targets for regional NSW.
TfNSW advises that the setting of state-wide road safety targets is consistent with other jurisdictions and international best practice. However, the proportion of road fatalities and serious injuries in regional NSW is almost the same as ten years ago.
There is no regional implementation plan to assist TfNSW to target the Road Safety Action Plan 2026 to regional areas.
TfNSW considers that local road safety outcomes should be managed by councils, but only 52% of regional councils participated in its Local Government Road Safety Program (LGRSP) in 2022–23. This program has not been updated since 2014, despite commitments to do so in 2021 and 2022.
TfNSW has not undertaken a systematic and integrated analysis of the combined impact of its road safety strategies and plans in regional NSW since 2012.
TfNSW reports against the Community Road Safety Fund (CRSF) annually but there is no consolidated, public reporting on total road safety funding allocated to regional NSW. The Fund underspend increased from 12% in 2019–20 to 20% in 2022–23.
What we recommended
We recommended TfNSW:
- develop a regional implementation plan to support the NSW Road Safety Action Plan, including a framework to annually measure, analyse and publicly report on progress
- develop a plan to measure and mitigate risks causing underspend in the CRSF
- expedite the review of the LGRSP including recommendations to increase involvement of regional councils.
Disclosure of confidential information
Under the Government Sector Audit Act 1983 (the Act), the Auditor-General may disclose confidential information if, in the Auditor-General’s opinion, the disclosure is in the public interest, and that disclosure is necessary for the exercise of the Auditor-General’s functions.
Confidential information in the Act means Cabinet information or information subject to legal privilege. This performance audit report contained confidential information.
The NSW Premier has certified that in his opinion the disclosure of the confidential information was not in the public interest.
The confidential information has been redacted from this report.
Under section 36A(2) of the Government Sector Audit Act 1983, the Auditor-General may authorise the disclosure of confidential information if, in the Auditor-General’s opinion, the disclosure is in the public interest and necessary for the exercise of the Auditor-General’s functions. Confidential information under the Government Sector Audit Act 1983 means Cabinet information, or information that could be subject to a claim of privilege by the State or a public official in a court of law. This performance audit report contained confidential information which, in the opinion of the Auditor-General, is in the public interest to disclose and that disclosure is necessary for the exercise of the Auditor-General’s functions.
On 26 October 2023, pursuant to section 36A(2)(b) of the Government Sector Audit Act 1983, the Auditor-General notified the NSW Premier of the intention to include this information in the published report, having formed the opinion that its disclosure is in the public interest and is necessary for the exercise of the Auditor-General’s functions.
On 23 November 2023, pursuant to section 36A(2)(c) of the Government Sector Audit Act 1983, the NSW Premier certified that, in his opinion, the proposed disclosure of the confidential information contained in this report was not in the public interest. The Premier’s certificate follows. Section 36A(4) states that a certificate of the Premier that it is not in the public interest to disclose confidential information is conclusive evidence of that fact.
The issuance of the certificate by the NSW Premier prevents the publication of this information. The relevant sections of the report containing confidential information have been redacted.
One-third of the New South Wales population resides in regional areas, but two-thirds of the state’s road crash fatalities take place on regional roads.
Between 2017 and 2021, the average number of fatalities for every 100,000 of the population living in regional New South Wales was 8.33 — approximately four times higher than the equivalent measure for Greater Sydney. Similarly, the average number of serious injuries in regional New South Wales over the same period was 75.24 per 100,000 of the population, compared with 50.53 in Greater Sydney. Further, more than 70% of people who lose their lives in accidents on regional roads are residents of regional areas.
Residents of regional areas face particular transport challenges. They often need to travel longer distances for work, health care, or recreation purposes, yet their public transport options are more limited than metropolitan residents. Vehicle safety is also an issue. According to the NSW Road Safety Progress Report 2021, of the light vehicles registered in New South Wales that were manufactured in or after 2000, 48.4% of light vehicles in regional areas had a five-star Australasian New Car Assessment Program (ANCAP) rating, compared to 54.8% in metropolitan areas. Road conditions in regional areas can also be more challenging for drivers.
Regional New South Wales covers 98.5% of the total area of the state. The road network in New South Wales is vast — spanning approximately 200,000 kilometres.
The road network includes major highways, state roads and local roads. Speed limits range from 10 km/hr in high pedestrian shared zones, up to 110 km/hr on high volume and critical road corridors. Eighty per cent of the network has a 100 km/h speed limit, which is mostly applied as a default speed limit, regardless of the presence of safety features and treatments.
Speed is the primary causal factor in more crashes in New South Wales than any other factor, and car crashes in regional areas are more likely to be fatal because of the higher average speeds involved.
The responsibility for managing road safety outcomes across the entire New South Wales road network lies with Transport for NSW (TfNSW), pursuant to Schedule 1 of the Transport Administration Act 1988.
While its safety responsibilities are state-wide, TfNSW does not own or directly manage all of the road network in regional New South Wales, which spans approximately 200,000 kilometres. Approximately 80% of the roads are classified as Local Roads and are administered and managed by local councils. Local councils also maintain Regional Roads that run through their local government areas. TfNSW is responsible for managing State Roads (approximately 20% of roads), which are major arterial roads. It also provides funding for councils to manage over 18,000 km (approximately 10%) of state-significant Regional Roads.
According to TfNSW, between 2016 and 2020, there were 9,776 people killed or seriously injured on roads in regional New South Wales. Adding to the tragic loss of life, according to TfNSW, the estimated cost to the community between 2016 and 2020 resulting from regional road trauma and fatalities was around $13.7 billion.
TfNSW also noted that the ‘risk of road trauma is pervasive, and a combination of effective road safety measures is required to systematically reduce this risk’.
TfNSW released its first long-term road-safety strategy in December 2012, which introduced the goal of ‘Vision Zero’ — a long-term goal of zero deaths or serious injuries on NSW roads. The terminology was changed to ‘Towards Zero’ in the 2021 Road Safety Plan and has been retained in the NSW Road Safety Action Plan 2022–2026. Towards Zero has the stated goal of ‘no death or serious injury occurring on the road transport network’ by 2050.
The objective of this audit is to assess the effectiveness of TfNSW’s delivery of ‘Towards Zero’ in regional areas.
In making this assessment, the audit examined whether TfNSW:
- is effectively reducing the number of fatalities and serious injuries on regional roads
- has an effective framework, including governance arrangements, for designing and refreshing the NSW Road Safety Strategy 2012–2021 and the NSW Road Safety Action Plan 2022–2026
- effectively makes use of whole-of-government and other relevant sources of data to support decision-making, and to evaluate progress and outcomes
- effectively manages accountabilities, including roles and responsibilities, with respect to road safety outcomes and the use of data.
This audit focused on the policies and strategies used by TfNSW for managing road safety outcomes in regional areas. We did not evaluate individual road safety projects, programs and initiatives as part of this audit.
Whilst Regional Roads and Local Roads (as defined by the Road Network Classifications) are owned and maintained by local councils, we included these roads in this audit as TfNSW may advise and assist councils to promote and improve road safety, as well as manage grant programs that focus on improving road safety outcomes on these roads. Hereafter, unless otherwise stated, references to ‘regional roads’ refer to all classifications of roads in the state which are in regional New South Wales, irrespective of their ownership.
Local councils in regional areas are key stakeholders for the purposes of this audit, and we interviewed eight as part of the audit process (noting that this was not intended to be a representative sample). Road asset management by local councils is also out of scope for this audit as it is the focus of a subsequent performance audit by the Audit Office of New South Wales.b
The Audit Office of New South Wales has undertaken several performance audits relating to road safety since 2009 and these have been referenced while undertaking this audit. They include:
- Condition of State Roads (August 2006)
- Improving Road Safety: Heavy Vehicles (May 2009)
- Improving Road Safety: School Zones (March 2010)
- Improving Road Safety: Speed Cameras (July 2011)
- Regional Assistance Programs (May 2018)
- Mobile speed cameras (October 2018)
- Rail freight and Greater Sydney (October 2021).
Conclusion
TfNSW has acknowledged that there is a disproportionate amount of road trauma on regional roads in the NSW Road Safety Strategy 2012–2021, the NSW Road Safety Plan 2021, and the NSW Road Safety Action Plan 2022–2026. However, TfNSW has not articulated or evaluated a strategy for implementing road safety policy in regional New South Wales to assist in guiding targeted activities to address regional road trauma. There is also no transparency about the total amount of funding invested in improving road safety outcomes for regional New South Wales.
People living in regional New South Wales make up one-third of the state’s population, but deaths on regional roads make up around two-thirds of the state’s total road toll. This statistic is almost the same in 2023 as it was ten years ago when TfNSW released its first long-term road safety strategy.
More than 70% of people who died on roads between 2012 and 2022 in regional New South Wales were residents of regional areas. Speed is the greatest contributing factor to road fatalities and serious injuries across the entire state. However, it is responsible for more fatalities on regional roads (43%) than in Greater Sydney (34%).
TfNSW’s road safety strategies and plans acknowledge that most road fatalities occur in regional New South Wales but none of its existing strategies or plans show evidence of tailoring measures to suit particular regional settings or ‘hot spots’. There are infrastructure initiatives (such as Saving Lives on Country Roads) and behavioural programs targeting regional areas (such as Driver Reviver). However, these activities are not aligned to a regional-specific strategy or plan that addresses issues specific to regional areas.
TfNSW has state-wide responsibility for managing road safety outcomes. TfNSW advised the audit that a regional plan and regional trauma reduction targets are not needed as the state-wide plan and targets apply equally for all areas of New South Wales, and local road safety factors are best managed by local councils. TfNSW partners with local councils. However, only 52% of councils in regional New South Wales participate in TfNSW’s Local Government Road Safety Program, compared to 84% of councils in metropolitan areas. TfNSW has not undertaken any evaluations to determine whether projects completed under the Local Government Road Safety Program have reduced road trauma at the local level.
Notwithstanding the above points, TfNSW works with local councils (who are road authorities for local roads in their respective areas under the Roads Act 1993) and other key stakeholders such as the NSW Police Force to achieve the NSW Government’s road safety policy objectives.
TfNSW advised that ‘the setting of state-wide road safety targets is consistent with other jurisdictions and international best practice. Importantly, delivery of road safety countermeasures is tailored and applied with a focus on road user groups across all geographic locations to maximise trauma reductions’. There may be legitimate reasons for the existing approach, as articulated by TfNSW. However, the proportion of road fatalities in regional New South Wales roads has not reduced since 2012 – despite a long-term reduction in the overall number of deaths on the state’s roads between 2012–2021. The audit report has recommended that a regionally focused implementation plan could address this issue. TfNSW has accepted this report’s recommendation that such a plan be developed.
Specific road safety initiatives targeted to regional areas have not been implemented or expanded
| Text removed pursuant to section 36A of the Government Sector Audit Act 1983 (NSW), in compliance with the issuance of a Premier’s certificate preventing the publication of this information. |
TfNSW increased the use of other forms of automated enforcement (such as tripling enforcement hours in mobile speed cameras).
However, the use of automated enforcement has a strong metropolitan focus with most red light and fixed speed cameras being in metropolitan areas. Average speed cameras are the only camera type overwhelmingly located in regional areas but these apply only to heavy vehicles and are positioned on major freight routes.
There is no consolidated, public reporting of what proportion of total road safety funding is directed to regional New South Wales each year. The main source of funding for road safety in New South Wales, the Community Road Safety Fund, has been underspent since 2019.
Fines from camera-detected speeding, red-light and mobile phone use offences are required to be used solely for road safety purposes through the Community Road Safety Fund (CRSF), as set out in the Transport Administration Amendment (Community Road Safety Fund) Act 2012.
The CRSF has been underspent every year since 2019–20. The underspend has increased from 12% in 2019–20 to 20% in 2022–23 where the full year underspend was forecasted to be $104 million. Of this underspend, $13.5 million was dedicated for regional road infrastructure projects. TfNSW advised the audit that much of the underspend is the result of delays to infrastructure projects due to COVID-19, bushfires, and floods, as well as skills shortages. However, TfNSW has not provided any evidence that it had a plan to mitigate these risks – meaning the level of underspend could continue to grow. TfNSW also advised ‘there is no reason to expect budget management and controls will not return to pre-COVID circumstances’.
In total, TfNSW received $700 million in funding for road safety in 2021–22 (including federal contributions and the Community Road Safety Fund). Of this, $411 million (or ~59%) was directed to regional New South Wales. This is the most recent comprehensive financial data that was provided by TfNSW to the audit team. The 2022–23 NSW Budget allocated $880 million for road safety in 2022–23, with a forecasted total allocation for road safety of $1.6 billion in recurrent expenses and $0.8 billion in capital expenditure over the period 2022–23 to 2025–26.
Appendix one – Response from Transport for NSW
Appendix two – The Safe Systems framework and NSW road safety strategies and plans
Appendix three – About the audit
Appendix four – Performance auditing
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #386 - released 30 November 2023
Enterprise, Investment and Trade 2023
What this report is about
Results of the Enterprise, Investment and Trade portfolio of financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2023.
What we found
Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all completed Enterprise, Investment and Trade portfolio agencies.
An 'other matter' paragraph was included in the Jobs for NSW Fund's 30 June 2022 independent auditor's report to reflect the non-compliance with the Jobs for NSW Act 2015 (the Act). The Act requires the board to consist of seven members that include the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of the Premier's Department, and five ministerial appointments. The board has consisted of two secretaries since 24 May 2019 when the independent members resigned. The remaining five members have not been appointed by the ministers as required by section 5(2) of the Act.
Financial statements were not prepared for the Responsible Gambling Fund, a special deposit account. Financial statements should be prepared unless NSW Treasury releases a Treasurer's Direction under section 7.8 of the GSF Act that will exempt the SDA from financial reporting requirements.
What the key issues were
The number of issues reported to management decreased from 65 in 2021–22 to 44 in 2022–23. Forty-six per cent of issues were repeated from the prior year.
Two high-risk issues were identified across the portfolio. One was a repeat issue where the Jobs for NSW Fund did not comply with legislation. The other high-risk issue was first identified in 2022–23 when the Department for Enterprise, Investment and Trade incorrectly recorded grants that did not meet the requirements of Australian Accounting Standards.
What we recommended
The Department should develop a robust model to ensure it only provides for grants that meet the eligibility criteria.
This report provides Parliament and other users of the Enterprise, Investment and Trade portfolio of agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- audit observations.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Enterprise, Investment and Trade portfolio of agencies (the portfolio) for 2023.
Section highlights
- Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all completed portfolio agencies’ 2022–23 financial statements.
- An ‘other matter’ paragraph was included for the Jobs for NSW Fund’s 30 June 2022 financial report to reflect non-compliance with the Jobs for NSW Act 2015.
- The Act requires the board to consist of seven members that include the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of the Department of Premier and Cabinet (or their nominees) and five ministerial appointments, one of whom is to be appointed as Chair of the board. The board has consisted of the two secretaries since 24 May 2019 when the independent members resigned. The remaining five members have not been appointed by the ministers as required by section 5(2) of the Act.
- An ‘emphasis of matter’ paragraph was included in the Jobs for NSW Fund’s 30 June 2022 financial report to draw attention to the financial report being prepared for the purpose of fulfilling the Jobs for NSW Fund’s financial reporting responsibilities as requested by the Treasurer’s delegate.
- The total number of errors (including corrected and uncorrected) in the financial statements increased by 12% compared to the prior year.
- The Responsible Gambling Fund (Special Deposit Account) did not prepare financial statements for the year ended 30 June 2023. Financial statements should be prepared unless NSW Treasury releases a Treasurer’s Direction under section 7.8 of the GSF Act that will exempt the Fund from financial reporting requirements.
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.
This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Enterprise, Investment and Trade portfolio.
Section highlights
- The audits identified two high-risk and 20 moderate risk issues across the portfolio. Of these, one was a high-risk repeat issue and ten were moderate-risk repeat issues.
- One of the high-risk matters related to the Jobs for NSW Fund audit for the year ended 30 June 2022.
- The other high-risk matter related to overstating grants relating to the Jobs Plus Program as the criteria to pay the grant was not met at 30 June 2023.
- The total number of findings decreased from 65 to 44 with 2022–23 findings mainly related to deficiencies in accounting for property, plant and equipment and agencies having outdated policies.
Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit
Appendix two – Early close procedures
Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting
Appendix four – Financial data
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Premier and Cabinet 2023
What this report is about
Results of the Premier and Cabinet portfolio of agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2023.
What we found
Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all Premier and Cabinet portfolio agencies.
What the key issues were
The Administrative Arrangements Orders, effective 1 July 2023, changed the name of the Department of Premier and Cabinet to the Premier's Department and transferred parts of Department of Premier and Cabinet to The Cabinet Office.
The number of monetary misstatements identified in our audits decreased from 15 in 2021–22 to 12 in 2022–23.
The total number of management letter findings across the portfolio of agencies increased from ten in 2021–22 to 20 in 2022–23.
Thirty per cent of all issues were repeat issues. The most common repeat issues related to deficiencies in controls over financial reporting.
What we recommended
Portfolio agencies should:
- ensure any changes to employee entitlements are assessed for their potential financial statements impact under the relevant Australian Accounting Standards
- prioritise and address internal control deficiencies identified in Audit Office management letters.
This report provides Parliament and other users of the Premier and Cabinet portfolio of agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- audit observations.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Premier and Cabinet portfolio of agencies (the portfolio) for 2023.
Section highlights
- Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all the portfolio agencies 2022–23 financial statements.
- The total number of errors (including corrected and uncorrected) in the financial statements decreased compared to the prior year.
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.
This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Premier and Cabinet portfolio.
Section highlights
- The 2022–23 audits identified eight moderate risk issues across the portfolio of agencies. Of these, two were repeat issues, and related to password and security configuration and management of excessive annual leave.
- The total number of findings increased from ten to 20, which mainly related to deficiencies in controls over financial reporting and governance and oversight.
- The most common repeat issues related to weaknesses in controls over financial reporting.
Appendix one – Early close procedures
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
