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Actions for Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program

Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program

Transport
Planning
Compliance
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management

The urban renewal projects on former railway land in the Newcastle city centre are well targeted to support the objectives of the Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program), according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the government. However, the evidence that the cost of the light rail will be justified by its contribution to the Program is not convincing.

The Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program) is an urban renewal and transport program in the Newcastle city centre. The Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation (HCCDC) has led the Program since 2017. UrbanGrowth NSW led the Program from 2014 until 2017. Transport for NSW has been responsible for delivering the transport parts of the Program since the Program commenced. All references to HCCDC in this report relate to both HCCDC and its predecessor, the Hunter Development Corporation. All references to UrbanGrowth NSW in this report relate only to its Newcastle office from 2014 to 2017.

This audit had two objectives:

  1. To assess the economy of the approach chosen to achieve the objectives of the Program.
  2. To assess the effectiveness of the consultation and oversight of the Program.

We addressed the audit objectives by answering the following questions:

a) Was the decision to build light rail an economical option for achieving Program objectives?
b) Has the best value been obtained for the use of the former railway land?
c) Was good practice used in consultation on key Program decisions?
d) Did governance arrangements support delivery of the program?

Conclusion
1. The urban renewal projects on the former railway land are well targeted to support the objectives of the Program. However, there is insufficient evidence that the cost of the light rail will be justified by its contribution to Program objectives.

The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the Government. HCCDC, and previously UrbanGrowth NSW, identified and considered options for land use that would best meet Program objectives. Required probity processes were followed for developments that involved financial transactions. Our audit did not assess the achievement of these objectives because none of the projects have been completed yet.

Analysis presented in the Program business case and other planning documents showed that the light rail would have small transport benefits and was expected to make a modest contribution to broader Program objectives. Analysis in the Program business case argued that despite this, the light rail was justified because it would attract investment and promote economic development around the route. The Program business case referred to several international examples to support this argument, but did not make a convincing case that these examples were comparable to the proposed light rail in Newcastle.

The audited agencies argue that the contribution of light rail cannot be assessed separately because it is a part of a broader Program. The cost of the light rail makes up around 53 per cent of the total Program funding. Given the cost of the light rail, agencies need to be able to demonstrate that this investment provides value for money by making a measurable contribution to the Program objectives.

2. Consultation and oversight were mostly effective during the implementation stages of the Program. There were weaknesses in both areas in the planning stages.

Consultations about the urban renewal activities from around 2015 onward followed good practice standards. These consultations were based on an internationally accepted framework and met their stated objectives. Community consultations on the decision to close the train line were held in 2006 and 2009. However, the final decision in 2012 was made without a specific community consultation. There was no community consultation on the decision to build a light rail.

The governance arrangements that were in place during the planning stages of the Program did not provide effective oversight. This meant there was not a single agreed set of Program objectives until 2016 and roles and responsibilities for the Program were not clear. Leadership and oversight improved during the implementation phase of the Program. Roles and responsibilities were clarified and a multi-agency steering committee was established to resolve issues that needed multi-agency coordination.
The light rail is not justified by conventional cost-benefit analysis and there is insufficient evidence that the indirect contribution of light rail to achieving the economic development objectives of the Program will justify the cost.
Analysis presented in Program business cases and other planning documents showed that the light rail would have small transport benefits and was expected to make a modest contribution to broader Program objectives. Analysis in the Program business case argued that despite this, the light rail was justified because it would attract investment and promote economic development around the route. The Program business case referred to several international examples to support this argument, but did not make a convincing case that these examples were comparable to the proposed light rail in Newcastle.
The business case analysis of the benefits and costs of light rail was prepared after the decision to build light rail had been made and announced. Our previous reports, and recent reports by others, have emphasised the importance of completing thorough analysis before announcing infrastructure projects. Some advice provided after the initial light rail decision was announced was overly optimistic. It included benefits that cannot reasonably be attributed to light rail and underestimated the scope and cost of the project.
The audited agencies argue that the contribution of light rail cannot be assessed separately because it is part of a broader Program. The cost of the light rail makes up around 53 per cent of the total Program funding. Given the high cost of the light rail, we believe agencies need to be able to demonstrate that this investment provides value for money by making a measurable contribution to the Program objectives.

Recommendations
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should support economical decision-making on infrastructure projects by:
  • providing balanced advice to decision makers on the benefits and risks of large infrastructure investments at all stages of the decision-making process
  • providing scope and cost estimates that are as accurate and complete as possible when initial funding decisions are being made
  • making business cases available to the public.​​​​​​
The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the government.

The planned uses of the former railway land align with the objectives of encouraging people to visit and live in the city centre, creating attractive public spaces, and supporting growth in employment in the city. The transport benefits of the activities are less clear, because the light rail is the major transport project and this will not make significant improvements to transport in Newcastle.

The processes used for selling and leasing parts of the former railway land followed industry standards. Options for the former railway land were identified and assessed systematically. Competitive processes were used for most transactions and the required assessment and approval processes were followed. The sale of land to the University of Newcastle did not use a competitive process, but required processes for direct negotiations were followed.

Recommendation
By March 2019, the Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation should:
  • work with relevant stakeholders to explore options for increasing the focus on the heritage objective of the Program in projects on the former railway land. This could include projects that recognise the cultural and industrial heritage of Newcastle.
Consultations about the urban renewal activities followed good practice standards, but consultation on transport decisions for the Program did not.

Consultations focusing on urban renewal options for the Program included a range of stakeholders and provided opportunities for input into decisions about the use of the former railway land. These consultations received mostly positive feedback from participants. Changes and additions were made to the objectives of the Program and specific projects in response to feedback received. 

There had been several decades of debate about the potential closure of the train line, including community consultations in 2006 and 2009. However, the final decision to close the train line was made and announced in 2012 without a specific community consultation. HCCDC states that consultation with industry and business representatives constitutes community consultation because industry representatives are also members of the community. This does not meet good practice standards because it is not a representative sample of the community.

There was no community consultation on the decision to build a light rail. There were subsequent opportunities for members of the community to comment on the implementation options, but the decision to build it had already been made. A community and industry consultation was held on which route the light rail should use, but the results of this were not made public. 

Recommendation
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should consult with a wide range of stakeholders before major decisions are made and announced, and report publicly on the results and outcomes of consultations. 

The governance arrangements that were in place during the planning stages of the Program did not provide effective oversight. Project leadership and oversight improved during the implementation phase of the Program.

Multi-agency coordination and oversight were ineffective during the planning stages of the Program. Examples include: multiple versions of Program objectives being in circulation; unclear reporting lines for project management groups; and poor role definition for the initial advisory board. Program ownership was clarified in mid-2016 with the appointment of a new Program Director with clear accountability for the delivery of the Program. This was supported by the creation of a multi-agency steering committee that was more effective than previous oversight bodies.

The limitations that existed in multi-agency coordination and oversight had some negative consequences in important aspects of project management for the Program. This included whole-of-government benefits management and the coordination of work to mitigate impacts of the Program on small businesses.

Recommendations
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should: 

  • develop and implement a benefits management approach from the beginning of a program to ensure responsibility for defining benefits and measuring their achievement is clear
  • establish whole-of-government oversight early in the program to guide major decisions. This should include:
    • agreeing on objectives and ensuring all agencies understand these
    • clearly defining roles and responsibilities for all agencies
    • establishing whole-of-government coordination for the assessment and mitigation of the impact of major construction projects on businesses and the community.

By March 2019, the Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation should update and implement the Program Benefits Realisation Plan. This should include:

  • setting measurable targets for the desired benefits
  • clearly allocating ownership for achieving the desired benefits
  • monitoring progress toward achieving the desired benefits and reporting publicly on the results.

Appendix one - Response from agencies    

Appendix two - About the audit

Appendix three - Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #310 - released 12 December 2018

Published

Actions for Managing Antisocial behaviour in public housing

Managing Antisocial behaviour in public housing

Community Services
Asset valuation
Infrastructure
Regulation
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

The Department of Family and Community Services (FACS) has not adequately supported or resourced its staff to manage antisocial behaviour in public housing according to a report released today by the Deputy Auditor-General for New South Wales, Ian Goodwin. 

In recent decades, policy makers and legislators in Australian states and territories have developed and implemented initiatives to manage antisocial behaviour in public housing environments. All jurisdictions now have some form of legislation or policy to encourage public housing tenants to comply with rules and obligations of ‘good neighbourliness’. In November 2015, the NSW Parliament changed legislation to introduce a new approach to manage antisocial behaviour in public housing. This approach is commonly described as the ‘strikes’ approach. 

When introduced in the NSW Parliament, the ‘strikes’ approach was described as a means to:

  • improve the behaviour of a minority of tenants engaging in antisocial behaviour 
  • create better, safer communities for law abiding tenants, including those who are ageing and vulnerable.

FACS has a number of tasks as a landlord, including a responsibility to collect rent and organise housing maintenance. FACS also has a role to support tenants with complex needs and manage antisocial behaviour. These roles have some inherent tensions. The FACS antisocial behaviour management policy aims are: 

to balance the responsibilities of tenants, the rights of their neighbours in social housing, private residents and the broader community with the need to support tenants to sustain their public housing tenancies.

This audit assessed the efficiency and effectiveness of the ‘strikes’ approach to managing antisocial behaviour in public housing environments.

We examined whether:

  • the approach is being implemented as intended and leading to improved safety and security in social housing environments
  • FACS and its partner agencies have the capability and capacity to implement the approach
  • there are effective mechanisms to monitor, report and progressively improve the approach.
Conclusion

FACS has not adequately supported or resourced its staff to implement the antisocial behaviour policy. FACS antisocial behaviour data is incomplete and unreliable. Accordingly, there is insufficient data to determine the nature and extent of the problem and whether the implementation of the policy is leading to improved safety and security

FACS management of minor and moderate incidents of antisocial behaviour is poor. FACS has not dedicated sufficient training to equip frontline housing staff with the relevant skills to apply the antisocial behaviour management policy. At more than half of the housing offices we visited, staff had not been trained to:

  • conduct effective interviews to determine whether an antisocial behaviour complaint can be substantiated

  • de escalate conflict and manage complex behaviours when required

  • properly manage the safety of staff and tenants

  • establish information sharing arrangements with police

  • collect evidence that meets requirements at the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal

  • record and manage antisocial behaviour incidents using the information management system HOMES ASB.

When frontline housing staff are informed about serious and severe illegal antisocial behaviour incidents, they generally refer them to the FACS Legal Division. Staff in the Legal Division are trained and proficient in managing antisocial behaviour in compliance with the policy and therefore, the more serious incidents are managed effectively using HOMES ASB. 


FACS provides housing services to most remote townships via outreach visits from the Dubbo office. In remote townships, the policy is not being fully implemented due to insufficient frontline housing staff. There is very limited knowledge of the policy in these areas and FACS data shows few recorded antisocial behaviour incidents in remote regions. 


The FACS information management system (HOMES ASB) is poorly designed and has significant functional limitations that impede the ability of staff to record and manage antisocial behaviour. Staff at most of the housing offices we visited were unable to accurately record antisocial behaviour matters in HOMES ASB, making the data incorrect and unreliable.

Published

Actions for Albert 'Tibby' Cotter Walkway

Albert 'Tibby' Cotter Walkway

Transport
Internal controls and governance
Procurement
Project management

On 17 September 2015, the Acting Auditor-General of New South Wales, Tony Whitfield, released a report on the Albert ‘Tibby’ Cotter Walkway which crosses over Anzac Parade in Moore Park. The Walkway’s primary function is to cater for event patrons in the precinct. Moore Park is listed on the State Heritage Register and is an open space specifically established to cater for public recreation.
 
Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) delivered the Walkway to an extremely tight timeframe. It was operational for the 2015 Cricket World Cup at the Sydney Cricket Ground as promised by the government. However, the World Cup deadline added substantially to the total cost of the Walkway, which is projected to be $38 million.
 
Transport for NSW and RMS could not provide evidence of a compelling economic or financial argument to support the construction of the Walkway or for the tight deadline. Also, the processes they adopted to provide assurance of the project’s value for money were not adequate.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #260 - released 17 September 2015

Published

Actions for Community Housing

Community Housing

Community Services
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Service delivery

On 16 September 2015 the NSW Acting Auditor-General, Tony Whitfield, released a report on community housing. The audit examines the Department of Family and Community Services’ transfer of public housing to non-government community housing providers.

The Department has worked collaboratively with community housing providers and industry groups to develop the community housing sector. Although there have been some delays, it has managed the transfer of public housing reasonably well and has improved the sustainability of the sector.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #259 - released 16 September 2015

Published

Actions for Sydney metropolitan bus contracts

Sydney metropolitan bus contracts

Transport
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Service delivery

On 9 September 2015, the Acting Auditor-General of New South Wales, Tony Whitfield, released a report on Sydney Metropolitan Bus Service Contracts.
 
All scheduled bus services in the Sydney metropolitan area are provided under contracts with the public and private operators. The contracts allow Transport for NSW (TfNSW) to determine what bus services are provided and to whom. This audit assessed the effectiveness of TfNSW’s design and management of these contracts.
 
Bus services provided under the Sydney Metropolitan Bus Service Contracts have largely been effective and efficient. Operators are mostly meeting their key performance indicators. Customer satisfaction is better than under the previous contracts and improving, patronage is increasing, and the unit costs of providing services are now lower than under the previous contracts. 
 
However, punctuality remains a problem. Private operators are mostly starting their trips on time, but rarely meeting their mid and end-of-trip targets. State Transit Authority’s (STA) punctuality is improving but is worse than private operators, and other areas of performance are generally below private operators.
 
The current situation is a substantial improvement over what we found in our 2010 audit on the previous contracts.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #258 - released 9 September 2015

Published

Actions for Transferring out-of-home care to non-government organisations

Transferring out-of-home care to non-government organisations

Community Services
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Service delivery

The audit assessed how well the Department of Family and Community Services has transferred the management of children in out-of-home care to non-government organisations (NGOs).
 
The Department has put considerable effort into developing the out-of-home care sector and is progressing well towards its goal of transferring all children in statutory care to NGOs. Since 2011, the number of children with an accredited NGO has more than doubled. This is a positive outcome as children are more likely to receive quality care because these providers meet NSW standards for outof-home care.
 
However, it is difficult to assess whether overall outcomes for children in care have improved. This is because the Department has yet to determine what wellbeing outcomes it wants to achieve, such as improvements in a child’s health, education and welfare. The Department is currently developing a quality assurance framework which will include such outcomes. We also found that the number of children in care returned to their birth family has declined, and the number of adoptions has remained relatively unchanged.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #257 - released 2 September 2015

Published

Actions for Large construction projects

Large construction projects

Treasury
Transport
Health
Industry
Planning
Premier and Cabinet
Whole of Government
Compliance
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management

The independent assurance given to the NSW Government and sponsor agencies on the viability of large capital projects throughout their lifecycle is inadequate. Government policy is regularly not followed and not properly communicated to those responsible for implementing such policy.
 
This audit sought to test the effectiveness of the NSW capital project assurance system - which includes gateway reviews and reporting - but significant levels of non-compliance identified in our case studies prevented this. The NSW Commission of Audit also identified this issue in 2012. Gateway reviews are conducted by independent reviewers at key stages of a project’s life cycle and provide an independent assessment on a project’s readiness to proceed to the next stage.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #252 - released 7 May 2015

Published

Actions for Handback of the M4 Tollway

Handback of the M4 Tollway

Transport
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management

This audit focuses on the M4 handback. It looks at whether the road will be in good condition when the State gets it back, and whether it will cope with the extra traffic after the toll is removed. These are critical issues for taxpayers and motorists. Taxpayers don’t want to be responsible for a large repair bill and motorists don’t want to be stuck in traffic jams.

To ensure that future private sector partnerships (PPP) deal adequately with handback, we recommend that the Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA):

  • ensure deeds spell out an appropriate inspection and testing program to determine repairs required to bring roads up to a satisfactory condition at handback (p.11)
  • ensure deeds link condition standards and maintenance approaches to changing industry standards and approaches over the life of the PPP (p.11)
  • consider including in deeds a requirement that operators provide a performance bond or similar security over the cost of handback repairs (p.11)
  • review the lessons learnt from the M4 tollway handback and determine whether it should seek to negotiate changes to existing tollway deeds to better deal with handback, by June 2010 (p.11)

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #193 - released 27 October 2009

Published

Actions for Grants Administration

Grants Administration

Premier and Cabinet
Treasury
Health
Community Services
Planning
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Risk

We found no significant difference in the funding of government and opposition electorates. However, more money was given to electorates that were safely held by the major parties. These seats received $1.29 for every dollar given to marginal and independent seats with government marginals getting the least. Electorates also receive different levels of funding according to which region they are in. Such variations may reflect valid agency objectives such as meeting State Plan targets or addressing socio-economic disadvantage.

But while agencies publish who gets what, they do not adequately evaluate or explain what grant programs have achieved. As a result, there is a risk that New South Wales may not get the best value for its spending. We recommend that agencies regularly evaluate their grant programs and publish the results.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #186 - released 6 May 2009

Published

Actions for Review of Eastern Distributor

Review of Eastern Distributor

Transport
Infrastructure
Procurement
Project management

Following a resolution of the Legislative Council, the Audit Office has undertaken a performance audit of the Eastern Distributor. For a number of reasons, The Audit Office is not in the position to determine “whether the proposed toll and concession period represents the best deal”. In part this is the result of time constraints which do not allow a careful analysis of many toll and concession options. Similarly, the audit does not answer “whether the current proposal represents the best environmental outcome”. But each of these issues (toll and concession and environmental consequences) is discussed in the audit report.

The Audit Office recommends that the Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA), for any further major project of this type, ensures that it establishes a process which allows all decision makers to have a thorough understanding of the reasonableness of the proponents’ offers and their implications for the State and for the public. The Audit Office also recommends that the RTA should at the outset consult with TCorp in respect of each major project put to tender.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #42 - released 31 July 1997