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Actions for Government advertising 2020-21

Government advertising 2020-21

Premier and Cabinet
Compliance
Management and administration

What the report is about

The Government Advertising Act 2011 requires the Auditor General to conduct a performance audit on government advertising activities each financial year.

This audit looked at whether three campaigns run by Destination NSW (DNSW) during 2020–21 were carried out in an effective, economical and efficient manner:

  • Love Sydney (comprising two sub campaigns being ‘Sydney - Love It Like You Mean It’ and ‘Get Your Sydney On’)
  • Love NSW
  • Road Trips. 

What we found

DNSW complied with section 6 of the Government Advertising Act 2011 (the Act), prohibiting political content.

The Act requires the head of an agency to sign a compliance certificate that certifies that the campaign complies with the Act and is an efficient and cost effective means of achieving its public purpose. 

When the Acting Chief Executive of DNSW signed DNSW’s compliance certificate, evidence to support this certification was not available.

The Act requires a peer review and cost benefit analysis for campaigns over $1.0 million. DNSW did not complete the peer review or cost-benefit analysis for the audited advertising campaigns before they had concluded. 

The Department of Customer Service (DCS), which manages the peer review process, did not escalate the issue of the outstanding peer review documentation to senior DNSW staff. 

DNSW did not set targets for all measures established for the campaigns. This limits the ability to assess their effectiveness.

The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic likely contributed to the campaigns not meeting a substantial proportion of established outcome and impact targets.

None of the audited campaigns met the minimum requirement of 7.5 per cent for the allocation of the media budget for communications with Culturally and Linguistically Diverse and Aboriginal audiences.

What we recommended

DNSW should:

  • implement processes for planning and delivering advertising campaigns delivered in urgent circumstances to bring them in line with NSW Government practice
  • ensure that it establishes measurements and targets for outcomes and impacts of its advertising campaigns consistent with NSW Government evaluation frameworks and guidance.

The Department of Customer Service should:

  • establish a policy and procedure for ensuring that campaign documentation is completed in a timely manner in the case of urgent campaigns, including establishing expectations around timeframes for the completion of peer review
  • establish a procedure for escalating issues of outstanding documentation to ensure that the peer review is completed in line with reasonable expectations and timeframes.

Fast Facts

  • $9.6m is the total money spent on the three audited campaigns
  • $91.2m is the total amount of money spent by the NSW Government on advertising in 2020–21.

The Government Advertising Act 2011 (the Act) requires the Auditor-General to conduct a performance audit on the activities of one or more government agencies in relation to government advertising campaigns in each financial year. The performance audit assesses whether a government agency or agencies have carried out activities in relation to government advertising in an effective, economical and efficient manner and in compliance with the Act, the regulations, other laws and the Government Advertising Guidelines (the Guidelines). This audit examined three campaigns run by Destination NSW during the 2020–21 financial year:

  • Love Sydney (comprising two sub-campaigns being ‘Sydney - Love It Like You Mean It’ and ‘Get Your Sydney On’), focussing on increasing visitor activity in Sydney
  • Love NSW, focussing on increasing visitor activity in regional New South Wales
  • Road Trips, focussing on encouraging visitor activity on iconic road trips in regional New South Wales.

Section 6 of the Act prohibits political advertising. Under this section, material that is part of a government advertising campaign must not contain the name, voice or image of a minister, member of Parliament or a candidate nominated for election to Parliament or the name, logo or any slogan of a political party. Further, a campaign must not be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party.

The Act and associated regulations and the Guidelines also establish an accountability and compliance framework around the investment in advertising by NSW Government agencies.

The government's operating circumstances at the commencement of the 2020–21 financial year were highly challenging, with the 2019–20 bushfires being followed by the COVID-19 pandemic. This created new demands across a range of government services, and without any clear view on the severity of the pandemic and when it would end. This was the case for Destination NSW, which had to plan for its advertising activities in the context of an uncertain future for national border closures (impacting international in-bound travel) and lockdowns across Australia, including in New South Wales (impacting domestic travel). Further, the sudden nature of outbreaks and lockdowns meant that Destination NSW often was required to change the targeting of its campaigns and, in some situations, had to cease particular advertising activities until specific lockdowns had ended.

Conclusion

The three Destination NSW campaigns subject to this audit were consistent with the allowed purposes of government advertising and did not include political advertising.

Destination NSW did not comply with the requirement to complete a peer review of campaigns, nor did it complete a cost-benefit analysis before or during the conduct of each of the audited campaigns. These requirements of the Act are designed to provide reasonable assurance that the advertising campaigns represented efficient, effective and economical uses of government funds.

Two of the three campaigns achieved some of their objectives relating to influencing consumers. The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic likely contributed to all of the campaigns not meeting a substantial proportion of established outcome and impact targets, with the impact of COVID-19 varying across campaigns and performance measures. It is particularly difficult to determine the impact of COVID-19 where measures or targets have not been set, as was the case with some of the measures for these campaigns. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic also meant Destination NSW needed to make media placement changes when lockdown resulted in pauses or re-directions of media activities. This led to some unforeseen expenditure, but was an unavoidable consequence of needing to make changes at short notice.

Destination NSW was only able to present evidence that two of the campaigns ('Sydney - Love It Like You Mean It' and 'Love NSW') represented a positive benefit-cost ratio.

The Act requires the head of an agency to sign a compliance certificate stating that, among other things, the campaign complies with the Act, the regulations and the Guidelines, and that the campaign is an efficient and cost-effective means of achieving the public purpose. The Acting Chief Executive of Destination NSW signed the required compliance certificate associated with all of its 2020–21 advertising campaigns in February 2020, before they had been designed and planned, and before the associated expenditure had been approved.

Destination NSW did not complete required cost-benefit analyses before the campaigns commenced or while the campaigns were airing and did not establish complete suites of measures and targets for impact and outcomes of the advertising campaigns to inform the campaign.

Destination NSW did not ensure that the required peer review process was completed in a timely manner. The Department of Customer Service (DCS) supported Destination NSW's decision to commence the campaigns while the peer review was completed simultaneously. The Act allows this for urgent campaigns, and Destination NSW and DCS agreed that the need for this campaign to support driving economic activity in New South Wales after months of reduced activity brought on initially by the 2019–20 bushfires and then by the pandemic warranted this approach. As the campaigns progressed, DCS provided reminders to complete the peer review process, but this was not done. DCS did not escalate the issue of the incomplete peer review during this time. In September 2021 it advised Destination NSW officially that it would not consider further submissions for peer review with regard to the completed campaigns.

Destination NSW could not demonstrate how its campaign designs or media placements effectively supported the cultural needs and issues of culturally and linguistically diverse populations, consistent with the requirements of the 'Culturally and Linguistically Diverse (CALD) and Aboriginal Advertising Policy'.

Destination NSW did not establish comprehensive suites of measures and targets to allow for robust assessments of whether the campaigns achieved the intended outcomes from the campaigns. This limited the effectiveness of these measures as an accountability tool as intended by the NSW Government evaluation framework. 

All three advertising campaigns complied with the political advertising prohibitions in the Act and were for an allowed purpose.

The Acting Chief Executive of Destination NSW signed the required compliance certificate associated with all of its 2020–21 advertising campaigns in February 2020, before the campaigns had been designed and planned, and before the associated expenditure had been approved. This means that the assertions in the certification could not be supported. It is therefore not a reliable certification of compliance with the Act. A more reliable approach to completion of the compliance certificate, and an approach that is more typical across other NSW Government advertising campaigns, is to complete the certification after all planning and designs work is done, after the peer review is complete, and immediately prior to the launch of the campaign.

Destination NSW did not complete the peer review of campaigns, nor a cost-benefit analysis before or during the conduct of the audited campaigns. This is inconsistent with key aspects of accountability within the NSW Government's framework for advertising. As the campaigns progressed, DCS provided reminders to complete the peer review process, but this was not done by Destination NSW prior to the end of the campaigns. DCS did not escalate the issue of the incomplete peer review during this time. In September 2021 DCS advised Destination NSW officially that it would not consider further submissions with regard to the completed campaigns.

Destination NSW could not demonstrate how its campaign designs or media placements effectively supported the cultural needs and issues of culturally and linguistically diverse populations, consistent with the requirements of the 'CALD and Aboriginal Advertising Policy'. 

Campaign materials we reviewed did not contain political content

The audit team reviewed campaign materials developed as part of each of the paid advertising campaigns including radio transcripts, digital videos and display. See Appendix two for examples of campaign materials for this campaign.

Section 6 of the Act prohibits political advertising as part of a government advertising campaign. A government advertising campaign must not:

  • be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party
  • contain the name, voice or image of a minister, a member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament
  • contain the name, logo, slogan or any other reference to a political party.

The audit found no breaches of section 6 of the Act in the campaign material reviewed.

All reviewed campaigns were for purposes permitted by section 1.2 of the Guidelines

Section 4 of the Act states that government advertising campaigns are 'the dissemination to members of the public of information about a government program, policy or initiative, or about any public health or safety or other matter'. To support this, section 1.2 of the NSW Government Advertising Guidelines states that government advertising campaigns may only be used to achieve certain objectives. One of these objectives is to encourage changed behaviours or attitudes that will lead to improved public health and safety or quality of life.

The audit team considers that each of the reviewed advertising campaigns was consistent with this objective. This reflects the intent of each of the campaigns to increase economic activity driven by tourism activity in New South Wales, that contributes to improved quality of life for New South Wales residents.

The Acting Chief Executive signed Destination NSW's compliance certificate without supporting evidence

The Acting Chief Executive of Destination NSW signed a single compliance certificate for all Destination NSW campaigns for 2020–21 (including the three campaigns that are considered by this audit) on 28 February 2020. Evidence was not available at this date to support the statements included in the compliance certificate for the campaigns that were considered by this audit.

The compliance certificate is required by section 8 of the Act and states that the head of the agency confirms that a proposed government advertising campaign:

  • complies with the Act, the regulations and the Guidelines, and
  • contains accurate information, and
  • is necessary to achieve a public purpose and is supported by analysis and research, and
  • is an efficient and cost-effective means of achieving that public purpose.

At the time of signing the certificate in February 2020, Destination NSW had not conceived, designed or planned any of the campaigns that are considered by this audit, nor had it developed the relevant supporting information that would enable the agency to support these statements. As noted above, peer review had not commenced prior to this date. Further, Destination NSW had not completed a cost-benefit analysis or equivalent analysis.

Without any form of cost-benefit analysis or other evaluation for any of the campaigns prior to the date of signing of the compliance certificate, the Acting Chief Executive had no evidence that could support the certification that the campaigns were 'an efficient and effective means of achieving the public purpose'. The absence of peer review or a cost-benefit analysis also means that the Acting Chief Executive could not certify that the campaigns complied with the Act, the regulations or the Guidelines, nor that the campaign was supported by analysis and research.

Destination NSW did not complete peer reviews for the advertising campaigns before they ended, limiting assurance over campaign effectiveness, efficiency and economy

As all the campaigns subject to this audit were valued at over $250,000, each campaign was required to undergo peer review. The peer review is an independent review of the need for the proposed advertising campaign, the creative and media strategy (including objectives and target audiences) and how the agency will manage the campaign. Ordinarily, a peer review would be completed prior to a campaign commencing, however section 7(4) of the Act permits agencies to carry out a peer review after the advertising campaign commences 'if the head of the government agency concerned is satisfied that the campaign relates to an urgent public health or safety matter or is required in other urgent circumstances'.

DCS supported Destination NSW's assessment that these were urgent campaigns and that it would accept consideration of peer review components in parallel with the roll-out of the advertising campaigns, given the urgency of the need to generate economic activity, initially after the 2019–20 bushfires and then after the challenging circumstances brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic. This is in line with section 7(4) of the Act.

Destination NSW presented and obtained clearance on creative materials and media planning on a timely basis for two of the three campaigns (but not for the Road Trips campaign), which would ordinarily form part of peer review. However, for all campaigns, the peer reviews were not completed or signed off by DCS prior to the completion of advertising campaigns. In particular, Destination NSW did not submit material related to the accountability for campaign effectiveness, including the campaign objectives and measures before the end of the campaigns.

The absence of peer review of much of the material prior to completion of the campaigns reduces the ability of the agency and government to be confident that the advertising expenditure was consistent with NSW Government requirements, or represented efficient, effective and economical use of funds.

Destination NSW noted that section 7(4) of the Act allows the peer review to be completed after the commencement of a campaign in urgent circumstances but places no requirement on it to be completed before the end of the campaign. The audit has determined that for the peer review to meet its intended purpose, being to inform the design and delivery of the advertising campaign, it needs to be completed prior to the end of the campaign, even in urgent circumstances. DCS has supported this intent of the framework.

By the end of September 2021, DCS advised Destination NSW that it would not consider any further material for peer review related to the 2020–21 advertising campaigns. At this time, DCS closed the peer review for the Love NSW and Road Trips campaigns and assessed them as incomplete. DCS assessed the Love Sydney peer review as complete, despite noting that the campaign evaluation was not complete and with no details or confirmation of meeting culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) advertising requirements, including for Aboriginal communities.

DCS did not escalate the issue of outstanding peer review materials

DCS worked at officer level to remind Destination NSW that peer review material was outstanding during the year. While this is appropriate as an initial point of escalation, at no time was the issue of non-compliance escalated to higher levels of management. DCS also never sent formal correspondence requesting the materials needed to ensure the completion of peer review.

DCS does not have a process for ensuring the timely completion of peer review in situations where urgency exemptions are used. There is an opportunity to formalise this process to ensure that there are appropriate escalation points and to ensure that compliance obligations are fulfilled in future.

Destination NSW did not meet the minimum requirement for allocation of the media budget for communications with CALD and Aboriginal audiences

The NSW Government 'CALD and Aboriginal Advertising Policy' stipulates that at least 7.5 per cent of an advertising campaign media budget is to be spent on direct communications to multicultural and Aboriginal audiences. Spend may be on media or non-media communication activities (e.g. events, participation at cultural festivals, direct mail, competitions and websites).

Destination NSW spent only 1.6 per cent of its media spend on culturally and linguistically diverse specific media placement on the 'Sydney - Love It Like You Mean It' campaign and none of its media placement for the other audited campaigns. This level of expenditure is substantially below the requirement.

Destination NSW could not demonstrate how its campaign designs or media placements effectively supported the cultural needs and issues of culturally and linguistically diverse populations. In connection with the 'Sydney - Love It Like You Mean It' campaign, it was noted that timeframes and production issues limited the ability to incorporate culturally diverse individuals in imagery.

Destination NSW advised that it believes the application of a 7.5 per cent threshold for specific audiences is not an effective way to reach these audiences. Destination NSW advised that its advertising was targeted at audiences with a propensity to travel, which did not necessarily include culturally diverse audiences, and its media channel research influenced its decision not to target specific CALD-focussed media channels.

None of the above factors negate Destination NSW's responsibility to ensure that the 'CALD and Aboriginal Advertising Policy' requirements are met.

In addition, Destination NSW also noted a number of non-media activities that supported culturally and linguistically diverse audiences, including translations on the sydney.com website, capturing of culturally and linguistically diverse audiences in production shooting and the production of a range of other collateral for culturally and linguistically diverse audiences. Despite these non-media activities, which Destination NSW did not quantify, the requirement for minimum expenditure in the reviewed campaigns for CALD audiences was not met by Destination NSW.

Destination NSW advised that it believes that the 7.5 per cent requirement does not apply to advertising outside of New South Wales, which the 'Get Your Sydney On', Love NSW and Road Trips campaigns targeted in whole or in part. The 'CALD and Aboriginal Advertising Policy' does not specifically limit its application to advertising for New South Wales residents.

Destination NSW did not establish comprehensive suites of measures and targets to allow for robust assessments of whether the campaigns achieved the intended outcomes from the campaigns. This limited the effectiveness of these measures as an accountability tool as intended by the NSW Government Evaluation Framework.

None of the campaigns met the majority of the targets which had been established. This means that the campaigns did not have the market impact that was committed at the time of making the investment. Despite this, the Love NSW campaign did have a positive return on investment. The 'Get Your Sydney On' campaign was not required to undergo a cost-benefit analysis as it fell below the threshold, and the Road Trips campaign had not been assessed for return on investment at the time of the audit. This indicates a measure of cost-efficiency in the delivery of one of the campaigns, and a positive impact on the New South Wales economy. For the 'Sydney - Love It Like You Mean It' campaign, both the benefit-to-cost ratio and the return on investment were considerably below reasonable benchmarks, indicating a poor cost-efficiency outcome from the investment.

In all procurement of research, production and media services, Destination NSW complied with relevant procurement requirements, providing support to achieving value for money in relevant expenditure. 

Appendix one – Response to Destination NSW

Appendix two – Response from agencies

Appendix three – About the campaigns

Appendix four – About the audit

Appendix five – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #360 - released (23 December 2021).

Published

Actions for Machinery of government changes

Machinery of government changes

Premier and Cabinet
Treasury
Whole of Government
Management and administration
Project management

What the report is about

The term ‘machinery of government’ refers to the way government functions and responsibilities are organised.

The decision to make machinery of government changes is made by the Premier. Changes may be made for a range of reasons, including to support the policy and/or political objectives of the government of the day.

Larger machinery of government changes typically occur after an election or a change of Premier.

This report assessed how effectively the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (DPIE) and the Department of Regional NSW (DRNSW) managed their 2019 and 2020 machinery of government changes, respectively. It also considered the role of the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) and NSW Treasury in overseeing machinery of government changes.

What we found

The anticipated benefits of the changes were not articulated in sufficient detail and the achievement of benefits has not been monitored. The costs of the changes were not tracked or reported.

DPC and NSW Treasury provided principles to guide implementation but did not require departments to collect or report information about the benefits or costs of the changes.

The implementation of the machinery of government changes was completed within the set timeframes, and operations for the new departments commenced as scheduled.

Major implementation challenges included negotiation about the allocation of corporate support staff and the integration of complex corporate and ICT systems.

What we recommended

DPC and NSW Treasury should:

  • consolidate existing guidance on machinery of government changes into a single document that is available to all departments and agencies
  • provide guidance for departments and agencies to use when negotiating corporate services staff transfers as a part of machinery of government changes, including a standard rate for calculating corporate services requirements
  • progress work to develop and implement common processes and systems for corporate services in order to support more efficient movement of staff between departments and agencies.

Fast facts

  • $23.7m is the estimated minimum direct cost of the 2019 DPIE changes to date, noting additional ICT costs will be incurred
  • $4.0m is the estimated minimum direct cost of the 2020 DRNSW changes, with an estimated $2.7 million ongoing annual cost
  • 40+ NSW Government entities affected by the 2019 machinery of government changes

The term ‘machinery of government’ refers to the way government functions and responsibilities are allocated and structured across government departments and agencies. A machinery of government change is the reorganisation of these structures. This can involve establishing, merging or abolishing departments and agencies and transferring functions and responsibilities from one department or agency to another.

The decision to make machinery of government changes is made by the Premier. These changes may be made for a range of reasons, including to support the policy and/or political objectives of the government of the day. Machinery of government changes are formally set out in Administrative Arrangements Orders, which are prepared by the Department of Premier and Cabinet, as instructed by the Premier, and issued as legislative instruments under the Constitution Act 1902.

The heads of agencies subject to machinery of government changes are responsible for implementing them. For more complex changes, central agencies are also involved in providing guidance and monitoring progress.

The NSW Government announced major machinery of government changes after the 2019 state government election. These changes took place between April and June 2019 and involved abolishing five departments (Industry; Planning and Environment; Family and Community Services; Justice; and Finance, Services and Innovation) and creating three new departments (Planning, Industry and Environment; Communities and Justice; and Customer Service). This also resulted in changes to the 'clusters' associated with departments. The NSW Government uses clusters to group certain agencies and entities with related departments for administrative and financial management. Clusters do not have legal status. Most other departments that were not abolished had some functions added or removed as a part of these machinery of government changes. For example, the functions relating to regional policy and service delivery in the Department of Premier and Cabinet were moved to the new Department of Planning, Industry and Environment.

Our Report on State Finances 2019, tabled in October 2019, outlined these changes and identified several issues that can arise from machinery of government changes if risks are not identified early and properly managed. These include: challenges measuring the costs and benefits of machinery of government changes; disruption to services due to unclear roles and responsibilities; and disruption to control environments due to staff, system and process changes.

In April 2020, the Department of Regional NSW was created in a separate machinery of government change. This involved moving functions and agencies related to regional policy and service delivery from the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment into a standalone department.

This audit assessed how effectively the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (DPIE) and the Department of Regional NSW (DRNSW) managed their 2019 and 2020 machinery of government changes, respectively. It also considered the role of the Department of Premier and Cabinet and NSW Treasury in overseeing machinery of government changes. The audit investigated whether:

  • DPIE and DRNSW have integrated new responsibilities and functions in an effective and timely manner
  • DPIE and DRNSW can demonstrate the costs of the machinery of government changes
  • The machinery of government changes have achieved or are achieving intended outcomes and benefits.
Conclusion

It is unclear whether the benefits of the machinery of government changes that created the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (DPIE) and the Department of Regional NSW (DRNSW) outweigh the costs. The anticipated benefits of the changes were not articulated in sufficient detail and the achievement of directly attributable benefits has not been monitored. The costs of the changes were not tracked or reported. The benefits and costs of the machinery of government changes were not tracked because the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) and NSW Treasury did not require departments to collect or report this information. The implementation of the machinery of government changes was completed within the set timeframes, and operations for the new departments commenced as scheduled. This was achieved despite short timelines and no additional budget allocation for the implementation of the changes.

The rationale for establishing DPIE was not documented at the time of the 2019 machinery of government changes and the anticipated benefits of the change were not defined by the government or the department. For DRNSW, the government’s stated purpose was to provide better representation and support for regional areas, but no prior analysis was conducted to quantify any problems or set targets for improvement. Both departments reported some anecdotal benefits linked to the machinery of government changes. However, improvements in these areas are difficult to attribute because neither department set specific measures or targets to align with these intended benefits. Since the machinery of government changes were completed, limited data has been gathered to allow comparisons of performance before and after the changes.

DPC and NSW Treasury advised that they did not define the purpose and benefits of the machinery of government changes, or request affected departments to do so, because these were decisions of the government and the role of the public service was to implement the decisions.

We have attempted to quantify some of the costs of the DPIE and DRNSW changes based on the information the audited agencies could provide. This information does not capture the full costs of the changes because some costs, such as the impact of disruption on staff, are very difficult to quantify, and the costs of ICT separation and integration work may continue for several more years. Noting these limitations, we estimate the initial costs of these machinery of government changes are at least $23.7 million for DPIE and $4.0 million for DRNSW. For DPIE, this is predominantly made up of ICT costs and redundancy payments made around the time of the machinery of government change. For DRNSW it includes ICT costs and an increase in senior executive costs for a standalone department, which we estimate is an ongoing cost of at least $1.9 million per year.

For the DPIE machinery of government change, there were risks associated with placing functions and agencies that represent potentially competing policy interests within the same 'cluster', such as environment protection and industry. We did not see evidence of plans to manage these issues being considered by DPIE as a part of the machinery of government change process.

The efficiency of machinery of government changes could be improved in several ways. This includes providing additional standardised guidance on the allocation of corporate functions and resources when agencies are being merged or separated, and consolidating guidance on defining, measuring and monitoring the benefits and costs of machinery of government changes.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #359 - released (17 December 2021).

Published

Actions for COVID Intensive Learning Support Program

COVID Intensive Learning Support Program

Education
Management and administration
Project management
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

What the report is about

This audit examined a state-wide program to provide small-group tuition to students disadvantaged by the move to learning from home during 2020.

The audit assessed the design and implementation of the program.

What we found

The program design was based on research and data showing learning loss during 2020. 

The department rapidly planned and developed the policy design and guidelines for schools. 

Governance arrangements matured during program delivery.

The department changed the models for funding schools but did not clearly explain the reasons for doing so.

Government schools with over 900 students were disadvantaged by the funding model compared to smaller schools. 

Guidelines, resources and professional learning helped schools implement the program.

Staff eligibility for the program was expanded after reported difficulties in recruiting qualified teachers in some areas. 

Online tuition and third-party provider options were developed throughout the program.

There were issues with the quality and timeliness of data used to monitor school progress. 

Evaluation arrangements were developed early in the program.

Data limitations mean the evaluation will not be able to fully assess all program objectives.

What we recommended

  1. Distributing funds between schools more equitably and improving communication of the funding methods. 
  2. Clearer communication about the intended targeted group of students.
  3. Reviewing the time needed to administer the program.
  4. Improve support for educators other than qualified teachers.
  5. Offer the online tuition program to more schools.
  6. Analysis of the effects of learning from home during 2021 across equity groups and geographic areas.
  7. Working with universities to increase use of pre-service teachers in the program.

The report also identifies lessons learned for future programs.
 

Fast facts

  • $337m in total program funding. $289 million for government schools and $31 million for non government schools
  • 12 days to develop the policy and provide costings to Treasury 
  • 290,000 targeted students in government schools and 31,000 in non government schools
  • 80% of schools were providing small group tuition by the target start date of Week 6, Term 1
  • 2–4 months was the estimated student learning loss from the move to learning from home during 2020
  • 7,600 tutors engaged in the program as at September 2021.

The NSW Government announced the COVID Intensive Learning Support Program on 10 November 2020, as part of the 2020–21 NSW Budget. The primary goal of the $337 million program was to deliver intensive small group tuition for students who were disadvantaged by the move to remote and/or flexible learning, helping to close the equity gap. It included:

  • $306 million to provide small-group tuition for eligible students across every NSW Government primary, secondary and special purpose school
  • $31.0 million for around 400 non-government schools to provide small-group tuition to students with the greatest levels of need.

The objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness of the design and implementation of the COVID Intensive Learning Support Program (the program). To address this objective, the audit assessed whether the Department of Education (the department):

  • effectively designed the program and supporting governance arrangements
  • is effectively implementing the program.

This audit focuses on activities between October 2020 and August 2021, which aimed to address the first session of learning from home in New South Wales. From August to October 2021, students in many areas of New South Wales were learning from home again, but this second period has not been a focus of this audit. On 18 October 2021, the NSW Government announced the program would be extended into 2022.

Conclusion

The COVID Intensive Learning Support Program was effectively designed to help students catch up on learning loss due to the interruptions to schooling caused by COVID-19. The department rapidly stood up a taskforce to implement the program and then developed supporting governance arrangements during implementation.

Most students in New South Wales were required to learn from home for at least seven weeks during 2020 due to the impact of the Novel-Coronavirus (COVID-19). The department researched, analysed and advised government on several options to address the learning loss that resulted. It recommended small group tuition as the preferred option as it was supported by available evidence and could be rolled out at scale with speed. It identified risks of ensuring an adequate supply of educators and options to address those risks. Consistent with its analysis of where the impact of the learning loss was most severe, the department proposed to direct funding to schools with higher concentrations of students from the most disadvantaged backgrounds.

The department established a cross-functional taskforce to conduct detailed planning and support program implementation. Short timeframes meant the taskforce initially sought approval for key decisions from the program sponsor and existing oversight bodies on an as-needed basis before dedicated program governance arrangements were formalised. Once established, the governance body met regularly to oversee program delivery.

The COVID Intensive Learning Support Program is being effectively implemented. The department has refined the program during rollout to respond to risks, issues and feedback from schools. Issues with how schools enter data into department systems have affected the timeliness and accuracy of program monitoring information.

The department provided schools with guidelines, example models of delivery, systems to record student progress and professional learning. Around 80 per cent of schools had begun delivering tuition under the program by the target date. Schools reported issues with sourcing qualified teachers as a key reason they were unable to start the program by the expected date. In response, the department expanded the type of staff schools could employ, developed an online tuition program, and allowed schools to engage third-party providers to help schools that had difficulty finding qualified teachers for the program.

The department used existing systems to monitor school progress in implementing the program. This reduced the administrative burden on schools, but there were several issues with data quality and timeliness. The program included a mid-year review point to check whether schools were on track to spend their funding. This helped focus schools on ensuring funding would be spent and allowed for redistribution between schools.

The department considered program evaluation early in policy design and planning. It embedded an evaluator on the taskforce and expanded a key assessment program to help provide evidence of impact. A process and outcome evaluation is underway which will help inform future delivery. The evaluation will examine educational impacts for students participating in the program but it has not established methods to reliably assess the extent to which the program has met a goal to help 'close the equity gap' for students.

This chapter considers how effectively the COVID Intensive Learning Support Program (the program) was designed and planned for implementation.

This chapter considers how effectively the COVID Intensive Learning Support Program was implemented over our period of review (Terms 1 and 2, 2021).

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #358 - released (15 December 2021).

Published

Actions for Premier and Cabinet 2021

Premier and Cabinet 2021

Premier and Cabinet
Whole of Government
Asset valuation
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Shared services and collaboration

This report analyses the results of our audits of the Premier and Cabinet cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2021.

Our preferred approach is to table the ‘Report on State Finances’ in Parliament before any other cluster report. This is because the 'Report on State Finances' focuses on the audit results and observations relating to the Total State Sector Accounts, in effect a consolidation of all government agencies. This year the 'Report on State Finances' has been delayed due to significant accounting issues being considered in the Total State Sector Accounts and which may impact the Treasury and Transport clusters.

As there are no outstanding matters relating to audits in the Premier and Cabinet cluster impacting the Total State Sector Accounts we have decided to break with normal practice and table this cluster report ahead of the ‘Report on State Finances’.

What the report is about

The results of the Premier and Cabinet cluster (the cluster) agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all Premier and Cabinet cluster agencies.

The number of monetary misstatements decreased from 49 in 2019–20 to 38 in 2020–21.

The Library Council of New South Wales corrected a prior period error of $325 million. In 2017, the council split its collection assets into six asset classes, but not the related asset revaluation reserves. To correct this error, some revaluation decrements previously recognised in asset revaluation reserves were reclassified to accumulated funds.

Eight agencies did not complete all of the mandatory early close procedures.

What the key issues were

The Premier and Cabinet cluster was impacted by three Machinery of Government (MoG) changes during 2020–21.

The changes resulted in the transfer of activities and functions in and out of the cluster and the creation of a new entity - Investment NSW.

The transferor entities continued to provide services to Investment NSW subsequent to 30 June 2021. There were no formal service level agreements in place for the provision of these services.

The New South Wales Electoral Commission (the Commission) and Sydney Opera House Trust obtained letters of financial support from their relevant Minister and/or NSW Treasury in 2020–21. The postponement of local government elections impacted the Commission's operations due to increased planned expenditure to support a COVID-safe election. Sydney Opera House Trust's ability to generate revenue was impacted due to the closure of the Concert Hall partly due to COVID-19 and planned renovations.

The number of repeated audit issues raised with management and those charged with governance increased from 22 in 2019–20 to 24 in 2020–21.

There were 47 moderate risk and 28 low risk findings identified. Of the total findings there were 24 repeat issues.

What we recommended

Investment NSW should ensure services received from other agencies are governed by service level agreements.

Fast facts

The Department of Premier and Cabinet supports the Premier and Cabinet to deliver the government's objectives, infrastructure, preparedness for disaster, incident recovery, arts and culture.

  • $11.9b of property, plant and equipment as at 30 June 2021
  • $4.4b total expenditure incurred in 2020-21
  • 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued on agencies' 30 June 2021 financial statements
  • 47 moderate risk findings were reported to management 
  • 38 monetary misstatements were reported in 2020-21
  • 32% of all reported issues were repeat issues.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Premier and Cabinet’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Premier and Cabinet cluster (the cluster) for 2021.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all completed cluster agencies' 2020–21 financial statements.
  • Monetary misstatements decreased from 49 in 2019–20 to 38 in 2020–21.
  • Thirteen agencies were exempt from financial reporting in 2020–21. 

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Premier and Cabinet cluster.

Section highlights

  • The 2020–21 audits identified 47 moderate risk issues across the cluster. Sixteen of the moderate risk issues were repeat issues. Many repeat issues related to governance and oversight and information technology.
  • The number of moderate risk findings increased by 42 per cent in 2020–21.
  • The moderate risk issues included information technology improvements, lack of service level agreements, risk management, contract and procurement and asset management improvements.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Education 2021

Education 2021

Education
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Procurement

This report analyses the results of our audits of the Education cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2021.

Our preferred approach is to table the ‘Report on State Finances’ in Parliament before any other cluster report. This is because the 'Report on State Finances' focuses on the audit results and observations relating to the Total State Sector Accounts, in effect a consolidation of all government agencies. This year the 'Report on State Finances' has been delayed due to significant accounting issues being considered in the Total State Sector Accounts and which may impact the Treasury and Transport clusters.

As there are no outstanding matters relating to audits in the Education cluster impacting the Total State Sector Accounts we have decided to break with normal practice and table this cluster report ahead of the ‘Report on State Finances’.

What the report is about

The results of the Education cluster (the cluster) agencies' financial statements audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued on the Department of Education (the department), the NSW Education Standards Authority and the NSW Skills Board's financial statements.

An 'other matter' paragraph was included in the Technical and Further Education Commission's (the TAFE Commission) audit opinion drawing attention to legislative non-compliance concerning financial delegations during the reporting year.

The number of misstatements identified in the financial statements of cluster agencies decreased from 14 in 2019–20 to seven.

What the key issues were

The department and the TAFE Commission revalued their land assets this year, recognising collective increases of $863.8 million.

The department and the TAFE Commission are not scheduled to perform comprehensive revaluations of their buildings until 2022–23. Construction costs, which are a key input in their current replacement cost valuation methodologies for buildings, may have increased by an estimated nine per cent since the last comprehensive revaluation in 2017–18 based on broad based indices used by the department and the TAFE Commission. While the estimated index increase indicates the fair value of buildings may exceed the carrying values, the use of such high-level indicators has a degree of estimation uncertainty due to the specialised nature of the assets. Therefore, both agencies did not adjust the values of their buildings.

The number of issues we reported to management decreased. Fifty per cent of issues were repeated from prior years.

Of the 11 newly identified moderate rated issues, seven related to internal control deficiencies, with six identified in procurement and payroll controls.

What we recommended

The department and the TAFE Commission reconsider policy settings governing the frequency of revaluations; and refine and consider the outcomes of interim fair value assessments to ensure asset carrying values reflect fair value at each balance date.

Cluster agencies should prioritise and action recommendations to address internal control deficiencies.

Fast facts

The Education cluster, comprising four agencies, administers and delivers education and training services for NSW students, workers and industry.

  • $38.6b property, plant and equipment as at 30 June 2021
  • $21.2b total expenditure incurred in 2020–21
  • 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued on agencies’ 30 June 2021 financial statements
  • 22 moderate risk management letter findings were identified and reported to management
  • monetary misstatements were reported in 2020–21
  • 50% of reported issues were repeat issues

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Education cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Education cluster (the cluster) for 2021.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the financial statements of cluster agencies.

  • Comprehensive revaluations of the Department of Education (the department) and the Technical and Further Education Commission's (the TAFE Commission) land assets resulted in collective net increases of $863.8 million to the carrying values of these entities' land assets.

  • Fair value assessments, based on broad indices, of the department and the TAFE Commission's buildings, indicated that replacement costs may have increased by an estimated nine per cent. Whilst the next comprehensive valuation is not scheduled until 2022–23, the department and the TAFE Commission will need to consider the outcomes of their annual assessments to ensure that the carrying amounts continue to reflect the fair value of these specialised assets in their financial statements.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Education cluster.

Section highlights

  • The 2020–21 audits identified 22 moderate issues across the cluster. Eleven moderate risk issues were repeat issues and related to general and application information technology controls and deficiencies in procurement and payroll practices.
  • Of the 11 newly identified moderate rated issues, seven related to internal control deficiencies and improvements, with identified deficiencies in procurement and payroll accounting for six.
  • A high-risk issue identified in 2019–20 relating to the Department of Education's (the department) monitoring of privileged user activity has largely been addressed.

Findings reported to management

The number of findings reported to management has decreased. Fifty per cent of all issues were repeat issues

Breakdowns and weaknesses in internal controls increase the risk of fraud and error. Deficiencies in internal controls, matters of governance interest and unresolved issues were reported to management and those charged with governance of agencies. The Audit Office does this through management letters, which include observations, related implications, recommendations and risk ratings.

In 2020–21, there were 28 findings raised across the cluster (33 in 2019–20). Fifty per cent of all issues were repeat issues (45 per cent in 2019–20).

The most common repeat issues related to weaknesses in controls over information technology general controls, application controls, and identified deficiencies in procurement and payroll practices.

A delay in implementing audit recommendations increases the risk of intentional and accidental errors in processing information, producing management reports and generating financial statements. This can impair decision-making, affect service delivery and expose agencies to fraud, financial loss and reputational damage. Poor controls may also mean agency staff are less likely to follow internal policies, inadvertently causing the agency not to comply with legislation, regulation and central agency policies.

The table below describes the common issues identified across the cluster by category and risk rating.

Risk rating Issue
Information technology

Moderate2
2 new,
6 repeat

The financial audits identified areas for agencies to improve information technology processes and controls that support the integrity of financial data used to prepare agencies' financial statements. Of note were deficiencies identified in:
  • agencies' user access administration and change management procedures, notably in the timing and frequency of managerial reviews over the granting and revocation of access to key systems relevant to financial reporting
  • application controls and segregation of duties in payroll systems, allowing certain users to access or modify employee records as well as process payroll
  • system configurations whereby preparers of manual journals can also post without a secondary review
  • password reviews undertaken that align with approved password guidelines
  • the monitoring of privileged user activities.

Low1
2 new,
1 repeat

Internal control deficiencies or improvements

Moderate2
7 new,
4 repeat

The financial audits identified internal control weaknesses across key business processes relevant to financial reporting. Of note were deficiencies identified in:
  • the adequacy of monitoring and oversight activities over the use of multiple financial delegation configurations in finance systems for specific users
  • the timely recording and approval of overtime claims and higher duties allowances
  • the timely finalisation of policies and procedures
  • procurement practices including a high proportion of retrospective purchase orders and the timely receipting of goods and services
  • the timely notification of employee resignations or employees applying for leave without pay, leading to salary overpayments
  • the management of excessive annual leave balances
  • the extent of review or approval of changes to lease information.

 Low1
1 new,
2 repeat

Financial reporting

Moderate2
2 new,
1 repeat

The financial audits identified:
  • opportunities for agencies to strengthen their financial preparation processes to facilitate a timelier and more efficient year-end audit
  • the need for agencies with non-financial assets subject to fair value to reconsider policy settings governing the frequency of revaluations; and to refine and consider the outcomes of interim fair value assessments to ensure asset carrying values reflect fair value at each balance date.

Low1
0 new,
0 repeat


3 High risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
2 Moderate risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
1 Low risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.

 
Note: Management letter findings are based on final management letters issued to agencies.

The department continues to address recommendations to improve monitoring of privileged user access

Privileged users have higher levels of access to systems, and in some instances, may include access that can bypass segregation of duty controls. If reviews of access logs are not fully embedded in the control environment, the risk of unauthorised transactions occurring and not being detected in a timely manner is elevated.

In 2019–20 a high-risk issue was reported at the department relating to the inadequate monitoring and follow up of privileged user activity in its enterprise resource planning system – SAP. This year the department has largely addressed our findings by initiating a review of the identified instances of privileged user activity and establishing periodic oversight controls. There remains a need to improve the timeliness and completeness of these newly implemented controls.

Data analytics identified the root cause of internal control deficiencies in procurement and payroll

Our 2020–21 agency management letters identified seven new moderate risk internal control deficiency matters, of which six related to payroll and procurement.

To enhance our financial statement audit of the department we applied data analytics over elements of the department's procurement and payroll control processes. Our procedures, conducted over periods across the financial year, helped identify the following:

  • a low level of compliance with procurement practices requiring the creation of purchase orders before invoices are received. The root cause was a lack of understanding by agency staff of the procurement processes
  • transactions related to previous years being recorded in the current year. The root cause was a lack of understanding of the three-way matching process and the goods received/not invoiced facilities within SAP
  • negative payments in fortnightly pay runs, predominantly representing deductions to recover salary payments made in error. The root cause was the lack of timeliness in notifying payroll for cessation of employment, or for employees undertaking secondments who should have been classified as being on leave without pay.
 
 

Recommendation

We recommend cluster agencies prioritise and action recommendations to address the internal control deficiencies outlined above. 

Appendix one – Early close procedures

 

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Published

Actions for Managing climate risks to assets and services

Managing climate risks to assets and services

Planning
Environment
Treasury
Industry
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery

What the report is about

This report assessed how effectively the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (DPIE) and NSW Treasury have supported state agencies to manage climate risks to their assets and services.

Climate risks that can impact on state agencies' assets and services include flooding, bushfires, and extreme temperatures. Impacts can include damage to transport, communications and energy infrastructure, increases in hospital admissions, and making social housing or school buildings unsuitable.

NSW Treasury estimates these risks could have significant costs.

What we found

DPIE and NSW Treasury’s support to agencies to manage climate risks to their assets and services has been insufficient.

In 2021, key agencies with critical assets and services have not conducted climate risk assessments, and most lack adaptation plans.

DPIE has not delivered on the NSW Government commitment to develop a state-wide climate change adaptation action plan. This was to be complete in 2017.

There is also no adaptation strategy for the state. These have been released in all other Australian jurisdictions. The NSW Government’s draft strategic plan for its Climate Change Fund was also never finalised.

DPIE’s approach to developing climate projections is robust, but it hasn’t effectively educated agencies in how to use this information to assess climate risk.

NSW Treasury did not consistently apply dedicated resourcing to support agencies' climate risk management until late 2019.

In March 2021, DPIE and NSW Treasury released the Climate Risk Ready NSW Guide and Course. These are designed to improve support to agencies.

What we recommended

DPIE and NSW Treasury should, in partnership:

  • enhance the coordination of climate risk management across agencies
  • implement climate risk management across their clusters.

DPIE should:

  • update information and strengthen education to agencies, and monitor progress
  • review relevant land-use planning, development and building guidance
  • deliver a climate change adaptation action plan for the state.

NSW Treasury should:

  • strengthen climate risk-related guidance to agencies
  • coordinate guidance on resilience in infrastructure planning
  • review how climate risks have been assured in agencies’ asset management plans.

Fast facts

4 years

between commitments in the NSW Climate Change Policy Framework, and DPIE and NSW Treasury producing key supports to agencies for climate risk management.

$120bn

Value of physical assets held by nine NSW Government entities we examined that have not completed climate risk assessments.

Low capability to do climate risk assessment has been found across state agencies. The total value of NSW Government physical assets is $365 billion, as at 30 June 2020.

x3

NSW Treasury’s estimates of the annual fiscal and economic costs associated with natural disasters will triple by 2060–61.

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 2021, each of the last four decades has been successively warmer and surface temperatures will continue to increase until at least the mid-century. The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) and the Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) have reported that extreme weather across Australia is more frequent and intense, and there have been longer-term changes to weather patterns. They also report sea levels are rising around Australia increasing the risk of inundation and damage to coastal infrastructure and communities.

According to the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department), in New South Wales the impacts of a changing climate, and the risks associated with it, will be felt differently across regions, populations and economic sectors. The department's climate projections indicate the number of hot days will increase, rainfall will vary across the state, and the number of severe fire days will increase.

The NSW Government is a provider of essential services, such as health care, education and public transport. It also owns and manages around $365 billion in physical assets (as at June 2020). More than $180 billion of its assets are in major infrastructure such as roads and railway lines.

In NSW, climate risks that could directly impact on state agencies' assets and services include flooding, bushfires, and extreme temperatures. In recent years, natural hazards exacerbated by climate change have damaged and disrupted government transport, communications and energy infrastructure. As climate risks eventuate, they can also increase hospital admissions when people are affected by poorer air quality, and make social housing dwellings or schools unsafe and unusable during heatwaves. The physical impacts of a changing climate also have significant financial costs. Taking into account projected economic growth, NSW Treasury has estimated that the fiscal and economic costs associated with natural disasters due to climate change will more than triple per year by 2061.

The department and NSW Treasury advise that leading practice in climate risk management includes a process that explicitly identifies climate risks and integrates these into existing risk management, monitoring and reporting systems. This is in line with international risk management and climate adaptation standards. For agencies to manage the physical risks of climate change to their assets and services, leading practice identified by the department means that they need to:

  • use robust climate projection information to understand the potential climate impacts
  • undertake sound climate risk assessments, within an enterprise risk management framework
  • implement adaptation plans that reduce these risks, and harness opportunities.

Adaptation responses that could be planned for include: controlling development in flood-prone locations; ensuring demand for health services can be met during heatwaves; improving thermal comfort in schools to support student engagement; proactive asset maintenance to reduce disruption of essential services, and safeguarding infrastructure from more frequent and intense natural disasters.

According to NSW Treasury policy, agencies are individually responsible for risk management systems appropriate to their context. The department and NSW Treasury have key roles in ensuring that agencies are supported with robust information and timely, relevant guidance to help manage risks to assets and services effectively, especially for emerging risks that require coordinated responses, such as those posed by climate change.

This audit assessed whether the department and NSW Treasury are effectively supporting NSW Government agencies to manage climate risks to their assets and services. It focused on the management of physical risks to assets and services associated with climate change.

Conclusion

The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) has made climate projections available to agencies since 2014, but provided limited guidance to assist agencies to identify and manage climate risks. NSW Treasury first noted climate change as a contextual factor in its 2012 guidance on risk management. NSW Treasury only clarified requirements for agencies to integrate climate considerations into their risk management processes in December 2020.
The department has not delivered on a NSW Government commitment for a state-wide climate change adaptation action plan, which was meant to be completed in 2017. Currently many state agencies that own or manage assets and provide services do not have climate risk management in place.
Since 2019, the department and NSW Treasury have worked in partnership to develop a coordinated approach to supporting agencies to manage these risks. This includes guidance to agencies on climate risk assessment and adaptation planning published in 2021.
More work is needed to embed, sustain and lead effective climate risk management across the NSW public sector, especially for the state's critical infrastructure and essential services that may be exposed to climate change impacts.

The NSW Government set directions in the 2016 NSW Climate Change Policy Framework to 'manage the impact of climate change on its assets and services by embedding climate change considerations into asset and risk management’ and more broadly into 'government decision-making'.

The department released climate projections and has made information on projected climate change impacts available since 2014, but this has not been effectively communicated to agencies. The absence of a state-wide climate change adaptation action plan has limited the department's implementation of a coordinated, well-communicated program of support to agencies for their climate risk management.

NSW Treasury is responsible for managing the state's finances and providing stewardship to the public sector on financial and risk management, but it did not consistently apply dedicated resourcing to support agencies' climate risk management until late 2019. NSW Treasury estimates the financial costs of climate-related physical risks are significant and will continue to grow.

The partnership between the department and NSW Treasury has produced the 2021 Climate Risk Ready NSW Guide and Course, which aim to help agencies understand their exposure to climate risks and develop adaptation responses. The Guide maps out a process for climate risk assessment and adaptation planning and is referenced in NSW Treasury policy on internal audit and risk management. It is also referenced in NSW Treasury guidance to agencies on how to reflect the effects of climate-related matters in financial statements.

There is more work to be done by the department on maintaining robust, accessible climate information and educating agencies in its use. NSW Treasury will need to continue to update its policies, guidance and economic analyses with relevant climate considerations to support an informed, coordinated approach to managing physical climate risks to agencies' assets and services, and to the state's finances more broadly.

The effectiveness of the department and NSW Treasury's support involves the proactive and sustained take-up of climate risk management by state agencies. There is a key role for the department and NSW Treasury in monitoring this progress and its results.

Prior to 2021, support provided by the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) to agencies for managing physical climate risks to their assets and services has been limited. NSW Treasury has a stewardship role in public sector performance, including risk management, but has not had a defined role in working with the department on climate risk matters until mid-2019. The low capacity of agencies to undertake this work has been known to NSW Government through agency surveys by the department in 2015 and by the department and NSW Treasury in 2018.

The support delivered to agencies around climate risk management, including risk assessment and adaptation planning, has been slow to start and of limited impact. The department's capacity to implement a coordinated approach to supporting agencies has also been limited by the absence of a state-wide adaptation strategy and related action plan.

In 2021, products were released by the department and NSW Treasury with potential to improve support to agencies on climate risk assessment and adaption planning (that this, Climate Risk Ready NSW Guide and Course, which provides links to key NSW Treasury polices). The department and NSW Treasury are now leading work to develop a more coordinated approach to climate risk management for agencies' assets and services, and building the resilience of the state to climate risk more broadly.

Climate projections are a key means of understanding the potential impacts of climate change, which is an important step in the climate risk assessment process. The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) used a robust approach to develop its climate projections (NARCliM). The full version of NARCliM (v1.0) is based on 2007 models11 and while still relevant, this has limited its perceived usefulness and uptake. The process of updating these projections requires significant resourcing. The department has made recent updates to enhance the currency and usefulness of its climate projections. NARCliM (v2.0) should be available in 2022.

While climate projections have been available to agencies and the community more broadly since 2013–14, the department has not been effective in educating the relevant data users within agencies in how to use the information for climate risk assessments and adaptation planning.

The absence of a strategy focused on this is significant and has contributed to the current low levels of climate risk assessment uptake across agencies (see section 2). Agencies are required to use the climate projections developed by the department when developing long term plans and strategies as part of the NSW Government Common Planning Assumptions.


11 The department advises the 2007 global climate models were released to users by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 2010.
It is too soon to determine the impact of the 2021 Climate Risk Ready NSW (CRR) Guide and Course, produced by the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) and NSW Treasury. But there are opportunities for these agencies to progress these developments in partnership: especially with the establishment of senior executive steering and oversight committees related to climate risk.

For the department, key opportunities to embed climate risk management include leveraging land use planning policies and guidance to drive adaptation, which has potential to better protect the state's assets and services. NSW Treasury has a role in continuing to update its policies, guidance and economic analyses with relevant climate change considerations to support an informed, coordinated approach to addressing physical climate risks to agencies' assets and services, and to the state's finances more broadly.

There is currently no plan on how the department and NSW Treasury intend to routinely monitor the progress of agencies with implementing the CRR Guide or developing climate risk 'maturity' more broadly. As agencies are responsible for implementing risk management systems that meet NSW Treasury standards, which now clearly includes consideration of climate risk (TPP20-08), establishing effective monitoring, reporting and accountability around this progress should be a priority for the department and NSW Treasury.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – Timeline of key activities 

Appendix three – About the audit 

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #355 - released (7 September 2021).

Published

Actions for Grants administration for disaster relief

Grants administration for disaster relief

Treasury
Finance
Compliance
Fraud
Management and administration
Project management

What the report is about

The report examined whether NSW Treasury, Service NSW and the Department of Customer Service effectively administered grants programs funded under the $750 million Small Business Support Fund, including:

  • $10,000 Small Business Support Grant
  • $3,000 Small Business Recovery Grant.

What we found

The agencies effectively implemented the grants within required timeframes, reflecting the NSW Government’s decision to deliver urgent financial support to small businesses impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic.

NSW Treasury met urgent timeframes to design the grants and Service NSW made timely payments in line with the grants' objectives and eligibility criteria.

Service NSW and the Department of Customer Service strengthened processes to detect and minimise fraud in response to identified external fraud risks, and to investigate suspected fraudulent applications.

Fraud security checks and investigations are ongoing, and the agencies will not know the full extent of fraud across the grants until these processes have been completed.

The agencies regularly monitored and reported on the timeliness of payments to small business applicants but have not yet measured all benefits of the grants programs.

The $10,000 Support Grant and the $3,000 Recovery Grant have provided around $630 million in one off grant payments to eligible small businesses.

What we recommended

NSW Treasury should finalise and implement an evaluation of both grants programs, including obtaining feedback from businesses.

Service NSW should develop a framework that documents expected controls for how it administers grants, including business processes, fraud control and governance and probity requirements.

Service NSW should publish information on all grants programs, including grants distribution and uptake.

The Department of Customer Service should ensure its processes for managing conflicts of interest meets its policy requirements.

Upcoming performance audit

The Audit Office is conducting a further performance audit into grants administration for disaster relief focussing on bushfire grants. This is planned to complete in 2021-22.

Fast facts

Small Business Support Fund
  • $630m Grant payments made to small businesses under two grants administered
  • Over 52,500 Applications received a $10,000 Grant payment
  • Over 23,000 Businesses paid both $10,000 Support Grant and $3,000 Recovery Grant
  • 36,700 Applications received a $3,000 grant payment
Grant program administration
  • 11 Days taken to deliver the $10,000 Small Business Support Grant application website
  • 26 Days taken to deliver the $3,000 Small Business Recovery Grant application website

Further information

Please contact Ian Goodwin, Deputy Auditor-General on 9275 7347 or by email.

The NSW Government responded to the partial shutdown of the NSW economy caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 by, among other measures, announcing on 3 April 2020 that it would place $750 million into the Small Business Support Fund (the Fund).

Under the Fund, the NSW Government would pay one-off grants of up to $10,000 to small business impacted by the shutdown. The objectives of the $10,000 Small Business Support Grant ($10,000 Support Grant) were to:

  • ease the pressure on small businesses that have been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic
  • support the ongoing operations of small businesses highly impacted by the COVID-19 restrictions
  • deliver cash-flow into small businesses as soon as possible so that small businesses could meet pressing financial needs.

Grant applications were assessed against eligibility criteria that were determined by the NSW Government. The eligibility criteria for the $10,000 Support Grant required an employing small business to demonstrate it was significantly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic by self-declaring or demonstrating a significant decline of 75 per cent or more in turnover compared to 2019. Documentation requirements were relaxed for small businesses within highly impacted industries.

In June 2020, the NSW Government announced a second round of one-off grants of up to $3,000 to small businesses that were highly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic ($3,000 Recovery Grant). The objective of the $3,000 Recovery Grant was to help small businesses in 'highly impacted industries' — those directly impacted by the restrictions and closures put in place under the Public Health Orders — to meet the costs of safely reopening or scaling up operations.

The eligibility criteria for the $3,000 Recovery Grant required that a small business be in a highly impacted industry, demonstrate that it was significantly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic by declaring a significant decline in turnover, and had costs associated with reopening under the 'COVID-Safe' requirements.

NSW Treasury and Service NSW implemented both grants on behalf of the NSW Government. The process of applying for a grant was intended to be quick and easy, with Service NSW using automated assessments and simple online application forms to process applications. Applicants applied for the $10,000 Support Grant through the Service NSW website between 14 April 2020 to 30 June 2020 and applied for the $3,000 Small Business Recovery Grant between 1 July 2020 and 31 August 2020.

At May 2021, around $520 million has been paid to over 52,500 grant applicants under the $10,000 Support Grant and around $109 million had been paid to around 36,700 grant applicants under the $3,000 Recovery Grant.

The Audit Office plans to undertake a performance audit into grants administration for disaster relief focussing on bushfire grants in 2021–22.

This audit assessed whether the grants funded under the $750 million Small Business Support Fund were effectively administered and implemented to provide disaster relief. It addressed the following questions:

  • Were funded grants programs planned, designed and targeted effectively?
  • Were funded grants programs implemented in line with the objectives and criteria and delivery requirements?
  • Have agencies established measures to monitor intended benefits and outcomes?

This audit did not seek to assess the effectiveness of any other grant programs or stimulus measures. It also did not seek to assess the impact of the funding on applicants, or the future prospects of small businesses that received support.

Conclusion

NSW Treasury and Service NSW effectively implemented two grants within required timeframes reflecting the NSW Government's decision to deliver urgent financial support to small businesses impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. The $10,000 Support Grant and the $3,000 Recovery Grant have provided around $630 million in one-off grant payments to eligible small businesses.
NSW Treasury met urgent timeframes to design the grants and Service NSW made timely payments in line with the grants' objectives and eligibility criteria.

NSW Treasury met urgent timeframes to provide advice to the NSW Government on the grant design, proposed delivery partner, expected numbers of eligible businesses and the suitability of the proposed grant payment amount within the required timeframes. This was achieved within one day for the $10,000 Support Grant and within four days for the $3,000 Support Grant. In the context of the complex and changing pandemic and economic conditions between March and July 2020, NSW Treasury's advice to government outlined the risk, feasibility, expected demand estimates and assumptions for the grants.

NSW Treasury's demand projections were limited by uncertainty as to the pandemic's economic impact. Estimated demand for the grants was not met, resulting in around $120 million from the Small Business Support Fund remaining unspent.

Service NSW met urgent timeframes to stand-up both grants: 11 days for the $10,000 Support Grant and 26 days for the $3,000 Recovery Grant. It met agreed delivery requirements and made timely payments to small businesses in line with the grants' objectives and eligibility criteria. Over 65,000 businesses have received a payment under either grant, and over 23,000 businesses received both grants.

Gaps in project and risk management processes were expected given the tight timeframe to implement the grants.

The tight timeframe in which the agencies had to implement the grants contributed to gaps in project and risk management. The agencies advised that compromises were understood by both parties and were a necessary trade-off to ensure payments were made quickly.

Service NSW and the Department of Customer Service have acted to strengthen their processes to detect and minimise fraud in response to identified external fraud risks and to investigate suspected fraudulent applications since the grants commenced. Service NSW intends to further enhance fraud controls for grants applications and payments for future grants by implementing a fraud control framework by December 2021.

The agencies regularly monitored and reported on the timeliness of payments to small business applicants but have not yet measured all benefits of the grants programs.

Service NSW and NSW Treasury established processes to monitor and report on the timeliness of payments to grant applicants.

NSW Treasury has not yet measured all intended impacts of the grants, nor undertaken processes to obtain detailed feedback from grant recipients. Without these measures, there is limited insight into the extent to which the grants helped to support small businesses or ability to capture lessons which could be applied in future grants programs. NSW Treasury advises that an evaluation will commence from mid-2021.

1. Key findings

Around $630 million in timely one-off grant payments have been made to small businesses

Service NSW and NSW Treasury have paid around $630 million in one-off grant payments to small businesses via two grants administered under the $750 million Small Business Support Fund. At May 2021:

  • around $520 million has been paid to over 52,500 grant applications received for the $10,000 Small Business Support Grant ($10,000 Support Grant)
  • around $109 million has been paid to 36,700 grant applications received for the $3,000 Small Business Recovery Grant ($3,000 Recovery Grant).

Across both grants, over 65,000 small businesses received a payment across either grant, and over 23,000 businesses received payments under both grants.

NSW Treasury advise that, while no data was collected on the time to pay applicants for the $10,000 Support Grant, from its monitoring of the grants' outputs it was satisfied that payment timeframes met its expectations. Service NSW met its targeted time to pay applicants with payments made within ten days for the $3,000 Recovery Grant.

Funds for both grants were not fully spent due to limitations in data and uncertainty of the COVID-19 pandemic's impact. At May 2021, the final demand for the $10,000 Support Grant was around 30 per cent less than initially anticipated and the final demand for the $3,000 Recovery Grant was around 40 per cent less than initially anticipated.

NSW Treasury developed proposals establishing high level design and delivery expectations within rapid timeframes

NSW Treasury put forward proposals to the NSW Government for the two grants administered under the $750 million Small Business Support Fund. It met rapid timeframes for producing this advice: within one day for the $10,000 Support Grant and within four days for the $3,000 Recovery Grant. NSW Treasury's advice to the NSW Government on how to best target the total funding, eligibility criteria and the feasibility of delivering the grants through Service NSW was based on comparable grants programs – including the $10,000 Small Business Bushfire Support Grant – which at that time were ongoing.

The proposals established, at a high-level, the rationale for the grants, expected financial costs, risks and analysis on budget impacts, and confirmation that Service NSW could deliver the grants applications platform. NSW Treasury's demand projections were uncertain due to limited data in the early stages of the pandemic regarding potential economic impact.

Given the tight timeframes, the proposals did not fully consider all planning and design aspects for both grants. For example, there was minimal identification of the costs and benefits of the programs, and a lack of detailed design and delivery requirements. The proposals outlined that arrangements to finalise the risk management, controls, and auditing plan would be agreed by Service NSW and NSW Treasury before implementation.

In future circumstances where urgent advice on program design is required, NSW Treasury could set clearer expectations for the delivery agency, including fully considering costs, benefits and delivery requirements that could be carried through to project governance and implementation.

Service NSW implemented both grants in line with delivery expectations

Service NSW met urgent timeframes to stand-up both grants: 11 days for the $10,000 Support Grant and 26 days for the $3,000 Recovery Grant. Delivery expectations for each grant were established under a grant project agreement (grant agreement). Service NSW delivered the online application platform, assessment of applications, payments and reporting of the grants' uptake as per the grant agreements.

The urgent timeframes to deliver the grants contributed to gaps in Service NSW's project and risk management processes throughout the lifecycle of both grants. For example, the requirement to meet pressing timeframes for the $10,000 Support Grant launch meant agencies had reduced time to achieve sign-off on key documentation. As a result, important documents and processes – including the grant agreement, risk documentation and key business process and quality assurance processes – were not finalised ahead of launch.

Quality assurance and compliance processes for detecting fraud were not settled until after the conclusion of the applications for the $10,000 Support Grant, and were not completed until late 2020. Some project documents, including risk registers, communication plans and project briefs are still not finalised.

The longer timeframe to develop the $3,000 Recovery Grant meant that agencies were able to build on their understanding of the implementation requirements from the $10,000 Support Grant, and better document these expectations and understanding while ensuring that key documents and sign-offs were in place prior to launch.

Service NSW tightened its risk management and controls in response to evidence of fraudulent applications

In May 2020, Service NSW and the Department of Customer Service (DCS) were alerted to suspected fraudulent activity within grants administered by Service NSW. Initially, Service NSW anticipated that up to $8.8 million of the $10,000 Support Grant was at risk of exposure to fraudulent applications. However, Service NSW reported that, at April 2021, $1.9 million for the $10,000 Support Grant and $254,000 for the $3,000 Recovery Grant from paid applications were at risk of fraud exposure.

Following an internal review of the potential exposure to fraudulent or ineligible applications, Service NSW implemented additional automated security checks on applications, increased manual assessments of grant applications, established a dedicated taskforce for grants administration and engaged a unit within DCS to manage high-risk investigations.

Service NSW and DCS's increased governance and oversight has resulted in an established case management function, increased referrals to law enforcement, prioritised investigations of suspicious applications and the development of a 'Fraud Control Framework' aimed at addressing external fraud risks. Given Service NSW had limited experience in these processes in context of administering grant payments, such actions were an appropriate response.

Security checks and investigations of suspicious applications are ongoing. Service NSW will not know the full extent of fraud across the grants until these processes have been fully completed.

Service NSW and Department of Customer Service can improve how conflicts of interest are managed for future programs

Compliance with agency policies and processes to manage conflicts of interest and financial subdelegations demonstrates that investment decisions are being made by appropriately skilled and experienced staff, allowing agencies to operate efficiently, and reducing the risk of internal fraud.

DCS was unable to produce employee conflicts of interest declarations for the $10,000 Support Grant. Therefore, it is not known how many employees had completed conflicts of interest declarations for this round.

DCS provided information on conflicts of interest declarations for the $3,000 Recovery Grant. Twenty-nine per cent of declarations provided for employees undertaking grant assessments for the $3,000 Recovery Grant were incomplete at March 2021, and a further nine per cent were not finalised even though they indicated a real, potential or perceived conflict.

For future grants programs, ensuring compliance with conflicts of interest policies would help DCS and Service NSW to have greater confidence that conflicts of interest are appropriately identified and managed.

NSW Treasury has not yet measured all benefits or outcomes of the grants

In April 2021, NSW Treasury updated its evaluation plan for the $10,000 Support Grant and $3,000 Recovery Grant in support of an economic evaluation to commence from mid-2021. The updated evaluation plan outlines inputs, activities, and outputs as well as immediate, short term and medium term outcomes for both grants.

The evaluation will consider the extent to which both grants achieved their intended outcomes, and whether the economic benefits exceeded the costs to help inform decisions about the nature and design of any future small business support programs. This will complement, and feed into a broader review of all NSW Government COVID-19 stimulus measures.

Service NSW rapidly developed an approach to administer the grants

Over recent disasters, such as the 2019–20 bushfires and the COVID-19 pandemic, Service NSW has been responsible for administering grant programs on behalf of other government agencies.

Service NSW implemented both grants under its Project Management Framework and under each grant agreement with NSW Treasury as it does not have its own grants administration framework. To address the risks that emerged during delivery, Service NSW developed an approach to standardise and monitor the administration of the grants while they were being implemented.

Service NSW now has an opportunity to establish a grants administration framework, based on the processes, lessons and outcomes captured under the grants administration taskforce and in developing its fraud control framework. Embedding these processes into business as usual for grants administration will enable Service NSW to have a consistent set of expectations for controls, business processes and governance and probity requirements for future grants it implements.

2. Recommendations

By December 2021, NSW Treasury should:

1. finalise and implement an evaluation of the $10,000 Support Grant and $3,000 Recovery Grant, including obtaining direct feedback from businesses on how grant funds achieved the grant objectives.

By December 2021, Service NSW should:

2. develop a grants administration framework, which documents expected controls – including fraud controls – business processes and governance and probity requirements

3. publish information on all grants programs, including grants distribution and uptake.

By December 2021, the Department of Customer Service should:

4. ensure its process for managing conflicts of interest meets policy requirements by:

  • ensuring employees promptly declare any real, potential or perceived conflicts of interest
  • annually producing a list of conflicts of interest for records retention purposes
  • requiring a separate register of conflicts of interest declarations where a grant program is deemed as high risk.

3. Lessons for grants administered within urgent timeframes

The two grants this audit examined were administered within a context of urgent timeframes, and increased complexity and uncertainty about the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The following lessons are shared to assist sponsor and delivery agencies in administering future grants where rapid implementation is required.

Sponsor agencies should consider the following lessons:

1. develop an approach to define and measure benefits for rapidly developed programs and projects where a full business case and cost-benefit analysis is not feasible

2. establish common processes and expectations for co-administered grants:

  • periodically assure agencies' capability to deliver grants programs
  • agree and establish risk appetite statements with administering agencies
  • clearly establish expected performance levels and targets under any agreement

3. review the processes and outcomes of rapidly developed programs, capture lessons learned, and apply these in planning and delivering future programs.

Delivery agencies should consider the following lessons:

1. risk management and risk appetite:

  • perform robust assessment procedures to ensure risks associated with delivery of the project are identified
  • ensure the controls implemented adequately address identified risks
  • agree and document the acceptable risk appetite at the outset
  • review risk management processes after the grants are issued when unable to finalise risk management processes ahead of launch

2. grant agreements between NSW public sector agencies:

  • ensure agreements are finalised in a timely manner
  • ensure agreements clearly outline:
    • roles and responsibilities of both parties,
    • changes in scope of services provided
    • fees and charges applicable

3. frameworks for grants administration:

  • ensure that there is a common set of expectations in place to guide grants administration including standard controls and processes for managing risk, capturing lessons learned and reporting on outcomes.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – Summary of other COVID‑19 Stimulus and Support for small businesses in NSW in April 2020

Appendix three – Public Health Orders

Appendix four – Highly impacted industries

Appendix five – About the audit

Appendix six – Performance auditing

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #352 - released (24 June 2021).

 

Published

Actions for Universities 2020 audits

Universities 2020 audits

Universities
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance

What the report is about

Results of the financial statement audits of the public universities in NSW for the year ended 31 December 2020.

What we found

Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all ten universities.

Two universities reported retrospective corrections of prior period errors.

Universities were impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic with student enrolments decreasing in 2020 compared to 2019 by 10,032 (3.3 per cent). Of this decrease 8,310 students were from overseas.

In response to the pandemic, each university provided welfare support, created student hardship funds, provided accommodation and flexibility on payment of course fees. State and Commonwealth governments provided additional support to the sector.

Six universities recorded negative net operating results in 2020 (two in 2019). The combined revenues of the ten universities from fees and charges decreased by $361 million (5.8 per cent).

Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, which will continue to impact the financial results of universities in 2021, enrolments of overseas students in semester one of 2021 increased at two universities. This growth meant that total overseas student enrolments increased by 7,944 or 5.8 per cent across the sector as a whole. However, eight universities experienced decreases in overseas student enrolments compared to semester one of 2020. All universities have experienced growth in domestic student enrolments.

What the key issues were

There were 110 findings reported to universities in audit management letters.

Three high risk findings were identified. One related to the continued work by the University of New South Wales to assess its liability for underpayment of casual staff entitlements. The other two deficiencies were at Charles Sturt University, relating to financial reporting implications of major contracts, and resolving issues identified by an internal review of its employment contracts to reliably quantify the university’s liability to its employees.

What we recommended

Universities should prioritise actions to address repeat findings. Forty-five findings were repeated from 2019, of which 23 related to information technology.

Fast facts

There are ten public universities in NSW with 51 local controlled entities and 23 overseas controlled entities.

  • $10.9bn Total combined revenue in 2020, a decrease of $538.5 million (4.7 per cent) from 2019.
  • 106,984 Overseas student enrolments in 2020, a decrease of 8,310 students (7.2 per cent) from 2019.
  • 3 High risk management letter findings were identified.
  • $11.0bn Total combined expenditure in 2020, a decrease of $147.8 million (0.9 per cent) from 2019.
  • 182,683 Domestic student enrolments in 2020, a decrease of 1,722 students (0.9 per cent) from 2019.
  • 41% Of reported issues were repeat issues.

Further information

Please contact Ian Goodwin, Deputy Auditor-General on 9275 7347 or by email.

This report analyses the results of our audits of the financial statements of the ten universities in NSW for the year ended 31 December 2020. The table below summarises our key observations.

1. Financial reporting

Financial reporting The 2020 financial statements of all ten universities received unmodified audit opinions.

Two universities reported retrospective corrections of prior period errors. The University of Sydney reported errors relating to the underpayment of staff entitlements and the fair value of buildings. Charles Sturt University reported an error relating to how it had calculated right‑of‑use assets and lease liabilities on initial application of the new leasing standard in the previous year.

Impacts of COVID‑19

Student enrolments decreased in 2020 compared to 2019 by 10,032 (3.3 per cent). Of this decrease, 8,310 students were from overseas.

The ongoing impact of COVID‑19 in the short‑term, on semester one enrolments for 2021 compared to semester one of 2020, has been mixed:

  • all universities in NSW experienced a growth in their domestic student enrolments
  • eight universities experienced decreases in overseas student enrolments.

During 2020, universities provided welfare support to students, created student hardship funds, provided accommodation, and flexibility on payment of course fees.

State and Commonwealth governments provided additional support to the sector:

  • those university controlled entities eligible to receive JobKeeper payments received a combined amount under the Commonwealth scheme totalling $47.6 million in 2020
  • the NSW Government launched a University Loan Guarantee scheme.
Financial results

Six universities recorded negative net operating results in 2020 (two in 2019). While most universities experienced decreased revenue in 2020, only four had reduced their expenses to a level that was less than revenue.

Revenue from operations

Universities' revenue streams were impacted in 2020 by the COVID‑19 pandemic, with fees and charges decreasing by $361 million (5.8 per cent).

Government grants as a proportion of total revenue increased for the first time in five years to 34 per cent in 2020.

Nearly 40 per cent of universities' total revenue from course fees in 2020 (40.9 per cent in 2019) came from overseas students from three countries: China, India and Nepal (same in 2019). Students from these countries of origin contributed $2.2 billion ($2.4 billion in 2019) in fees. Some universities continue to be dependent on revenues from students from these destinations and their results are more sensitive to fluctuations in demand as a result.

Other revenues

Overall philanthropic contributions to universities increased by 32.2 per cent in 2020 to $222 million ($167.9 million in 2019). The University of Sydney and the University of New South Wales attracted 75.2 per cent of the total philanthropic contributions in 2020 (69.5 per cent in 2019).

Total research income for universities was $1.4 billion in 20191, with the University of Sydney and the University of New South Wales attracting 66.5 per cent of the total research income of all universities in NSW (65.2 per cent in 2018).

Expenditure Universities initiated cost saving measures in response to the COVID‑19 pandemic. The cost of redundancy programs increased employee related expenses in 2020 by 4.4 per cent to $6.5 billion ($6.2 billion in 2019). The cost of redundancies offered in 2020 across the universities totalled $293.9 million. Combined other expenses decreased to $2.8 billion in 2020, a reduction of $436 million (13.4 per cent).

2. Internal controls and governance

Internal control findings One hundred and ten internal control deficiencies were identified in 2020 (108 in 2019). Forty‑five findings were repeated from 2019, of which 23 related to information technology.

Recommendation: Universities should prioritise actions to address repeat findings on internal control deficiencies in a timely manner. Risks associated with unmitigated control deficiencies may increase over time.

Three high risk internal control deficiencies were identified, namely:

  • The University of New South Wales should continue work to assess its liability for the underpayment of casual staff entitlements. This issue was also reported last year.
  • Two high risk deficiencies were identified at Charles Sturt University. One related to misunderstanding the requirements of the new accounting standard in relation to recognising grant funding revenue for construction work. The second related to resolving issues identified by an ongoing internal review of its employment contracts to enable a reliable quantification as to the university's liability to its employees.

Gaps in information technology (IT) controls comprised the majority of the remaining deficiencies. Deficiencies included a lack of sufficient privileged user access reviews and monitoring, payment files being held in editable formats and accessible by unauthorised persons, and password settings not aligning with the requirements of information security policies.

Business continuity and disaster recovery planning All universities have a business continuity policy supported with a business impact analysis.

Except for Macquarie University, all other universities had disaster recovery plans prepared for all of the IT systems that support critical business functions. Macquarie University’s disaster recovery plans were still in progress at 31 December 2020.

Only half of the universities' policies require regular testing of their business continuity plans and six universities' plans do not specify staff must capture, asses and report disruptive incidents.

3. Teaching and research

Graduate employment outcomes Eight out of ten universities were reported as having full‑time employment rates of their undergraduates in 2020 that were greater than the national average.

Six universities were reported as having full‑time employment rates of their postgraduates in 2020 that were greater than the national average.

Student enrolments by field of education Enrolments at universities in NSW decreased the most in Management and Commerce courses and Engineering and Related Technologies courses. The largest increase in enrolments was in Society and Culture courses.
Achieving diversity outcomes Five universities in 2019 were reported as meeting the target enrolment rate for students from low socio‑economic status (SES) backgrounds.

Seven universities were reported to have increased their enrolments of students from Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander backgrounds in 2019. The target growth rate for increases in enrolments of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander students (to exceed the growth rate of enrolments of non‑indigenous students by at least 50 per cent) was achieved in 2019.

 1 2020 data, which is compiled by the Australian Department of Education and Training, is not yet available.

This report provides Parliament with the results of our financial audits of universities in NSW and their controlled entities in 2020, including our analysis, observations and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • internal controls and governance
  • teaching and research.

Financial reporting is an important element of governance. Confidence and transparency in university sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations on the financial reporting of universities in NSW for 2020.

Financial results

The graph below shows the net results of individual universities for 2020.

Appropriate and robust internal controls help reduce risks associated with managing finances, compliance and administration of universities.

This chapter outlines the internal controls related observations and insights across universities in NSW for 2020, including overall trends in findings, level of risk and implications.

Our audits do not review all aspects of internal controls and governance every year. The more significant issues and risks are included in this chapter. These along with the less significant matters are reported to universities for management to address.

Universities' primary objectives are teaching and research. They invest most of their resources to achieve quality outcomes in academia and student experience. Universities have committed to achieving certain government targets and compete to advance their reputation and their standing in international and Australian rankings.

This chapter outlines teaching and research outcomes for universities in NSW for 2020.

Published

Actions for Delivering school infrastructure

Delivering school infrastructure

Education
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Project management

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining the planning and delivery of new, redeveloped and upgraded public schools.

School Infrastructure NSW has identified the need to accommodate an additional 180,000 enrolments in public schools by 2039 with a large portion of this growth expected in metropolitan Sydney. It has also identified that around 34,000 teaching spaces will require upgrading to be fit-for-purpose.

Although School Infrastructure NSW has developed a long-term strategic plan that advises government of ongoing funding requirements, it has not presented a list of priorities to meet those needs. Developing a longer-term list of priorities would help signal the areas of greatest need and allow more time to develop the best options to meet those needs.

The audit found that School Infrastructure NSW has focused on delivering existing projects, election commitments and other government announcements. This has diverted attention from identifying and delivering projects that would have better met present and future needs. 

The report makes eight recommendations to improve long-term planning for future needs, strengthen the quality of estimated project costs and benefits, and embed a continuous improvement program. 

In 2016, the Department of Education prepared a School Assets Strategic Plan (2016 SASP) which outlined long-term funding needs to support the expected growth in enrolments to 2031. Following the release of the 2016 SASP, the NSW Government substantially increased funding for new and upgraded schools from $2.4 billion in the 2016–17 State Budget to $4.2 billion in 2017–18.

In 2017, the Department of Education established School Infrastructure NSW (SINSW) to lead the delivery of the 2016 SASP and the 123 new projects announced in the 2017–18 Budget. This significantly larger program of work required rapid development of internal capacity, governance arrangements, and project management systems. This needed to be done at the same time as scoping and planning for the list of announced projects.

As there are limited funds available to meet growing needs across the State, it is important that SINSW has effective methods to prioritise projects to communities with the greatest need. To ensure that projects deliver value for money, business cases need to have robust estimates of project costs and benefits. Business cases also need to account for the inherent risks in delivering infrastructure projects. Unplanned cost escalations can reduce the number of new or modernised classrooms SINSW can deliver. Unforeseen delays may also impact families who make significant life choices based on their expectations that a school will open at the beginning of the school year.

The objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness of planning and delivery of new, upgraded and redeveloped schools to meet demand for public school education in New South Wales. To address this objective, the audit examined whether the Department:

  • has effective procedures for planning and prioritising school capital works to meet present and future demands
  • develops robust business cases for school capital works that reliably inform decision-making
  • has effective program/project governance and management systems that support delivering projects on-time, within budget and achievement of intended benefits.

The audit examined business cases for 12 projects as case studies. These include a mix of projects initiated before and after the establishment of SINSW.

This audit commenced in June 2020 and examined strategies and demographic projections developed prior to the emergence of COVID-19. This audit did not examine potential longer-term impacts of COVID-19 on future demands for public school education.

Conclusion

School Infrastructure NSW has been focused on delivering existing projects, election commitments and other government announcements. This has diverted attention from identifying and delivering projects that would have better met present and future student and classroom needs. While it has developed a long-term strategic plan that advises government of ongoing funding requirements, it has not presented a list of priorities to meet these needs.

In its first years of operation, SINSW has focused on delivering existing projects and the 123 new projects announced in the 2017–18 Budget. Further NSW Government announcements in the 2018–19 Budget, election commitments in the 2019–20 Budget, and announcements in the 2020–21 Budget, made up the majority of new projects, rather than projects prioritised by SINSW. 

In early 2020, SINSW advised the NSW Government that the currently funded infrastructure program would not meet forecast classroom requirements for 2023 and beyond. The School Asset Strategic Plan 2020 estimates the annual level of investment needed over the next 20 years to meet growth, update and upgrade facilities to meet compliance obligations. However, SINSW’s ten-year Capital Investment Plans for 2018–19, 2019–20 and 2020–21 only identified priorities over a two-year horizon.

Developing a longer-term pipeline of priorities would signal the areas of greatest need and allow greater scope to consider a range of options to best meet those needs.

SINSW has made progress in planning across geographic areas but needs to better prioritise which projects move forward.

Given the current and projected needs for new classrooms, it is vital that SINSW provides long-term advice based on thorough state-wide analysis to help prioritise projects that best meet this demand.

SINSW has improved its capabilities, processes, and systems to support planning in ‘School Community Groups’, which are clusters of between 5 to 15 schools in a geographic area. This addresses a key direction identified in the School Assets Strategic Plan 2016. It has developed a planning tool which allows it to prioritise School Community Groups based on weighted criteria. It has also developed an approach to identify potential projects within School Community Groups but has not yet put in place a structured process to prioritise which projects move to the business case stage to seek funding for delivery.

Business cases we examined established service needs, but several had shortcomings in scope definition, cost estimation and risk identification.

Most business cases we examined demonstrated the service need and consultation with stakeholders helped to incorporate educational requirements. Common templates and specific cost-benefit guidance developed in partnership with NSW Treasury has helped to promote consistency across business cases.

However, there were shortcomings in several business cases we reviewed. Business cases for projects already announced by government presented a limited number of options, and the process for eliminating other options was not transparent. Cost increases and contingency drawdowns for several projects indicate that scoping, costing and risk assessments could be improved, especially for complex projects.

Standard program management systems and governance arrangements support project delivery, however, there is scope for better ongoing oversight of benefits.

SINSW applies standard governance arrangements to projects based on their size. Higher value projects have executive oversight while lower value projects are overseen on a regional basis. SINSW has improved its project management systems to provide more consistent data and greater transparency to senior management over project status, cost and use of contingencies.

SINSW has worked with NSW Treasury to define a consistent set of benefits for new and redeveloped schools. Estimated benefits are currently based on international contexts but SINSW advises it is undertaking further research to improve the evidence base in this area. The current approach to ongoing monitoring, reporting and evaluation of project benefits places responsibility on the infrastructure delivery team. This team is not the most appropriate area to monitor ongoing benefits, which are expected to accrue many years after delivery and depend on actions in other areas of the Department.

1. Key findings

SINSW delivered projects against an established program of works in its first years of operation

At establishment, SINSW inherited a portfolio of existing projects and 123 new projects announced as part of the 2017–18 Budget (to commence over 2017–18 and 2018–19). It has progressively worked through individual project planning to deliver against these projects.

The 2018–19 Budget funded two new projects that had not already been announced. Both projects were identified by SINSW as a priority. The 2018–19 Budget also allocated funding for 'planning' 22 new projects. Seventeen of the 22 projects had been identified by SINSW as a priority.

SINSW identified 31 new priority projects in its Capital Investment Plan for 2019–20. Thirteen of these projects were funded in that year with a further 27 projects included as election commitments. SINSW identified 20 new projects in its Capital Investment Plan for 2020–21 but only two of these were funded. SINSW advised this was due to a constrained budget environment.

There is an anticipated shortfall of classrooms based on the current funded program

Despite increased funding since 2017–18, SINSW advised the NSW Government in early 2020 that the currently funded infrastructure program would not meet forecast classroom requirements for 2023 and beyond. Accordingly, it is vital that new funding is prioritised to projects which best meet demand.

SINSW only identified specific priorities over a two-year horizon in its Capital Investment Plans for 2018–19, 2019–20 and 2020–21. The School Assets Strategic Plan 2016 and the 2020 update make the case for sustained funding for school building and redevelopment. These plans estimate annual funding requirements and show geographic areas with increasing forecast enrolments. Detailing how priorities over a ten-year timeframe fit within a ten-year capital planning limit would create more certainty about meeting growth demands.

There has been progress in formalising prioritisation frameworks, data tools and supporting governance arrangements

SINSW committed to planning for new and redeveloped schools in 'School Community Groups' in the School Assets Strategic Plan 2016. This is a new way of planning which considers the educational needs over a defined geographical area. It has developed a planning tool to prioritise School Community Groups based on weighted criteria. It has also established governance frameworks to improve transparency over decisions to reprioritise this list.

SINSW has refined its approach to planning in School Community Groups over the past four years. It now prepares Service Needs Reports to investigate needs, identify projects, prioritise, determine scope and timing, and assess non-capital options. SINSW has yet to finalise arrangements for how needs identified in Service Needs Reports progress to the strategic business case stage.

Projects announced prior to developing a business case have less opportunity to consider a range of options to meet the service needs

Business cases for projects already announced by government (or announced for planning) go through the same process of determining the service need and impacts on surrounding schools. However, for some announced projects, the range of options considered in the business case is influenced by the parameters of the announcement. This makes it more difficult to genuinely pursue alternate options that could better meet the identified service need.

Projects identified by SINSW have a more rigorous process of considering options. Service Needs Reports explore a wide range of asset and non-asset interventions across the School Community Group. Options are narrowed as the projects move through the strategic and final business case stages. SINSW uses its Investment Review Committee to engage key stakeholders early in the process so that they are informed about how non-asset solutions have been considered and why SINSW is progressing the business case for a capital solution for particular projects.

Several business cases underestimated project costs and risks, leading to scope and budget increases

Several business cases we reviewed did not adequately identify the initial scope requirements, project-specific risks or the likely project cost. For two business cases, this appeared to be due to an attempt to fit the project within a predetermined amount. Announcing a project’s scope, budget and timeframe before proper planning increases risks to successful delivery against expectations.

Several of the projects we examined required drawdowns on contingency funds due to inadequate consideration of scope, costs and project risks at the planning stage. Contingency funds are intended for unanticipated extra costs rather than those that could have or should have been identified at the planning stage.

Guidance on benefit calculations has provided a consistent framework for business cases

Business cases we examined presented a consistent set of benefits based on guidance developed in partnership with NSW Treasury. Following this guidance helps to compare cost-benefit analyses across business cases. However, the evidence for the estimated benefits is based on contexts outside of NSW. SINSW has the tools and data sources to calculate benefits more suited to the context of particular schools. Doing so would improve the accuracy of cost-benefit analyses. SINSW advised that it is currently updating the guidance in partnership with NSW Treasury.

SINSW involves school principals, executives and teaching staff in developing education rationales when commencing projects. These documents help align projects with education outcomes. They also provide a baseline for post-occupancy evaluation, which is important to determine whether the new school infrastructure is being used in the ways that were anticipated in the business case.

SINSW could elevate its existing assurance review process to consolidate lessons learned

SINSW engages external peer reviewers to conduct assurance reviews on its projects at multiple stages of planning and delivery. It has established a Community of Practice for external reviewers to keep them up to date on new developments and requirements. Higher value projects are also subject to review by Infrastructure NSW under the Investor Assurance Framework.

By looking at all projects at all stages, assurance reviews can identify systematic issues across the full portfolio of projects. A recent assurance review analysed common findings from reviews of strategic and final business cases. This provides a helpful way to improve internal processes. SINSW advised that it is implementing a continuous improvement program, which will be able to take findings from assurance reviews to build organisational capabilities.

2. Recommendations

By September 2021, the Department of Education should:

  1. finalise the investment prioritisation approach with agreement from key stakeholders
  2. finalise and update on an ongoing basis a ten-year list of priorities to meet the forecast demand for new classrooms and contemporary fit for purpose learning environments, which identifies individual projects and programs in the short-term and priority geographic areas and programs in the medium-term
  3. seek a ten-year Capital Planning Limit from NSW Treasury to ensure the needs identified in the ten-year list of priorities are met and are coordinated with the forward capital programs of other agencies
  4. improve the quality of data on cost benchmarks that underpin the annual ten-year Capital Investment Plan and updates to the School Assets Strategic Plan
  5. embed an evidence-based cost benefit analysis framework for school investment, in consultation with NSW Treasury, by:
    • validating benefits estimated in previous business cases with actual results
    • building the evidence base in relation to contemporary learning environments
  6. regularly share data on forecast needs with relevant planning agencies to promote strategic opportunities for servicing education needs
  7. implement the continuous improvement program for service planning, options assessment, business case development, project delivery and handover. The program should be informed by findings from assurance reviews, post-occupancy evaluations and project lessons learned
  8. establish benefits realisation processes and practices that:
    • ensure business cases set baselines and targets for benefits
    • review benefits during delivery, prior to handover and as part of Post Occupancy Evaluations
    • identify which part(s) of the Department are best placed to develop, manage and evaluate benefits on an ongoing basis.

Note:

The Department's formal response to this report at Appendix one states that while it 'supports the recommendations, it considers the proposed six-month timeframe to be an unreasonably short period for a large and complex organisation to effectively implement many of these recommendations'. It suggests 12 months would be needed to implement the recommendations.

The recommendations stemming from this audit are core business for SINSW. The Audit Office considers it important for SINSW to place priority on implementing the recommendations in time to inform the 2022–23 budget cycle. Extending the deadline to April 2022 would place action outside of that budget cycle.

There have been significant increases in funding for education infrastructure since the 2017–18 Budget and further growth in demand for places in schools is forecast. SINSW has the challenge, not only of meeting the need for new classrooms due to population growth, but also upgrading facilities to enable modern teaching techniques. In addition, community expectations of what constitutes a vibrant and successful school community continues to increase.

Given growing demand and budget constraints, projects must be selected to best meet the needs of the community and planning and prioritisation are vital. SINSW has been progressing planning for announced projects as well as implementing a new type of strategic state-wide planning and prioritisation, cluster planning, where options are developed for School Community Groups.

The primary role of a business case is to reliably inform an investment and/or policy decision. Over the period of review, the NSW Government's guidelines for business cases have established this requires recommendations based on convincing arguments, sufficient evidence, and accurate costing of alternatives and expected benefits. Business case guidelines are underpinned by guides for economic appraisal and cost-benefit analysis.

As SINSW moves to prioritise business cases for interventions in School Community Groups, it will increasingly need to demonstrate rigour in its assessment of all options. It will also need to ensure that scope identification, cost and risk planning and the setting of contingencies are accurate. This will help decision-makers better understand, plan for and manage the investment required to meet the demand for school infrastructure.

For this audit, we examined business cases and related documentation for 12 projects. Several of these projects were developed before School Infrastructure NSW was established in mid-2017.

Over the period of review, NSW Government policies for business case development and submission have emphasised that effective governance arrangements are critical to a proposal's successful implementation.

SINSW's guidance similarly highlight the importance of effective governance and project management for achieving good outcomes. It prescribes a general governance structure managed by SINSW that can be tailored to the planning and delivery of school infrastructure projects.

Appendix one – Response from agency
 
Appendix two – About the audit 

Appendix three – Performance auditing 


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Parliamentary reference - Report number #347 - released (8 April 2021).

Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament on Delivering School Infrastructure 

This corrigendum has been prepared to amend the following text within my Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament on Delivering School Infrastructure, dated 8 April 2021. 

On page two, the original text was as follows: 

Further NSW Government announcements in the 2018–19 Budget and election commitments in the 2019–20 Budget made up the majority of new projects, rather than projects prioritised by SINSW. 

The original text has now been changed to 

Further NSW Government announcements in the 2018–19 Budget, election commitments in the 2019–20 Budget, and announcements in the 2020–21 Budget, made up the majority of new projects, rather than projects prioritised by SINSW. 

On page three, the original text was as follows: 

The 2018–19 Budget funded three new projects that had not already been announced. One of the three projects was identified by SINSW as a priority. 

The original text has now been changed to: 

The 2018–19 Budget funded two new projects that had not already been announced. Both projects were identified by SINSW as a priority. 

On page three the original text was as follows: 

SINSW identified 33 priority projects in its Capital Investment Plan for 2019–20.

The original text has now been changed to  

SINSW identified 31 new priority projects in its Capital Investment Plan for 2019–20. 

On page eleven, in Exhibit 4, the original text was as follows: 

The 2018–19 NSW Budget announced funding for an additional 43 new and upgraded schools to commence works in 2018–19. Of the 43 projects: 

•    1 was identified by SINSW as a priority in its Capital Investment Plan (SINSW requested funding for one new project)
•    40 had already been announced
•    2 were new announcements (not identified as a priority by SINSW in its Capital Investment Plan).

The original text has now been changed to: 

The 2018–19 NSW Budget announced funding for an additional 42 new and upgraded schools to commence works in 2018–19. Of the 42 projects: 

•    2 were identified by SINSW as a priority in its Capital Investment Plan (SINSW requested funding for two new projects)
•    40 had already been announced.

On page eleven, the original text was as follows: 

The 2019–20 NSW Budget announced funding for an additional 40 new and upgraded schools as election commitments. Of the 40 election commitment projects: 

•    13 were identified by SINSW as priorities in its Capital Investment Plan (SINSW requested funding for a total of 33 new projects)
•    27 were new announcements (not identified as a priority by SINSW in its Capital Investment Plan).

The original text has now been changed to: 

The 2019–20 NSW Budget announced funding for an additional 40 new and upgraded schools as election commitments. Of the 40 election commitment projects: 

•    13 were identified by SINSW as priorities in its Capital Investment Plan (SINSW requested funding for a total of 31 new projects)
•    27 were new announcements (not identified as a priority by SINSW in its Capital Investment Plan).

The above changes will be reflected in the version of the report published on the Audit Office website and should be considered the true and accurate version.  

 

Published

Actions for Education 2016

Education 2016

Education
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Fraud
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Procurement
Project management

The Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford released a report today highlighting the impact of the growing student population on school infrastructure and the increasing cost of psychological injury workers' compensation claims in Education. The report also gives updates on an initiative designed to create new out of school hours care (OSHC) places and on the expected final cost and completion date for the Learning Management and Business Reform (LMBR) program.