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Reports

Published

Actions for Workers compensation claims management

Workers compensation claims management

Treasury
Finance
Management and administration
Regulation

What this report is about

Workers compensation schemes in NSW provide compulsory workplace injury insurance. The effective management of workers compensation is important to ensure injured workers are provided with prompt support to ensure timely, safe and sustainable return to work.

Insurance and Care NSW (icare) manages workers compensation insurance. The State Insurance Regulatory Authority (SIRA) regulates workers compensation schemes. NSW Treasury has a stewardship role but does not directly manage the schemes.

This audit assessed the effectiveness and economy of icare’s management of workers compensation claims, and the effectiveness of SIRA’s oversight of workers compensation claims.

Findings

icare is implementing major reforms to its approach to workers compensation claims management - but it is yet to demonstrate if these changes are the most effective or economical way to improve outcomes.

icare’s planning and assurance processes for its reforms have not adequately assessed existing claims models or analysed other reform options.

icare's activities have not focused enough on its core responsibilities of improving return to work and maintaining financial sustainability.

SIRA has improved the effectiveness of its workers compensation regulatory activities in recent years. Prior to 2019, SIRA was mostly focussed on developing regulatory frameworks and was less active in its supervision of workers compensation schemes.

NSW Treasury's role in relation to workers compensation has been unclear, which has limited its support for performance improvements.

Recommendations

icare should:

  • Ensure that its annual Statement of Business Intent clearly sets out its approach to achieving its legislative objectives.
  • Monitor and evaluate its workers compensation scheme reforms.
  • Develop a quality assurance program to ensure insurance claim payments are accurate.

NSW Treasury should:

  • Work with relevant agencies to improve public sector workers compensation scheme outcomes.
  • Engage with the icare Board to ensure icare's management is in line with relevant NSW Treasury policies.

SIRA should:

  • Address identified gaps in its fraud investigation.
  • Develop a co-ordinated research strategy.

 

Read the PDF report

Parliamentary reference - Report number #393 - released 2 April 2024

Published

Actions for State Finances 2023

State Finances 2023

Treasury
Whole of Government
Asset valuation
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Regulation

What this report is about

Results of the audit of the Consolidated State Financial Statements of the New South Wales General Government Sector (GGS) and Total State Sector (TSS) for the year ended 30 June 2023.

Findings

The audit opinion on the 2022–23 Consolidated State Financial Statements was qualified in relation to two issues and included an emphasis of matter.

The first qualification matter is a continuation of the prior year limitation of scope on the audit relating to the Catholic Metropolitan Cemeteries Trust (CMCT), a controlled state entity, who continued to deny access to its management, books and records for the purposes of a financial audit. As a result, the Audit Office was unable to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to support the assets, liabilities, income and expenses relating to CMCT recorded in the TSS and the equity investment recognised in the GGS relating to the net assets of CMCT.

The second qualification matter relates to the limitations on the accuracy and reliability of financial information relating to Statutory Land Managers (SLMs) and Common Trust entities (CTs) controlled by the State and were either exempted from requirements to prepare financial reports, or who were required to submit financial reports and have not done so. The Audit Office was unable to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to determine the impact on the value of non-land assets and liabilities, income and expenses that should be recognised in the 2022–23 Consolidated State Financial Statements and which have not been recorded in the Consolidated State Financial Statements.

The independent audit opinion also includes an emphasis of matter drawing attention to key decisions made by the NSW Government regarding the future of the Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (TAHE).

Recommendations

The report includes recommendations for NSW Treasury to address several high-risk findings, including:

  • ensuring accurate and reliable financial information is available to recognise the non-land balances of SLMs and CTs
  • ensuring the CMCT, SLMs and CTs meet their statutory reporting obligations
  • conducting a broader review of the financial reporting exemption framework
  • continued monitoring of TAHE's control over its assets
  • providing timely guidance to the sector relating to legislative or policy changes that impact financial reporting
  • developing an accounting policy for the reimbursement of unsuccessful tender bid cost contributions.

 

Read the PDF report

Published

Actions for Treasury 2023

Treasury 2023

Treasury
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Regulation
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration

What this report is about

Result of the Treasury portfolio of agencies’ financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2023.

The results of the audit of the NSW Government’s consolidated Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA), which are prepared by NSW Treasury, will be reported separately in our report on ‘State Finances 2023’.

The audit found

Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all general purpose financial statement audits.

Qualified audit opinions were issued on two of the 24 other engagements prepared by portfolio agencies. These related to payments made from Special Deposit Accounts that did not comply with the relevant legislation.

The number of monetary misstatements identified in our audits increased from 29 in 2021–22 to 39 in 2022–23.

The new parental leave policy impacted agencies across all portfolios. NSW Treasury should perform annual assessments to identify changes in legislation and regulation and provide timely guidance to the sector.

Transport for NSW and Sydney Metro have capitalised over $300 million of tender bid costs paid to unsuccessful tender bidders relating to significant infrastructure projects. Whilst NSW Treasury policy provides clarity on the reimbursement of unsuccessful bidders’ costs, clearer guidance on how to account for these costs in agencies’ financial statements is required.

The key audit issues were

Five high-risk issues were reported in 2022–23. Three were new findings on contract management, accounting treatments for workers compensation renewal premium adjustments and the management and oversight of a Special Deposit Account. Two repeat issues referred to the need to improve quality review processes over financial reporting and the timely approval of administration costs.

Portfolio agencies should prioritise and action recommendations to address internal control deficiencies.

 

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Treasury portfolio of agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Treasury portfolio of agencies (the portfolio) for 2023.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all Treasury portfolio agencies’ 2022–23 financial statements.
  • Two qualified audit opinions were issued on special purpose financial reports, relating to whether payments from the Electricity Retained Interest Corporation – Ausgrid (ERIC-A) Fund and the Electricity Retained Interest Corporation – Endeavour (ERIC-E) Fund, complied with the relevant legislation.
  • The total number of errors (both corrected and uncorrected) in the financial statements increased from 29 in 2021–22 to 39 in 2022–23.
    Reported corrected misstatements increased from 15 in 2021–22 to 25 with a gross value of $7.1 billion in 2022–23. Reported uncorrected misstatements increased from 13 in 2021–22 to 14 in 2022–23, with a gross value of $277.6 million in 2022–23.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury portfolio.

Section highlights

  • Five high-risk issues were reported in 2022–23. Three were new findings on contract management, accounting treatments for workers compensation renewal premium adjustments and the management and oversight of a Special Deposit Account.
  • A further 35 moderate risk findings were reported in 2022–23, of which ten were repeat findings.
  • Some agencies have again spent monies without an authorised delegation.
  • The quality of information provided for audit purposes needs to improve.

 

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

Appendix five – Acquittals and other opinions

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Natural disasters

Natural disasters

Community Services
Environment
Finance
Local Government
Planning
Transport
Treasury
Whole of Government
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Regulation
Risk
Service delivery

What this report is about

This report draws together the financial impact of natural disasters on agencies integral to the response and impact of natural disasters during 2021–22.

What we found

Over the 2021–22 financial year $1.4 billion from a budget of $1.9 billion was spent by the NSW Government in response to natural disasters.

Total expenses were less than the budget due to underspend in the following areas:

  • clean-up assistance, including council grants
  • anticipated temporary accommodation support
  • payments relating to the Northern Rivers Business Support scheme for small businesses.

Natural disaster events damaged council assets such as roads, bridges, waste collection centres and other facilities used to provide essential services. Additional staff, contractors and experts were engaged to restore and repair damaged assets and minimise disruption to service delivery.

At 30 June 2022, the estimated damage to council infrastructure assets totalled $349 million.

Over the first half of the 2022–23 financial year, councils experienced further damage to infrastructure assets due to natural disasters. NSW Government spending on natural disasters continued with a further $1.1 billion spent over this period.

Thirty-six councils did not identify climate change or natural disaster as a strategic risk despite 22 of these having at least one natural disaster during 2021–22.

Section highlights

  • $1.4 billion from a budget of $1.9 billion was spent by the NSW Government in response to natural disasters during 2021–22.
  • Budget underspent for temporary housing and small business support as lower than expected need.

Section highlights

  • 83 local council areas were impacted by natural disasters during 2021–22, with 58 being impacted by more than one type of natural disaster.
  • $349 million damage to council infrastructure assets at 30 June 2022.

 

Published

Actions for NSW government agencies' use of consultants

NSW government agencies' use of consultants

Treasury
Whole of Government
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Workforce and capability

What the report is about

This audit assessed how effectively NSW government agencies procure and manage consultants. It examined the role of the NSW Procurement Board and NSW Procurement (a unit within NSW Treasury) in supporting and monitoring agency procurement and management of consultants.

The audit used four sources of data that contain information about spending on consultants by NSW government agencies, including annual report disclosures and the State's financial consolidation system (Prime). It also reviewed a sample of consulting engagements from ten NSW government agencies.

What we found

Our review of a selection of consulting engagements indicates that agencies do not procure and manage consultants effectively.

We found most agencies do not use consultants strategically and do not have systems for managing or evaluating consultant performance. We also found examples of non-compliance with procurement rules, including contract variations that exceeded procurement thresholds.

NSW Procurement has made improvements to the information available about spending on consultants, including additional analysis and reporting. However, there is no single data source that accurately captures spending on consultants.

Our analysis of data on whole-of-government spending on consultants, drawn from agency annual reports, indicates that four large professional services firms accounted for about a quarter of consultancy expenditure from 2017–18 to 2021–22. This concentration increases strategic risks, including over-reliance on a limited number of providers and potential reduction in the independence of advice.

It is also highly unlikely that NSW government agencies will meet the government's 2019 policy commitment to reduce consultancy expenses by 20% each year, over four years, from 2019–20. NSW Treasury advised that to implement this commitment, agency budgets were reduced in Prime in line with the savings targets. However, actual spending on consulting in NSW Treasury's Reports on State Finances 2020–21 and 2021–22 was almost $100 million higher than the savings targets over the first three years since 2019–20.

What we recommended

The report made seven recommendations which aim to improve:

  • the quality and transparency of data on spending on consultants
  • monitoring of strategic risks and agency compliance with procurement and recordkeeping rules
  • agencies' strategic use of consultants, including evaluation and knowledge retention.

Between 2017–18 and 2021–22, NSW government agency annual reports disclosed total spending of around $1 billion on consultants across more than 10,000 engagements. More than 1,000 consulting firms provided services to NSW government agencies during this period. Consulting is a classification of professional services that is characterised by giving advice or recommendations on a specific issue. The NSW Procurement Board Direction PBD-2021-03 defines a consultant as a person or organisation that provides 'recommendations or professional advice to assist decision-making by management'. PBD-2021-03 notes that the advisory nature of the work of consultants is the main factor that distinguishes them from other providers of professional services.

The NSW Procurement Board is responsible for setting procurement policy, issuing directions to support policies, and monitoring and reporting on agency compliance with policies and directions. NSW Procurement, a division within NSW Treasury, supports agencies to comply with the NSW Procurement Board’s policies and directions. A 'devolved governance model' is used for procurement in New South Wales. This means the heads of government entities that are covered by the NSW Procurement Board’s directions are responsible for managing the entity's procurement, including managing risks, reporting and ensuring compliance, in line with procurement laws and policies.

This audit assessed how effectively NSW government agencies procure and manage consultants. It assessed the role of the NSW Procurement Board and NSW Procurement in supporting and monitoring agency procurement and management of consultants. It also reviewed a sample of consulting engagements from ten NSW government agencies to examine how agencies procured, managed and reported on their use of consultants. The ten NSW government agencies were:

  • NSW Treasury
  • Department of Communities and Justice
  • Department of Customer Service
  • Department of Education
  • Department of Planning and Environment
  • Department of Premier and Cabinet
  • Department of Regional NSW
  • Infrastructure NSW
  • Sydney Metro
  • Transport for NSW

There are four different sources of data that contain information about spending on consultants by NSW government agencies: the State's financial consolidation system (Prime), disclosures of spending on consultants in agency annual reports, and two systems operated by NSW Procurement (the Business Advisory Services (BAS) dashboard and Spend Cube). Each of these data sources serves a different purpose, and collects and categorises information differently. None of these provide a complete source of data on spending on consultants, either in their own right or collectively.

NSW Treasury considers Prime to be the 'source of truth' on consulting expenditure across the NSW public sector. An account within Prime records recurrent spending on consultants, but this account does not include capital expenditure (that is, spending on consultants that has from a financial reporting perspective been 'capitalised' to a project on the balance sheet). As the State's financial consolidation system, Prime captures all financial information. However, capitalised consulting expenditure is recorded within various capital accounts, and is not identifiable within these accounts. While this is appropriate for accounting purposes, it means that the Prime account that records recurrent consulting expenditure does not reflect total spending on consultants by NSW government agencies. We used the data in Prime to assess whether NSW government agencies met the NSW Government's policy commitment—stated before the 2019 election and costed by the Parliamentary Budget Office—to reduce recurrent expenditure on consulting by 20% each year, over four years, from 2019–20. We did this because, while the Prime account for recurrent consulting expenditure does not reflect all spending on consultants, it does capture the recurrent spending that was subject to the policy commitment.

Most NSW government agencies are required by legislation to disclose spending on consultants (as defined in PBD-2021-03) in their annual reports. These disclosures include both recurrent and capital expenditure. For consulting engagements that cost more than $50,000, the disclosures also provide itemised information, including the names of the individual projects and the consultants used. While this data is more complete than Prime because it includes capital expenditure, it also has some gaps. Some entities are excluded from public reporting requirements on consultant use. For example, NSW Local Health Districts (LHD) are not required to produce annual reports, and the Ministry of Health does not include LHD consulting expenditure in its annual report.1 We used annual report disclosure data to report on total expenditure on consultants, and the concentration of suppliers of consulting services to NSW government agencies.

The BAS dashboard and Spend Cube are systems created by NSW Procurement to collect information about spending on suppliers of professional services. This includes consultants, but also includes other professional services providers. The systems were not designed for reporting on spending on consulting as defined in PBD-2021-03. However, we have used this data to assess specific aspects of NSW Procurement's monitoring of the use of consultants by NSW government agencies.

In 2018, we conducted an audit titled 'Procurement and reporting of consultancy services'. This assessed how 12 NSW government agencies complied with procurement requirements and how NSW Procurement supported the functions of the NSW Procurement Board. The 2018 audit found that none of the 12 agencies fully complied with NSW Procurement Board Directions on the use of consultants and that the NSW Procurement Board was not fully effective in overseeing and supporting agencies’ procurement of consultants. Specific findings from the 2018 audit included: 

  • Agencies applied the definition of consultant inconsistently, which affected the accuracy of reporting on consultancy expenditure.
  • There was inadequate guidance from NSW Procurement for agencies implementing the procurement framework, with a need for additional tools, automated processes, and other internal controls to improve compliance.
  • NSW Procurement had insufficient data for effective oversight of procurement and did not publish any data on the procurement of consultancy services by NSW government agencies.

Conclusion

Our review of a selection of consulting engagements from ten NSW government agencies indicates that these agencies do not procure and manage consultants effectively. We found that most agencies do not have a strategic approach to using consultants, or systems for managing or evaluating their performance. We also found examples of non-compliance with procurement rules, including contract variations that exceeded procurement thresholds. NSW Procurement, a division within NSW Treasury, provides frameworks and some guidance to agencies for procuring consultants. However, gaps in its data collection and analysis mean monitoring of strategic risks is limited and it does not respond to agency non-compliance consistently. There are limitations in ability of various data sources to accurately record spending on consultants. These limitations include incomplete recording of all spending, and different definitions of consulting for accounting and financial reporting purposes. Notwithstanding these limitations, and based on information in the State's financial consolidation system (Prime)—which records recurrent expenditure on consultants—it is highly unlikely that NSW government agencies will meet the government's 2019 policy commitment to reduce spending on consultants, as defined in the policy commitment and costed by the Parliamentary Budget Office. 

The use of a 'devolved governance model' for procurement means NSW government agencies are responsible for developing and implementing their own systems that align with the NSW Government Procurement Policy Framework. Agency heads are responsible for demonstrating compliance. Most agencies included in this audit did not have a clear strategic approach to how and when consultants should be used (for example, to seek advice and expertise not already available within the agency) and were using consultants in an ad hoc manner.

Our analysis of whole-of-government spending on consultants, drawn from agency annual reports, indicates that four large professional services firms account for around 27% of spending on consultants in the period from 2017–18 to 2021–22. The number of firms making up the top 50% of expenditure decreased from 11 to eight during this time, with the other 50% of expenditure spread across more than 1,000 firms. Concentration of consulting engagements within a small number of firms increases strategic risks, including that advice is not sufficiently objective and impartial, and that NSW government agencies become overly reliant on selected professional services firms.

Our review of a selection of consulting engagements by NSW government agencies found several examples of non-compliance with procurement policy. This included the use of variations to contract values which exceeded allowable limits. Record keeping was inadequate in many cases we reviewed, which limits transparency about government spending. Most agencies did not proactively manage their consulting engagements. The majority of consulting engagements that we reviewed were not evaluated or assessed by the agency for quality. Very few used any processes to ensure the transfer and retention of knowledge generated through consulting engagements. This means agencies miss opportunities to increase core staff skills and knowledge and to maximise value from these engagements.

NSW Procurement oversees a detailed policy framework that provides guidance and support to NSW government agencies when they are using consultants. The policy framework provides mandatory steps and some other guidance. Our audit on the procurement and reporting of consultancy services in 2018 found that agency reporting on the use of consultants was inconsistent and recommended that NSW Procurement should improve the quality, accuracy and completeness of data collection. NSW Procurement’s guidance on how agencies should classify and report on consulting engagements remains ambiguous. This contributes to continued inconsistent reporting by and across agencies, and reduces the quality of data on the use of consultants.

NSW Procurement has made some improvements to the information available about spending on consultants since our audit in 2018, including additional analysis and reporting that is available to agencies. However, there is still no single data source that accurately captures all spending on consultants. This is despite our recommendations in 2018 that NSW Procurement improve the quality of information collected from agencies and suppliers, which NSW Procurement accepted. This makes it harder for NSW Procurement or individual agencies to track trends and identify risks or improvement opportunities in the way consultants are used. 

In early 2019, the NSW Government made a policy commitment to reduce consultancy expenses by 20% each year, over four years, from 2019–20 (excluding capital-related consultancy expenses). This commitment was set out in the Parliamentary Budget Office's '2019 Coalition Election Policy Costings (Policy Costings)'. NSW Treasury subsequently advised that to implement this commitment, agency budgets were reduced in Prime in line with the savings targets. However, actual spending on consultants recorded in Prime in the first three years after the commitment was made was almost $100 million higher than the targets. We did not see any evidence that the financial data on actual expenditure was used to inform reporting on NSW government agencies' progress toward achieving the savings set out in the policy commitment.


1 The Government Sector Finance Legislation (Repeal and Amendment) Act 2018 No 70 will amend the Health Services Act 1997 to specify that annual reporting information for any or all NSW Health entities may be included in the annual reporting information prepared by the Ministry of Health under the Government Sector Finance Act 2018. This provision is expected to commence on 1 July 2023.

This chapter outlines our findings on the role of NSW Procurement in overseeing the use of consultants by NSW government agencies.

This chapter outlines our findings on the use of consultants by the ten NSW government agencies that were included in this audit.

Appendix one – Responses from auditees

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #378 - released 2 March 2023

Published

Actions for Treasury 2022

Treasury 2022

Treasury
Asset valuation
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Regulation
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration

What the report is about

Results of the Treasury cluster agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2022.

The results of the audit of the NSW Government's consolidated Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA), which is prepared by NSW Treasury, are reported separately in our report on 'State Finances 2022'.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued on all 30 June 2022 general purpose financial statement audits.

Qualified audit opinions were issued on three of the 25 other engagements prepared by cluster agencies. These related to payments made from Special Deposit Accounts (SDA) that did not comply with the relevant legislation.

What the key issues were

Commercial agreements were signed between TAHE, the operators and Transport for NSW in June 2022, which reflected an expected rate of return of 2.5% on contributed equity. However, it remains critical that the government continue to provide sufficient funding to the operators so they can pay for access and use TAHE assets. These findings are reported in our report on 'State Finances 2022'.

Eight high-risk issues were raised in 2021–22, of which five relate to NSW Treasury.

A number of previously reported audit findings and recommendations with respect to icare continue to be ongoing issues. This includes the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer continuing to hold less assets than the estimated present value of its future payment obligations, when measured in accordance with the accounting framework.

What we recommended

Our report on 'State Finances 2022' made several recommendations to improve NSW Treasury's processes.

In this report, we recommended icare should ensure:

  • it has sufficient controls in place over claim payments, including an effective quality assurance program, to minimise claim payment errors
  • that documentation to support PIAWE calculations is appropriately maintained, and that the minimum documentation requirements are set out in a policy.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Treasury cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Treasury cluster (the cluster) for 2022.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the general purpose financial statements of all cluster agencies.
  • A qualified opinion was issued on the NSW Government's consolidated Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA), which are prepared by NSW Treasury. This is reported separately in our 'State Finances 2022' NSW Auditor-General's Report to Parliament.
  • Three qualified audit opinions were issued on special purpose financial reports, relating to whether payments from the funds complied with the relevant legislation.
  • Reported corrected misstatements increased from seven in 2020–21 to ten in 2021–22 with a gross value of $808.6 million. Reported uncorrected misstatements decreased from 17 in 2020–21 to 11 in 2021–22 with a gross value of $85.7 million.
  • Nine of 15 cluster agencies either did not submit or did not complete certain mandatory early close procedures on time.
  • NSW Treasury corrected a $39.7 million prior period error retrospectively in the financial statements as it overstated its accrual at 30 June 2021 relating to hotel quarantine costs.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury cluster.

Section highlights

  • Eight high-risk issues were identified in 2021–22, an increase from four high-risk and one extreme risk in 2020–21. A further 31 moderate risk findings were reported in 2021–22, of which 12 were repeat findings.
  • Inconsistencies in the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 (GSF Act) and Government Sector Audit Act 1983 (GSA Act) relating to key statutory timeframes have been addressed.
  • Further to last year's reporting, some agencies have again spent moneys without an authorised delegation. 
  • There was a lack of quality review of submissions for audit by NSW Treasury.
  • The Nominal Insurer's net assets decreased from a $2.5 billion surplus at 30 June 2018, to a $1.2 billion deficiency at 30 June 2022.
  • The Nominal Insurer's return-to-work rates stabilised, but remain below the performance levels prior to the COVID-19 pandemic.
  • The Nominal Insurer paid $29.5 million in 2021–22 to remediate historical underpayment of compensation benefits to workers (Pre-Injury Average Weekly Earnings (PIAWE) payments), and a further $8.5 million was payable at 30 June 2022.
  • During its review of historical PIAWE errors, icare found that indexation may have been incorrectly applied, or failed to have been applied when determining injured worker entitlements within the Nominal Insurer between 2012 and 2019. Based on calculations provided by icare, the Audit Office reported an uncorrected judgemental misstatement of $28.5 million (understatement).

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

Appendix five – Acquittals and other opinions

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for State Finances 2022

State Finances 2022

Treasury
Whole of Government
Asset valuation
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Regulation
Risk

What the report is about

Results of the 2021–22 consolidated General Government Sector (GGS) and Total State Sector (TSS) financial statements audits.

What we found

The Independent Auditor’s Report on the 2021–22 GGS and TSS financial statements was modified with a limitation of scope and also contained an emphasis of matter.

The opinion in the TSS Independent Auditor’s Report was modified with a limitation of scope on certain balances consolidated in the TSS financial statements because the Catholic Metropolitan Cemeteries Trust (CMCT) denied access to its management, books and records for the purpose of conducting a financial audit.

The Independent Auditor’s Report also includes an emphasis of matter drawing attention to the significant uncertainties associated with the GGS’s equity investment in Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE). The significant uncertainty relates to key assumptions and estimates used to forecast a 2.5% return from GGS investments into TAHE that supports the accounting treatment as an equity injection, including:

  • funding to support the Rail Operators to pay TAHE’s contracted and forecast access and licence fees up until 2045–46. The Rail Operators are dependent on funding from the GGS to pay access and licence fees. Forecast modelling notes a requirement of a further $10.2 billion in budget funding to pay TAHE to the end of the ten-year contract period in 2030–31, in addition to the $5.5 billion allocated in the forward estimates and up to $50.8 billion for the period 2032 to 2046
  • a significant portion of the projected returns are earnt outside of the ten-year contract period and there is a risk that TAHE may not be able to recontract fees at levels consistent with current projections.

What we recommended

The report includes a number of recommendations including:

  • continued monitoring that TAHE controls the reported assets ensuring the CMCT, Category 2 Statutory Land Managers (SLM) and Commons Trusts meet their statutory reporting obligations
  • ensuring accounting and audit position papers are sufficiently consulted with key stakeholders and are concluded on a timely basis
  • ensuring agencies support the timely conclusion of audits by bringing to the auditors' attention key Cabinet records and identifying references relating to accounting issues impacting the financial statements
  • for Special Deposit Accounts (SDA) responsible managers should ensure amounts appropriated under any Act or law for payment into the account are appropriately recorded, ensuring payments from SDAs are allowable and made in accordance with Treasurer's delegations and standing authorisation.
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Margaret Crawford, Auditor-General for New South Wales

Pursuant to section 52A of the Government Sector Audit Act 1983 I am pleased to present my Auditor-General’s Report on State Finances 2022.

Once again this year has presented considerable challenges for the state sector and my Office as we collectively grapple with uncertainties related to COVID-19 and the disruption of emergency events impacting New South Wales. In addition, there were many recommendations arising from last year’s audit to be addressed.

While there is more to do to ensure good financial stewardship of the State, resolution of matters was helped by constructive engagement with the NSW Treasury at the most senior levels. Personally I wish to thank the Treasurer and Secretary for their commitment to instilling integrity in financial management systems and processes. The support Treasury provided for recent amendments to the Government Sector Audit Act 1983 to provide ‘follow the dollar’ powers and other changes recommended by the Public Accounts Committee quadrennial review of my Office is also acknowledged.

Finally I want to thank the teams that contributed to this year’s audit of the Total State Accounts for their diligence, professionalism and commitment. I am very proud of your work.

Margaret Crawford

Auditor-General for New South Wales

The Independent Auditor's Report was qualified and also included an emphasis of matter

The audit opinion on the State's 2021–22 financial statements was modified. The delayed signing of the NSW Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA) by NSW Treasury was in order to resolve significant accounting issues that were material to the TSSA. The key areas requiring significant audit effort included reviewing the State's accounting for TCorp Investment Management (IM) Funds and responding to the risks related to the Catholic Metropolitan Cemeteries Trust (CMCT) denying access to its management and books and records, which is detailed in this Report.

NSW Treasury aimed to sign the TSSA by 19 October 2022. This was delayed by nearly six weeks and the TSSA audit opinion was subsequently signed on the statutory deadline imposed on the Treasurer for tabling of the TSSA in the Legislative Assembly of 30 November 2022.

The Independent Auditor’s Report was modified due to a limitation of scope on the balances consolidated in the TSSA relating to the CMCT

The opinion in the Independent Auditor’s Report was modified with a limitation of scope due to the inability to access management, books and records of a controlled entity, the CMCT.

This year, NSW Treasury, after reconsidering all facts and the perspectives of the CMCT, reconfirmed that the CMCT is a controlled entity of the State for financial reporting purposes. This means CMCT is a GSF agency under the provisions of the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 (GSF Act). As such NSW Treasury is required by Australian Accounting Standards to consolidate the CMCT into the Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA). The value of assets and liabilities of CMCT consolidated into the TSSA is $310.3 million and $15.1 million, respectively, and the loss of CMCT consolidated into the TSSA for the year is $2.4 million.

To date, CMCT has not met its statutory obligations to prepare financial statements under the GSF Act and give them to the Auditor-General. CMCT has not submitted its financial statements to the Auditor-General for audit as required despite repeated requests and has not provided access to its books and records for the purposes of a financial audit. The Secretary of the Department of Planning and Environment wrote to CMCT to request it work with, and offer full assistance to, the Auditor-General in the exercise of her duties.

NSW Treasury has met with and considered CMCT's perspectives. NSW Treasury’s position remains that CMCT is a controlled entity of the State for financial reporting purposes. Consequently, CMCT has not met its statutory obligations as a controlled entity to submit its financial statements for audit and provide access to its books and records. Therefore, the Audit Office was unable to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence about the carrying amount of assets and liabilities consolidated into the Total State Sector Accounts as at 30 June 2022 and of the amount of income and expenses for the year then ended. Accordingly a modified audit opinion was issued on the NSW Government's 2021–22 consolidated financial statements.

Section 3 of this report titled 'Limitation of Scope relating to CMCT' discusses this matter in further detail.

An emphasis of matter drawing attention to uncertainty relating to the General Government Sector's investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE) remains

The Independent Auditor’s Report also includes an emphasis of matter, drawing attention to the significant uncertainties associated with the General Government Sector's (GGS) equity investment in TAHE. The significant uncertainty relates to key assumptions used to forecast returns from investments into TAHE in order to support the recognition of the government's funding of TAHE as an equity injection.

At the time of signing the Independent Auditor's Report, there was significant uncertainty with regards to assumptions and estimates used to forecast a return from the GGS investment into TAHE, which supports the recognition of an equity injection. There is significant uncertainty relating to:

  • the 2022–23 Budget committed $5.5 billion to fund TAHE's key customers, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains (the operators), to support their payment of access and licence fees agreed on 23 June 2022. However, this funding only extends out to the end of the forward estimates period in 2025–26, which falls short of the ten-year contractual periods to 2030–31 and the projected period to 2045–46 to achieve a 2.5% return from the government's equity investment. The government will need to fund the operators an additional $10.2 billion in Budget funding so that they can meet their contractual obligations to TAHE from 2026–27 to 2030–31, and a further projected funding of $50.8 billion from 2031 to 2046. This additional funding is not within the government's published Budget figures, leading to uncertainty on whether the government-funded operators can pay access and licence fees beyond the forward estimates period of 2025–26
  • a significant portion of the projected returns are earnt outside the ten-year contract period (terminating 30 June 2031) and there is a risk that TAHE will not be able to recontract for access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections. There is also a risk that funding for TAHE's key customers will not be sufficient to fund payment of access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections.

The 'State Finances 2021' report made recommendations regarding the significant accounting issues relating to TAHE. The State's response to these recommendations are detailed in Section 4 of this report titled ‘Investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity’. Other significant matters related to the TSSA audit are covered in Section 8 titled ‘Key audit findings’.

Other financial reporting matters

All government agencies were granted an extra week to submit financial statements for audit

A one-week extension provided agencies across the sector with additional time to resolve key accounting issues and submit financial statements for audit by 1 August 2022.

Further extensions were approved for the following seven agencies (ten in 2020–21):

  • State Insurance Regulatory Authority (3 August 2022)
  • Dams Safety NSW (8 August 2022)
  • Jenolan Caves Reserve Trust (8 August 2022)
  • Transport for NSW (8 August 2022)
  • Department of Enterprise, Investment and Trade (22 August 2022)
  • Transport Asset Holding Entity (22 August 2022)
  • Department of Transport (26 August 2022).

Additional extensions provided agencies with more time to complete:

  • asset valuations
  • valuations of actuarially assessed liabilities.

An initial draft of the TSSA was provided to audit on 15 September 2022. This version was incomplete and excluded the impact of consolidating the State's TCorp IM funds under the correct Australian Accounting Standards. An additional three versions of the draft TSSA were provided to audit progressively to update the TCorp IM fund consolidated balances. The final complete version of the TSSA was submitted on 27 October 2022 which included all adjustments relating to the TCorp IM fund consolidation. Refer to section 8.1 for more details on the material restatements relating to the consolidation of the TCorp IM funds.

In 2021–22, agency financial statements presented for audit contained 20 errors exceeding $20 million (24 in 2020–21). The total value of these errors was $973 million, a decrease from the previous year ($6.6 billion in 2020–21).

The graph below shows the number of reported errors exceeding $20 million over the past five years in agencies’ financial statements presented for audit.

The errors resulted from:

  • incorrect application of Australian Accounting Standards and NSW Treasury policies
  • incorrect judgements and assumptions when valuing non-current physical assets and liabilities.

NSW Treasury concluded CMCT is a controlled entity of the State

In response to our recommendation in the ‘State Finances 2021’ report, NSW Treasury reconfirmed that the Catholic Metropolitan Cemeteries Trust (CMCT) is a controlled entity of the State. The Audit Office accepted the position of NSW Treasury.

The reaffirmation of this position means CMCT is a GSF agency under the provisions of the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 (GSF Act). Section 7.6 of the GSF Act places an obligation on CMCT to prepare financial statements and give them to the Auditor-General. Further, section 34 of the Government Sector Audit Act 1983 (the GSA Act) requires the Auditor-General to furnish an audit report on these financial statements.

To date, CMCT has not met its statutory obligations to prepare financial statements under the GSF Act and give them to the Auditor-General. CMCT has not submitted their financial statements to the Auditor-General for audit despite repeated requests and has not provided access to its books and records for the purposes of a financial audit. There was extensive correspondence between the Audit Office of NSW, CMCT, NSW Treasury and the Department of Planning and Environment in 2022 regarding this matter.

Recommendation

NSW Treasury and the Department of Planning and Environment should ensure the Catholic Metropolitan Cemeteries Trust meets its statutory reporting obligations.

In addition, on 10 December 2021, the then Minister for Water, Property and Housing wrote to the Auditor-General requesting a financial and performance audit be performed pursuant to section 27B(3)(c) of the GSA Act. The audit would cover the financial affairs of CMCT, including whether funds have been used for the proper purpose. The Audit Office of New South Wales has written to CMCT on a number of occasions to request the provision of documentation and access to management in order to conduct the performance audit. CMCT has not provided the Audit Office of New South Wales access to its management, books and records for the purpose of the required performance audit.

NSW Treasury has met with and considered CMCT's perspectives. NSW Treasury’s position remains that CMCT is a controlled entity of the State for financial reporting purposes. Consequently, CMCT did not meet its statutory obligations as a controlled entity to submit its financial statements for audit and provide access to its books and records.

The TSSA audit opinion included a limitation of scope

The opinion in the TSSA Independent Auditor’s Report was modified with a limitation of scope due to an inability to access management and the books and records of CMCT. This limitation was appropriately disclosed in Note 1 'Statement of Significant Accounting Policies' of the TSSA. The Statement of Compliance signed by the Secretary of Treasury and the Treasurer on 29 November 2022 was also updated to acknowledge the disclosure in Note 1 regarding CMCT.

The Audit Office was unable to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence about the carrying amount of assets and liabilities consolidated into the Total State Sector Accounts as at 30 June 2022 and of the amount of income and expenses for the year then ended. Accordingly a modified audit opinion was issued on the NSW Government's 2021–22 consolidated financial statements.

The process of information sharing by NSW Treasury continues to require improvement

In last year’s ‘State Finances 2021’ report an extreme risk management letter finding was reported for NSW Treasury to ensure it significantly improve its processes so that all relevant information is identified and shared with the Audit Office to support material transactions and balances of the State.

A number of events reconfirmed that NSW Treasury needs to continue improving its process with respect to information sharing with the Audit Office. Notably, NSW Treasury’s finance team had not demonstrated that all available information (on their systems) was considered by them when assessing the State’s control over CMCT.

Critical information relating to CMCT was in the possession of NSW Treasury since late October 2021 but not considered when reconfirming their accounting position on the State's control of CMCT this year. A further reconfirmation of the State's control over CMCT was needed by NSW Treasury to ensure this information was considered in their accounting assessment.

The above demonstrates that more effective consultation is required by NSW Treasury with key stakeholders to ensure all information relevant to forming an accounting position relating to the TSSA is captured. This will ensure new information is not identified late in the audit process and NSW Treasury considers all information when concluding on the accounting position of the State.

Recommendation

NSW Treasury should ensure when drafting position papers and concluding on accounting issues impacting the State, these are provided to audit on a timely basis and reflect a complete and accurate understanding of the key public sector issues being considered.

Last year's report highlighted that NSW Government actions avoided a qualified opinion in 2020–21 relating to the General Government Sector's $2.4 billion cash contribution to Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE). These actions included the NSW Government agreeing to provide additional future funding to TAHE's key government customers Sydney Trains and NSW Trains (the operators) to support increases in access and licence fees to be paid to TAHE.

The additional funding by the government was necessary to demonstrate that a reasonable expectation of a sufficient rate of return would be earned on its equity invested in TAHE. Last year, there was no government policy on what the minimum return should be on investments in other public sector entities, so the long-term inflation rate was used as a benchmark. A recommendation was made in last year's State Finances report that NSW Treasury establish a policy on the minimum expected return from its investments.

On 6 September 2022, NSW Treasury finalised its policy relating to the government’s returns on equity investments. The application of this policy is limited to State Owned Corporations and similar to the Commonwealth framework for commercial businesses, which requires the expected return be at least equal to the long-term inflation rate.

The government's commitment to additional funding was conveyed last year through revised shareholder expectations being published in the 2021–22 'NSW Budget-Half yearly Review' on 16 December 2021, increasing the expected returns on equity from 1.5% to the expected long-term inflation rate of 2.5%. On 18 December 2021, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) and the operators entered into a Heads of Agreement (HoA). This formed the basis of negotiations to revise the pricing within the existing ten-year contracts and deliver upon the shareholders’ expected return of 2.5% on contributed equity to be earned over the estimated weighted average remaining useful lives of TAHE's assets.

Further information on last year's audit of the government’s investment in TAHE can be found in our 'State Finances 2021' report.

Ten-year commercial agreements were signed between TAHE, operators and TfNSW

Last year's State Finances report recommended that NSW Treasury facilitate revised commercial agreements to reflect the access and licence fees detailed in the HoA. As these agreements were not executed by 30 June 2021, last year's audit opinion of the Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA) included an Emphasis of Matter drawing attention to the uncertainty that existed at balance date as these agreements were not finalised.

On 23 June 2022, commercial agreements were signed between TAHE, the operators and Transport for NSW through a deed of variation. The revised access and licence fees for the ten-year period 2021–22 to 2030–31 was $16.6 billion, which is $520 million less than the HoA fees of $17.1 billion.

Comparison FY22
$m
FY23
$m
FY24
$m
FY25
$m
FY26
$m
FY27
$m
FY28
$m
FY29
$m
FY30
$m
FY31
$m
Total
$m
Revised commercial agreements 641.1 911.8 1,298.1 1,585 1,807.3 1,921.8 1,992 2,065.4 2,139.1 2,252.8 16,614.4
HoA 679.9 1,081.4 1,236 1,398.9 1,645.8 1,826.1 2,023.3 2,209.4 2,404.5 2,629.2 17,134.6
Difference (38.8) (169.6) 62.1 186.1 161.5 95.7 (31.3) (144) (265.4) (376.4) (520.2)

TAHE's main customers principally rely on government funding to pay access and licence fees

Whilst TAHE has agreed ten-year access and licence fees of $16.6 billion with its two main customers Sydney Trains and NSW Trains, these two operators significantly rely on government funding when making these payments to TAHE. At 30 June 2022, TAHE's expected return of 2.5% is contingent upon the GGS funding the operators to support their payment of access and licence fees that have been agreed with TAHE for the ten-year contracted period and for non-contracted periods from 2031–32 to 2045–46.

The 2022–23 NSW Budget has allocated $5.5 billion to fund the operators, to support their payment of access and licence fees. However, this funding extends to the end of the forward estimates period in 2025–26, which falls short of the ten-year contractual period to 2030–2031 and the projected period to 2045–46 to achieve the 2.5% return.

  2022–261
$b
2027–20312
$b
2032–46
$b
Total
$b
Access and licence fees3 5.5 10.2 50.8 66.5

1 Represents the 2022–23 Budget year and three-year forward estimates which includes: FY2024–26.
2 Whilst excluded from the 2022–23 NSW Budget, these access and licence fees are included in the ten-year commercial agreement between TAHE, operators and TfNSW.
3 Represents cumulative access and licence fees for the period stated.

The government will need to fund the operators an additional $10.2 billion in budget funding to meet their contractual obligations to TAHE from 2026–27 to 2030–2031, and a further projected funding of $50.8 billion from 2032 to 2046. This is needed to ensure the government continues to demonstrate its expected return on investment of 2.5%. This additional funding is not within the government's published 2022–23 NSW Budget figures, leading to uncertainty on whether the government funded operators can pay access and licence fees beyond the forward estimate period of 2025–26.

Significant funding uncertainties remain

While the ten-year access and licence fee agreements were communicated to the NSW Government's Expenditure Review Committee, it is yet to be fully provided for in the government's budget figures. As TAHE's projections are highly dependent on the operators as its key customers, it remains critical that the government continue to provide sufficient funding to the operators so they can pay for access and use of TAHE assets. This means the significant funding uncertainties reported in last year's TSSA audit opinion remain for 2021–22.

The government has estimated $37.9 billion in returns (equivalent to 2.5% on contributed equity) is to be earned from its investment in TAHE over the period from 1 July 2022 to 30 June 2046. As previously reported, TAHE derives most of its revenue from access and licence fee agreements from the operators, who in turn are both funded by grants through TfNSW from the GGS. More than 95% of these returns are estimated to be earned outside of the ten-year contract period (terminating 30 June 2031).

  2022–261
$b
2027–20312
$b
2032–46
$b
Total
$b
Returns to GGS 1.8 4.7 31.5 37.9

1 Represents the 2022–23 budget year and three-year forward estimates which includes: 2023–24, 2024–25 and 2025–26.
2 Whilst excluded from the 2022–23 NSW Budget, these access and licence fees are included in the ten-year commercial agreement between TAHE, operators and TfNSW.

There remains risk that:

  • TAHE will not be able to recontract for access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections
  • future governments' funding to TAHE's key customers will not be sufficient to fund payment of access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections
  • TAHE will be unable to grow its non-government revenues.

This significant funding uncertainty was also reported in last year's TSSA audit opinion and will remain for 2021–22.

In 2021–22, TAHE and NSW Treasury prepared further modelling to support the Government's intent to earn a 2.5% return inclusive of recovering the holding (revaluation) loss of $20.3 billion on its investment in TAHE

Last year's State Finances report highlighted that NSW Treasury, with TAHE, should prepare robust projections and business plans to support the expected returns forecast beyond FY2031.

This year TAHE engaged an expert to help develop a model demonstrating the government's expected returns from its investment in TAHE. The model mathematically forecasts that returns of 2.5% will be achieved by 2046 and this will include recovery of the revaluation losses of $20.3 billion relating to 2020–21.

The current model includes some key assumptions:

  • The main source of revenue is the access and licence fees expected from the two public rail operators (Sydney Trains and NSW Trains) contributing to more than 80% of TAHE's projected revenue. The rail operators are largely funded by the government when paying access and licence fees to TAHE.
  • For the first ten years, the access and licence fees are based on the signed agreements between TAHE and the public rail operators.
  • Beyond the ten-year contracted period, the model assumes existing contractual terms for access and licence fees will continue unchanged allowing for an annual rise for inflation (2.5% per annum), and increased fees to enable a 7.62% return for renewed assets.
  • The capital expenditure included in the model is only the amounts approved by the Expenditure Review Committee (ERC) as part of the ten-year forecast. The model beyond ten years includes expected investment in renewed and replacement assets but excludes any forecasts relating to growth capex that is not approved by the ERC, and any related depreciation expenses for growth capex.

While management has developed a 35-year long term financial model to support the returns, we note this will need to be refined over the next few years. Furthermore, these are forecasted figures and we have not seen sufficient evidence of whether this reflects reality (that is, the achievement of dividends representing a return on equity) as it is still very early. Therefore, this will remain a high-risk matter until we have seen sufficient evidence of reality to the forecasted figures.

There is negative net impact on the budget after 2024–25 and this will grow in the future

There are some key points to highlight with this modelling and these are best conveyed with the graph below. This graph shows total cash injections made by the GGS since the government first announced the creation of TAHE as a for-profit entity in the 2015–16 NSW Budget. It also conveys the forecast returns from TAHE to the GGS and the level of funding operators will need from the GGS to pay TAHE's access and licence fees over the 30-year period. These cash flows are key inputs used in the modelling which calculates a 2.5% return from TAHE inclusive of recovering the holding (revaluation) loss of $20.3 billion.

The government continues to respond to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on New South Wales through its economic stimulus measures

The COVID-19 pandemic continued to significantly impact the State’s finances, reducing revenue and increasing expenses especially in sectors directly responsible for responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, such as Health. In October 2021, the government announced through the 'COVID-19 Economic Recovery Strategy' an additional $2.8 billion in economic stimulus and response measures following the conclusion of the three-month lockdown due to the Delta COVID-19 outbreak. Measures included:

  • $739 million in household and social support, including housing support for Aboriginal communities and survivors of domestic violence, and vouchers to thank parents for their efforts to support learning from home
  • $500 million to consumers and businesses including expansion of the 'Dine & Discover' and 'Stay & Rediscover' voucher programs
  • $495 million in education support addressing learning gaps for children and helping schools prepare for future learning disruptions
  • $487 million in combined funding for tourism, events, sports, and recreation throughout New South Wales
  • $130 million to fund mental health services for individuals whose mental health was impacted by the pandemic.

The 2021–22 financial year included $21.9 billion for pandemic response and economic stimulus measures. Of this, $17.9 billion was spent in 2021–22 while a further $1 billion of the budgeted amount from 2021–22 was carried forward into 2022–23. The graph below shows the total allocation and spend by cluster for 2022 compared to target spend.

There were 14 natural disaster declarations including four severe weather events in 2021–22

Natural disasters such as bushfires, storms, floods, and other adverse weather events can have a significant impact on the State's finances. Costs associated with natural disasters include direct response costs such as clean-up and recovery, temporary accommodation, and as well as financial assistance provided to impacted communities such as recovery and business support grants.

The NSW Government can make a natural disaster declaration allowing eligible individuals and communities from impacted Local Government Areas access to a range of special financial assistance measures.

In 2021–22, there were 14 natural disaster declarations announced comparable to 14 in the previous year. These natural disaster declarations largely related to storms and floods throughout the State. In 2021–22, there was a larger number of 'severe weather' events declared, with four in 2021–22 (nil in 2020–21).

Natural disaster expenses increased 143% to $1.4 billion in 2021–22, up from $569 million last year

Over 2021–22, the budgeted cost for declared natural disasters was $1.9 billion ($725 million in 2020–21). Actual expenditure by the State on disaster response increased by $815 million to $1.4 billion. The graph below shows the total allocation and spend by cluster for 2022 compared to their budget spend.

Deficit of $15.3 billion compared with a budgeted deficit of $8.6 billion

The outcomes of the government’s overall activity and policies are reflected in its net operating balance (budget result). This is the difference between the cost of general government service delivery and the revenue earned to fund these sectors.

The General Government Sector, which comprises 196 entities, generally provides goods and services funded centrally by the State.

In addition to the 196 entities within the General Government Sector, a further 85 government controlled businesses are included within the consolidated Total State Sector financial statements. These businesses generally provide goods and services, such as water, electricity and financial services for which consumers pay for directly, and form part of the PNFC (31) and PFC (54) sectors.

The budget result for the 2021–22 financial year was a deficit of $15.3 billion compared to an original forecast of a budget deficit of $8.6 billion.

Revenues increased $16.1 billion to $106.7 billion

The State’s total revenues increased $16.1 billion to $106.7 billion, an increase of 17.8% compared to the previous year. Total revenue growth in 2020–21 was 5.1%. The State's increase in revenue was mostly from $9.2 billion in grants and subsidies and $4.6 billion in taxation.

Taxation revenue increased by 13.3%

Taxation revenue increased by $4.6 billion, mainly due to the net of:

  • $4.9 billion higher stamp duties collected from property sales driven by growth in property transaction volumes and prices during 2021–22. This was growth was experienced across residential and commercial property markets
  • $296 million lower gambling and betting taxes compared to 2020–21. Decrease was primarily attributed to the ongoing effects of COVID-19 restrictions and venue closures within the first half of 2021–22.

Stamp duties of $16.6 billion remains the largest source of taxation revenue, $7.7 billion higher than payroll tax of $8.9 billion, the second-largest source of taxation revenue.

Assets grew by $53 billion to $571 billion

The State’s assets include physical assets such as land, buildings and infrastructure, and financial assets such as cash, and other financial instruments and equity investments. The value of total assets increased by $53.2 billion or 10.3% to $571 billion. The increase was largely due to increases in the carrying value of land, buildings and infrastructure systems.

Valuing the State’s physical assets

State’s physical assets valued at $437 billion

The value of the State’s physical assets increased by $46.8 billion to $437 billion in 2021–22 ($724 million increase in 2020–21). The State’s physical assets include land and buildings ($198 billion), infrastructure systems ($221 billion), and plant and equipment ($18 billion).

The movement in physical asset values between years includes additions, disposals, depreciation and valuation adjustments. Other movements include assets reclassified to held for sale and other opening balance adjustments.

Appendix one – Prescribed entities

Appendix two – Legal opinions

Appendix three – TSS sectors and entities

 

Copyright notice

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Published

Actions for Audit Insights 2018-2022

Audit Insights 2018-2022

Community Services
Education
Environment
Finance
Health
Industry
Justice
Local Government
Premier and Cabinet
Planning
Transport
Treasury
Universities
Whole of Government
Asset valuation
Cross-agency collaboration
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Fraud
Information technology
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Regulation
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

What the report is about

In this report, we have analysed the key findings and recommendations from our audit reports over the past four years.

This analysis includes financial audits, performance audits, and compliance audits of state and local government entities that were tabled in NSW Parliament between July 2018 and February 2022.

The report is framed by recognition that the past four years have seen significant challenges and emergency events.

The scale of government responses to these events has been wide-ranging, involving emergency response coordination, service delivery, governance and policy.

The report is a resource to support public sector agencies and local government to improve future programs and activities.

What we found

Our analysis of findings and recommendations is structured around six key themes:

  • Integrity and transparency
  • Performance and monitoring
  • Governance and oversight
  • Cyber security and data
  • System planning for disruption
  • Resource management.

The report draws from this analysis to present recommendations for elements of good practice that government agencies should consider in relation to these themes. It also includes relevant examples from recent audit reports.

In this report we particularly call out threats to the integrity of government systems, processes and governance arrangements.

The report highlights the need for balanced advice to government on options and risks, for transparent documentation and reporting of directions and decisions, and for early and open sharing of information with integrity bodies and audit.

A number of the matters highlighted in this report are similar to those described in our previous Insights Report, (Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018) specifically in relation to cyber and information security, to performance measurement, reporting and evaluation, and system and workforce planning and capability.

Fast facts

  • 72 audits included in the Audit Insights 2018–2022 analysis
  • 4 years of audits tabled by the Auditor-General for New South Wales
  • 6 key themes for Audit Insights 2018–2022.

picture of Margaret Crawford Auditor-General for New South Wales in black dress with city skyline as backgroundI am pleased to present the Audit Insights 2018–2022 report. This report describes key findings, trends and lessons learned from the last four years of audit. It seeks to inform the New South Wales Parliament of key risks identified and to provide insights and suggestions to the agencies we audit to improve performance across the public sector.

The report is framed by a very clear recognition that governments have been responding to significant events, in number, character and scale, over recent years. Further, it acknowledges that public servants at both state and council levels generally bring their best selves to work and diligently strive to deliver great outcomes for citizens and communities. The role of audit in this context is to provide necessary assurance over government spending, programs and services, and make suggestions for continuous improvement.

A number of the matters highlighted in this report are similar to those described in our previous Insights Report, (Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018) specifically in relation to cyber and information security, to performance measurement, reporting and evaluation, and system and workforce planning and capability.

However, in this report we particularly call out threats to the integrity of government systems, processes and governance arrangements. We highlight the need for balanced advice to government on options and risks, for transparent documentation and reporting of directions and decisions, and for early and open sharing of information with integrity bodies and audit. Arguably, these considerations are never more important than in an increasingly complex environment and in the face of significant emergency events and they will be key areas of focus in our future audit program.

While we have acknowledged the challenges of the last few years have required rapid responses to address the short-term impacts of emergency events, there is much to be learned to improve future programs. I trust that the insights developed in this report provide a helpful resource to public sector agencies and local government across New South Wales. I would be pleased to receive any feedback you may wish to offer.

Margaret Crawford
Auditor-General for New South Wales

Integrity and transparency Performance and monitoring Governance and oversight Cyber security and data System planning Resource management
Insufficient documentation of decisions reduces the ability to identify, or rule out, misconduct or corruption. Failure to apply lessons learned risks mistakes being repeated and undermines future decisions on the use of public funds. The control environment should be risk-based and keep pace with changes in the quantum and diversity of agency work. Building effective cyber resilience requires leadership and committed executive management, along with dedicated resourcing to build improvements in cyber security and culture. Priorities to meet forecast demand should incorporate regular assessment of need and any emerging risks or trends. Absence of an overarching strategy to guide decision-making results in project-by-project decisions lacking coordination. Governments must weigh up the cost of reliance on consultants at the expense of internal capability, and actively manage contracts and conflicts of interest.
Government entities should report to the public at both system and project level for transparency and accountability. Government activities benefit from a clear statement of objectives and associated performance measures to support systematic monitoring and reporting on outcomes and impact. Management of risk should include mechanisms to escalate risks, and action plans to mitigate risks with effective controls. In implementing strategies to mitigate cyber risk, agencies must set target cyber maturity levels, and document their acceptance of cyber risks consistent with their risk appetite. Service planning should establish future service offerings and service levels relative to current capacity, address risks to avoid or mitigate disruption of business and service delivery, and coordinate across other relevant plans and stakeholders. Negotiations on outsourced services and major transactions must maintain focus on integrity and seeking value for public funds.
Entities must provide balanced advice to decision-makers on the benefits and risks of investments. Benefits realisation should identify responsibility for benefits management, set baselines and targets for benefits, review during delivery, and evaluate costs and benefits post-delivery. Active review of policies and procedures in line with current business activities supports more effective risk management. Governments hold repositories of valuable data and data capabilities that should be leveraged and shared across government and non-government entities to improve strategic planning and forecasting. Formal structures and systems to facilitate coordination between agencies is critical to more efficient allocation of resources and to facilitate a timely response to unexpected events. Transformation programs can be improved by resourcing a program management office.
Clear guidelines and transparency of decisions are critical in distributing grant funding. Quality assurance should underpin key inputs that support performance monitoring and accounting judgements. Governance arrangements can enable input into key decisions from both government and non-government partners, and those with direct experience of complex issues.     Workforce planning should consider service continuity and ensure that specialist and targeted roles can be resourced and allocated to meet community need.
Governments must ensure timely and complete provision of information to support governance, integrity and audit processes.          
Read more Read more Read more Read more Read more Read more

 

This report brings together a summary of key findings arising from NSW Audit Office reports tabled in the New South Wales Parliament between July 2018 and February 2022. This includes analysis of financial audits, performance audits, and compliance audits tabled over this period.

  • Financial audits provide an independent opinion on the financial statements of NSW Government entities, universities and councils and identify whether they comply with accounting standards, relevant laws, regulations, and government directions.
  • Performance audits determine whether government entities carry out their activities effectively, are doing so economically and efficiently, and in accordance with relevant laws. The activities examined by a performance audit may include a selected program or service, all or part of an entity, or more than one government entity. Performance audits can consider issues which affect the whole state and/or the local government sectors.
  • Compliance audits and other assurance reviews are audits that assess whether specific legislation, directions, and regulations have been adhered to.

This report follows our earlier edition titled 'Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018'. That report sought to highlight issues and themes emerging from performance audit findings, and to share lessons common across government. In this report, we have analysed the key findings and recommendations from our reports over the past four years. The full list of reports is included in Appendix 1. The analysis included findings and recommendations from 58 performance audits, as well as selected financial and compliance reports tabled between July 2018 and February 2022. The number of recommendations and key findings made across different areas of activity and the top issues are summarised at Exhibit 1.

The past four years have seen unprecedented challenges and several emergency events, and the scale of government responses to these events has been wide-ranging involving emergency response coordination, service delivery, governance and policy. While these emergencies are having a significant impact today, they are also likely to continue to have an impact into the future. There is much to learn from the response to those events that will help the government sector to prepare for and respond to future disruption. The following chapters bring together our recommendations for core elements of good practice across a number of areas of government activity, along with relevant examples from recent audit reports.

This 'Audit Insights 2018–2022' report does not make comparative analysis of trends in public sector performance since our 2018 Insights report, but instead highlights areas where government continues to face challenges, as well as new issues that our audits have identified since our 2018 report. We will continue to use the findings of our Insights analysis to shape our future audit priorities, in line with our purpose to help Parliament hold government accountable for its use of public resources in New South Wales.

Appendix one – Included reports, 2018–2022

Appendix two – About this report

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Train station crowding

Train station crowding

Transport
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

This report focuses on how Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains manage crowding at selected metropolitan train stations.

The audit found that while Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, it does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. Sydney Trains 'do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed’, the Auditor-General said.

Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or station entries before crowding reaches unsafe levels or when it impacts on-time running. Assuming rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, causing customer delay. ‘Restricting customer access to platforms or station entries is not a sustainable approach to manage station crowding’, said the Auditor-General.

The Auditor-General made seven recommendations to improve Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains' management of station crowding. Transport for NSW have accepted these recommendations on behalf of the Transport cluster.

Public transport patronage has been impacted by COVID-19. This audit was conducted before these impacts occurred.

Read full report (PDF)

Sydney Trains patronage has increased by close to 34 per cent over the last five years, and Transport for NSW (TfNSW) expects the growth in patronage to continue over the next 30 years. As patronage increases there are more passengers entering and exiting stations, moving within stations to change services, and waiting on platforms. As a result, some Sydney metropolitan train stations are becoming increasingly crowded.

There are three main causes of station crowding:

  • patronage growth exceeding the current capacity limits of the rail network
  • service disruptions
  • special events.

Crowds can inhibit movement, cause discomfort and can lead to increased health and safety risks to customers. In the context of a train service, unmanaged crowds can affect service operation as trains spend longer at platforms waiting for customers to alight and board services which can cause service delays. Crowding can also prevent customers from accessing services.

Our 2017 performance audit, ‘Passenger Rail Punctuality’, found that rail agencies would find it hard to maintain train punctuality after 2019 unless they significantly increased the capacity of the network to carry trains and people. TfNSW and Sydney Trains have plans to improve the network to move more passengers. These plans are set out in strategies such as More Trains, More Services and in the continued implementation of new infrastructure such as the Sydney Metro. Since 2017, TfNSW and Sydney Trains have introduced 1,500 more weekly services to increase capacity. Additional network capacity improvements are in progress for delivery from 2022 onwards.

In the meantime, TfNSW and Sydney Trains need to use other ways of managing crowding at train stations until increased capacity comes on line.

This audit examined how effectively TfNSW and Sydney Trains are managing crowding at selected metropolitan train stations in the short and medium term. In doing so, the audit examined how TfNSW and Sydney Trains know whether there is a crowding problem at stations and how they manage that crowding.

TfNSW is the lead agency for transport in NSW. TfNSW is responsible for setting the standard working timetable that Sydney Trains must implement. Sydney Trains is responsible for operating and maintaining the Sydney metropolitan heavy rail passenger service. This includes operating, staffing and maintaining most metropolitan stations. Sydney Trains’ overall responsibility is to run a safe rail network to timetable.

Conclusion

Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, but does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. TfNSW and Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers, but do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed. TfNSW is delivering a program to influence demand for transport in key precincts but the effectiveness of this program and its impact on station crowding is unclear as Transport for NSW has not evaluated the outcomes of the program.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. Data and observation on dwell time, which is the time a train waits at a platform for customers to get on and off trains, inform the development of operational approaches to manage crowding at stations. Sydney Trains has KPIs on reliability, punctuality and customer experience and use these to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. TfNSW and Sydney Trains only formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events.

Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for crowd management to Customer Area Managers, who rely on frontline Sydney Trains staff to understand how crowding affects individual stations. Station staff at identified key metropolitan train stations have developed customer management plans (also known as crowd management plans). However, Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring and evaluation of these plans and does not systematically collect data on when station staff activate crowding interventions under these plans.

Sydney Trains stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services. Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or stations before crowding reaches unsafe levels, or when it impacts on-time running. As rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will need to increase its use of interventions to manage crowding. As Sydney Trains restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, it is likely these customers will experience delays caused by these interventions.

Since 2015, TfNSW has been delivering the 'Travel Choices' program which aims to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services in key precincts. TfNSW is unable to provide data demonstrating the overall effectiveness of this program and the impact the program has on distributing public transport usage out of peak AM and PM times. TfNSW and Sydney Trains continue to explore initiatives to specifically address crowd management.

Conclusion

TfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. There are no key performance indicators directly related to station crowding. Sydney Trains uses performance indicators on reliability, punctuality and customer experience to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. Sydney Trains does not have a routine process for identifying whether crowding contributed to minor safety incidents. TfNSW and Sydney Trains formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events.

 

Conclusion

Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a strategic risk but does not have an overarching strategy to manage station crowding. Sydney Trains' stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services.

Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers but does not have sufficient oversight to know that station crowding is effectively managed. Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring or evaluation of crowd management plans at key metropolitan train stations. The use of crowding interventions is likely to increase due to increasing patronage, causing more customers to experience delays directly caused by these activities.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains have developed interventions to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services but are yet to evaluate these interventions. As such, their impact on managing station crowding is unclear.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Sydney rail network

Appendix three – Rail services contract

Appendix four – Crowding pedestrian modelling

Appendix five – Airport Link stations case study

Appendix six – About the audit

Appendix seven – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #333 - released 30 April 2020

 

Published

Actions for Transport 2019

Transport 2019

Transport
Asset valuation
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

This report details the results of the financial audits of NSW Government's Transport cluster for the financial year ended 30 June 2019. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport cluster.

Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements. However, valuations of assets continue to create challenges across the cluster. The Audit Office identified some deficiencies in relation to asset valuations at Transport for NSW, Roads and Maritime Services, Rail Corporation New South Wales and Sydney Metro.

The Audit Office noted an increase in findings on internal controls across the Transport cluster. Key themes related to information technology, asset management and employee leave entitlements. The report also highlights the status of significant infrastructure projects across the Transport cluster.

The report makes several recommendations including:

  • agency finance teams need to be consulted on major business decisions and commercial transactions at the time of their execution to assess the financial reporting impacts
  • the Department of Transport should ensure consistent accounting policies are applied across its controlled entities.

Download the Transport 2019 report (PDF)

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Transport cluster for the year ended 30 June 2019. The table below summarises our key observations.

1. Machinery of Government changes
Transport for NSW, as the
lead agency, will absorb the
functions of Roads and
Maritime Services

The NSW Government announced its intention to integrate Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) into Transport for NSW (TfNSW) as part of the Machinery of Government changes.

This change was not included in the Administrative Orders as the Transport Administration Act 1988 No. 109 governs the composition of the Transport cluster. The Transport Administration Amendment (RMS Dissolution) Act 2019 (the Act) received assent on 22 November 2019. The Act dissolves RMS and transfers the assets, rights and liabilities of RMS to TfNSW. As at the date of this Report, the Act is not yet in force.

Transport is considering the impact of the changes on its operating model and financial reporting.

2. Financial reporting
Audit opinions

Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the 2018–19 financial statements of all agencies in the Transport cluster.

TfNSW and Sydney Metro obtained a three-week extension from NSW Treasury to submit their financial statements for audit to resolve accounting issues surrounding the valuation of property, plant and equipment.

The Department of Transport reported total consolidated property, plant and equipment of $158 billion at 30 June 2019. In 2018–19, there were issues with asset valuations at TfNSW, RMS, Sydney Metro and Rail Corporation New South Wales (RailCorp), resulting in adjustments after the submission of financial statements for audit and the correction of a prior period error.

There was also a prior period error resulting from an agreement between TfNSW and the former UrbanGrowth Development Corporation due to a lack of assessment of the financial reporting implications at the time of signing the agreement.

Recommendation: Agency finance teams need to be consulted on major business decisions and commercial transactions to assess their accounting impacts at the time of their execution, rather than at the end of a financial year. Agencies also need to resolve all key accounting issues such as valuations as part of the early close procedures.

This would improve the quality of financial reporting and avoid the need for extensions for agencies to submit their financial statements for audit.

Preparedness for new
accounting standards
Agencies across the cluster are progressing in their implementation of the new accounting standards.

Transport cluster agencies need to improve their contracts registers to ensure they have a complete list of contracts and agreements to assess the impact of the new accounting standards.
Valuation of assets remains
a challenge in the
Transport cluster

Whilst agencies complied with the requirements of the accounting standards and NSW Treasury policies on valuations, the Audit Office identified some deficiencies in relation to asset valuations across the cluster.

TfNSW reported a retrospective correction of a prior period error at 1 July 2017 which resulted in a reduction in the valuation of its Country Rail Network earthworks by $2.1 billion. This was due to survey results which identified the earthworks were flatter and lower than estimated in the valuation at 30 June 2017.

RMS made several adjustments during the year to correct asset values due to changes to valuation assumptions or data improvements. This included:

  • reduction of $318 million in the value of land under roads
  • decrease of $84.9 million to the value of land and buildings
  • changes to the value of traffic control and traffic signal network assets, due to data improvements.

Sydney Metro North West officially opened in May 2019 and reported total assets of $9.1 billion. Sydney Metro derecognised $322 million in assets constructed to facilitate its operation but transferred to councils and utilities.

Inconsistent accounting
policies across the
Transport cluster

There was an inconsistency identified in the cluster relating to the valuation of substratum land. In 2018–19, RailCorp derecognised $109 million of substratum land to ensure consistency in its approach with other Transport agencies.

As the parent entity, the Department of Transport needs to ensure accounting policies are consistently applied across all controlled entities for consolidation purposes. Inconsistencies in the application of accounting standards across agencies will impact comparability of financial reporting and decision making across the Transport cluster.

Recommendation: The Department of Transport should ensure consistent accounting policies are applied across its controlled entities.

Revenue growth

Public transport passenger revenue increased by $89.0 million (5.9 per cent) in 2018–19, and patronage increased by 37.8 million (4.9 per cent) across all modes of transport based on data provided by TfNSW.

The increase in revenue is mainly due to an increase in patronage as well as the annual increase in fares.

Negative Opal cards

Negative balance Opal cards resulted in $2.9 million in revenue not collected in 2018–19 ($10.4 million since the introduction of Opal).

In January 2019, Transport made a change to the Sydney Airport stations to prevent customers with high negative balances exiting the station. In addition, in late 2018, Transport increased the minimum top up values for new cards at the airport stations.

Recommendation (repeat): TfNSW should implement further measures to prevent the loss of revenue from passengers tapping off with negative balance Opal cards.

3. Audit observations
Internal controls There was an increase in findings on internal controls across the Transport cluster. Key themes relate to information technology, employee leave entitlements and asset management.

Twenty-nine per cent of all issues were repeat issues. The majority of the repeat issues related to information technology controls.
Write-off of assets In addition to a $322 million derecognition of assets transferred to councils and utilities by Sydney Metro and a $109 million derecognition of substratum land at RailCorp, the Transport cluster wrote-off $278 million of assets related to roads, bridges, maritime assets, traffic signals and controls network.

These mainly related to roads, bridges, maritime assets, traffic signals and the control network where new infrastructure assets substantially replaced an existing asset as part of construction activities.
Transport Asset Holding
Entity (TAHE)
TAHE was established to be a dedicated asset manager for the delivery of public transport asset management. The Transport Administration Amendment (Transport Entities) Act 2017 will transition RailCorp into TAHE. RailCorp is now expected to transition to TAHE from 1 July 2020 (previously 1 July 2019). Several working groups have been considering various aspects of the TAHE transition including its status as a for profit Public Trading Enterprise, the operating model and the impact of the new accounting standards AASB 16 'Leases' and AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors'. The considerations of these aspects identified several challenges in the implementation of TAHE which has led to the revised transition date. Given the delays in implementation, it is important to clarify the intent of the TAHE model.
Excess annual leave

Twenty-six per cent of Transport employees have annual leave balances exceeding 30 days. Of the employees with excess leave balances, 732 (10.3 per cent) did not take any annual leave in 2018–19.

Recommendation (repeat): Transport entities should further review the approach to managing excess annual leave in 2019–20. They should:

  • monitor current and projected leave balances to the end of the financial year each month
  • agree formal leave plans with employees to reduce leave balances over an acceptable timeframe
  • ensure leave plans are actioned appropriately
  • encourage all staff with excess leave balances take a minimum two-week period of leave per year.
Completeness and
accuracy of contracts
registers

There are no centralised processes to record all significant contracts and agreements in a register across the Transport cluster.

Across the Transport cluster, contracts and agreements are maintained by the individual agencies using disparate registers. Agencies must perform detailed assessments of their existing contracts and agreements to quantify the impact of the new accounting standards (AASB 16 ‘Leases’, AASB 15 ‘Revenue from Contracts with Customers’, AASB 1058 ‘Income of Not-for-Profit Entities’ and AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors').

In 2018–19, there was also a prior period error resulting from an agreement between TfNSW and another government agency due to a lack of assessment of the financial reporting implications at the time of signing the agreement.

A lack of a complete register of all contracts and agreements increases the risk that agencies may not be able to assess the full impact of the new accounting standards, as well as perform a complete assessment of the financial reporting implications of contracts and agreements.

Recommendation: Transport agencies should implement a process to centrally capture all significant contracts and agreements entered. This will ensure:

  • agencies are fully aware of contractual and other obligations
  • appropriate assessment of financial reporting implications
  • assessment of new accounting standards, in particular AASB 16 ‘Leases’, AASB 15 'Revenue from Contract with Customers', AASB 1058 'Income of Not-for-Profit Entities ' and AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors' are accurate and complete.

 

This report provides parliament and other users of the Transport cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

This cluster was impacted by the Machinery of Government changes on 1 July 2019. The NSW Government announced its intention to integrate Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) into Transport for NSW (TfNSW). This report is focused on the Transport cluster prior to these changes. Please refer to the section on Machinery of Government changes for more details.

Machinery of Government refers to how the government organises the structures and functions of the public service. Machinery of Government changes are where the government reorganises these structures and functions, and are given effect by Administrative orders.

The Transport cluster was impacted by recent Machinery of Government changes. These changes were announced by the Department of Premier and Cabinet but were not included in the Administrative Orders as the Transport Administration Act 1988 No. 109 governs the composition of the Transport cluster. It was the intention of government to transfer the functions of the RMS into TfNSW. This requires legislative changes to the Transport Administration Act 1988 No. 109.

Section highlights

Under the Machinery of Government changes, the NSW Government will transfer the functions of RMS into TfNSW.

  • The Transport Administration Amendment (RMS Dissolution) Act 2019 (the Act) received assent on 22 November 2019.
  • The Act will dissolve RMS and transfer its functions, assets, rights and liabilities to TfNSW.
  • As at the date of this report, the Act is not yet in force.
  • There are risks and challenges for asset and liability transfers, governance and retention of knowledge.
  • As of 1 July 2019, administrative arrangements (delegations and reporting line changes) were put in place to enable TfNSW and RMS to operate within a single management structure, while still remaining as separate legal entities.
  • Transport is working on a number of options as to how to implement the changes. 

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Transport cluster for 2019.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all agencies' financial statements.
  • RMS required an extension from NSW Treasury for their early close procedures.
  • TfNSW and Sydney Metro required extensions to submit their year-end financial statements.
  • Valuation of assets remains a challenge across the cluster.
  • There remains Opal cards with negative balances.
  • Sydney Metro derecognised assets of $322 million in relation to assets constructed for third parties.
  • Inconsistencies in the application of accounting policies across cluster agencies impact comparability of financial reporting across the Transport cluster.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport cluster.

Section highlights

  • There was an increase in findings on internal controls across the Transport cluster. Twenty-nine per cent of all issues were repeat issues.
  • Transport entities wrote-off over $278 million of assets which were replaced by new assets or technology.
  • Twenty-six per cent of Transport employees have excess annual leave.
  • There are no processes to ensure all significant contracts and agreements are captured by agencies in a centralised register.

Appendix one – Timeliness of financial reporting by agency 

Appendix two – Management letter findings by agency 

Appendix three – List of 2019 recommendations 

Appendix four – Status of 2017 and 2018 recommendations 

Appendix five – Cluster agencies 

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.