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Actions for Internal controls and governance 2020

Internal controls and governance 2020

Education
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Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford today released her report on the findings and recommendations from the 2019–20 financial audits that relate to internal controls and governance at 40 of the largest agencies in the NSW public sector.

The bushfire and flood emergencies and the COVID‑19 pandemic continue to have a significant impact on the people and public sector of New South Wales. The scale of the government response to these events has been significant. The report focuses on the effectiveness of internal controls and governance processes, including relevant agencies’ response to the emergencies. In particular, the report focuses on:

  • financial and information technology controls
  • business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements
  • procurement, including emergency procurement
  • delegations that support timely and effective decision-making.

Due to the ongoing impact of COVID‑19 agencies have not yet returned to a business‑as‑usual environment. ‘Agencies will need to assess their response to the recent emergencies and update their business continuity, disaster recovery and other business resilience frameworks to reflect the lessons learnt from these events’ the Auditor-General said.

The report noted that special procurement provisions were put in place to allow agencies to better respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Auditor-General recommended agencies update their procurement policies to reflect the current requirements of the NSW Procurement Framework and the emergency procurement requirements.

Read the PDF report

This report analyses the internal controls and governance of 40 of the largest agencies in the NSW public sector for the year ended 30 June 2020. These 40 agencies constitute an estimated 85 per cent of total expenditure for all NSW public sector agencies.

1. Internal control trends
New, repeat and high risk findings

Internal control deficiencies increased by 13 per cent compared to last year. This is predominately due to a seven per cent increase in new internal control deficiencies and 24 per cent increase in repeat internal control deficiencies. There were ten high risk findings compared to four last year.

The recent emergencies have consumed agency time and resources and may have contributed to the increase in internal control deficiencies, particularly repeat deficiencies.

Agencies should:

  • prioritise addressing high-risk findings
  • address repeat internal control deficiencies by re-setting action plans and timeframes and monitoring the implementation status of recommendations.
Common findings

A number of findings remain common across multiple agencies over the last four years, including:

  • out of date or missing policies to guide appropriate decisions
  • poor record keeping and document retention
  • incomplete or inaccurate centralised registers or gaps in these registers.
2. Information technology controls
IT general controls

We found deficiencies in information security controls over key financial systems including:

  • user access administration deficiencies relating to inadequate oversight of the granting, review and removal of user access at 53 per cent of agencies
  • privileged users were not appropriately monitored at 43 per cent of agencies
  • deficient password controls that did not align to the agency's own password policies at 25 per cent of agencies.

The deficiencies above increase the risk of non-compliance with the NSW Cyber Security Policy, which requires agencies to have processes in place to manage user access, including privileged user access to sensitive information or systems and remove that access once it is not required or employment is terminated.

3. Business continuity and disaster recovery planning
Assessing risks to business continuity and Scenario testing

The response to the recent emergencies and the COVID-19 pandemic has encompassed a wide range of activities, including policy setting, on-going service delivery, safety and availability of staff, availability of IT and other systems and financial management. Agencies were required to activate their business continuity plans in response, and with the continued impact of COVID-19 have not yet returned to a business-as-usual environment.

Our audits focused on the preparedness of agency business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

We identified deficiencies in agency business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements. Twenty-three per cent of agencies had not conducted a business impact analysis (BIA) to identify critical business functions and determine business continuity priorities. Agencies can also improve the content of their BIA. For example, ten per cent of agencies' BIAs did not include recovery time objectives and six per cent of agencies did not identify key IT systems that support critical business functions. Scenario testing improves the effectiveness with which a live crisis is handled, but 40 per cent of agencies had not conducted a business continuity scenario testing exercise in the period from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2019. There were also opportunities to improve the effectiveness of scenario testing exercises by:

  • involving key dependent or inter-dependent third parties who support or deliver critical business functions
  • testing one or more high impact scenarios identified in their business continuity plan
  • preparing a formalpost-exercise report documenting the outcome of their scenario testing.

Agencies have responded to the recent emergencies but addressing deficiencies will ensure agencies have adequate safeguards in their processes to again respond in the future, if required.

During 2020–21 we plan to conduct a performance audit on 'Business continuity and disaster recovery planning'. This audit will consider the effectiveness of agency business continuity planning arrangements to maintain business continuity through the recent emergencies and/or COVID-19 pandemic and return to a business-as-usual environment. We also plan to conduct a performance audit on whole-of-government 'Coordination of emergency responses'.

Responding to disruptions

We found agencies' governance functions could have been better informed about responses to disruptive incidents that had activated a business continuity or disaster recovery response between 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2019. For instance:

in 89 per cent of instances where a business continuity response was activated, a post-incident review had been performed. In 82 per cent of these instances, the outcomes were reported to a relevant governance or executive management committee

in 95 per cent of instances where a disaster recovery response was activated, a post incident review had been performed. In 86 per cent of these instances, the outcomes were reported to a relevant governance committee or executive management committee.

Examples of recorded incidents included extensive air quality issues and power outages due to bushfires, system and network outages, and infected and hijacked servers.

Agencies should assess their response to the recent emergencies and the COVID-19 pandemic and update business continuity, disaster recovery and other business resilience frameworks to incorporate lessons learned. Agencies should report to those charged with governance on the results and planned actions.

Management review and oversight Eighty-two per cent and 86 per cent of agencies report to their audit and risk committees (ARC) on their business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements, respectively. Only 18 per cent and five per cent of ARCs are briefed on the results of respective scenario testing. Briefing ARCs on the results of scenario testing exercises helps inform their decisions about whether sound and effective business continuity and disaster recovery arrangements have been established.
4. Procurement, including emergency procurement
Policy framework

Agency procurement policies did not capture the requirements of several key NSW Procurement Board Directions (the Directions), increasing the risk of non-compliance with the Directions. We noted: 

  • 67 per cent of agencies did specify that procurement above $650,000 must be open to market unless exempt or procured through an existing Whole of Government Scheme or contract
  • 36 per cent of agencies did specify that procurements above $500,000 payable in foreign currencies must be hedged
  • 69 per cent of agencies' policies did specify that the agency head or cluster CFO must authorise the engagement of consultants where the engagement of the supplier does not comply with the standard commercial framework.

Recommendation: Agencies should review their procurement policies and guidelines to ensure they capture the key requirements of the NSW Government Procurement Policy Framework, including NSW Procurement Board Directions.

Managing contracts

Eighty-eight per cent of agencies maintain a central contract register to record all details of contracts above $150,000, which is a requirement of GIPA legislation. Of the agencies that maintained registers, 13 per cent did not capture all contracts and eight per cent did not include all relevant contract details.

Sixteen per cent of agencies did not periodically review their contract register. Timely review increases compliance with GIPA legislation, and enhances the effectiveness with which procurement business units monitor contract end dates, contract extensions and commence new procurement.

Training and support

Ninety-three per cent of agencies provide training to staff involved in procurement processes, and a further 77 per cent of agencies provide this training on an on-going basis. Of the seven per cent of agencies that had not provided training to staff, we noted gaps in aspects of their procurement activity, including:

  • not conducting value for money assessments prior to renewing or extending the contract with their existing supplier
  • not obtaining approval from a delegated authority to commence the procurement process
  • procurement documentation not specifying certain key details such as the conditions for participation including any financial guarantees and dates for the delivery of goods or supply of services.

Training on procurement activities ensures there is effective management of procurement processes to support operational requirements, and compliance with procurement directions.

Procurement activities While agencies had implemented controls for tender activities above $650,000, 43 per cent of unaccredited agencies did not comply with the NSW Procurement Policy Framework because they had not had their procurement endorsed by an accredited agency within the cluster or by NSW Procurement. This endorsement aims to ensure the procurement is properly planned to deliver a value for money outcome before it commences.
Emergency procurement

As at 30 June 2020, agencies within the scope of this report reported conducting 32,239 emergency procurements with a total contract value of $316,908,485. Emergency procurement activities included the purchase of COVID-19 cleaning and hygiene supplies.

The government, through NSW Procurement released the 'COVID-19 Emergency procurement procedure', which relaxed procurement requirements to allow agencies to make COVID-19 emergency procurements. Our review against the emergency procurement measures found most agencies complied with requirements. For example:

  • 95 per cent of agencies documented an assessment of the need for the emergency procurement for the good and/or service
  • 86 per cent of agencies obtained authorisation of the emergency procurement by the agency head or the nominated employee under Public Works and Procurement Regulation 2019
  • 76 per cent of agencies reported the emergency procurement to the NSW Procurement Board.

Complying with the procedure helps to ensure government resources are being efficiently, effectively, economically and in accordance with the law.

Recommendation: Agency procurement frameworks should be reviewed and updated so they can respond effectively to emergency situations that may arise in the future. This includes:

  • updating procurement policies and guidelines to define an emergency situation, specify who can approve emergency procurement and capture other key requirements
  • using standard templates and documentation to prompt users to capture key requirements, such as needs analysis, supplier selection criteria, price assessment criteria, licence and insurance checks
  • having processes for reporting on emergency procurements to those charged with governance and NSW Procurement.
5. Delegations
Instruments of delegation

We found that agencies have established financial and human resources delegations, but some had not revisited their delegation manuals following the legislative and machinery of government changes. For those agencies impacted by machinery of government changes we noted:

  • 16 per cent of agencies had not updated their financial delegations to reflect the changes
  • 16 per cent of agencies did not update their human resources delegations to reflect the changes.

Delegations manuals are not always complete; 16 per cent of agencies had no delegation for writing off bad debts and 26 per cent of agencies had no delegation for writing off capital assets.

Recommendation: Agencies should ensure their financial and human resources delegation manuals contain regular set review dates and are updated to reflect the Government Sector Finance Act 2018, machinery of government changes and their current organisational structure and roles and responsibilities.

Compliance with delegations

Agencies did not understand or correctly apply the requirements of the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 (GSF Act), resulting in non-compliance with the Act. We found that 18 per cent of agencies spent deemed appropriations without obtaining an authorised delegation from the relevant Minister(s), as required by sections 4.6(1) and 5.5(3) of the GSF Act.

Further detail on this issue will be included in our Auditor-General's Reports to Parliament on Central Agencies, Education, Health and Stronger Communities, which will be tabled throughout December 2020.

Recommendation: Agencies should review financial and human resources delegations to ensure they capture all key functions of laws and regulations, and clearly specify the relevant power or function being conferred on the officer.

6. Status of 2019 recommendations
Progress implementing last year's recommendations

Recommendations were made last year to improve transparency over reporting on gifts and benefits and improve the visibility management and those charged with governance had over actions taken to address conflicts of interest that may arise. This year, we continue to note:

  • 38 per cent of agencies have not updated their gifts and benefits register to include all the key fields required under the minimum standards set by the Public Service Commission
  • 56 per cent of agencies have not provided training to staff and 63 per cent of agencies have not implemented an annual attestation process for senior management
  • 97 per cent of agencies have not published their gifts and benefits register on their website and 41 per cent of agencies are not reporting on trends in the gifts and benefits register to those charged with governance.

While we acknowledge the significance of the recent emergencies, which have consumed agency time and resources, we note limited progress has been made implementing these recommendations. Further detail on the status of implementing all recommendations is in Appendix 2.

Recommendation: Agencies should re-visit the recommendations made in last year's report on internal controls and governance and action these recommendations.

Internal controls are processes, policies and procedures that help agencies to:

  • operate effectively and efficiently
  • produce reliable financial reports
  • comply with laws and regulations
  • support ethical government.

This chapter outlines the overall trends for agency controls and governance issues, including the number of audit findings, the degree of risk those deficiencies pose to the agency, and a summary of the most common deficiencies we found across agencies. The rest of this report presents this year’s controls and governance findings in more detail.

Section highlights

We identified ten high risk findings, compared to four last year with two findings repeated from the previous year. There was an overall increase of 13 per cent in the number of internal control deficiencies compared to last year due to a seven per cent increase in new internal control deficiencies, and a 24 per cent increase in repeat internal control deficiencies. The recent emergencies have consumed agency time and resources and may have contributed to the increase in internal control deficiencies, particularly repeat deficiencies.

We identified a number of findings that remain common across multiple agencies over the last four years. Some of these findings related to areas that are fundamental to good internal control environments and effective organisational governance. Examples include:

  • out of date or missing policies to guide appropriate decisions
  • poor record keeping and document retention
  • incomplete or inaccurate centralised registers, or gaps in these registers.

Policies, procedures and internal controls should be properly designed, be appropriate for the current organisational structure and its business activities, and work effectively.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency controls to manage key financial systems.

Section highlights

Government agencies’ financial reporting is heavily reliant on information technology (IT). We continue to see a high number of deficiencies related to IT general controls, particularly those related to user access administration. These controls are key in adequately protecting IT systems from inappropriate access and misuse.

IT is also important to the delivery of agency services. These systems often provide the data to help monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of agency processes and services they deliver. Our financial audits do not review all agency IT systems. For example, IT systems used to support agency service delivery are generally outside the scope of our financial audit. However, agencies should also consider the relevance of our findings to these systems.

Agencies need to continue to focus on assessing the risks of inappropriate access and misuse and the implementation of controls to adequately protect their systems, focussing on the processes in place to grant, remove and monitor user access, particularly privileged user access.

 

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements.

Section highlights

We identified deficiencies in agency business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements and opportunities for agencies to enhance their business continuity management and disaster recovery planning arrangements. This will better prepare them to respond to a disruption to their critical functions, resulting from an emergency or other serious event. Twenty-three per cent of agencies had not conducted a business impact analysis (BIA) to identify critical business functions and determine business continuity priorities and 40 per cent of agencies had not conducted a business continuity scenario testing exercise in the period from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2019. Scenario testing improves the effectiveness with which a live crisis is handled.

This section focusses on the preparedness of agency business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. While agencies have responded to the recent emergencies, proactively addressing deficiencies will ensure agencies have adequate safeguards in their processes to again respond in the future, if required.

During 2020–21 we plan to conduct a performance audit on 'Business continuity and disaster recovery planning'. This audit will consider the effectiveness of agency business continuity planning arrangements to maintain business continuity through the recent emergencies and/or COVID-19 pandemic and return to a business-as-usual environment. We also plan to conduct a performance audit on whole-of-government 'Coordination of emergency responses'.

 

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of procurement agency procurement policies and procurement activity.

Section highlights

We found agencies have procurement policies in place to manage procurement activity, but the content of these policies was not sufficiently detailed to ensure compliance with NSW Procurement Board Directions (the Directions). The Directions aim to ensure procurement activity achieves value for money and meets the principles of probity and fairness.

Agencies have generally implemented controls over their procurement process. In relation to emergency procurement activity, agencies reported conducting 32,239 emergency procurements with a total contract value of $316,908,485 up to 30 June 2020. Our review of emergency procurement activity conducted during 2019–20 identified areas where some agencies did not fully comply with the 'COVID-19 Emergency procurement procedure'.

We also found not all agencies are maintaining complete and accurate contract registers. This not only increases the risk of non-compliance with GIPA legislation, but also limits the effectiveness of procurement business units to monitor contract end dates, contract extensions and commence new procurement in a timely manner. We noted instances where agencies renewed or extended contracts without going through a competitive tender process during the year.

 

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency compliance with financial and human resources delegations.

Section highlights
We found that agencies are not always regularly reviewing and updating their financial and human resources delegations when there are changes to legislation or other organisational changes within the agency or from machinery of government changes. For example, agencies did not understand or correctly apply the requirements of the GSF Act, resulting in non-compliance with the Act. We found that 18 per cent of agencies spent deemed appropriations without obtaining an authorised delegation from the relevant Minister(s), as required by sections 4.6(1) and 5.5(3) of the GSF Act.
In order for agencies to operate efficiently, make necessary expenditure and human resource decisions quickly and lawfully, particularly in emergency situations, it is important that delegations are kept up to date, provide clear authority to decision makers and are widely communicated.

Appendix one – List of 2020 recommendations 

Appendix two – Status of 2019 recommendations

Appendix three – Cluster agencies

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for CBD South East Sydney Light Rail: follow-up performance audit

CBD South East Sydney Light Rail: follow-up performance audit

Transport
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Risk
Service delivery

This is a follow-up to the Auditor-General's November 2016 report on the CBD South East Sydney Light Rail project. This follow-up report assessed whether Transport for NSW has updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits.

The audit found that Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public.

The Auditor-General reports that the total cost of the project will exceed $3.1 billion, which is above the revised cost of $2.9 billion published in November 2019. $153.84 million of additional costs are due to omitted costs for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays.

The report makes four recommendations to Transport for NSW to publicly report on the final project cost, the updated expected project benefits, the benefits achieved in the first year of operations and the average weekly journey times.

Read full report (PDF)

The CBD and South East Light Rail is a 12 km light rail network for Sydney. It extends from Circular Quay along George Street to Central Station, through Surry Hills to Moore Park, then to Kensington and Kingsford via Anzac Parade and Randwick via Alison Road and High Street.

Transport for NSW (TfNSW) is responsible for planning, procuring and delivering the Central Business District and South East Light Rail (CSELR) project. In December 2014, TfNSW entered into a public private partnership with ALTRAC Light Rail as the operating company (OpCo) responsible for delivering, operating and maintaining the CSELR. OpCo engaged Alstom and Acciona, who together form its Design and Construct Contractor (D&C).

On 14 December 2019, passenger services started on the line between Circular Quay and Randwick. Passenger services on the line between Circular Quay and Kingsford commenced on 3 April 2020.

In November 2016, the Auditor-General published a performance audit report on the CSELR project. The audit found that TfNSW would deliver the CSELR at a higher cost with lower benefits than in the approved business case, and recommended that TfNSW update and consolidate information about project costs and benefits and ensure the information is readily accessible to the public.

In November 2018, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) examined TfNSW's actions taken in response to our 2016 performance audit report on the CSELR project. The PAC recommended that the Auditor-General consider undertaking a follow-up audit on the CSELR project. The purpose of this follow-up performance audit is to assess whether TfNSW has effectively updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits for the CSELR project.

Conclusion

Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated CSLER project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public. In line with the NSW Government Benefits Realisation Management Framework, TfNSW intends to measure benefits after the project is completed and has not updated the expected project benefits since April 2015.

Between February 2015 and December 2019, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) regularly updated capital expenditure costs for the CSELR in internal monthly financial performance and risk reports. These reports did not include all the costs incurred by TfNSW to manage and commission the CSELR project.

Omitted costs of $153.84 million for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays will bring the current estimated total cost of the CSELR project to $3.147 billion.

From February 2015, TfNSW did not regularly provide the financial performance and risk reports to key CSELR project governance bodies. TfNSW publishes information on project costs and benefits on the Sydney Light Rail website. However, the information on project costs has not always been accurate or current.

TfNSW is working with OpCo partners to deliver the expected journey time benefits. A key benefit defined in the business plan was that bus services would be reduced owing to transfer of demand to the light rail - entailing a saving. However, TfNSW reports that the full expected benefit of changes to bus services will not be realised due to bus patronage increasing above forecasted levels.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Governance and reporting arrangements for the CSELR

Appendix three – 2018 CSELR governance changes

Appendix four – About the audit

Appendix five – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #335 - released 11 June 2020

Published

Actions for Train station crowding

Train station crowding

Transport
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

This report focuses on how Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains manage crowding at selected metropolitan train stations.

The audit found that while Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, it does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. Sydney Trains 'do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed’, the Auditor-General said.

Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or station entries before crowding reaches unsafe levels or when it impacts on-time running. Assuming rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, causing customer delay. ‘Restricting customer access to platforms or station entries is not a sustainable approach to manage station crowding’, said the Auditor-General.

The Auditor-General made seven recommendations to improve Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains' management of station crowding. Transport for NSW have accepted these recommendations on behalf of the Transport cluster.

Public transport patronage has been impacted by COVID-19. This audit was conducted before these impacts occurred.

Read full report (PDF)

Sydney Trains patronage has increased by close to 34 per cent over the last five years, and Transport for NSW (TfNSW) expects the growth in patronage to continue over the next 30 years. As patronage increases there are more passengers entering and exiting stations, moving within stations to change services, and waiting on platforms. As a result, some Sydney metropolitan train stations are becoming increasingly crowded.

There are three main causes of station crowding:

  • patronage growth exceeding the current capacity limits of the rail network
  • service disruptions
  • special events.

Crowds can inhibit movement, cause discomfort and can lead to increased health and safety risks to customers. In the context of a train service, unmanaged crowds can affect service operation as trains spend longer at platforms waiting for customers to alight and board services which can cause service delays. Crowding can also prevent customers from accessing services.

Our 2017 performance audit, ‘Passenger Rail Punctuality’, found that rail agencies would find it hard to maintain train punctuality after 2019 unless they significantly increased the capacity of the network to carry trains and people. TfNSW and Sydney Trains have plans to improve the network to move more passengers. These plans are set out in strategies such as More Trains, More Services and in the continued implementation of new infrastructure such as the Sydney Metro. Since 2017, TfNSW and Sydney Trains have introduced 1,500 more weekly services to increase capacity. Additional network capacity improvements are in progress for delivery from 2022 onwards.

In the meantime, TfNSW and Sydney Trains need to use other ways of managing crowding at train stations until increased capacity comes on line.

This audit examined how effectively TfNSW and Sydney Trains are managing crowding at selected metropolitan train stations in the short and medium term. In doing so, the audit examined how TfNSW and Sydney Trains know whether there is a crowding problem at stations and how they manage that crowding.

TfNSW is the lead agency for transport in NSW. TfNSW is responsible for setting the standard working timetable that Sydney Trains must implement. Sydney Trains is responsible for operating and maintaining the Sydney metropolitan heavy rail passenger service. This includes operating, staffing and maintaining most metropolitan stations. Sydney Trains’ overall responsibility is to run a safe rail network to timetable.

Conclusion

Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, but does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. TfNSW and Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers, but do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed. TfNSW is delivering a program to influence demand for transport in key precincts but the effectiveness of this program and its impact on station crowding is unclear as Transport for NSW has not evaluated the outcomes of the program.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. Data and observation on dwell time, which is the time a train waits at a platform for customers to get on and off trains, inform the development of operational approaches to manage crowding at stations. Sydney Trains has KPIs on reliability, punctuality and customer experience and use these to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. TfNSW and Sydney Trains only formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events.

Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for crowd management to Customer Area Managers, who rely on frontline Sydney Trains staff to understand how crowding affects individual stations. Station staff at identified key metropolitan train stations have developed customer management plans (also known as crowd management plans). However, Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring and evaluation of these plans and does not systematically collect data on when station staff activate crowding interventions under these plans.

Sydney Trains stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services. Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or stations before crowding reaches unsafe levels, or when it impacts on-time running. As rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will need to increase its use of interventions to manage crowding. As Sydney Trains restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, it is likely these customers will experience delays caused by these interventions.

Since 2015, TfNSW has been delivering the 'Travel Choices' program which aims to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services in key precincts. TfNSW is unable to provide data demonstrating the overall effectiveness of this program and the impact the program has on distributing public transport usage out of peak AM and PM times. TfNSW and Sydney Trains continue to explore initiatives to specifically address crowd management.

Conclusion

TfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. There are no key performance indicators directly related to station crowding. Sydney Trains uses performance indicators on reliability, punctuality and customer experience to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. Sydney Trains does not have a routine process for identifying whether crowding contributed to minor safety incidents. TfNSW and Sydney Trains formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events.

 

Conclusion

Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a strategic risk but does not have an overarching strategy to manage station crowding. Sydney Trains' stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services.

Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers but does not have sufficient oversight to know that station crowding is effectively managed. Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring or evaluation of crowd management plans at key metropolitan train stations. The use of crowding interventions is likely to increase due to increasing patronage, causing more customers to experience delays directly caused by these activities.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains have developed interventions to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services but are yet to evaluate these interventions. As such, their impact on managing station crowding is unclear.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Sydney rail network

Appendix three – Rail services contract

Appendix four – Crowding pedestrian modelling

Appendix five – Airport Link stations case study

Appendix six – About the audit

Appendix seven – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #333 - released 30 April 2020

 

Published

Actions for Handback of the M4 Tollway

Handback of the M4 Tollway

Transport
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management

This audit focuses on the M4 handback. It looks at whether the road will be in good condition when the State gets it back, and whether it will cope with the extra traffic after the toll is removed. These are critical issues for taxpayers and motorists. Taxpayers don’t want to be responsible for a large repair bill and motorists don’t want to be stuck in traffic jams.

To ensure that future private sector partnerships (PPP) deal adequately with handback, we recommend that the Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA):

  • ensure deeds spell out an appropriate inspection and testing program to determine repairs required to bring roads up to a satisfactory condition at handback (p.11)
  • ensure deeds link condition standards and maintenance approaches to changing industry standards and approaches over the life of the PPP (p.11)
  • consider including in deeds a requirement that operators provide a performance bond or similar security over the cost of handback repairs (p.11)
  • review the lessons learnt from the M4 tollway handback and determine whether it should seek to negotiate changes to existing tollway deeds to better deal with handback, by June 2010 (p.11)

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #193 - released 27 October 2009

Published

Actions for Administering Domestic Waterfront Tenancies

Administering Domestic Waterfront Tenancies

Planning
Transport
Management and administration
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration

The audit’s overall conclusion is that Lands and Maritime are broadly achieving outcomes consistent with the IPART report on administering domestic waterfront tenancies. But a lack of collaboration between the agencies is contributing to poor customer service. Inconsistencies with the IPART report recommendations and operational differences between the two agencies result in different rents and conditions for tenants in the two agencies. The differences are having a significant impact on customer service.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #191 - released 23 September 2009

Published

Actions for Improving Road Safety: Heavy Vehicles

Improving Road Safety: Heavy Vehicles

Transport
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Regulation
Risk

The RTA (Roads and Traffic Authority) approach to detecting and enforcing heavy vehicle safety has produced mixed results. There have been overall decreases in the number of crashes and people killed and injured in crashes involving heavy vehicles between 2002 and 2007. However, the number of crashes and the number of people injured have increased between 2006 and 2007.

We recognise that the RTA is unable to prevent all crashes. However, we consider that the RTA could do more to improve its ability to detect and respond to high risk heavy vehicles travelling on our roads.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #187 - released 13 May 2009

Published

Actions for Liverpool to Parramatta Bus Transitway

Liverpool to Parramatta Bus Transitway

Transport
Treasury
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Project management
Service delivery

Several of my recent audits have identified a need to improve our public transport system – both for the benefit of travellers and to assist in achieving better air quality.

Bus Transitways can provide a good public transport solution for lower density population areas, potentially at a relatively low capital cost. This audit examines the transitway running between Liverpool and Parramatta, the first of several planned for Sydney. This audit should contribute to a better understanding of the lessons learnt from this first project, and so to future transitways providing better value for money.

But this audit also raises broader issues.

It highlights the importance of accurately projecting the total cost of major infrastructure projects before governments lock in their decisions. It also highlights the need for sound decision-making processes when government agencies compete with the private sector. The principles and recommendations flowing from these issues are ones I would draw to the attention of all agencies, and to the Government.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #146 - released 5 December 2005

Published

Actions for Managing Disruptions to Cityrail Passenger Services

Managing Disruptions to Cityrail Passenger Services

Transport
Management and administration
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

About one in every twelve Sydney people travels by train each weekday.

Unplanned disruptions to services are inevitable, even on the best-run railways.

Because of the complexities of Sydney’s rail network, a single event can disrupt many services.

From a passenger’s perspective, three issues are important –

  • how quickly the disruption is fixed (“When will my train arrive?”)
  • the accuracy of information provided about the disruption (“Should I change my travel/meeting/other arrangements?”)
  • how often the disruptions occur (“Should I give up on rail travel?”).

In this audit, we looked at how well RailCorp responds when there are routine disruptions to its CityRail passenger services. We focused on how RailCorp manages passenger journeys and informs passengers.

This report informs Parliament and the community about the limitations of the current system, and what more needs to be done in order to minimise the impact of disruptions on passengers.

It should also help passengers judge the extent to which they can rely on the information they receive, and to better understand some of the obstacles faced by staff.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #139 - released 22 June 2005

Published

Actions for Follow-up of Performance Audit: Bus Maintenance and Bus Contracts

Follow-up of Performance Audit: Bus Maintenance and Bus Contracts

Transport
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

Periodically we review the extent to which agencies have implemented the recommendations they accepted from our earlier audits.

This gives Parliament and the public an update on the extent of progress made.

In this follow-up audit, we examine changes following our May 2002 report on how well the:

  • State Transit Authority maintained its buses
  • Ministry of Transport administered contracts for the provision of regular passenger bus services.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #138 - released 14 June 2005

Published

Actions for Review of Eastern Distributor

Review of Eastern Distributor

Transport
Infrastructure
Procurement
Project management

Following a resolution of the Legislative Council, the Audit Office has undertaken a performance audit of the Eastern Distributor. For a number of reasons, The Audit Office is not in the position to determine “whether the proposed toll and concession period represents the best deal”. In part this is the result of time constraints which do not allow a careful analysis of many toll and concession options. Similarly, the audit does not answer “whether the current proposal represents the best environmental outcome”. But each of these issues (toll and concession and environmental consequences) is discussed in the audit report.

The Audit Office recommends that the Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA), for any further major project of this type, ensures that it establishes a process which allows all decision makers to have a thorough understanding of the reasonableness of the proponents’ offers and their implications for the State and for the public. The Audit Office also recommends that the RTA should at the outset consult with TCorp in respect of each major project put to tender.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #42 - released 31 July 1997