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Actions for The effectiveness of the financial arrangements and management practices in four integrity agencies

The effectiveness of the financial arrangements and management practices in four integrity agencies

Premier and Cabinet
Treasury
Management and administration

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining the effectiveness of the financial arrangements and management practices of four integrity agencies: the Independent Commission Against Corruption, the NSW Electoral Commission, the NSW Ombudsman, and the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission. The audit also included NSW Treasury and the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) because both departments are involved in the processes that lead to decisions about funding for the integrity agencies and managing access to this funding. The Hon. Don Harwin MLC, Special Minister of State, requested this audit under section 27(B)(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983.

The audit found that the current approach to determining and administering annual funding for the integrity agencies presents threats to their independent status. The approach used by NSW Treasury and DPC is consistent with the legislative and Constitutional framework for financial management in New South Wales, but it does not sufficiently recognise that the roles and functions of the integrity agencies that are the focus of this audit are different to other departments and agencies. Specific mechanisms that present threats to the independence of the integrity agencies include the absence of transparency in decisions about funding for the integrity agencies, the means of applying efficiency dividends and budget savings and reform measures, the process of providing additional funding from DPC to the integrity agencies, and requests for the integrity agencies to report to DPC on their activities and outcomes.

The Auditor-General outlined the principles that inform the report’s recommendations in order to strengthen the financial arrangements for the integrity agencies. These principles are:

  • There should be structured oversight by Parliament of the performance and financial management of the integrity agencies.
  • Parliament’s role in the budget process should be expanded to ensure Cabinet is provided with more independent advice on the funding requirements for the integrity agencies.
  • There should be transparency to Parliament and the relevant agency for decisions made about funding for the integrity agencies.
  • The integrity agencies should be required to demonstrate their accountability as prudent managers of their financial resources.

The report also notes that the NSW Parliament should be consulted when considering the report’s recommendations.

Read full report (PDF)

This audit examined the effectiveness of the financial arrangements and management practices of four integrity agencies. It was conducted with reference to the legislative and Constitutional framework that is currently in place for financial management in New South Wales.

This report appropriately recognises that the government of the day is responsible for the prudent and responsible management of the state’s finances. It identifies several areas of ambiguity in the way the current financial arrangements apply to the integrity agencies that are the subject of this audit. It also highlights threats to the independence of the integrity agencies that may arise from the involvement of the Executive Government in the decision making about funding. The report argues these risks are not mitigated sufficiently under the current financial arrangements.

The recommendations in this report outline the principles that should inform the financial arrangements for the integrity agencies. Consistent with the Audit Office of NSW’s role in auditing NSW Government departments and agencies, the recommendations are directed to NSW Treasury and the Department of Premier and Cabinet. However, the report recognises that the current role of these entities in the funding arrangements for the integrity agencies poses a threat to their independence. Consequently, it is important to recognise the important role of the NSW Parliament in determining the appropriate funding model for the integrity agencies. The audited agencies should consult closely with the NSW Parliament when considering these recommendations to ensure the views of Parliament are reflected appropriately in any changes arising from the implementation of these recommendations. This recognises the appropriate role of the NSW Parliament in safeguarding the independence of its integrity agencies.

On 4 November 2019, the Hon. Don Harwin MLC, Special Minister of State, requested this audit under section 27(B)(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983.

Consistent with the Minister’s request, this audit assessed the effectiveness of the financial arrangements and management practices of four integrity agencies - the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), the NSW Electoral Commission (NSWEC), the NSW Ombudsman (NSWO) and the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission (LECC). The audit also included NSW Treasury and the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) because both departments are involved in the processes that lead to decisions about funding for the integrity agencies and managing access to this funding.

The NSW Government, through the Treasurer, is responsible to the citizens of New South Wales for the prudent and responsible management of the state’s finances. The annual budget is the primary process that the NSW Government uses for financial management. Decisions about funding for the integrity agencies are made through this budget process. NSW Treasury provides guidance to all government departments and agencies, including the integrity agencies that are the focus of this audit, on the Government’s priorities for the budget. NSW Treasury also reviews and provides advice to the Expenditure Review Committee of Cabinet on proposals for funding through the budget.

The integrity agencies are subject to the application of ‘efficiency dividends’ and ‘budget savings and reform measures’, which limit their access to the full funding that has been approved by Parliament. NSW Treasury and DPC manage the application of these limits to the integrity agencies. The integrity agencies are grouped within the DPC ‘cluster’, which is an administrative arrangement created by the NSW Government. Clusters do not have legal status but are used for administrative and financial management. DPC has provided additional funding during the financial year to some of the integrity agencies in the years covered in this audit. DPC also oversees the involvement of the integrity agencies in developing and reporting on their outcomes. This is a requirement of NSW Treasury’s outcome budgeting reforms, which are currently being implemented.

Each of the integrity agencies is overseen by a parliamentary committee that includes members of both houses of the NSW Parliament. These committees are responsible for reviewing the performance of the integrity agencies that they oversee. They do not have a role in funding decisions. ICAC and LECC each have additional oversight from an Inspector. The Inspector of the ICAC’s role is to oversee the operations and conduct of ICAC to ensure that it complies with the law. The Inspector of the LECC’s role is to oversee the way LECC carries out its functions, with a focus on the legality of LECC’s use of its powers. Neither of these Inspectors has a role in funding decisions.

The Audit Office of NSW is an independent integrity agency that receives some of its revenue through the NSW Government’s budget process and sits within the DPC cluster. We have taken the following actions to preserve our independence and mitigate potential conflicts of interest that could arise in conducting this audit:

  • not considering or commenting on the financial arrangements for our office
  • requesting a deferral of our office’s evidence to an inquiry by the NSW Legislative Council’s Public Accountability Committee that is considering the budget process for integrity agencies. The inquiry includes the four integrity agencies that are the subject of this audit and our office
  • seeking independent legal advice on the framework for the financial arrangements for the integrity agencies
  • using additional internal review processes to provide quality assurance to audit conclusions.

Conclusion

The current approach to determining annual funding for the integrity agencies presents threats to their independent status. The approach is consistent with the legislative and Constitutional framework for financial management in New South Wales, but it does not sufficiently recognise that the roles and functions of the integrity agencies that are the focus of this audit are different to other departments and agencies.

The government of the day is responsible to the citizens of New South Wales for the prudent and responsible management of the state’s finances. Accordingly, the government of the day has a central role in decisions about funding for departments and agencies and in determining the financial management processes to be applied. This is clearly established in the legislative framework and conventions for managing public funds in New South Wales. This system is primarily designed to determine the funding for departments and agencies that are responsible to ministers. It is less appropriate for integrity agencies because it does not provide additional protection against the risk that funding decisions could be influenced by previous or planned investigations by the integrity agencies. This risk has the potential to limit the ability of the integrity agencies to fulfil their legislative mandate. The extent and nature of this risk differs for each of the integrity agencies. This is outlined in the key findings section below and described in detail in Chapters 2–5 of this report.

Aspects of the financial management mechanisms used to administer funding for the integrity agencies create tensions with their independent status. These mechanisms include the means of applying efficiency dividends and budget savings and reform measures, the provision of additional funding from DPC to the integrity agencies, and requests for the integrity agencies to report to DPC on their activities and outcomes.

NSW Treasury and DPC have administered efficiency dividends and budget savings and reform measures to the integrity agencies. This results in the integrity agencies not being able to access the full funding approved by Parliament. There are two competing interpretations of appropriation legislation that lead to different conclusions about whether there is a clear legal basis for doing this. NSW Treasury and DPC focus on the fact that the Appropriation Act provides funding for the integrity agencies to a Premier, rather than the agency, and does not state that a Premier must provide the full amount of funding approved to the agency. This interpretation leads to the view that a Premier can restrict access to appropriation funding that was approved by Parliament. An alternative interpretation of the Appropriation Act would consider factors specific to the integrity agencies that differentiate them from other agencies subject to these measures. These factors include that the integrity agencies are independent of ministerial control, accountable to Parliament for performing specific legislated functions, and some may conduct investigations that involve a Premier, or DPC or NSW Treasury. If this alternative interpretation is used, then the reduction of the integrity agencies’ access to appropriation funding approved by Parliament could diminish the independent status of the integrity agencies and limit their ability to fulfil their legislative mandate.

DPC has given additional funding to three of the integrity agencies in recent years in response to requests from the agencies. If the integrity agencies require additional funding during the year, the only mechanism available is to seek funding from DPC. This creates a potential threat to the independence of the integrity agencies. Asking DPC to make decisions about funding allocations between an integrity agency and another agency in the DPC cluster is inappropriate because DPC is not responsible for the functions or actions of an integrity agency. It is also possible that DPC could be the subject of an investigation conducted by an integrity agency. DPC has advised that it considers these risks more theoretical than real.

DPC’s provision of $2.5 million in additional funding to ICAC in 2019–20 may not have been consistent with the Appropriation Act 2019 (the Act), because of a change to the Act compared to previous appropriation legislation. The additional funding that was provided to ICAC in 2019–20 by DPC had been appropriated to DPC under Part 2 of the Act. The Act specified that funding appropriated under Part 2 could only be used for the purposes specified in that Part. ICAC receives its appropriation under Part 4 of the Act. It is contestable as to whether the purpose of an appropriation under Part 2 of the Act would include providing funding for an agency that receives an appropriation under another part of the Act.

The integrity agencies have been asked to report on activities and outcomes to DPC as part of the outcome budgeting reforms that are being implemented by NSW Treasury. This is inconsistent with their independent status because the integrity agencies are accountable to Parliament for their activities, not DPC or a Premier.

Our audit also assessed the integrity agencies’ systems for planning, budgeting and monitoring the efficiency of their work. We did not find major deficiencies in the management practices of the integrity agencies. We did identify opportunities for improvement in each agency. These are specific to the circumstances of each agency and are outlined in the key findings section below and Chapters 2–5 of this report.

On 4 November 2019, the Hon. Don Harwin MLC, Special Minister of State, requested this audit under section 27(B)(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983.

Consistent with the Minister’s request, this audit assessed the effectiveness of the financial arrangements and management practices of four integrity agencies - the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), the NSW Electoral Commission (NSWEC), the NSW Ombudsman (NSWO) and the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission (LECC). The audit also included NSW Treasury and the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) because both departments have a role in the financial arrangements for the integrity agencies. NSW Treasury manages the budget process that determines the annual funding for the integrity agencies. DPC has a role in managing access to this funding because the integrity agencies are placed within the DPC ‘cluster’.

The Audit Office of NSW is an independent integrity agency that receives some of its revenue through the NSW Government’s budget process and sits within the DPC cluster. We have taken the following actions to preserve our independence and mitigate potential conflicts of interest that could arise in conducting this audit:

  • not considering or commenting on the financial arrangements for our office
  • requesting a deferral of our office’s evidence to an inquiry by the NSW Legislative Council’s Public Accountability Committee that is considering the budget process for integrity agencies and the NSW Parliament, including the four integrity agencies in this audit and our office
  • seeking independent legal advice on the framework for the financial arrangements of the four integrity agencies in this audit
  • using additional internal review processes to provide quality assurance to audit conclusions.

Conclusion

Financial arrangements for ICAC

ICAC's main functions are to investigate and prevent corruption in the public sector. Its legislation establishes it as an independent agency that is accountable to Parliament.

Decisions about the annual appropriation for ICAC are made by the Cabinet, with advice from NSW Treasury. Members of Cabinet or NSW Treasury could be involved in or affected by an ICAC investigation. There is no independent advice to Cabinet on ICAC’s funding requirements and there is no transparency to Parliament about the reasons for decisions made about ICAC’s budget. The absence of these safeguards in the current financial arrangements creates a threat to ICAC’s independence and have the potential to limit its ability to fulfil its legislative mandate.

ICAC submitted budget proposals seeking increases to its appropriation funding in several recent years. The budget proposals related to funding to expand its workforce to respond to increases in the volume and complexity of its work. Some of these proposals were rejected without reasons being provided. There are no formal mechanisms available to ICAC to question or challenge these decisions. The process available to ICAC to request additional funding outside the annual budget creates further risks to its independence.

ICAC’s management practices

ICAC’s staff use structured processes for prioritising work against its legislative mandate and it has conducted recent reviews to assess its operational efficiency. ICAC's internal budgeting processes are adequate but could be improved with better documentation of the reasons for its budget decisions.

Conclusion

Financial arrangements for NSWEC

NSWEC conducts elections and is responsible for maintaining the integrity of the electoral system in New South Wales. NSWEC’s legislation states that it should conduct elections and investigate potential breaches of electoral law independently and be accountable to Parliament. Decisions about the annual appropriation for NSWEC are made by the Cabinet. It is possible that NSWEC’s investigations of electoral integrity could include members of Cabinet or the political party that holds government. There is a risk that decisions about its funding could be influenced by the conduct of these investigations. If realised, this would be a threat to NSWEC’s independence and ability to fulfil its legislative mandate. NSWEC has not received the full funding amount it has requested in recent years. There is inadequate transparency about how funding decisions were made and there are no formal mechanisms to question or challenge these decisions.

The conduct of elections is a key element of a democratic system and under-funding this function could have serious implications. NSWEC’s requests for additional appropriation funding are assessed alongside the priorities of the government of the day. Its role transcends these immediate priorities and there is a risk that its funding requirements may not be prioritised.

NSWEC’s management practices

NSWEC’s internal budgeting processes and efficiency programs are clear and well documented. NSWEC has identified options to improve its operational and corporate efficiency but has not implemented all of these.

Conclusion

Financial arrangements for NSWO

NSWO oversees government agencies and some government-funded private sector bodies that provide services to the community or exercise administrative functions. NSWO’s legislation makes it clear that it should operate independently of the agencies it oversees and be accountable to Parliament.

NSWO’s investigations do not include members of Cabinet, except in relation to Public Interest Disclosures made about a minister, so the risk that decisions about its budget could be affected by its investigations is relatively lower. However, NSWO's investigations can comment on and make recommendations about government policies, which may have been endorsed by Cabinet or an individual minister, and its investigations cover systemic issues for which ministers and the heads of government departments are responsible. NSWO faces a further challenge in its ability to make compelling budget proposals under the current financial arrangements. Its funding requests are assessed alongside the government’s priorities, but its work is unlikely to align directly with these priorities.

NSWO’s management practices

NSWO has assessed its operational and corporate efficiency recently and has implemented major changes to its operating model in response to this. Its internal budgeting process is adequate but could be improved by being documented more thoroughly.

Conclusion

Financial arrangements for LECC

LECC's main functions are to investigate allegations of misconduct by law enforcement and oversee police handing of complaints. LECC’s legislation states it should operate independently of the agencies it oversees and be accountable to Parliament. LECC’s jurisdiction does not include members of Cabinet, NSW Treasury or DPC. However, LECC’s investigations have the potential to have a negative impact on a Minister for Police, who is a member of Cabinet, and the government of the day. There is a risk that decision makers for LECC’s funding could be influenced by these considerations. While LECC has not sought increases to its appropriation funding in recent years, there are no formal mechanisms to question or challenge these decisions if it did have concerns about its funding in the future.

Unlike the other integrity agencies in this audit, LECC is not classified as a separate GSF agency under the Government Sector Finance Act 2018. This difference means that LECC has less independence from the Executive Government, because LECC would have to comply with a Treasurer’s Direction even if it believes it is not consistent with the independent exercise of its functions.

LECC's management practices

LECC's internal budgeting processes are clear and documented and it has identified and implemented operational and corporate efficiency savings in several areas. LECC published a new strategic plan in July 2020. Over the first three years of its operations since 2017, LECC had not conducted effective strategic planning which made it difficult for LECC to demonstrate that it had a cohesive approach to its operations across the agency during this time.

Conclusion

Aspects of the financial management mechanisms used by NSW Treasury and DPC to administer funding for the integrity agencies create tensions with their independent status.

NSW Treasury and DPC have administered efficiency dividends and budget savings and reform measures which results in the integrity agencies not being able to access the full funding approved by Parliament. There are two competing interpretations of appropriation legislation that lead to different conclusions about whether there is a clear legal basis for doing this. NSW Treasury and DPC take the view that the Appropriation Act provides funding for the integrity agencies to a Premier and does not state that a Premier must provide the full amount of funding to the agencies. This interpretation leads to the view that a Premier can restrict access to appropriation funding that was approved by Parliament. An alternative approach to interpreting the Appropriation Act would consider the contextual factors specific to the integrity agencies. These factors include: the integrity agencies are independent of ministerial control, the integrity agencies are accountable to Parliament for performing specific legislated functions, and the integrity agencies may conduct investigations that involve a Premier, or DPC or NSW Treasury. If this alternative interpretation is accepted, then the reduction of the integrity agencies’ access to appropriation funding could diminish the independent status of the integrity agencies.

DPC has given additional funding to three of the integrity agencies in recent years in response to requests from the agencies. If the integrity agencies require additional funding during the year, the only mechanism available is to seek funding from DPC. This creates a potential threat to the independence of the integrity agencies. Asking DPC to make decisions about funding allocations between an integrity agency and another agency in the DPC cluster is inappropriate because DPC is not responsible for the functions or actions of an integrity agency. It is also possible that DPC could be the subject of an investigation conducted by an integrity agency. Separately, DPC’s provision of $2.5 million in additional funding to ICAC in 2019–20 may not have been consistent with the Appropriation Act 2019. The appropriations for DPC and ICAC were made under different parts of the Act. Appropriation funding can only be paid out for the purpose specified in each part of the Act. It is not clear whether it is permissible to transfer funding between agencies that receive appropriations from different Parts of the Act.

The integrity agencies have recently been asked to report activity and outcome measures to DPC, as the principal department for the cluster that they have been placed in, under the outcome budgeting reforms that are being implemented by NSW Treasury. This is inconsistent with their independent status because the integrity agencies are accountable to Parliament for their activities, not DPC or a Premier. DPC has advised that it considers the risks to the independence of the integrity agencies described above to be more theoretical than real.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Opinion from the Crown Solicitor’s Office

 

 

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Published

Actions for Health capital works

Health capital works

Health
Compliance
Infrastructure
Procurement
Project management

This report examines whether NSW Health effectively planned and delivered major capital works to meet the demand for health services in New South Wales.

The report found that NSW Health has substantially expanded health infrastructure across New South Wales since 2015. However, the program was driven by Local Health District priorities without assessment of the State’s broader and future‑focussed health requirements.

The report found that unclear decision making roles and responsibilities between Health Infrastructure and the Ministry of Health limited the ability of NSW Health to effectively test and analyse investment options.

Project delays and budget overruns on some major projects indicate that Health Infrastructure's project governance, risk assessment and management systems could be improved.

The Auditor‑General recommends that NSW Health ensure its capital projects offer the greatest value to New South Wales by establishing effective policy guidance and enhancing project governance and management systems.

Read full report (PDF)

Since 2011–12, NSW Health has aimed to improve its facilities and build 'future focused' infrastructure. The NSW Government’s 2015–16 election commitments established a four-year $5.0 billion capital program for NSW Health to build and upgrade more than 60 hospitals and health services. The 2019–20 State Budget committed a further $10.1 billion over four years for another 29 projects. This is the largest investment to date on health capital works in New South Wales.

Recent reviews of infrastructure have recognised that population and demographic growth will require a change in the delivery and composition of health infrastructure, including considering greater use of non-traditional, non-capital health service options and assets.

To ensure that expenditure on capital works represents the best value for money, NSW Health's business cases need to be robust and supported by evidence that demonstrates they are worthy investments. The NSW Process of Facility Planning has been the main framework guiding the detailed planning and development of NSW Health's capital works proposals. This framework was developed by the then NSW Department of Health in 2010. Its aim is to ensure investment proposals are supported by rigorous planning processes that address health service needs and provide value for money.

Infrastructure projects of the complexity and scale being delivered by NSW Health carry inherent risks. For example, unplanned cost escalations can potentially impact on the State’s finances. Unforeseen delays can also reduce the intended benefits. The growth in the State’s health capital spend and project profile, means its exposure to such risks has increased over time.

The objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness of planning and delivery of major capital works to meet demand for health services in New South Wales. To address this objective, the audit examined whether:

  • the Ministry of Health has effective procedures for planning and prioritising investments in major health capital works
  • Health Infrastructure develops robust business cases for initiated major capital works that reliably inform government decision making
  • Health Infrastructure has effective project governance and management systems that support delivering projects on-time, within budget and achievement of intended benefits.

The audit focused on the Ministry of Health and Health Infrastructure – being the lead agencies within NSW Health responsible for prioritising, planning and delivering major health capital works across the State. The audit examined 13 business cases for eight discrete projects over a ten-year period.

Conclusion

NSW Health has substantially expanded health infrastructure across New South Wales since 2015. However, its planning and prioritisation processes were not assessed against a long-term statewide health infrastructure plan and lacked rigorous assessment against non-capital options creating a risk that they do not maximise value for New South Wales.

The scale of NSW Health's capital investment is significant and has grown substantially in recent years. The NSW Government’s election commitments in 2015–16 and 2019–20 collectively set out a $15.0 billion capital program to build and upgrade 89 hospitals and health services. NSW Health developed this infrastructure program in the absence of a statewide health infrastructure strategy and investment framework to focus its planning and decisions on the types of capital investments required to meet the long-term needs of the NSW health system.

Consequently, locally focused priorities of the State’s 17 Local Health Districts have been the primary drivers of NSW Health’s capital investments since 2015–16. Local Health District investment proposals for hospitals were developed without consideration of alternative health options such as community health service models, technology-driven eHealth care, or private sector options. Without rigorous assessment against a range of potential health service options, there is a risk that selected projects do not maximise value for New South Wales.

In recognition of the need for a statewide approach to infrastructure planning, the Ministry of Health recently developed a 20-year Health Infrastructure Strategy and prioritisation framework in 2019. The strategy was approved by the NSW Government in April 2020.

NSW Health's ability to effectively test and analyse its capital investment options has been compromised by unclear decision-making roles and responsibilities between its Health Infrastructure and the Ministry of Health agencies.

While both Health Infrastructure and the Ministry of Health have responsibilities for the assessment of business cases for proposed infrastructure projects, confusion about the roles of each agency at key steps compromised the efficacy of the process. Health Infrastructure and the Ministry of Health have differing views about which agency is responsible for testing business case inputs and conducting comprehensive options appraisals.

As a result of this confusion, Health Infrastructure and the Ministry of Health did not rigorously test Local Health District capital investment proposals against defined statewide health infrastructure investment priorities. The NSW Process of Facility Planning does not clarify the responsibilities of all parties in validating and prioritising Local Health District's Clinical Service Plans and progressing them to business cases.

NSW Health's infrastructure priorities are not sufficiently supported by transparent documentation of selection methodology and the rationale for decisions. Consequently, there is a risk that recommended options, whilst having some economic and health service merit, do not represent the greatest value.

Substantial delays and budget overruns on some major projects indicate that Health Infrastructure's project governance, risk assessment and management systems could be improved.

Health Infrastructure did not fully comply with NSW Government guidelines for developing business cases and making economic appraisals for proposed capital investments. These weaknesses, along with delays and budget overruns on some projects, demonstrate a need for Health Infrastructure to strengthen its project governance, management and quality control systems.

 

Over the period of review, NSW Government policies for business case development and submission have emphasised that effective governance arrangements are critical to a proposal's successful implementation.

NSW Health's Process of Facility Planning similarly highlights the importance of effective governance and project management for achieving good outcomes. It prescribes a general governance structure managed by Health Infrastructure that can be tailored to the planning and delivery of health infrastructure projects greater than $10.0 million.

Project challenges indicate opportunities for strengthening governance and project management

The three major hospital redevelopments examined in metropolitan, regional and rural areas had a combined Estimated Total Cost of more than $1.2 billion and comprised eight discrete projects and 13 separate business cases.

Almost all these projects experienced delivery challenges which impacted achievement of their original objectives and intended benefits. This is expected in complex and large-scale health infrastructure programs. However, in some projects the impacts were significant and resulted in substantial delays, unforeseen costs, and diversion of resources from other priority areas.

Our review of the selected case studies highlighted opportunities for enhancing governance and project management. Specifically, it indicates a need for improving transparency in the management of contingencies, risk management and assessments particularly relating to adverse site conditions and the selection of contractors. There is also a need to strengthen forward planning for options to address unfunded priorities within business cases that risk complicating the delivery of future project stages resulting in unforeseen costs and potentially avoidable budget overruns.

Need for increased transparency and accountability in the management of contingency funds

In February 2017, the Ministry's Capital Strategy Group approved the use of surplus funds of $13.76 million from Stage 1 of the Hornsby Ku-ring-gai Hospital Redevelopment for new works deemed needed to support Stage 2. Following this decision, Health Infrastructure finalised and submitted a business case addendum for Stage 1 to the Ministry in March 2017, addressing the new works comprising a two-storey building for medical imaging and paediatric floors. The business case addendum also addressed options to fit out and procure major medical imaging equipment. The Ministry approved the Stage 1 business case in July 2017, noting the Ministry's Capital Strategy Group had already approved the use of remaining Stage 1 funds to deliver the new works.

Stage 1 was completed in 2015, almost two years before the Stage 1 business case addendum was prepared in February 2017.

The Ministry's decision to approve the new works using $13.76 million of surplus Stage 1 funds did not comply with the NSW Treasury Circular TC 12/20. This policy establishes the Treasurer's approval must be sought and received before a new capital project with an Estimated Total Cost of $5.0 million or more can be approved by NSW Health. The Ministry therefore exceeded its delegated authority in making this decision, as it was not evident it had sought and received the Treasurer's approval prior to doing so.

Consequently, the surplus Stage 1 funds should not have been used by the Ministry to deliver new works in the circumstances. Instead, they should have been released from the Stage 1 project in accordance with established NSW Health procedures, and the Stage 1 Estimated Total Cost revised down accordingly. This did not occur, and NSW Health ultimately directed $11.0 million in surplus Stage 1 funds to the new works.

These circumstances indicate a need to strengthen transparency and accountability within NSW Health for the approval of new projects, and how contingency funds are used in the management of major health capital works. They also demonstrate the impact of weaknesses with options appraisal as the initial Stage 1 business case did not consider alternative options for addressing the initially unfunded works later covered by the Stage 1 business case addendum and ultimately funded from the Stage 1 contingency provision.

Weaknesses in service delivery planning resulted in unaccounted-for costs

In addition to proposing the above-noted new works, the 2017 Stage 1 Business Case Addendum for the Hornsby-Ku-ring-gai development sought to retrospectively address the estimated funding gap of around $14.0 million for the internal fit out, supply of major medical imaging equipment, and cost to operate the medical imaging service at Hornsby Ku-ring-gai Hospital also not addressed in the originally Stage 1 business case.

The Stage 1 business case addendum considered various procurement options to purchase and run the medical imaging services ranging from State operation purchase options to private operation purchase options.

It recommended outsourcing the operation and provision of equipment to the private sector based on estimated savings to the public sector initially of around $650,000 per annum reducing over time to $270,000. The Ministry endorsed this option in June 2017, but it did not ultimately proceed.

A July 2018 report to the Executive Steering Committee on the project shows NSW Health later decided to deliver operation of the medical imaging unit 'traditionally' with an updated estimate of the cost at approximately $16.4 million. The report also shows the Ministry supported the costs now being met by the Northern Sydney Local Health District.

This means the funding gap previously identified in the Stage 1 business case addendum for fitting out the medical imaging building and supply of major medical equipment would need to be met fully by the State, representing a $16.4 million cost overrun for the project.

Examined reports to the Executive Steering Committee show this was largely funded by the Northern Sydney Local Health District via the disposal of land realising approximately $15.0 million in proceeds.

This initially unforeseen cost, along with the additional $11.0 million for the new works approved under the Stage 1 business case addendum, were ultimately merged with the Stage 2 project initially approved in 2017–18 with an Estimated Total Cost of $200 million.

The extent of budget variation on the Hornsby Kur-ring-gai development has not been transparent

The 2019–20 State Budget provided an additional $65.0 million for a further Stage 2A to deliver additional built capacity to support outpatient services, enhanced allied health services, re-housed community health services and the delivery of prioritised clinical services unfunded as part of Stage 2. The funds were approved based on an Investment Decision Template (IDT) that examined two options in addition to the base case representing scoping alternatives to the preferred master planned capital solution.

However, we found the IDT showed around 23 per cent of the $65.0 million sought (i.e. $15.0 million) was to be allocated to fund the deficit in Stage 2, which had arisen as a result of project delays due to adverse site conditions. This was not discussed in the IDT.

The February 2020 report to the Executive Steering Committee shows a combined Stage 2 and 2A final forecast cost of $292.6 million against a potential budget of $290.7 million representing an overall deficit for the project of around 0.6 per cent.

However, this favourable final budget position does not transparently show the funding challenges experienced over the project's implementation to-date. The three major budget issues include:

  • inappropriate use of around $11.0 million in Stage 1 contingency for originally unfunded works contrary to Treasury policy
  • the additional $16.4 million cost unforeseen in the Stage 1 business case for delivering medical imaging services mostly funded through the sale of land
  • an additional $15.0 million from Stage 2A to cover the budget overrun in Stage 2 due to adverse site conditions.

The cumulative impact of these events is that Stages 1 and 2 of the Hornsby project cost approximately $42.4 million than it should have in the circumstances around 14 per cent more than what the revised combined Estimated Total Cost for both stages should have been after releasing the $11.0 million in surplus Stage 1 funds, with Stage 2 delayed by around 14 months.

Opportunity for strengthening risk management for adverse site conditions

Major construction projects often experience adverse site conditions which can be difficult to fully detect in advance. However, we found this was a common occurrence in the projects we examined sometimes with significant time and/or budget impacts indicating scope to enhance related risk and cost assessments. Specifically:

  • Hornsby Ku-ring-gai Hospital Redevelopment Stage 2: adverse site conditions during demolition works resulted in an 11-month delay for delivering the medical imaging unit and 14-month delay completing Stage 2 main works including need for additional $15.0 million in funds to cover the resultant budget deficit for the project.
  • Blacktown Mt Druitt Hospital Redevelopment Stage 2: adverse site conditions combined with project complexity delayed completion of the early works by approximately five months. This contributed to the delay in completing the main construction works which occurred around nine months later than planned in the business case.
  • Dubbo Health Service Redevelopment Stages 3 and 4: Health Infrastructure advised adverse site conditions including asbestos containing materials and ground conditions delayed works for the main building with completion forecast for March 2021, around 21 months later than planned in the final business case. This resulted in the need for additional $13.5 million to cover increased construction costs and risks, increasing the Stage 3 and 4 forecast final cost from $150 million to $163.5 million as at February 2020.

These examples indicate a risk the cumulative impact of adverse site conditions may be substantial when measured across both time and Health Infrastructure's full delivery program. They also point to potential for Health Infrastructure to achieve efficiencies and improved outcomes from strengthening its approach to assessing and mitigating the risks from adverse site conditions.

Limited due diligence with prospective contractors risks avoidable delays and costs

Main construction works on Stage 1 of the Dubbo Health Service Redevelopment were completed in October 2015, approximately 13 months later than planned in the final business case. Delays were mainly due to insolvency of the early works contractor resulting in their departure from the project. The ensuing 11-month delay in completing the early works significantly impacted the overall schedule and delivery of main construction works.

The insolvency event was significant as it affected nine separate Health Infrastructure projects – three of which had yet to reach practical completion. It also affected state-funded projects in other sectors. It resulted in the need for additional funding of $11.5 million that was provided in the 2014–15 State Budget increasing the total Stage 1 and 2 budget from $79.8 million to $91.3 million.

Health Infrastructure’s analysis of lessons learned shows it worked actively to mitigate the impacts of the insolvency event across all affected projects. However, it also indicates a risk the lessons were mainly focused on mitigating the impacts after an insolvency event occurred rather than on prevention.

Although Health Infrastructure initially commissioned a financial assessment of the now insolvent early works contractor before engagement, it did not detect any risks of the impending insolvency and instead concluded the contractor was in a strong financial position. However, the contractor became insolvent shortly after commencement approximately seven months later. This indicates a risk of weaknesses in the assessment performed that was not explicitly addressed by the lessons learned.

Delivery of the main construction works were further impacted by disputes with the main works contractor over the scope of works for the renal unit resulting in Health Infrastructure terminating the contract in November 2016 following lengthy negotiations over several months.

The scope of works relating to the renal unit were ultimately transferred to Stages 3 and 4 and were delivered in December 2019, around five years later than originally planned in the business case.

Health Infrastructure advised the delay was ultimately beneficial to the project because the refurbishment works for the renal unit, initially scheduled for Stages 1 and 2, would have been demolished to accommodate the new Western Cancer Centre proposed after Stages 1 and 2 and currently being delivered in parallel with Stages 3 and 4.

Health Infrastructure advised the actual cost of Stages 1 and 2 was $84.7 million against the budget of $91.3 million. The residual $6.6 million relates to the renal works not delivered during Stage 1 and 2 and transferred to Stage 3 and 4.

Health Infrastructure advised the contractual provisions for mitigating insolvency events 'in-flight' are limited highlighting the importance of proactive and effective due diligence prior to engaging contractors for significant construction projects.

Need for a quality framework linked to staff training and capability development

Health Infrastructure's 2017-20 Corporate Plan identifies the development of a quality framework to support delivery of future-focused outcomes as a key organisational priority. Related initiatives within the Corporate Plan describe a framework underpinned by a Quality Committee providing advice on:

  • records management, to meet the requirements of the State Records Act 1998
  • project assurance, to ensure future focused outcomes and enhance Health Infrastructure's Standards, Policies, Procedures and Guidelines, Templates and Design Guidance Notes
  • knowledge management and library services, to promote and leverage from project learnings.

Although Health Infrastructure has some elements of a quality framework it is not yet fully in place. Health Infrastructure advised it had yet to establish the quality framework and related committee described in its Corporate Plan due in part to its focus on responding to the growth of its capital program.

Health Infrastructure's Development and Innovation team has been active in supporting continuous improvement in knowledge and project management including development of business cases. Although useful, these initiatives have relied heavily on leveraging and disseminating insights from Gateway reviews and have not formed part of a systematic quality and continuous improvement framework.

The limited focus on the quality of business cases is reflected in internal performance monitoring and reporting which focuses mainly on tracking the delivery of projects against internal benchmarks, often revised from the baselines in the business case, and expenditure against cashflow targets. There is no evident internal monitoring and/or reporting to the Chief Executive and Board on defined quality metrics linked to business case development and staff capability.

Performance reporting on balanced scorecard metrics has similarly focused mainly on process rather than quality and has been inconsistent in recent years.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

Appendix four – Ministry of Health planning tools and guidelines

Appendix five – Streamlined investment decision process for Health Capital Projects

Appendix six – Timeline of business cases and relevant policy guidelines

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #338 - released 12 August 2020

Published

Actions for Their Futures Matter

Their Futures Matter

Justice
Community Services
Education
Health
Whole of Government
Cross-agency collaboration
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Project management

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining whether the Department of Communities and Justice had effective governance and partnership arrangements in place to deliver ‘Their Futures Matter’.

Their Futures Matter was intended to place vulnerable children and families at the heart of services, and direct investment to where funding and programs deliver the greatest social and economic benefits. It was a four-year whole-of-government reform in response to the 2015 Tune Review of out-of-home care.

The Auditor-General found that while important foundations were put in place, and new programs trialled, the key objective to establish an evidence-based whole-of-government early intervention approach for vulnerable children and families in NSW was not achieved.

Governance and cross-agency partnership arrangements to deliver Their Futures Matter were found to be ineffective. 'Their Futures Matter lacked mechanisms to secure cross portfolio buy‑in and did not have authority to drive reprioritisation of government investment', the Auditor-General said.

At the reform’s close, the majority of around $380 million in investment funding remains tied to existing agency programs, with limited evidence of their comparative effectiveness or alignment with Their Futures Matter policy objectives. The reform concluded on 30 June 2020 without a strategy or plan in place to achieve its intent.

The Auditor-General made four recommendations to the Department of Communities and Justice, aimed at improving implementation of outstanding objectives, revising governance arrangements, and utilising the new human services data set to address the intent of the reform. However, these recommendations respond only in part to the findings of the audit.

According to the Auditor-General, ‘Cross-portfolio leadership and action is required to ensure a whole-of-government response to delivering the objectives of Their Futures Matter to improve outcomes for vulnerable children, young people and their families in New South Wales.’

Read full report (PDF)

In 2016, the NSW Government launched 'Their Futures Matter' (TFM) - a whole-of-government reform aimed at delivering improved outcomes for vulnerable children, young people and their families. TFM was the government's key response to the 2015 Independent Review of Out of Home Care in New South Wales (known as 'the Tune Review').

The Tune Review found that, despite previous child protection reforms, the out of home care system was ineffective and unsustainable. It highlighted that the system was not client-centred and was failing to improve the long-term outcomes for vulnerable children and families. The review found that the greatest proportion of relevant expenditure was made in out of home care service delivery rather than in evidence-based early intervention strategies to support children and families when vulnerabilities first become evident to government services (such as missed school days or presentations to health services).

The then Department of Family and Community Services (FACS) designed the TFM reform initiatives, in consultation with central and human services agencies. A cross-agency board, senior officers group, and a new unit in the FACS cluster were established to drive the implementation of TFM. In the 2016–17 Budget, the government allocated $190 million over four years (2016–17 to 2019–20) to the reform. This resourced the design and commissioning of evidence-based pilots, data analytics work, staffing for the implementation unit and secretariat support for the board and cross-agency collaboration.

As part of the TFM reform, the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Treasury and partnering agencies (NSW Health, Department of Education and Department of Justice) identified various existing programs that targeted vulnerable children and families (such as the preceding whole-of-government ‘Keep Them Safe’ reform coming to an end in June 2020). Funding for these programs, totalling $381 million in 2019–20, was combined to form a nominal ‘investment pool’. The government intended that the TFM Implementation Board would use this pool to direct and prioritise resource allocation to evidence-based interventions for vulnerable children and families in NSW.

This audit assessed whether TFM had effective governance and partnership arrangements in place to enable an evidence-based early intervention investment approach for vulnerable children and families in NSW. We addressed the audit objective with the following audit questions:

  • Was the TFM reform driven by effective governance arrangements?
  • Was the TFM reform supported by effective cross-agency collaboration?
  • Has the TFM reform generated an evidence base to inform a cross-agency investment approach in the future?

The audit did not seek to assess the outcomes for children, young people and families achieved by TFM programs and projects.

Conclusion

The governance and cross-agency partnership arrangements used to deliver the Their Futures Matter reform were ineffective. Important foundations were put in place, and new programs trialled over the reform's four years. However, an evidence-based whole-of-government early intervention approach for vulnerable children and families in NSW − the key objective of the reform − was not established. The reform concluded in June 2020 without a strategy or plan in place to achieve its intent.

The governance arrangements established for the Their Futures Matter (TFM) reform did not provide sufficient independence, authority and cross-agency clout to deliver on the reform’s intent. This hindered delivery of the reform's key elements, particularly the redirection of funding to evidence-based earlier intervention supports, and limited the impact that TFM could have on driving system change.

TFM increased focus on the contribution that other agencies outside of the former Family and Community Services portfolio could make in responding to the needs of vulnerable children and families, and in reducing the demand costs of related government service delivery. Despite being a whole-of-government reform, TFM lacked mechanisms to secure cross-portfolio buy-in and lacked the powers to drive reprioritisation of government investment in evidence-based and earlier intervention supports across agencies. At the reform’s close, the majority of the reform's investment pool funding remained tied to existing agency programs, with limited evidence of their comparative effectiveness or alignment with Their Futures Matter policy objectives.

TFM began building an evidence base about ‘what works’, including piloting programs and creating a new dataset to identify risk factors for vulnerability and future costs to government. However, this evidence base does not yet comprehensively map how existing services meet needs, identify system duplications or gaps, nor demonstrate which government funded supports and interventions are most effective to make a difference to life outcomes for vulnerable children and families in NSW.
Despite these issues, the need, intent and vision for Their Futures Matter remains relevant and urgent, as issues identified in the Tune Review remain pertinent.

Their Futures Matter (TFM) is a whole-of-government reform to deliver improved outcomes for vulnerable children, young people and their families.

Supported by a cross-agency TFM Board, and the TFM Unit in the then Department of Family and Community Services (FACS), the reform aimed to develop whole-of-government evidence-based early intervention investment approaches for vulnerable children and families in NSW.

Governance refers to the structures, systems and practices that an organisation has in place to:

  • assign decision-making authorities and establish the organisation's strategic direction
  • oversee the delivery of its services, the implementation of its policies, and the monitoring and mitigation of its key risks
  • report on its performance in achieving intended results, and drive ongoing improvements.

We examined whether the TFM reform was driven by effective governance arrangements and cross-agency collaboration.

The reform agenda and timeframe set down for Their Futures Matter (TFM) were ambitious. This chapter assesses whether the TFM Board and TFM Unit had the capability, capacity and clout within government to deliver the reform agenda.

Creating a robust evidence base was important for Their Futures Matter, in order to:

  • identify effective intervention strategies to improve supports and outcomes for vulnerable children and families
  • make efficient use of taxpayer money to assist the maximum number of vulnerable children and families
  • inform the investment-based approach for future funding allocation.

This chapter assesses whether the TFM reform has developed an evidence base to inform cross-agency investment decisions.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – TFM governance entities

Appendix three – TFM Human Services Data Set

Appendix four – TFM pilot programs

Appendix five – About the audit

Appendix six – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #337 - released 24 July 2020

Published

Actions for CBD South East Sydney Light Rail: follow-up performance audit

CBD South East Sydney Light Rail: follow-up performance audit

Transport
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Risk
Service delivery

This is a follow-up to the Auditor-General's November 2016 report on the CBD South East Sydney Light Rail project. This follow-up report assessed whether Transport for NSW has updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits.

The audit found that Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public.

The Auditor-General reports that the total cost of the project will exceed $3.1 billion, which is above the revised cost of $2.9 billion published in November 2019. $153.84 million of additional costs are due to omitted costs for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays.

The report makes four recommendations to Transport for NSW to publicly report on the final project cost, the updated expected project benefits, the benefits achieved in the first year of operations and the average weekly journey times.

Read full report (PDF)

The CBD and South East Light Rail is a 12 km light rail network for Sydney. It extends from Circular Quay along George Street to Central Station, through Surry Hills to Moore Park, then to Kensington and Kingsford via Anzac Parade and Randwick via Alison Road and High Street.

Transport for NSW (TfNSW) is responsible for planning, procuring and delivering the Central Business District and South East Light Rail (CSELR) project. In December 2014, TfNSW entered into a public private partnership with ALTRAC Light Rail as the operating company (OpCo) responsible for delivering, operating and maintaining the CSELR. OpCo engaged Alstom and Acciona, who together form its Design and Construct Contractor (D&C).

On 14 December 2019, passenger services started on the line between Circular Quay and Randwick. Passenger services on the line between Circular Quay and Kingsford commenced on 3 April 2020.

In November 2016, the Auditor-General published a performance audit report on the CSELR project. The audit found that TfNSW would deliver the CSELR at a higher cost with lower benefits than in the approved business case, and recommended that TfNSW update and consolidate information about project costs and benefits and ensure the information is readily accessible to the public.

In November 2018, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) examined TfNSW's actions taken in response to our 2016 performance audit report on the CSELR project. The PAC recommended that the Auditor-General consider undertaking a follow-up audit on the CSELR project. The purpose of this follow-up performance audit is to assess whether TfNSW has effectively updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits for the CSELR project.

Conclusion

Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated CSLER project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public. In line with the NSW Government Benefits Realisation Management Framework, TfNSW intends to measure benefits after the project is completed and has not updated the expected project benefits since April 2015.

Between February 2015 and December 2019, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) regularly updated capital expenditure costs for the CSELR in internal monthly financial performance and risk reports. These reports did not include all the costs incurred by TfNSW to manage and commission the CSELR project.

Omitted costs of $153.84 million for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays will bring the current estimated total cost of the CSELR project to $3.147 billion.

From February 2015, TfNSW did not regularly provide the financial performance and risk reports to key CSELR project governance bodies. TfNSW publishes information on project costs and benefits on the Sydney Light Rail website. However, the information on project costs has not always been accurate or current.

TfNSW is working with OpCo partners to deliver the expected journey time benefits. A key benefit defined in the business plan was that bus services would be reduced owing to transfer of demand to the light rail - entailing a saving. However, TfNSW reports that the full expected benefit of changes to bus services will not be realised due to bus patronage increasing above forecasted levels.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Governance and reporting arrangements for the CSELR

Appendix three – 2018 CSELR governance changes

Appendix four – About the audit

Appendix five – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #335 - released 11 June 2020

Published

Actions for Funding enhancements for police technology

Funding enhancements for police technology

Justice
Community Services
Information technology
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management

This report focuses on how the NSW Police Force managed a $100 million program to acquire new technology. The program invested in technologies intended to make police work safer and quicker. These included body-worn video (BWV) cameras, smart phone devices, mobile fingerprint scanners and hand-held drug testing devices.

The audit found that while the NSW Police Force mostly managed the ‘Policing for Tomorrow’ program effectively, investment decision making could be improved in the future. The NSW Police Force missed an opportunity to take a whole-of-organisation approach to identify capability gaps and target the acquired technologies to plug these.

The NSW Police Force has processes in place to monitor the benefits of some of the larger technology, but it does not do this consistently for all procured technology. It could not demonstrate that smaller projects are improving the efficiency or effectiveness of policing.

The audit also found that the NSW Police Force does not routinely engage with external stakeholders on the use or impacts of new technology that changes how officers interact with the public, noting that this will not always be possible for particularly sensitive procurements that involve covert technologies or methodologies.

The Auditor-General made three recommendations to guide improvement of NSW Police Force ICT procurement, benefits management and stakeholder engagement processes.

Read full report (PDF)

Ahead of the March 2015 election, the NSW Government announced a $100 million Policing for Tomorrow fund for the NSW Police Force to acquire technology intended to make police work safer and quicker. The announcement committed the NSW Police Force to several investment priorities, including body-worn video (BWV) cameras, smart phone devices (MobiPOL), mobile fingerprint scanners and hand-held drug testing devices. Otherwise, the NSW Police Force was allowed flexibility in identifying and resourcing suitable projects.

This audit assessed whether the Policing for Tomorrow fund was effectively managed to improve policing in New South Wales. We addressed the audit objective with the following audit questions:

  • Did the NSW Police Force efficiently and effectively identify, acquire, implement and maintain technology resourced by the fund?
  • Did the NSW Police Force establish effective governance arrangements for administering the fund, and for monitoring expected benefits and unintended consequences?
  • Did technology implemented under the fund improve the efficiency and effectiveness of policing in New South Wales?

Conclusion

The NSW Police Force's management of the Policing for Tomorrow fund was mostly effective. There are measures in place to assess the impact of the technologies on the efficiency and effectiveness of policing in NSW. However, these measures are not in place for all technologies funded by Policing for Tomorrow. A strategic whole-of-organisation approach to identifying and filling technology capability gaps may have assisted in better targeting funds and managing expected benefits.

The NSW Police Force identified, acquired, implemented and maintained a range of technologies resourced by the fund in an efficient and effective way. The election announcement committed the NSW Police Force to four specific projects which made up over three quarters of the fund value. Investment decisions for remaining funds were driven by the availability of funding and individual technology requirements rather than targeting improved policing outcomes and the capability necessary to achieve these.

The NSW Police Force missed an opportunity to take a whole-of-organisation approach to selecting technology projects for the remainder of the funds where it had discretion. This may have included considering less obvious back office technology or making different investment decisions driven by gaps in the agency's technology capabilities.

The NSW Police Force used effective governance arrangements for administering the Policing for Tomorrow fund, including using its existing ICT Executive Board. The NSW Police Force has adequate processes in place to drive benefits and monitor the impact of technology on the efficiency and effectiveness of policing for the larger projects funded by Policing for Tomorrow. Further work is required to ensure this for smaller projects.

The NSW Police Force tends to consider only impacts on the organisation in managing benefits and identifying unintended consequences. It does not routinely engage proactively with stakeholders, including partner criminal justice agencies and members of the community, on new technology that changes how police interact with the public.

We examined how effectively the NSW Police Force governed the Policing for Tomorrow fund, to ensure that key accountability and decision-making arrangements were in place to direct the $100 million spend to appropriate technologies. We also assessed how the NSW Police Force acquired, implemented and maintained technology funded by Policing for Tomorrow to determine the effectiveness of the relevant asset management.

The Policing for Tomorrow election commitment aimed to invest in technology to ‘make police work safer and quicker – meaning more time on the street combatting crime’. We assessed whether the NSW Police Force ensured that funded technologies have improved policing efficiency and effectiveness. We did not seek to independently assure the benefits or outcomes resulting from the technologies.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Policing for Tomorrow projects and expenditure

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #334 - released 2 June 2020

Published

Actions for Train station crowding

Train station crowding

Transport
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

This report focuses on how Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains manage crowding at selected metropolitan train stations.

The audit found that while Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, it does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. Sydney Trains 'do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed’, the Auditor-General said.

Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or station entries before crowding reaches unsafe levels or when it impacts on-time running. Assuming rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, causing customer delay. ‘Restricting customer access to platforms or station entries is not a sustainable approach to manage station crowding’, said the Auditor-General.

The Auditor-General made seven recommendations to improve Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains' management of station crowding. Transport for NSW have accepted these recommendations on behalf of the Transport cluster.

Public transport patronage has been impacted by COVID-19. This audit was conducted before these impacts occurred.

Read full report (PDF)

Sydney Trains patronage has increased by close to 34 per cent over the last five years, and Transport for NSW (TfNSW) expects the growth in patronage to continue over the next 30 years. As patronage increases there are more passengers entering and exiting stations, moving within stations to change services, and waiting on platforms. As a result, some Sydney metropolitan train stations are becoming increasingly crowded.

There are three main causes of station crowding:

  • patronage growth exceeding the current capacity limits of the rail network
  • service disruptions
  • special events.

Crowds can inhibit movement, cause discomfort and can lead to increased health and safety risks to customers. In the context of a train service, unmanaged crowds can affect service operation as trains spend longer at platforms waiting for customers to alight and board services which can cause service delays. Crowding can also prevent customers from accessing services.

Our 2017 performance audit, ‘Passenger Rail Punctuality’, found that rail agencies would find it hard to maintain train punctuality after 2019 unless they significantly increased the capacity of the network to carry trains and people. TfNSW and Sydney Trains have plans to improve the network to move more passengers. These plans are set out in strategies such as More Trains, More Services and in the continued implementation of new infrastructure such as the Sydney Metro. Since 2017, TfNSW and Sydney Trains have introduced 1,500 more weekly services to increase capacity. Additional network capacity improvements are in progress for delivery from 2022 onwards.

In the meantime, TfNSW and Sydney Trains need to use other ways of managing crowding at train stations until increased capacity comes on line.

This audit examined how effectively TfNSW and Sydney Trains are managing crowding at selected metropolitan train stations in the short and medium term. In doing so, the audit examined how TfNSW and Sydney Trains know whether there is a crowding problem at stations and how they manage that crowding.

TfNSW is the lead agency for transport in NSW. TfNSW is responsible for setting the standard working timetable that Sydney Trains must implement. Sydney Trains is responsible for operating and maintaining the Sydney metropolitan heavy rail passenger service. This includes operating, staffing and maintaining most metropolitan stations. Sydney Trains’ overall responsibility is to run a safe rail network to timetable.

Conclusion

Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, but does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. TfNSW and Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers, but do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed. TfNSW is delivering a program to influence demand for transport in key precincts but the effectiveness of this program and its impact on station crowding is unclear as Transport for NSW has not evaluated the outcomes of the program.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. Data and observation on dwell time, which is the time a train waits at a platform for customers to get on and off trains, inform the development of operational approaches to manage crowding at stations. Sydney Trains has KPIs on reliability, punctuality and customer experience and use these to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. TfNSW and Sydney Trains only formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events.

Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for crowd management to Customer Area Managers, who rely on frontline Sydney Trains staff to understand how crowding affects individual stations. Station staff at identified key metropolitan train stations have developed customer management plans (also known as crowd management plans). However, Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring and evaluation of these plans and does not systematically collect data on when station staff activate crowding interventions under these plans.

Sydney Trains stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services. Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or stations before crowding reaches unsafe levels, or when it impacts on-time running. As rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will need to increase its use of interventions to manage crowding. As Sydney Trains restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, it is likely these customers will experience delays caused by these interventions.

Since 2015, TfNSW has been delivering the 'Travel Choices' program which aims to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services in key precincts. TfNSW is unable to provide data demonstrating the overall effectiveness of this program and the impact the program has on distributing public transport usage out of peak AM and PM times. TfNSW and Sydney Trains continue to explore initiatives to specifically address crowd management.

Conclusion

TfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. There are no key performance indicators directly related to station crowding. Sydney Trains uses performance indicators on reliability, punctuality and customer experience to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. Sydney Trains does not have a routine process for identifying whether crowding contributed to minor safety incidents. TfNSW and Sydney Trains formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events.

 

Conclusion

Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a strategic risk but does not have an overarching strategy to manage station crowding. Sydney Trains' stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services.

Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers but does not have sufficient oversight to know that station crowding is effectively managed. Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring or evaluation of crowd management plans at key metropolitan train stations. The use of crowding interventions is likely to increase due to increasing patronage, causing more customers to experience delays directly caused by these activities.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains have developed interventions to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services but are yet to evaluate these interventions. As such, their impact on managing station crowding is unclear.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Sydney rail network

Appendix three – Rail services contract

Appendix four – Crowding pedestrian modelling

Appendix five – Airport Link stations case study

Appendix six – About the audit

Appendix seven – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #333 - released 30 April 2020

 

Published

Actions for Destination NSW's support for major events

Destination NSW's support for major events

Treasury
Financial reporting
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Service delivery

This report focuses on whether Destination NSW (DNSW) can demonstrate that its support for major events achieves value for money.

The audit found that DNSW’s processes for assessing and evaluating the major events it funds are mostly effective, but its public reporting does not provide enough transparency.

DNSW provides clear information to event organisers seeking funding and has a comprehensive methodology for conducting detailed event assessments. However, the reasons for decisions to progress events from the initial assessment to the detailed assessment stage are not documented in sufficient detail.

DNSW does not publish detailed information about the events it funds or the outcomes of these events. This means that members of the public are unable to see whether its activities achieve value for money. However, DNSW’s internal reporting to its key decision‑makers, including the CEO, the Board and the Minister is appropriate.

The Auditor-General made four recommendations to DNSW, aimed at improving the transparency of its activities, improving the documentation of decisions and certain compliance matters, and streamlining its approach to assessing and evaluating events that receive smaller amounts of funding.

Read full report (PDF)

Destination NSW (DNSW) provides funding to attract a range of major events to New South Wales, including high-profile professional sports matches and tournaments, musicals, art and museum exhibitions, and participation-focused events such as festivals and sports events that members of the public can enter. The NSW Government's rationale for providing funding is to encourage event organisers to hold events in New South Wales, and to ensure that events held in New South Wales maximise the potential for attracting overseas and interstate visitors.

This audit assessed whether DNSW can demonstrate that its support for major events achieves value for money. In making this assessment, the audit examined whether:

  • DNSW effectively assesses proposals to support major events
  • DNSW effectively evaluates the impact of its support for major events.

This audit focused on DNSW's work to attract major events to New South Wales. It did not assess DNSW's tourism promotion or development work, which includes developing tourism strategies, marketing and advertising campaigns, national and international partnerships, and regional programs.

Conclusion

Destination NSW's processes for assessing event applications and evaluating its support for major events are mostly effective. DNSW's internal systems allow it to know whether its decisions are achieving value for money. Its public reporting does not provide enough information about its activities and their outcomes, although it is consistent with that of equivalent organisations in other Australian jurisdictions.

DNSW's process for assessing applications for funding from organisers of major events is mostly effective. Clear information is provided to event organisers seeking funding, and DNSW has a comprehensive methodology for conducting detailed event assessments. However, the reasons for decisions to progress events from the initial assessment to the detailed assessment stage are not documented in sufficient detail.

DNSW has a framework for disclosure and monitoring staff conflicts of interest. However, its forms for staff to disclose conflicts of interest on specific events they are working on are ambiguous. DNSW's management of gifts and benefits broadly complies with the minimum standards set by the Public Service Commission, but there are some gaps in its implementation of these.

DNSW conducts an evaluation of each major event it supports. DNSW articulates expected outcomes in contracts with event organisers and uses a sound methodology to evaluate events. Internal reporting to its key decision-makers, including the CEO, the Board and the Minister is appropriate. However, DNSW does not publish detailed information about the events it funds or the outcomes of these events. This means that members of the public are unable to see whether its activities achieve value for money.

Appendix one – Response from Destination NSW

Appendix two – About the audit 

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Copyright Notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #332 - released 9 April 2020.

Published

Actions for Integrity of data in the Births, Deaths and Marriages Register

Integrity of data in the Births, Deaths and Marriages Register

Justice
Premier and Cabinet
Whole of Government
Cyber security
Fraud
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration

This report outlines whether the Department of Customer Service (the department) has effective controls in place to ensure the integrity of data in the Births, Deaths and Marriages Register (the register), and to prevent unauthorised access and misuse.

The audit found that the department has processes in place to ensure that the information entered in the register is accurate and that any changes to it are validated. Although there are controls in place to prevent and detect unauthorised access to, and activity in the register, there were significant gaps in these controls. Addressing these gaps is necessary to ensure the integrity of information in the register.

The Auditor-General made nine recommendations to the department, aimed at strengthening controls to prevent and detect unauthorised access to, and activity in the register. These included increased monitoring of individuals who have access to the register and strengthening security controls around the databases that contain the information in the register.

The NSW Registry of Births Deaths and Marriages is responsible for maintaining registers of births, deaths and marriages in New South Wales as well as registering adoptions, changes of names, changes of sex and relationships. Maintaining the integrity of this information is important as it is used to confirm people’s identity and unauthorised access to it can lead to fraud or identity theft.

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The NSW Registry of Births Deaths and Marriages (BD&M) is responsible for maintaining registers of births, deaths and marriages in New South Wales. BD&M is also responsible for registering adoptions, changes of name, changes of sex and relationships. These records are collectively referred to as 'the Register'. The Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (the BD&M Act) makes the Registrar (the head of BD&M) responsible for maintaining the integrity of the Register and preventing fraud associated with the Register. Maintaining the integrity of the information held in the Register is important as it is used to confirm people's identity. Unauthorised access to, or misuse of the information in the Register can lead to fraud or identity theft. For these reasons it is important that there are sufficient controls in place to protect the information.

BD&M staff access, add to and amend the Register through the LifeLink application. While BD&M is part of the Department of Customer Service, the Department of Communities and Justice (DCJ) manages the databases that contain the Register and sit behind LifeLink and is responsible for the security of these databases.

This audit assessed whether BD&M has effective controls in place to ensure the integrity of data in the Births, Deaths and Marriages Register, and to prevent unauthorised access and misuse. It addressed the following:

  • Are relevant process and IT controls in place and effective to ensure the integrity of data in the Register and the authenticity of records and documents?
  • Are security controls in place and effective to prevent unauthorised access to, and modification of, data in the Register?

Conclusion

BD&M has processes and controls in place to ensure that the information entered in the Register is accurate and that amendments to the Register are validated. BD&M also has controls in place to prevent and detect unauthorised access to, and activity in the Register. However, there are significant gaps in these controls. Addressing these gaps is necessary to ensure the integrity of the information in the Register.

BD&M has detailed procedures for all registrations and amendments to the Register, which include processes for entering, assessing and checking the validity and adequacy of source documents. Where BD&M staff have directly input all the data and for amendments to the Register, a second person is required to check all information that has been input before an event can be registered or an amendment can be made. BD&M carries out regular internal audits of all registration processes to check whether procedures are being followed and to address non-compliance where required.

BD&M authorises access to the Register and carries out regular access reviews to ensure that users are current and have the appropriate level of access. There are audit trails of all user activity, but BD&M does not routinely monitor these. At the time of the audit, BD&M also did not monitor activity by privileged users who could make unauthorised changes to the Register. Not monitoring this activity created a risk that unauthorised activity in the Register would not be detected.

BD&M has no direct oversight of the database environment which houses the Register and relies on DCJ's management of a third-party vendor to provide the assurance it needs over database security. The vendor operates an Information Security Management System that complies with international standards, but neither BD&M nor DCJ has undertaken independent assurance of the effectiveness of the vendor's IT controls.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

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Parliamentary reference - Report number #330 - released 7 April 2020.