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Published

Actions for Family and Community Services 2018

Family and Community Services 2018

Community Services
Compliance
Financial reporting
Information technology
Management and administration
Project management
Risk
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford released her report today on the Family and Community Services cluster. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial audits of agencies in the cluster. Cluster entities received unqualified audit opinions for their 30 June 2018 financial statements. Opportunities to improve the quality of financial reporting were identified and reported to management.

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Family and Community Services cluster for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report provides NSW Parliament and other users of the financial statements of Family and Community Services' agencies with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations
  • service delivery.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Family and Community Services cluster for 2018.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
2.1 Quality of financial reporting
Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all cluster agencies' financial statements. Conclusion: Sufficient audit evidence was obtained to conclude the financial statements were free of material misstatement.
Agencies complied with NSW Treasury’s mandatory early close requirements.

Completing other early close procedures was inconsistent and not always supported by adequate evidence.
Conclusion: There are opportunities for agencies to improve the quality of financial reporting by:
  • documenting all significant judgements and assumptions used when preparing the financial statements
  • regularly reconciling inter-agency balances and transactions
  • reconciling key account balances on a timely basis
  • quantifying the impact of new and revised accounting standards.
2.2 Timeliness of financial reporting
Agencies completed revaluations of property, plant and equipment and submitted 31 March 2018 financial statements by the due date as required by NSW Treasury.

Agencies submitted year-end financial statements by the statutory deadline.
Conclusion: Early revaluations of property, plant and equipment contributes to agencies meeting the year-end statutory reporting deadline.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:

  • our financial statement audits of agencies in the Family and Community Services cluster for 2018
  • the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office annual work program.

The Audit Office Annual Work Program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each NSW Government cluster.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
3.1 Internal controls
The 2017–18 audits reported 47 internal control weaknesses. While none were high risk, there were 15 repeat issues.

Conclusion: Management accepted audit findings and advised they are actioning recommendations. Timely action is important to ensure internal controls operate effectively.

Twenty-two of these internal control weaknesses related to information technology processes and control environment. Conclusion: Control weaknesses in information systems may compromise the integrity and security of financial data used for decision making and financial reporting.

Recommendation: Agencies should strengthen user access administration to prevent inappropriate access to key IT systems by:
  • ensuring privileged user access is limited to those requiring access to maintain the IT systems
  • monitoring privileged user access to address risks from unauthorised activity
  • ensuring IT password settings comply with password policies
  • ensuring timely removal of access to business systems for terminated and casual employees.
The Department, NSW Land and Housing Corporation (LAHC) and three other cluster agencies’ contract registers are incomplete and/or inaccurate. Recommendation: Agencies should ensure their contract registers are complete and accurate so they can more effectively govern contracts and manage compliance obligations.
3.2 Audit Office annual work program
Financial impact of the commissioning approach.

The transfer of disability services to the National Disability Insurance Scheme and other commissioning of service delivery has contributed to a 36 per cent decrease in frontline employee numbers since 2015–16. Similarly, corporate services’ employee numbers reduced by 34 per cent.

The Department’s salary costs have reduced by $232 million or 18 per cent from 2016–17.
Conclusion: The ratio of corporate services employee numbers to support frontline and support services has remained at 1:10 since 2015–16, which indicates restructures have been planned to align with the transfer of disability services.
Impact of the new social housing maintenance contract

Maintenance expenses have increased by about 40 per cent since the new maintenance contract commenced in April 2016. LAHC measures the benefits of the new maintenance contract such as improved tenant satisfaction.
Conclusion: The new maintenance contract has contributed to some positive social outcomes such as tenants being employed by the contractors to conduct maintenance, as call centre operators and in administration. However, more can be done to ensure value for money is being achieved.
ChildStory IT Project

Whilst phase one of the ChildStory IT project went 'live' in 2017–18, the planned timetable has not been met and the revised date for full implementation is end of 2018.

According to the 2014–15 NSW Budget, the budget for ChildStory was $100 million over a four-year period. During the design and implementation stage, this amount was revised to $128 million, with approval of the Expenditure Review Committee. The actual cost incurred over the four years until 30 June 2018, is approximately $131 million.

We identified issues with the data migration from the legacy systems to ChildStory.
Conclusion: To inform future IT projects, we understand the Department is capturing our findings, along with the findings from the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation’s ‘Healthchecks’.

This chapter outlines certain service delivery outcomes for 2017–18. The data on activity levels and performance is provided by Cluster agencies. The Audit Office does not have a specific mandate to audit performance information. Accordingly, the information in this chapter is unaudited.

In our recent performance audit, Progress and measurement of Premier's Priorities, we identified 12 limitations of performance measurement and performance data. We recommended that the Department of Premier and Cabinet ensure that processes to check and verify data are in place for all agency data sources.

Published

Actions for Transport 2018

Transport 2018

Transport
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Procurement
Risk
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford released her report today on key observations and findings from the 30 June 2018 financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport cluster. Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements. However, assessing the fair value of the broad range of transport related assets creates challenges.

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Transport cluster for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Transport cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Transport cluster for 2018.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
2.1 Quality of financial reporting
Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements Sufficient audit evidence was obtained to conclude the financial statements were free of material misstatement.
2.2 Key accounting issues
Valuation of assets continues to create challenges. Although agencies complied with the requirements of the accounting standards and Treasury policies on valuations, we identified some opportunities for improvements at RMS.

RMS incorporated data from its asset condition assessments for the first time in the valuation methodology which improved the valuation outcome. Overall, we were satisfied with the valuation methodology and key assumptions, but we noted some deficiencies in the asset data in relation to asset component unit rates and old condition data for some components of assets. 

Also, a bypass and tunnel were incorrectly excluded from RMS records and valuation process since 2013. This resulted in an increase for these assets’ value by $133 million.

The valuation inputs for Wetlands and Moorings were revised this year to better reflect the assets' characteristics resulting in a $98.0 million increase.

2.3 Timeliness of financial reporting
Residual Transport Corporation did not submit its financial statements by the statutory reporting deadline. Residual Transport Corporation remained a dormant entity with no transactions for the year ended 30 June 2018.
With the exception of Residual Transport Corporation, all agencies completed early close procedures and submitted financial statements within statutory timeframes. Early close procedures allow financial reporting issues and risks to be addressed early in the reporting and audit process.
2.4 Financial sustainability
NSW Trains and the Chief Investigator of the Office of Transport Safety Investigations reported negative net assets of $75.7 million and $89,000 respectively at 30 June 2018.  NSW Trains and the Chief Investigator of the Office of Transport Safety Investigations continue to require letters of financial support to confirm their ability to pay liabilities as they fall due. 
2.5 Passenger revenue and patronage
Transport agencies revenue growth increased at a higher rate than patronage. Public transport passenger revenue increased by $114 million (8.3 per cent) in 2017–18, and patronage increased by 37.1 million (5.1 per cent) across all modes of transport based on data provided by TfNSW. 
Negative balance Opal Cards resulted in $3.8 million in revenue not collected in 2017–18 and $7.8 million since the introduction of Opal. A total of 1.1 million Opal cards issued since its introduction have negative balances. Transport for NSW advised it is liaising with the ticketing vendor to implement system changes and are investigating other ways to reduce the occurrences.
2.6 Cost recovery from public transport users
Overall cost recovery from users has decreased. Overall cost recovery from public transport users (on rail and bus services by STA) decreased from 23.2 per cent to 22.4 per cent between 2016–17 and 2017–18. The main reason for the decrease is due to expenditure increasing at a faster rate than revenue in 2017–18.


 

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:

  • our financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport cluster for 2018
  • the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office annual work program.

The Audit Office Annual Work Program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each of the NSW Government clusters. 

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
3.1 Internal controls 
There was an increase in findings on internal controls across the Transport cluster. Key themes related to information technology, employee leave entitlements and asset management. Eighteen per cent of all issues were repeat issues.
3.2 Audit Office Annual work program
The Transport cluster wrote-off over $200 million of assets which were replaced by new assets or technology.

Majority of this write-off was recognised by RMS, with $199 million relating to the write-off of existing assets which have been replaced during the year. 

RailCorp is expected to convert to TAHE from 1 July 2019. Several working groups are considering different aspects of the TAHE transition including its status as a for-profit Public Trading Enterprise and which assets to transfer to TAHE. We will continue to monitor developments on TAHE for any impact to the financial statements.
RMS' estimated maintenance backlog at 30 June 2018 of $3.4 billion is lower than last year. Sydney Trains' estimated maintenance backlog at 30 June 2018 increased by 20.6 per cent to $434 million. TfNSW does not quantify its backlog maintenance. TfNSW advised it is liaising with Infrastructure NSW to develop a consistent definition of maintenance backlog across all transport service providers. 
Not all agencies monitor unplanned maintenance across the Transport cluster. Unplanned maintenance can be more expensive than planned maintenance. TfNSW should develop a consistent approach to define, monitor and track unplanned maintenance across the cluster.

This chapter outlines certain service delivery outcomes for 2017–18. The data on activity levels and performance is provided by Cluster agencies. The Audit Office does not have a specific mandate to audit performance information. Accordingly, the information in this chapter is unaudited. 

We report this information on service delivery to provide additional context to understand the operations of the Transport cluster and to collate and present service information for different modes of transport in one report. 

In our recent performance audit, Progress and measurement of Premier's Priorities, we identified 12 limitations of performance measurement and performance data. We recommended that the Department of Premier and Cabinet ensure that processes to check and verify data are in place for all agency data sources.

Published

Actions for Managing Antisocial behaviour in public housing

Managing Antisocial behaviour in public housing

Community Services
Asset valuation
Infrastructure
Regulation
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

The Department of Family and Community Services (FACS) has not adequately supported or resourced its staff to manage antisocial behaviour in public housing according to a report released today by the Deputy Auditor-General for New South Wales, Ian Goodwin. 

In recent decades, policy makers and legislators in Australian states and territories have developed and implemented initiatives to manage antisocial behaviour in public housing environments. All jurisdictions now have some form of legislation or policy to encourage public housing tenants to comply with rules and obligations of ‘good neighbourliness’. In November 2015, the NSW Parliament changed legislation to introduce a new approach to manage antisocial behaviour in public housing. This approach is commonly described as the ‘strikes’ approach. 

When introduced in the NSW Parliament, the ‘strikes’ approach was described as a means to:

  • improve the behaviour of a minority of tenants engaging in antisocial behaviour 
  • create better, safer communities for law abiding tenants, including those who are ageing and vulnerable.

FACS has a number of tasks as a landlord, including a responsibility to collect rent and organise housing maintenance. FACS also has a role to support tenants with complex needs and manage antisocial behaviour. These roles have some inherent tensions. The FACS antisocial behaviour management policy aims are: 

to balance the responsibilities of tenants, the rights of their neighbours in social housing, private residents and the broader community with the need to support tenants to sustain their public housing tenancies.

This audit assessed the efficiency and effectiveness of the ‘strikes’ approach to managing antisocial behaviour in public housing environments.

We examined whether:

  • the approach is being implemented as intended and leading to improved safety and security in social housing environments
  • FACS and its partner agencies have the capability and capacity to implement the approach
  • there are effective mechanisms to monitor, report and progressively improve the approach.
Conclusion

FACS has not adequately supported or resourced its staff to implement the antisocial behaviour policy. FACS antisocial behaviour data is incomplete and unreliable. Accordingly, there is insufficient data to determine the nature and extent of the problem and whether the implementation of the policy is leading to improved safety and security

FACS management of minor and moderate incidents of antisocial behaviour is poor. FACS has not dedicated sufficient training to equip frontline housing staff with the relevant skills to apply the antisocial behaviour management policy. At more than half of the housing offices we visited, staff had not been trained to:

  • conduct effective interviews to determine whether an antisocial behaviour complaint can be substantiated

  • de escalate conflict and manage complex behaviours when required

  • properly manage the safety of staff and tenants

  • establish information sharing arrangements with police

  • collect evidence that meets requirements at the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal

  • record and manage antisocial behaviour incidents using the information management system HOMES ASB.

When frontline housing staff are informed about serious and severe illegal antisocial behaviour incidents, they generally refer them to the FACS Legal Division. Staff in the Legal Division are trained and proficient in managing antisocial behaviour in compliance with the policy and therefore, the more serious incidents are managed effectively using HOMES ASB. 


FACS provides housing services to most remote townships via outreach visits from the Dubbo office. In remote townships, the policy is not being fully implemented due to insufficient frontline housing staff. There is very limited knowledge of the policy in these areas and FACS data shows few recorded antisocial behaviour incidents in remote regions. 


The FACS information management system (HOMES ASB) is poorly designed and has significant functional limitations that impede the ability of staff to record and manage antisocial behaviour. Staff at most of the housing offices we visited were unable to accurately record antisocial behaviour matters in HOMES ASB, making the data incorrect and unreliable.

Published

Actions for Managing risks in the NSW public sector: risk culture and capability

Managing risks in the NSW public sector: risk culture and capability

Finance
Health
Justice
Treasury
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk
Workforce and capability

The Ministry of Health, NSW Fair Trading, NSW Police Force, and NSW Treasury Corporation are taking steps to strengthen their risk culture, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford. 'Senior management communicates the importance of managing risk to their staff, and there are many examples of risk management being integrated into daily activities', the Auditor-General said.

We did find that three of the agencies we examined could strengthen their culture so that all employees feel comfortable speaking openly about risks. To support innovation, senior management could also do better at communicating to their staff the levels of risk they are willing to accept.

Effective risk management is essential to good governance, and supports staff at all levels to make informed judgements and decisions. At a time when government is encouraging innovation and exploring new service delivery models, effective risk management is about seizing opportunities as well as managing threats.

Over the past decade, governments and regulators around the world have increasingly turned their attention to risk culture. It is now widely accepted that organisational culture is a key element of risk management because it influences how people recognise and engage with risk. Neglecting this ‘soft’ side of risk management can prevent institutions from managing risks that threaten their success and lead to missed opportunities for change, improvement or innovation.

This audit assessed how effectively NSW Government agencies are building risk management capabilities and embedding a sound risk culture throughout their organisations. To do this we examined whether:

  • agencies can demonstrate that senior management is committed to risk management
  • information about risk is communicated effectively throughout agencies
  • agencies are building risk management capabilities.

The audit examined four agencies: the Ministry of Health, the NSW Fair Trading function within the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation, NSW Police Force and NSW Treasury Corporation (TCorp). NSW Treasury was also included as the agency responsible for the NSW Government's risk management framework.

Conclusion
All four agencies examined in the audit are taking steps to strengthen their risk culture. In these agencies, senior management communicates the importance of managing risk to their staff. They have risk management policies and funded central functions to oversee risk management. We also found many examples of risk management being integrated into daily activities.
That said, three of the four case study agencies could do more to understand their existing risk culture. As good practice, agencies should monitor their employees’ attitude to risk. Without a clear understanding of how employees identify and engage with risk, it is difficult to tell whether the 'tone' set by the executive and management is aligned with employee behaviours.
Our survey of risk culture found that three agencies could strengthen a culture of open communication, so that all employees feel comfortable speaking openly about risks. To support innovation, senior management could also do better at communicating to their staff the levels of risk they are willing to accept.
Some agencies are performing better than others in building their risk capabilities. Three case study agencies have reviewed the risk-related skills and knowledge of their workforce, but only one agency has addressed the gaps the review identified. In three agencies, staff also need more practical guidance on how to manage risks that are relevant to their day-to-day responsibilities.
NSW Treasury provides agencies with direction and guidance on risk management through policy and guidelines. Its principles-based approach to risk management is consistent with better practice. Nevertheless, there is scope for NSW Treasury to develop additional practical guidance and tools to support a better risk culture in the NSW public sector. NSW Treasury should encourage agency heads to form a view on the current risk culture in their agencies, identify desirable changes to that risk culture, and take steps to address those changes. 

In assessing an agency’s risk culture, we focused on four key areas:

Executive sponsorship (tone at the top)

In the four agencies we reviewed, senior management is communicating the importance of managing risk. They have endorsed risk management frameworks and funded central functions tasked with overseeing risk management within their agencies.

That said, we found that three case study agencies do not measure their existing risk culture. Without clear measures of how employees identify and engage with risk, it is difficult for agencies to tell whether employee's behaviours are aligned with the 'tone' set by the executive and management.

For example, in some agencies we examined we found a disconnect between risk tolerances espoused by senior management and how these concepts were understood by staff.

Employee perceptions of risk management

Our survey of staff indicated that while senior leaders have communicated the importance of managing risk, more could be done to strengthen a culture of open communication so that all employees feel comfortable speaking openly about risks. We found that senior management could better communicate to their staff the levels of risk they should be willing to accept.

Integration of risk management into daily activities and links to decision-making

We found examples of risk management being integrated into daily activities. On the other hand, we also identified areas where risk management deviated from good practice. For example, we found that corporate risk registers are not consistently used as a tool to support decision-making.

Support and guidance to help staff manage risks

Most case study agencies are monitoring risk-related skills and knowledge of their workforce, but only one agency has addressed the gaps it identified. While agencies are providing risk management training, surveyed staff in three case study agencies reported that risk management training is not adequate.

NSW Treasury provides agencies with direction and guidance on risk management through policy and guidelines. In line with better practice, NSW Treasury's principles-based policy acknowledges that individual agencies are in a better position to understand their own risks and design risk management frameworks that address those risks. Nevertheless, there is scope for NSW Treasury to refine its guidance material to support a better risk culture in the NSW public sector.

Recommendation

By May 2019, NSW Treasury should:

  • Review the scope of its risk management guidance, and identify additional guidance, training or activities to improve risk culture across the NSW public sector. This should focus on encouraging agency heads to form a view on the current risk culture in their agencies, identify desirable changes to that risk culture, and take steps to address those changes.

Published

Actions for Detecting and responding to cyber security incidents

Detecting and responding to cyber security incidents

Finance
Cyber security
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Workforce and capability

A report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, found there is no whole-of-government capability to detect and respond effectively to cyber security incidents. There is very limited sharing of information on incidents amongst agencies, and some agencies have poor detection and response practices and procedures.

The NSW Government relies on digital technology to deliver services, organise and store information, manage business processes, and control critical infrastructure. The increasing global interconnectivity between computer networks has dramatically increased the risk of cyber security incidents. Such incidents can harm government service delivery and may include the theft of information, denial of access to critical technology, or even the hijacking of systems for profit or malicious intent.

This audit examined cyber security incident detection and response in the NSW public sector. It focused on the role of the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation (DFSI), which oversees the Information Security Community of Practice, the Information Security Event Reporting Protocol, and the Digital Information Security Policy (the Policy).

The audit also examined ten case study agencies to develop a perspective on how they detect and respond to incidents. We chose agencies that are collectively responsible for personal data, critical infrastructure, financial information and intellectual property.

Conclusion
There is no whole‑of‑government capability to detect and respond effectively to cyber security incidents. There is limited sharing of information on incidents amongst agencies, and some of the agencies we reviewed have poor detection and response practices and procedures. There is a risk that incidents will go undetected longer than they should, and opportunities to contain and restrict the damage may be lost.
Given current weaknesses, the NSW public sector’s ability to detect and respond to incidents needs to improve significantly and quickly. DFSI has started to address this by appointing a Government Chief Information Security Officer (GCISO) to improve cyber security capability across the public sector. Her role includes coordinating efforts to increase the NSW Government’s ability to respond to and recover from whole‑of‑government threats and attacks.

Some of our case study agencies had strong processes for detection and response to cyber security incidents but others had a low capability to detect and respond in a timely way.

Most agencies have access to an automated tool for analysing logs generated by their IT systems. However, coverage of these tools varies. Some agencies do not have an automated tool and only review logs periodically or on an ad hoc basis, meaning they are less likely to detect incidents.

Few agencies have contractual arrangements in place for IT service providers to report incidents to them. If a service provider elects to not report an incident, it will delay the agency’s response and may result in increased damage.

Most case study agencies had procedures for responding to incidents, although some lack guidance on who to notify and when. Some agencies do not have response procedures, limiting their ability to minimise the business damage that may flow from a cyber security incident. Few agencies could demonstrate that they have trained their staff on either incident detection or response procedures and could provide little information on the role requirements and responsibilities of their staff in doing so.

Most agencies’ incident procedures contain limited information on how to report an incident, who to report it to, when this should occur and what information should be provided. None of our case study agencies’ procedures mentioned reporting to DFSI, highlighting that even though reporting is mandatory for most agencies their procedures do not require it.

Case study agencies provided little evidence to indicate they are learning from incidents, meaning that opportunities to better manage future incidents may be lost.

Recommendations

The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should:

  • assist agencies by providing:
    • better practice guidelines for incident detection, response and reporting to help agencies develop their own practices and procedures
    • training and awareness programs, including tailored programs for a range of audiences such as cyber professionals, finance staff, and audit and risk committees
    • role requirements and responsibilities for cyber security across government, relevant to size and complexity of each agency
    • a support model for agencies that have limited detection and response capabilities
       
  • revise the Digital Information Security Policy and Information Security Event Reporting Protocol by
    • clarifying what security incidents must be reported to DFSI and when
    • extending mandatory reporting requirements to those NSW Government agencies not currently covered by the policy and protocol, including State owned corporations.

DFSI lacks a clear mandate or capability to provide effective detection and response support to agencies, and there is limited sharing of information on cyber security incidents.

DFSI does not currently have a clear mandate and the necessary resources and systems to detect, receive, share and respond to cyber security incidents across the NSW public sector. It does not have a clear mandate to assess whether agencies have an acceptable detection and response capability. It is aware of deficiencies in agencies and across whole‑of‑government, and has begun to conduct research into this capability.

Intelligence gathering across the public sector is also limited, meaning agencies may not respond to threats in a timely manner. DFSI has not allocated resources for gathering of threat intelligence and communicating it across government, although it has begun to build this capacity.

Incident reporting to DFSI is mandatory for most agencies, however, most of our case study agencies do not report incidents to DFSI, reducing the likelihood of containing an incident if it spreads to other agencies. When incidents have been reported, DFSI has not provided dedicated resources to assess them and coordinate the public sector’s response. There are currently no formal requirements for DFSI to respond to incidents and no guidance on what it is meant to do if an incident is reported. The lack of central coordination in incident response risks delays and increased damage to multiple agencies.

DFSI's reporting protocol is weak and does not clearly specify what agencies should report and when. This makes agencies less likely to report incidents. The lack of a standard format for incident reporting and a consistent method for assessing an incident, including the level of risk associated with it, also make it difficult for DFSI to determine an appropriate response.

There are limited avenues for sharing information amongst agencies after incidents have been resolved, meaning the public sector may be losing valuable opportunities to improve its protection and response.

Recommendations

The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should:

  • develop whole‑of‑government procedure, protocol and supporting systems to effectively share reported threats and respond to cyber security incidents impacting multiple agencies, including follow-up and communicating lessons learnt
  • develop a means by which agencies can report incidents in a more effective manner, such as a secure online template, that allows for early warnings and standardised details of incidents and remedial advice
  • enhance NSW public sector threat intelligence gathering and sharing including formal links with Australian Government security agencies, other states and the private sector
  • direct agencies to include standard clauses in contracts requiring IT service providers report all cyber security incidents within a reasonable timeframe
  • provide assurance that agencies have appropriate reporting procedures and report to DFSI as required by the policy and protocol by:
    • extending the attestation requirement within the DISP to cover procedures and reporting
    • reviewing a sample of agencies' incident reporting procedures each year.