Reports
Actions for Service NSW's handling of personal information
Service NSW's handling of personal information
The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining the effectiveness of Service NSW’s handling of customers’ personal information to ensure its privacy.
The audit found that Service NSW is not effectively handling personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy. Service NSW continues to use business processes that pose a risk to the privacy of personal information. This includes the routine emailing of personal information between Service NSW service centres and other agencies, which is one of the processes that contributed to the data breach earlier this year. The audit found that previously identified risks and recommended solutions had not been implemented on a timely basis.
The Auditor-General made eight recommendations aimed at ensuring improved processes, technologies, and governance arrangements for how Service NSW handles customers’ personal information.
The Hon. Victor Dominello, MP, Minister for Customer Service, requested this audit under section 27(B)(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 following public reports in May 2020 of a cyber security attack which had led to a breach of Service NSW customer information. This audit also included the Department of Customer Service which supports Service NSW with privacy, risk and governance functions.
Service NSW was established in 2013 with the intention that it would, over time, 'become the primary interaction point for customers accessing New South Wales Government transaction services'.
Service NSW's functions are set out in the Service NSW (One stop Access to Government Services) Act 2013. This legislation allows for other NSW Government agencies to delegate to and enter into agreements with the Chief Executive Officer of Service NSW in order for Service NSW to undertake service functions for the agency.
Service NSW now has agreements with 36 NSW Government client agencies to facilitate over 1,200 types of interactions and transactions for the community.
The nature of each agreement between Service NSW and its client agencies varies. Some client agencies have delegated authority to allow Service NSW staff to conduct transactions on their behalf in the agencies' systems. Other arrangements do not include the same degree of delegation. In these cases, Service NSW provides services such as responding to enquiries and validating documents.
In addition, Service NSW conducts transactions for its own programs, such as the Seniors Card. Personal information for these programs, as well as information for customers' MyServiceNSW accounts, are stored by Service NSW on its Salesforce Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system.
In March 2020, Service NSW suffered two cyber security attacks in short succession. Technical analysis undertaken by the Department of Customer Service (DCS) concluded that these attacks resulted from a phishing exercise through which external threat actors gained access to the email accounts of 47 staff members. These attacks resulted in the breach of a large amount of personal customer information that was contained in these email accounts. See Section 1.1 for further details.
This audit is being conducted in response to a request from the Hon. Victor Dominello, Minister for Customer Service, under section 27B(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983. Minister Dominello requested that the Auditor General conduct a performance audit in relation to Service NSW's handling of sensitive customer and business information.
This audit assessed how effectively Service NSW handles personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy.
It addressed the following:
- Does Service NSW have processes and governance in place to identify and manage risks to the privacy of personal customer and business information?
- Does Service NSW have policies, processes and systems in place that support the effective handling of personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy?
- Has Service NSW effectively implemented its policies, processes and systems for managing personal customer and business information?
ConclusionService NSW is not effectively handling personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy. It continues to use business processes that pose a risk to the privacy of personal information. These include routinely emailing personal customer information to client agencies, which is one of the processes that contributed to the March 2020 data breach. Previously identified risks and recommended solutions had not been implemented on a timely basis.Service NSW identifies privacy as a strategic risk in both its Risk Management Guideline and enterprise risk register and sets out a zero level appetite for privacy risk in its risk appetite statement. That said, the governance, policies, and processes established by Service NSW to mitigate privacy risk are not effective in ensuring the privacy of personal customer and business information. While Service NSW had risk identification and management processes in place at the time of the March 2020 data breach, these did not prevent the breach occurring. Some of the practices that contributed to the data breach are still being followed by Service NSW staff. For example, business processes still require Service NSW staff to scan and email personal information to some client agencies. The lack of multi factor authentication has been identified as another key contributing factor to the March 2020 data breach as this enabled the external threat actors to gain access to staff email accounts once they had obtained the user account details through a phishing exercise. Service NSW had identified the lack of multi factor authentication on its webmail platform as a risk more than a year prior to the breach and had committed to addressing this by June 2019. It was not implemented until after the breach occurred. There are weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system, which holds the personal information of over four million NSW residents.Internal audits carried out by Service NSW, including one completed in August 2020, have identified significant weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce CRM system. These include deficiencies in the management of role based access, monitoring and audit of user access, and partitioning of program specific transaction information. These deficiencies create an increased risk of unauthorised access to the personal information of over four million customers held in the system. Lines of responsibility for meeting privacy obligations are not clearly drawn between Service NSW and its client agencies.Service NSW has agreements in place with client agencies. However, the agreements lack detail and clarity about the roles and responsibilities of the agencies in relation to the collection, storage and security of customer's personal information. This lack of clarity raises the risk that privacy obligations will become confused and missed between the agencies. Service NSW carries out privacy impact assessments for major new projects but does not routinely review existing processes and systems.Service NSW carries out privacy impact assessments as part of its routine processes for implementing major new projects, ensuring that privacy management is considered as part of project design. Service NSW does not regularly undertake privacy impact assessments or reviews of existing or legacy processes and systems, which has resulted in some processes continuing despite posing significant risks to the privacy of personal information, such as the scanning, emailing, and storing of identification documents. |
1. Key findings
Service NSW identifies privacy risks, but the controls and processes it put in place to mitigate these privacy risks were not adequate to prevent or limit the extent of the data breach that occurred in March 2020
Service NSW’s approach to risk management is framed by its Risk Management Guideline, which defines 'privacy and compliance' as one of the key types of risk for the agency. Service NSW's enterprise risk register identifies four strategic privacy related risks. Service NSW has set out a zero level appetite for privacy risk in its risk appetite statement.
Service NSW has assessed the adequacy of its controls for privacy risks as needing improvement. To be fully effective, the Risk Management Guideline says that these controls should have a focus that is ‘largely preventative and address the root causes’.
One of the business processes that was a key contributing factor to the data breach was the emailing of personal information by Service NSW staff to client agencies.
This process had been identified as a risk prior to the breach and some steps had been put in place to mitigate the risk. In particular, staff were required to manually delete emails that contained personal information. However, these measures were ineffective in preventing the breach, as the external threat actors still gained access to 47 staff email accounts that contained a large amount of personal information.
It is unclear why Service NSW did not effectively mitigate this risk prior to the breaches. However, Service NSW has advised that it implemented measures in June and October 2020 to automatically archive emails likely to contain personal information. This is expected to limit the quantity of information retained in email accounts for extended periods.
Service NSW has not put in place any technical or other solutions to avoid Service NSW staff having to scan and email personal information to some client agencies. Urgent action is needed to remove the requirement for staff to email personal information to client agencies, thereby mitigating the risk inherent in sending and storing this information using email.
There are weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce CRM system, which holds the personal information of over four million customers
There are weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce CRM system. These weaknesses include deficiencies in governance of role based access, monitoring and audit of staff access, and partitioning of program specific transaction information. These deficiencies create an increased risk of unauthorised access to the personal information of over four million customers which is stored in this system.
In addition, there is an absence of important controls to safeguard customers' privacy, such as multi factor authentication and reviewable logs of access history to their information. Such controls, when properly implemented, would enhance the control that customers are able to exercise over their personal information.
A privacy impact assessment conducted on Service NSW’s Salesforce CRM system in 2015 recommended that the system include the ability for customers to review access history to their personal information, as well as the option for customers to apply multi factor authentication to their accounts. While both these recommendations appeared positively received by Service NSW, neither have been implemented.
Since its inception, Service NSW’s use of Salesforce has extended to storing transaction data, particularly for transactions for which Service NSW is responsible, such as the Seniors Card. It also holds details of over four million MyServiceNSW account holders, including name, email address and phone number, and optional address details. It was not originally intended for the system to hold this volume and nature of customer information.
Lines of responsibility for meeting privacy obligations are unclear between Service NSW and its client agencies
Service NSW's privacy management plan does not clearly set out the privacy obligations of Service NSW and its client agencies. It sets out that 'compliance with the privacy principles will primarily be the responsibility of that [client] agency'. However, Service NSW has its own obligations under the security principles of the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (PPIP Act) to take reasonable steps to prevent unauthorised access to personal information, which is not made clear in the privacy management plan.
The agreements between Service NSW and client agencies reviewed for this audit only include general and high level references to privacy. Most do not include details of each parties' privacy responsibilities such as: which agency will provide the customer with a privacy notice explaining how their personal information will be handled, how personal information will be kept secure, how long Service NSW will retain information, what processes will be followed for internal reviews, and what specific planning is in place to respond to data breaches.
Service NSW's privacy management plan has not been updated to include new programs and governance changes
Service NSW's privacy management plan includes most of the matters required by law or good practice, with some exceptions. It does not explain any exemptions that the agency commonly relies on under the PPIP Act and does not address any health information that Service NSW may handle. It had also not been updated to reflect governance changes and the fact that, at the time this audit commenced, Service NSW was disclosing the content of internal review applications (the formal expression for 'complaints') to the Department of Customer Service (DCS). These governance changes were part of the centralisation of Service NSW's corporate support functions into DCS in late 2019, though internal review staff were seconded back into Service NSW during the course of this audit.
The current July 2019 privacy management plan has also not been updated since the rollout of a number of major new initiatives in 2020. These include 2019–20 bushfire emergency recovery initiatives (such as small business grants) and COVID 19 pandemic response initiatives (such as small business grants, border permits and the COVID safe check in app).
Service NSW routinely conducts privacy impact assessments for new initiatives, though privacy risks remain in legacy systems and processes
Service NSW routinely conducts privacy impact assessments for major new initiatives and the assessments reviewed for this audit largely accorded with good practice guidance.
Service NSW does not routinely review existing processes and systems to ensure that they are effective in ensuring the privacy of customer personal information. Business processes that create the highest risk to privacy, such as emailing of personal information, are more common in these longstanding legacy systems.
Service NSW's significant and rapid growth has outpaced the establishment of a robust control environment which has exacerbated privacy risks
Since it was established in 2013, Service NSW has experienced significant growth in the number and diversity of the types of transactions it provides, as well as the number of client agencies with which it works. The pace and extent of this growth has contributed to important controls not being properly implemented on a timely basis, which has heightened privacy risks, particularly in regard to existing, legacy systems and processes.
The pace of change and increasing demand for new program implementation has limited the opportunity for Service NSW, in collaboration with its client agencies, to revisit and redesign legacy business practices which pose a greater privacy risk. This includes the scanning and emailing of personal information.
While 2019–20 has seen additional demands placed on Service NSW in responding to the 2019–20 bushfire emergency and COVID 19 pandemic, it is the nature of the agency’s work that it operates in a fast paced and complex environment, where it is required to respond to multiple client agencies and stakeholders. Ensuring customer privacy should be integral to Service NSW’s business as usual operations.
2. Recommendations
Service NSW commissioned a number of external reviews and investigations stemming from the data breaches. The Auditor General's recommendations below have taken these other reviews into account. In order to offer assurance that it is appropriately protecting the privacy of its customers, Service NSW should address the full breadth of findings and recommendations made across all relevant reviews.
As a matter of urgency, Service NSW should:
1. in consultation with relevant client agencies and the Department of Customer Service, implement a solution for a secure method of transferring personal information between Service NSW and client agencies
2. review the need to store scanned copies of personal information and, if still required, implement a more secure method of storing this information and regular deletion of material.
By March 2021, Service NSW should:
3. ensure that all new agreements entered into with client agencies from 1 April 2021 address the deficiencies identified in this audit, including that they provide clarity on:
- the content and provision of privacy collection notices
- the terms by which personal information will be retained, stored, archived, and disposed of when no longer required
- steps that will be taken by each agency to ensure that personal information is kept secure
- the circumstances in which, and processes by which, applications for internal review will be referred by one agency to the other
- how identified breaches of privacy will be handled between agencies
4. in collaboration with the Department of Customer Service, review its privacy management plan to address the deficiencies raised in this audit, including:
- to clarify Service NSW's understanding of how responsibility for meeting privacy obligations are delineated between Service NSW and client agencies
- to better reflect the full scope and complexity of personal information handled by Service NSW
- to better explain how applications for internal review are handled between Service NSW and the Department of Customer Service
- to ensure regular ongoing review, either according to a schedule or when Service NSW experiences substantial change to its programs and handling of personal information
5. in consultation with the Department of Customer Service, review its policies and processes for the management of privacy risks, including to:
- ensure that there are appropriate mechanisms to escalate identified privacy risks from business units to the Executive Leadership Team
- ensure that there are action plans to address strategic privacy risks that are assessed as having ineffective controls.
By June 2021, Service NSW should:
6. address deficiencies in the controls over, and security for, its Salesforce customer relationship management and related systems that hold customer personal information, including:
- establish policies and processes for regular access reviews and monitoring of user activity in these systems, including for privileged users
- enable partitioning and role based access restrictions to personal information collected for different programs
- provide customers the choice to use multi factor authentication to further secure their MyServiceNSW accounts
- enable customers to view the transaction history of their personal information to detect possible mishandling.
By December 2021, Service NSW should:
7. ensure that all existing agreements with client agencies address the deficiencies identified in this audit, including that they provide clarity on:
- the content and provision of privacy collection notices
- the terms by which personal information will be retained, stored, archived, and disposed of when no longer required
- steps that will be taken by each agency to ensure that personal information is kept secure
- the circumstances in which, and processes by which, applications for internal review will be referred by one agency to the other
- how identified breaches of privacy will be handled between agencies
8. carry out a risk assessment of all processes, systems and transactions that involve the handling of personal information and undertake a privacy impact assessment for those that:
- are identified as high risk and have not previously had a privacy impact assessment
- have had major changes or updates since the privacy impact assessment was completed.
Appendix one – Responses from agencies
Appendix two – About the audit
Copyright notice
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Actions for One TAFE NSW modernisation program
One TAFE NSW modernisation program
The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining the management of the One TAFE NSW modernisation program.
In 2016, the Government released 'A Vision for TAFE NSW' which stated that TAFE NSW needed to become more flexible, efficient and competitive. It set out the need to progressively reduce significant cost inefficiencies, including by moving away from separate institutes to a single institute model. TAFE NSW established the One TAFE NSW modernisation program to deliver on that vision.
The Auditor General found that the One TAFE NSW modernisation program did not deliver against its key objectives within planned timeframes. The modernisation program originally aimed to realise $250 million in annual savings from 2018–19. Because of project delays and higher than expected transition costs, TAFE NSW did not meet the original savings target. TAFE NSW has made progress on key elements of the program and anticipates that savings will be realised in coming years.
The report makes two recommendations to improve governance arrangements for delivering on commercial objectives and increasing transparency of non commercial activities.
The report also identifies a series of lessons for future government transformation programs.
TAFE NSW is the public provider of Vocational Education and Training (VET) in New South Wales. In 2018, TAFE NSW enrolled 436,000 students in more than 1,200 courses at around 130 locations across the State.
There have been major policy changes impacting TAFE NSW over the past decade. Under the Smart and Skilled reform, TAFE NSW started to compete with other Registered Training Organisations (RTOs) for a share of the student market.
In 2016, the NSW Government released 'A Vision for TAFE NSW'. The Vision stated that a failure to adapt to market circumstances had left TAFE NSW with unsustainable costs and inefficiencies. To address this, TAFE NSW needed to become more flexible, efficient and competitive. It set out that TAFE NSW must progressively reduce significant cost inefficiencies, including by moving away from a model of separate institutes to a One TAFE NSW model. The NSW Government set TAFE NSW a target to achieve savings through implementing the Vision.
TAFE NSW established the One TAFE NSW modernisation program to deliver on that vision. The program initially aimed to deliver savings of $250 million per year from 2018–19, but this target was reviewed and updated as the program was being delivered.
This audit assessed whether TAFE NSW effectively managed the One TAFE NSW modernisation program to deliver on the NSW Government's vision for TAFE NSW. In making this assessment, the audit examined whether:
- delivery of the program was well planned
- the program was driven by sound governance arrangements
- TAFE NSW is making progress against the intended outcomes of the program.
The audit focused on the effectiveness of planning, governance and reporting arrangements. It examined five projects within the overall modernisation program as case studies.
Conclusion
The One TAFE NSW modernisation program was an ambitious plan to deliver on the NSW Government’s vision for TAFE NSW, while achieving ongoing savings. Several factors contributed to TAFE NSW not effectively managing the program to deliver on planned timeframes and objectives. These factors include unclear expectations of the primary role of TAFE NSW, unrealistic timeframes, undertaking a large number of complex projects concurrently, governance arrangements that were not fit-for-purpose and poor-quality data.
Planning for the modernisation program and its projects was driven by top-down savings targets and pre-determined timeframes. This led to TAFE NSW attempting to deliver a large number of programs concurrently within tight timeframes. Program management capability was underdeveloped at the commencement of the program and this affected the quality of planning for delivery.
There was a lack of clarity around TAFE NSW's primary purpose. Part of the NSW Government's vision for TAFE NSW was for it to be more commercial, competitive and efficient. These objectives were not fully supported by existing legislation. The commercial objectives of the modernisation program conflicted with legislated social objectives for TAFE NSW. TAFE NSW did not have the autonomy to operate like a government-owned business in a market environment. And while TAFE NSW received separate funding to support students facing disadvantage this did not cover the costs of other non-commercial activities undertaken for social purposes, such as delivering uneconomic courses. The role of the TAFE Commission Board was ambiguous during the initial years of the program, which increased reporting requirements and blurred accountabilities for decision-making.
TAFE NSW's Strategic Plan 2016-22 nominated ten key milestones for delivery by January 2019. TAFE NSW has made progress against several important milestones, including that TAFE ‘is a single TAFE NSW brand’ and has 'industry specific TAFE NSW SkillsPoints'. Other key elements have yet to be delivered, including that TAFE NSW achieves 'integrated enterprise-wide business systems'. Because of delays to projects and higher than expected transition costs, TAFE NSW reported that it did not meet the originally targeted $250 million in annual savings for 2018–19 (which was reviewed and updated as the program was being delivered).
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Performance auditing
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #346 - released 17 December 2020
Actions for Central Agencies 2020
Central Agencies 2020
This report analyses the results of our audits of the financial statements of the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet, Customer Service cluster agencies (central agencies), and the Legislature for the year ended 30 June 2020. The table below summarises our key observations.
1. Financial reporting
Audit opinions and timeliness of reporting |
Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the 2019–20 financial statements of central agencies and the Legislature. The audit opinion on the Social and Affordable Housing NSW Fund's compliance with the payment requirements of the Social and Affordable Housing NSW Fund Act 2016 was qualified. All agencies met statutory deadlines for submitting |
Agencies were financially impacted by recent emergency events | The NSW Government allocated $1.4 billion to provide small business support and bushfire recovery relief, support COVID-19 quarantine compliance management, recruit more staff to respond to increased customer demand, and meet additional COVID-19 cleaning requirements. Agencies spent $901 million (64 per cent of the allocated funding) for the financial year ended 30 June 2020. NSW Self Insurance Corporation reported an increase of $850 million in its liability for claims related to emergency events. |
AASB 16 'Leases' resulted in significant changes to agencies' financial position | The implementation of new accounting standards was challenging for many agencies. The New South Wales Government Telecommunications Authority was not well-prepared to implement AASB 16 'Leases' and had not completely assessed contracts that contained leases. This resulted in understatements of leased assets and liabilities by $56 million which were subsequently corrected. |
Implementation of new revenue standards | NSW Treasury did not adequately implement the new revenue standard AASB 1058 ‘Income of Not-for-Profit Entities’ for the Crown Entity. This resulted in understatements of $274 million in opening equity and $254 million to current year revenue, which have been corrected in the final financial statements. |
2. Audit observations
Management letter findings and repeat issues | Our 2019–20 audits identified nine high risk and 122 moderate risk issues across central agencies and the Legislature. The high risk issues were identified in the audits of:
High risk findings include:
Of the 122 moderate risk issues, 36 per cent were repeat issues. The most common repeat issue related to weaknesses in controls over information technology user access administration, which increases the risk of inappropriate access to systems and records. |
Grants administration for disaster relief | Service NSW delivers grants responding to emergency events on behalf of other NSW Public Sector agencies. Since the first grant program commenced in January 2020, Service NSW processed approximately $791 million to NSW citizens and businesses impacted by emergency events for the financial year ended 30 June 2020. A performance audit of grants administration for disaster relief is planned for 2020–21. It will assess whether grants programs administered under the Small Business Support Fund were effectively designed and implemented to provide disaster relief. |
Internal controls at GovConnect NSW service providers require enhancement |
GovConnect NSW provides transactional and information technology services to central agencies. It engages an independent service auditor (service auditor) from the private sector to perform annual assurance reviews of controls at service providers, namely Infosys, Unisys and the Department of Customer Service (DCS). The service auditor issued:
These may impact on the ability of agencies to detect and respond to a cyber incident. Recommendation: We recommend DCS work with GovConnect service providers to resolve the identified control deficiencies as a matter of priority. |
The NSW Public Sector's cyber security resilience needs to improve |
The NSW Cyber Security Policy requires agencies to provide a maturity self-assessment against the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) Essential 8 to the head of the agency and Cyber Security NSW annually. Completed self-assessment returns highlighted limited progress in implementing the Essential 8. Repeat recommendation: Cyber Security NSW and NSW government agencies need to prioritise improvements to their cyber security resilience as a matter of urgency |
Three Insurance and Care NSW (icare) entities had net asset deficiencies at 30 June 2020 | The Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer, NSW Self Insurance Corporation and the Lifetime Care and Support Authority of NSW all had negative net assets at 30 June 2020. These icare entities did not hold sufficient assets to meet the estimated present value of all of their future payment obligations at 30 June 2020. The deterioration in net assets was largely due to increases in outstanding claims liabilities. Notwithstanding the overall net asset deficiencies, the financial statements for these entities were prepared on a going concern basis. This is because future payment obligations are not all due within the next 12 months. Settlement is instead expected to occur over years into the future, depending on the nature of the benefits provided by each scheme. |
icare has not been able to demonstrate that its allocation of costs reflects the actual costs incurred by the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer and other schemes |
Costs are incurred by icare as the 'service entity' of the statutory scheme it administers, and then subsequently recovered from the schemes through 'service fees'. In the absence of documentation supported by robust supporting analysis, there is a risk of the schemes being overcharged, and the allocation of costs being in breach of legislative requirements. Recommendation: icare should ensure its approach to allocating service fees to the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer and the other schemes it manages, is transparent and reflects actual costs. |
icare did not comply with GIPA requirements | icare did not comply with the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (GIPA) contract disclosure requirements in 2019–20 and has not complied for several years. A total of 417 contracts were identified by management as not having been published on the NSW Government’s eTendering website. The final upload of these past contracts occurred on 20 August 2020. |
Implementation of Machinery of Government (MoG) changes | MoG changes impacted the governance and business processes of some agencies. Our audits identified and reported areas for improvement in the consolidation of corporate functions following MoG implementation processes at Infrastructure NSW and in the Customer Service cluster. |
This report provides Parliament and other users of NSW Government central agencies' financial statements and the Legislature's financial statements with the results of our financial audits, observations, analyses, conclusions and recommendations.
Emergency events, such as bushfires, floods and the COVID-19 pandemic significantly impacted agencies in 2019–20. Our findings on nine agencies that were most impacted by recent emergency events are included throughout this report.
Refer to Appendix one for the names of all central agencies and Appendix four for the nine agencies most impacted by emergency events.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely. This chapter outlines our audit observations on the financial reporting of central agencies and the Legislature for 2020, including the financial implications from recent emergency events.
Section highlights
|
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.
This chapter outlines:
- our observations and insights from the financial statement audits of agencies in the central agencies and the Legislature
- our assessment of how well agencies adapted their systems, policies, procedures and governance arrangements in response to recent emergencies.
Section highlights
|
Actions for Waste levy and grants for waste infrastructure
Waste levy and grants for waste infrastructure
The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today that examined the effectiveness of the waste levy and grants for waste infrastructure in minimising the amount of waste sent to landfill and increasing recycling rates.
The audit found that the waste levy has a positive impact on diverting waste from landfill. However, while the levy rates increase each year in line with the consumer price index, the EPA has not conducted a review since 2009 to confirm whether they are set at the optimal level. The audit also found that there were no objective and transparent criteria for which local government areas should pay the levy, and the list of levied local government areas has not been reviewed since 2014.
Grant funding programs for waste infrastructure administered by the EPA and the Environmental Trust have supported increases in recycling capacity. However, these grant programs are not guided by a clear strategy for investment in waste infrastructure.
The Auditor-General made six recommendations aimed at ensuring the waste levy is as effective as possible at meeting its objectives and ensuring funding for waste infrastructure is contributing effectively to recycling and waste diversion targets.
Overall, waste generation in New South Wales (NSW) is increasing. This leads to an increasing need to manage waste in ways that reduce the environmental impact of waste and promote the efficient use of resources. In 2014, the NSW Government set targets relating to recycling rates and diversion of waste from landfill, to be achieved by 2021–22. The NSW Waste and Resource Recovery (WARR) Strategy 2014–21 identifies the waste levy, a strong compliance regime, and investment in recycling infrastructure as key tools for achieving these waste targets.
This audit assessed the effectiveness of the NSW Government in minimising waste sent to landfill and increasing recycling rates. The audit focused on the waste levy, which is paid by waste facility operators when waste is sent to landfill, and grant programs that fund infrastructure for waste reuse and recycling.
The waste levy is regulated by the Environment Protection Authority (EPA) and is generally paid when waste is disposed in landfill. The waste levy rates are set by the NSW Government and prescribed in the Protection of Environment Operations (Waste) Regulation 2014. As part of its broader role in reviewing the regulatory framework for managing waste and recycling, the EPA can provide advice to the government on the operation of the waste levy.
The purpose of the waste levy is to act as an incentive for waste generators to reduce, re-use or recycle waste by increasing the cost of sending waste to landfill. In 2019–20, around $750 million was collected through the waste levy in NSW. The government spends approximately one third of the revenue raised through the waste levy on waste and environmental programs.
One of the waste programs funded through the one third allocation of the waste levy is Waste Less, Recycle More (WLRM). This initiative funds smaller grant programs that focus on specific aspects of waste management. This audit focused on five grant programs that fund projects that provide new or enhanced waste infrastructure such as recycling facilities. Four of these programs were administered by the Environmental Trust and one by the EPA.
Conclusion
The waste levy has a positive impact on diverting waste from landfill. However, aspects of the EPA's administration of the waste levy could be improved, including the frequency of its modelling of the waste levy impact and coverage, and the timeliness of reporting. Grant funding programs have supported increases in recycling capacity but are not guided by a clear strategy for investment in waste infrastructure which would help effectively target them to where waste infrastructure is most needed. Data published by the EPA indicates that the NSW Government is on track to meet the recycling target for construction and demolition waste, but recycling targets for municipal solid waste and commercial and industrial waste are unlikely to be met.
Waste levy
The waste levy rate, including a schedule of annual increases to 2016, was set by the NSW Government in 2009. Since 2016, the waste levy rate has increased in line with the consumer price index (CPI). The EPA has not conducted recent modelling to test whether the waste levy is set at the optimal level to achieve its objectives. The waste levy operation was last reviewed in 2012, although some specific aspects of the waste levy have been reviewed more recently, including reviews of waste levy rates for two types of waste. The waste levy is applied at different rates across the state. Decisions about which local government areas (LGAs) are subject to the levy, and which rate each LGA pays, were made in 2009 and potential changes were considered but not implemented in 2014. Currently, there are no objective and transparent criteria for determining which LGAs pay the levy. The EPA collects waste data from waste operators. This data has improved since 2015, but published data is at least one year out of date which limits its usefulness to stakeholders when making decisions relating to waste management.
Grants for waste infrastructure
All state funding for new and enhanced waste infrastructure in NSW is administered through grants to councils and commercial waste operators. The government's Waste and Resource Recovery (WARR) Strategy 2014–21 includes few priorities for waste infrastructure and there is no other waste infrastructure strategy in place to guide investment. The absence of a formal strategy to guide infrastructure investment in NSW limits the ability of the State Government to develop a shared understanding between planners, councils and the waste industry about waste infrastructure requirements and priorities. The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment is currently developing a 20-year waste strategy and there is an opportunity for the government to take a more direct role in planning the type, location and timing of waste infrastructure needed in NSW.
The grants administration procedures used for the grant programs reviewed in this audit were well designed. However, we identified some gaps in risk management, record-keeping and consistency of information provided to applicants and assessment teams. In four of the five programs we examined, there was no direct alignment between program objectives and the NSW Government's overall waste targets.
Achievement of the 2014–21 state targets for waste and resource recovery (WARR targets) is reliant in part on the availability of infrastructure that supports waste diversion and recycling. The state WARR targets dependent on waste infrastructure are:
- Increase recycling rates to 70 per cent for municipal solid waste and commercial and industrial waste, and 80 per cent for construction and demolition waste.
- Increase waste diverted from landfill to 75 per cent.
A further target — manage problem waste better by establishing or upgrading 86 drop-off facilities or services for managing household problem wastes state-wide — is dependent on accessible community waste drop-off facilities across NSW.
Exhibit 7 identifies the five grant programs that provide funding for new or enhanced waste infrastructure to increase capacity for reuse or recycling of waste. All five of these programs were examined in the audit.
In addition to the grant programs shown in Exhibit 7, other programs provide funding for infrastructure, but at a smaller scale. Examples of these include:
- Bin Trim which provides rebates to small businesses for small scale recycling equipment such as cardboard and soft plastic balers.
- Litter grants which provide funding for litter bins.
- Weighbridges grants for installation of a weighbridge at waste facilities.
- Landfill consolidation and environmental improvement grants for rural councils to replace old landfills with transfer stations or to improve the infrastructure at landfill sites.
Appendix one – Responses from audited agencies
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #343 - released 26 November 2020
Actions for CBD South East Sydney Light Rail: follow-up performance audit
CBD South East Sydney Light Rail: follow-up performance audit
This is a follow-up to the Auditor-General's November 2016 report on the CBD South East Sydney Light Rail project. This follow-up report assessed whether Transport for NSW has updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits.
The audit found that Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public.
The Auditor-General reports that the total cost of the project will exceed $3.1 billion, which is above the revised cost of $2.9 billion published in November 2019. $153.84 million of additional costs are due to omitted costs for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays.
The report makes four recommendations to Transport for NSW to publicly report on the final project cost, the updated expected project benefits, the benefits achieved in the first year of operations and the average weekly journey times.
The CBD and South East Light Rail is a 12 km light rail network for Sydney. It extends from Circular Quay along George Street to Central Station, through Surry Hills to Moore Park, then to Kensington and Kingsford via Anzac Parade and Randwick via Alison Road and High Street.
Transport for NSW (TfNSW) is responsible for planning, procuring and delivering the Central Business District and South East Light Rail (CSELR) project. In December 2014, TfNSW entered into a public private partnership with ALTRAC Light Rail as the operating company (OpCo) responsible for delivering, operating and maintaining the CSELR. OpCo engaged Alstom and Acciona, who together form its Design and Construct Contractor (D&C).
On 14 December 2019, passenger services started on the line between Circular Quay and Randwick. Passenger services on the line between Circular Quay and Kingsford commenced on 3 April 2020.
In November 2016, the Auditor-General published a performance audit report on the CSELR project. The audit found that TfNSW would deliver the CSELR at a higher cost with lower benefits than in the approved business case, and recommended that TfNSW update and consolidate information about project costs and benefits and ensure the information is readily accessible to the public.
In November 2018, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) examined TfNSW's actions taken in response to our 2016 performance audit report on the CSELR project. The PAC recommended that the Auditor-General consider undertaking a follow-up audit on the CSELR project. The purpose of this follow-up performance audit is to assess whether TfNSW has effectively updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits for the CSELR project.
Conclusion
Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated CSLER project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public. In line with the NSW Government Benefits Realisation Management Framework, TfNSW intends to measure benefits after the project is completed and has not updated the expected project benefits since April 2015.Between February 2015 and December 2019, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) regularly updated capital expenditure costs for the CSELR in internal monthly financial performance and risk reports. These reports did not include all the costs incurred by TfNSW to manage and commission the CSELR project.
Omitted costs of $153.84 million for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays will bring the current estimated total cost of the CSELR project to $3.147 billion.
From February 2015, TfNSW did not regularly provide the financial performance and risk reports to key CSELR project governance bodies. TfNSW publishes information on project costs and benefits on the Sydney Light Rail website. However, the information on project costs has not always been accurate or current.
TfNSW is working with OpCo partners to deliver the expected journey time benefits. A key benefit defined in the business plan was that bus services would be reduced owing to transfer of demand to the light rail - entailing a saving. However, TfNSW reports that the full expected benefit of changes to bus services will not be realised due to bus patronage increasing above forecasted levels.
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – Governance and reporting arrangements for the CSELR
Appendix three – 2018 CSELR governance changes
Appendix four – About the audit
Appendix five – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #335 - released 11 June 2020
Actions for Train station crowding
Train station crowding
This report focuses on how Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains manage crowding at selected metropolitan train stations.
The audit found that while Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, it does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. Sydney Trains 'do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed’, the Auditor-General said.
Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or station entries before crowding reaches unsafe levels or when it impacts on-time running. Assuming rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, causing customer delay. ‘Restricting customer access to platforms or station entries is not a sustainable approach to manage station crowding’, said the Auditor-General.
The Auditor-General made seven recommendations to improve Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains' management of station crowding. Transport for NSW have accepted these recommendations on behalf of the Transport cluster.
Public transport patronage has been impacted by COVID-19. This audit was conducted before these impacts occurred.
Sydney Trains patronage has increased by close to 34 per cent over the last five years, and Transport for NSW (TfNSW) expects the growth in patronage to continue over the next 30 years. As patronage increases there are more passengers entering and exiting stations, moving within stations to change services, and waiting on platforms. As a result, some Sydney metropolitan train stations are becoming increasingly crowded.
There are three main causes of station crowding:
- patronage growth exceeding the current capacity limits of the rail network
- service disruptions
- special events.
Crowds can inhibit movement, cause discomfort and can lead to increased health and safety risks to customers. In the context of a train service, unmanaged crowds can affect service operation as trains spend longer at platforms waiting for customers to alight and board services which can cause service delays. Crowding can also prevent customers from accessing services.
Our 2017 performance audit, ‘Passenger Rail Punctuality’, found that rail agencies would find it hard to maintain train punctuality after 2019 unless they significantly increased the capacity of the network to carry trains and people. TfNSW and Sydney Trains have plans to improve the network to move more passengers. These plans are set out in strategies such as More Trains, More Services and in the continued implementation of new infrastructure such as the Sydney Metro. Since 2017, TfNSW and Sydney Trains have introduced 1,500 more weekly services to increase capacity. Additional network capacity improvements are in progress for delivery from 2022 onwards.
In the meantime, TfNSW and Sydney Trains need to use other ways of managing crowding at train stations until increased capacity comes on line.
This audit examined how effectively TfNSW and Sydney Trains are managing crowding at selected metropolitan train stations in the short and medium term. In doing so, the audit examined how TfNSW and Sydney Trains know whether there is a crowding problem at stations and how they manage that crowding.
TfNSW is the lead agency for transport in NSW. TfNSW is responsible for setting the standard working timetable that Sydney Trains must implement. Sydney Trains is responsible for operating and maintaining the Sydney metropolitan heavy rail passenger service. This includes operating, staffing and maintaining most metropolitan stations. Sydney Trains’ overall responsibility is to run a safe rail network to timetable.
ConclusionSydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, but does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. TfNSW and Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers, but do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed. TfNSW is delivering a program to influence demand for transport in key precincts but the effectiveness of this program and its impact on station crowding is unclear as Transport for NSW has not evaluated the outcomes of the program. TfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. Data and observation on dwell time, which is the time a train waits at a platform for customers to get on and off trains, inform the development of operational approaches to manage crowding at stations. Sydney Trains has KPIs on reliability, punctuality and customer experience and use these to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. TfNSW and Sydney Trains only formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events. Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for crowd management to Customer Area Managers, who rely on frontline Sydney Trains staff to understand how crowding affects individual stations. Station staff at identified key metropolitan train stations have developed customer management plans (also known as crowd management plans). However, Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring and evaluation of these plans and does not systematically collect data on when station staff activate crowding interventions under these plans. Sydney Trains stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services. Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or stations before crowding reaches unsafe levels, or when it impacts on-time running. As rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will need to increase its use of interventions to manage crowding. As Sydney Trains restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, it is likely these customers will experience delays caused by these interventions. Since 2015, TfNSW has been delivering the 'Travel Choices' program which aims to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services in key precincts. TfNSW is unable to provide data demonstrating the overall effectiveness of this program and the impact the program has on distributing public transport usage out of peak AM and PM times. TfNSW and Sydney Trains continue to explore initiatives to specifically address crowd management. |
ConclusionTfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. There are no key performance indicators directly related to station crowding. Sydney Trains uses performance indicators on reliability, punctuality and customer experience to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. Sydney Trains does not have a routine process for identifying whether crowding contributed to minor safety incidents. TfNSW and Sydney Trains formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events. |
ConclusionSydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a strategic risk but does not have an overarching strategy to manage station crowding. Sydney Trains' stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services. Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers but does not have sufficient oversight to know that station crowding is effectively managed. Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring or evaluation of crowd management plans at key metropolitan train stations. The use of crowding interventions is likely to increase due to increasing patronage, causing more customers to experience delays directly caused by these activities. TfNSW and Sydney Trains have developed interventions to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services but are yet to evaluate these interventions. As such, their impact on managing station crowding is unclear. |
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – Sydney rail network
Appendix three – Rail services contract
Appendix four – Crowding pedestrian modelling
Appendix five – Airport Link stations case study
Appendix six – About the audit
Appendix seven – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #333 - released 30 April 2020
Actions for Internal Controls and Governance 2017
Internal Controls and Governance 2017
Agencies need to do more to address risks posed by information technology (IT).
Effective internal controls and governance systems help agencies to operate efficiently and effectively and comply with relevant laws, standards and policies. We assessed how well agencies are implementing these systems, and highlighted opportunities for improvement.
1. Overall trends
New and repeat findings |
The number of reported financial and IT control deficiencies has fallen, but many previously reported findings remain unresolved. |
High risk findings |
Poor systems implementations contributed to the seven high risk internal control deficiencies that could affect agencies. |
Common findings |
Poor IT controls are the most commonly reported deficiency across agencies, followed by governance issues relating to cyber security, capital projects, continuous disclosure, shared services, ethics and risk management maturity. |
2. Information Technology
IT security |
Only two-thirds of agencies are complying with their own policies on IT security. Agencies need to tighten user access and password controls. |
Cyber security |
Agencies do not have a common view on what constitutes a cyber attack, which limits understanding the extent of the cyber security threat. |
Other IT systems |
Agencies can improve their disaster recovery plans and the change control processes they use when updating IT systems. |
3. Asset Management
Capital investment |
Agencies report delays delivering against the significant increase in their budgets for capital projects. |
Capital projects |
Agencies are underspending their capital budgets and some can improve capital project governance. |
Asset disposals |
Eleven per cent of agencies were required to sell their real property through Property NSW but didn’t. And eight per cent of agencies can improve their asset disposal processes. |
4. Governance
Governance arrangements |
Sixty-four per cent of agencies’ disclosure policies support communication of key performance information and prompt public reporting of significant issues. |
Shared services |
Fifty-nine per cent of agencies use shared services, yet 14 per cent do not have service level agreements in place and 20 per cent can strengthen the performance standards they set. |
5. Ethics and Conduct
Ethical framework |
Agencies can reinforce their ethical frameworks by updating code‑of‑conduct policies and publishing a Statement of Business Ethics. |
Conflicts of interest |
All agencies we reviewed have a code of conduct, but they can still improve the way they update and manage their codes to reduce the risk of fraud and unethical behaviour. |
6. Risk Management
Risk management maturity |
All agencies have implemented risk management frameworks, but with varying levels of maturity. |
Risk management elements |
Many agencies can improve risk registers and strengthen their risk culture, particularly in the way that they report risks to their lead agency. |
This report covers the findings and recommendations from our 2016–17 financial audits related to the internal controls and governance of the 39 largest agencies (refer to Appendix three) in the NSW public sector. These agencies represent about 95 per cent of total expenditure for all NSW agencies and were considered to be a large enough group to identify common issues and insights.
The findings in this report should not be used to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of individual agency control environments and governance arrangements. Specific financial reporting, controls and service delivery comments are included in the individual 2017 cluster financial audit reports tabled in Parliament from October to December 2017.
This new report offers strategic insight on the public sector as a whole
In previous years, we have commented on internal control and governance issues in the volumes we published on each ‘cluster’ or agency sector, generally between October and December. To add further value, we then commented more broadly about the issues identified for the public sector as a whole at the start of the following year.
This year, we have created this report dedicated to internal controls and governance. This will help Parliament to understand broad issues affecting the public sector, and help agencies to compare their own performance against that of their peers.
Without strong control measures and governance systems, agencies face increased risks in their financial management and service delivery. If they do not, for example, properly authorise payments or manage conflicts of interest, they are at greater risk of fraud. If they do not have strong information technology (IT) systems, sensitive and trusted information may be at risk of unauthorised access and misuse.
These problems can in turn reduce the efficiency of agency operations, increase their costs and reduce the quality of the services they deliver.
Our audits do not review every control or governance measure every year. We select a range of measures, and report on those that present the most significant risks that agencies should mitigate. This report divides these into the following six areas:
- Overall trends
- Information technology
- Asset management
- Governance
- Ethics and conduct
- Risk management.
Internal controls are processes, policies and procedures that help agencies to:
- operate effectively and efficiently
- produce reliable financial reports
- comply with laws and regulations.
This chapter outlines the overall trends for agency controls and governance issues, including the number of findings, level of risk and the most common deficiencies we found across agencies. The rest of this volume then illustrates this year’s controls and governance findings in more detail.
Issues |
Recommendations |
1.1 New and repeat findings |
|
The number of internal control deficiencies reduced over the past three years, but new higher-risk information technology (IT) control deficiencies were reported in 2016–17. Deficiencies repeated from previous years still make up a sizeable proportion of all internal control deficiencies. |
Recommendation Agencies should focus on emerging IT risks, but also manage new IT risks, reduce existing IT control deficiencies, and address repeat internal control deficiencies on a more timely basis. |
1.2 High risk findings |
|
We found seven high risk internal control deficiencies, which might significantly affect agencies. |
Recommendation Agencies should rectify high risk internal control deficiencies as a priority |
1.3 Common findings |
|
The most common internal control deficiencies related to poor or absent IT controls. We found some common governance deficiencies across multiple agencies. |
Recommendation Agencies should coordinate actions and resources to help rectify common IT control and governance deficiencies. |
Information technology (IT) has become increasingly important for government agencies’ financial reporting and to deliver their services efficiently and effectively. Our audits reviewed whether agencies have effective controls in place over their IT systems. We found that IT security remains the source of many control weakness in agencies.
Issues | Recommendations |
2.1 IT security |
|
User access administration While 95 per cent of agencies have policies about user access, about two-thirds were compliant with these policies. Agencies can improve how they grant, change and end user access to their systems. |
Recommendation Agencies should strengthen user access administration to prevent inappropriate access to sensitive systems. Agencies should:
|
Privileged access Sixty-eight per cent of agencies do not adequately manage who can access their information systems, and many do not sufficiently monitor or restrict privileged access. |
Recommendation Agencies should tighten privileged user access to protect their information systems and reduce the risks of data misuse and fraud. Agencies should ensure they:
|
Password controls Forty-one per cent of agencies did not meet either their own standards or minimum standards for password controls. |
Recommendation Agencies should review and enforce password controls to strengthen security over sensitive systems. As a minimum, password parameters should include:
|
2.2 Cyber Security |
|
Cyber security framework Agencies do not have a common view on what constitutes a cyber attack, which limits understanding the extent of the cyber security threat. |
Recommendation The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should revisit its existing framework to develop a shared cyber security terminology and strengthen the current reporting requirements for cyber incidents. |
Cyber security strategies While 82 per cent of agencies have dedicated resources to address cyber security, they can strengthen their strategies, expertise and staff awareness. |
Recommendations The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should:
Agencies should ensure they adequately resource staff dedicated to cyber security. |
2.3 Other IT systems |
|
Change control processes Some agencies need to improve change control processes to avoid unauthorised or inaccurate system changes. |
Recommendation Agencies should consistently perform user acceptance testing before system upgrades and changes. They should also properly approve and document changes to IT systems. |
Disaster recovery planning Agencies can do more to adequately assess critical business systems to enforce effective disaster recovery plans. This includes reviewing and testing their plans on a timely basis. |
Recommendation Agencies should complete business impact analyses to strengthen disaster recovery plans, then regularly test and update their plans. |
Agency service delivery relies on developing and renewing infrastructure assets such as schools, hospitals, roads, or public housing. Agencies are currently investing significantly in new assets. Agencies need to manage the scale and volume of current capital projects in order to deliver new infrastructure on time, on budget and realise the intended benefits. We found agencies can improve how they:
- manage their major capital projects
- dispose of existing assets.
Issues | Recommendations or conclusions |
3.1 Capital investment |
|
Capital asset investment ratios Most agencies report high capital investment ratios, but one-third of agencies’ capital investment ratios are less than one. |
Recommendation Agencies with high capital asset investment ratios should ensure their project management and delivery functions have the capacity to deliver their current and forward work programs. |
Volume of capital spending Most agencies have significant forward spending commitments for capital projects. However, agencies’ actual capital expenditure has been below budget for the last three years. |
Conclusion The significant increase in capital budget underspends warrant investigation, particularly where this has resulted from slower than expected delivery of projects from previous years. |
3.2 Capital projects |
|
Major capital projects Agencies’ major capital projects were underspent by 13 percent against their budgets. |
Conclusion The causes of agency budget underspends warrant investigation to ensure the NSW Government’s infrastructure commitment is delivered on time. |
Capital project governance Agencies do not consistently prepare business cases or use project steering committees to oversee major capital projects. |
Conclusion Agencies that have project management processes that include robust business cases and regular updates to their steering committees (or equivalent) are better able to provide those projects with strategic direction and oversight. |
3.3. Asset disposals |
|
Asset disposal procedures Agencies need to strengthen their asset disposal procedures. |
Recommendations Agencies should have formal processes for disposing of surplus properties. Agencies should use Property NSW to manage real property sales unless, as in the case for State owned corporations, they have been granted an exemption. |
Governance refers to the high-level frameworks, processes and behaviours that help an organisation to achieve its objectives, comply with legal and other requirements, and meet a high standard of probity, accountability and transparency.
This chapter sets out the governance lighthouse model the Audit Office developed to help agencies reach best practice. It then focuses on two key areas: continuous disclosure and shared services arrangements. The following two chapters look at findings related to ethics and risk management.
Issues | Recommendations or conclusions |
4.1 Governance arrangements |
|
Continuous disclosure Continuous disclosure promotes improved performance and public trust and aides better decision-making. Continuous disclosure is only mandatory for NSW Government Businesses such as State owned corporations. |
Conclusion Some agencies promote transparency and accountability by publishing on their websites a continuous disclosure policy that provides for, and encourages:
|
4.2 Shared services |
|
Service level agreements Some agencies do not have service level agreements for their shared service arrangements. Many of the agreements that do exist do not adequately specify controls, performance or reporting requirements. This reduces the effectiveness of shared services arrangements. |
Conclusion Agencies are better able to manage the quality and timeliness of shared service arrangements where they have a service level agreement in place. Ideally, the terms of service should be agreed before services are transferred to the service provider and:
|
Shared service performance Some agencies do not set performance standards for their shared service providers or regularly review performance results. |
Conclusion Agencies can achieve better results from shared service arrangements when they regularly monitor the performance of shared service providers using key measures for the benefits realised, costs saved and quality of services received. Before agencies extend or renegotiate a contract, they should comprehensively assess the services received and test the market to maximise value for money. |
All government sector employees must demonstrate the highest levels of ethical conduct, in line with standards set by The Code of Ethics and Conduct for NSW government sector employees.
This chapter looks at how well agencies are managing these requirements, and where they can improve their policies and processes.
We found that agencies mostly have the appropriate codes, frameworks and policies in place. But we have highlighted opportunities to improve the way they manage those systems to reduce the risks of unethical conduct.
Issues | Recommendations or conclusions |
5.1 Ethical framework |
|
Code of conduct All agencies we reviewed have a code of conduct, but they can still improve the way they update and manage their codes to reduce the risk of fraud and unethical behaviour. |
Recommendation Agencies should regularly review their code-of-conduct policies and ensure they keep their codes of conduct up-to-date. |
Statement of business ethics Most agencies maintain an ethical framework, but some can enhance their related processes, particularly when dealing with external clients, customers, suppliers and contractors. |
Conclusion Agencies can enhance their ethical frameworks by publishing a Statement of Business Ethics, which communicates their values and culture. |
5.2 Potential conflicts of interest |
|
Conflicts of interest All agencies have a conflicts-of-interest policy, but most can improve how they identify, manage and avoid conflicts of interest. |
Recommendation Agencies should improve the way they manage conflicts of interest, particularly by:
|
Gifts and benefits While all agencies already have a formal gifts-and-benefits policy, we found gaps in the management of gifts and benefits by some that increase the risk of unethical conduct. |
Recommendation Agencies should improve the way they manage gifts and benefits by promptly updating registers and providing annual training to staff. |
Risk management is an integral part of effective corporate governance. It helps agencies to identify, assess and prioritise the risks they face and in turn minimise, monitor and control the impact of unforeseen events. It also means agencies can respond to opportunities that may emerge and improve their services and activities.
This year we looked at the overall maturity of the risk management frameworks that agencies use, along with two important risk management elements: risk culture and risk registers.
Issues | Recommendations or conclusions |
6.1 Risk management maturity |
|
All agencies have implemented risk management frameworks, but with varying levels of maturity in their application. Agencies’ averaged a score of 3.1 out of five across five critical assessment criteria for risk management. While strategy and governance fared best, the areas that most need to improve are risk culture, and systems and intelligence. |
Conclusion Agencies have introduced risk management frameworks and practices as required by the Treasury’s:
However, more can be done to progress risk management maturity and embed risk management in agency culture. |
6.2 Risk management elements |
|
Risk culture Most agencies have started to embed risk management into the culture of their organisation. But only some have successfully done so, and most agencies can improve their risk culture.
|
Conclusion Agencies can improve their risk culture by:
|
Risk registers and reporting Some agencies do not report their significant risks to their lead agency, which may impair the way resources are allocated in their cluster. Some agencies do not integrate risk registers at a divisional and whole-of-enterprise level. |
Conclusion Agencies not reporting significant risks at the cluster level increases the likelihood that significant risks are not being mitigated appropriately. |
Effective risk management can improve agency decision-making, protect reputations and lead to significant efficiencies and cost savings. By embedding risk management directly into their operations, agencies can also derive extra value for their activities and services.
Actions for Sharing school and community facilities
Sharing school and community facilities
Schools and the community would benefit if school facilities were shared more often.
The Department of Education’s ‘Community Use of School Facilities Policy’ encourages but does not require schools to share facilities. Sharing depends heavily on the willingness of school principals and there are few incentives. There are many challenges in developing agreements with community users and there is only limited support available from the Department.
There are strategies and plans to support the sharing of facilities between schools and the wider community, but none are backed up with budgets, specific plans or timeframes.
Governments should strive for the best use of assets. This is particularly important in the context of a growing New South Wales population, fiscal constraints and increasing demand for services.
Lack of available land, rising land costs and population growth highlighted in our April 2017 'Planning for school infrastructure' performance audit report mean that new and existing schools will need to share their facilities with communities more than is currently the case.
This audit assessed how effectively schools share facilities with each other, local councils and community groups. In making this assessment, the audit examined whether the Department of Education (Department):
- has a clear policy to encourage and support facilities sharing
- is implementing evidence-based strategies and procedures for facilities sharing
- can show it is realising an increasing proportion of sharing opportunities.
Facilities sharing is the use of a physical asset, such as a building, rooms, or open spaces, by more than one group for a range of activities at the same time or at different times. For the purposes of this audit, we have divided sharing arrangements into two types: shared use and joint use.
Shared use refers to arrangements where existing school assets are hired out for non-school purposes, usually for a limited time. The assets remain under the control of the school. Generally, there is little alteration or enhancement to the asset required to enable shared use. Shared use can also refer to schools using external facilities, such as council pools, but these arrangements are not included within the scope of this audit.
Joint use refers to arrangements where new or upgraded school and non-school facilities or community hubs are planned, funded, built and jointly shared between a school and other parties, usually involving significant investment.
Both shared use and joint use agreements are governed by contractual obligations.
The sharing of school facilities with the community is not fully effective. The Department of Education is implementing strategies to increase shared and joint use but several barriers, some outside the Department’s direct control, must be addressed to fully realise benefits to students and the community of sharing school facilities. In addition, the Department needs to do more to encourage individual schools to share facilities with the community.
A collaborative, multi-agency approach is needed to overcome barriers to the joint use of facilities, otherwise, the Department may need significantly more funds than planned to deliver sufficient fit-for-purpose school facilities where and when needed.
Since the early 2000’s, several reviews in NSW and other jurisdictions have commented on the benefits of and need to increase the sharing of school facilities.
Several NSW Government strategies and plans support shared and joint use of facilities between schools and the wider community, but none are backed up with financial incentives, or specific plans with implementation timeframes. In Victoria and Queensland whole-of-government processes are in place to support a more coordinated approach to planning, building and sharing community facilities. For example, Victoria has a comprehensive policy framework encompassing both existing and future use of community facilities and a $50 million program to seed the development of community facilities on school sites over the next four years.
There are examples of successful shared use, but more can be done. Information about the available facilities is not readily available to potential community users. Schools should work more closely with councils and other stakeholders to leverage shared use.
Currently, the administrative burden, costs and risks associated with shared use can exceed the perceived benefits to schools, leading to reluctance amongst some Principals to share. In addition, a substantial backlog of school-initiated infrastructure proposals awaiting Departmental approval means that schools that raise money from sharing their facilities find it difficult to use the funds they raise on improved infrastructure. Some of these proposals have been waiting for approval for more than 12 months.
The Department could do more to support Principals by ensuring the fees charged for facilities cover the costs incurred by schools, that Principals can access help with negotiating and managing contracts, and that infrastructure proposals initiated and funded by schools are approved in a timely manner.
The Department is not monitoring shared use across the State, and does not evaluate different approaches as evidence to influence policies and procedures.
Recommendations
By December, 2018, the Department should:
- increase incentives and reduce impediments for school Principals to share school facilities, including:
- review the methodology for calculating fees charged for facilities to ensure that shared use of school facilities does not result in a financial burden to schools or the Department
- improve support provided to Principals by School Infrastructure NSW, including reducing the backlog of school-initiated infrastructure proposals awaiting approval
- develop service standards, including timeframes, for assessing and approving school-initiated infrastructure proposals.
- provide readily-accessible information about available school facilities to community groups and local councils
- implement processes to monitor and regularly evaluate the implementation of the shared use policy and promote better practice to drive improvements.
As discussed in our 2017 audit report on ‘Planning for school infrastructure’, joint use agreements are a key direction of the School Assets Strategic Plan. Joint use of school facilities will be necessary to ensure that there will be enough fit-for-purpose learning spaces for students when and where needed. Under the ‘Community Use of School Facilities Policy’ Principals play the leading role in identifying opportunities, and developing and managing agreements for sharing school facilities. This is impractical for joint use projects which involve substantial investment in new or refurbished assets, in particular for joint use projects in schools that are yet to be built. In addition, the policy does not address joint-use facilities built on land not owned by the Department. For these reasons, the Department is developing a new policy.
The Department is planning to develop joint use agreements in a more systematic way as part of school community planning, previously known as cluster planning, with a special focus on local councils. Several agreements are currently being piloted, and will be evaluated to provide an evidence-based foundation for this new approach.
To develop or refurbish school facilities for joint use, the Department, councils and other key stakeholders must work together and prioritise joint use from the earliest stages of any project. A collaborative, multi-agency approach is needed to ensure sufficient fit-for-purpose facilities are available for school students within the funding framework proposed in the School Assets Strategic Plan.
To increase shared and joint use, the Department is recruiting specialist staff in its Asset Division to assist with the brokerage, community engagement and development of agreements, but these staff are not dedicated to joint use projects and their available time may not be sufficient to provide the necessary support in the timeframes required.
Recommendations
By December, 2018, the Department of Education should:
- ensure that the implementation of the new ‘Joint Use of School Facilities and Land Policy’ is adequately resourced, and has the support of Principals
- implement processes to monitor and regularly evaluate the implementation of joint use policy and promote better practice to drive improvements.
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - About the audit
Appendix three - Victoria's 30-Year Infrastructure Strategy
Appendix four - Not-for-profit hire changes
Appendix five - Performance Auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #293 - released 1 November 2017
Actions for 2016 - An overview
2016 - An overview
This report focuses on key observations and findings from 2016 audits and highlights key areas of focus for financial and performance audits in 2017.
Financial reporting | |
Observation | Conclusion |
Only one qualified audit opinion was issued on the 2015–16 financial statements of NSW public sector agencies, compared to two in 2014–15. | The quality of financial reporting continued to improve across the NSW public sector. |
More 2015–16 financial statements and audit opinions were signed within three months of the year end. | Timely financial reporting was facilitated by more agencies resolving significant accounting issues early, completing asset valuations on time and compiling sufficient evidence to support financial statement balances. |
NSW Treasury’s early close procedures in 2015–16 were again successful in improving the quality and timeliness of financial reporting, largely facilitated by the early resolution of accounting issues. For 2016–17, NSW Treasury has narrowed the scope of mandatory early close procedures. |
The narrowed scope of mandatory early close procedures may diminish the good performance in ensuring the quality and timeliness of financial reporting achieved in recent years. To mitigate this risk, NSW Treasury has mandated that agencies perform non-financial asset valuations and prepare proforma financial statements in their early close procedures. It also encourages them to continue with the good practices embedded in recent years. |
Although most agencies complied with NSW Treasury’s early close asset revaluation procedures we identified areas where they can improve. | Asset revaluations need to commence early enough to ensure all assets are identified and the results are analysed, recorded and reflected accurately in the early close financial statements. |
Number of misstatements | |||||
Year ended 30 June | 2015-16 | 2014-15 | 2013-14 | 2012-13 | 2011-12 |
Total reported misstatements | 298 | 396 | 459 | 661 | 1,077 |
All material misstatements identified by agencies and audit teams were corrected before the financial statements and audit opinions were signed. A material misstatement relates to an incorrect amount, classification, presentation or disclosure in the financial statements that could reasonably be expected to influence the economic decisions of users.
Significant matters reported to the portfolio Minister, Treasurer and Agency Head
In 2015–16, we reported the following significant matters to the portfolio Minister, Treasurer and agency head in our Statutory Audit Reports:
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and the implementation and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.
In 2015–16, our audit teams made the following key observations on the financial controls of NSW public sector agencies.
Financial controls | |
Observation | Conclusion |
More needs to be done to implement audit recommendations on a timely basis. We found 212 internal control issues identified in previous audits had not been adequately addressed by 30 June 2016. |
Delays in implementing audit recommendations can impact the quality of financial information and the effectiveness of decision making. Agencies need to ensure they have action plans, timeframes and assigned responsibilities to address recommendations in a timely manner. |
Agencies continue to face challenges managing information security. Most information technology issues we identified related to poor IT user administration in areas like password controls and inappropriate access. | Agencies should review the design and effectiveness of information security controls to ensure data is adequately protected. |
We found shared service provider agreements did not always adequately address information security requirements. |
Where agencies use shared service providers they should consider whether the service level arrangements adequately address information security. |
Thirteen of 108 agencies required to attest to having a minimum set of information security controls did not do so in their 2015 annual reports. | The 'NSW Government Digital Information Security Policy' recognises the growing need for effective information security. With cyber security threats continuing to increase as digital services expand we plan to look at cyber security as part of our 2017–18 performance audit program. |
We identified instances where service level agreements with shared service providers were outdated, signed too late or did not exist. | Corporate and shared service arrangements are more effective when service level arrangements are negotiated and signed in time, clearly detail rights and responsibilities and include meaningful KPIs, fee arrangements and dispute resolution processes. |
Internal controls at GovConnect, the private sector provider of transactional and information technology services to many NSW public sector agencies were ineffective in 2015–16. We found mitigating actions taken to manage transition risks from ServiceFirst to GovConnect were ineffective in ensuring effective control over client transactions and data. | The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should ensure GovConnect addresses the control deficiencies. It should also examine the breakdowns in the transition of the shared service arrangements and apply the learnings to other services being transitioned to the private sector. |
Maintenance backlogs exist in several NSW public sector agencies, including Roads and Maritime Services, Sydney Trains, NSW Health, the Department of Education and the Department of Justice. | To address backlog maintenance it is important for agencies to have asset lifecycle planning strategies that ensure newly built and existing assets are funded and maintained to a desired service level. |
Actions for Assessing major development applications
Assessing major development applications
The Planning Assessment Commission (the Commission) has improved its decision-making processes for major development applications in recent years. The Commission has improved how it consults the public and manages conflicts of interest, and now also publishes records of its meetings with applicants and stakeholders.
The Planning Assessment Commission (the Commission) is an independent body established in 2008 under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (the EP&A Act). It makes decisions on major development applications in New South Wales. Along with the Department of Planning and Environment (the Department) and the Land and Environment Court, it is one of three bodies that have a role in making decisions on these applications.
The Department refers development applications to the Commission where 25 or more objections have been received from the community, a local council objects to the proposal, or the applicant has donated to a political party.
These applications are often complex and controversial, and can attract a high level of public interest. This may mean that, regardless of the process, not all stakeholders are satisfied with the outcome.
The Commission is required to take into account section 79C of the EP&A Act when making decisions. Section 79C includes consideration of the likely environmental, social and economic impacts of the development.
This audit assessed the extent to which the Commission’s decisions on major development applications are made in a consistent and transparent manner. To assist us in making this assessment, we asked whether the Commission:
- has sound processes in place to help it make decisions on major development applications that are informed and made in a consistent manner
- ensures its decisions are free from bias and transparent to stakeholders and the public.
Conclusion
Over the last two years, the Commission has improved its decision-making process. It has improved how it consults the public and manages conflicts of interest, and now also publishes records of its meetings with applicants and stakeholders.
However, there are still some vital issues to be addressed to ensure it makes decisions in a consistent and transparent manner. Most importantly, the Commission was not able to show in every decision we reviewed how it met its statutory obligation to consider the matters in section 79C of the EP&A Act.
Despite improved probity measures put in place by the Commission, there is a perception among some stakeholders that it is not independent of the Department. The reasons for some of these concerns are outside of the Commission’s control. For example, the Commission becomes involved after the Department has prepared an assessment report which recommends whether a development should proceed. This creates the perception that the Commission is acting on the recommendation of the Department. The Department’s assessment report should state whether an application meets relevant legislative and policy requirements, but not recommend whether a development should be approved or not.
More can also be done to improve transparency in decision-making and the public’s perception of the independence of Commissioners. The Commission should continue to improve how it communicates the reasons for its decisions and also publish on its website a summary of Commissioners’ conflict of interest declarations for each development application.
Decision-making processes have improved but some key aspects need to be addressed
Although not articulated in one document, there is a framework in place to assist Commissioners make decisions on major development applications. This includes setting out the information to be considered, who to consult, and that a report is to be prepared. The Commission has recently improved how it conducts public meetings and the level of support provided to Commissioners to ensure they understand the decision-making process. The Commissioners we interviewed all showed a good understanding of their role.
As a consent authority, the Commission is required to consider the matters in section 79C of the EP&A Act when making a decision. However, it was not able to show how it met this requirement in every decision we reviewed. We found some evidence of these considerations in six of the nine cases we reviewed, for example in meeting notes or in its report on a decision. Of these six cases, the degree to which the Commission considered all matters under section 79C varied considerably. The larger, more complex applications were more likely to address these considerations. To demonstrate compliance with the EP&A Act, the Commission must be able to show how it considers all matters in section 79C for each decision it makes.
We found that the Commission has access to relevant information to make a decision and consults stakeholders for their views of the development. The level of consultation depends on the size and complexity of an application. If Commissioners decide they need more information to make a decision, they consult local councils, the community, other government agencies and experts as needed.
The Commission’s public meetings are a valuable part of the decision-making process, where new perspectives or issues are often raised. However, some aspects could be improved. For example, many stakeholders thought the five minutes allowed for individual speakers was insufficient. The Commission could be more flexible with this timeframe. Identifying new ways to notify the public of its meetings, other than advertisements on its website and in newspapers, would also ensure it reaches as many interested parties as possible.
Improved transparency and probity but the Commission is not seen by some as impartial
The Commission has sound processes in place to ensure that its decisions are impartial and transparent to the community. It has improved its probity measures over the last two years, following a review by the NSW Ombudsman in 2014. We found that the Commission:
- has probity policies and procedures which are available on its website
- has improved its record keeping of some processes, such as meetings with applicants and stakeholders
- publishes its decision and supporting documentation, such as meeting notes, on its website.
Conflicts of interest are a significant risk for the Commission because they could lead to corruption, abuse of public office, and affect the public’s view of its independence. The Commission manages this risk well. It has a policy in place to address potential, perceived or actual conflicts. Commissioners update their conflicts of interest records annually, and declare any conflicts when the Commission assigns them to a development application. Unlike the Commission’s probity polices, Commissioners’ conflict of interest declarations are not available on its website. Providing a summary of this information on its website when Commissioners are allocated to a development application would further improve transparency around conflicts of interest.
The Commission has been improving how it communicates its decisions to the public. It now produces fact sheets for its decisions on matters that attract a high level of public interest. Its reports on decisions for complex applications also discuss issues raised by the community. However, the level of detail varied in the decisions we reviewed, and it was not always clear how conditions placed on a development would resolve identified issues. Similarly, the reports did not clearly address the matters under section 79C of the EP&A Act. Reporting this would further improve the transparency of its decisions, and clearly demonstrate compliance with the EP&A Act.
While we did not find any issues that would make us question the integrity or independence of Commissioners, there remains a perception among some stakeholders that the Commission is not impartial. Some of these concerns are within the Commission’s control to fix, such as allowing individual speakers at public meetings extra time to discuss their issues, therefore avoiding perceptions of bias.
Other perceptions, such as the Commission being part of the Department and not an independent decision making authority, are outside the Commission’s immediate control. For example, the Commission receives applications at the end of the assessment process, after the Department has prepared an assessment report recommending whether the application should be approved. This means there are effectively two reports on an application; the Department’s assessment report and the Commission’s report on its decision. However, there is only one decision-maker: the Commission. This may cause community confusion about the roles of the Department and the Commission in the decision-making process. Clearer separation of their roles in assessing applications and preparing reports is needed.
To minimise the perception that the Commission is simply ‘rubber stamping’ the Department’s recommendations, assessment reports should not recommend whether or not a project be approved. Instead, they should provide the Department’s views on whether a project meets relevant legislative and policy requirements. The Commission should also be involved earlier in the process, so it can establish key facts and identify relevant issues sooner. It should request that the Department’s assessment report covers matters Commissioners consider particularly important when assessing projects under section 79C. Earlier referral of applications should also help the Commission to plan its work in assessing applications, and may reduce the time taken to reach a decision.
Unless these issues are addressed, stakeholders will continue to believe the Commission does not act in a transparent and impartial manner, which could erode public confidence in the Commission.
The Planning Assessment Commission
The Planning Assessment Commission (the Commission) is a planning authority established in 2008 under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (the EP&A Act). One of its functions is to make decisions on major development applications.
The Commission is independent of the Department of Planning and Environment (the Department) and the Minister for Planning. This means its decisions are not subject to the direction or control of the Department or the Minister.
The Department refers applications for major development to the Commission, including state significant development and infrastructure applications. These projects are generally initiated by the private sector. Applications are referred to the Commission when one or more of the following criteria are met:
- more than 25 objections are received about the proposal
- the local council objects to the proposal
- the applicant has donated $1,000 or more to a political party or member of parliament.
These applications are often controversial and may attract a high level of public interest. Of the 29 development applications the Commission received in 2015–16, almost 40 per cent were in the mining and energy sectors, and another 40 per cent related to urban development.
Section 79C of the EP&A Act outlines the matters the Commission must consider when making decisions about major development applications. These include:
- any relevant environmental and planning instruments
- likely environmental, social and economic impacts of the development
- suitability of the site for the development
- submissions received about the application
- the public interest.
In addition to making decisions about major development applications, the Commission also reviews major developments as part of the planning process, and provides independent expert advice to the government on planning and development matters. Since the Commission’s inception, it has provided advice on 76 matters, conducted 39 reviews, and made 444 decisions on development applications.
Process for approving major development applications
The Commission is one of three bodies that have a role in the planning and approval process for major development applications in New South Wales, as seen in Exhibit 1. The other two bodies are the Department of Planning and Environment, and the Land and Environment Court.
The Department determines the outcomes of major development applications. When an application meets one of the criteria listed above, it refers these to the Commission to make the decision. In certain circumstances, the Land and Environment Court hears appeals against decisions made by either the Department or the Commission.
A Memorandum of Understanding between the Commission and the Department sets out timeframes the Commission must meet when making a decision, specifically:
- two weeks where no stakeholder meetings are required
- three weeks where stakeholder meetings are required
- six weeks when a public meeting is required.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #279 - released 19 January 2017