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Actions for Service NSW's handling of personal information

Service NSW's handling of personal information

Premier and Cabinet
Finance
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Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining the effectiveness of Service NSW’s handling of customers’ personal information to ensure its privacy.

The audit found that Service NSW is not effectively handling personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy. Service NSW continues to use business processes that pose a risk to the privacy of personal information. This includes the routine emailing of personal information between Service NSW service centres and other agencies, which is one of the processes that contributed to the data breach earlier this year. The audit found that previously identified risks and recommended solutions had not been implemented on a timely basis.

The Auditor-General made eight recommendations aimed at ensuring improved processes, technologies, and governance arrangements for how Service NSW handles customers’ personal information.

The Hon. Victor Dominello, MP, Minister for Customer Service, requested this audit under section 27(B)(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 following public reports in May 2020 of a cyber security attack which had led to a breach of Service NSW customer information. This audit also included the Department of Customer Service which supports Service NSW with privacy, risk and governance functions.

Service NSW was established in 2013 with the intention that it would, over time, 'become the primary interaction point for customers accessing New South Wales Government transaction services'.

Service NSW's functions are set out in the Service NSW (One stop Access to Government Services) Act 2013. This legislation allows for other NSW Government agencies to delegate to and enter into agreements with the Chief Executive Officer of Service NSW in order for Service NSW to undertake service functions for the agency.

Service NSW now has agreements with 36 NSW Government client agencies to facilitate over 1,200 types of interactions and transactions for the community.

The nature of each agreement between Service NSW and its client agencies varies. Some client agencies have delegated authority to allow Service NSW staff to conduct transactions on their behalf in the agencies' systems. Other arrangements do not include the same degree of delegation. In these cases, Service NSW provides services such as responding to enquiries and validating documents.

In addition, Service NSW conducts transactions for its own programs, such as the Seniors Card. Personal information for these programs, as well as information for customers' MyServiceNSW accounts, are stored by Service NSW on its Salesforce Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system.

In March 2020, Service NSW suffered two cyber security attacks in short succession. Technical analysis undertaken by the Department of Customer Service (DCS) concluded that these attacks resulted from a phishing exercise through which external threat actors gained access to the email accounts of 47 staff members. These attacks resulted in the breach of a large amount of personal customer information that was contained in these email accounts. See Section 1.1 for further details.

This audit is being conducted in response to a request from the Hon. Victor Dominello, Minister for Customer Service, under section 27B(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983. Minister Dominello requested that the Auditor General conduct a performance audit in relation to Service NSW's handling of sensitive customer and business information.

This audit assessed how effectively Service NSW handles personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy.

It addressed the following:

  • Does Service NSW have processes and governance in place to identify and manage risks to the privacy of personal customer and business information?
  • Does Service NSW have policies, processes and systems in place that support the effective handling of personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy?
  • Has Service NSW effectively implemented its policies, processes and systems for managing personal customer and business information?

Conclusion

Service NSW is not effectively handling personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy. It continues to use business processes that pose a risk to the privacy of personal information. These include routinely emailing personal customer information to client agencies, which is one of the processes that contributed to the March 2020 data breach. Previously identified risks and recommended solutions had not been implemented on a timely basis.

Service NSW identifies privacy as a strategic risk in both its Risk Management Guideline and enterprise risk register and sets out a zero level appetite for privacy risk in its risk appetite statement. That said, the governance, policies, and processes established by Service NSW to mitigate privacy risk are not effective in ensuring the privacy of personal customer and business information. While Service NSW had risk identification and management processes in place at the time of the March 2020 data breach, these did not prevent the breach occurring.

Some of the practices that contributed to the data breach are still being followed by Service NSW staff. For example, business processes still require Service NSW staff to scan and email personal information to some client agencies.

The lack of multi factor authentication has been identified as another key contributing factor to the March 2020 data breach as this enabled the external threat actors to gain access to staff email accounts once they had obtained the user account details through a phishing exercise. Service NSW had identified the lack of multi factor authentication on its webmail platform as a risk more than a year prior to the breach and had committed to addressing this by June 2019. It was not implemented until after the breach occurred.

There are weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system, which holds the personal information of over four million NSW residents.

Internal audits carried out by Service NSW, including one completed in August 2020, have identified significant weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce CRM system. These include deficiencies in the management of role based access, monitoring and audit of user access, and partitioning of program specific transaction information. These deficiencies create an increased risk of unauthorised access to the personal information of over four million customers held in the system.

Lines of responsibility for meeting privacy obligations are not clearly drawn between Service NSW and its client agencies.

Service NSW has agreements in place with client agencies. However, the agreements lack detail and clarity about the roles and responsibilities of the agencies in relation to the collection, storage and security of customer's personal information. This lack of clarity raises the risk that privacy obligations will become confused and missed between the agencies.

Service NSW carries out privacy impact assessments for major new projects but does not routinely review existing processes and systems.

Service NSW carries out privacy impact assessments as part of its routine processes for implementing major new projects, ensuring that privacy management is considered as part of project design. Service NSW does not regularly undertake privacy impact assessments or reviews of existing or legacy processes and systems, which has resulted in some processes continuing despite posing significant risks to the privacy of personal information, such as the scanning, emailing, and storing of identification documents.

1. Key findings

Service NSW identifies privacy risks, but the controls and processes it put in place to mitigate these privacy risks were not adequate to prevent or limit the extent of the data breach that occurred in March 2020

Service NSW’s approach to risk management is framed by its Risk Management Guideline, which defines 'privacy and compliance' as one of the key types of risk for the agency. Service NSW's enterprise risk register identifies four strategic privacy related risks. Service NSW has set out a zero level appetite for privacy risk in its risk appetite statement.

Service NSW has assessed the adequacy of its controls for privacy risks as needing improvement. To be fully effective, the Risk Management Guideline says that these controls should have a focus that is ‘largely preventative and address the root causes’.

One of the business processes that was a key contributing factor to the data breach was the emailing of personal information by Service NSW staff to client agencies.

This process had been identified as a risk prior to the breach and some steps had been put in place to mitigate the risk. In particular, staff were required to manually delete emails that contained personal information. However, these measures were ineffective in preventing the breach, as the external threat actors still gained access to 47 staff email accounts that contained a large amount of personal information.

It is unclear why Service NSW did not effectively mitigate this risk prior to the breaches. However, Service NSW has advised that it implemented measures in June and October 2020 to automatically archive emails likely to contain personal information. This is expected to limit the quantity of information retained in email accounts for extended periods.

Service NSW has not put in place any technical or other solutions to avoid Service NSW staff having to scan and email personal information to some client agencies. Urgent action is needed to remove the requirement for staff to email personal information to client agencies, thereby mitigating the risk inherent in sending and storing this information using email.

There are weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce CRM system, which holds the personal information of over four million customers

There are weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce CRM system. These weaknesses include deficiencies in governance of role based access, monitoring and audit of staff access, and partitioning of program specific transaction information. These deficiencies create an increased risk of unauthorised access to the personal information of over four million customers which is stored in this system.

In addition, there is an absence of important controls to safeguard customers' privacy, such as multi factor authentication and reviewable logs of access history to their information. Such controls, when properly implemented, would enhance the control that customers are able to exercise over their personal information.

A privacy impact assessment conducted on Service NSW’s Salesforce CRM system in 2015 recommended that the system include the ability for customers to review access history to their personal information, as well as the option for customers to apply multi factor authentication to their accounts. While both these recommendations appeared positively received by Service NSW, neither have been implemented.

Since its inception, Service NSW’s use of Salesforce has extended to storing transaction data, particularly for transactions for which Service NSW is responsible, such as the Seniors Card. It also holds details of over four million MyServiceNSW account holders, including name, email address and phone number, and optional address details. It was not originally intended for the system to hold this volume and nature of customer information.

Lines of responsibility for meeting privacy obligations are unclear between Service NSW and its client agencies

Service NSW's privacy management plan does not clearly set out the privacy obligations of Service NSW and its client agencies. It sets out that 'compliance with the privacy principles will primarily be the responsibility of that [client] agency'. However, Service NSW has its own obligations under the security principles of the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (PPIP Act) to take reasonable steps to prevent unauthorised access to personal information, which is not made clear in the privacy management plan.

The agreements between Service NSW and client agencies reviewed for this audit only include general and high level references to privacy. Most do not include details of each parties' privacy responsibilities such as: which agency will provide the customer with a privacy notice explaining how their personal information will be handled, how personal information will be kept secure, how long Service NSW will retain information, what processes will be followed for internal reviews, and what specific planning is in place to respond to data breaches.

Service NSW's privacy management plan has not been updated to include new programs and governance changes

Service NSW's privacy management plan includes most of the matters required by law or good practice, with some exceptions. It does not explain any exemptions that the agency commonly relies on under the PPIP Act and does not address any health information that Service NSW may handle. It had also not been updated to reflect governance changes and the fact that, at the time this audit commenced, Service NSW was disclosing the content of internal review applications (the formal expression for 'complaints') to the Department of Customer Service (DCS). These governance changes were part of the centralisation of Service NSW's corporate support functions into DCS in late 2019, though internal review staff were seconded back into Service NSW during the course of this audit.

The current July 2019 privacy management plan has also not been updated since the rollout of a number of major new initiatives in 2020. These include 2019–20 bushfire emergency recovery initiatives (such as small business grants) and COVID 19 pandemic response initiatives (such as small business grants, border permits and the COVID safe check in app).

Service NSW routinely conducts privacy impact assessments for new initiatives, though privacy risks remain in legacy systems and processes

Service NSW routinely conducts privacy impact assessments for major new initiatives and the assessments reviewed for this audit largely accorded with good practice guidance.

Service NSW does not routinely review existing processes and systems to ensure that they are effective in ensuring the privacy of customer personal information. Business processes that create the highest risk to privacy, such as emailing of personal information, are more common in these longstanding legacy systems.

Service NSW's significant and rapid growth has outpaced the establishment of a robust control environment which has exacerbated privacy risks

Since it was established in 2013, Service NSW has experienced significant growth in the number and diversity of the types of transactions it provides, as well as the number of client agencies with which it works. The pace and extent of this growth has contributed to important controls not being properly implemented on a timely basis, which has heightened privacy risks, particularly in regard to existing, legacy systems and processes.

The pace of change and increasing demand for new program implementation has limited the opportunity for Service NSW, in collaboration with its client agencies, to revisit and redesign legacy business practices which pose a greater privacy risk. This includes the scanning and emailing of personal information.

While 2019–20 has seen additional demands placed on Service NSW in responding to the 2019–20 bushfire emergency and COVID 19 pandemic, it is the nature of the agency’s work that it operates in a fast paced and complex environment, where it is required to respond to multiple client agencies and stakeholders. Ensuring customer privacy should be integral to Service NSW’s business as usual operations.

2. Recommendations

Service NSW commissioned a number of external reviews and investigations stemming from the data breaches. The Auditor General's recommendations below have taken these other reviews into account. In order to offer assurance that it is appropriately protecting the privacy of its customers, Service NSW should address the full breadth of findings and recommendations made across all relevant reviews.

As a matter of urgency, Service NSW should:

1. in consultation with relevant client agencies and the Department of Customer Service, implement a solution for a secure method of transferring personal information between Service NSW and client agencies

2. review the need to store scanned copies of personal information and, if still required, implement a more secure method of storing this information and regular deletion of material.

By March 2021, Service NSW should:

3. ensure that all new agreements entered into with client agencies from 1 April 2021 address the deficiencies identified in this audit, including that they provide clarity on:

  • the content and provision of privacy collection notices
  • the terms by which personal information will be retained, stored, archived, and disposed of when no longer required
  • steps that will be taken by each agency to ensure that personal information is kept secure
  • the circumstances in which, and processes by which, applications for internal review will be referred by one agency to the other
  • how identified breaches of privacy will be handled between agencies

4. in collaboration with the Department of Customer Service, review its privacy management plan to address the deficiencies raised in this audit, including:

  • to clarify Service NSW's understanding of how responsibility for meeting privacy obligations are delineated between Service NSW and client agencies
  • to better reflect the full scope and complexity of personal information handled by Service NSW
  • to better explain how applications for internal review are handled between Service NSW and the Department of Customer Service
  • to ensure regular ongoing review, either according to a schedule or when Service NSW experiences substantial change to its programs and handling of personal information

5. in consultation with the Department of Customer Service, review its policies and processes for the management of privacy risks, including to:

  • ensure that there are appropriate mechanisms to escalate identified privacy risks from business units to the Executive Leadership Team
  • ensure that there are action plans to address strategic privacy risks that are assessed as having ineffective controls.
By June 2021, Service NSW should:

6. address deficiencies in the controls over, and security for, its Salesforce customer relationship management and related systems that hold customer personal information, including:

  • establish policies and processes for regular access reviews and monitoring of user activity in these systems, including for privileged users
  • enable partitioning and role based access restrictions to personal information collected for different programs
  • provide customers the choice to use multi factor authentication to further secure their MyServiceNSW accounts
  • enable customers to view the transaction history of their personal information to detect possible mishandling.
By December 2021, Service NSW should:

7. ensure that all existing agreements with client agencies address the deficiencies identified in this audit, including that they provide clarity on:

  • the content and provision of privacy collection notices
  • the terms by which personal information will be retained, stored, archived, and disposed of when no longer required
  • steps that will be taken by each agency to ensure that personal information is kept secure
  • the circumstances in which, and processes by which, applications for internal review will be referred by one agency to the other
  • how identified breaches of privacy will be handled between agencies

8. carry out a risk assessment of all processes, systems and transactions that involve the handling of personal information and undertake a privacy impact assessment for those that:

  • are identified as high risk and have not previously had a privacy impact assessment
  • have had major changes or updates since the privacy impact assessment was completed.

Appendix one – Responses from agencies

Appendix two – About the audit

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for One TAFE NSW modernisation program

One TAFE NSW modernisation program

Education
Finance
Management and administration
Project management
Shared services and collaboration

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining the management of the One TAFE NSW modernisation program.

In 2016, the Government released 'A Vision for TAFE NSW' which stated that TAFE NSW needed to become more flexible, efficient and competitive. It set out the need to progressively reduce significant cost inefficiencies, including by moving away from separate institutes to a single institute model. TAFE NSW established the One TAFE NSW modernisation program to deliver on that vision.

The Auditor General found that the One TAFE NSW modernisation program did not deliver against its key objectives within planned timeframes. The modernisation program originally aimed to realise $250 million in annual savings from 2018–19. Because of project delays and higher than expected transition costs, TAFE NSW did not meet the original savings target. TAFE NSW has made progress on key elements of the program and anticipates that savings will be realised in coming years.

The report makes two recommendations to improve governance arrangements for delivering on commercial objectives and increasing transparency of non commercial activities. 

The report also identifies a series of lessons for future government transformation programs.

TAFE NSW is the public provider of Vocational Education and Training (VET) in New South Wales. In 2018, TAFE NSW enrolled 436,000 students in more than 1,200 courses at around 130 locations across the State.

There have been major policy changes impacting TAFE NSW over the past decade. Under the Smart and Skilled reform, TAFE NSW started to compete with other Registered Training Organisations (RTOs) for a share of the student market.

In 2016, the NSW Government released 'A Vision for TAFE NSW'. The Vision stated that a failure to adapt to market circumstances had left TAFE NSW with unsustainable costs and inefficiencies. To address this, TAFE NSW needed to become more flexible, efficient and competitive. It set out that TAFE NSW must progressively reduce significant cost inefficiencies, including by moving away from a model of separate institutes to a One  TAFE NSW model. The NSW Government set TAFE NSW a target to achieve savings through implementing the Vision.

TAFE NSW established the One TAFE NSW modernisation program to deliver on that vision. The program initially aimed to deliver savings of $250 million per year from 2018–19, but this target was reviewed and updated as the program was being delivered.

This audit assessed whether TAFE NSW effectively managed the One TAFE NSW modernisation program to deliver on the NSW Government's vision for TAFE NSW. In making this assessment, the audit examined whether:

  • delivery of the program was well planned
  • the program was driven by sound governance arrangements
  • TAFE NSW is making progress against the intended outcomes of the program.

The audit focused on the effectiveness of planning, governance and reporting arrangements. It examined five projects within the overall modernisation program as case studies.

Conclusion

The One TAFE NSW modernisation program was an ambitious plan to deliver on the NSW Government’s vision for TAFE NSW, while achieving ongoing savings. Several factors contributed to TAFE NSW not effectively managing the program to deliver on planned timeframes and objectives. These factors include unclear expectations of the primary role of TAFE NSW, unrealistic timeframes, undertaking a large number of complex projects concurrently, governance arrangements that were not fit-for-purpose and poor-quality data.

Planning for the modernisation program and its projects was driven by top-down savings targets and pre-determined timeframes. This led to TAFE NSW attempting to deliver a large number of programs concurrently within tight timeframes. Program management capability was underdeveloped at the commencement of the program and this affected the quality of planning for delivery.

There was a lack of clarity around TAFE NSW's primary purpose. Part of the NSW Government's vision for TAFE NSW was for it to be more commercial, competitive and efficient. These objectives were not fully supported by existing legislation. The commercial objectives of the modernisation program conflicted with legislated social objectives for TAFE NSW. TAFE NSW did not have the autonomy to operate like a government-owned business in a market environment. And while TAFE NSW received separate funding to support students facing disadvantage this did not cover the costs of other non-commercial activities undertaken for social purposes, such as delivering uneconomic courses. The role of the TAFE Commission Board was ambiguous during the initial years of the program, which increased reporting requirements and blurred accountabilities for decision-making.

TAFE NSW's Strategic Plan 2016-22 nominated ten key milestones for delivery by January 2019. TAFE NSW has made progress against several important milestones, including that TAFE ‘is a single TAFE NSW brand’ and has 'industry specific TAFE NSW SkillsPoints'. Other key elements have yet to be delivered, including that TAFE NSW achieves 'integrated enterprise-wide business systems'. Because of delays to projects and higher than expected transition costs, TAFE NSW reported that it did not meet the originally targeted $250 million in annual savings for 2018–19 (which was reviewed and updated as the program was being delivered). 

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #346 - released 17 December 2020

Published

Actions for Their Futures Matter

Their Futures Matter

Justice
Community Services
Education
Health
Whole of Government
Cross-agency collaboration
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Project management

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining whether the Department of Communities and Justice had effective governance and partnership arrangements in place to deliver ‘Their Futures Matter’.

Their Futures Matter was intended to place vulnerable children and families at the heart of services, and direct investment to where funding and programs deliver the greatest social and economic benefits. It was a four-year whole-of-government reform in response to the 2015 Tune Review of out-of-home care.

The Auditor-General found that while important foundations were put in place, and new programs trialled, the key objective to establish an evidence-based whole-of-government early intervention approach for vulnerable children and families in NSW was not achieved.

Governance and cross-agency partnership arrangements to deliver Their Futures Matter were found to be ineffective. 'Their Futures Matter lacked mechanisms to secure cross portfolio buy‑in and did not have authority to drive reprioritisation of government investment', the Auditor-General said.

At the reform’s close, the majority of around $380 million in investment funding remains tied to existing agency programs, with limited evidence of their comparative effectiveness or alignment with Their Futures Matter policy objectives. The reform concluded on 30 June 2020 without a strategy or plan in place to achieve its intent.

The Auditor-General made four recommendations to the Department of Communities and Justice, aimed at improving implementation of outstanding objectives, revising governance arrangements, and utilising the new human services data set to address the intent of the reform. However, these recommendations respond only in part to the findings of the audit.

According to the Auditor-General, ‘Cross-portfolio leadership and action is required to ensure a whole-of-government response to delivering the objectives of Their Futures Matter to improve outcomes for vulnerable children, young people and their families in New South Wales.’

Read full report (PDF)

In 2016, the NSW Government launched 'Their Futures Matter' (TFM) - a whole-of-government reform aimed at delivering improved outcomes for vulnerable children, young people and their families. TFM was the government's key response to the 2015 Independent Review of Out of Home Care in New South Wales (known as 'the Tune Review').

The Tune Review found that, despite previous child protection reforms, the out of home care system was ineffective and unsustainable. It highlighted that the system was not client-centred and was failing to improve the long-term outcomes for vulnerable children and families. The review found that the greatest proportion of relevant expenditure was made in out of home care service delivery rather than in evidence-based early intervention strategies to support children and families when vulnerabilities first become evident to government services (such as missed school days or presentations to health services).

The then Department of Family and Community Services (FACS) designed the TFM reform initiatives, in consultation with central and human services agencies. A cross-agency board, senior officers group, and a new unit in the FACS cluster were established to drive the implementation of TFM. In the 2016–17 Budget, the government allocated $190 million over four years (2016–17 to 2019–20) to the reform. This resourced the design and commissioning of evidence-based pilots, data analytics work, staffing for the implementation unit and secretariat support for the board and cross-agency collaboration.

As part of the TFM reform, the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Treasury and partnering agencies (NSW Health, Department of Education and Department of Justice) identified various existing programs that targeted vulnerable children and families (such as the preceding whole-of-government ‘Keep Them Safe’ reform coming to an end in June 2020). Funding for these programs, totalling $381 million in 2019–20, was combined to form a nominal ‘investment pool’. The government intended that the TFM Implementation Board would use this pool to direct and prioritise resource allocation to evidence-based interventions for vulnerable children and families in NSW.

This audit assessed whether TFM had effective governance and partnership arrangements in place to enable an evidence-based early intervention investment approach for vulnerable children and families in NSW. We addressed the audit objective with the following audit questions:

  • Was the TFM reform driven by effective governance arrangements?
  • Was the TFM reform supported by effective cross-agency collaboration?
  • Has the TFM reform generated an evidence base to inform a cross-agency investment approach in the future?

The audit did not seek to assess the outcomes for children, young people and families achieved by TFM programs and projects.

Conclusion

The governance and cross-agency partnership arrangements used to deliver the Their Futures Matter reform were ineffective. Important foundations were put in place, and new programs trialled over the reform's four years. However, an evidence-based whole-of-government early intervention approach for vulnerable children and families in NSW − the key objective of the reform − was not established. The reform concluded in June 2020 without a strategy or plan in place to achieve its intent.

The governance arrangements established for the Their Futures Matter (TFM) reform did not provide sufficient independence, authority and cross-agency clout to deliver on the reform’s intent. This hindered delivery of the reform's key elements, particularly the redirection of funding to evidence-based earlier intervention supports, and limited the impact that TFM could have on driving system change.

TFM increased focus on the contribution that other agencies outside of the former Family and Community Services portfolio could make in responding to the needs of vulnerable children and families, and in reducing the demand costs of related government service delivery. Despite being a whole-of-government reform, TFM lacked mechanisms to secure cross-portfolio buy-in and lacked the powers to drive reprioritisation of government investment in evidence-based and earlier intervention supports across agencies. At the reform’s close, the majority of the reform's investment pool funding remained tied to existing agency programs, with limited evidence of their comparative effectiveness or alignment with Their Futures Matter policy objectives.

TFM began building an evidence base about ‘what works’, including piloting programs and creating a new dataset to identify risk factors for vulnerability and future costs to government. However, this evidence base does not yet comprehensively map how existing services meet needs, identify system duplications or gaps, nor demonstrate which government funded supports and interventions are most effective to make a difference to life outcomes for vulnerable children and families in NSW.
Despite these issues, the need, intent and vision for Their Futures Matter remains relevant and urgent, as issues identified in the Tune Review remain pertinent.

Their Futures Matter (TFM) is a whole-of-government reform to deliver improved outcomes for vulnerable children, young people and their families.

Supported by a cross-agency TFM Board, and the TFM Unit in the then Department of Family and Community Services (FACS), the reform aimed to develop whole-of-government evidence-based early intervention investment approaches for vulnerable children and families in NSW.

Governance refers to the structures, systems and practices that an organisation has in place to:

  • assign decision-making authorities and establish the organisation's strategic direction
  • oversee the delivery of its services, the implementation of its policies, and the monitoring and mitigation of its key risks
  • report on its performance in achieving intended results, and drive ongoing improvements.

We examined whether the TFM reform was driven by effective governance arrangements and cross-agency collaboration.

The reform agenda and timeframe set down for Their Futures Matter (TFM) were ambitious. This chapter assesses whether the TFM Board and TFM Unit had the capability, capacity and clout within government to deliver the reform agenda.

Creating a robust evidence base was important for Their Futures Matter, in order to:

  • identify effective intervention strategies to improve supports and outcomes for vulnerable children and families
  • make efficient use of taxpayer money to assist the maximum number of vulnerable children and families
  • inform the investment-based approach for future funding allocation.

This chapter assesses whether the TFM reform has developed an evidence base to inform cross-agency investment decisions.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – TFM governance entities

Appendix three – TFM Human Services Data Set

Appendix four – TFM pilot programs

Appendix five – About the audit

Appendix six – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #337 - released 24 July 2020

Published

Actions for Destination NSW's support for major events

Destination NSW's support for major events

Treasury
Financial reporting
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Service delivery

This report focuses on whether Destination NSW (DNSW) can demonstrate that its support for major events achieves value for money.

The audit found that DNSW’s processes for assessing and evaluating the major events it funds are mostly effective, but its public reporting does not provide enough transparency.

DNSW provides clear information to event organisers seeking funding and has a comprehensive methodology for conducting detailed event assessments. However, the reasons for decisions to progress events from the initial assessment to the detailed assessment stage are not documented in sufficient detail.

DNSW does not publish detailed information about the events it funds or the outcomes of these events. This means that members of the public are unable to see whether its activities achieve value for money. However, DNSW’s internal reporting to its key decision‑makers, including the CEO, the Board and the Minister is appropriate.

The Auditor-General made four recommendations to DNSW, aimed at improving the transparency of its activities, improving the documentation of decisions and certain compliance matters, and streamlining its approach to assessing and evaluating events that receive smaller amounts of funding.

Read full report (PDF)

Destination NSW (DNSW) provides funding to attract a range of major events to New South Wales, including high-profile professional sports matches and tournaments, musicals, art and museum exhibitions, and participation-focused events such as festivals and sports events that members of the public can enter. The NSW Government's rationale for providing funding is to encourage event organisers to hold events in New South Wales, and to ensure that events held in New South Wales maximise the potential for attracting overseas and interstate visitors.

This audit assessed whether DNSW can demonstrate that its support for major events achieves value for money. In making this assessment, the audit examined whether:

  • DNSW effectively assesses proposals to support major events
  • DNSW effectively evaluates the impact of its support for major events.

This audit focused on DNSW's work to attract major events to New South Wales. It did not assess DNSW's tourism promotion or development work, which includes developing tourism strategies, marketing and advertising campaigns, national and international partnerships, and regional programs.

Conclusion

Destination NSW's processes for assessing event applications and evaluating its support for major events are mostly effective. DNSW's internal systems allow it to know whether its decisions are achieving value for money. Its public reporting does not provide enough information about its activities and their outcomes, although it is consistent with that of equivalent organisations in other Australian jurisdictions.

DNSW's process for assessing applications for funding from organisers of major events is mostly effective. Clear information is provided to event organisers seeking funding, and DNSW has a comprehensive methodology for conducting detailed event assessments. However, the reasons for decisions to progress events from the initial assessment to the detailed assessment stage are not documented in sufficient detail.

DNSW has a framework for disclosure and monitoring staff conflicts of interest. However, its forms for staff to disclose conflicts of interest on specific events they are working on are ambiguous. DNSW's management of gifts and benefits broadly complies with the minimum standards set by the Public Service Commission, but there are some gaps in its implementation of these.

DNSW conducts an evaluation of each major event it supports. DNSW articulates expected outcomes in contracts with event organisers and uses a sound methodology to evaluate events. Internal reporting to its key decision-makers, including the CEO, the Board and the Minister is appropriate. However, DNSW does not publish detailed information about the events it funds or the outcomes of these events. This means that members of the public are unable to see whether its activities achieve value for money.

Appendix one – Response from Destination NSW

Appendix two – About the audit 

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Copyright Notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #332 - released 9 April 2020.

Published

Actions for Local Schools, Local Decisions: needs-based equity funding

Local Schools, Local Decisions: needs-based equity funding

Education
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Service delivery

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining the Department of Education’s (the department’s) support and oversight of school planning and use of needs-based funding under the Local Schools, Local Decisions reform.

The report found the department has not had adequate oversight of how schools are using needs-based funding to improve student outcomes since it was introduced in 2014.

The department had not set measures or targets for needs-based equity funding. It had also not been clear enough in how it expected schools to report on the outcomes of additional funding. This means it has not been able to effectively demonstrate the impact of funding at a school, or state-wide level.

To assist with the transition to greater local decision-making, the department provided schools with guidance materials, additional resources and systems support. However, guidance material was not clear enough on the purpose of funding, school budgeting systems were not fit-for-purpose when initially introduced, and support for schools was spread across different areas of the department.

The department has recently increased executive oversight of progress to improve educational outcomes for Aboriginal students and students from a low socio-economic background. It has also developed a consistent set of school-level targets to be implemented from 2020. This may help the department more reliably monitor progress in lifting outcomes for students with additional learning needs.

The report makes eight recommendations aimed at clarifying requirements of schools, better coordinating support and strengthening oversight of the use of needs-based equity funding.

Read full report (PDF)

The Local Schools, Local Decisions reform was launched in 2012 to give public schools more authority to make local decisions about how best to meet the needs of their students. A major element of the reform was the introduction of a new needs-based school funding model. Core elements of the model address staffing and operational requirements, while needs-based elements reflect the characteristics of schools and students within them. This includes equity funding designed to support students with additional needs. The four categories of equity funding are:

  • socio-economic background
  • Aboriginal background
  • English language proficiency
  • low-level adjustment for disability. 

Around $900 million in equity funding was allocated in 2019. School principals decide how to use these funds and account for them through their school annual reports. The Department of Education (the department) supports schools in making these choices with tools and systems, guidelines, and good practice examples.

The objective of this audit was to assess the department's support and oversight of school planning and use of needs-based funding under the Local Schools, Local Decisions reform. To address this objective, the audit examined whether:

  • effective accountability arrangements have been established
  • effective support is provided to schools.  

Conclusion

The department has not had adequate oversight of how schools are using needs-based equity funding to improve student outcomes since it was introduced in 2014. While it provides guidance and resources, it has not set measures or targets to describe the outcomes expected of this funding, or explicit requirements for schools to report outcomes from how these funds were used. Consequently, there is no effective mechanism to capture the impact of funding at a school, or state-wide level. The department has recently developed a consistent set of school-level targets to be implemented from 2020. This may help it to better hold schools accountable for progress towards its strategic goal of reducing the impact of disadvantage.

A significant amount of extra funding has been provided to schools over recent years in recognition of the additional learning needs of certain groups of students facing disadvantage. Under the Local Schools, Local Decisions reform, schools were given the ability to make decisions about how best to use the equity funding in combination with their overall school resources to meet their students’ needs. However, multiple guidelines provided to schools contain inconsistent advice on how the community should be consulted, how funding could be used, and how impact should be reported. Because of this, it is not clear how schools have used equity funding for the benefit of identified groups. School annual reports we reviewed did not fully account for the equity funding received, nor adequately describe the impact of funding on student outcomes.

To help in the transition to greater local decision-making, the department provided extra support by; establishing peer support for new principals, increasing the number of directors, developing data analysis and financial planning systems, targeted training and showcasing good practice. Multiple roles and areas of the department provide advice to schools in similar areas and this support could be better co-ordinated.

Financial planning systems designed to help schools budget for equity and other funding sources were not fit-for-purpose when originally introduced. Schools reported a lack of trust in their budget figures and so were not fully spending their allocated funding. Since then, the department developed and improved a budgeting tool in consultation with stakeholder and user groups. It provided extra funding for administrative support and one-to-one training to help schools develop their capabilities. Despite this, schools we spoke to reported they were not yet fully confident in using the system and needed ongoing training and support. 

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #331 - released 8 April 2020.

Published

Actions for Volume Nine 2011 focus on Education and Communities

Volume Nine 2011 focus on Education and Communities

Education
Community Services
Asset valuation
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Project management
Workforce and capability

The report includes comments on financial audits of government agencies in the Education and Communities sectors. The audits of the above entities’ financial statements for the year ended 30 June 2011 resulted in unmodified audit opinions within the Independent Auditor’s Reports. A key finding was that Treasury should consider issuing further guidance to arts and cultural bodies on collection valuation methodologies due to the significance of these assets to the State’s asset base.

Published

Actions for Volume Five 2011 focus on Superannuation, Compensation and Housing

Volume Five 2011 focus on Superannuation, Compensation and Housing

Finance
Treasury
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Regulation
Shared services and collaboration

The audits of the New South Wales Government controlled superannuation entities financial statements for the year ended 30 June 2011 resulted in unmodified audit opinions within the Independent Auditor’s Reports. Findings show that Treasury should review the structure and number of public sector superannuation funds and consider whether efficiencies and cost savings could be achieved through consolidation.

Published

Actions for Solar Bonus Scheme

Solar Bonus Scheme

Premier and Cabinet
Compliance
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Project management
Regulation
Risk
Service delivery

A NSW Auditor General’s Report has found that the NSW Government and its agencies grossly underestimated the cost and number of people that would install systems under the Solar Bonus Scheme.

By October 2010, the estimated cost of the Scheme, if it continued the way it was going, would have reached $3.988 billion. More than ten times the original estimate of $362 million. In response to the increased cost, the gross tariff for new applicants was reduced from 60 to 20 cents reducing the estimated cost to $1.954 billion.

It was a statutory requirement that when 50 mega watts of installed capacity was reached, the Government would review the Scheme. By the time the review was completed the installed capacity had reached 101 mega watts.

Published

Actions for Government expenditure and transport planning in relation to implementing Barangaroo

Government expenditure and transport planning in relation to implementing Barangaroo

Industry
Treasury
Transport
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Project management
Service delivery

Barangaroo is an ambitious and significant development on Government-owned Sydney Harbour foreshore. Construction on the 22 hectare CBD site is expected to take 12 years to 2023. Developer contributions to Government of $1 billion are to provide for public domain and other Government development costs, including a six hectare Headland Park. When completed the precinct is to service an anticipated 26,000 workers and residents and up to 33,000 visitors a day. The Auditor-General concluded that while there was extensive transport planning and extensive documentation supporting Government financial forecasts, considerable risks remain for the implementation of the Barangaroo project. 

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #214 - released 15 June 2011

Published

Actions for Two Ways Together - NSW Aboriginal Affairs Plan

Two Ways Together - NSW Aboriginal Affairs Plan

Community Services
Premier and Cabinet
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Project management
Service delivery

To date the Two Ways Together Plan (the Plan) has not delivered the improvement in overall outcomes for Aboriginal people that was intended. Stronger partnerships between the government and Aboriginal people are only beginning to emerge. The disadvantage still experienced by some of the estimated 160,000 Aboriginal people in NSW is substantial. For example, the unemployment rate for Aboriginal people is at least three times higher than the rate for all NSW residents and hospital admissions for diabetes are also around three times higher.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #213 - released 18 May 2011