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Actions for Mobile speed cameras

Mobile speed cameras

Transport
Compliance
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Regulation
Service delivery

Key aspects of the state’s mobile speed camera program need to be improved to maximise road safety benefits, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. Mobile speed cameras are deployed in a limited number of locations with a small number of these being used frequently. This, along with decisions to limit the hours that mobile speed cameras operate, and to use multiple warning signs, have reduced the broad deterrence of speeding across the general network - the main policy objective of the mobile speed camera program.

The primary goal of speed cameras is to reduce speeding and make the roads safer. Our 2011 performance audit on speed cameras found that, in general, speed cameras change driver behaviour and have a positive impact on road safety.

Transport for NSW published the NSW Speed Camera Strategy in June 2012 in response to our audit. According to the Strategy, the main purpose of mobile speed cameras is to reduce speeding across the road network by providing a general deterrence through anywhere, anytime enforcement and by creating a perceived risk of detection across the road network. Fixed and red-light speed cameras aim to reduce speeding at specific locations.

Roads and Maritime Services and Transport for NSW deploy mobile speed cameras (MSCs) in consultation with NSW Police. The cameras are operated by contractors authorised by Roads and Maritime Services. MSC locations are stretches of road that can be more than 20 kilometres long. MSC sites are specific places within these locations that meet the requirements for a MSC vehicle to be able to operate there.

This audit assessed whether the mobile speed camera program is effectively managed to maximise road safety benefits across the NSW road network.

Conclusion

The mobile speed camera program requires improvements to key aspects of its management to maximise road safety benefits. While camera locations have been selected based on crash history, the limited number of locations restricts network coverage. It also makes enforcement more predictable, reducing the ability to provide a general deterrence. Implementation of the program has been consistent with government decisions to limit its hours of operation and use multiple warning signs. These factors limit the ability of the mobile speed camera program to effectively deliver a broad general network deterrence from speeding.

Many locations are needed to enable network-wide coverage and ensure MSC sessions are randomised and not predictable. However, there are insufficient locations available to operate MSCs that meet strict criteria for crash history, operator safety, signage and technical requirements. MSC performance would be improved if there were more locations.

A scheduling system is meant to randomise MSC location visits to ensure they are not predictable. However, a relatively small number of locations have been visited many times making their deployment more predictable in these places. The allocation of MSCs across the time of day, day of week and across regions is prioritised based on crash history but the frequency of location visits does not correspond with the crash risk for each location.

There is evidence of a reduction in fatal and serious crashes at the 30 best-performing MSC locations. However, there is limited evidence that the current MSC program in NSW has led to a behavioural change in drivers by creating a general network deterrence. While the overall reduction in serious injuries on roads has continued, fatalities have started to climb again. Compliance with speed limits has improved at the sites and locations that MSCs operate, but the results of overall network speed surveys vary, with recent improvements in some speed zones but not others.
There is no supporting justification for the number of hours of operation for the program. The rate of MSC enforcement (hours per capita) in NSW is less than Queensland and Victoria. The government decision to use multiple warning signs has made it harder to identify and maintain suitable MSC locations, and impeded their use for enforcement in both traffic directions and in school zones. 

Appendix one - Response from agency

Appendix two - About the audit

Appendix three - Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #308 - released 18 October 2018

Published

Actions for Improving Road Safety: Heavy Vehicles

Improving Road Safety: Heavy Vehicles

Transport
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Regulation
Risk

The RTA (Roads and Traffic Authority) approach to detecting and enforcing heavy vehicle safety has produced mixed results. There have been overall decreases in the number of crashes and people killed and injured in crashes involving heavy vehicles between 2002 and 2007. However, the number of crashes and the number of people injured have increased between 2006 and 2007.

We recognise that the RTA is unable to prevent all crashes. However, we consider that the RTA could do more to improve its ability to detect and respond to high risk heavy vehicles travelling on our roads.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #187 - released 13 May 2009

Published

Actions for Managing Disruptions to Cityrail Passenger Services

Managing Disruptions to Cityrail Passenger Services

Transport
Management and administration
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

About one in every twelve Sydney people travels by train each weekday.

Unplanned disruptions to services are inevitable, even on the best-run railways.

Because of the complexities of Sydney’s rail network, a single event can disrupt many services.

From a passenger’s perspective, three issues are important –

  • how quickly the disruption is fixed (“When will my train arrive?”)
  • the accuracy of information provided about the disruption (“Should I change my travel/meeting/other arrangements?”)
  • how often the disruptions occur (“Should I give up on rail travel?”).

In this audit, we looked at how well RailCorp responds when there are routine disruptions to its CityRail passenger services. We focused on how RailCorp manages passenger journeys and informs passengers.

This report informs Parliament and the community about the limitations of the current system, and what more needs to be done in order to minimise the impact of disruptions on passengers.

It should also help passengers judge the extent to which they can rely on the information they receive, and to better understand some of the obstacles faced by staff.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #139 - released 22 June 2005

Published

Actions for Follow-up of Performance Audit: Bus Maintenance and Bus Contracts

Follow-up of Performance Audit: Bus Maintenance and Bus Contracts

Transport
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

Periodically we review the extent to which agencies have implemented the recommendations they accepted from our earlier audits.

This gives Parliament and the public an update on the extent of progress made.

In this follow-up audit, we examine changes following our May 2002 report on how well the:

  • State Transit Authority maintained its buses
  • Ministry of Transport administered contracts for the provision of regular passenger bus services.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #138 - released 14 June 2005