Refine search Expand filter

Reports

Published

Actions for Transport 2020

Transport 2020

Transport
Asset valuation
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Information technology
Infrastructure
Project management

1. Financial Reporting

Audit opinion Unmodified audit opinions issued for the financial statements of all Transport cluster entities.
Quality and timeliness of financial reporting All cluster agencies met the statutory deadlines for completing the early close and submitting the financial statements.

Transport cluster agencies continued to experience some challenges with accounting for land and infrastructure assets. The former Roads and Maritime Services and Sydney Metro recorded prior period corrections to property, plant and equipment balances.
Impact of COVID-19 on passenger revenue and patronage Total patronage and revenue for public transport decreased by approximately 18 per cent in 2019–20 due to COVID-19.

The Transport cluster received additional funding from NSW Treasury during the year to support the reduced revenue and additional costs incurred such as cleaning on all modes of public transport and additional staff to manage physical distancing.
Completion of the CBD and South East Light Rail The CBD and South East Light Rail project was completed and commenced operations in this financial year. At 30 June 2020, the total cost of the project related to the CBD and South East Light Rail was $3.3 billion. Of this total cost, $2.6 billion was recorded as assets, whilst $700 million was expensed.

2. Audit Observations

Internal control While internal controls issues raised in management letters in the Transport cluster have decreased compared to the prior year, control weaknesses continue to exist in access security for financial systems. We identified 56 management letter findings across the cluster and 43 per cent of all issues were repeat issues. The majority of the repeat issues relate to information technology controls around user access management.

There were three high risk issues identified - two related to financial reporting of assets and one for implementation of TAHE (see below).
Agency responses to emergency events Transport for NSW established the COVID-19 Taskforce in March 2020 to take responsibility for the overall response of planning and coordination for the Transport cluster. It also implemented the COVIDSafe Transport Plan which incorporates guidance on physical distancing, increasing services to support social distancing and cleaning.
RailCorp transition to TAHE On 1 July 2020, RailCorp was renamed Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (TAHE) and converted to a for-profit statutory State-Owned Corporation. TAHE is a commercial for-profit Public Trading Entity with the intent to provide a commercial return to its shareholders.

A plan was established by NSW Treasury to transition RailCorp to TAHE which covered the period 1 July 2015 to 1 July 2019. A large portion of the planned arrangements were not implemented by 1 July 2020. As at the time of this report, the TAHE operating model, Statement of Corporate Intent (SCI) and other key plans and commercial agreements are not finalised. The State Owned Corporations Act 1989 generally requires finalisation of an SCI three months after the commencement of each financial year. However, under the Transport Administration Act 1988, TAHE received an extension from the voting shareholders, the Treasurer and Minister for Finance and Small Business, to submit its first SCI by 31 December 2020. In accordance with the original plan, interim commercial access arrangements were supposed to be in place with RailCorp prior to commencement of TAHE.

Under the transitional arrangements, TAHE is continuing to operate in accordance with the asset and safety management plans of RailCorp. The final operating model is expected to include considerations of safety, operational, financial and fiscal risks. This should include a consideration of the potential conflicting objectives of a commercial return, and maintenance and safety measures.

This matter has been included as a high risk finding in our management letter due to the significance of the financial reporting impacts and business risks for TAHE.

Recommendation: TAHE management should:
  • establish an operating model in line with the original intent of a commercial return
  • finalise commercial agreements with the public rail operators
  • confirm forecast financial information to assess valuation of TAHE infrastructure
  • finalise asset and safety management plans.

Resolution of the above matters are critical as they may significantly impact the financial reporting arrangements for TAHE for 2020–21, in particular, accounting policies adopted as well as measurement principles of its significant infrastructure asset base.

Completeness and accuracy of contracts registers Across the Transport cluster, contracts and agreements are maintained by the transport agencies using disparate registers.

Recommendation (repeat): Transport agencies should continue to implement a process to centrally capture all contracts and agreements entered. This will ensure:
  • agencies are fully aware of contractual and other obligations
  • appropriate assessment of financial reporting implications
  • ongoing assessments of accounting standards, in particular AASB 16 ‘Leases’, AASB 15 'Revenue from Contract with Customers', AASB 1058 'Income of Not-for-Profit Entities' and new accounting standard AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors' are accurate and complete.

 

This report provides parliament and other users of the Transport cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations
  • the impact of emergencies and the pandemic.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Transport cluster for 2020, including any financial implications from the recent emergency events.

Section highlights

  • Total patronage and revenue for public transport decreased by approximately 18 per cent in 2019–20 due to COVID-19.
  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all Transport agencies' financial statements.
  • Transport cluster agencies continued to experience challenges with accounting of land and infrastructure assets.

 

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our:

  • observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport cluster
  • assessment of how well cluster agencies adapted their systems, policies and procedures, and governance arrangements in response to recent emergencies.

Section highlights

  • While there was a decrease in findings on internal controls across the Transport cluster, 43 per cent of all issues were repeat issues. Many repeat issues related to information technology controls around user access management.
  • RailCorp transitioned to TAHE on 1 July 2020. TAHE's operating model and commercial arrangements with public rail operators has not been finalised despite government original plans to be operating from 1 July 2019. TAHE management should finalise its operating model and commercial agreements with public rail operators as they may significantly impact the financial reporting arrangements for TAHE for 2020–21.
  • Completeness and accuracy of contracts registers remains an ongoing issue for the Transport cluster.

Appendix one – List of 2020 recommendations

Appendix two – Status of 2019, 2018 and 2017 recommendations

Appendix three – Management letter findings

Appendix four – Financial data

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Internal controls and governance 2020

Internal controls and governance 2020

Education
Environment
Community Services
Finance
Health
Industry
Justice
Premier and Cabinet
Transport
Treasury
Compliance
Cyber security
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford today released her report on the findings and recommendations from the 2019–20 financial audits that relate to internal controls and governance at 40 of the largest agencies in the NSW public sector.

The bushfire and flood emergencies and the COVID‑19 pandemic continue to have a significant impact on the people and public sector of New South Wales. The scale of the government response to these events has been significant. The report focuses on the effectiveness of internal controls and governance processes, including relevant agencies’ response to the emergencies. In particular, the report focuses on:

  • financial and information technology controls
  • business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements
  • procurement, including emergency procurement
  • delegations that support timely and effective decision-making.

Due to the ongoing impact of COVID‑19 agencies have not yet returned to a business‑as‑usual environment. ‘Agencies will need to assess their response to the recent emergencies and update their business continuity, disaster recovery and other business resilience frameworks to reflect the lessons learnt from these events’ the Auditor-General said.

The report noted that special procurement provisions were put in place to allow agencies to better respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Auditor-General recommended agencies update their procurement policies to reflect the current requirements of the NSW Procurement Framework and the emergency procurement requirements.

Read the PDF report

This report analyses the internal controls and governance of 40 of the largest agencies in the NSW public sector for the year ended 30 June 2020. These 40 agencies constitute an estimated 85 per cent of total expenditure for all NSW public sector agencies.

1. Internal control trends
New, repeat and high risk findings

Internal control deficiencies increased by 13 per cent compared to last year. This is predominately due to a seven per cent increase in new internal control deficiencies and 24 per cent increase in repeat internal control deficiencies. There were ten high risk findings compared to four last year.

The recent emergencies have consumed agency time and resources and may have contributed to the increase in internal control deficiencies, particularly repeat deficiencies.

Agencies should:

  • prioritise addressing high-risk findings
  • address repeat internal control deficiencies by re-setting action plans and timeframes and monitoring the implementation status of recommendations.
Common findings

A number of findings remain common across multiple agencies over the last four years, including:

  • out of date or missing policies to guide appropriate decisions
  • poor record keeping and document retention
  • incomplete or inaccurate centralised registers or gaps in these registers.
2. Information technology controls
IT general controls

We found deficiencies in information security controls over key financial systems including:

  • user access administration deficiencies relating to inadequate oversight of the granting, review and removal of user access at 53 per cent of agencies
  • privileged users were not appropriately monitored at 43 per cent of agencies
  • deficient password controls that did not align to the agency's own password policies at 25 per cent of agencies.

The deficiencies above increase the risk of non-compliance with the NSW Cyber Security Policy, which requires agencies to have processes in place to manage user access, including privileged user access to sensitive information or systems and remove that access once it is not required or employment is terminated.

3. Business continuity and disaster recovery planning
Assessing risks to business continuity and Scenario testing

The response to the recent emergencies and the COVID-19 pandemic has encompassed a wide range of activities, including policy setting, on-going service delivery, safety and availability of staff, availability of IT and other systems and financial management. Agencies were required to activate their business continuity plans in response, and with the continued impact of COVID-19 have not yet returned to a business-as-usual environment.

Our audits focused on the preparedness of agency business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

We identified deficiencies in agency business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements. Twenty-three per cent of agencies had not conducted a business impact analysis (BIA) to identify critical business functions and determine business continuity priorities. Agencies can also improve the content of their BIA. For example, ten per cent of agencies' BIAs did not include recovery time objectives and six per cent of agencies did not identify key IT systems that support critical business functions. Scenario testing improves the effectiveness with which a live crisis is handled, but 40 per cent of agencies had not conducted a business continuity scenario testing exercise in the period from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2019. There were also opportunities to improve the effectiveness of scenario testing exercises by:

  • involving key dependent or inter-dependent third parties who support or deliver critical business functions
  • testing one or more high impact scenarios identified in their business continuity plan
  • preparing a formalpost-exercise report documenting the outcome of their scenario testing.

Agencies have responded to the recent emergencies but addressing deficiencies will ensure agencies have adequate safeguards in their processes to again respond in the future, if required.

During 2020–21 we plan to conduct a performance audit on 'Business continuity and disaster recovery planning'. This audit will consider the effectiveness of agency business continuity planning arrangements to maintain business continuity through the recent emergencies and/or COVID-19 pandemic and return to a business-as-usual environment. We also plan to conduct a performance audit on whole-of-government 'Coordination of emergency responses'.

Responding to disruptions

We found agencies' governance functions could have been better informed about responses to disruptive incidents that had activated a business continuity or disaster recovery response between 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2019. For instance:

in 89 per cent of instances where a business continuity response was activated, a post-incident review had been performed. In 82 per cent of these instances, the outcomes were reported to a relevant governance or executive management committee

in 95 per cent of instances where a disaster recovery response was activated, a post incident review had been performed. In 86 per cent of these instances, the outcomes were reported to a relevant governance committee or executive management committee.

Examples of recorded incidents included extensive air quality issues and power outages due to bushfires, system and network outages, and infected and hijacked servers.

Agencies should assess their response to the recent emergencies and the COVID-19 pandemic and update business continuity, disaster recovery and other business resilience frameworks to incorporate lessons learned. Agencies should report to those charged with governance on the results and planned actions.

Management review and oversight Eighty-two per cent and 86 per cent of agencies report to their audit and risk committees (ARC) on their business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements, respectively. Only 18 per cent and five per cent of ARCs are briefed on the results of respective scenario testing. Briefing ARCs on the results of scenario testing exercises helps inform their decisions about whether sound and effective business continuity and disaster recovery arrangements have been established.
4. Procurement, including emergency procurement
Policy framework

Agency procurement policies did not capture the requirements of several key NSW Procurement Board Directions (the Directions), increasing the risk of non-compliance with the Directions. We noted: 

  • 67 per cent of agencies did specify that procurement above $650,000 must be open to market unless exempt or procured through an existing Whole of Government Scheme or contract
  • 36 per cent of agencies did specify that procurements above $500,000 payable in foreign currencies must be hedged
  • 69 per cent of agencies' policies did specify that the agency head or cluster CFO must authorise the engagement of consultants where the engagement of the supplier does not comply with the standard commercial framework.

Recommendation: Agencies should review their procurement policies and guidelines to ensure they capture the key requirements of the NSW Government Procurement Policy Framework, including NSW Procurement Board Directions.

Managing contracts

Eighty-eight per cent of agencies maintain a central contract register to record all details of contracts above $150,000, which is a requirement of GIPA legislation. Of the agencies that maintained registers, 13 per cent did not capture all contracts and eight per cent did not include all relevant contract details.

Sixteen per cent of agencies did not periodically review their contract register. Timely review increases compliance with GIPA legislation, and enhances the effectiveness with which procurement business units monitor contract end dates, contract extensions and commence new procurement.

Training and support

Ninety-three per cent of agencies provide training to staff involved in procurement processes, and a further 77 per cent of agencies provide this training on an on-going basis. Of the seven per cent of agencies that had not provided training to staff, we noted gaps in aspects of their procurement activity, including:

  • not conducting value for money assessments prior to renewing or extending the contract with their existing supplier
  • not obtaining approval from a delegated authority to commence the procurement process
  • procurement documentation not specifying certain key details such as the conditions for participation including any financial guarantees and dates for the delivery of goods or supply of services.

Training on procurement activities ensures there is effective management of procurement processes to support operational requirements, and compliance with procurement directions.

Procurement activities While agencies had implemented controls for tender activities above $650,000, 43 per cent of unaccredited agencies did not comply with the NSW Procurement Policy Framework because they had not had their procurement endorsed by an accredited agency within the cluster or by NSW Procurement. This endorsement aims to ensure the procurement is properly planned to deliver a value for money outcome before it commences.
Emergency procurement

As at 30 June 2020, agencies within the scope of this report reported conducting 32,239 emergency procurements with a total contract value of $316,908,485. Emergency procurement activities included the purchase of COVID-19 cleaning and hygiene supplies.

The government, through NSW Procurement released the 'COVID-19 Emergency procurement procedure', which relaxed procurement requirements to allow agencies to make COVID-19 emergency procurements. Our review against the emergency procurement measures found most agencies complied with requirements. For example:

  • 95 per cent of agencies documented an assessment of the need for the emergency procurement for the good and/or service
  • 86 per cent of agencies obtained authorisation of the emergency procurement by the agency head or the nominated employee under Public Works and Procurement Regulation 2019
  • 76 per cent of agencies reported the emergency procurement to the NSW Procurement Board.

Complying with the procedure helps to ensure government resources are being efficiently, effectively, economically and in accordance with the law.

Recommendation: Agency procurement frameworks should be reviewed and updated so they can respond effectively to emergency situations that may arise in the future. This includes:

  • updating procurement policies and guidelines to define an emergency situation, specify who can approve emergency procurement and capture other key requirements
  • using standard templates and documentation to prompt users to capture key requirements, such as needs analysis, supplier selection criteria, price assessment criteria, licence and insurance checks
  • having processes for reporting on emergency procurements to those charged with governance and NSW Procurement.
5. Delegations
Instruments of delegation

We found that agencies have established financial and human resources delegations, but some had not revisited their delegation manuals following the legislative and machinery of government changes. For those agencies impacted by machinery of government changes we noted:

  • 16 per cent of agencies had not updated their financial delegations to reflect the changes
  • 16 per cent of agencies did not update their human resources delegations to reflect the changes.

Delegations manuals are not always complete; 16 per cent of agencies had no delegation for writing off bad debts and 26 per cent of agencies had no delegation for writing off capital assets.

Recommendation: Agencies should ensure their financial and human resources delegation manuals contain regular set review dates and are updated to reflect the Government Sector Finance Act 2018, machinery of government changes and their current organisational structure and roles and responsibilities.

Compliance with delegations

Agencies did not understand or correctly apply the requirements of the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 (GSF Act), resulting in non-compliance with the Act. We found that 18 per cent of agencies spent deemed appropriations without obtaining an authorised delegation from the relevant Minister(s), as required by sections 4.6(1) and 5.5(3) of the GSF Act.

Further detail on this issue will be included in our Auditor-General's Reports to Parliament on Central Agencies, Education, Health and Stronger Communities, which will be tabled throughout December 2020.

Recommendation: Agencies should review financial and human resources delegations to ensure they capture all key functions of laws and regulations, and clearly specify the relevant power or function being conferred on the officer.

6. Status of 2019 recommendations
Progress implementing last year's recommendations

Recommendations were made last year to improve transparency over reporting on gifts and benefits and improve the visibility management and those charged with governance had over actions taken to address conflicts of interest that may arise. This year, we continue to note:

  • 38 per cent of agencies have not updated their gifts and benefits register to include all the key fields required under the minimum standards set by the Public Service Commission
  • 56 per cent of agencies have not provided training to staff and 63 per cent of agencies have not implemented an annual attestation process for senior management
  • 97 per cent of agencies have not published their gifts and benefits register on their website and 41 per cent of agencies are not reporting on trends in the gifts and benefits register to those charged with governance.

While we acknowledge the significance of the recent emergencies, which have consumed agency time and resources, we note limited progress has been made implementing these recommendations. Further detail on the status of implementing all recommendations is in Appendix 2.

Recommendation: Agencies should re-visit the recommendations made in last year's report on internal controls and governance and action these recommendations.

Internal controls are processes, policies and procedures that help agencies to:

  • operate effectively and efficiently
  • produce reliable financial reports
  • comply with laws and regulations
  • support ethical government.

This chapter outlines the overall trends for agency controls and governance issues, including the number of audit findings, the degree of risk those deficiencies pose to the agency, and a summary of the most common deficiencies we found across agencies. The rest of this report presents this year’s controls and governance findings in more detail.

Section highlights

We identified ten high risk findings, compared to four last year with two findings repeated from the previous year. There was an overall increase of 13 per cent in the number of internal control deficiencies compared to last year due to a seven per cent increase in new internal control deficiencies, and a 24 per cent increase in repeat internal control deficiencies. The recent emergencies have consumed agency time and resources and may have contributed to the increase in internal control deficiencies, particularly repeat deficiencies.

We identified a number of findings that remain common across multiple agencies over the last four years. Some of these findings related to areas that are fundamental to good internal control environments and effective organisational governance. Examples include:

  • out of date or missing policies to guide appropriate decisions
  • poor record keeping and document retention
  • incomplete or inaccurate centralised registers, or gaps in these registers.

Policies, procedures and internal controls should be properly designed, be appropriate for the current organisational structure and its business activities, and work effectively.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency controls to manage key financial systems.

Section highlights

Government agencies’ financial reporting is heavily reliant on information technology (IT). We continue to see a high number of deficiencies related to IT general controls, particularly those related to user access administration. These controls are key in adequately protecting IT systems from inappropriate access and misuse.

IT is also important to the delivery of agency services. These systems often provide the data to help monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of agency processes and services they deliver. Our financial audits do not review all agency IT systems. For example, IT systems used to support agency service delivery are generally outside the scope of our financial audit. However, agencies should also consider the relevance of our findings to these systems.

Agencies need to continue to focus on assessing the risks of inappropriate access and misuse and the implementation of controls to adequately protect their systems, focussing on the processes in place to grant, remove and monitor user access, particularly privileged user access.

 

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements.

Section highlights

We identified deficiencies in agency business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements and opportunities for agencies to enhance their business continuity management and disaster recovery planning arrangements. This will better prepare them to respond to a disruption to their critical functions, resulting from an emergency or other serious event. Twenty-three per cent of agencies had not conducted a business impact analysis (BIA) to identify critical business functions and determine business continuity priorities and 40 per cent of agencies had not conducted a business continuity scenario testing exercise in the period from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2019. Scenario testing improves the effectiveness with which a live crisis is handled.

This section focusses on the preparedness of agency business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. While agencies have responded to the recent emergencies, proactively addressing deficiencies will ensure agencies have adequate safeguards in their processes to again respond in the future, if required.

During 2020–21 we plan to conduct a performance audit on 'Business continuity and disaster recovery planning'. This audit will consider the effectiveness of agency business continuity planning arrangements to maintain business continuity through the recent emergencies and/or COVID-19 pandemic and return to a business-as-usual environment. We also plan to conduct a performance audit on whole-of-government 'Coordination of emergency responses'.

 

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of procurement agency procurement policies and procurement activity.

Section highlights

We found agencies have procurement policies in place to manage procurement activity, but the content of these policies was not sufficiently detailed to ensure compliance with NSW Procurement Board Directions (the Directions). The Directions aim to ensure procurement activity achieves value for money and meets the principles of probity and fairness.

Agencies have generally implemented controls over their procurement process. In relation to emergency procurement activity, agencies reported conducting 32,239 emergency procurements with a total contract value of $316,908,485 up to 30 June 2020. Our review of emergency procurement activity conducted during 2019–20 identified areas where some agencies did not fully comply with the 'COVID-19 Emergency procurement procedure'.

We also found not all agencies are maintaining complete and accurate contract registers. This not only increases the risk of non-compliance with GIPA legislation, but also limits the effectiveness of procurement business units to monitor contract end dates, contract extensions and commence new procurement in a timely manner. We noted instances where agencies renewed or extended contracts without going through a competitive tender process during the year.

 

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency compliance with financial and human resources delegations.

Section highlights
We found that agencies are not always regularly reviewing and updating their financial and human resources delegations when there are changes to legislation or other organisational changes within the agency or from machinery of government changes. For example, agencies did not understand or correctly apply the requirements of the GSF Act, resulting in non-compliance with the Act. We found that 18 per cent of agencies spent deemed appropriations without obtaining an authorised delegation from the relevant Minister(s), as required by sections 4.6(1) and 5.5(3) of the GSF Act.
In order for agencies to operate efficiently, make necessary expenditure and human resource decisions quickly and lawfully, particularly in emergency situations, it is important that delegations are kept up to date, provide clear authority to decision makers and are widely communicated.

Appendix one – List of 2020 recommendations 

Appendix two – Status of 2019 recommendations

Appendix three – Cluster agencies

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for State Finances 2020

State Finances 2020

Education
Finance
Community Services
Health
Justice
Industry
Planning
Environment
Premier and Cabinet
Transport
Treasury
Whole of Government
Financial reporting

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released her report today on State Finances for the year ended 30 June 2020.

‘I am pleased to once again report that I issued an unmodified audit opinion on the State’s consolidated financial statements,’ the Auditor-General said.

The report acknowledges this has been a challenging year, with New South Wales impacted by natural disasters and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The State’s Budget Result, reported in the financial statements, was a deficit of $6.9 billion. This is different to the 2019-20 budget forecast surplus of $1.0 billion and is an outcome of the government’s significant response to bushfires and COVID-19.

The report summarises a number of audit and accounting matters arising from the audit of the Total State Sector Accounts, a sector that comprises 291 entities controlled by the NSW Government with total assets of $495 billion and total liabilities of $256 billion.

Read full report (PDF)

Our audit opinion on the State’s 2019–20 financial statements was unmodified

An unmodified audit opinion was issued on the State’s 2019–20 consolidated financial statements.

The State extended signing its financial statements by six weeks.

Natural disasters, the COVID-19 pandemic and other factors impacted the State’s 2019–20 reporting timetable. The State extended signing its financial statements by six weeks, compared with 2018–19.

All agencies were also given a two-week extension to prepare their financial statements compared with 2018–19. Further extensions beyond two weeks were subsequently approved for the following 11 agencies (7 in 2018–19) to submit completed financial statements for audit:

  • Department of Communities and Justice
  • Department of Customer Service
  • Department of Planning, Industry and Environment
  • Department of Regional NSW
  • Department of Transport
  • Environment Protection Authority
  • Infrastructure NSW
  • Lord Howe Island Board
  • NSW Crown Holiday Parks Land Manager
  • Service NSW
  • Water Administration Ministerial Corporation.

The extensions reflected that the COVID-19 pandemic impacted agencies’ work environments during the first six months of 2020. This was at a time when many were still implementing machinery of government changes and preparing to implement three significant new accounting standards:

  • AASB 15 Revenue from Contracts with Customers (issued December 2014, effective 1 July 2019)
  • AASB 16 Leases (issued February 2016, effective 1 July 2019)
  • AASB 1058 Income of Not-for-profit entities (issued December 2016, effective 1 July 2019).

These new accounting standards were issued some years before they became effective, to allow reporting entities sufficient time to prepare for implementation. Notwithstanding this, some agencies had not fully implemented the new accounting standards in time for early close procedures, and the unforeseen impact of COVID-19 further complicated the year-end financial reporting processes for the State and its agencies.

The graph below shows the number of reported errors exceeding $20 million over the past five years in agencies’ financial statements presented for audit.

In 2019–20, agency financial statements presented for audit contained 19 errors exceeding $20 million (six in 2018–19). The total value of these errors increased to $1.4 billion ($927 million in 2018–19).

The errors resulted from:

  • incorrectly applying Australian Accounting Standards and Treasury Policies
  • incorrect judgements and assumptions when valuing noncurrent physical assets and liabilities
  • incorrectly interpreting the accounting treatment for unspent stimulus funding.

Errors in agency financial statements exceeding $20m (2016–2020)

$4.1 billion in stimulus funding was allocated in 2019–20

The government implemented an economic stimulus package primarily to mitigate the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on New South Wales.

The COVID-19 pandemic and bushfires had a significant impact on the State’s finances, reducing its revenue and increasing its expenses especially in sectors directly responsible for responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, such as Health.

The government announced a $4.1 billion health and economic stimulus package in 2019–20. This primarily included:

  • $2.2 billion in health measures including purchases of essential medical equipment and increasing clinical health capacity (like intensive care spaces)
  • $1.0 billion in small business and land tax relief
  • $355 million in extra cleaning services and quarantine costs.

Cluster agencies had spent $3.0 billion (just under 75 per cent) of the COVID-19 stimulus package by 30 June 2020.

The Health cluster incurred most of this expenditure.

Total spend relating to bushfires was $1.3 billion in 2019–20.

The graph below shows the total allocation and spend by cluster to 30 June 2020.

Economic stimulus allocation and spend by cluster to 30 June 2020

Deficit of $6.9 billion compared with a budgeted surplus of $1.0 billion

An outcome of the government’s overall activity and policies is its net operating balance (Budget Result). This is the difference between the cost of general government service delivery and the revenue earned to fund these sectors.

The General Government Sector, which comprises 199 entities, generally provides goods and services funded centrally by the State.

The Non-General Government Sector, which comprises 92 government businesses, generally provides goods and services, such as water, electricity and financial services that consumers pay for directly.

The Budget Result for the 2019–20 financial year was a deficit of $6.9 billion. The original budget forecast, set before the COVID-19 pandemic and bushfires, was a $1.0 billion surplus. The main driver of the change in result was:

  • $1.3 billion of higher employee costs, mainly due to:
    • increased workers compensation claims
    • additional personnel required (mainly in the Health sector) to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic
  • $2.3 billion of higher operating expenses, mainly due to:
    • $828 million from first time recognition of a child abuse claim liability
    • $507 million from additional insurance claims from the NSW bushfires
    • $343 million from COVID-19 claims by agencies for loss of revenue.
  • $1.8 billion in higher grants and subsidy expenses, mainly due to:
    • small business grants
    • COVID-19 quarantine compliance measures
    • costs incurred in response to the 2019–20 bushfires, drought and disaster relief payments
    • third party-controlled assets that were subsequently transferred to councils and utility providers, mainly arising from construction of the CBD and South East Light Rail.

The deficit was further driven by:

  • $1.9 billion less taxation revenue, mainly resulting from:
    • $1.3 billion less in payroll tax due to relief measures introduced by the government as part of its COVID-19 economic stimulus
    • $424 million less in gambling and betting taxes, due to venue closures required by COVID-19 public health orders
  • $523 million less in dividends and income tax revenue from the Non-General Government Sector, due to lower dividends received from NSW Treasury Corporation and from the State’s other commercial government businesses
  • lower fines, regulatory fees and other revenue, due to a $305 million decrease in mining royalties, largely driven by lower coal prices.

Main drivers of the 2019–20 actual vs. budget variance

Revenues increased $209 million to $86.3 billion

In 2019–20, the State’s total revenues increased by $209 million to $86.3 billion, 0.2 per cent higher than in 2018–19. COVID-19 impacted taxation revenue, which fell by $1.1 billion and revenue from the sale of goods and services, which fell by $1.1 billion. These falls were offset by a $2.5 billion (7.7 per cent) increase in grants and subsidies from the Australian Government, mainly in the form of additional stimulus funding.

Taxation revenue fell 3.5 per cent

Taxation revenue fell by $1.1 billion, mainly due to a:

  • $861 million fall in payroll tax as a result of COVID-19 relief (reduced payroll tax payments for eligible small businesses)
  • $430 million fall in stamp duty collections, driven by lower than expected growth in the property market
  • $427 million decline in gambling and betting taxes, mainly due to venue closures driven by COVID-19 public health orders.

Stamp duties of $8.8 billion were the largest source of taxation revenue, $473 million higher than payroll tax, the second-largest source of taxation revenue.

Australian Government grants and subsidies

The State received $34.2 billion in grants and subsides which are mainly from the Australian Government, $2.4 billion more than in 2018–19.

The increase was driven by a $1.1 billion increase in Commonwealth Specific Purpose Payments to support the Health cluster respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. Commonwealth National Partnership Payments increased by a similar amount to provide the State with Natural Disaster relief.

Sales of goods and services

In 2019–20, sales of goods and services fell $1.1 billion. This was due to the COVID-19 pandemic reducing:

  • patronage and related transport passenger revenue
  • health billing activities with elective surgery being put on hold
Fines, regulatory fees and other revenues

Fines, regulatory fees and other revenues fell $505 million. This was mainly due to a $409 million decrease in mining royalties attributed to a drop in thermal coal prices during 2019–20.

Other dividends and distributions

Other dividends and distributions rose by $616 million due to higher distributions received from the State’s investments. This was due to an additional $1.3 billion held in the State’s investment portfolio compared with last year.

Expenses increased $8.2 billion to $96.0 billion

The State’s expenses increased 9.3 per cent compared with 2018–19. Most of the increase was due to higher employee expenses, other operating costs and grants and subsidies.

Employee expenses, including superannuation, increased 5.7 per cent to $42.6 billion.

Salaries and wages increased to $42.6 billion from $40.3 billion in 2018–19. This was mainly due to increases in staff numbers and a 2.5 per cent increase in pay rates across the sector. Salaries and wages for the Education and Health sectors increased by $659 million and $732 million in each sector respectively.

The Health sector employed an additional 2,763 full time staff in 2019–20. It also incurred more overtime in response to COVID-19. Education increased staff numbers by 4,866 full time equivalents and paid a one off 11 per cent pay rise to school administration staff in 2019–20. Historically, the government wages policy aims to limit growth in employee remuneration and other employee related costs to no more than 2.5 per cent per annum.

Operating expenses increased 8.7 per cent to $27.0 billion.

Operating expenses increased to $27.0 billion in 2019–20 ($24.8 billion in 2018–19) due to higher operating activities in Health. The higher level of activities and related costs is attributed to a full year of operations at the Northern Beaches Hospital (opened November 2018), and responding to COVID-19. The response to COVID-19 involved the State providing viability payments to private hospitals, higher visiting medical officer costs due to additional overtime hours and spending more on equipment to set up COVID-19 testing clinics.

Insurance claims increased by $2.0 billion. This was mainly due to NSW Self Insurance Corporation (SiCorp) recognising a liability for child abuse claims incurred but not reported for the first time, and claims for the 2019–20 bushfires, floods and COVID-19.

Health costs remain the State’s highest expense.

Total expenses of the State were $96 billion ($87.8 billion in 2018–19). Traditionally, the following clusters have the highest expenses as a percentage of total government expenses:

  • Health – 24.3 per cent (25.8 per cent in 2018–19)
  • Education – 17.6 per cent (19.3 per cent in 2018–19)
  • Transport - 12.8 per cent (12.6 per cent in 2018–19).

General public service expenses as a percentage of total State expenses is higher due to a $2.0 billion increase in SiCorp’s accrued claim expenses.

Other expenses increased due to additional grant funding by the State for drought relief and COVID-19 stimulus spend.

Health expenses increased by $632 million compared with 2018–19 but fell as a proportion of total State expenses.

Education expenses remained stable compared with last year due to savings in student transportation costs primarily driven by COVID-19. This led to a decrease in the proportion of the State’s costs relating to education activities.

Grants and subsidies increased $2.5 billion to $14.1 billion.

The increase in grants and subsidies was due to payments the State made to support businesses and local communities in the face of COVID-19 and bushfires. In addition, the State transferred CBD and South East Light Rail assets to councils and utility providers during 2019–20 as it no longer controlled these.

Depreciation expense increased $1.0 billion to $9.2 billion.

Depreciation increased to $9.2 billion from $8.0 billion in 2018–19. At 1 July 2019, the State implemented the new leases standard recognising a right of use (ROU) asset and related lease liability in its financial statements. The value of ROU assets are amortised over the term of the lease. This contributed to $980 million of the increase in 2019–20 depreciation expense. Last year, these costs were previously reported within other operating expenses.

Assets grew by $28.0 billion to $495 billion

The State’s assets primarily include physical assets such as land, buildings and infrastructure, and financial assets such as cash, and other financial instruments and equity investments. The value of total assets increased by $28.0 billion to $495 billion. This was a six per cent increase compared with 2018–19, mostly due to changes in asset carrying values.

Of the State’s $28.0 billion increase in asset values, $9.3 billion was due to a new accounting standard requirement for operating leases to be valued and recorded on balance sheet for the first time.

AASB 16 Leases requires entities recognise values for right-ofuse assets (ROU) for the first time. An ROU asset is a lessee’s right to use an asset, the value of which is amortised over the term of the lease. This standard came into effect from 1 July 2019.

Valuing the State’s physical assets

State’s physical assets valued at $365 billion.

The value of the State’s physical assets increased by $14.1 billion to $365 billion in 2019–20. The assets include land and buildings ($168 billion), infrastructure ($180 billion) and plant and equipment ($16.7 billion). A prior period error relating to the valuation of RMS infrastructure assets reduced the reported values by $1.0 billion from $352 billion to $351 billion at 30 June 2019.

The movement in physical asset values between years includes additions, disposals, depreciation and valuation adjustments. Other movements include reclassification of physical assets leased under finance leases to right of use assets upon adoption of AASB 16 Leases on 1 July 2019.

Movements in physical asset values

Liabilities increased $38.4 billion to $256 billion

The State borrowed additional funds in response to natural disasters and COVID-19.

The State’s borrowings rose by $33.9 billion to $113.8 billion at 30 June 2020. This accounted for most of the increase in the State’s total liabilities.

The value of TCorp bonds on issue increased by $25.2 billion to $97.0 billion to largely fund capital expenditure and costs associated with the bushfires, drought and COVID-19.

TCorp bonds are actively traded in financial markets and are guaranteed by the NSW Government.

Over 2019–20, TCorp continued to take advantage of lower interest rates, buying back short-term bonds and replacing them with longer dated debt. This lengthens the portfolio matching liabilities with the funding requirements for infrastructure assets.

With effect from 1 July 2019, AASB 16 Leases required the State to recognise liabilities for operating leases for the first time. This increased total lease liabilities from $5.3 billion at 30 June 2019 to $11.8 billion at 30 June 2020.

More than a third of the State’s liabilities relate to its employees. They include unfunded superannuation and employee benefits, such as long service and recreation leave.

Valuing these obligations involves complex estimation techniques and significant judgements. Small changes in assumptions and other variables, such as a lower discount rate, can materially impact the valuation of liability balances in the financial statements.

The State’s unfunded superannuation liability rose $300 million from $70.7 billion to $71.0 billion at 30 June 2020. This was mainly due to a lower discount rate of 0.87 per cent (1.32 per cent in 2018–19). The State’s unfunded superannuation liability represents the value of its obligations to past and present employees less the value of assets set aside to fund those obligations.

 

The State maintained its AAA credit rating

The object of the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012 is to maintain the State’s AAA credit rating.

The government manages New South Wales’ finances in accordance with the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012 (the Act).

The Act establishes the framework for fiscal responsibility and the strategy to maintain the State’s AAA credit rating and service delivery to the people of New South Wales.

The legislation sets out targets and principles for financial management to achieve this.

This year, the State’s credit rating from Standard & Poor’s changed from AAA/Stable to AAA/Negative. Moody’s Investors Service credit rating of Aaa/Stable did not change from the previous year.

The fiscal target for achieving this objective is that General Government annual expenditure growth should be lower than long term average revenue growth.

The State did not achieve its fiscal target of maintaining annual expenditure growth below the long-term revenue growth rate target of 5.6 per cent.

In 2019–20, General Government expenditure grew by 9.7 per cent (5.5 per cent in 2018–19).

Expenditure items that contributed most to the growth rate include:

  • recurrent grants and subsidies (20.4 per cent)
  • other operating expenses (9.5 per cent)
  • employee costs (including superannuation) (5.6 per cent)

Recurrent grant and subsidy expenses increased by $2.8 billion in 2019–20 mainly due to the COVID-19 and natural disaster payments. Other operating expenses increased mainly due to a $2.0 billion increase in SiCorp insurance claims. This included the $828 million provision for child abuse claims incurred but not reported. The bushfires and COVID-19 pandemic also increased the number and cost of claims in 2019–20.

Superannuation funding position since inception of the Act - AASB 1056 Valuation

Published

Actions for CBD South East Sydney Light Rail: follow-up performance audit

CBD South East Sydney Light Rail: follow-up performance audit

Transport
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Risk
Service delivery

This is a follow-up to the Auditor-General's November 2016 report on the CBD South East Sydney Light Rail project. This follow-up report assessed whether Transport for NSW has updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits.

The audit found that Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public.

The Auditor-General reports that the total cost of the project will exceed $3.1 billion, which is above the revised cost of $2.9 billion published in November 2019. $153.84 million of additional costs are due to omitted costs for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays.

The report makes four recommendations to Transport for NSW to publicly report on the final project cost, the updated expected project benefits, the benefits achieved in the first year of operations and the average weekly journey times.

Read full report (PDF)

The CBD and South East Light Rail is a 12 km light rail network for Sydney. It extends from Circular Quay along George Street to Central Station, through Surry Hills to Moore Park, then to Kensington and Kingsford via Anzac Parade and Randwick via Alison Road and High Street.

Transport for NSW (TfNSW) is responsible for planning, procuring and delivering the Central Business District and South East Light Rail (CSELR) project. In December 2014, TfNSW entered into a public private partnership with ALTRAC Light Rail as the operating company (OpCo) responsible for delivering, operating and maintaining the CSELR. OpCo engaged Alstom and Acciona, who together form its Design and Construct Contractor (D&C).

On 14 December 2019, passenger services started on the line between Circular Quay and Randwick. Passenger services on the line between Circular Quay and Kingsford commenced on 3 April 2020.

In November 2016, the Auditor-General published a performance audit report on the CSELR project. The audit found that TfNSW would deliver the CSELR at a higher cost with lower benefits than in the approved business case, and recommended that TfNSW update and consolidate information about project costs and benefits and ensure the information is readily accessible to the public.

In November 2018, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) examined TfNSW's actions taken in response to our 2016 performance audit report on the CSELR project. The PAC recommended that the Auditor-General consider undertaking a follow-up audit on the CSELR project. The purpose of this follow-up performance audit is to assess whether TfNSW has effectively updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits for the CSELR project.

Conclusion

Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated CSLER project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public. In line with the NSW Government Benefits Realisation Management Framework, TfNSW intends to measure benefits after the project is completed and has not updated the expected project benefits since April 2015.

Between February 2015 and December 2019, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) regularly updated capital expenditure costs for the CSELR in internal monthly financial performance and risk reports. These reports did not include all the costs incurred by TfNSW to manage and commission the CSELR project.

Omitted costs of $153.84 million for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays will bring the current estimated total cost of the CSELR project to $3.147 billion.

From February 2015, TfNSW did not regularly provide the financial performance and risk reports to key CSELR project governance bodies. TfNSW publishes information on project costs and benefits on the Sydney Light Rail website. However, the information on project costs has not always been accurate or current.

TfNSW is working with OpCo partners to deliver the expected journey time benefits. A key benefit defined in the business plan was that bus services would be reduced owing to transfer of demand to the light rail - entailing a saving. However, TfNSW reports that the full expected benefit of changes to bus services will not be realised due to bus patronage increasing above forecasted levels.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Governance and reporting arrangements for the CSELR

Appendix three – 2018 CSELR governance changes

Appendix four – About the audit

Appendix five – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #335 - released 11 June 2020

Published

Actions for Universities 2019 audits

Universities 2019 audits

Universities
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance
Procurement

This report contains findings on the results of financial audits of NSW universities for the year ended 31 December 2019.

All ten NSW universities received unqualified audit opinions. The 2019 financial results for universities are reported as at 31 December and reflect results from operations before the impact of the COVID‑19 pandemic.

The combined revenues for all NSW universities increased by $381 million to $11.4 billion in 2019, driven by increases in student revenues. Revenue from overseas students continued to grow faster than that from domestic students and contributed $3.6 billion in course fees to NSW universities in 2019.

Overseas students from the top three countries of origin, being China, India and Nepal, represented 72.4 per cent of all enrolments of overseas students and 65.4 per cent of all overseas student revenues for 2019. Revenue from students from these three countries comprised 40.9 per cent of total student revenues for all NSW universities, creating a considerable concentration risk for NSW universities.

The COVID‑19 pandemic may significantly impact the financial results of NSW universities in 2020. NSW universities provided data on COVID‑19 impacted student enrolments for semester one 2020. Overall numbers of student enrolments in semester one 2020 were 5.8 per cent beneath projections. Overseas student enrolments were 13.8 per cent beneath expectations and domestic student enrolments were 2.4 per cent below expectations.

The report makes recommendations to the NSW universities, aimed at strengthening controls over information technology, cyber security, validating published performance information, procurement practices and the oversight of their overseas controlled entities' legal and policy compliance functions.

Read full report (PDF)

This report analyses the results of our audits of the financial statements of the ten NSW universities for the year ended 31 December 2019. The table below summarises our key observations.

1. Financial reporting

Financial reporting

The 2019 financial statements of all ten NSW universities received unmodified audit opinions.

One controlled entity of the Western Sydney University received a qualified audit opinion.

Five NSW universities finalised their audited financial statements this year on or before the date they did last year.

New accounting standards, which changed how universities report income and treat operating leases, became effective from 1 January 2019.

Sources of revenue from operations

Government grants as a proportion of the total income of NSW universities continued to decrease.

Fee revenue from overseas students continued to grow faster than fees from domestic students. Forty-one per cent of NSW universities' total student revenue came from overseas students from three countries.

Five NSW universities increased the proportion of revenue they receive from overseas students from a single country. Two universities sourced over 73 per cent of their total overseas student revenue from students from a single country of origin in 2019.

Other revenues Two universities attracted over 69.5 per cent of the total philanthropic revenue of $174 million received by all NSW universities in 2019.
Operating expenditures Combined total operating expenditure for NSW universities increased to $9.9 billion in 2019, a rise of 5.2 per cent from 2018.
Current ratio At 31 December 2019, five NSW universities had a current ratio of less than one, meaning those universities need to actively manage their cash to meet current obligations.
Controlled entities

All six NSW universities with overseas controlled entities have devolved responsibility for governance and legislative compliance to their overseas controlled entities.

Recommendation (repeat issue): NSW universities should strengthen their governance arrangements to oversight their overseas controlled entities' legal and policy compliance functions.

COVID-19 impacts and responses

The 2019 financial results for universities are reported as at 31 December. Consequently, the results for the 2019 year were unaffected by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

NSW universities provided data on the COVID-19 impacted student enrolments for semester one 2020. Overall numbers of student enrolments were 5.8 per cent beneath projections. Overseas student enrolments were 13.8 per cent beneath expectations and domestic student enrolments were 2.4 per cent beneath expectations.

NSW universities are responding to the challenges presented by COVID-19 by moving course delivery online, expanding student support and introducing cost saving measures.

2. Internal controls and governance

Internal control findings

Our audits identified 108 internal control deficiencies in 2019 (99 in 2018).

Gaps in information technology (IT) controls comprised the majority of these deficiencies. Deficiencies included a lack of sufficient user access reviews, inadequate review and approval of change management processes, and issues with password settings.

We identified one high risk financial control deficiency at the University of New South Wales, which resulted in the University providing for a potential underpayment of casual staff salaries.

NSW universities continue to implement recommendations arising from 35 findings raised in previous years.

Performance reporting

Five NSW universities still do not have formal processes to internally review and validate performance information published in their annual reports.

Recommendation (repeat issue): NSW universities should strengthen processes to review and validate published performance information.

Cyber security

Two universities have not yet implemented a cyber risk policy and three universities have not formally trained staff in cyber awareness.

Recommendation (repeat issue): NSW universities should strengthen cyber security frameworks and controls to protect sensitive data and prevent financial and reputational losses.

Management of IT service providers NSW universities have contracts with vendors to support their computer systems. Five universities have not formally established frameworks to manage these contracts. Poor contract management can compound risks associated with IT control deficiencies.
Data breach management Universities are required to maintain the privacy of sensitive data which, if disclosed or used inappropriately, could result in harm to individuals, financial loss, or loss of intellectual property. Two NSW universities have not established formal policies to manage data breaches.
Procurement

All universities have a procurement policy. Most universities have a documented procurement manual and contact management policy.

Recommendation: NSW universities should review their procurement and contract management policies and procedures to ensure that they are relevant and effective in reducing risk and improving purchasing outcomes.

3. Teaching and research

Graduate employment outcomes Eight out of ten NSW universities exceeded the national average for full-time employment rates of their undergraduates in 2019. Six universities performed better than the national average for full-time employment outcomes of their postgraduates in 2019.
Student enrolments by field of education Enrolments at NSW universities increased the most in Management and Commerce courses in 2019.
Achieving diversity outcomes

Five universities in 2018 (five in 2017) met the target enrolment rate for students from low socio-economic status (SES) backgrounds.

Eight universities increased enrolments of students from Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander backgrounds in 2018.

 

This report provides Parliament with the results of our financial audits of New South Wales universities and their controlled entities in 2019, including our analysis, observations and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • internal controls and governance
  • teaching and research.

Financial reporting is an important element of governance. Confidence and transparency in university sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations on the financial reporting of NSW universities for 2019.

Appropriate and robust internal controls help reduce risks associated with managing finances, compliance and administration of NSW universities.

This chapter outlines the internal controls related observations and insights across NSW universities for 2019, including overall trends in findings, level of risk and implications.

Our audits do not review all aspects of internal controls and governance every year. The more significant issues and risks are included in this chapter. These along with the less significant ones are reported to universities for them to address.

Universities' primary objectives are teaching and research. They invest most of their resources to achieve quality outcomes in academia and student experience. Universities have committed to achieving certain government targets and compete to advance their reputation and international and Australian rankings.

This chapter outlines teaching and research outcomes for NSW universities for 2019.

Appendix one – List of 2019 recommendations

Appendix two – Status of 2018 recommendations

Appendix three – NSW universities’ controlled entities and associated entities

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Train station crowding

Train station crowding

Transport
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

This report focuses on how Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains manage crowding at selected metropolitan train stations.

The audit found that while Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, it does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. Sydney Trains 'do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed’, the Auditor-General said.

Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or station entries before crowding reaches unsafe levels or when it impacts on-time running. Assuming rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, causing customer delay. ‘Restricting customer access to platforms or station entries is not a sustainable approach to manage station crowding’, said the Auditor-General.

The Auditor-General made seven recommendations to improve Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains' management of station crowding. Transport for NSW have accepted these recommendations on behalf of the Transport cluster.

Public transport patronage has been impacted by COVID-19. This audit was conducted before these impacts occurred.

Read full report (PDF)

Sydney Trains patronage has increased by close to 34 per cent over the last five years, and Transport for NSW (TfNSW) expects the growth in patronage to continue over the next 30 years. As patronage increases there are more passengers entering and exiting stations, moving within stations to change services, and waiting on platforms. As a result, some Sydney metropolitan train stations are becoming increasingly crowded.

There are three main causes of station crowding:

  • patronage growth exceeding the current capacity limits of the rail network
  • service disruptions
  • special events.

Crowds can inhibit movement, cause discomfort and can lead to increased health and safety risks to customers. In the context of a train service, unmanaged crowds can affect service operation as trains spend longer at platforms waiting for customers to alight and board services which can cause service delays. Crowding can also prevent customers from accessing services.

Our 2017 performance audit, ‘Passenger Rail Punctuality’, found that rail agencies would find it hard to maintain train punctuality after 2019 unless they significantly increased the capacity of the network to carry trains and people. TfNSW and Sydney Trains have plans to improve the network to move more passengers. These plans are set out in strategies such as More Trains, More Services and in the continued implementation of new infrastructure such as the Sydney Metro. Since 2017, TfNSW and Sydney Trains have introduced 1,500 more weekly services to increase capacity. Additional network capacity improvements are in progress for delivery from 2022 onwards.

In the meantime, TfNSW and Sydney Trains need to use other ways of managing crowding at train stations until increased capacity comes on line.

This audit examined how effectively TfNSW and Sydney Trains are managing crowding at selected metropolitan train stations in the short and medium term. In doing so, the audit examined how TfNSW and Sydney Trains know whether there is a crowding problem at stations and how they manage that crowding.

TfNSW is the lead agency for transport in NSW. TfNSW is responsible for setting the standard working timetable that Sydney Trains must implement. Sydney Trains is responsible for operating and maintaining the Sydney metropolitan heavy rail passenger service. This includes operating, staffing and maintaining most metropolitan stations. Sydney Trains’ overall responsibility is to run a safe rail network to timetable.

Conclusion

Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, but does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. TfNSW and Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers, but do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed. TfNSW is delivering a program to influence demand for transport in key precincts but the effectiveness of this program and its impact on station crowding is unclear as Transport for NSW has not evaluated the outcomes of the program.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. Data and observation on dwell time, which is the time a train waits at a platform for customers to get on and off trains, inform the development of operational approaches to manage crowding at stations. Sydney Trains has KPIs on reliability, punctuality and customer experience and use these to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. TfNSW and Sydney Trains only formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events.

Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for crowd management to Customer Area Managers, who rely on frontline Sydney Trains staff to understand how crowding affects individual stations. Station staff at identified key metropolitan train stations have developed customer management plans (also known as crowd management plans). However, Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring and evaluation of these plans and does not systematically collect data on when station staff activate crowding interventions under these plans.

Sydney Trains stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services. Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or stations before crowding reaches unsafe levels, or when it impacts on-time running. As rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will need to increase its use of interventions to manage crowding. As Sydney Trains restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, it is likely these customers will experience delays caused by these interventions.

Since 2015, TfNSW has been delivering the 'Travel Choices' program which aims to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services in key precincts. TfNSW is unable to provide data demonstrating the overall effectiveness of this program and the impact the program has on distributing public transport usage out of peak AM and PM times. TfNSW and Sydney Trains continue to explore initiatives to specifically address crowd management.

Conclusion

TfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. There are no key performance indicators directly related to station crowding. Sydney Trains uses performance indicators on reliability, punctuality and customer experience to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. Sydney Trains does not have a routine process for identifying whether crowding contributed to minor safety incidents. TfNSW and Sydney Trains formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events.

 

Conclusion

Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a strategic risk but does not have an overarching strategy to manage station crowding. Sydney Trains' stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services.

Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers but does not have sufficient oversight to know that station crowding is effectively managed. Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring or evaluation of crowd management plans at key metropolitan train stations. The use of crowding interventions is likely to increase due to increasing patronage, causing more customers to experience delays directly caused by these activities.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains have developed interventions to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services but are yet to evaluate these interventions. As such, their impact on managing station crowding is unclear.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Sydney rail network

Appendix three – Rail services contract

Appendix four – Crowding pedestrian modelling

Appendix five – Airport Link stations case study

Appendix six – About the audit

Appendix seven – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #333 - released 30 April 2020

 

Published

Actions for Transport 2017

Transport 2017

Transport
Asset valuation
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Project management

The following report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport cluster.

Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements. However, the report notes the agencies can improve their asset revaluation processes.

1. Financial reporting and controls

Audit opinions

Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements.

Early close

Early close procedures continue to facilitate timely preparation of financial statements and completion of audits, but agencies can improve their asset revaluation processes. The revaluations were not completed by the early close deadline.
Key audit matters The cluster corrected the value of rail tunnels and earthworks by recording an additional $8.5 billion in infrastructure assets.
Passenger revenue and patronage Revenue increased by seven per cent at a similar rate to patronage. Opal fare structure changes came into effect on 5 September 2016. Continued rises in patronage can increase pressure on public transport punctuality.
Negative balances on Opal Cards

There was $2.6 million in revenue not collected during 2016–17 financial year through negative balance Opal Cards. This represents 0.2 per cent of total annual passenger revenue. Transport advise the cumulative balance of negative balance Opal Cards is $4.2 million as at 30 June 2017.

Recommendation: Transport for NSW (TfNSW) should implement measures to prevent loss of revenue from passengers tapping off with negative balance Opal Cards.

Investment in infrastructure Agencies spent $8.5 billion on assets in 2016–17 and have contractual capital commitments of $11.3 billion over the next five years.
Internal controls IT systems user access administration remains an area of weakness.


2. Service Delivery

Punctuality According to Transport data, average punctuality is above target for Sydney Trains, Ferries and Light Rail, but below target for NSW Trains services. State Transit Authority of NSW (STA) is not meeting punctuality targets. STA continued working with TfNSW on delivering improved punctuality.
Public transport capacity Passenger crowding is above benchmark for many morning peak suburban rail services, as indicated by Transport data. Eleven of the 14 bus contract regions had full buses.

Bus crowding

There are no target measures on crowding for bus operators in any contract region.

Recommendation: TfNSW should develop target measures on crowding for bus operators in all contract regions and publish the results.

Customer satisfaction

Surveys conducted by Transport indicate customer satisfaction exceeded target for all modes of public transport.

This report provides Parliament and other users of Transport cluster agencies' financial statements with audit results, observations, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • Financial reporting and controls
  • Service delivery.

Confidence in public sector decision-making and transparency is enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely. Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions or recommendations related to financial reporting and controls of Transport cluster agencies for 2016–17.

Observation Conclusion or recommendation
Quality of financial reporting
Unqualified opinions were issued for all agencies’ financial statements. Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the 2016–17 financial statements of all agencies in the Transport cluster. Agencies complied with the new disclosure requirements required under accounting standard AASB 124 'Related Party Disclosures'.
Old tunnels and earthworks valued. The cluster corrected the value of rail tunnels and earthworks by recording an additional $8.5 billion in infrastructure assets.
Timeliness of financial reporting  
Most agencies complied with the statutory timeframes for completion of early close procedures and preparation and audit of financial statements. Early close procedures continue to facilitate timely preparation of financial statements and completion of audits, but agencies can make further improvement in the revaluation process.
TfNSW and RailCorp completed asset revaluations after the early close deadline. While all revaluation matters were resolved and corrected, completing the revaluation process earlier would enable more timely review, identification and resolution of matters.
Passenger revenue, patronage and cost recovery
Revenue increased by 7 per cent at a similar rate to patronage. Public transport passenger revenue increased by $93 million (seven per cent) in 2016–17, and patronage increased by 49 million (seven per cent) across all modes of transport. There were some changes in the method of calculating reported patronage between 2015–16 and 2016–17. If the methods had been consistent, the patronage increase would be 6.5 per cent. Opal fare structure changes came into effect on 5 September 2016.
Value of negative balance Opal Cards doubled since last year.

There was $2.6 million in revenue not collected during 2016–17 financial year through negative balance Opal Cards. This represents 0.2 per cent of total annual passenger revenue. Transport advise the cumulative balance of negative balance Opal Cards is $4.2 million as at 30 June 2017.

Recommendation: TfNSW should implement measures to prevent the loss of revenue from passengers tapping off with negative balance Opal cards.

The overall cost recovery from users of public transport increased slightly to 21.3 per cent. Cost of service per passenger journey for buses and ferries decreased. Revenue per passenger journey for all modes remained fairly stable.
Investment in infrastructure
There was a significant investment in transport assets in 2016–17. Agencies spent $8.5 billion on assets in 2016–17, including $3.8 billion on rail systems and $3.8 billion on road and maritime infrastructure systems.
Transport cluster have capital commitment of $11.3 billion over the next five years.
 
The transport cluster has significant contractual commitments over the next five years on rail and road infrastructure projects.
 

Internal controls

User access administration over systems remains an area of weakness. We identified six moderate and eight low risk issues related to user systems access administration across four agencies. This included review of highly privileged/super user account transactions not performed effectively and user access reviews not performed. These weaknesses increase the risk of users having excessive or unauthorised access to critical financial systems and information.

Achievement of government outcomes can be improved through effective delivery of the right mix of services, whether from the public, private or not‑for‑profit sectors. Service delivery reform will be most successful if there is clear accountability for service delivery outcomes, decisions are aligned to strategic direction and performance is monitored and evaluated.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions or recommendations related to service delivery in the Transport cluster agencies for 2016–17.

Observations Conclusion or recommendation

Punctuality

Average punctuality is above target for Sydney Trains, but below target for NSW Trains services. Punctuality targets are not met by all bus operators. Meeting punctuality targets is a continuing challenge for NSW Trains’ and STA bus services.
The 2017 performance audit 'Passenger Rail Punctuality' reported that based on forecast patronage increases, rail agencies will find it hard to maintain punctuality after 2019 unless the capacity of the network to carry trains and people is increased significantly. The 2017 performance audit found that given the likely lead times involved with major infrastructure projects, there remains a significant risk of poor punctuality after 2019. Transport advised it is currently either delivering or planning rail network upgrades to address current growth and longer-term future demand. This includes investments such as procurement of suburban and intercity trains, Sydney Metro services and further timetable planning into the 2020s.
 
After reaching its punctuality target in 2015–16 for the first time in 13 years, NSW Trains regional services was below the target in 2016–17. NSW Trains regional services achieved an average of 75 per cent punctuality in 2016–17, four per cent less than 2015–16.
The bus contracts do not have an option to impose financial penalties on STA for poor punctuality performance. In 2015–16, we recommended TfNSW should consider including financial penalties for not meeting each punctuality KPI in future contracts with bus operators. An opportunity to implement the recommendation requires a contract renewal process to be finalised with STA, which did not occur during 2016–17.

Public transport capacity

There are no target measures on crowding for bus operators in any contract region. Recommendation: TfNSW should develop target measures on crowding for bus operators in all contract regions and publish the results.

Customer Satisfaction

Customers on ferries continued to be most satisfied, followed by those on light rail. Sydney Trains and NSW Trains had fewer complaints in 2016–17. Customer satisfaction exceeded target for all modes of transport.

Project management

Transport cluster manages many of the State high profile/high risk projects. Major Transport projects include WestConnex, Sydney Metro Northwest, Sydney Metro City and Southwest, Woolgoolga to Ballina - Pacific Highway upgrade, NorthConnex, CBD and South East Light Rail and Newcastle Light Rail.
Safety performance
Road fatalities decreased by eight per cent between July 2016 and June 2017, from 390 to 359 deaths. Road fatalities mainly involved speed, fatigue and vehicle occupants not wearing available restraints.
 

Maintenance

RMS’ maintenance backlog of $3.7 billion is higher than the $3.4 billion reported in 2016. Transport cluster agencies manage $134 billion in property, plant and equipment. The total backlog maintenance of $4.1 billion at 30 June 2017 represents 3.1 per cent of those assets.

Published

Actions for Agency compliance with NSW Government travel policies

Agency compliance with NSW Government travel policies

Education
Community Services
Finance
Health
Industry
Justice
Local Government
Planning
Premier and Cabinet
Transport
Treasury
Universities
Whole of Government
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Procurement

Overall, agencies materially complied with NSW Government travel policies.

However, the Auditor-General found some agencies:

  • did not always book official travel through the approved supplier
  • had weaknesses in their travel approval processes
  • had travel policies that were inconsistent with the NSW Government policy
  • did not adequately manage their travel records.   

Last year the NSW Government spent almost $250 million on travel. The government’s travel policies aim to help agencies make better travel decisions and reduce costs. The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation (DFSI) is responsible for the government’s travel policy and manages the government contract with an approved private sector provider to procure travel services.

This audit assessed how effective agency processes were to ensure compliance with:

  • the ‘Policy on Official Travel within Australia and Overseas’ issued by the Department of Premier and Cabinet in Circular OFS-2014–07 ‘Official Travel in Australia and Overseas’ (the former policy)
  • the ‘NSW Government Travel and Transport Policy’ issued by DFSI (the new policy), effective from 28 September 2016.

We examined 15 agencies from different NSW Government clusters with significant travel expenditure. For a list of participating agencies, refer to the Appendix two.

Conclusion

We found that overall, agencies materially complied with NSW Government travel policies. However, some agencies:

  • did not always book official travel through the approved supplier
  • had weaknesses in their travel approval processes
  • had travel policies that were inconsistent with the government policy
  • did not adequately manage their travel records.

Self-assessments indicate agencies comply with most aspects of the new policy. Agencies also believe more guidance from DFSI about certain aspects of the policy would increase compliance.

We asked the 15 participating agencies to complete a self assessment of the processes they have implemented to comply with the new policy. The key observations are summarised below.

Published

Actions for State Finances 2017

State Finances 2017

Finance
Health
Industry
Justice
Local Government
Planning
Premier and Cabinet
Treasury
Universities
Whole of Government
Environment
Asset valuation
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance

Total State Sector Accounts received an unqualified audit opinion for the fifth consecutive year.

There was a $5.7 billion State budget surplus and continued investment in new infrastructure, in part funded by the long-term leases of Ausgrid and Endeavour Energy assets. This report also comments on key accounting matters, including the correction of some previously reported balances and the first time reporting of combined Cabinet members’ compensation in the Total State Sector Accounts.

Pursuant to the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983, I present my Report on State Finances 2017.

You will note that the format of this report has changed from previous years.

The intent of this change is to draw attention to the key matters that have been the focus of our audit and highlight significant factors that have contributed to the outcome.

First, it is pleasing to report once again that I issued a clear audit opinion on the State’s consolidated financial statements. This outcome demonstrates the Government’s continued focus on the quality of financial reporting across the NSW public sector.

High quality financial management and reporting are crucial to properly inform the public and build community confidence in our system of government.

The Treasury’s Financial Management Transformation program also aims to improve financial governance, budgeting and reporting arrangements across the sector. My Office is working collaboratively with The Treasury on reforms to reduce the burden of reporting, without weakening established safeguards.

The reforms should include measures to provide independent assurance of the budget process, of outcome reporting by agencies, and the power to “follow the dollar” given the increasing use of non-government organisations to deliver Government programs.

This Report also highlights another year of strong financial performance. The State’s budget result was a $5.7 billion surplus, and investment in new infrastructure has continued, in part funded by the long-term leases of Ausgrid and Endeavour Energy assets.

Finally, could I take this opportunity to thank the staff of The Treasury for the way they approached this audit. Our partnership is critical to ensuring NSW is an exemplar of quality financial management and reporting.

02_Margaret_signature.jpg

Margaret Crawford 
24 October 2017

A clear audit opinion on the State’s consolidated financial statements was issued.

Timely and accurate financial reporting is essential for informed decision making, effective management of public funds and enhancing public accountability.

This year’s clear audit opinion reflects the Government’s continued efforts to improve the quality of financial reporting across the NSW public sector.

Since the introduction of ‘early close procedures’ in 2011-12, the number of significant errors in financial statements of agencies has generally fallen largely due to identifying and resolving complex accounting issues early. Agencies’ 2016-17 financial statements submitted for audit contained nine errors exceeding $20 million. All errors were subsequently corrected in the individual agencies financial statements.

Agencies should continue to respond to key accounting issues as soon as they are identified. Where issues are identified, accounting position papers should be prepared for consideration by the Audit Office, their Audit and Risk Committee members, and when relevant, The Treasury.

The State addressed the following key accounting matters during 2016-17. 

The State recognised rail tunnels and earthworks valued at $8.5 billion.

Some rail tunnels and earthworks have never been valued by the State. These include the City Circle, the country rail network and other tunnels and earthworks built before the year 2000. Some of these tunnels and earthworks date back to the early 1900s.

For many years, the State did not account for these assets as they believed that their value could not be reliably measured. This year an independent valuer was engaged to perform a comprehensive valuation. The methodology used demonstrated
that the assets could have been reflected in the financial statements earlier.

The State recorded an additional $8.5 billion to correct the value of infrastructure assets at 1 July 2016.

Cabinet member’s compensation and related party transactions were reviewed.

Due to changes in Accounting Standards, the State had to consider 'related party information' in the financial statements. Previously this only applied to for-profit entities.

This year, requirements to report related party information extended to members of Cabinet, considered to be “key management personnel” of the State, as defined by Accounting Standards.

The Treasury implemented a process to assess and report Cabinet member’s compensation, and transactions between Cabinet members and/or their close family members, and government agencies.

Collectively, Cabinet members’ remuneration was $8.8 million, which was mainly salaries and allowances, and $3.5 million of non-monetary benefits such as security and drivers. The Treasury determined there were no other specific “related party” transactions or balances that required disclosure in the State’s financial statements.

Information system limitations continue at TAFE NSW.

TAFE NSW has experienced ongoing issues with its student administration system.

TAFE NSW has again implemented additional processes to verify the accuracy and completeness of revenue from sales of goods and services.

TAFE NSW expects to spend up to $89 million on a new information system to address these issues. Modules of the new student enrolment system are expected to be in place for the 2018 enrolment period.

Restatements relating to the General Government Sector's investment in the commercial sector.

The State corrected two previously reported balances relating to the General Government Sector’s investment in the commercial sector.

Accounting Standards require the General Government Sector to effectively store gains or losses related to its investment in the commercial sector in reserves until the investment is derecognised.

When these investments are disposed of, the cumulative gains and losses must be cleared and recognised in the operating result. However, the Government had previously cleared the cumulative gains and losses directly to Accumulated Funds within equity.

To comply with Accounting Standards, a total of $6 billion previously reported as a movement in equity  at 30 June 2016, has now been corrected to the operating result.

In addition, Accounting Standards only allow gains or losses on its investments to be stored in reserves. In past years, the State recognised all changes in the value of its investment in Available for Sale Reserves, including the capital contributed to establish the State’s investment. In 2016-17, a total of $23.4 billion of contributed capital was corrected to accumulated funds at 1 July 2015.

The State’s budget result was a $5.7 billion surplus, $2.0 billion higher than the budget estimate.

The Total State Sector comprises 310 entities controlled by the NSW Government.

Of the total, the General Government Sector comprises 215 entities that provide goods and services not directly paid for by consumers.

The non-General Government Sector comprises 95 Government businesses that provide goods and services such as water and electricity, or financial services.

A principal measure of a Government’s overall performance is its Net Operating Balance, or Budget Result. The Net Operating Balance reports the difference between the cost of General Government service delivery and the revenue earned to fund these sectors.

The State has recorded budget surpluses and exceeded the original budget result in nine of the last ten years.

The State maintained its AAA credit rating.

The object of the Act is to maintain the AAA credit rating.

NSW’s finances are managed in alignment with the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012 (the Act).

The Act established the framework for fiscal responsibility and strategy needed to protect the State’s AAA credit rating and service delivery to the people of NSW.

The purpose of maintaining the AAA credit rating is to reduce the cost of, and ensure the broadest access to, borrowings.

A triple-A credit rating also helps maintain business and consumer confidence so economic activity and employment are sustained. The legislation sets out targets and principles for financial management to achieve this.

New South Wales has credit ratings of AAA/Negative from Standard & Poor’s and Aaa/Stable from Moody’s Investors Service.

The fiscal targets for achieving this objective are:

General Government expenditure growth is lower than long term revenue growth.

General Government expenditure growth was 4.2 per cent in 2016-17, below the long-term revenue growth of 5.6 per cent.

Eliminating unfunded superannuation liabilities by 2030.

The Act sets a target of eliminating unfunded defined benefit superannuation liabilities by 2030. The State’s net superannuation liability was $58.6 billion at 30 June 2017 ($71.2 billion at 30 June 2016).

The Government predicts the 2030 target will be achieved. The State’s funding plan is to contribute amounts escalated by five per cent each year so the schemes will be fully funded by 2030. In 2016-17, the State made employer contributions of $1.5 billion, which is largely consistent with contributions over the past five years.

The liability values in the graph below do not reflect the values recorded in the Total State Sector Accounts. For financial reporting purposes, Accounting Standards (AASB 119 Employee Benefits) require the State to discount its superannuation liability using the government bond rate (refer to page 10 of this report). 

The relevant government bond rate in the current economic climate is 2.62 per cent.

The State’s target for the unfunded superannuation liability is measured using AASB 1056 Superannuation Entities. This is because it adopts a measurement basis that reflects expected earnings on fund assets, which are currently between 5.9 and 7.4 per cent. Using these rates, the liability is $15.0 billion at 30 June 2017 ($16.1 billion at 30 June 2016). The unfunded liability is $2.4 billion less than when the Act was introduced.

The State’s assets grew by $31.6 billion during 2016-17 to $409 billion.

Valuing the State’s physical assets.

When we audit the financial statements, we focus on areas we consider as higher risk. These areas are often complex, and require the use of estimates and judgements.

The State has $307.2 billion of physical assets measured at fair value in accordance with Australian Accounting Standards. Fair value calculations are inherently complex and sensitive to assumptions and estimates, increasing the risk these assets are incorrectly valued.

In our audits, we assess the reasonableness and appropriateness of assumptions used in valuing physical assets. This includes obtaining an understanding of the valuation methodologies applied and judgements made. We also review the completeness of asset registers, and the mathematical accuracy of valuation models.

Net movements between years includes additions, disposals, depreciation and valuations. This year, valuations of physical assets added $16.2 billion to the State’s assets, comprising: 

  • Transport for NSW and Railcorp $8.5 billion

  • New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation $4.8 billion

  • Roads and Maritime Services $930 million

  • Crown Entity $400 million.    

The State’s financial assets increased $27.5 billion in 2016-17

The State’s financial assets have increased by 88 per cent over the past four years. In 2016-17, financial assets increased primarily due to proceeds from the sale of government assets and businesses.

The Government implemented reforms to better use the State’s financial assets. A key element was the creation of an Asset and Liability Committee (ALCO) to provide advice on ways to improve balance sheet management.

Since the creation of the ALCO, reforms include:

  • Establishment of the New South Wales Infrastructure Future Fund (NIFF). The net proceeds from the State’s asset recycling program are invested into the NIFF, which is managed by TCorp, with a balance of $14.6 billion by 30 June 2017. Funds raised are invested through the NIFF until the Government requires them for critical infrastructure projects that are part of the Restart NSW and Rebuilding NSW program of works. ALCO and TCorp provide advice on the NIFF’s performance and management

  • Establishment of the Social and Affordable Housing Fund ($1.1 billion at 30 June 2017). ALCO oversees the Fund to ensure an appropriate investment approach that will maintain funding certainty for new social and affordable housing stock

  • Cash and liquidity management reforms to centralise cash previously held by agencies in the Treasury Banking System. This reform is designed to ensure agencies have adequate levels of liquidity but with surplus funds invested centrally for better returns.

The State’s liabilities decreased by $13.1 billion during 2016-17 to $182 billion.

Valuing the State’s liabilities relies on an actuarial assessment.

Nearly half of the State’s liabilities relate to its employees. This includes unfunded superannuation, and employee benefits, such as long service and recreation leave.

Valuation of these obligations is subject to complex estimation techniques and significant judgements. Small changes in assumptions can materially impact the financial statements.

We address the risk associated with auditing these balances:

  • using actuarial specialists

  • testing controls around underlying employee data used in data models, and testing the accuracy of the calculations

  • evaluating assumptions applied in calculating employee entitlements such as the discount rate and the probability of long service leave vesting conditions being met.

The State’s superannuation obligations reduced by $12.6 billion in 2016-17.

The State’s $58.6 billion superannuation liability represents obligations for past and present employees, less the value of assets set aside to meet those obligations. The superannuation liability decreased from $71.2 billion to $58.6 billion, largely due to an increase in the discount rate from 1.99 per cent to 2.62 per cent. This alone reduced the liability by $9.2 billion

The State’s borrowings totalled $70.6 billion at 30 June 2017.

The State’s borrowings totalled $70.6 billion at 30 June 2017, $9.5 billion less than the previous year. This was largely due to the repayment of borrowings when the assets of Ausgrid and Endeavour Energy were leased to the private sector.

TCorp issues bonds to raise funds for NSW Government agencies. The bonds are actively traded in financial markets providing price transparency and liquidity to public sector borrowers and institutional investors. All TCorp bonds are guaranteed by the NSW Government.

The Government manages its debt liabilities through its balance sheet management strategy. The strategy extends to TCorp, which applies an active risk management strategy to the Government’s debt portfolio.

General Government Sector debt is being restructured by replacing shorter-term debt with longer-term debt. This lengthens the portfolio to better match liabilities with the funding requirements of infrastructure assets and reduces refinancing risks. It also allows the Government to take advantage of the low interest rate environment.

The State recorded revenue of $83.5 billion in  2016-17, an increase of $5.3 billion from 2015-16.

The State’s results are underpinned by revenue growth in taxation, fees and fines.

Taxation, fees, fines and other revenue comprises $30.5 billion of taxation ($28.7 billion in 2015-16) and $5.3 billion of fees, fines and other revenue ($4.6 billion).

Tax revenue for the Total State Sector increased by $1.8 billion, or 6.4 per cent compared to 2015-16, primarily due to:

  • one-off business asset sales and lease transactions, including $718 million in transfer duty from the Ausgrid and Endeavour Energy lease transactions

  • $385 million increase in payroll tax from growth in NSW employment and average employee compensation

  • a $426 million increase in land taxes.

Growth in stamp duty is expected to slow over the next 4 years.

General Government Sector stamp duties have increased from $6.2 billion in 2012-13 to $11.5 billion in 2016-17, an annual average growth rate of 16.5 per cent. The Government’s budget forecasts the growth in stamp duties to decline, to an average annual growth rate of 2.6 per cent between 2016-17 and 2020-21.

The State received Commonwealth grants and subsidies of $30.8 billion in 2016-17.

The State received $30.8 billion from the Commonwealth Government in 2016-17, $1.6 billion more than in 2015-16. This was primarily due to transaction based asset recycling grants of $1.0 billion and a $720 million increase in national land transport grants. This increase was offset by a $435 million decrease in General Purpose Grants, which mainly comprises New South Wales’ share of the Goods and Services Tax (GST). 

The State spent $79.4 billion in 2016-17 to deliver services to the community, an increase of $3.9 billion from 2015-16.

Overall expenses increased 5.2 per cent from last year. Most of the increase was due to higher employee costs and operating costs.

Total salaries and wages increased by 4.2 per cent from 2015-16.

Total salaries and wages increased to $30 billion from $28.8 billion in 2015-16. The Government wages policy aims to limit the growth in remuneration and other employee costs to no more than 2.5 per cent per annum.

Operating expenses increased by 12.4 per cent from 2015-16.

Within operating expenses, payments for supplies, services and other expenses increased, in part, due to the State:

  • reacquiring mining licenses worth $482 million and additional land remediation costs of $101 million

  • spending more on health including additional drug supplies relating to Hepatitis C.

State spend on transport and communications increased by 68.1 per cent since 2012-13.

While spending on health and education remain the largest functional areas provided by Government, expenditure on transport and communication increased, on average, by 13.9 per cent annually between 2012-13 and 2016-17. This increase reflects the Government’s investment in transport infrastructure such as the Sydney Metro and Westconnex. Over the same period, spending on health increased by $3.9 billion.

Expenditure on fuel and energy has decreased by an average of 44.7 per cent since 2012-13, reflecting the State’s leases of electricity network assets.

In 2011, the Government established Restart NSW to fund high priority infrastructure projects.

Restart NSW projects are primarily funded from the proceeds from the asset recycling program enabling Government to deliver new infrastructure investment.

Restart NSW provides funding for the delivery of Rebuilding NSW, which is the Government’s 10-year plan to invest $20 billion in new infrastructure.

The State finalised long-term leases of Ausgrid and Endeavour Energy assets.

In June 2017, the Government finalised its long-term lease of 50.4 per cent of Endeavour Energy. This transaction follows on from the long-term leases of TransGrid in December 2015 and 50.4 per cent of Ausgrid in December 2016. Net proceeds of $15.0 billion were paid into Restart NSW relating to these transactions.

The Government also finalised an arrangement for the private sector to provide land titling and registry services to the public for 35 years. The State, through Restart NSW, received an upfront payment of $2.6 billion from the new operator.

Restart NSW is funding $29.8 billion of new infrastructure.

The Government has detailed its plan to invest $20 billion into the Rebuilding NSW plan from Restart NSW.

At 30 June 2017, around $2.9 billion has already been spent on Rebuilding NSW projects from Restart NSW, with a further $9 billion included in the budget aggregates. The Government has also earmarked a further $8.1 billion in Restart NSW for future projects.

The most significant project is the Sydney Metro. The Government has committed $7.0 billion from Restart NSW to build a 30-kilometre metro line, linking Sydney Metro Northwest at Chatswood, through new stations in the lower North Shore, the Sydney CBD and southwest to Bankstown. At 30 June 2017, $2.4 billion has been spent on this project from Restart NSW.

Other significant projects funded by Restart NSW include a $1.8 billion contribution to WestConnex and reserved funding of $1 billion towards the State’s Major Stadia Network program.

The Treasury initiated the Financial Management Transformation (FMT) program with the aim of changing and improving financial governance, budgeting and reporting arrangements of the New South Wales public sector.

FMT aims to deliver better outcomes for the people of New South Wales and focuses on transparency and accountability for expenditure, and better value for money.

New Financial Management System

PRIME is the Information Technology (IT) solution component of the FMT program, replacing several historical systems. PRIME will provide both financial and performance information within one IT platform for all agencies in the NSW public sector.

It is expected to give Government more timely information to plan and deliver its policy priorities and the budget.

Independent assurance over the budget process would improve confidence in the reliability of the State’s financial information.

Published

Actions for Sydney Road Maintenance Contracts

Sydney Road Maintenance Contracts

Transport
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management

In November 2013, Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) outsourced the maintenance of State roads in the Sydney region south and west zones using an innovative contracting approach called the Stewardship Maintenance Contract (SMC). The SMC links risk to reward, and uses a performance framework where outcomes should drive improved performance over time.

RMS’ SMC contract management includes most elements of good practice, including governance and dispute resolution mechanisms. However, key elements are missing which reduces its effectiveness.

Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) is responsible for the Sydney region State roads network This includes over 2,800 kilometres of roads and associated road corridor infrastructure such as bridges, tunnels and drainage structures. RMS divides the network into three geographical areas: south, west and north zones.

In 1995, RMS first outsourced road corridor infrastructure maintenance for the north zone through a Performance Specified Maintenance Contract (PSMC). The current 10-year PSMC for the north zone will expire in October 2018. Prior to November 2013, RMS maintained roads in the south and west zones through its Road and Fleet Services unit. 

In November 2013, RMS outsourced road maintenance services for the south and west zones using Stewardship Maintenance Contracts (SMC). The contracts run for seven years with an option for a further three years at RMS’ discretion. RMS estimated that the annual cost of these contracts was around $240 million in total. In March 2018, the contract prices are due to be reset by negotiation to reflect the contractors’ experience with, and better information about, the road networks and routine maintenance requirements. 

The SMC model adopted stewardship principles to improve value for money. RMS defined stewardship principles as a broad set of values, attitudes and behaviours, required of the contractor to effectively manage the assets on behalf of RMS. The SMC also includes commercial principles, such as linking risk to reward, and a performance framework where outcomes drive performance.

This audit assessed whether RMS had effectively managed the outsourcing of road maintenance in the Sydney region south and west zones. In making this assessment, we answered the following questions:

  1. Did RMS justify the decision to adopt the SMC model?
  2. Do SMCs include key performance indicators (KPIs) and incentives which promote efficiency and effectiveness? 
  3. Does RMS collect high quality information on contractor performance and take action to correct performance deficiencies?
  4. Are the expected benefits being achieved?

Conclusion

RMS developed an innovative contracting approach with the SMC. RMS has realised some benefits in the first year, including savings, from outsourcing road maintenance in the Sydney region south and west zones using the SMC. However, RMS’ management of the SMC has key elements missing which reduces its effectiveness.

The SMC includes performance measures and incentives to drive efficiency and effectiveness improvements over time.  

RMS has established a contract management framework which includes most elements of good practice, including governance and dispute resolution mechanisms. However, it does not have procedures to guide its contract managers in managing specific provisions of the SMC. Consequently, RMS has not exercised several significant SMC requirements, such as having the contractor account for an efficiency dividend in its pricing at the start of each three-year works period. It also has not done enough to assure itself that the contractor provided performance and financial data are correct. This is important because the data is used to measure performance and calculate contractor payments.  

RMS assessed that it had achieved around 80 per cent of the expected cost benefit in the initial year of the SMC. However, it has not tracked its achievement of benefits since then.

The Stewardship Maintenance Contract

RMS justified adopting the SMC model and included KPIs to drive efficiency and effectiveness

The SMC model includes features that RMS had not previously used for road maintenance contracts. These included adopting stewardship principles and transferring price risk to the contractor over time as the contractor becomes familiar with the assets being maintained.

The SMC model meets RMS’ requirements for flexibility in pricing models, the need for collaboration in asset maintenance planning, promoting innovation and effective performance management.

RMS used many good practices to develop the SMC model, including:

  • preparing a robust business case comparing the SMC model to RMS maintaining the road network itself, as well as assessing whether two other contracting models
    (traditional and alliance) would meet its requirements
  • assessing experiences with similar arrangements in other jurisdictions and identifying elements that worked to get the best outcomes
  • developing a robust performance framework, which included a mix of efficiency and effectiveness KPIs that reflected NSW Government policy and RMS priorities
  • incorporating risk and reward incentives delivered through cost sharing arrangements which change as the contract matures
  • using a contract duration that supports RMS priorities and provides an incentive for better quality outcomes.

RMS uses data provided by the contractor to measure performance and calculate payments to the contractor. The SMC includes a specific sanction if RMS finds that the contractor provided incorrect performance data, but no specific sanction if the contractor provides incorrect financial data. If RMS finds that the contactor provided incorrect performance or financial data, RMS can only recover over-payments which may have been made using the incorrect data.  

To provide a stronger incentive for the contractor to ensure data it provides is accurate, RMS should consider whether to incorporate stronger sanctions when negotiating the commercial reset due in mid-2018 for south and west zones. RMS should also consider this for the new contract for the north zone when the current PSMC contract expires in October 2018.

RMS' contract management approach and benefits realization

RMS can improve the effectiveness of its oversight and management of the SMC

RMS does not have SMC specific contract procedures to guide its contract managers. Consequently, RMS has not exercised several significant SMC requirements, such as having the contractors account for an efficiency dividend in their pricing at the start of each three-year works period. Effective contract management should be supported by contract specific procedures, with explanations of, and allocation of responsibility for, the various interventions that RMS may be required to exercise in the SMC.

Performance and financial reporting under the SMC is based on a mix of RMS and contractor provided data. While there are a range of audits of contractor provided performance and financial data that RMS can conduct each year under the SMC, it does not have a schedule of audits it will conduct and when.  
During the first year of the SMC, RMS commissioned some limited audits of financial data. In the first three years of the SMC, RMS did not conduct any audits of performance data. Had there been SMC specific procedures in place, this would have reduced the risk of RMS not implementing a systematic audit program to give it reasonable assurance on the quality of the data that the contractor has provided. This is important because the data is used to measure performance and calculate contractor payments.

RMS has been aware of data quality issues since 2015. While RMS advised that it commenced addressing some data quality issues in response to a series of reviews conducted in 2015, a recent internal audit report indicates that RMS has not resolved the data quality issues.  

RMS achieved benefits in the first year, but has not tracked benefits since

As part of the business case, RMS agreed to implement a benefits realisation strategy, including a benefits tracking tool. RMS commenced tracking benefits, but did not establish a comparative baseline pre-SMC on non-financial benefits, and has not tracked benefits past year one.

In 2015, a benchmarking study commissioned by RMS found that it had achieved 80 per cent of the expected recurrent cost savings and other benefits, such as improved workplace safety, in the first full year of the SMC. However, there was no clear baseline to measure
non-financial performance. The study was qualified due to gaps in available data. The study also did not reconcile the actual one-off transition costs to the business case estimate.

During the course of the audit, RMS advised that it intends to repeat this type of study to determine whether it has achieved all expected benefits (and their value), and that it would use the results to inform its negotiation with the SMC contractors as part of the commercial reset due in mid-2018.

Roads and Maritime Services is responsible for the State Roads network in the Sydney region

Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) is responsible for the Sydney region State roads network. This includes over 2,800 kilometres of roads and associated road corridor infrastructure such as bridges, tunnels and drainage structures. The network is divided into three geographical areas: south, west and north zones. Prior to November 2013, RMS maintained roads in the Sydney region south and west zones through its Road and Fleet Services unit.  

In 1995, RMS first outsourced road corridor infrastructure maintenance for the north zone through a Performance Specified Maintenance Contract (PSMC). The current 10-year PSMC for the north zone will expire in October 2018. This contract is worth around $35 million per annum.  

NSW Government priorities and road maintenance

Efficient and effective road maintenance contributes to the following NSW Government priorities:

  • improving road travel reliability
  • ensuring on-time running of public transport
  • reducing road fatalities
  • improving government services
  • keeping our environment clean.

The NSW Commission of Audit recommended outsourcing the maintenance of State roads

The NSW Commission of Audit in its Final Report on Government Expenditure (May 2012) recommended contestability as an appropriate strategy to consider for improving road maintenance service delivery for State roads.  

The Commission benchmarked RMS’ road surface quality and cost per lane kilometre against those of Western Australia, Victoria, and Queensland. This showed that New South Wales lagged the other states on both these measures.  

Exhibit 1: Interjurisdictional comparison of road maintenance outcomes 2009–10
  WA VIC QLD NSW
Roads managed (lane kms) 52,659 50,510 71,353 80,348
Estimated spend ($/lane km) 5,000 4,500 6,000 7,000
Road quality measure (%) 99 99 94 91

Source: NSW Commission of Audit Final Report May 2012.

The Commission noted that RMS had conducted two independent reviews to examine the potential for extending road maintenance contestability. The Commission found that there was inadequate and inconclusive benchmarking to establish the efficiency of RMS’ Road and Fleet Services unit when compared to outsourcing. It recommended that RMS bring forward a proposal to conduct a competitive tender for the road maintenance of the Sydney region south zone road network to inform the feasibility of a progressive rollout of road maintenance contestability across other areas of the State. In August 2012, the NSW Government adopted the Commission’s recommendation.

The NSW Government introduced road maintenance contestability through Stewardship Maintenance Contracts

In April 2013, the NSW Government announced that it would introduce road maintenance contestability across the Sydney region, using a Stewardship Maintenance Contract (SMC) model to improve value for money. In doing so, it excluded RMS’ Road and Fleet Services unit from tendering.  

The SMC model is based on the following key commercial and performance principles set by RMS:

  • performance driven by outcomes
  • flexible and adaptable
  • transparent and measurable
  • linking risk to reward
  • continuous improvement
  • criteria for selection of, and transition to, different payment models.

The following key stewardship principles underpin the SMC’s broad set of values, attitudes and behaviours, which are required of the contractor to effectively manage the assets on behalf of RMS:

  • putting RMS’ customers (road users and the general public) first and being responsive to them
  • being responsible and accountable for the outcomes resulting from the management of the assets
  • managing the assets diligently, efficiently and effectively with limited direction from RMS
  • working collaboratively with RMS to deliver services that are tailored to meet RMS’ evolving needs
  • acting with integrity and transparency in performing the services
  • performing the services in the best interests of RMS and asset users.

Other key features of the SMC include:

  • service requirements which describe the scope of the services, and the standards the contractor must meet
  • a commercial framework which defines how payments are structured, how performance assessment will impact on payments and outlines the key commercial principles. SMCs primarily divide payments into two main mechanisms, these being the priced component (or fixed price) and the target cost calculated as follows:
    • fixed price – the contractor is paid a pre-agreed amount for specific services being provided, regardless of the actual costs incurred
    • target cost – RMS and the contractor agree on a target cost for a project, and any cost overruns or underruns are shared between them
  • a performance framework which provides mechanisms for assessing contractor performance. This includes a comprehensive listing of the key result areas (KRAs) and key performance indicators (KPIs) against which RMS measures the contractor’s performance. The framework also outlines the scoring methodology that RMS uses to determine whether the contractor’s bid margin (profit and overheads) is reduced due to less than satisfactory performance or whether a bonus is paid if a threshold performance score is exceeded.

Road maintenance under SMCs for Sydney region south and west zones commenced in November 2013

In November 2013, RMS awarded SMCs to the Leighton Boral Amey consortium, now named Ventia Boral Amey (VBA), for the south zone and the DownerMouchel (DM) consortium for the west zone. The contracts run for seven years with an option for a further three years at RMS’ discretion. In April 2014, full services commenced following a four-month transition period. RMS estimated that the annual cost of these contracts was around $240 million in total. In March 2018, the contract prices are due to be reset by negotiation to reflect the contractors’ experience with, and better information about, the road networks and routine maintenance requirements. 

  1. Roads and Maritime Services should consider whether to incorporate stronger sanctions in the Stewardship Maintenance Contract if the contractor provides incorrect performance or financial data to RMS, when:
     
    1. negotiating the commercial reset for the next works period with the Sydney region south and west zone contractors due in July 2018.
    2. finalising a new SMC contract for the Sydney region north zone, due to commence in October 2018.

Roads and Maritime Services should, by September 2017:

2.  Review its contract management framework for SMCs to ensure that all authorities and accountabilities of
     contract managers are clearly defined, including:

a) accountability and procedures for exercising all operational clauses in the SMC where RMS may opt to, or be required to intervene, or make a decision

b) authority to approve or initiate the interventions RMS is required to, or may, exercise under the SMC

c) the audits that RMS will conduct to systematically validate the performance and financial data that the SMC contractors provide

d) the accountabilities of RMS contract managers to systematically review audits and quality reviews that the SMC contractors must conduct to demonstrate compliance with their service plans

e) the accountabilities of RMS contract managers to check that the monthly and annual reports provided by SMC contractors do not contain errors, omissions or inaccuracies.

3.  Improve its management of benefits realisation by:

a) initiating a further benefits realisation review and record the benefits delivered against those
    estimated following the tender process, including the one-off transition costs

b) identify any benefits, including savings, not yet attained and develop strategies to address any short-falls

c) establish a tool to track the ongoing realisation of benefits.