Refine search Expand filter

Reports

Published

Actions for Managing demand for ambulance services 2017

Managing demand for ambulance services 2017

Health
Information technology
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

NSW Ambulance has introduced several initiatives over the past decade to better manage the number of unnecessary ambulance responses and transports to hospital emergency departments. However, there is no overall strategy to guide the development of these initiatives nor do NSW Ambulance's data systems properly monitor their impact. As a result, the Audit Office was unable to assess whether NSW Ambulance's approach to managing demand is improving the efficiency of ambulance services.

Demand for ambulance services is increasing. Demographic factors including population growth and ageing have contributed to this and ongoing growth in demand is likely. It is important that NSW Ambulance finds ways to respond to this demand more efficiently, while maintaining patient safety standards and meeting community expectations.

Most triple zero calls to NSW Ambulance do not involve medical issues that require an emergency response. NSW Ambulance has introduced a range of initiatives to change the way it manages these less urgent requests for assistance. Its major demand management initiatives include using a telephone advice line, referring some patients to services other than hospital emergency departments and using specialist paramedics to respond to less urgent cases.

The role of NSW Ambulance has changed in recent years. It is aiming to become a ‘mobile health service’ that identifies the needs of patients and provides or refers them to the most appropriate type of care. This change involves a significant expansion of the clinical decision-making role of paramedics. Considerable strategic and organisational efforts are required to make this work. The successful implementation of demand management initiatives is important to NSW Ambulance's ability to continue to meet demand for its services.

This audit assessed NSW Ambulance's major demand management initiatives that aim to reduce unnecessary demand for ambulance responses and unnecessary transport to hospital emergency departments. It aimed to assess the extent to which these initiatives have improved the efficiency of its services.

Conclusion

NSW Ambulance has introduced several initiatives that aim to manage demand for its services from less urgent cases more efficiently. There is no overall strategy for these initiatives and NSW Ambulance’s data systems do not measure their outputs or outcomes. As a result, we are unable to assess the impact of NSW Ambulance's demand management initiatives on the efficiency of ambulance services. More focus is needed to ensure these initiatives achieve the efficiency improvements necessary to help NSW Ambulance meet future increases in demand.

Increasing demand for ambulance services is a key issue for NSW Ambulance. Demand has increased at a faster rate than population growth in recent years and continued growth is expected. NSW Ambulance has introduced several initiatives that aim to manage demand for its services from people with less urgent medical issues more efficiently and align its approach with the rest of the health system in New South Wales.

These individual initiatives lack a broader strategy to guide their development. NSW Ambulance’s demand management initiatives also lack clear goals and performance targets, with insufficient organisational resources allocated to support their implementation. NSW Ambulance does not have a data system that allows it to conduct accurate routine monitoring of the activity and performance of these initiatives.

More effort is required to make demand management initiatives a core part of NSW Ambulance's work. Key relationships with other health services to support demand management initiatives have only recently been established. NSW Ambulance has not communicated proactively with the public about its demand management initiatives. To ensure paramedics are as well prepared as possible for their expanded roles, they need better professional development and up to date technology.

Demand for ambulance services in New South Wales is increasing steadily. Forecast future increases in demand due to population growth and ageing mean that NSW Ambulance must improve its efficiency to maintain its performance.

Demand for ambulance services is growing at a rate higher than population growth. The increase in demand is likely to continue as the population continues to grow and age. NSW Ambulance has made several recent changes to remove large parts of demand for its services, including moving non-emergency patient transport to a separate government agency and changing the way triple zero calls are categorised.

These changes were expected to improve emergency response time performance, but the anticipated improvements have not been achieved. If demand continues to increase as forecast, NSW Ambulance will need to find more efficient ways to manage demand to maintain its performance.

NSW Ambulance has introduced initiatives to change the way it manages demand from patients who have less urgent medical issues. These have the potential to achieve positive results, but we were unable to fully assess their impact because of weaknesses in data systems and monitoring. More needs to be done to demonstrate progress toward the efficiency improvements required.

NSW Ambulance uses a telephone referral system to manage triple zero calls from people with medical issues that do not require an ambulance. This has the potential to achieve efficiency improvements but there are weaknesses in NSW Ambulance's use and monitoring of this system. Paramedics are now able to make decisions about whether patients need transport to a hospital emergency department. NSW Ambulance does not routinely measure or monitor the decisions paramedics make, so it does not know whether these decisions are improving efficiency. Extended Care Paramedics who have additional skills in diagnosing and treating patients with less urgent medical issues were introduced in 2007. NSW Ambulance analysis indicates that these paramedics have the potential to improve efficiency, but have not been used as effectively as possible.

Our 2013 audit of NSW Ambulance found that accurate monitoring of activity and performance was not being conducted. More than four years later, this remains the case. 

NSW Ambulance has recognised the need to change the way it manages demand and has developed initiatives that have the potential to improve efficiency. However, there are significant weaknesses in the strategy for and implementation of its demand management initiatives.

NSW Ambulance has identified the goal of moving from an emergency transport provider to a mobile health service and developed several initiatives to support this. Its demand management initiatives have the potential to contribute to the broader policy directions for the health system in New South Wales. However, there is no clear overall strategy guiding these initiatives and their implementation has been poor.

NSW Ambulance's reasons for changing its approach to demand management have not been communicated proactively to the community. Demand management initiatives that have been operating for over a decade still do not have clear performance measures or targets. Project management of new initiatives has been inadequate, with insufficient organisational resources to oversee them and inadequate engagement with other healthcare providers.

NSW Ambulance uses an in-house Vocational Education and Training course to recruit some paramedics, as well as recruiting paramedics who have completed a university degree. No other Australian ambulance services continue to provide their own Vocational Education and Training qualifications. Paramedics will need more support in several key areas to be able to fulfil their expanded roles in providing a mobile health service. Performance and development systems for paramedics are not used effectively. Up to date technology would help paramedics make better decisions and improve NSW Ambulance's ability to monitor demand management activity.

There are gaps in NSW Ambulance's oversight of the risks of some of the initiatives it has introduced, particularly its lack of information on the outcomes for patients who are not transported to hospital. Weaknesses in the way NSW Ambulance uses its data limit its ability to properly assess the risks of the demand management initiatives it has introduced.

Appendix one - Response from agency

Appendix two - About the audit

Appendix three - Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #295 - released 13 December 2017

Published

Actions for Planning and evaluating palliative care services in NSW

Planning and evaluating palliative care services in NSW

Health
Management and administration
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

NSW Health’s approach to planning and evaluating palliative care is not effectively coordinated. There is no overall policy framework for palliative and end-of-life care, nor is there comprehensive monitoring and reporting on services and outcomes.

Palliative care is an essential component of modern health care services and an increasingly important part of the wider health and social care systems. Palliative care is healthcare and support for people with a life-limiting illness, their families and carers. It is provided by, or informed by, professionals who specialise in palliative care. ‘End of life’ care is provided to people approaching the end of life by health professionals, who may work in the health, community or aged care systems. Not everyone receiving end of life care needs palliative care.

NSW Health has a policy and planning role in palliative and end-of-life care, and it coordinates a wide range of service providers. Local Health Districts (LHDs) provide care services in settings such as homes, hospitals and clinics to patients with varying needs. There are several care providers that can be involved.

Due to this shared nature of palliative care — where many people, services and settings are involved in delivering care to the patient — availability and communication of information is critical. For service planning, data and evidence must be drawn from various sources in a timely and efficient way.

This audit assessed whether NSW Health is effectively planning and evaluating palliative care services, in the context of rising demand, increasingly complex needs, and the diversity of service providers.

Conclusion 

NSW Health’s approach to planning and evaluating palliative care is not effectively coordinated. There is no overall policy framework for palliative and end-of-life care, nor is there comprehensive monitoring and reporting on services and outcomes.  

NSW Health has a limited understanding of the quantity and quality of palliative care services across the state, which reduces its ability to plan for future demand and the workforce needed to deliver it. At the district level, planning is sometimes ad hoc and accountability for performance is unclear.

The capacity of LHDs to use accurate and complete data to plan and deliver services is hindered by multiple disjointed information systems and manual data collections. Further, a data collection on patient outcomes, for benchmarking and quality improvement, is not used universally. This limits the ability of districts to plan, benchmark and improve services based on outcomes data.

NSW Health's engagement with stakeholders is not systematic. The lack of an overall stakeholder engagement strategy puts at risk the sustainability and value of stakeholder input in planning and limits transparency.

Over the last two years, NSW Health has taken steps to improve its planning and support for districts. The Agency for Clinical Innovation has produced an online resource which will assist LHDs in constructing their own, localised models of care. eHealth, which coordinates information communication technology for the state’s healthcare, aims to invest in integrating and improving information systems. These initiatives should help to address many of the issues now inhibiting integrated service delivery, reporting on activity and outcomes, and planning for the future.

1. By July 2018, NSW Health should develop an integrated palliative and end-of-life care policy framework that:

  • clearly articulates the interface between palliative and end of life care and outlines the priorities for the respective areas
  • defines policy goals and objectives, and a performance and evaluation framework for palliative care service planning and delivery
  • informs a related workforce plan which supports the policy framework and is linked to the Health Professional Workforce Plan 2012–2022
  • reviews the funding allocation model to ensure future enhancement funds are distributed equitably and transparently based on the need and population of districts.

By December 2018, NSW Health should:

2. assess how the functionality provided in data collection programs such as the Palliative Care Outcomes Collaboration program can be provided across all palliative care services in NSW

3. complete its statewide review of systems and reporting for end of life management including specialist palliative care, and develop a business case to implement a more integrated set of solutions to:

  • support providers delivering end of life and palliative care
  • help monitor service quality and quantity
  • provide comprehensive data for service planning

4. improve stakeholder engagement by:

  • developing a statewide stakeholder engagement strategy that brings together current activity and good practice, and is transparent and publicly available
  • defining accountability for overseeing and implementing the strategy at state and district levels.

1. Performance monitoring is inadequate

NSW Government policy on palliative care is outlined in the NSW Government Plan to Increase Access to Palliative Care 2012–2016 (the Plan). Under the Plan, the overarching policy is ‘to ensure that everyone has access to quality palliative care regardless of their economic or social circumstances, their geographical location or their medical condition.’ Some initiatives under the Plan are still being implemented.

NSW Health only has measures in place to assess some processes and activities for individual initiatives under the Plan. There is no tracking of outcomes relating to the policy goals set out in the Plan, such as increased choice to die at home or the location of the patient’s choice, and improved access to specialist palliative care services. NSW Health has not conducted an overall assessment of the Plan’s outcomes to guide future priorities.

Further, there is no overall performance and reporting framework for palliative and end of life care, meaning there is no monitoring of performance of palliative care services for NSW as a whole. This lack of evaluation and performance measurement impacts on NSW Health's ability to monitor progress and achievements, address gaps in service, and plan for future service enhancement. 

2. Statewide planning and evaluation lacks coordination

Currently, palliative care services are complex to plan and evaluate. Many policies, strategies, guidelines, directives and data collections currently inform services. Even definitions of services vary. The split of policy functions for palliative care and end-of-life care between different branches within NSW Health adds further complexity. These arrangements create the risk of confusion, gaps in advice and support for LHDs.

Consistency is needed in the use of terminology and planning to achieve an integrated approach at all levels, including:

  • standard definitions of palliative care and end-of-life care
  • planning within a single structured policy framework to help clarify what services are to be delivered, who is accountable for delivering them and how to measure their outcomes.

Workforce planning is also affected. While NSW Health has identified significant gaps in the specialist palliative care workforce (especially in regional and remote areas) and it previously made workforce capacity one of its priorities, limited work has been undertaken in producing a statewide strategy to reduce these gaps.

3. District planning is not systematic and some external providers are poorly managed

An integrated approach would inform district-level service planning for palliative care. Planning in the districts we visited was sometimes ad hoc and accountability for performance unclear. Districts would benefit from:

  • better integrating data collection systems with planning
  • clearer guidelines, easy-to-use tools, monitoring and accountability systems.

The recently developed guide – A Blueprint for Improvement, from the Agency for Clinical Innovation – should help districts plan more effectively and consistently as it rolls out more widely in 2017. This takes an integrated approach to palliative and end-of-life care. Only one district we visited has finalised a comprehensive plan using the Blueprint.

Issues with district planning extend to external agreements with service providers, as these are sometimes poorly managed and do not support improved patient outcomes. Examples we reviewed showed a significant reporting burden with process-focused reporting. We also found little evidence of monitoring or action as a result of these reports.

4. Diverse information systems mean data collection and use are inconsistent

NSW Health gathers a broad range of data from many collection points and systems to inform palliative care services at hospital, ward or unit level, and community teams. However, the current data is limited because: 

  • activity is under-reported, particularly in community-based services
  • collection is not universal across districts and services.

Districts also struggle with evidence-based planning and service delivery because multiple information systems mean data may be incomplete or inaccurate. Too often, clinicians and service managers rely on manual collection and paper-based systems. 

eHealth, which coordinates information communication technology (ICT) for the state’s healthcare, is planning a statewide approach to capture information and report on all palliative care activity. The current plans of eHealth to review and improve systems should make data more complete, robust and accessible for quality improvement and planning.

5. An overarching stakeholder strategy would strengthen engagement

Just as data is central to effective planning and evaluation, so too is stakeholder engagement. However, there is currently no explicit stakeholder strategy, which means consultation is inconsistent across the state and not systematic at a district level.

While NSW Health uses a range of platforms to consult, the purpose and value is often not clear to stakeholders. Individual districts have some good practices, but there are limited mechanisms to identify and share these with other areas. A state-wide strategy would improve the quality and consistency of engagement, which will in turn inform service planning and delivery.

A stakeholder engagement strategy would integrate current initiatives, such as the two major networks that consult with health planning staff and clinicians. But it will also need to extend the feedback gathered from families, carers and volunteers, and from the peak bodies that represent them. 

Published

Actions for Contingent workforce - management and procurement

Contingent workforce - management and procurement

Industry
Management and administration
Procurement
Workforce and capability

The Department of Industry, Transport for NSW and the Department of Education were not able to demonstrate that the use of contingent labour is the best resourcing strategy to meet their business needs or deliver value for money.

NSW Government agencies use contingent labour to help deliver services to the community. The NSW Public Service Commission (PSC) defines contingent labour as people employed by a recruitment agency and hired by government agencies to provide labour or services. Agencies use contingent labour to fill a gap in skills or capability, for example, to fill a position while a staff member is on leave or where specialist knowledge may be needed on a short-term basis. The PSC estimated that in 2016 the contingent workforce represented 2.3 per cent of the public sector workforce, equivalent to 7,571 full-time employees.

The PSC recommends that contingent labour only be used when it is the most efficient and effective option available to respond to an agency’s business needs. It also recommends that agencies’ use of contingent labour be informed by workforce planning. 

Government spending on contingent labour has increased significantly over the last five years, from $503 million in 2011–12 to $1.1 billion in 2015–16. To reduce spend in this area, the NSW Government has introduced the Contingent Workforce Renewal Strategy, overseen by NSW Procurement. The Strategy aims to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in the use of contingent labour. It has four pillars:

  • prequalification scheme – a list of approved contingent labour suppliers
  • vendor management system – an information system to manage contingent workers
  • managed service provider – a recruitment agency broker
  • contractor management organisations – organisations that manage a contingent labour database, which agencies can source labour from.

The prequalification scheme is mandatory for public sector agencies. Agencies are progressively rolling out the other pillars. The vendor management system and managed service provider are together called ‘Contractor Central’.

Within the context of sector reform aimed at promoting efficiency and effectiveness, the objective of this audit is to assess whether agencies’ approach to purchasing and managing their contingent workforce meets business needs and delivers value for money. In making this assessment, we reviewed three agencies each at a different stage of the reform:

  • Department of Education (Education) – Contractor Central introduced in August 2015
  • Department of Industry (Industry) – Contractor Central introduced in November 2016, after our review
  • Transport for NSW (Transport) – Contractor Central not in place.
Conclusion

None of the three agencies we reviewed were able to demonstrate that contingent labour is the best resourcing strategy to meet their agencies’ business needs or delivers value for money. There are three reasons for this. First, agencies’ use of contingent labour was not informed by workforce planning at an agency level, with limited work undertaken in this area. Second, two of the three agencies have limited oversight of their contingent workforce. Information is not reliable or accurate, reports are onerous to produce, and there is limited reporting to the agency’s executive. Finally, none of the agencies routinely monitor and centrally document the performance of contingent workers to ensure services are delivered as planned. Together, these factors make it difficult for agencies to ensure contingent labour is engaged only when needed, at reasonable rates, and delivers quality services.

Some of these issues will be addressed by Contractor Central, which had only been introduced at Education at the time of our review. The new software program enables staff to easily obtain real-time reports on its contingent workforce. The recruitment broker also has the potential to improve value through better negotiation and benchmarking of pay rates. However, Contractor Central will only address some of the issues highlighted above. Better workforce planning and performance monitoring are needed to ensure an agencies’ workforce, including contingent workers, meets its business needs and represents value for money.


The use of contingent labour neither informs nor is informed by agency level workforce plans

None of the three agencies we reviewed had an agency level workforce plan in place. Agencies could not demonstrate that they had analysed their use of contingent labour at an agency level, including how it is being used to address any skills gaps. An agency’s executive is responsible for ensuring that an agency level workforce plan is in place. An agency level workforce plan helps hiring managers to make decisions on the best resource strategy to meet their business needs. This is important because contingent labour should only be engaged after considering all other recruitment options and the agency’s workforce plan.

Contingent workforce data is not always reliable or accurate

The accuracy and reliability of contingent workforce data varied significantly across the three agencies we reviewed. In Industry and Transport, information on contingent labour is difficult to obtain because it must be drawn from different data sources, affecting its accuracy, reliability and timeliness. This information is also incomplete, with these agencies not having a full picture of their contingent workforce. Quality data is important because it improves an agency’s capacity to plan and monitor its use of contingent labour to ensure it meets business needs.

At the time of our review, only Education, through Contractor Central, was able to obtain timely and accurate data on its use of contingent labour. Contractor Central has also improved its reporting capability, with the agency’s executive now receiving quarterly reports on its contingent workforce. In contrast, executives in Industry and Transport received ad-hoc reports on the use of contingent labour that only gave them limited oversight of their contingent workforce.

Long tenure of contingent workers is an issue in agencies

We found that the maximum tenure of contingent labour varied across agencies from nine to more than 20 years. In Education and Transport, staff reported that hiring managers assume contingent workers are automatically renewed at the end of their contract, with no formal consideration about whether contingent labour is still needed. Also, contingent labour is used for significant capital projects in the information technology and infrastructure areas where a project may run for several years.

None of the agencies reviewed undertook an analysis to determine how to reduce tenure while ensuring business needs are met. This is particularly important for long-term use of contingent labour for large capital projects. Understanding whether contingent labour represents best value compared to other recruitment options, such as secondments or temporary employment, is essential. Contingent workers are engaged under different working conditions to employees. Long tenure can pose an industrial relations risk to agencies because contingent workers may believe they are entitled to the same working conditions as employees.

On and off-boarding processes could be strengthened

Agencies have processes to engage and release contingent labour, also called on boarding and off-boarding. This includes access to IT systems, building access, and the return of property. However, not all agencies had on boarding or off-boarding checklists with specific requirements for engaging or releasing contingent labour. In addition, agencies’ off boarding guidelines did not always provide for knowledge transfer. This was identified as a key risk by staff because it is important to ensure that critical skills and knowledge are retained.

Risk that agencies are being overcharged when engaging contingent labour

We found that in agencies without Contractor Central, there is limited assurance that recruitment agencies charge in line with the prequalification scheme fees. NSW Procurement estimates that the government was overcharged $1.3 million in 2015–16. In addition, there is a risk that hiring managers do not have sufficient information to benchmark pay rates when negotiating contingent labour engagements. Agencies with Contractor Central may be more likely to get reasonable rates by using a recruitment broker who has specialised market knowledge.

No system in place to monitor the performance of contingent workers

None of the agencies we reviewed had a system in place to monitor the performance of their contingent workforce at an agency level to ensure it delivers value for money. Hiring managers are not required to evaluate whether contingent labour delivers the services for which they are hired. For example, hiring managers do not routinely assess and centrally document the quality of services provided, including whether services are delivered on time and within budget. This means contingent workers who are not performing may be re-hired by other managers or agencies. With the implementation of Contractor Central, there is the means to capture agency-wide information on the performance of contingent workers.

Contractor Central has the potential to improve value for money

Contractor Central has the potential to improve value for money. This is because the recruitment broker has specialised market knowledge and is able to promote competition, and benchmark and negotiate pay rates. In addition, the new software can streamline invoice processing and ensure correct supplier rates are charged. Education reports that it achieved a net saving of $944,600 from August 2015 to May 2016 due to the introduction of Contractor Central. Industry also expects to achieve similar results with Contractor Central, which it advised was implemented in November 2016.

The Department of Industry and Transport for NSW should, by December 2017:

1. improve the accuracy and reliability of their data on contingent labour

2. routinely report the use of contingent labour to agency executive.

The Department of Industry, Department of Education, and Transport for NSW should:

by December 2017:

3. ensure agency-wide on-boarding and off-boarding guidelines or checklists detail the specific requirements for engaging or releasing contingent labour, including provisions for knowledge transfer.

by March 2018

4. ensure that contingent labour informs and is informed by workforce planning, by:

  • analysing agency-wide business needs, staff capability, and skills gaps
  • understanding how gaps are filled by contingent workers or other recruitment options
  • assessing whether long-term contingent worker engagements are the most economical and effective labour option
  • evaluating whether contingent workers meet agency business needs and deliver value for money.

5. assess and centrally document the performance of their contingent workforce to ensure that services are delivered as contracted

6. implement processes to ensure that hiring managers consider other recruitment options prior to engaging or re-engaging contingent workers.
    

Sector-wide learnings

This audit identified learnings that government agencies across the sector should consider when procuring and managing contingent labour:

1. Contingent workforce planning should be part of an agency’s broader workforce planning.

2. Using information systems to manage and procure contingent labour improves the accuracy, reliability and timeliness of contingent labour data. This information enables agencies to consistently assess contingent labour rates and to identify persistent skills gaps in their workforce.

3. Routine reporting of contingent labour to agency executives provides oversight of an agency’s use of contingent labour.

4. Hiring managers should consider all recruitment options, with advice from human resources staff, before engaging contingent labour to ensure that it is the most appropriate solution for a specific need.

5. Regularly assessing long tenure contingent labour engagements helps to ensure that such engagements are still the most economical and effective labour option.

6. Planning the engagement of contingent workers, including provisions for knowledge transfer, maximises the potential to obtain value for money from the use of contingent labour.

7. Assessing and centrally documenting the performance of contingent labour against agreed deliverables helps to ensure services are delivered as planned, including in terms of quality, and timeliness.

Download appendices for report on Contingent workforce

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #282 - released 27 April 2017

Published

Actions for Building the readiness of the non-government sector for the NDIS

Building the readiness of the non-government sector for the NDIS

Community Services
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Project management
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

The Department of Family and Community Services has managed the risks of the transition to the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) in New South Wales effectively by increasing the overall capacity of the non-government sector and investing in provider capability.

The National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) is a major reform that aims to change the way disability support is provided and received. Responsibility for overseeing the system to support people with disability in New South Wales will transfer from the NSW Government to the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA), an independent statutory agency of the Australian Government. Eligible people with disability will receive individual funding from the NDIA and purchase support from their chosen service providers, rather than being referred to services funded or provided by government. The NSW Government will transfer all disability services it currently provides to the non-government sector.

Approximately 78,000 people received NSW Government-funded disability support in 2015–16 at a cost of around $3.3 billion. An estimated 142,000 people will have an individual NDIS support plan in New South Wales, with total funding rising to around $6.8 billion in 2018–19. NDIS trials began in New South Wales in 2013. The full scheme was introduced in July 2016 and is scheduled to be operating across the state by July 2018.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the NSW Department of Family and Community Services' (the Department's) management of the risks of the NDIS transition in New South Wales. It focused on the Department's work to build the readiness of the non-government sector for the NDIS. To make this assessment, we asked whether:

  1. the Department supported the non-government sector to build capacity to meet the expected increase in demand under the NDIS
  2. the Department supported disability service providers in NSW to improve their capability to deliver NDIS services
  3. the Department's work to prepare for the NDIS has been coordinated with the Australian Government's NDIS readiness work.

In addition to the audit questions above, this audit identified principles governments should consider when building the capacity and capability of the non-government sector to deliver human services.

Conclusion

The Department of Family and Community Services has managed the risks of the transition to the NDIS in New South Wales effectively by increasing the overall capacity of the sector and investing in provider capability building initiatives. More work is needed to build the sector's capacity to provide services to people with more complex support needs and to help existing providers complete the transition to the NDIS successfully.

The Department expanded the capacity of the non-government sector over the past decade in a way that was consistent with NDIS objectives. The development of a national market and workforce for the NDIS is an Australian Government responsibility and the Department has supported the Australian Government's work. More targeted work will be needed to build the capacity of the non-government sector to provide services to people with the most complex support and access needs.

The Department invested in provider capability building by funding programs that were delivered in partnership with sector peak bodies. The larger programs were evaluated and received positive feedback, but many providers will need more support to transition to the NDIS. The overall impact of the programs on provider readiness for the NDIS is not clear because baseline information on provider capability was not collected and targets for improvement were not set.

The Department managed the transition coordination risks by establishing comprehensive governance arrangements, contributing to the Australian Government's sector development work through national policy coordination forums and sharing lessons from New South Wales.

Building the capacity of the non-government sector

The Department supported an increase in the capacity of non-government providers

The Department started building the capacity of the non-government sector before the NDIS was developed. This included moving services provided by government into the non‑government sector, funding early intervention and community-based disability support, and introducing some individual support packages. The Department checks that the business and operational systems of non-government disability providers are adequate. However, its understanding of the outcomes for people using the services is limited.

Service gaps are possible for people with more complex support or access needs

There are risks to the supply of services to people who have more complex support or access needs, including people who need specialist clinical support, people in remote areas, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities and culturally and linguistically diverse communities. The Department has supported the NDIA's initial market development work and funded some programs to help providers build their capacity to support these groups.  However, there is a risk the market will not expand quickly enough to meet the increase in demand for services.

Sector sustainability depends on support from outside the disability services sector

The sustainability of funded disability services provided by the non-government sector depends on support from outside the sector. Most people with disability receive significant unpaid support from family members, so carers will play a key role in the sustainability of the NDIS. There are opportunities for organisations that do not provide specific disability services to contribute to sector sustainability by providing some NDIS services. To do this, many will need help to make their services more accessible and inclusive to people with disability.

Helping non-government providers develop their capability

The Department invested in capability building programs for providers

The Department has spent more than $30 million over six years on programs that aim to improve the capability of disability support providers. This work began before the NDIS was established and was adjusted to focus on NDIS readiness from December 2012. It was guided by an industry development strategy that was developed after consultation with the sector and delivered in partnership with sector peak bodies. This approach gave the sector some responsibility for developing its own capability, which is important because the sector will not receive support from the NSW Government after the transition to the NDIS.

The overall impact of the programs on the capability of providers is not clear

The overall effectiveness of the Department's spending on provider capability is not clear. The Department had some information on the general financial health and organisational capability of providers from previous industry development work. However, baseline information on provider capability was not collected before programs commenced and targets for improvements in provider capability were not set. Without this information, the Department cannot demonstrate clearly that the capability building programs it funded represent good value for money.

Most providers will need more support to transition to the NDIS effectively

In late 2015, the Department assessed the transition progress of providers in New South Wales. This assessment indicates almost one third of providers are highly likely to need additional assistance to transition to the NDIS successfully, with only 14 per cent unlikely to need further assistance. We conducted a survey of 299 providers in New South Wales in August 2016. Most reported that they feel they are on track to transition to the NDIS successfully. Sixty-two per cent said the Department-funded programs and resources they had used had improved their readiness for the NDIS. Fifty-four per cent said the changes made because of using these programs and resources had a lasting impact on their organisation.

Coordinating sector development

Governance systems and planning processes for the NDIS transition were established

The Department developed governance arrangements for the transition in New South Wales. It contributed actively to the development of national policy and strategy documents including a strategy for national market development.

The Department shared sector readiness lessons with the Australian Government

Two NDIS sector readiness programs funded by the NSW Government were later expanded to national programs through funding from the Australian Government. New South Wales only received around five per cent of the total Australian Government funding for NDIS sector readiness initiatives. A report by the Australian National Audit Office in 2016 found there was limited evidence of a strategic approach by the Australian Government when allocating this funding to states and territories.

The Department has monitored transition issues and mitigated these where possible

The Department has monitored administrative issues for providers, which have included the changes in funding arrangements and registering for the NDIS. It has taken action to mitigate these where possible, although some issues, such as the operation of NDIA administrative systems, are beyond its control.

The National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS)

The NDIS is a fundamental change to the disability support system

The NDIS is a major reform that aims to make significant changes to the way disability support is provided and received. Under the NDIS, the administration of funding for disability support in New South Wales will transfer from the NSW Government to the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA), an independent statutory agency of the Australian Government. The NSW and Australian Governments will both contribute to funding the NDIS. The size of the disability services sector in New South Wales is expected to more than double when the NDIS is fully operational (Exhibit 1).

Exhibit 1: Estimated increase in the disability services sector under the NDIS
Measure of sector capacity Pre-NDIS (2015-16) NDIS (2018-19)
Funding for services $3.3 billion $6.8 billion
People receiving support 78,000 142,000
Workforce required 25,000-30,000 48,000-59,000
Number of providers 699 Determined by the market

Sources: NSW Government Budget Paper No.3, 2015–16; NDIS NSW Market Position Statement, March 2016; Department of Family and Community Services Funding Management System, 2015–16 (unpublished).

One of the main objectives of the NDIS is to increase the choice and control that people with disability have over the support they receive. Under the NDIS, people with disability receive individual funding packages which they can use to pay their chosen providers for the support they need, instead of being referred to services that are deemed appropriate for their needs. This is a fundamental change to the nature of disability support. Before the NDIS, people with disability were moved around the system according to decisions made by government or other organisations providing disability support. Under the NDIS, the funding will move around the system based on the choices people with disability make. The development of the new market for NDIS disability services is expected to take up to ten years because the changes to the system are so extensive.

In addition to increasing choice and control for participants, the NDIS aims to:

  • improve outcomes for people with disability by intervening early to help reduce the need for support later in life
  • increase integration by helping people with disability access mainstream government services such as health and education
  • increase the involvement of people with disability in the community by making it easier to access community services such as sports clubs and community groups.

The transition to the NDIS is underway

The transition to the NDIS is underway in most Australian states and territories, following trials over the last three years. In New South Wales, a trial site was established in the Hunter area in July 2013. Early roll out of the NDIS began in July 2015 for people aged under 18 in the Nepean Blue Mountains area. On 30 June 2016, about 7,800 people had an NDIS plan in the Hunter trial site and around 1,800 people had a plan in the Nepean Blue Mountains area.

The full roll out of the NDIS began in about half of New South Wales in July 2016. The NDIS will start operating in the rest of the state from July 2017 and the transition is scheduled to be completed by July 2018 (Exhibit 2).

For the rest of the transition, the Department of Family and Community Services should:

  1. Work with the Australian Government, NDIA and other NSW Government agencies to identify gaps and develop the capacity of specialist clinical services, focusing on regional and rural areas.
  2. Continue to implement projects to increase the number of organisations that can support Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander and culturally and linguistically diverse communities.
  3. Target remaining capability building assistance to less prepared providers, including via one-to-one support and mentoring in identified areas of weakness.
  4. Continue working with the Australian Government and the NDIA to ensure lessons from sector capability programs are shared.

Principles for developing the non-government sector

  1. Commence work to increase the capacity of the non-government sector early to allow time for service capacity to be built in a sustainable way.
  2. Decide whether to increase the capacity of the sector by supporting existing providers to expand their operations, attracting new organisations from outside the existing provider group, or some combination of these.
  3. Tailor approaches to supporting groups that have additional support or access needs because of cultural or geographic factors.
  4. Define the desired outcomes for people using services and, where possible, include outcomes in service delivery contracts.
  5. Invest in the sector by partnering with sector peak bodies to deliver capability programs.
  6. Include one-to-one support and mentoring in capability building programs where possible to improve the targeting of support to the specific needs of providers.
  7. Collect baseline information on provider capability before commencing programs and build robust tracking and evaluation into their design.
  8. Establish whole-of-government governance arrangements to ensure roles, responsibilities and accountability for delivery are clear.