The report includes comments on his financial audits of NSW Government transport, planning and industry agencies for 2009-10. A key recommendation from the report is that the New South Wales Government identify lessons learnt from the metro experience and ensure that future decision processes are developed to ensure the State never again expends such a large amount of scarce transport funding dollars and valuable time on a project that does not proceed.

The report includes comments on NSW Treasury and agencies in the finance and superannuation sectors. The New South Wales public sector superannuation funds’ investments were $42.2 billion at 30 June 2010, up from $38.5 billion in 2009. Investment returns reached 14.5 per cent in 2009-10. This is a significant improvement on the investment returns of up to negative 18.4 per cent at the peak of the global financial crisis in 2008.
 

The final Budget result for 2009-10 was a surplus of $994 million, originally budgeted to be a $990 million deficit. If the Commonwealth Government’s capital stimulus funding had been excluded, the result would have been a deficit of $861 million. Employee costs (excluding superannuation costs) increased by approximately 3.5 per cent compared to 7.5 per cent in the prior year.
 
“I have issued a qualified Independent Auditor’s Report as the State has not recognised the value of Crown Reserves and the infrastructure on those reserves that should be recorded as an asset,” Mr Achterstraat said. 

The 2004 Review of Bus Services in NSW always envisaged that there would be a transition period as the new bus contracts were introduced. NSWTI has developed and implemented the new arrangements, and pursued a range of new initiatives including the network improvement program, strategic corridors and uniform bus fares and concessions. The new contracts provided for a performance management regime to hold operators accountable. But this is still being developed four years after the bus contracts came into effect and it remains unproven as a basis for ensuring value for money from the contracts - each of which guarantees monopoly rights to the operators.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #198 - released 10 March 2010

This audit focuses on the M4 handback. It looks at whether the road will be in good condition when the State gets it back, and whether it will cope with the extra traffic after the toll is removed. These are critical issues for taxpayers and motorists. Taxpayers don’t want to be responsible for a large repair bill and motorists don’t want to be stuck in traffic jams.

To ensure that future private sector partnerships (PPP) deal adequately with handback, we recommend that the Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA):

• ensure deeds spell out an appropriate inspection and testing program to determine repairs required to bring roads up to a satisfactory condition at handback (p.11)
• ensure deeds link condition standards and maintenance approaches to changing industry standards and approaches over the life of the PPP (p.11)
• consider including in deeds a requirement that operators provide a performance bond or similar security over the cost of handback repairs (p.11)
• review the lessons learnt from the M4 tollway handback and determine whether it should seek to negotiate changes to existing tollway deeds to better deal with handback, by June 2010 (p.11)

Parliamentary reference - Report number #193 - released 27 October 2009

Agencies have managed the planning of outsourcing in a competent way. All agencies satisfactorily managed the contractual aspects of outsourcing. The Audit Office is of the opinion, however, that there is no objective evidence to demonstrate that agencies have achieved their goals in outsourcing IT. Most agencies had identified the current and expected costs and risks of outsourcing. Agencies were not able to demonstrate that the actual costs of outsourcing matched the expected costs.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #103 - released 23 October 2002

State Transit has developed fleet management plans and maintenance standards that meet its regulatory and contractual obligations as a bus operator and are consistent with vehicle manufacturers’ standards and best practice. However, assumptions used in fleet management plans to forecast fleet growth may not result in the most efficient and effective outcome for State Transit. Forecasts fail to take account of opportunities to redesign or reduce services where they exceed contract requirements and are difficult to justify on a commercial basis. Of greater concern are the consequences arising from bus maintenance practices not meeting State Transit’s own standards.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #97 - released 29 May 2002