Reports
The effectiveness of the financial arrangements and management practices in four integrity agencies
The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining the effectiveness of the financial arrangements and management practices of four integrity agencies: the Independent Commission Against Corruption, the NSW Electoral Commission, the NSW Ombudsman, and the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission. The audit also included NSW Treasury and the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) because both departments are involved in the processes that lead to decisions about funding for the integrity agencies and managing access to this funding. The Hon. Don Harwin MLC, Special Minister of State, requested this audit under section 27(B)(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983.
The audit found that the current approach to determining and administering annual funding for the integrity agencies presents threats to their independent status. The approach used by NSW Treasury and DPC is consistent with the legislative and Constitutional framework for financial management in New South Wales, but it does not sufficiently recognise that the roles and functions of the integrity agencies that are the focus of this audit are different to other departments and agencies. Specific mechanisms that present threats to the independence of the integrity agencies include the absence of transparency in decisions about funding for the integrity agencies, the means of applying efficiency dividends and budget savings and reform measures, the process of providing additional funding from DPC to the integrity agencies, and requests for the integrity agencies to report to DPC on their activities and outcomes.
The Auditor-General outlined the principles that inform the report’s recommendations in order to strengthen the financial arrangements for the integrity agencies. These principles are:
- There should be structured oversight by Parliament of the performance and financial management of the integrity agencies.
- Parliament’s role in the budget process should be expanded to ensure Cabinet is provided with more independent advice on the funding requirements for the integrity agencies.
- There should be transparency to Parliament and the relevant agency for decisions made about funding for the integrity agencies.
- The integrity agencies should be required to demonstrate their accountability as prudent managers of their financial resources.
The report also notes that the NSW Parliament should be consulted when considering the report’s recommendations.
This audit examined the effectiveness of the financial arrangements and management practices of four integrity agencies. It was conducted with reference to the legislative and Constitutional framework that is currently in place for financial management in New South Wales.
This report appropriately recognises that the government of the day is responsible for the prudent and responsible management of the state’s finances. It identifies several areas of ambiguity in the way the current financial arrangements apply to the integrity agencies that are the subject of this audit. It also highlights threats to the independence of the integrity agencies that may arise from the involvement of the Executive Government in the decision making about funding. The report argues these risks are not mitigated sufficiently under the current financial arrangements.
The recommendations in this report outline the principles that should inform the financial arrangements for the integrity agencies. Consistent with the Audit Office of NSW’s role in auditing NSW Government departments and agencies, the recommendations are directed to NSW Treasury and the Department of Premier and Cabinet. However, the report recognises that the current role of these entities in the funding arrangements for the integrity agencies poses a threat to their independence. Consequently, it is important to recognise the important role of the NSW Parliament in determining the appropriate funding model for the integrity agencies. The audited agencies should consult closely with the NSW Parliament when considering these recommendations to ensure the views of Parliament are reflected appropriately in any changes arising from the implementation of these recommendations. This recognises the appropriate role of the NSW Parliament in safeguarding the independence of its integrity agencies.
On 4 November 2019, the Hon. Don Harwin MLC, Special Minister of State, requested this audit under section 27(B)(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983.
Consistent with the Minister’s request, this audit assessed the effectiveness of the financial arrangements and management practices of four integrity agencies - the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), the NSW Electoral Commission (NSWEC), the NSW Ombudsman (NSWO) and the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission (LECC). The audit also included NSW Treasury and the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) because both departments are involved in the processes that lead to decisions about funding for the integrity agencies and managing access to this funding.
The NSW Government, through the Treasurer, is responsible to the citizens of New South Wales for the prudent and responsible management of the state’s finances. The annual budget is the primary process that the NSW Government uses for financial management. Decisions about funding for the integrity agencies are made through this budget process. NSW Treasury provides guidance to all government departments and agencies, including the integrity agencies that are the focus of this audit, on the Government’s priorities for the budget. NSW Treasury also reviews and provides advice to the Expenditure Review Committee of Cabinet on proposals for funding through the budget.
The integrity agencies are subject to the application of ‘efficiency dividends’ and ‘budget savings and reform measures’, which limit their access to the full funding that has been approved by Parliament. NSW Treasury and DPC manage the application of these limits to the integrity agencies. The integrity agencies are grouped within the DPC ‘cluster’, which is an administrative arrangement created by the NSW Government. Clusters do not have legal status but are used for administrative and financial management. DPC has provided additional funding during the financial year to some of the integrity agencies in the years covered in this audit. DPC also oversees the involvement of the integrity agencies in developing and reporting on their outcomes. This is a requirement of NSW Treasury’s outcome budgeting reforms, which are currently being implemented.
Each of the integrity agencies is overseen by a parliamentary committee that includes members of both houses of the NSW Parliament. These committees are responsible for reviewing the performance of the integrity agencies that they oversee. They do not have a role in funding decisions. ICAC and LECC each have additional oversight from an Inspector. The Inspector of the ICAC’s role is to oversee the operations and conduct of ICAC to ensure that it complies with the law. The Inspector of the LECC’s role is to oversee the way LECC carries out its functions, with a focus on the legality of LECC’s use of its powers. Neither of these Inspectors has a role in funding decisions.
The Audit Office of NSW is an independent integrity agency that receives some of its revenue through the NSW Government’s budget process and sits within the DPC cluster. We have taken the following actions to preserve our independence and mitigate potential conflicts of interest that could arise in conducting this audit:
- not considering or commenting on the financial arrangements for our office
- requesting a deferral of our office’s evidence to an inquiry by the NSW Legislative Council’s Public Accountability Committee that is considering the budget process for integrity agencies. The inquiry includes the four integrity agencies that are the subject of this audit and our office
- seeking independent legal advice on the framework for the financial arrangements for the integrity agencies
- using additional internal review processes to provide quality assurance to audit conclusions.
Conclusion
The current approach to determining annual funding for the integrity agencies presents threats to their independent status. The approach is consistent with the legislative and Constitutional framework for financial management in New South Wales, but it does not sufficiently recognise that the roles and functions of the integrity agencies that are the focus of this audit are different to other departments and agencies.
The government of the day is responsible to the citizens of New South Wales for the prudent and responsible management of the state’s finances. Accordingly, the government of the day has a central role in decisions about funding for departments and agencies and in determining the financial management processes to be applied. This is clearly established in the legislative framework and conventions for managing public funds in New South Wales. This system is primarily designed to determine the funding for departments and agencies that are responsible to ministers. It is less appropriate for integrity agencies because it does not provide additional protection against the risk that funding decisions could be influenced by previous or planned investigations by the integrity agencies. This risk has the potential to limit the ability of the integrity agencies to fulfil their legislative mandate. The extent and nature of this risk differs for each of the integrity agencies. This is outlined in the key findings section below and described in detail in Chapters 2–5 of this report.
Aspects of the financial management mechanisms used to administer funding for the integrity agencies create tensions with their independent status. These mechanisms include the means of applying efficiency dividends and budget savings and reform measures, the provision of additional funding from DPC to the integrity agencies, and requests for the integrity agencies to report to DPC on their activities and outcomes.
NSW Treasury and DPC have administered efficiency dividends and budget savings and reform measures to the integrity agencies. This results in the integrity agencies not being able to access the full funding approved by Parliament. There are two competing interpretations of appropriation legislation that lead to different conclusions about whether there is a clear legal basis for doing this. NSW Treasury and DPC focus on the fact that the Appropriation Act provides funding for the integrity agencies to a Premier, rather than the agency, and does not state that a Premier must provide the full amount of funding approved to the agency. This interpretation leads to the view that a Premier can restrict access to appropriation funding that was approved by Parliament. An alternative interpretation of the Appropriation Act would consider factors specific to the integrity agencies that differentiate them from other agencies subject to these measures. These factors include that the integrity agencies are independent of ministerial control, accountable to Parliament for performing specific legislated functions, and some may conduct investigations that involve a Premier, or DPC or NSW Treasury. If this alternative interpretation is used, then the reduction of the integrity agencies’ access to appropriation funding approved by Parliament could diminish the independent status of the integrity agencies and limit their ability to fulfil their legislative mandate.
DPC has given additional funding to three of the integrity agencies in recent years in response to requests from the agencies. If the integrity agencies require additional funding during the year, the only mechanism available is to seek funding from DPC. This creates a potential threat to the independence of the integrity agencies. Asking DPC to make decisions about funding allocations between an integrity agency and another agency in the DPC cluster is inappropriate because DPC is not responsible for the functions or actions of an integrity agency. It is also possible that DPC could be the subject of an investigation conducted by an integrity agency. DPC has advised that it considers these risks more theoretical than real.
DPC’s provision of $2.5 million in additional funding to ICAC in 2019–20 may not have been consistent with the Appropriation Act 2019 (the Act), because of a change to the Act compared to previous appropriation legislation. The additional funding that was provided to ICAC in 2019–20 by DPC had been appropriated to DPC under Part 2 of the Act. The Act specified that funding appropriated under Part 2 could only be used for the purposes specified in that Part. ICAC receives its appropriation under Part 4 of the Act. It is contestable as to whether the purpose of an appropriation under Part 2 of the Act would include providing funding for an agency that receives an appropriation under another part of the Act.
The integrity agencies have been asked to report on activities and outcomes to DPC as part of the outcome budgeting reforms that are being implemented by NSW Treasury. This is inconsistent with their independent status because the integrity agencies are accountable to Parliament for their activities, not DPC or a Premier.
Our audit also assessed the integrity agencies’ systems for planning, budgeting and monitoring the efficiency of their work. We did not find major deficiencies in the management practices of the integrity agencies. We did identify opportunities for improvement in each agency. These are specific to the circumstances of each agency and are outlined in the key findings section below and Chapters 2–5 of this report.
On 4 November 2019, the Hon. Don Harwin MLC, Special Minister of State, requested this audit under section 27(B)(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983.
Consistent with the Minister’s request, this audit assessed the effectiveness of the financial arrangements and management practices of four integrity agencies - the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), the NSW Electoral Commission (NSWEC), the NSW Ombudsman (NSWO) and the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission (LECC). The audit also included NSW Treasury and the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) because both departments have a role in the financial arrangements for the integrity agencies. NSW Treasury manages the budget process that determines the annual funding for the integrity agencies. DPC has a role in managing access to this funding because the integrity agencies are placed within the DPC ‘cluster’.
The Audit Office of NSW is an independent integrity agency that receives some of its revenue through the NSW Government’s budget process and sits within the DPC cluster. We have taken the following actions to preserve our independence and mitigate potential conflicts of interest that could arise in conducting this audit:
- not considering or commenting on the financial arrangements for our office
- requesting a deferral of our office’s evidence to an inquiry by the NSW Legislative Council’s Public Accountability Committee that is considering the budget process for integrity agencies and the NSW Parliament, including the four integrity agencies in this audit and our office
- seeking independent legal advice on the framework for the financial arrangements of the four integrity agencies in this audit
- using additional internal review processes to provide quality assurance to audit conclusions.
Conclusion
Financial arrangements for ICAC
ICAC's main functions are to investigate and prevent corruption in the public sector. Its legislation establishes it as an independent agency that is accountable to Parliament.
Decisions about the annual appropriation for ICAC are made by the Cabinet, with advice from NSW Treasury. Members of Cabinet or NSW Treasury could be involved in or affected by an ICAC investigation. There is no independent advice to Cabinet on ICAC’s funding requirements and there is no transparency to Parliament about the reasons for decisions made about ICAC’s budget. The absence of these safeguards in the current financial arrangements creates a threat to ICAC’s independence and have the potential to limit its ability to fulfil its legislative mandate.
ICAC submitted budget proposals seeking increases to its appropriation funding in several recent years. The budget proposals related to funding to expand its workforce to respond to increases in the volume and complexity of its work. Some of these proposals were rejected without reasons being provided. There are no formal mechanisms available to ICAC to question or challenge these decisions. The process available to ICAC to request additional funding outside the annual budget creates further risks to its independence.
ICAC’s management practices
ICAC’s staff use structured processes for prioritising work against its legislative mandate and it has conducted recent reviews to assess its operational efficiency. ICAC's internal budgeting processes are adequate but could be improved with better documentation of the reasons for its budget decisions.
Conclusion
Financial arrangements for NSWEC
NSWEC conducts elections and is responsible for maintaining the integrity of the electoral system in New South Wales. NSWEC’s legislation states that it should conduct elections and investigate potential breaches of electoral law independently and be accountable to Parliament. Decisions about the annual appropriation for NSWEC are made by the Cabinet. It is possible that NSWEC’s investigations of electoral integrity could include members of Cabinet or the political party that holds government. There is a risk that decisions about its funding could be influenced by the conduct of these investigations. If realised, this would be a threat to NSWEC’s independence and ability to fulfil its legislative mandate. NSWEC has not received the full funding amount it has requested in recent years. There is inadequate transparency about how funding decisions were made and there are no formal mechanisms to question or challenge these decisions.
The conduct of elections is a key element of a democratic system and under-funding this function could have serious implications. NSWEC’s requests for additional appropriation funding are assessed alongside the priorities of the government of the day. Its role transcends these immediate priorities and there is a risk that its funding requirements may not be prioritised.
NSWEC’s management practices
NSWEC’s internal budgeting processes and efficiency programs are clear and well documented. NSWEC has identified options to improve its operational and corporate efficiency but has not implemented all of these.
Conclusion
Financial arrangements for NSWO
NSWO oversees government agencies and some government-funded private sector bodies that provide services to the community or exercise administrative functions. NSWO’s legislation makes it clear that it should operate independently of the agencies it oversees and be accountable to Parliament.
NSWO’s investigations do not include members of Cabinet, except in relation to Public Interest Disclosures made about a minister, so the risk that decisions about its budget could be affected by its investigations is relatively lower. However, NSWO's investigations can comment on and make recommendations about government policies, which may have been endorsed by Cabinet or an individual minister, and its investigations cover systemic issues for which ministers and the heads of government departments are responsible. NSWO faces a further challenge in its ability to make compelling budget proposals under the current financial arrangements. Its funding requests are assessed alongside the government’s priorities, but its work is unlikely to align directly with these priorities.
NSWO’s management practices
NSWO has assessed its operational and corporate efficiency recently and has implemented major changes to its operating model in response to this. Its internal budgeting process is adequate but could be improved by being documented more thoroughly.
Conclusion
Financial arrangements for LECC
LECC's main functions are to investigate allegations of misconduct by law enforcement and oversee police handing of complaints. LECC’s legislation states it should operate independently of the agencies it oversees and be accountable to Parliament. LECC’s jurisdiction does not include members of Cabinet, NSW Treasury or DPC. However, LECC’s investigations have the potential to have a negative impact on a Minister for Police, who is a member of Cabinet, and the government of the day. There is a risk that decision makers for LECC’s funding could be influenced by these considerations. While LECC has not sought increases to its appropriation funding in recent years, there are no formal mechanisms to question or challenge these decisions if it did have concerns about its funding in the future.
Unlike the other integrity agencies in this audit, LECC is not classified as a separate GSF agency under the Government Sector Finance Act 2018. This difference means that LECC has less independence from the Executive Government, because LECC would have to comply with a Treasurer’s Direction even if it believes it is not consistent with the independent exercise of its functions.
LECC's management practices
LECC's internal budgeting processes are clear and documented and it has identified and implemented operational and corporate efficiency savings in several areas. LECC published a new strategic plan in July 2020. Over the first three years of its operations since 2017, LECC had not conducted effective strategic planning which made it difficult for LECC to demonstrate that it had a cohesive approach to its operations across the agency during this time.
Conclusion
Aspects of the financial management mechanisms used by NSW Treasury and DPC to administer funding for the integrity agencies create tensions with their independent status.
NSW Treasury and DPC have administered efficiency dividends and budget savings and reform measures which results in the integrity agencies not being able to access the full funding approved by Parliament. There are two competing interpretations of appropriation legislation that lead to different conclusions about whether there is a clear legal basis for doing this. NSW Treasury and DPC take the view that the Appropriation Act provides funding for the integrity agencies to a Premier and does not state that a Premier must provide the full amount of funding to the agencies. This interpretation leads to the view that a Premier can restrict access to appropriation funding that was approved by Parliament. An alternative approach to interpreting the Appropriation Act would consider the contextual factors specific to the integrity agencies. These factors include: the integrity agencies are independent of ministerial control, the integrity agencies are accountable to Parliament for performing specific legislated functions, and the integrity agencies may conduct investigations that involve a Premier, or DPC or NSW Treasury. If this alternative interpretation is accepted, then the reduction of the integrity agencies’ access to appropriation funding could diminish the independent status of the integrity agencies.
DPC has given additional funding to three of the integrity agencies in recent years in response to requests from the agencies. If the integrity agencies require additional funding during the year, the only mechanism available is to seek funding from DPC. This creates a potential threat to the independence of the integrity agencies. Asking DPC to make decisions about funding allocations between an integrity agency and another agency in the DPC cluster is inappropriate because DPC is not responsible for the functions or actions of an integrity agency. It is also possible that DPC could be the subject of an investigation conducted by an integrity agency. Separately, DPC’s provision of $2.5 million in additional funding to ICAC in 2019–20 may not have been consistent with the Appropriation Act 2019. The appropriations for DPC and ICAC were made under different parts of the Act. Appropriation funding can only be paid out for the purpose specified in each part of the Act. It is not clear whether it is permissible to transfer funding between agencies that receive appropriations from different Parts of the Act.
The integrity agencies have recently been asked to report activity and outcome measures to DPC, as the principal department for the cluster that they have been placed in, under the outcome budgeting reforms that are being implemented by NSW Treasury. This is inconsistent with their independent status because the integrity agencies are accountable to Parliament for their activities, not DPC or a Premier. DPC has advised that it considers the risks to the independence of the integrity agencies described above to be more theoretical than real.
Appendix one – Response from agencies
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Opinion from the Crown Solicitor’s Office
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Governance and internal controls over local infrastructure contributions
The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today on how well four councils managed their local infrastructure contributions during the 2017-18 and 2018-19 financial years.
Local infrastructure contributions, also known as developer contributions, are collected from developers to pay for local infrastructure such as drainage, local roads, open space and community facilities. Controls over local infrastructure contributions help to ensure that all contributions owed are collected, funds are spent as intended, and any contributions paid in the form of works-in-kind or dedicated land are correctly valued.
The audit found that Blacktown City Council and City of Sydney Council provided effective governance over their local infrastructure contributions whereas Central Coast and Liverpool City Councils’ governance arrangements require improvement.
The audit found that three councils had spent local infrastructure contributions in accordance with approved contributions plans. Central Coast Council and the former Gosford City Council had spent $13.2 million on administration costs in breach of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979. These funds were repaid into the council’s local infrastructure fund during the course of the audit.
The Auditor-General made a number of recommendations for each council relating to improving controls over contributions and increasing transparency.
This audit examined the effectiveness of governance and internal controls over local infrastructure contributions, also known as developer contributions, held by four councils during the 2017–18 and 2018–19 financial years.
This performance audit was conducted with reference to the legislative and regulatory planning framework that was in place during that period.
Our work for this performance audit was completed at the end of March 2020 when we issued the final report to the four audited councils and the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment. We received their respective formal responses to the report’s recommendations during April and May 2020.
Concurrently to this audit, we sought Crown Solicitor’s advice (the ‘Advice’) regarding the use of local infrastructure contributions collected by local councils under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (‘the EPA Act’) for our financial audit work. The Advice clarified the applicable legislative requirements with reference to the application, investment and pooling of local infrastructure contributions. The Advice is included in Appendix 2 of this report. The Advice has not impacted on the findings and recommendations of this report.
Councils collect Local Infrastructure Contributions (LICs) from developers under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act (1979), the Local Government Act (1993) and the City of Sydney Act (2000) (EP&A Act, LG Act and City of Sydney Act) to fund infrastructure required to service and support new development. At 30 June 2018, councils across NSW collectively held more than $3.0 billion in LICs collected from developers. Just over $1.37 billion in total was held by ten councils. Councils collecting LICs must prepare a contributions plan, which outlines how LICs will be calculated and apportioned across different types of infrastructure. Councils that deliver water and sewer services prepare a development servicing plan (DSP) which allows them to collect contributions for water and sewer infrastructure.
Development timeframes are such that there is often several years between when LICs are collected and the infrastructure is required. Good governance and internal controls are needed over these funds to ensure they are available when needed and spent appropriately.
This audit assessed the effectiveness of governance and internal controls over LICs collected by four councils during the 2017–18 and 2018–19 financial years: Blacktown City Council, Central Coast Council, City of Sydney Council and Liverpool City Council. As at June 2018 these councils held the four highest LIC balances, each in excess of $140 million.
Audit Conclusion
Three of the four councils audited were currently compliant with legislation, regulations and Ministerial Directions regarding LICs. All had gaps in governance and controls over LICs which limited effective oversight.
Three of the councils included in the audit complied with legislation, regulations and Ministerial Directions relating to LICs. Central Coast Council breached the EP&A Act between 2001 and 2019 when it used LICs for administration costs. These funds were repaid in late 2019.
While controls over the receipt and expenditure of contributions funds were largely in place at all councils, there were some exceptions relating to valuing work and land delivered in lieu of cash. Three councils do not provide probity guidance in policies relating to LICs delivered through works-in-kind. Three of the councils had contributions plans that were more than five years old.
Staff at all four councils are knowledgeable about LICs but not all councils keep procedures up to date. Three councils' governance frameworks operate effectively with senior officers from across the council involved in decisions about spending LICs, entering into voluntary planning agreements (VPAs) and reviewing contributions plans.
Transparency over key information relating to LICs is important for senior management so they can make informed decisions, and for the community who pay LICs and expect infrastructure to be provided. During the period of the audit, none of the councils included in the audit provided sufficient information to senior management or their councillors about the projected financial status of contributions plans. This information would be valuable when making broader strategic and financial decisions. Information about LIC levies and intended infrastructure is available to the community but not always easy to find.
A strong governance framework is important at each council to ensure that the funds are managed well, available when needed and spent as intended. The audit examined the following features of each council's governance framework as they apply to LICs:
- decision-making by councillors and council officers relating to LICs
- monitoring delivery of contributions plans and DSPs including:
- reviewing assumptions underlying the plans
- monitoring projected status of plans.
Internal controls over LICs are important to promote accountability, prevent fraud and deliver infrastructure to the required standard at the best possible price. If financial controls are weak or are not implemented well, there is a risk that LICs are misspent or that councils pay too much for infrastructure.
Not all councils' internal controls adequately addressed risks associated with the administration of LICs
The audit examined a number of internal controls that manage risks related to LICs. These included:
- financial controls over receipt and expenditure of LIC funds
- management of conflicts-of-interest when dealing with developers
- independent valuations of works-in-kind and dedicated land
- ensuring delivery and quality of works-in-kind, and obtaining security from developers in the event of non-delivery or poor quality work
- management of variations to VPAs and works-in-kind agreements.
We reviewed controls included in policies and procedures and then checked samples of work to ensure that controls were implemented. We found variation in the controls that councils implemented, and some weaknesses in controls. It is a matter for each council to assess their financial risk and develop internal controls that support the collection, management, and expenditure of LICs. However, councils must be able to assure their communities and developers that they are doing everything possible to collect all LICs owing and that work conducted by developers in lieu of cash payments is properly valued and carried out to the required standard.
Further information about audit findings in relation to internal controls for each council are included in chapters five to eight. The exhibit below demonstrates variation in several controls implemented in the audited councils.
In a 2018 report, the Independent Commission Against Corruption noted that 'the appetite for transparency is expanding in both the public and private sectors'.
The Practice Note and S64 Guidance refer to transparency, including the importance of transparency over:
- calculation and apportionment of LICs
- funding of infrastructure, including where and when infrastructure is delivered
- arrangements made with developers through VPAs.
The LIC system is largely transparent for community members who know where to look
Contributions plans and DSPs are public documents, exhibited to the public before being adopted by council. Councils included in the audit publish their contributions plans and DSPs on their websites and meet statutory requirements with regard to reporting and accessibility of information.
However, other public information relating to the LIC system is fragmented across different websites and reports and varies in detail across councils.
| Blacktown City Council | Central Coast Council | City of Sydney Council | Liverpool City Council | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Financial details about contributions collected and spent | Financial statements | Financial statements | Financial statements | Financial statements |
| Implementation plans for spending LICs | Contribution plans | S64 implementation plans in DSPs. S7.11 & S7.12 implementation plans developed annually within capital works plan | Contribution plans | Developed annually within capital works plan |
| Capital works underway or completed, funded by LICs | Capital works plan and annual report | Not published | Not published | Capital works plan |
The Practice Note states that councils are accountable for providing the infrastructure for which contributions are collected. Demonstrating that infrastructure has been provided is difficult with fragmented information. As an example of transparent reporting, Blacktown City Council's 2018–19 annual report includes information about infrastructure that has been delivered for every contributions plan, providing transparency over how LICs have been spent.
Use of LICs collected under VPAs is not always transparent
Contributions collected under VPAs are not required to demonstrate the same relationship to a development as LICs collected under section 7.11 of the EP&A Act. VPAs are often negotiated because a developer requests a change to a planning instrument, and it is important that these arrangements, and their outcomes, are transparent to the community.
The EP&A Regulation includes mechanisms to ensure that VPAs are partially transparent. VPAs are exhibited to the public and approved by the elected council. Councils must maintain a VPA Register and make the VPA Deeds of Agreement available on request. However, there is no obligation on council to report on the outcomes or delivery of developers' obligations under VPAs. The four audited councils vary in transparency and accessibility of information available about VPAs.
| Blacktown City Council | Central Coast Council | City of Sydney Council | Liverpool City Council | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| VPA Register | Council website and annual report | Annual report | Annual report | Council website and annual report |
| VPA Deeds of Agreement | Council website | Available on request | Available on request | Council website |
| Intended use of LICs collected under VPAs | In Deeds of Agreement | In Deeds of Agreement | In VPA Register and most Deeds of Agreement | In VPA Register and most Deeds of Agreement |
| Completion of work funded by cash collected under VPAs | Not published | Not published | Not published | Not published |
| Delivery of works-in-kind or land negotiated under VPAs | Not published | Not published | In VPA Register | Not published |
The Practice Note suggests that councils incorporate the intended use of LICs collected under VPAs in the Deed of Agreement, but there is no guidance relating to transparency over where and when funds have actually been spent. There is merit in councils providing greater transparency over public benefits delivered through VPAs to give communities confidence in VPAs as a planning tool.
Credit arrangements with developers are not always well documented or monitored
When levying LICs, section 7.11(6) of the EP&A Act requires councils to take into account land, money, or works-in-kind that the developer has contributed on other development sites over and above their LIC obligations. This section of the EP&A Act allows a developer to offset a LIC owed on one site against land or works contributed on another. This leads to some developers carrying 'credits' for work delivered to councils, to be paid back by reduced LICs on a future development. Blacktown City Council and Central Coast Council allow developers to carry credits. Liverpool City Council and City of Sydney Council do not permit credits and instead pay the developers for any additional work undertaken.
Councils should formally document credit arrangements and have a robust process to validate and keep track of credit balances and report on them. Central Coast Council does not keep good track of credit arrangements and neither Blacktown City Council or Central Coast Council aggregate or report on outstanding credit balances.
Blacktown City Council manages the largest LIC fund in NSW and negotiates more VPAs than any other council. Overall, Blacktown City Council demonstrates effective governance over the LIC funds but there is scope for improved oversight of the projected financial status of contributions plans and credit arrangements with developers. Blacktown City Council also needs to update its operating procedures relating to LICs and improve security over key information.
Blacktown City Council is managing areas with high growth. There is a risk that Blacktown City Council will be unable to collect sufficient LICs to fund the infrastructure required to support that growth. However, Blacktown City Council does not assess and report to senior management or its Audit, Risk and Improvement Committee about the projected financial status of contributions plans.
Blacktown City Council has policies in place to guide the management of LICs although management of credit arrangements with developers requires greater oversight. Policies relating to works-in-kind agreements provide no guidance about probity in negotiations with developers and valuations of works-in-kind are not independent as they are paid for by the developer. Blacktown City Council's S7.11 committee structure could act as a model for other councils. Blacktown City Council is spending LICs according to its contributions plans. Staff managing LICs demonstrate good knowledge of the regulatory environment. However, a number of administrative processes need attention such as outdated procedures, lack of security over key spreadsheets, and inappropriate retention of sensitive personal data.
Recommendations
By December 2020, Blacktown City Council should:
- regularly report to senior management on the projected financial status of contributions plans
- update council's works-in-kind policy to address probity risks during negotiations with developers
- mitigate risks associated with lack of independence in valuations of works-in-kind
- improve public reporting about expenditure of cash collected under VPAs
- improve management oversight of credit arrangements with developers
- update procedures for managing LICs
- implement security measures over critical or personal information and spreadsheets.
Central Coast Council's governance and internal controls over LICs were not fully effective. Between 2001 and 2019, more than $13.0 million in LICs was misspent on administration costs in breach of the EP&A Act. There is scope for improved oversight of the projected financial status of contributions plans and credit arrangements with developers. Policies and procedures from the two former councils are not aligned.
In May 2016, the newly amalgamated Central Coast Council inherited 53 contributions plans from the former Gosford City and Wyong Shire Councils. Managing this number of contributions plans fragments the available funds and increases complexity. Central Coast Council is currently working on consolidating these plans. Between June 2016 and June 2019, its LIC balance doubled from $90.0 million to $196 million. Central Coast Council does not assess and report to senior management or its Audit, Risk and Improvement Committee about the projected financial status of contributions plans. Central Coast Council has a LIC committee but it has no formal charter and senior officers do not regularly attend meetings. This limits the committee's effectiveness as a decision-making body. A draft policy relating to works-in-kind agreements provide no guidance about probity in negotiations with developers. Valuations of works-in-kind and land dedications are not independent as they are paid for by the developer.
Central Coast Council has adjusted its accounts in 2018–19 by $13.2 million to repay the LIC fund for administration expenses that were not provided for in 40 contributions plans.
Recommendations
By June 2020, Central Coast Council should:
1. obtain independent validation of the adjustment made to the restricted asset accounts and general fund to repay LICs spent on administration, and adjustments made to each infrastructure category within the contributions plans
2. publish current contributions plans from the former Gosford City Council on the Central Coast Council website.
By December 2020, Central Coast Council should:
3. regularly report to senior management on the projected financial status of contributions plans
4. increase transparency of information available to the public about LIC works planned and underway, including intended use of contributions collected under VPAs
5. consolidate existing plans, ensuring the new contributions plans includes a regular review cycle
6. develop a formal charter for the developer contributions committee and increase the seniority of membership
7. complete and adopt council's works-in-kind policy currently under development, ensuring it addresses probity risks during negotiations with developers
8. mitigate risks associated with lack of independence in valuations of works-in-kind and dedicated land
9. improve public reporting about expenditure of cash collected under VPAs
10. improve management oversight of credit arrangements with developers
11. implement security measures to ensure the integrity of key spreadsheets used to manage LICs
12. align policies and procedures relating to LICs across the amalgamated council including developing policies and procedures for the management of S64 LICs
13. update council's VPA policy to address increased or indexed bank guarantees to accommodate cost increases.
City of Sydney Council manages a complex development environment across the Sydney CBD and inner suburbs. Overall, governance and internal controls over LICs are effective although there is scope for improved oversight of the projected financial status of contributions plans.
City of Sydney Council maintains a large balance of LICs, although not excessive relative to the annual level of LIC expenditure. Unspent contributions are largely associated with open space infrastructure that cannot be delivered until suitable land is available. Thirty per cent of cash contributions are collected under VPAs and there is limited transparency over how these funds are spent. City of Sydney Council does not assess and report to management or its Audit, Risk and Compliance Committee about the projected financial status of contributions plans.
In 2017–18 and 2018–19, LICs were spent in accordance with the corresponding contributions plans. City of Sydney Council staff are knowledgeable about the regulatory environment and are supported by up-to-date policies and procedures.
Recommendations
By December 2020, City of Sydney Council should:
- regularly report to senior management on the projected financial status of contributions plans
- improve public reporting about expenditure of cash collected under VPAs
- periodically review the risk of unpaid LICs associated with complying development certificates and assess whether additional controls are required
- implement security measures to ensure the integrity of key spreadsheets used to manage LICs.
During the audit period 2017–18 and 2018–19, Liverpool City Council did not have effective governance and internal controls over LICs. Liverpool City Council is addressing deficiencies and risks identified through an internal audit published in December 2018 although further work is required. There is scope for improved oversight of the projected financial status of contributions plans.
In the two years to 30 June 2019, the balance of unspent LICs increased by more than 60 per cent against a relatively low pattern of expenditure. Prior to an internal audit completed in late 2018, there was no regular reporting on the status of LICs and a lack of transparency when prioritising the expenditure of LIC funds. During 2019, and following the internal audit, Liverpool City Council engaged additional skilled resources to improve focus and accountability for LICs. A LIC committee has been established to manage contributions plans and support business units to initiate relevant infrastructure projects, although it is too early to assess whether this committee is operating effectively. From February 2019, Liverpool City Council commenced monthly reporting to its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) about the point-in-time status of LIC funds, and to its Audit, Risk and Improvement Committee about risks associated with LICs and the implementation of internal audit recommendations. There is limited reporting to senior management about the projected financial status of some contributions plans. Our audit found no evidence of misuse of funds during the audited period. Methods for valuing work and land are not aligned with policies and procedures and are implemented inconsistently. In addition, valuations of works-in-kind and land dedications are not independent as they are paid for by the developer. The policy relating to works-in-kind provides no guidance about managing probity risks when negotiating with developers.
Recommendations
By December 2020, Liverpool City Council should:
- regularly report to senior management on the projected financial status of contributions plans
- update council's policies and procedures to provide consistent guidance about how works and land offered by developers should be valued
- update council's Works-in-Kind and Land Acquisition Policy to address probity risks during negotiations with developers
- improve public reporting about expenditure of cash collected under VPAs
- mitigate risks associated with lack of independence in valuations of works-in-kind and dedicated land
- implement security measures over critical or private information.
Appendix one – Responses from councils and the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment
Appendix two – Advice from the Crown Solicitor
Appendix three – About the audit
Appendix four – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #339 - released 17 August 2020
Their Futures Matter
The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining whether the Department of Communities and Justice had effective governance and partnership arrangements in place to deliver ‘Their Futures Matter’.
Their Futures Matter was intended to place vulnerable children and families at the heart of services, and direct investment to where funding and programs deliver the greatest social and economic benefits. It was a four-year whole-of-government reform in response to the 2015 Tune Review of out-of-home care.
The Auditor-General found that while important foundations were put in place, and new programs trialled, the key objective to establish an evidence-based whole-of-government early intervention approach for vulnerable children and families in NSW was not achieved.
Governance and cross-agency partnership arrangements to deliver Their Futures Matter were found to be ineffective. 'Their Futures Matter lacked mechanisms to secure cross portfolio buy‑in and did not have authority to drive reprioritisation of government investment', the Auditor-General said.
At the reform’s close, the majority of around $380 million in investment funding remains tied to existing agency programs, with limited evidence of their comparative effectiveness or alignment with Their Futures Matter policy objectives. The reform concluded on 30 June 2020 without a strategy or plan in place to achieve its intent.
The Auditor-General made four recommendations to the Department of Communities and Justice, aimed at improving implementation of outstanding objectives, revising governance arrangements, and utilising the new human services data set to address the intent of the reform. However, these recommendations respond only in part to the findings of the audit.
According to the Auditor-General, ‘Cross-portfolio leadership and action is required to ensure a whole-of-government response to delivering the objectives of Their Futures Matter to improve outcomes for vulnerable children, young people and their families in New South Wales.’
In 2016, the NSW Government launched 'Their Futures Matter' (TFM) - a whole-of-government reform aimed at delivering improved outcomes for vulnerable children, young people and their families. TFM was the government's key response to the 2015 Independent Review of Out of Home Care in New South Wales (known as 'the Tune Review').
The Tune Review found that, despite previous child protection reforms, the out of home care system was ineffective and unsustainable. It highlighted that the system was not client-centred and was failing to improve the long-term outcomes for vulnerable children and families. The review found that the greatest proportion of relevant expenditure was made in out of home care service delivery rather than in evidence-based early intervention strategies to support children and families when vulnerabilities first become evident to government services (such as missed school days or presentations to health services).
The then Department of Family and Community Services (FACS) designed the TFM reform initiatives, in consultation with central and human services agencies. A cross-agency board, senior officers group, and a new unit in the FACS cluster were established to drive the implementation of TFM. In the 2016–17 Budget, the government allocated $190 million over four years (2016–17 to 2019–20) to the reform. This resourced the design and commissioning of evidence-based pilots, data analytics work, staffing for the implementation unit and secretariat support for the board and cross-agency collaboration.
As part of the TFM reform, the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Treasury and partnering agencies (NSW Health, Department of Education and Department of Justice) identified various existing programs that targeted vulnerable children and families (such as the preceding whole-of-government ‘Keep Them Safe’ reform coming to an end in June 2020). Funding for these programs, totalling $381 million in 2019–20, was combined to form a nominal ‘investment pool’. The government intended that the TFM Implementation Board would use this pool to direct and prioritise resource allocation to evidence-based interventions for vulnerable children and families in NSW.
This audit assessed whether TFM had effective governance and partnership arrangements in place to enable an evidence-based early intervention investment approach for vulnerable children and families in NSW. We addressed the audit objective with the following audit questions:
- Was the TFM reform driven by effective governance arrangements?
- Was the TFM reform supported by effective cross-agency collaboration?
- Has the TFM reform generated an evidence base to inform a cross-agency investment approach in the future?
The audit did not seek to assess the outcomes for children, young people and families achieved by TFM programs and projects.
ConclusionThe governance and cross-agency partnership arrangements used to deliver the Their Futures Matter reform were ineffective. Important foundations were put in place, and new programs trialled over the reform's four years. However, an evidence-based whole-of-government early intervention approach for vulnerable children and families in NSW − the key objective of the reform − was not established. The reform concluded in June 2020 without a strategy or plan in place to achieve its intent. The governance arrangements established for the Their Futures Matter (TFM) reform did not provide sufficient independence, authority and cross-agency clout to deliver on the reform’s intent. This hindered delivery of the reform's key elements, particularly the redirection of funding to evidence-based earlier intervention supports, and limited the impact that TFM could have on driving system change. TFM increased focus on the contribution that other agencies outside of the former Family and Community Services portfolio could make in responding to the needs of vulnerable children and families, and in reducing the demand costs of related government service delivery. Despite being a whole-of-government reform, TFM lacked mechanisms to secure cross-portfolio buy-in and lacked the powers to drive reprioritisation of government investment in evidence-based and earlier intervention supports across agencies. At the reform’s close, the majority of the reform's investment pool funding remained tied to existing agency programs, with limited evidence of their comparative effectiveness or alignment with Their Futures Matter policy objectives. TFM began building an evidence base about ‘what works’, including piloting programs and creating a new dataset to identify risk factors for vulnerability and future costs to government. However, this evidence base does not yet comprehensively map how existing services meet needs, identify system duplications or gaps, nor demonstrate which government funded supports and interventions are most effective to make a difference to life outcomes for vulnerable children and families in NSW. |
Their Futures Matter (TFM) is a whole-of-government reform to deliver improved outcomes for vulnerable children, young people and their families.
Supported by a cross-agency TFM Board, and the TFM Unit in the then Department of Family and Community Services (FACS), the reform aimed to develop whole-of-government evidence-based early intervention investment approaches for vulnerable children and families in NSW.
Governance refers to the structures, systems and practices that an organisation has in place to:
- assign decision-making authorities and establish the organisation's strategic direction
- oversee the delivery of its services, the implementation of its policies, and the monitoring and mitigation of its key risks
- report on its performance in achieving intended results, and drive ongoing improvements.
We examined whether the TFM reform was driven by effective governance arrangements and cross-agency collaboration.
The reform agenda and timeframe set down for Their Futures Matter (TFM) were ambitious. This chapter assesses whether the TFM Board and TFM Unit had the capability, capacity and clout within government to deliver the reform agenda.
Creating a robust evidence base was important for Their Futures Matter, in order to:
- identify effective intervention strategies to improve supports and outcomes for vulnerable children and families
- make efficient use of taxpayer money to assist the maximum number of vulnerable children and families
- inform the investment-based approach for future funding allocation.
This chapter assesses whether the TFM reform has developed an evidence base to inform cross-agency investment decisions.
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – TFM governance entities
Appendix three – TFM Human Services Data Set
Appendix four – TFM pilot programs
Appendix five – About the audit
Appendix six – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #337 - released 24 July 2020
CBD South East Sydney Light Rail: follow-up performance audit
This is a follow-up to the Auditor-General's November 2016 report on the CBD South East Sydney Light Rail project. This follow-up report assessed whether Transport for NSW has updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits.
The audit found that Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public.
The Auditor-General reports that the total cost of the project will exceed $3.1 billion, which is above the revised cost of $2.9 billion published in November 2019. $153.84 million of additional costs are due to omitted costs for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays.
The report makes four recommendations to Transport for NSW to publicly report on the final project cost, the updated expected project benefits, the benefits achieved in the first year of operations and the average weekly journey times.
The CBD and South East Light Rail is a 12 km light rail network for Sydney. It extends from Circular Quay along George Street to Central Station, through Surry Hills to Moore Park, then to Kensington and Kingsford via Anzac Parade and Randwick via Alison Road and High Street.
Transport for NSW (TfNSW) is responsible for planning, procuring and delivering the Central Business District and South East Light Rail (CSELR) project. In December 2014, TfNSW entered into a public private partnership with ALTRAC Light Rail as the operating company (OpCo) responsible for delivering, operating and maintaining the CSELR. OpCo engaged Alstom and Acciona, who together form its Design and Construct Contractor (D&C).
On 14 December 2019, passenger services started on the line between Circular Quay and Randwick. Passenger services on the line between Circular Quay and Kingsford commenced on 3 April 2020.
In November 2016, the Auditor-General published a performance audit report on the CSELR project. The audit found that TfNSW would deliver the CSELR at a higher cost with lower benefits than in the approved business case, and recommended that TfNSW update and consolidate information about project costs and benefits and ensure the information is readily accessible to the public.
In November 2018, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) examined TfNSW's actions taken in response to our 2016 performance audit report on the CSELR project. The PAC recommended that the Auditor-General consider undertaking a follow-up audit on the CSELR project. The purpose of this follow-up performance audit is to assess whether TfNSW has effectively updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits for the CSELR project.
Conclusion
Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated CSLER project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public. In line with the NSW Government Benefits Realisation Management Framework, TfNSW intends to measure benefits after the project is completed and has not updated the expected project benefits since April 2015.Between February 2015 and December 2019, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) regularly updated capital expenditure costs for the CSELR in internal monthly financial performance and risk reports. These reports did not include all the costs incurred by TfNSW to manage and commission the CSELR project.
Omitted costs of $153.84 million for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays will bring the current estimated total cost of the CSELR project to $3.147 billion.
From February 2015, TfNSW did not regularly provide the financial performance and risk reports to key CSELR project governance bodies. TfNSW publishes information on project costs and benefits on the Sydney Light Rail website. However, the information on project costs has not always been accurate or current.
TfNSW is working with OpCo partners to deliver the expected journey time benefits. A key benefit defined in the business plan was that bus services would be reduced owing to transfer of demand to the light rail - entailing a saving. However, TfNSW reports that the full expected benefit of changes to bus services will not be realised due to bus patronage increasing above forecasted levels.
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – Governance and reporting arrangements for the CSELR
Appendix three – 2018 CSELR governance changes
Appendix four – About the audit
Appendix five – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #335 - released 11 June 2020
Train station crowding
This report focuses on how Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains manage crowding at selected metropolitan train stations.
The audit found that while Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, it does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. Sydney Trains 'do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed’, the Auditor-General said.
Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or station entries before crowding reaches unsafe levels or when it impacts on-time running. Assuming rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, causing customer delay. ‘Restricting customer access to platforms or station entries is not a sustainable approach to manage station crowding’, said the Auditor-General.
The Auditor-General made seven recommendations to improve Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains' management of station crowding. Transport for NSW have accepted these recommendations on behalf of the Transport cluster.
Public transport patronage has been impacted by COVID-19. This audit was conducted before these impacts occurred.
Sydney Trains patronage has increased by close to 34 per cent over the last five years, and Transport for NSW (TfNSW) expects the growth in patronage to continue over the next 30 years. As patronage increases there are more passengers entering and exiting stations, moving within stations to change services, and waiting on platforms. As a result, some Sydney metropolitan train stations are becoming increasingly crowded.
There are three main causes of station crowding:
- patronage growth exceeding the current capacity limits of the rail network
- service disruptions
- special events.
Crowds can inhibit movement, cause discomfort and can lead to increased health and safety risks to customers. In the context of a train service, unmanaged crowds can affect service operation as trains spend longer at platforms waiting for customers to alight and board services which can cause service delays. Crowding can also prevent customers from accessing services.
Our 2017 performance audit, ‘Passenger Rail Punctuality’, found that rail agencies would find it hard to maintain train punctuality after 2019 unless they significantly increased the capacity of the network to carry trains and people. TfNSW and Sydney Trains have plans to improve the network to move more passengers. These plans are set out in strategies such as More Trains, More Services and in the continued implementation of new infrastructure such as the Sydney Metro. Since 2017, TfNSW and Sydney Trains have introduced 1,500 more weekly services to increase capacity. Additional network capacity improvements are in progress for delivery from 2022 onwards.
In the meantime, TfNSW and Sydney Trains need to use other ways of managing crowding at train stations until increased capacity comes on line.
This audit examined how effectively TfNSW and Sydney Trains are managing crowding at selected metropolitan train stations in the short and medium term. In doing so, the audit examined how TfNSW and Sydney Trains know whether there is a crowding problem at stations and how they manage that crowding.
TfNSW is the lead agency for transport in NSW. TfNSW is responsible for setting the standard working timetable that Sydney Trains must implement. Sydney Trains is responsible for operating and maintaining the Sydney metropolitan heavy rail passenger service. This includes operating, staffing and maintaining most metropolitan stations. Sydney Trains’ overall responsibility is to run a safe rail network to timetable.
ConclusionSydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, but does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. TfNSW and Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers, but do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed. TfNSW is delivering a program to influence demand for transport in key precincts but the effectiveness of this program and its impact on station crowding is unclear as Transport for NSW has not evaluated the outcomes of the program. TfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. Data and observation on dwell time, which is the time a train waits at a platform for customers to get on and off trains, inform the development of operational approaches to manage crowding at stations. Sydney Trains has KPIs on reliability, punctuality and customer experience and use these to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. TfNSW and Sydney Trains only formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events. Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for crowd management to Customer Area Managers, who rely on frontline Sydney Trains staff to understand how crowding affects individual stations. Station staff at identified key metropolitan train stations have developed customer management plans (also known as crowd management plans). However, Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring and evaluation of these plans and does not systematically collect data on when station staff activate crowding interventions under these plans. Sydney Trains stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services. Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or stations before crowding reaches unsafe levels, or when it impacts on-time running. As rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will need to increase its use of interventions to manage crowding. As Sydney Trains restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, it is likely these customers will experience delays caused by these interventions. Since 2015, TfNSW has been delivering the 'Travel Choices' program which aims to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services in key precincts. TfNSW is unable to provide data demonstrating the overall effectiveness of this program and the impact the program has on distributing public transport usage out of peak AM and PM times. TfNSW and Sydney Trains continue to explore initiatives to specifically address crowd management. |
ConclusionTfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. There are no key performance indicators directly related to station crowding. Sydney Trains uses performance indicators on reliability, punctuality and customer experience to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. Sydney Trains does not have a routine process for identifying whether crowding contributed to minor safety incidents. TfNSW and Sydney Trains formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events. |
ConclusionSydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a strategic risk but does not have an overarching strategy to manage station crowding. Sydney Trains' stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services. Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers but does not have sufficient oversight to know that station crowding is effectively managed. Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring or evaluation of crowd management plans at key metropolitan train stations. The use of crowding interventions is likely to increase due to increasing patronage, causing more customers to experience delays directly caused by these activities. TfNSW and Sydney Trains have developed interventions to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services but are yet to evaluate these interventions. As such, their impact on managing station crowding is unclear. |
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – Sydney rail network
Appendix three – Rail services contract
Appendix four – Crowding pedestrian modelling
Appendix five – Airport Link stations case study
Appendix six – About the audit
Appendix seven – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #333 - released 30 April 2020
Local Schools, Local Decisions: needs-based equity funding
The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining the Department of Education’s (the department’s) support and oversight of school planning and use of needs-based funding under the Local Schools, Local Decisions reform.
The report found the department has not had adequate oversight of how schools are using needs-based funding to improve student outcomes since it was introduced in 2014.
The department had not set measures or targets for needs-based equity funding. It had also not been clear enough in how it expected schools to report on the outcomes of additional funding. This means it has not been able to effectively demonstrate the impact of funding at a school, or state-wide level.
To assist with the transition to greater local decision-making, the department provided schools with guidance materials, additional resources and systems support. However, guidance material was not clear enough on the purpose of funding, school budgeting systems were not fit-for-purpose when initially introduced, and support for schools was spread across different areas of the department.
The department has recently increased executive oversight of progress to improve educational outcomes for Aboriginal students and students from a low socio-economic background. It has also developed a consistent set of school-level targets to be implemented from 2020. This may help the department more reliably monitor progress in lifting outcomes for students with additional learning needs.
The report makes eight recommendations aimed at clarifying requirements of schools, better coordinating support and strengthening oversight of the use of needs-based equity funding.
The Local Schools, Local Decisions reform was launched in 2012 to give public schools more authority to make local decisions about how best to meet the needs of their students. A major element of the reform was the introduction of a new needs-based school funding model. Core elements of the model address staffing and operational requirements, while needs-based elements reflect the characteristics of schools and students within them. This includes equity funding designed to support students with additional needs. The four categories of equity funding are:
- socio-economic background
- Aboriginal background
- English language proficiency
- low-level adjustment for disability.
Around $900 million in equity funding was allocated in 2019. School principals decide how to use these funds and account for them through their school annual reports. The Department of Education (the department) supports schools in making these choices with tools and systems, guidelines, and good practice examples.
The objective of this audit was to assess the department's support and oversight of school planning and use of needs-based funding under the Local Schools, Local Decisions reform. To address this objective, the audit examined whether:
- effective accountability arrangements have been established
- effective support is provided to schools.
ConclusionThe department has not had adequate oversight of how schools are using needs-based equity funding to improve student outcomes since it was introduced in 2014. While it provides guidance and resources, it has not set measures or targets to describe the outcomes expected of this funding, or explicit requirements for schools to report outcomes from how these funds were used. Consequently, there is no effective mechanism to capture the impact of funding at a school, or state-wide level. The department has recently developed a consistent set of school-level targets to be implemented from 2020. This may help it to better hold schools accountable for progress towards its strategic goal of reducing the impact of disadvantage. A significant amount of extra funding has been provided to schools over recent years in recognition of the additional learning needs of certain groups of students facing disadvantage. Under the Local Schools, Local Decisions reform, schools were given the ability to make decisions about how best to use the equity funding in combination with their overall school resources to meet their students’ needs. However, multiple guidelines provided to schools contain inconsistent advice on how the community should be consulted, how funding could be used, and how impact should be reported. Because of this, it is not clear how schools have used equity funding for the benefit of identified groups. School annual reports we reviewed did not fully account for the equity funding received, nor adequately describe the impact of funding on student outcomes. To help in the transition to greater local decision-making, the department provided extra support by; establishing peer support for new principals, increasing the number of directors, developing data analysis and financial planning systems, targeted training and showcasing good practice. Multiple roles and areas of the department provide advice to schools in similar areas and this support could be better co-ordinated. Financial planning systems designed to help schools budget for equity and other funding sources were not fit-for-purpose when originally introduced. Schools reported a lack of trust in their budget figures and so were not fully spending their allocated funding. Since then, the department developed and improved a budgeting tool in consultation with stakeholder and user groups. It provided extra funding for administrative support and one-to-one training to help schools develop their capabilities. Despite this, schools we spoke to reported they were not yet fully confident in using the system and needed ongoing training and support. |
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #331 - released 8 April 2020.
Integrity of data in the Births, Deaths and Marriages Register
This report outlines whether the Department of Customer Service (the department) has effective controls in place to ensure the integrity of data in the Births, Deaths and Marriages Register (the register), and to prevent unauthorised access and misuse.
The audit found that the department has processes in place to ensure that the information entered in the register is accurate and that any changes to it are validated. Although there are controls in place to prevent and detect unauthorised access to, and activity in the register, there were significant gaps in these controls. Addressing these gaps is necessary to ensure the integrity of information in the register.
The Auditor-General made nine recommendations to the department, aimed at strengthening controls to prevent and detect unauthorised access to, and activity in the register. These included increased monitoring of individuals who have access to the register and strengthening security controls around the databases that contain the information in the register.
The NSW Registry of Births Deaths and Marriages is responsible for maintaining registers of births, deaths and marriages in New South Wales as well as registering adoptions, changes of names, changes of sex and relationships. Maintaining the integrity of this information is important as it is used to confirm people’s identity and unauthorised access to it can lead to fraud or identity theft.
The NSW Registry of Births Deaths and Marriages (BD&M) is responsible for maintaining registers of births, deaths and marriages in New South Wales. BD&M is also responsible for registering adoptions, changes of name, changes of sex and relationships. These records are collectively referred to as 'the Register'. The Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (the BD&M Act) makes the Registrar (the head of BD&M) responsible for maintaining the integrity of the Register and preventing fraud associated with the Register. Maintaining the integrity of the information held in the Register is important as it is used to confirm people's identity. Unauthorised access to, or misuse of the information in the Register can lead to fraud or identity theft. For these reasons it is important that there are sufficient controls in place to protect the information.
BD&M staff access, add to and amend the Register through the LifeLink application. While BD&M is part of the Department of Customer Service, the Department of Communities and Justice (DCJ) manages the databases that contain the Register and sit behind LifeLink and is responsible for the security of these databases.
This audit assessed whether BD&M has effective controls in place to ensure the integrity of data in the Births, Deaths and Marriages Register, and to prevent unauthorised access and misuse. It addressed the following:
- Are relevant process and IT controls in place and effective to ensure the integrity of data in the Register and the authenticity of records and documents?
- Are security controls in place and effective to prevent unauthorised access to, and modification of, data in the Register?
ConclusionBD&M has processes and controls in place to ensure that the information entered in the Register is accurate and that amendments to the Register are validated. BD&M also has controls in place to prevent and detect unauthorised access to, and activity in the Register. However, there are significant gaps in these controls. Addressing these gaps is necessary to ensure the integrity of the information in the Register. BD&M has detailed procedures for all registrations and amendments to the Register, which include processes for entering, assessing and checking the validity and adequacy of source documents. Where BD&M staff have directly input all the data and for amendments to the Register, a second person is required to check all information that has been input before an event can be registered or an amendment can be made. BD&M carries out regular internal audits of all registration processes to check whether procedures are being followed and to address non-compliance where required. BD&M authorises access to the Register and carries out regular access reviews to ensure that users are current and have the appropriate level of access. There are audit trails of all user activity, but BD&M does not routinely monitor these. At the time of the audit, BD&M also did not monitor activity by privileged users who could make unauthorised changes to the Register. Not monitoring this activity created a risk that unauthorised activity in the Register would not be detected. BD&M has no direct oversight of the database environment which houses the Register and relies on DCJ's management of a third-party vendor to provide the assurance it needs over database security. The vendor operates an Information Security Management System that complies with international standards, but neither BD&M nor DCJ has undertaken independent assurance of the effectiveness of the vendor's IT controls. |
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #330 - released 7 April 2020.
Volume Nine 2011 focus on Education and Communities
The report includes comments on financial audits of government agencies in the Education and Communities sectors. The audits of the above entities’ financial statements for the year ended 30 June 2011 resulted in unmodified audit opinions within the Independent Auditor’s Reports. A key finding was that Treasury should consider issuing further guidance to arts and cultural bodies on collection valuation methodologies due to the significance of these assets to the State’s asset base.
Volume Eight 2011 Focus on Transport and Ports
The report includes comments on financial audits of government agencies in the Transport and Ports sectors. The audit of corporations’ financial statements for the year ended 30 June 2011 resulted in unmodified audit opinions within the Independent Auditor’s Reports. A key recommendation from the report is that Sydney Ports Corporation should continue working with other government authorities and industry stakeholders to improve the effectiveness of program initiatives for increasing container freight movements by rail. The Corporation should review the underlying causes hindering growth in the rail mode and develop and implement strategies to address the unfavourable trend.
Volume Six 2011 focus on Environment, Water and Regional Infrastructure
The Environment Protection Authority’s expenditure for the financial year 2010/11 was $92 million - $76 million of this was for environment protection and regulation. The Office of Environment and Heritage and the Environment Protection Authority commenced 145 prosecutions for environmental offences and 106 were completed in the financial year 2010/11, down from the 134 prosecutions completed in 2009/10. Financial penalties for 2010/11 totalled $969,000 down from $1,403,000 in 2009/10. The average fine decreased from $10,468 in 2009/10 to $9,141 in 2010/11.
