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Planning and managing bushfire equipment

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What the report is about

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the NSW Rural Fire Service (RFS) and local councils in planning and managing equipment for bushfire prevention, mitigation, and suppression.

What we found

The RFS has focused its fleet development activity on modernising and improving the safety of its firefighting fleet, and on the purchase of new firefighting aircraft.

There is limited evidence that the RFS has undertaken strategic fleet planning or assessment of the capability of the firefighting fleet to respond to current bushfire events or emerging fire risks.

The RFS does not have an overarching strategy to guide its planning, procurement, or distribution of the firefighting fleet.

The RFS does not have effective oversight of fleet maintenance activity across the State, and is not ensuring the accuracy of District Service Agreements with local councils, where maintenance responsibilities are described.

What we recommended

  1. Develop a fleet enhancement framework and strategy that is informed by an assessment of current fleet capability, and research into appropriate technologies to respond to emerging fire risks.
  2. Develop performance measures to assess the performance and capabilities of the fleet in each RFS District by recording and publicly reporting on fire response times, fire response outcomes, and completions of fire hazard reduction works.
  3. Report annually on fleet allocations to RFS Districts, and identify the ways in which fleet resources align with district-level fire risks.
  4. Develop a strategy to ensure that local brigade volunteers are adequate in numbers and appropriately trained to operate fleet appliances in RFS Districts where they are required.
  5. Establish a fleet maintenance framework to ensure regular update of District Service Agreements with local councils.
  6. Review and improve processes for timely recording of fleet asset movements, locations, and maintenance status.

This audit assessed how effectively the NSW Rural Fire Service (the RFS) plans and manages the firefighting equipment needed to prevent, mitigate, and suppress bushfires. This audit also examined the role of local councils in managing bushfire equipment fleet assets. Local councils have vested legal ownership of the majority of the land-based firefighting fleet, including a range of legislated responsibilities to carry out fleet maintenance and repairs. The RFS has responsibilities to plan and purchase firefighting fleet assets, and ensure they are ready for use in response to fires and other emergencies.

This report describes the challenges in planning and managing the firefighting fleet, including a confusion of roles and responsibilities between the RFS and local councils in relation to managing certain land-based rural firefighting fleet – a point that has been made in our Local Government financial audits over several years. This role confusion is further demonstrated in the responses of the RFS and local councils to this audit report – included at Appendix one.

The lack of cohesion in roles and responsibilities for managing rural firefighting vehicles increases the risk that these firefighting assets are not properly maintained and managed, and introduces a risk that this could affect their readiness to be mobilised when needed.

While the audit findings and recommendations address some of the operational and organisational inefficiencies in relation to rural firefighting equipment management, they do not question the legislative arrangements that govern them. This is a matter for the NSW Government to consider in ensuring the fleet arrangements are fit for purpose, and are clearly understood by the relevant agencies.

The NSW Rural Fire Service (hereafter the RFS) is the lead combat agency for bushfires in New South Wales, and has the power to take charge of bushfire prevention and response operations anywhere in the State. The RFS has responsibilities to prevent, mitigate and suppress bushfires across 95% of the State, predominantly in the non-metropolitan areas of New South Wales. Fire and Rescue NSW is responsible for fire response activity in the cities and large townships that make up the remaining five per cent of the State.

The RFS bushfire fleet is an integral part of the agency's overall bushfire risk management. The RFS also uses this fleet to respond to other emergencies such as floods and storms, motor vehicle accidents, and structural fires. Fleet planning and management is one of a number of activities that is necessary for fire mitigation and suppression.

The Rural Fires Act 1997 (Rural Fires Act) imposes obligations on all landowners and land managers to prevent the occurrence of bushfires and reduce the risk of bushfires from spreading. Local councils have fire prevention responsibilities within their local government areas, principally to reduce fire hazards near council owned or managed assets, and minor roads.

The RFS is led by a Commissioner and is comprised of both paid employees and volunteer rural firefighters. Its functions are prescribed in the Rural Fires Act and related legislation such as the State Emergency Rescue Management Act 1989. The RFS functions are also described in Bush Fire Risk Management Plans, the State Emergency Management Plan, District Service Agreements, and RFS procedural documents. Some of the core responsibilities of the RFS include:

  • preventing, mitigating, and suppressing fires across New South Wales
  • recruiting and managing volunteer firefighters in rural fire brigades
  • purchasing and allocating firefighting fleet assets to local councils
  • establishing District Service Agreements with local councils to give the RFS permissions to use the fleet assets that are vested with local councils
  • carrying out fleet maintenance and repairs when authorised to do so by local councils
  • inspecting the firefighting fleet
  • supporting land managers and private property owners with fire prevention activity.

In order to carry out its legislated firefighting functions, the RFS relies on land-based vehicles, marine craft, and aircraft. These different firefighting appliance types are referred to in this report as the firefighting fleet or fleet assets.

RFS records show that in 2021 there were 6,345 firefighting fleet assets across NSW. Most of the land-based appliances commonly associated with firefighting, such as water pumpers and water tankers, are purchased by the RFS and vested with local councils under the Rural Fires Act. The vesting of firefighting assets with local councils means that the assets are legally owned by the council for which the asset has been purchased. The RFS is able to use the firefighting assets through District Service Agreements with local councils or groups of councils.

In addition to the land-based firefighting fleet, the RFS owns a fleet of aircraft with capabilities for fire mitigation, suppression, and reconnaissance during fire events. The RFS hires a fleet of different appliances to assist with fire prevention and hazard reduction works. These include aircraft for firefighting and fire reconnaissance, and heavy plant equipment such as graders and bulldozers for hazard reduction. Hazard reduction works include the clearance of bush and grasslands around major roads and protected assets, and the creation and maintenance of fire trails and fire corridors to assist with fire response activity.

The RFS is organised into 44 RFS Districts and seven Area Commands. The RFS relies on volunteer firefighters to assist in carrying out most of its firefighting functions. These functions may include the operation of the fleet during fire response activities and training exercises, and the routine inspection of the fleet to ensure it is maintained according to fleet service standards. Volunteer fleet inspections are supervised by the RFS Fire Control Officer.

In 2021 there were approximately 73,000 volunteers located in 1,993 rural fire brigades across the State, making the RFS the largest volunteer fire emergency service in Australia. In addition to brigade volunteers, the RFS has approximately 1,100 salaried staff who occupy leadership and administrative roles at RFS headquarters and in the 44 RFS Districts.

Local councils have legislative responsibilities relating to bushfire planning and management. Some of the core responsibilities of local councils include:

  • establishing and equipping rural fire brigades
  • contributing to the Rural Fire Fighting Fund
  • vested ownership of land-based rural firefighting equipment
  • carrying out firefighting fleet maintenance and repairs
  • conducting bushfire prevention and hazard reduction activity.

The objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness of the RFS and local councils in planning and managing equipment for bushfire prevention, mitigation, and suppression. From the period of 2017 to 2022 inclusive, we addressed the audit objective by examining whether the NSW RFS and local councils effectively:

  • plan for current and future bushfire fleet requirements
  • manage and maintain the fleet required to prevent, mitigate, and suppress bushfires in NSW.

This audit did not assess:

  • the operational effectiveness of the RFS bushfire response
  • the effectiveness of personal protective equipment and clothing
  • the process of vesting of rural firefighting equipment with local councils
  • activities of any other statutory authorities responsible for managing bushfires in NSW.

As the lead combat agency for the bushfire response in NSW, the RFS has primary responsibility for bushfire prevention, mitigation, and suppression.

Three local councils were selected as case studies for this audit, Hawkesbury City Council, Wagga Wagga City Council and Uralla Shire Council. These case studies highlight the ways in which the RFS and local councils collaborate and communicate in rural fire districts.

Conclusion

The RFS has focused its fleet development activity on modernising and improving the safety of its land-based firefighting fleet, and on the purchase of new firefighting aircraft

The RFS has reduced the average age of the firefighting fleet from approximately 21 years in 2017, to approximately 16 years in 2022. The RFS has also enhanced the aerial fleet with the addition of six new aircraft to add to the existing three aircraft.

Recommendations from inquiries into the 2019–20 bushfires have driven significant levels of fleet improvement activity, mainly focused on the addition of safety features to existing fleet appliances. The RFS has dedicated most of its efforts to purchasing and refurbishing firefighting appliances of the same type and in the same volumes year on year.

However, the RFS is unable to demonstrate how the composition, size, or the locations of the NSW firefighting fleet is linked to current fire prevention, mitigation, and suppression requirements, or future fire risks.

There is limited evidence that the RFS has undertaken strategic fleet planning or assessment of the capability of the firefighting fleet to respond to current bushfire events or emerging fire risks

The RFS has not established a methodology to assess the composition or volumes of the firefighting fleet against fire activity and fire risks in the 44 NSW Rural Fire Districts. The RFS has not developed performance measures or targets to assess or report on fire response times in each of its districts, nor has it developed measures to assess the effectiveness of responses according to fire sizes and fire types. Similarly, the RFS has limited performance measures to assess fire prevention activity, or to assess fuel load reduction works, so it is not possible to assess whether its fleet capabilities are fit for these purposes.

The RFS does not have an overarching strategy to guide its planning, procurement, or distribution of the firefighting fleet

RFS fleet planning and fleet allocations are based on historical fleet sizes and compositions, and distributed to locations where there are appropriately trained brigade volunteers.

The RFS takes an asset protection approach to bushfire prevention and planning that is based on the Australian and New Zealand Standard for Risk Management. This approach requires that the RFS identify assets at risk of fire, and develop treatment plans to protect these assets. However, fleet requirements are not linked to NSW asset protection plans, meaning that fleet is not allocated according to the identified risks in these plans. Further, the RFS does not develop fire prevention plans for areas where there are no identified assets.

The RFS has not conducted future-focused fleet research or planning into technologies that match fleet capabilities to emerging or future fire risks. Since the significant fire events of 2019–2020, the RFS has not changed its approach to planning for, or assessing, the operational capabilities of the fleet. The RFS advises it is scoping a project to match resources to risk, which it plans to commence in 2023.

The RFS does not have effective oversight of fleet maintenance activity across the State, and is not ensuring the accuracy of District Service Agreements where maintenance responsibilities are described

The RFS does not have a framework to ensure that District Service Agreements with local councils are accurate. Almost two thirds of service agreements have not been reviewed in the last ten years, and some do not reflect actual maintenance practices. There is no formalised process to ensure communication occurs between the RFS and local councils for fleet management and maintenance.

RFS fleet management systems at the central level are not integrated with RFS district-level databases to indicate when fleet assets are in workshops being maintained and serviced. The RFS has a new centralised Computer Aided Dispatch System that relies on accurate fleet locations and fleet condition information in order to dispatch vehicles to incidents and fires. A lack of interface between the district-level fleet systems and the centralised RFS fleet dispatch system, may impact on operational responses to bushfires. 

The RFS has not made significant changes to the size or composition of the firefighting fleet in the past five years and does not have an overarching strategy to drive fleet development

Since 2017, the RFS has made minimal changes to its firefighting fleet volumes or vehicle types. The RFS is taking a fleet renewal approach to fleet planning, with a focus on refurbishing and replacing ageing firefighting assets with newer appliances and vehicles of the same classification and type. While the RFS has adopted a fleet renewal approach, driven by its Appliance Replacement Program Guide, it does not have a strategy or framework to guide its future-focused fleet development. There is no document that identifies and analyses bushfire events and risks in NSW, and matches fleet resources and fleet technologies to meet those risks. The RFS does not have fleet performance measures or targets to assess whether the size and composition of the fleet is meeting current or emerging bushfire climate hazards, or fuel load risks across its 44 NSW Fire Districts.

The RFS fleet currently comprises approximately 4,000 frontline, operational firefighting assets such as tankers, pumpers, and air and marine craft, and approximately 2,300 logistical vehicles, such as personnel transport vehicles and specialist support vehicles. Of the land-based firefighting vehicles, the RFS has maintained a steady number of approximately 3,800 tankers and 65 pumpers, year on year, for the past five years. This appliance type is an essential component of the RFS land-based, firefighting fleet with capabilities to suppress and extinguish fires.

Since 2017, most RFS fleet enhancement activity has been directed to upgrades and the modernisation of older fleet assets with new safety features. There is limited evidence of research into new fleet technologies for modern firefighting. The RFS fleet volumes and fleet types have remained relatively static since 2017, with the exception of the aerial firefighting fleet. Since 2017, the RFS has planned for, and purchased, six additional aircraft to add to the existing three aircraft in its permanent fleet.

While the RFS has made minimal changes to its fleet since 2017, in 2016 it reduced the overall number of smaller transport vehicles, by purchasing larger vehicles with increased capacity for personnel transport. The consolidation of logistical and transport vehicles accounts for an attrition in fleet numbers from 7,058 in 2016, to 6,315 in 2017 as shown in Exhibit 2.

The firefighting fleet management system is not always updated in a timely manner due to insufficient RFS personnel with permissions to make changes in the system

The RFS uses a fleet management system known as SAP EAM to record the location and status of firefighting fleet assets. The system holds information about the condition of the firefighting fleet, the home location of each fleet asset, and the maintenance, servicing, and inspection records of all assets. The RFS uses the system for almost all functions related to the firefighting fleet, including the location of vehicles so that they can be dispatched during operational exercises or fire responses.

Staff at RFS Headquarters are responsible for creating and maintaining asset records in the fleet management system. RFS District staff have limited permissions in relation to SAP EAM. They are able to raise work orders for repairs and maintenance, upload evidence to show that work has been done, and close actions in the system.

RFS District staff are not able to enter or update some fleet information in the system, such as the location of vehicles. When an RFS District receives a fleet appliance, it cannot be allocated to a brigade until the location of the asset is accurately recorded in the system. The location of the asset must be updated in the SAP EAM system by staff at RFS Headquarters. District staff can request system support from staff at RFS Headquarters to enter this information. At the time of writing, the position responsible for updating the fleet management system at RFS Headquarters was vacant, and RFS District personnel reported significant wait times in response to their service requests.

The RFS conducts annual audits of SAP EAM system information to ensure data is accurate and complete. RFS staff are currently doing data cleansing work to ensure that fleet allocations are recorded correctly in the system.

Communication between brigades, local councils and the RFS needs improvement to ensure that fleet information is promptly updated in the fleet management system

RFS brigade volunteers do not have access to the fleet management system. When fleet assets are used or moved, volunteers report information about the location and condition of the fleet to RFS District staff using a paper-based form, or by email or phone. Information such as vehicle mileage, engine hours, and defects are all captured by volunteers in a logbook which is scanned and sent to RFS District staff. RFS District staff then enter the relevant information into the fleet management system, or raise a service ticket with RFS Headquarters to enter the information.

Brigade volunteers move fleet assets for a range of reasons, including for fire practice exercises. If volunteers are unable to report the movement of assets to RFS District staff in a timely manner, this can lead to system inaccuracies. Lapses and backlogs in record keeping can occur when RFS staff at district offices or at Headquarters are not available to update records at the times that volunteers report information. A lack of accurate record keeping can potentially impact on RFS operational activities, including fire response activity.

Brigade volunteers notify RFS District staff when fleet appliances are defective, or if they have not been repaired properly. District staff then enter the information into the fleet management system. The inability of volunteers to enter information into the system means they have no visibility over their requests, including whether they have been approved, actioned, or rejected.

Local councils are responsible for servicing and maintaining the firefighting fleet according to the Rural Fires Act, but this responsibility can be transferred to the RFS through arrangements described in local service agreements. Council staff record all fleet servicing and maintenance information in their local systems. The types of fleet information that is captured in local council records can vary between councils. RFS staff described the level of council reporting, and the effectiveness of this process, as 'mixed'.

Councils use different databases and systems to record fleet assets, and some councils are better resourced for this activity than others

Firefighting fleet information is recorded in different asset management systems across NSW. Each council uses its own asset management system to record details about the vested fleet assets. All three councils that were interviewed for this audit had different systems to record information about the fleet. In addition, the type of information captured by the three councils was varied.

Exhibit 10: Systems used by local councils to manage the firefighting fleet
System Hawkesbury City Council Uralla Shire Council Wagga Wagga City Council
Financial asset management system TechnologyOne Civica Assetic
Asset management system TechnologyOne Manual MEX

Source: Audit Office analysis of information provided by the RFS and local councils.

Local councils have varying levels of resources and capabilities to manage the administrative tasks associated with the firefighting fleet. Some of the factors that impact on the ability of councils to manage administrative tasks include: the size of the council; the capabilities of the information management systems, the size of the staff team, and the levels of staff training in asset management.

Uralla Shire Council is a small rural council in northern NSW. This council uses financial software to record information about the firefighting fleet. While staff record information about the condition of the asset, its replacement value, and its depreciation, staff do not record the age of the asset, or its location. Staff manually enter fleet maintenance information into their systems. Uralla Shire Council would like to purchase asset maintenance software that generates work orders for fleet repairs and maintenance. However, the council does not have trained staff in the use of asset management software, and the small size of the fleet may not make it financially worthwhile.

The Hawkesbury City Council uses a single system to capture financial and asset information associated with the firefighting fleet. Hawkesbury is a large metropolitan council located north-west of Sydney, with a relatively large staff team in comparison with Uralla Shire Council. The Hawkesbury City Council has given RFS District staff access to their fleet information system. RFS District staff can directly raise work orders for fleet repairs and maintenance through the council system, and receive automated notifications when the work is complete.

Two of the three audited councils report that they conduct annual reviews of fleet assets to assess whether the information they hold is accurate and up-to-date.

More than half of the fleet maintenance service agreements between the RFS and local councils have not been reviewed in ten years, and some do not reflect local practices

Local councils have a legislated responsibility to service, repair, and maintain the firefighting fleet to service standards set by the RFS. Councils may transfer this responsibility to the RFS through District Service Agreements. The RFS Districts are responsible for ensuring that the service agreements are current and effective.

The RFS does not have monitoring and quality control processes to ensure that service agreements with local councils are reviewed regularly. The RFS has 73 service agreements with local councils or groups of councils. Sixty-three per cent of service agreements had not been reviewed in the last ten years. Only four service agreements specify an end date and, of those, one agreement expired in 2010 and had not been reviewed at the time of this audit.

The RFS does not have a framework to ensure that service agreements with local councils reflect actual practices. Of the three councils selected for audit, one agreement does not describe the actual arrangements for fleet maintenance practices in RFS Districts. The service agreement with Hawkesbury City Council specifies that the RFS will maintain the firefighting fleet on behalf of council when, in fact, council maintains the firefighting fleet. The current agreement commenced in 2012, and at the time of writing had not been updated to reflect local maintenance practices.

When District Service Agreements are not reviewed periodically, there is a risk that neither local councils nor the RFS have clear oversight of the status of fleet servicing, maintenance, and repairs.

RFS District Service Agreements set out a requirement that RFS and local councils establish a liaison committee. Liaison committees typically include council staff, RFS District staff, and RFS brigade volunteers. While service agreements state that liaison committees must meet periodically to monitor and review the performance of the service agreement, committee members determine when and how often the committee meets.

RFS District staff and staff at the three audited councils are not meeting routinely to review or update their service agreements. At Wagga Wagga City Council, staff meet with RFS District staff each year to report on activity to fulfil service agreement requirements. Uralla Shire Council staff did not meet routinely with RFS District staff before 2021. When liaison committees do not meet regularly, there is a risk that the RFS and local councils have incorrect or outdated information about the location, status, or condition of the firefighting fleet. Given that councils lack systems to track and monitor fleet locations, regular communication between the RFS and local councils is essential.

The RFS has not established processes to ensure that local councils and RFS District personnel meet and exchange information about the fleet. Of the three councils selected for this audit, one council had not received information about the number, type, or status of the fleet for at least five years, and did not receive an updated list of appliances until there was a change in RFS District personnel. This has impacted on the accuracy of council record keeping. Councils do not always receive notification about new assets or information about the location of assets from the RFS, and therefore cannot reflect this information in their accounting and reporting.

RFS area commands audit system records to ensure fleet inspections occur as planned, but central systems are not always updated, creating operational risks

RFS District staff are required by the Rural Fires Act to ensure the firefighting fleet is inspected at least once a year. Regular inspections of the fleet are vital to ensure that vehicles are fit-for-purpose and safe for brigade volunteers. Inspections are also fundamental to the operational readiness and capability of RFS to respond to fire incidents.

RFS Area Command personnel conduct audits of fleet maintenance data to ensure that fleet inspections are occurring as planned. These inspections provide the RFS with assurance that the fleet is being maintained and serviced by local council workshops, or third-party maintenance contractors.

Some RFS Districts run their own fleet management systems outside of the central management system. They do this to manage their fleet inspection activity effectively. Annual fleet inspection dates are programmed by staff at RFS Headquarters. Most of the inspection dates generated by RFS Headquarters are clustered together and RFS Districts need to separate inspection times to manage workloads over the year. Spreading inspection dates is necessary to avoid exceeding the capacity of local council workshops or third party contractors, and to ensure that fleet are available during the bushfire season.

The fleet inspection records at RFS Headquarters are not always updated in a timely manner to reflect actual inspection and service dates of vehicles. District staff are not able to change fleet inspection and service dates in the central management system because they do not have the necessary permissions to access the system. The usual practice is for RFS District staff to notify staff at RFS Headquarters, and ask them to retrospectively update the system. As there is a lag in updating the central database, at a point in time, the actual inspection and service dates of vehicles can be different to the dates entered in the central fleet management system.

Fleet inspection and maintenance records must be accurately recorded in the central RFS management system for operational reasons. RFS Headquarters personnel need to know the location and maintenance status of fleet vehicles at all times in order to dispatch vehicles to incidents and fires. The RFS fleet management system is integrated with a new Computer Aided Dispatch System. The Computer Aided Dispatch System assigns the nearest and most appropriate vehicles to fire incidents. The system relies on accurate fleet locations and fleet condition information in order to dispatch these vehicles.

There is a risk that RFS Headquarters' systems do not contain accurate information about the location and status of vehicles. Some may be in workshops for servicing and repair, while the system may record them as available for dispatch. As there are many thousands of fleet vehicles, all requiring an annual service and inspection, a lack of accurate record keeping has wide implications for State fire operations.

RFS is currently exploring ways to improve the ways in which fleet inspections are programmed into the fleet management system.

RFS provides funds to councils to assist with maintaining the firefighting fleet, but does not receive fleet maintenance cost information from all local councils

Each year the RFS provides local councils with a lump sum to assist with the cost of repairing and maintaining the firefighting fleet. This lump sum funding is also used for meeting the costs of maintaining brigade stations, utilities, and other miscellaneous matters associated with RFS business.

In 2020–21, the RFS provided NSW local councils with approximately $23 million for maintenance and repairs of appliances, buildings, and utilities. Ninety councils were provided with lump sum funding in 2021, receiving on average $257,000. The amounts received by individual councils ranged from $56,200 to $1,029,884.

Some councils provide itemised repairs and maintenance reports to RFS District staff, showing the work completed and the cost of that work. However, not all councils collect this information or provide it to the RFS. Local councils collect fleet maintenance information in their local council systems. In some cases, the responsibility for fleet maintenance is shared across a group of councils, and not all councils have oversight of this process.

The RFS has not taken steps to require local councils to provide itemised maintenance costings for the firefighting fleet. Thus, the RFS does not have a clear understanding of how local councils are spending their annual fleet maintenance funding allocations. The RFS does not know if the funding allocations are keeping pace with the actual cost of repairing and maintaining the fleet.

RFS District staff report that funding shortfalls are impacting on the prioritisation of fleet servicing and maintenance works in some council areas. When fleet servicing and maintenance is not completed routinely or effectively, there is a risk that it can negatively impact the overall condition and lifespan of the vehicle. Poor processes in relation to fleet maintenance and repair risk impacting on the operational capabilities of the fleet during fire events.

The timeliness and effectiveness of fleet servicing and maintenance is affected by resource levels in RFS Districts and local councils

Local councils have a legislated responsibility to service and maintain the firefighting fleet to the service standards set by the RFS. Fleet maintenance is usually done by the entity with the appropriate workshops and resources, and the maintenance arrangements are described in District Service Agreements. RFS District staff conduct annual inspections to ensure that the firefighting fleet has been serviced and maintained appropriately, and is safe for use by brigade volunteers. If the fleet has not been maintained to RFS service standards or timelines, RFS District staff may work with local councils to support or remediate these works.

The effectiveness of this quality control activity is dependent on relationships and communication between the RFS Districts and local councils. While some RFS staff reported having positive relationships with local councils, others said they struggled to get fleet maintenance work done in a timely manner. Some councils reported that funding shortfalls for fleet maintenance activity was impacting on the prioritisation of RFS fleet maintenance works. When fleet maintenance work is not completed routinely or effectively, it can negatively impact on the overall condition and lifespan of the vehicle. It can also reduce the capacity of the RFS to respond to fire events.

Fleet quality control activities are carried out by RFS District staff. In some of the smaller RFS Districts, one person is responsible for liaising with local councils and brigade volunteers about fleet maintenance and repairs. In the regions where resources are limited, there is less ability to maintain ongoing communication. This is impacting on fleet service and maintenance timelines and the timeliness of fleet monitoring activity.

The RFS has mutual support arrangements with agencies in NSW and interstate, though shared fleet levels are yet to be quantified

The RFS has arrangements with state, federal, and international fire authorities to provide mutual support during fire incidents. In NSW, the RFS has agreements with the three statutory authorities – Fire and Rescue NSW, the Forestry Corporation of NSW, and the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service. The agreement with Fire and Rescue NSW provides a framework for cooperation and joint operations between the agencies. The agreements with the Forestry Corporation of NSW and the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service describe the control and coordination arrangements for bush and grass fires across NSW. These arrangements are set out in legislation and incorporated into local Bush Fire Risk Management Plans.

The RFS has agreements with fire authorities in three of the four Australian states and territories that share a border with NSW – the Australian Capital Territory, Queensland, and South Australia. Each agreement sets out the arrangements for mutual assistance and joint operations, including arrangements for sharing aircraft. The agreement between the RFS and Victoria had lapsed. The RFS told the NSW Bushfire Inquiry that the agreement with Victoria would be finalised by June 2020. In June 2022, the RFS reported that the agreement was in the process of being finalised.

The arrangements for mutual aid from Western Australia, Northern Territory and Tasmania, are managed by the National Resource Sharing Centre. These agreements set out the arrangements for interstate assistance between Australian fire services, emergency services, and land management agencies in those states and territories.

These mutual support arrangements may assist during state-based fire events. However, when there are competing demands for resources, such as during the bushfires of 2019–2020, there can be limits on fleet availability. During the 2019–2020 fires, resources were stretched in all jurisdictions as these fires affected NSW, Victoria, and Queensland.

There are opportunities for the RFS and other NSW agencies to quantify fleet resources across the State and identify assets that can be mobilised for different fire activities. This form of fleet planning may be used to enhance surge capabilities during times of high fire activity. There are also opportunities for the RFS and other agencies to match the levels of shared assets to projected bushfire risks.

Appendix one – Responses from agencies 

Appendix two – About the audit 

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #376 - released 27 February 2023

 

Published

Actions for Government's acquisition of private property: Sydney Metro project

Government's acquisition of private property: Sydney Metro project

Transport
Planning
Whole of Government
Compliance
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Project management
Risk

What the report is about

Sydney Metro is Australia’s largest public transport project. It requires the acquisition of many private properties, including residential and business properties.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the acquisition of private properties for the Sydney Metro project. The audited agencies were Sydney Metro, the Department of Planning and Environment (Valuer General NSW) and Transport for NSW (the Centre for Property Acquisition).

The audit assessed agencies against the framework for property acquisitions in New South Wales. It did not re-perform the valuations done for individual properties that were acquired by Sydney Metro.

What we found

Acquisitions of private property for the Sydney Metro project were mostly effective in the sample of acquisitions we assessed. We found Sydney Metro:

  • complied with legislative and policy requirements for compensation and communication with people subject to property acquisitions
  • kept accurate records of its acquisitions and applied probity controls consistently
  • did not complete detailed plans or negotiation strategies for the high-risk and high-value acquisitions we reviewed
  • did not comply with legislative timelines for most compulsory acquisitions because of delays in receiving the required information from the Valuer General in these cases.

The Centre for Property Acquisition has overseen the implementation of reforms to residential acquisition processes, but its assessment of the effectiveness of these reforms has not been comprehensive.

What we recommended

The audit made four recommendations to the audited agencies to improve:

  • plans and strategies for the acquisition of high-risk and high-value properties
  • timeliness of issuing compensation determinations for compulsory acquisitions
  • data quality on the experience of people subject to property acquisitions.

The NSW Government has the power to acquire land that is owned or leased by individuals or businesses, if it is needed for a public purpose. The power arises from the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (the Just Terms Act). Government agencies that have the power to compulsorily acquire private property are referred to as ‘acquiring authorities’. People who are subject to acquisitions are referred to as ‘affected parties’ and include property owners (business or residential), businesses with a commercial lease on a property, or individuals with residential tenancy leases. In recent years, the vast majority of acquisitions by the NSW Government have been for public transport or road projects.

Sydney Metro is a NSW Government agency with responsibility for building the Sydney Metro railway project. Sydney Metro is Australia’s largest public transport project. The project requires the acquisition of a large number of private properties. Sydney Metro has been one of the largest acquirers of private property in recent years, completing over 500 acquisitions between 2020 and mid-2022, with a total acquisition value of over $2 billion. Other agencies and statutory officers involved in the acquisition of property for the Sydney Metro project include:

  • the Department of Planning and Environment (DPE), which supports the minister responsible for the Just Terms Act. DPE also provides staff to the Valuer General of NSW
  • the Valuer General of NSW, an independent statutory officer that determines compensation in cases where the acquiring authority and the affected party cannot agree on compensation for property that has been acquired
  • Transport for NSW, which includes the Centre for Property Acquisition (CPA). The CPA does not have a direct role in acquiring properties, but its responsibilities include developing guidance for acquiring agencies and monitoring and reporting on their activities.

About this audit

The objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness of acquisitions of private properties for Sydney Metro projects. The audit assessed agencies against the legislative and policy requirements in place for government acquisitions of private property in New South Wales. In line with the Audit Office's legislative mandate, the audit does not comment on the merits of the policy objectives reflected in the Just Terms Act.

The audit examined a sample of 20 property acquisitions. This was not a statistically representative sample. While our report provides comments on Sydney Metro’s overall acquisition processes, it does not provide assurance regarding the acquisitions that were not examined for this audit.

The audit did not re-perform the valuations done for individual properties that were acquired by Sydney Metro. Affected parties who disagree with the valuation of their property have the right to seek independent assessment of this via the Valuer General and the Land and Environment Court.

Conclusion

Acquisitions of property for the Sydney Metro project were mostly effective in the sample of acquisitions we assessed. Sydney Metro followed requirements for communication with affected parties. Compensation processes were conducted in compliance with legislative requirements, but compensation determinations for compulsory acquisitions were not completed within legislated time frames due to delays in receiving these from the Valuer General. Governance and probity processes were followed consistently, with some relatively minor exceptions. 

Sydney Metro has detailed guidelines for acquisitions that are based on relevant legislation and government policy. In the 20 acquisitions we assessed for this audit, these procedures were followed consistently. This included adhering to minimum timelines for negotiation periods, engaging independent valuers and other experts when needed, and complying with governance and probity processes.

Sydney Metro staff followed requirements for communication and support for residential acquisitions by assigning ‘personal managers’ and providing additional support to affected parties when needed. The Centre for Property Acquisition (CPA) has overseen reforms to the residential property acquisition process in recent years. These reforms include the introduction of the NSW Property Acquisition Standards and the use of personal managers, in addition to the existing acquisition managers, for residential acquisitions. However, the CPA has not assessed the impact of these changes on the experiences on people affected by property acquisitions.

Sydney Metro did not comply with the legislative requirement to provide a formal compensation notice to the affected party within 45 days of a compulsory acquisition starting in any of the eight relevant acquisitions in our sample. This was because Sydney Metro must wait for the Valuer General to complete a compensation determination before Sydney Metro can send the compensation notice, and the Valuer General did not do this within 45 days. We acknowledge that Sydney Metro does not have full control over this process, and that it has taken steps to mitigate the impact of delays on affected parties. 

This chapter presents our findings on Sydney Metro's acquisition of industrial and commercial properties. Industrial properties include construction businesses and manufacturing facilities. Commercial properties were mostly properties such as shopping centres and office towers. Many of these acquisitions involve businesses and properties that are relatively complex and have high values. This means the valuation process can require multiple experts and can be lengthy and contested. Adherence to governance and probity requirements is important for these acquisitions in order to demonstrate that the acquiring authority has achieved value for money.

This chapter presents our findings on Sydney Metro's acquisition of residential properties, which include apartments and houses, and small business leases, which mostly affected businesses in small shopping centres or arcades. Most of these acquisitions were lower value compared to industrial and commercial property acquisitions and did not require as much expert advice on complex technical issues. However, residential property acquisitions can be personally distressing for the affected parties and require staff from the acquiring authority to provide support and show empathy while ensuring legislative compliance and value for money.

Appendix one – Responses from agencies

Appendix two – About the audit 

Appendix three – Performance auditing 

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #375 - released 9 February 2023

Published

Actions for Design and implementation of the Transport Asset Holding Entity

Design and implementation of the Transport Asset Holding Entity

Transport
Treasury
Asset valuation
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Procurement
Risk
Service delivery

What the report is about

The Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE) is the State's custodian of rail assets. It is a state owned corporation and commenced operating on 1 July 2020.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies' design and implementation of TAHE. We audited TAHE, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) and NSW Treasury.

Separate and related audits on TAHE are reported in 'State Finances 2022', 'State Finances 2021' and 'Transport and Infrastructure 2022' reports.

What we found

The design and implementation of TAHE, which spanned seven years, was not effective.

The process was not cohesive or transparent. It delivered an outcome that is unnecessarily complex in order to support an accounting treatment to meet the NSW Government's short-term Budget objectives, while creating an obligation for future governments.

The benefits of TAHE were claimed in the 2015–16 NSW Budget before the enabling legislation was passed by Parliament in 2017. This committed the agencies to implement a solution that justified the 2015–16 Budget impacts, regardless of any challenges that arose.

Rail safety arrangements were a priority throughout TAHE's design and implementation, and risks were raised and addressed.

Agencies relied heavily on consultants on matters related to the creation of TAHE, but failed to effectively manage these engagements. Agencies failed to ensure that consultancies delivered independent advice as an input to decision-making. A small number of firms were used repeatedly to provide advice on the same topic. The final cost of TAHE-related consultancies was $22.6 million compared to the initial estimated cost of $12.9 million.

What we recommended

We recommended that the audited agencies should:

  • improve accountability and transparency for major new fiscal transformation initiatives
  • ensure entities do not reflect the financial impact of significant initiatives in the Budget when there is uncertainty, or it creates perverse incentives
  • review record keeping practices, systems and policies to ensure compliance with the State Records Act 1998, and the NSW Government Information Classification, Labelling and Handling Guidelines
  • review procurement policies to ensure that consultant use complies with all NSW Government policy requirements.

The NSW Government established the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE), a statutory State Owned Corporation (SOC), on 1 July 2020 to replace the former rail infrastructure owner – RailCorp. It is the State's custodian of rail network assets, including rail tracks and other infrastructure, rolling stock, land, train stations and facilities, retail space, and signal and power systems, within metropolitan and regional New South Wales. It is responsible for $2.8 billion of major capital projects in 2022–23.

TAHE was established under Part 2 of the Transport Administration Act 1988 and is governed by a decision-making board. The Treasurer and the Minister for Finance and Employee Relations are the Shareholding Ministers of TAHE, and they annually agree performance expectations articulated in a Statement of Corporate Intent.

Whereas TAHE is the custodian of rail assets, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains operate public rail services. TAHE does not have responsibility for the operation of the heavy rail network or train services, nor does it have network control functions. TAHE, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains are in the Transport and Infrastructure cluster in the public sector (formerly the Transport cluster and renamed in April 2022), which also includes Sydney Metro and Transport for NSW (TfNSW).

TfNSW leads the Transport and Infrastructure cluster. Its role is to set the strategic direction for transport across the State. This involves the shaping of planning, policy, strategy, regulation, resource allocation and other service and non-service delivery functions for all modes of transport.

TAHE's Operating Licence is granted by the Portfolio Minister and authorises the entity to perform the functions required to acquire, develop, finance, divest and hold assets, pursuant to the Transport Administration Act 1988. The Portfolio Minister also issues a Statement of Expectations which outlines the government’s expectation for the business for the next three to five years.

TAHE's original Portfolio Minister was the Minister for Transport who approved, on 30 June 2020, the issuing of an interim 12-month Operating Licence to enable TAHE to commence operating on 1 July 2020. The Portfolio Minister then granted TAHE's current Operating Licence in 2021. After TAHE requested a 12-month extension to its current Operating Licence, its next Operating Licence is due on 1 July 2024. The current Portfolio Minister is the Minister for Infrastructure, Cities and Active Transport.

About this audit

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies' design and implementation of TAHE. In making this assessment, we considered whether: 

  • the process of designing and implementing TAHE was cohesive and transparent, and delivered an effective outcome
  • agencies' roles and responsibilities were clear in the planning of TAHE
  • agencies effectively identified and managed certain risks.

Conclusion

The design and implementation of TAHE was not effective. The process was not cohesive or transparent. It delivered an outcome that is unnecessarily complex in order to meet the NSW Government's short-term Budget objectives, while creating an obligation for future governments to sustain TAHE through continuing investment, and funding of the state owned rail operators. The ineffective process to design TAHE delivered a model that entails significant uncertainty as to whether the anticipated longer-term financial improvements to the Budget position can be achieved or sustained.

NSW Treasury and TfNSW had different objectives for TAHE

Up to June 2013, RailCorp had been the owner and operator of rail services and maintainer of the metropolitan rail network for almost a decade. It had been operating as a not-for-profit Public Non-Financial Corporation (PNFC).

In 2012, NSW Treasury (hereafter Treasury) decided there was a risk that the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) would reclassify RailCorp to the General Government Sector (GGS), meaning depreciation expenses of approximately $870 million would be reflected in the GGS Budget. Treasury wanted to avoid this impact on the GGS Budget, and considered the establishment of a transport asset holding entity as a means to do so. Capital grants to RailCorp were being treated as an expense to the GGS Budget.

TfNSW also wanted an asset holding entity – but one that would be a non-trading ‘shell’ company with no staff that would hold and manage all public transport assets. TfNSW's concept envisaged the entity would have a structure that would enable future public transport reforms and strategic directions while ensuring vertical integration of operations between asset owners and the rail operators to maintain rail safety.

However, Treasury pursued its objective to improve the GGS Budget result, and sought to expand on TfNSW's 'shell' asset holding entity concept. Treasury wanted an entity that could generate a return on investment, as this meant that government investment in transport assets could be treated as equity investments, rather than a Budget expense, and in turn improve the GGS Budget position. As an example of the potential impact of creating this new entity, capital grants of $2.3 billion were paid to RailCorp in 2013–14. If Treasury's objective was met, grants of this significance would then be treated as an equity investment, rather than an expense in the GGS Budget.

In 2017, Treasury's preferred option was progressed through legislation, but both agencies' central objectives for the proposed asset holding entity would continue to prove difficult to reconcile. To achieve Treasury's objective to improve the Budget result, the entity would need to generate a return on investment (this is further discussed below). However, TfNSW expressed concerns that the prioritisation of rail safety, and the effective management of governance, regulation and operations would be more complex in an entity with commercial imperatives.

Asset holding entities are a common approach to the management of transport assets in Australia and internationally, and there are a range of approaches to how they are structured and used. Such structures should be driven by the goal of improved asset management. Ultimately, TfNSW's objectives could have been delivered through a simpler entity structure. However, reconciling TfNSW's objectives with Treasury's imperative to deliver and justify a Budget improvement in the short-term resulted in an overly lengthy process and an unnecessarily complex outcome that places an obligation on future governments to sustain. There is still significant uncertainty as to whether the short-term improvements to the Budget can continue to be realised in the longer-term.

The Budget benefits of TAHE were claimed before the entity was legislated, committing the agencies to deliver, regardless of the complexities that subsequently arose

The 2015–16 GGS Budget treated the government's investment in TAHE (still known at this time as RailCorp) as an equity contribution. This had the immediate impact of improving the Budget result by $1.8 billion per annum. However, the legislation to enable the establishment of TAHE had not yet been passed by Parliament, key elements of the operating model were still under development, and imminent changes in accounting standards had the potential to impact TAHE's financial model. The decision to book the benefits in the Budget early committed the involved agencies to implement a solution that justified the 2015–16 Budget impacts, irrespective of the challenges that arose. 

TAHE's financial structure requires circular government investment to work

For the NSW Government to continue to treat its investment in TAHE as an equity contribution, rather than an expense to the Budget, there must be a reasonable expectation that TAHE will generate a sufficient rate of return as required by the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) framework. In doing so, it needs to recover a revaluation loss created by a $20.3 billion reduction in the value of its assets which was incurred in its first full year of operation. This loss occurred as a result of a revaluation of TAHE's assets when RailCorp (a not-for profit entity) became TAHE (a for-profit commercial entity) – and is discussed further in the 'Key findings' below.

TAHE generates a small portion of its income from transactions with the private sector but, as noted in our report 'State Finances 2021', TAHE receives the majority of its revenue (more than 80%) from access and licence fee agreements with Sydney Trains and NSW Trains. Both of these entities are funded by grants (a Budget expense) to TfNSW from the GGS Budget.

Based on Treasury’s correspondence with the ABS in 2015, TAHE was initially expected to pay a return on equity of 7% in 2016–17. The assumption of a 7% return persisted through to 2018, after the legislation enabling the establishment of TAHE was passed by Parliament. However, when the initial access and licence fees were agreed on 1 July 2020, this figure had been revised to an expected rate of return of 1.5% excluding the revaluation loss. This was below the long-term inflation target and did not include the recovery of the revaluation loss – risking the government's ability to treat its investment in TAHE as an equity contribution. Importantly, as TAHE is primarily reliant on fees paid by the state owned rail operators that, in turn, are funded by the GGS Budget (as an expense), the decision to change the returns model from 7% to 1.5% would in its own right have had a positive impact on the GGS Budget. However, the decision to use a 1.5% return would ultimately be problematic as it made it difficult to treat the government's contributions to TAHE as an equity investment, as discussed below.

On 14 December 2021, to avoid a qualified audit opinion, the NSW Government made the decision to increase TAHE's expected rate of return to 2.5%, equal to the Reserve Bank’s long-term inflation target.

In 2021-22, TAHE needed to start charging rail operators higher access and licence fees in order to generate a return of 2.5%, so as to support the government's treatment of its investment in TAHE as an equity contribution in the GGS Budget. This meant the government needed to provide additional grant (expense) funding to the state owned rail operators so they could pay the increased access and licence fees to TAHE. Based on current projections, TAHE is not expected to recover the revaluation loss until 2046.

There remains a risk that TAHE will not be able to generate a sufficient return on the NSW Government's investment without relying on increased funding to state owned rail operators so that they can in turn pay the higher access and licence fees. TAHE's ability to generate returns on government investment from other sources are uncertain and may not be achievable or sustainable. Current modelling highlights that TAHE remains largely reliant, through to 2046, on increasing fees (which are assumed to increase at 2.5% per annum from 2031 onwards when the current 10 year contracts with rail operators expire) paid by the state owned rail operators that remain principally reliant on GGS Budget grants.

The process of designing and implementing TAHE was not transparent to independent scrutiny

Our report 'State Finances 2021' commented that Treasury did not always provide this Office with information relating to TAHE on a timely basis. Similarly, during this performance audit, there were also multiple instances where auditees were unable to provide documentation regarding key activities in the process to deliver TAHE. Agencies also applied higher sensitivity classifications to large tranches of documents than was justified or required by policy. Of particular concern is the incorrect classification of documents as Cabinet sensitive information. The incorrect or over-classification of documentation as Cabinet sensitive delayed this Office's ability to provide scrutiny or independent assurance.

There was a lack of clarity around the roles and responsibilities of governance structures set up to oversee the design and implementation of TAHE

From 2014, multiple workstreams and advisory committees were established to progress the design and implementation of TAHE. For some of these committees and workstreams, there is limited information on what they were tasked to do and what they achieved. Most had ceased meeting by 2018, before significant work needed to deliver TAHE was completed.

The lack of clarity around the roles and responsibilities of these governance structures reduced opportunities for TfNSW and Treasury to reconcile their differing objectives for TAHE, and resolve key questions earlier in the process.

There was a heavy reliance on consulting firms throughout the process to establish TAHE, and the management of consultant engagements failed to ensure that agencies received independent advice to support objective decision-making

In 2020, Treasury and TfNSW failed to prevent, identify, or adequately manage a conflict of interest when they engaged the same 'Big 4' consulting firm to work on separate TAHE-related projects. Both agencies used the firm's work to further their respective views with regard to the financial implications of TAHE's operating model. At this time those views were still unreconciled.

Treasury engaged the firm to provide a fiscal risk management strategy and advice on the impact of changes to accounting standards. TfNSW engaged the same firm to develop operating and financial models for TAHE, which raised concerns regarding the viability of TAHE. Disputes arose around the findings of these reports. Treasury disagreed with some of the outcomes of the work commissioned by TfNSW, relating to accounting treatment and fiscal advice.

The management of this conflict (real or perceived) was left to the 'Big 4' consulting firm when it was more appropriate for it to be managed by Treasury and TfNSW. If these agencies had communicated more effectively, used available governance structures consistently, and shared information openly about their use of the firm and the nature of their respective engagements, these disputes might have been avoided. This issue, coupled with deficiencies in procurement by both agencies, reflected and further perpetuated the lack of cohesion in the design and implementation of TAHE.

More broadly, over the period 2014 – 2021, 16 separate consulting firms were employed to work on 36 contracts, valued at over $22.56 million, relating to TAHE ranging from accounting and legal advice, project management, and the provision of administrative support and secretariat services.

Consultants are legitimately used by agencies to provide advice on how to achieve the outcomes determined by government, including advising agencies on the risks and challenges in achieving those outcomes. Similarly, consultants can provide expert knowledge in the service of achieving those outcomes and managing the risks. However, the heavy reliance on consulting firms during the design and implementation of TAHE heightened the risk that agencies were not receiving value for money, were outsourcing tasks that should be performed by the public service, and did not mitigate the risk that the advice received was not objective and impartial. The risk that the role of consultants could have been blurred between providing independent advice to government on options and facilitating a pre-determined outcome was not effectively treated or mitigated. This risk was amplified because a small number of firms were used repeatedly to provide advice on one topic. The effective procurement and management of consultants is an obligation of government agencies.

Appendix one – Responses from audited agencies, and Audit Office clarification of matters raised in the TAHE formal response 

Appendix two – Classification of government entities 

Appendix three – About the audit 

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #372 - released 24 January 2023

 

Published

Actions for State Finances 2022

State Finances 2022

Treasury
Whole of Government
Asset valuation
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Regulation
Risk

What the report is about

Results of the 2021–22 consolidated General Government Sector (GGS) and Total State Sector (TSS) financial statements audits.

What we found

The Independent Auditor’s Report on the 2021–22 GGS and TSS financial statements was modified with a limitation of scope and also contained an emphasis of matter.

The opinion in the TSS Independent Auditor’s Report was modified with a limitation of scope on certain balances consolidated in the TSS financial statements because the Catholic Metropolitan Cemeteries Trust (CMCT) denied access to its management, books and records for the purpose of conducting a financial audit.

The Independent Auditor’s Report also includes an emphasis of matter drawing attention to the significant uncertainties associated with the GGS’s equity investment in Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE). The significant uncertainty relates to key assumptions and estimates used to forecast a 2.5% return from GGS investments into TAHE that supports the accounting treatment as an equity injection, including:

  • funding to support the Rail Operators to pay TAHE’s contracted and forecast access and licence fees up until 2045–46. The Rail Operators are dependent on funding from the GGS to pay access and licence fees. Forecast modelling notes a requirement of a further $10.2 billion in budget funding to pay TAHE to the end of the ten-year contract period in 2030–31, in addition to the $5.5 billion allocated in the forward estimates and up to $50.8 billion for the period 2032 to 2046
  • a significant portion of the projected returns are earnt outside of the ten-year contract period and there is a risk that TAHE may not be able to recontract fees at levels consistent with current projections.

What we recommended

The report includes a number of recommendations including:

  • continued monitoring that TAHE controls the reported assets ensuring the CMCT, Category 2 Statutory Land Managers (SLM) and Commons Trusts meet their statutory reporting obligations
  • ensuring accounting and audit position papers are sufficiently consulted with key stakeholders and are concluded on a timely basis
  • ensuring agencies support the timely conclusion of audits by bringing to the auditors' attention key Cabinet records and identifying references relating to accounting issues impacting the financial statements
  • for Special Deposit Accounts (SDA) responsible managers should ensure amounts appropriated under any Act or law for payment into the account are appropriately recorded, ensuring payments from SDAs are allowable and made in accordance with Treasurer's delegations and standing authorisation.
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Margaret Crawford, Auditor-General for New South Wales

Pursuant to section 52A of the Government Sector Audit Act 1983 I am pleased to present my Auditor-General’s Report on State Finances 2022.

Once again this year has presented considerable challenges for the state sector and my Office as we collectively grapple with uncertainties related to COVID-19 and the disruption of emergency events impacting New South Wales. In addition, there were many recommendations arising from last year’s audit to be addressed.

While there is more to do to ensure good financial stewardship of the State, resolution of matters was helped by constructive engagement with the NSW Treasury at the most senior levels. Personally I wish to thank the Treasurer and Secretary for their commitment to instilling integrity in financial management systems and processes. The support Treasury provided for recent amendments to the Government Sector Audit Act 1983 to provide ‘follow the dollar’ powers and other changes recommended by the Public Accounts Committee quadrennial review of my Office is also acknowledged.

Finally I want to thank the teams that contributed to this year’s audit of the Total State Accounts for their diligence, professionalism and commitment. I am very proud of your work.

Margaret Crawford

Auditor-General for New South Wales

The Independent Auditor's Report was qualified and also included an emphasis of matter

The audit opinion on the State's 2021–22 financial statements was modified. The delayed signing of the NSW Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA) by NSW Treasury was in order to resolve significant accounting issues that were material to the TSSA. The key areas requiring significant audit effort included reviewing the State's accounting for TCorp Investment Management (IM) Funds and responding to the risks related to the Catholic Metropolitan Cemeteries Trust (CMCT) denying access to its management and books and records, which is detailed in this Report.

NSW Treasury aimed to sign the TSSA by 19 October 2022. This was delayed by nearly six weeks and the TSSA audit opinion was subsequently signed on the statutory deadline imposed on the Treasurer for tabling of the TSSA in the Legislative Assembly of 30 November 2022.

The Independent Auditor’s Report was modified due to a limitation of scope on the balances consolidated in the TSSA relating to the CMCT

The opinion in the Independent Auditor’s Report was modified with a limitation of scope due to the inability to access management, books and records of a controlled entity, the CMCT.

This year, NSW Treasury, after reconsidering all facts and the perspectives of the CMCT, reconfirmed that the CMCT is a controlled entity of the State for financial reporting purposes. This means CMCT is a GSF agency under the provisions of the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 (GSF Act). As such NSW Treasury is required by Australian Accounting Standards to consolidate the CMCT into the Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA). The value of assets and liabilities of CMCT consolidated into the TSSA is $310.3 million and $15.1 million, respectively, and the loss of CMCT consolidated into the TSSA for the year is $2.4 million.

To date, CMCT has not met its statutory obligations to prepare financial statements under the GSF Act and give them to the Auditor-General. CMCT has not submitted its financial statements to the Auditor-General for audit as required despite repeated requests and has not provided access to its books and records for the purposes of a financial audit. The Secretary of the Department of Planning and Environment wrote to CMCT to request it work with, and offer full assistance to, the Auditor-General in the exercise of her duties.

NSW Treasury has met with and considered CMCT's perspectives. NSW Treasury’s position remains that CMCT is a controlled entity of the State for financial reporting purposes. Consequently, CMCT has not met its statutory obligations as a controlled entity to submit its financial statements for audit and provide access to its books and records. Therefore, the Audit Office was unable to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence about the carrying amount of assets and liabilities consolidated into the Total State Sector Accounts as at 30 June 2022 and of the amount of income and expenses for the year then ended. Accordingly a modified audit opinion was issued on the NSW Government's 2021–22 consolidated financial statements.

Section 3 of this report titled 'Limitation of Scope relating to CMCT' discusses this matter in further detail.

An emphasis of matter drawing attention to uncertainty relating to the General Government Sector's investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE) remains

The Independent Auditor’s Report also includes an emphasis of matter, drawing attention to the significant uncertainties associated with the General Government Sector's (GGS) equity investment in TAHE. The significant uncertainty relates to key assumptions used to forecast returns from investments into TAHE in order to support the recognition of the government's funding of TAHE as an equity injection.

At the time of signing the Independent Auditor's Report, there was significant uncertainty with regards to assumptions and estimates used to forecast a return from the GGS investment into TAHE, which supports the recognition of an equity injection. There is significant uncertainty relating to:

  • the 2022–23 Budget committed $5.5 billion to fund TAHE's key customers, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains (the operators), to support their payment of access and licence fees agreed on 23 June 2022. However, this funding only extends out to the end of the forward estimates period in 2025–26, which falls short of the ten-year contractual periods to 2030–31 and the projected period to 2045–46 to achieve a 2.5% return from the government's equity investment. The government will need to fund the operators an additional $10.2 billion in Budget funding so that they can meet their contractual obligations to TAHE from 2026–27 to 2030–31, and a further projected funding of $50.8 billion from 2031 to 2046. This additional funding is not within the government's published Budget figures, leading to uncertainty on whether the government-funded operators can pay access and licence fees beyond the forward estimates period of 2025–26
  • a significant portion of the projected returns are earnt outside the ten-year contract period (terminating 30 June 2031) and there is a risk that TAHE will not be able to recontract for access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections. There is also a risk that funding for TAHE's key customers will not be sufficient to fund payment of access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections.

The 'State Finances 2021' report made recommendations regarding the significant accounting issues relating to TAHE. The State's response to these recommendations are detailed in Section 4 of this report titled ‘Investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity’. Other significant matters related to the TSSA audit are covered in Section 8 titled ‘Key audit findings’.

Other financial reporting matters

All government agencies were granted an extra week to submit financial statements for audit

A one-week extension provided agencies across the sector with additional time to resolve key accounting issues and submit financial statements for audit by 1 August 2022.

Further extensions were approved for the following seven agencies (ten in 2020–21):

  • State Insurance Regulatory Authority (3 August 2022)
  • Dams Safety NSW (8 August 2022)
  • Jenolan Caves Reserve Trust (8 August 2022)
  • Transport for NSW (8 August 2022)
  • Department of Enterprise, Investment and Trade (22 August 2022)
  • Transport Asset Holding Entity (22 August 2022)
  • Department of Transport (26 August 2022).

Additional extensions provided agencies with more time to complete:

  • asset valuations
  • valuations of actuarially assessed liabilities.

An initial draft of the TSSA was provided to audit on 15 September 2022. This version was incomplete and excluded the impact of consolidating the State's TCorp IM funds under the correct Australian Accounting Standards. An additional three versions of the draft TSSA were provided to audit progressively to update the TCorp IM fund consolidated balances. The final complete version of the TSSA was submitted on 27 October 2022 which included all adjustments relating to the TCorp IM fund consolidation. Refer to section 8.1 for more details on the material restatements relating to the consolidation of the TCorp IM funds.

In 2021–22, agency financial statements presented for audit contained 20 errors exceeding $20 million (24 in 2020–21). The total value of these errors was $973 million, a decrease from the previous year ($6.6 billion in 2020–21).

The graph below shows the number of reported errors exceeding $20 million over the past five years in agencies’ financial statements presented for audit.

The errors resulted from:

  • incorrect application of Australian Accounting Standards and NSW Treasury policies
  • incorrect judgements and assumptions when valuing non-current physical assets and liabilities.

NSW Treasury concluded CMCT is a controlled entity of the State

In response to our recommendation in the ‘State Finances 2021’ report, NSW Treasury reconfirmed that the Catholic Metropolitan Cemeteries Trust (CMCT) is a controlled entity of the State. The Audit Office accepted the position of NSW Treasury.

The reaffirmation of this position means CMCT is a GSF agency under the provisions of the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 (GSF Act). Section 7.6 of the GSF Act places an obligation on CMCT to prepare financial statements and give them to the Auditor-General. Further, section 34 of the Government Sector Audit Act 1983 (the GSA Act) requires the Auditor-General to furnish an audit report on these financial statements.

To date, CMCT has not met its statutory obligations to prepare financial statements under the GSF Act and give them to the Auditor-General. CMCT has not submitted their financial statements to the Auditor-General for audit despite repeated requests and has not provided access to its books and records for the purposes of a financial audit. There was extensive correspondence between the Audit Office of NSW, CMCT, NSW Treasury and the Department of Planning and Environment in 2022 regarding this matter.

Recommendation

NSW Treasury and the Department of Planning and Environment should ensure the Catholic Metropolitan Cemeteries Trust meets its statutory reporting obligations.

In addition, on 10 December 2021, the then Minister for Water, Property and Housing wrote to the Auditor-General requesting a financial and performance audit be performed pursuant to section 27B(3)(c) of the GSA Act. The audit would cover the financial affairs of CMCT, including whether funds have been used for the proper purpose. The Audit Office of New South Wales has written to CMCT on a number of occasions to request the provision of documentation and access to management in order to conduct the performance audit. CMCT has not provided the Audit Office of New South Wales access to its management, books and records for the purpose of the required performance audit.

NSW Treasury has met with and considered CMCT's perspectives. NSW Treasury’s position remains that CMCT is a controlled entity of the State for financial reporting purposes. Consequently, CMCT did not meet its statutory obligations as a controlled entity to submit its financial statements for audit and provide access to its books and records.

The TSSA audit opinion included a limitation of scope

The opinion in the TSSA Independent Auditor’s Report was modified with a limitation of scope due to an inability to access management and the books and records of CMCT. This limitation was appropriately disclosed in Note 1 'Statement of Significant Accounting Policies' of the TSSA. The Statement of Compliance signed by the Secretary of Treasury and the Treasurer on 29 November 2022 was also updated to acknowledge the disclosure in Note 1 regarding CMCT.

The Audit Office was unable to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence about the carrying amount of assets and liabilities consolidated into the Total State Sector Accounts as at 30 June 2022 and of the amount of income and expenses for the year then ended. Accordingly a modified audit opinion was issued on the NSW Government's 2021–22 consolidated financial statements.

The process of information sharing by NSW Treasury continues to require improvement

In last year’s ‘State Finances 2021’ report an extreme risk management letter finding was reported for NSW Treasury to ensure it significantly improve its processes so that all relevant information is identified and shared with the Audit Office to support material transactions and balances of the State.

A number of events reconfirmed that NSW Treasury needs to continue improving its process with respect to information sharing with the Audit Office. Notably, NSW Treasury’s finance team had not demonstrated that all available information (on their systems) was considered by them when assessing the State’s control over CMCT.

Critical information relating to CMCT was in the possession of NSW Treasury since late October 2021 but not considered when reconfirming their accounting position on the State's control of CMCT this year. A further reconfirmation of the State's control over CMCT was needed by NSW Treasury to ensure this information was considered in their accounting assessment.

The above demonstrates that more effective consultation is required by NSW Treasury with key stakeholders to ensure all information relevant to forming an accounting position relating to the TSSA is captured. This will ensure new information is not identified late in the audit process and NSW Treasury considers all information when concluding on the accounting position of the State.

Recommendation

NSW Treasury should ensure when drafting position papers and concluding on accounting issues impacting the State, these are provided to audit on a timely basis and reflect a complete and accurate understanding of the key public sector issues being considered.

Last year's report highlighted that NSW Government actions avoided a qualified opinion in 2020–21 relating to the General Government Sector's $2.4 billion cash contribution to Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE). These actions included the NSW Government agreeing to provide additional future funding to TAHE's key government customers Sydney Trains and NSW Trains (the operators) to support increases in access and licence fees to be paid to TAHE.

The additional funding by the government was necessary to demonstrate that a reasonable expectation of a sufficient rate of return would be earned on its equity invested in TAHE. Last year, there was no government policy on what the minimum return should be on investments in other public sector entities, so the long-term inflation rate was used as a benchmark. A recommendation was made in last year's State Finances report that NSW Treasury establish a policy on the minimum expected return from its investments.

On 6 September 2022, NSW Treasury finalised its policy relating to the government’s returns on equity investments. The application of this policy is limited to State Owned Corporations and similar to the Commonwealth framework for commercial businesses, which requires the expected return be at least equal to the long-term inflation rate.

The government's commitment to additional funding was conveyed last year through revised shareholder expectations being published in the 2021–22 'NSW Budget-Half yearly Review' on 16 December 2021, increasing the expected returns on equity from 1.5% to the expected long-term inflation rate of 2.5%. On 18 December 2021, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) and the operators entered into a Heads of Agreement (HoA). This formed the basis of negotiations to revise the pricing within the existing ten-year contracts and deliver upon the shareholders’ expected return of 2.5% on contributed equity to be earned over the estimated weighted average remaining useful lives of TAHE's assets.

Further information on last year's audit of the government’s investment in TAHE can be found in our 'State Finances 2021' report.

Ten-year commercial agreements were signed between TAHE, operators and TfNSW

Last year's State Finances report recommended that NSW Treasury facilitate revised commercial agreements to reflect the access and licence fees detailed in the HoA. As these agreements were not executed by 30 June 2021, last year's audit opinion of the Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA) included an Emphasis of Matter drawing attention to the uncertainty that existed at balance date as these agreements were not finalised.

On 23 June 2022, commercial agreements were signed between TAHE, the operators and Transport for NSW through a deed of variation. The revised access and licence fees for the ten-year period 2021–22 to 2030–31 was $16.6 billion, which is $520 million less than the HoA fees of $17.1 billion.

Comparison FY22
$m
FY23
$m
FY24
$m
FY25
$m
FY26
$m
FY27
$m
FY28
$m
FY29
$m
FY30
$m
FY31
$m
Total
$m
Revised commercial agreements 641.1 911.8 1,298.1 1,585 1,807.3 1,921.8 1,992 2,065.4 2,139.1 2,252.8 16,614.4
HoA 679.9 1,081.4 1,236 1,398.9 1,645.8 1,826.1 2,023.3 2,209.4 2,404.5 2,629.2 17,134.6
Difference (38.8) (169.6) 62.1 186.1 161.5 95.7 (31.3) (144) (265.4) (376.4) (520.2)

TAHE's main customers principally rely on government funding to pay access and licence fees

Whilst TAHE has agreed ten-year access and licence fees of $16.6 billion with its two main customers Sydney Trains and NSW Trains, these two operators significantly rely on government funding when making these payments to TAHE. At 30 June 2022, TAHE's expected return of 2.5% is contingent upon the GGS funding the operators to support their payment of access and licence fees that have been agreed with TAHE for the ten-year contracted period and for non-contracted periods from 2031–32 to 2045–46.

The 2022–23 NSW Budget has allocated $5.5 billion to fund the operators, to support their payment of access and licence fees. However, this funding extends to the end of the forward estimates period in 2025–26, which falls short of the ten-year contractual period to 2030–2031 and the projected period to 2045–46 to achieve the 2.5% return.

  2022–261
$b
2027–20312
$b
2032–46
$b
Total
$b
Access and licence fees3 5.5 10.2 50.8 66.5

1 Represents the 2022–23 Budget year and three-year forward estimates which includes: FY2024–26.
2 Whilst excluded from the 2022–23 NSW Budget, these access and licence fees are included in the ten-year commercial agreement between TAHE, operators and TfNSW.
3 Represents cumulative access and licence fees for the period stated.

The government will need to fund the operators an additional $10.2 billion in budget funding to meet their contractual obligations to TAHE from 2026–27 to 2030–2031, and a further projected funding of $50.8 billion from 2032 to 2046. This is needed to ensure the government continues to demonstrate its expected return on investment of 2.5%. This additional funding is not within the government's published 2022–23 NSW Budget figures, leading to uncertainty on whether the government funded operators can pay access and licence fees beyond the forward estimate period of 2025–26.

Significant funding uncertainties remain

While the ten-year access and licence fee agreements were communicated to the NSW Government's Expenditure Review Committee, it is yet to be fully provided for in the government's budget figures. As TAHE's projections are highly dependent on the operators as its key customers, it remains critical that the government continue to provide sufficient funding to the operators so they can pay for access and use of TAHE assets. This means the significant funding uncertainties reported in last year's TSSA audit opinion remain for 2021–22.

The government has estimated $37.9 billion in returns (equivalent to 2.5% on contributed equity) is to be earned from its investment in TAHE over the period from 1 July 2022 to 30 June 2046. As previously reported, TAHE derives most of its revenue from access and licence fee agreements from the operators, who in turn are both funded by grants through TfNSW from the GGS. More than 95% of these returns are estimated to be earned outside of the ten-year contract period (terminating 30 June 2031).

  2022–261
$b
2027–20312
$b
2032–46
$b
Total
$b
Returns to GGS 1.8 4.7 31.5 37.9

1 Represents the 2022–23 budget year and three-year forward estimates which includes: 2023–24, 2024–25 and 2025–26.
2 Whilst excluded from the 2022–23 NSW Budget, these access and licence fees are included in the ten-year commercial agreement between TAHE, operators and TfNSW.

There remains risk that:

  • TAHE will not be able to recontract for access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections
  • future governments' funding to TAHE's key customers will not be sufficient to fund payment of access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections
  • TAHE will be unable to grow its non-government revenues.

This significant funding uncertainty was also reported in last year's TSSA audit opinion and will remain for 2021–22.

In 2021–22, TAHE and NSW Treasury prepared further modelling to support the Government's intent to earn a 2.5% return inclusive of recovering the holding (revaluation) loss of $20.3 billion on its investment in TAHE

Last year's State Finances report highlighted that NSW Treasury, with TAHE, should prepare robust projections and business plans to support the expected returns forecast beyond FY2031.

This year TAHE engaged an expert to help develop a model demonstrating the government's expected returns from its investment in TAHE. The model mathematically forecasts that returns of 2.5% will be achieved by 2046 and this will include recovery of the revaluation losses of $20.3 billion relating to 2020–21.

The current model includes some key assumptions:

  • The main source of revenue is the access and licence fees expected from the two public rail operators (Sydney Trains and NSW Trains) contributing to more than 80% of TAHE's projected revenue. The rail operators are largely funded by the government when paying access and licence fees to TAHE.
  • For the first ten years, the access and licence fees are based on the signed agreements between TAHE and the public rail operators.
  • Beyond the ten-year contracted period, the model assumes existing contractual terms for access and licence fees will continue unchanged allowing for an annual rise for inflation (2.5% per annum), and increased fees to enable a 7.62% return for renewed assets.
  • The capital expenditure included in the model is only the amounts approved by the Expenditure Review Committee (ERC) as part of the ten-year forecast. The model beyond ten years includes expected investment in renewed and replacement assets but excludes any forecasts relating to growth capex that is not approved by the ERC, and any related depreciation expenses for growth capex.

While management has developed a 35-year long term financial model to support the returns, we note this will need to be refined over the next few years. Furthermore, these are forecasted figures and we have not seen sufficient evidence of whether this reflects reality (that is, the achievement of dividends representing a return on equity) as it is still very early. Therefore, this will remain a high-risk matter until we have seen sufficient evidence of reality to the forecasted figures.

There is negative net impact on the budget after 2024–25 and this will grow in the future

There are some key points to highlight with this modelling and these are best conveyed with the graph below. This graph shows total cash injections made by the GGS since the government first announced the creation of TAHE as a for-profit entity in the 2015–16 NSW Budget. It also conveys the forecast returns from TAHE to the GGS and the level of funding operators will need from the GGS to pay TAHE's access and licence fees over the 30-year period. These cash flows are key inputs used in the modelling which calculates a 2.5% return from TAHE inclusive of recovering the holding (revaluation) loss of $20.3 billion.

The government continues to respond to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on New South Wales through its economic stimulus measures

The COVID-19 pandemic continued to significantly impact the State’s finances, reducing revenue and increasing expenses especially in sectors directly responsible for responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, such as Health. In October 2021, the government announced through the 'COVID-19 Economic Recovery Strategy' an additional $2.8 billion in economic stimulus and response measures following the conclusion of the three-month lockdown due to the Delta COVID-19 outbreak. Measures included:

  • $739 million in household and social support, including housing support for Aboriginal communities and survivors of domestic violence, and vouchers to thank parents for their efforts to support learning from home
  • $500 million to consumers and businesses including expansion of the 'Dine & Discover' and 'Stay & Rediscover' voucher programs
  • $495 million in education support addressing learning gaps for children and helping schools prepare for future learning disruptions
  • $487 million in combined funding for tourism, events, sports, and recreation throughout New South Wales
  • $130 million to fund mental health services for individuals whose mental health was impacted by the pandemic.

The 2021–22 financial year included $21.9 billion for pandemic response and economic stimulus measures. Of this, $17.9 billion was spent in 2021–22 while a further $1 billion of the budgeted amount from 2021–22 was carried forward into 2022–23. The graph below shows the total allocation and spend by cluster for 2022 compared to target spend.

There were 14 natural disaster declarations including four severe weather events in 2021–22

Natural disasters such as bushfires, storms, floods, and other adverse weather events can have a significant impact on the State's finances. Costs associated with natural disasters include direct response costs such as clean-up and recovery, temporary accommodation, and as well as financial assistance provided to impacted communities such as recovery and business support grants.

The NSW Government can make a natural disaster declaration allowing eligible individuals and communities from impacted Local Government Areas access to a range of special financial assistance measures.

In 2021–22, there were 14 natural disaster declarations announced comparable to 14 in the previous year. These natural disaster declarations largely related to storms and floods throughout the State. In 2021–22, there was a larger number of 'severe weather' events declared, with four in 2021–22 (nil in 2020–21).

Natural disaster expenses increased 143% to $1.4 billion in 2021–22, up from $569 million last year

Over 2021–22, the budgeted cost for declared natural disasters was $1.9 billion ($725 million in 2020–21). Actual expenditure by the State on disaster response increased by $815 million to $1.4 billion. The graph below shows the total allocation and spend by cluster for 2022 compared to their budget spend.

Deficit of $15.3 billion compared with a budgeted deficit of $8.6 billion

The outcomes of the government’s overall activity and policies are reflected in its net operating balance (budget result). This is the difference between the cost of general government service delivery and the revenue earned to fund these sectors.

The General Government Sector, which comprises 196 entities, generally provides goods and services funded centrally by the State.

In addition to the 196 entities within the General Government Sector, a further 85 government controlled businesses are included within the consolidated Total State Sector financial statements. These businesses generally provide goods and services, such as water, electricity and financial services for which consumers pay for directly, and form part of the PNFC (31) and PFC (54) sectors.

The budget result for the 2021–22 financial year was a deficit of $15.3 billion compared to an original forecast of a budget deficit of $8.6 billion.

Revenues increased $16.1 billion to $106.7 billion

The State’s total revenues increased $16.1 billion to $106.7 billion, an increase of 17.8% compared to the previous year. Total revenue growth in 2020–21 was 5.1%. The State's increase in revenue was mostly from $9.2 billion in grants and subsidies and $4.6 billion in taxation.

Taxation revenue increased by 13.3%

Taxation revenue increased by $4.6 billion, mainly due to the net of:

  • $4.9 billion higher stamp duties collected from property sales driven by growth in property transaction volumes and prices during 2021–22. This was growth was experienced across residential and commercial property markets
  • $296 million lower gambling and betting taxes compared to 2020–21. Decrease was primarily attributed to the ongoing effects of COVID-19 restrictions and venue closures within the first half of 2021–22.

Stamp duties of $16.6 billion remains the largest source of taxation revenue, $7.7 billion higher than payroll tax of $8.9 billion, the second-largest source of taxation revenue.

Assets grew by $53 billion to $571 billion

The State’s assets include physical assets such as land, buildings and infrastructure, and financial assets such as cash, and other financial instruments and equity investments. The value of total assets increased by $53.2 billion or 10.3% to $571 billion. The increase was largely due to increases in the carrying value of land, buildings and infrastructure systems.

Valuing the State’s physical assets

State’s physical assets valued at $437 billion

The value of the State’s physical assets increased by $46.8 billion to $437 billion in 2021–22 ($724 million increase in 2020–21). The State’s physical assets include land and buildings ($198 billion), infrastructure systems ($221 billion), and plant and equipment ($18 billion).

The movement in physical asset values between years includes additions, disposals, depreciation and valuation adjustments. Other movements include assets reclassified to held for sale and other opening balance adjustments.

Appendix one – Prescribed entities

Appendix two – Legal opinions

Appendix three – TSS sectors and entities

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Transport and Infrastructure 2022

Transport and Infrastructure 2022

Transport
Asset valuation
Financial reporting
Information technology
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Procurement

What the report is about

Result of the Transport and Infrastructure cluster agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2022.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all Transport and Infrastructure cluster agencies' financial statements.

An 'other matter' paragraph was included in TAHE's Independent Auditor's Report for its 30 June 2022 financial statements which draws attention to Transport and Asset Holding Entity's (TAHE) reliance on government-funded customers.

We included an ‘emphasis of matter’ paragraph in the Independent Auditor’s Report for State Transit Authority of New South Wales’ (the authority) 30 June 2022 financial statements, which draws attention to the financial statements being prepared on a liquidation basis as the authority’s principal activities ceased operations on 3 April 2022.

What the key issues were

The 2021–22 audits identified five high-risk findings:

  • detailed business modelling to support returns from TAHE
  • valuation of assets at TAHE
  • control of assets at TAHE
  • accounting and valuation of tree assets at Centennial Park and Moore Park Trust and Parramatta Park Trust.

Access and licence fees - TAHE

Revised commercial agreements were signed between TAHE, the operators and Transport for NSW on 23 June 2022 to reflect increased access and licence fees detailed in the 18 December 2021 Heads of Agreement.

TAHE’s ability to generate the expected return of 2.5% based on the current modelling is heavily reliant on the government funding the public rail operators (TAHE's customers).

There are risks that:

  • TAHE will not be able to recontract for access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections
  • future governments' funding to TAHE's key customers will not be sufficient to fund payment of access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections
  • TAHE will be unable to grow its non-government revenues.

Valuation of assets - TAHE

Although TAHE's selected valuation of assets falls within an acceptable range, there remains a significant gap between what has been assessed as an acceptable range and TAHE's range.

What we recommended

Control of assets - TAHE

While we accepted TAHE’s position on control for the current year, NSW Treasury and TAHE should continue to monitor the risk that control of TAHE assets could change in future reporting periods. TAHE must continue to demonstrate control of its assets or the current accounting presentation would need to be reconsidered.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Transport and Infrastructure cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Transport and Infrastructure cluster (the cluster) for 2022.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all Transport and Infrastructure cluster agencies' financial statements.
  • An 'Other Matter' paragraph was included in the Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales' (TAHE) Independent Auditor's Report to draw attention to TAHE's reliance on government-funded customers.
  •  An 'Emphasis of Matter' paragraph was included in the State Transit Authority of New South Wales' (the authority) Independent Auditor's Report to draw attention to management’s disclosures that State Transit Authority of New South Wales' financial statements for the year ended 30 June 2022 were prepared on a liquidation basis as the authority’s principal activities ceased operations on 3 April 2022.
  • While TAHE's valuation of assets at 30 June 2022 was within an acceptable range of valuation outcomes, there remained significant differences in assumptions used when compared with relevant market benchmarks.
  • Sydney Metro corrected two prior period errors of $1.5 billion and $51 million in accounting and valuation of assets, and double counting of assets capitalised in infrastructure as well as assets under construction respectively.

 

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the cluster.

Section highlights

  • The number of findings reported to management decreased from 87 in 2020–21 to 59 in 2021–22.
  • Repeat findings accounted for 54.2% of management letter points. Many repeat findings related to controls over payroll, including management of annual leave and processing of timesheets, management of conflicts of interests, weaknesses in controls over information technology user access administration and password management.
  • One new high-risk issue was identified in 2020–21, and four high-risk repeat issues remained.
  • The five high-risk issues arose from the audit in the cluster, with respect to:
    • control over TAHE assets and operations (repeat)
    • TAHE detailed business modelling to support returns (repeat)
    • valuation of trees (repeat for Parramatta Park Trust and Centennial Park and Moore Park Trust)
    • TAHE asset valuations.

 

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Coordination of the response to COVID-19 (June to November 2021)

Coordination of the response to COVID-19 (June to November 2021)

Premier and Cabinet
Community Services
Health
Justice
Whole of Government
Internal controls and governance
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration

What the report is about

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies’ coordination of the response to COVID-19, with a focus on the Delta variant outbreak in the Dubbo and Fairfield Local Government Areas (LGA) between June and November 2021. We audited five agencies - the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Health, the NSW Police Force, Resilience NSW and the Department of Customer Service.

The audit also considered relevant planning and preparation activities that occurred prior to June 2021 to examine how emergency management and public health responses learned from previous events.

What we found

Prior to Delta, agencies developed capability to respond to COVID-19 related challenges.

However, lessons learned from prior reviews of emergency management arrangements, and from other jurisdictions, had not been implemented when Delta emerged in June 2021. As a result, agencies were not as fully prepared as they could have been to respond to the additional challenges presented by Delta.

Gaps in emergency management plans affected agencies' ability to support individuals, families and businesses impacted by restrictions to movement and gathering such as stay-at-home orders. In LGAs of concern, modest delays of a few days had a significant impact on people, especially those most vulnerable.

On 23 July 2021, the NSW Government established a cross-government coordinating approach, the Delta Microstrategy, which complemented existing emergency management arrangements, improved coordination between NSW Government agencies and led to more effective local responses.

Where possible, advice provided to government was supported by cross-government consultation, up-to-date evidence and insights. Public Health Orders were updated as the response to Delta intensified or to address unintended consequences of previous orders. The frequency of changes hampered agencies' ability to effectively communicate changes to frontline staff and the community in a rapidly evolving situation.

The NSW Government could provide greater transparency and accountability over decisions to apply Public Health Orders during a pandemic.

What we recommended

The audit made seven recommendations intended to improve transparency, accountability and preparedness for future emergency events.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies’ coordination (focused on the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Health, the NSW Police Force, Resilience NSW and the Department of Customer Service) of the COVID-19 response in selected Local Government Areas (Fairfield City Council and Dubbo Regional Council) between June and November 2021.

As noted in this report, Resilience NSW was responsible for the coordination of welfare services as part of the emergency management arrangements. On 16 December 2022, the NSW Government abolished Resilience NSW.

During the audited period, Resilience NSW was tasked with supporting the needs of communities subject to stay-at-home orders or stricter restrictions and it provided secretariat support to the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC). The SEMC was, and remains, responsible for the coordination and oversight of emergency management policy and preparedness.

Our work for this performance audit was completed on 15 November 2022, when we issued the final report to the five audited agencies. While the audit report does not make specific recommendations to Resilience NSW, it does include five recommendations to the State Emergency Management Committee. On 8 December 2022, the then Commissioner of Resilience NSW provided a response to the final report, which we include as it is the formal response from the audited entity at the time the audit was conducted.

The community of New South Wales has experienced significant emergency events during the past three years. COVID-19 first emerged in New South Wales after bushfire and flooding emergencies in 2019–20. The pandemic is now into its third year, and there have been further extreme weather and flooding events during 2021 and 2022.

Lessons taken from the experience of these events are important to informing future responses and reducing future risks to the community from emergencies.

This audit focuses on the NSW Government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and in particular, the Delta variant (Delta) that occurred between June and November 2021. The response to the Delta represents six months of heightened challenges for the NSW Government.

Government responses to emergencies are guided by legislation. The State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989 (SERM Act) establishes emergency management arrangements in New South Wales and covers:

  • coordination at state, regional and local levels through emergency management committees
  • emergency management plans, supporting plans and functional areas including the State Emergency Management Plan (EMPLAN)
  • operations centres and controllers at state, regional and local levels.

This audit focuses on the activities of five agencies during the audit period:

  • The NSW Police Force led the emergency management response and was responsible for coordinating agencies across government in providing the tactical and operational elements that supported and enhanced the health response to the pandemic. The NSW Police Force also led the compliance response which enforced Public Health Orders and included household checks on those required to isolate at home after testing positive to COVID-19. In some parts of NSW, they were supported by the Australian Defence Force in this role.
  • NSW Health was responsible for leading the health response which coordinated all parts of the health system, initially to prevent, and then to manage, the pandemic.
  • Resilience NSW coordinated welfare services as part of the emergency management arrangements and provided secretariat support to the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC). The SEMC is responsible for the coordination and oversight of emergency management policy and preparedness. Resilience NSW was also tasked with supporting the needs of communities subject to stay-at-home orders or stricter restrictions.
  • The Department of Customer Service (DCS) was responsible for the statewide strategic communications response.
  • The Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) held a key role in providing policy and legal services, as well as supporting the coordination of activity across a range of functional areas and decision-making by our State’s leaders.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies’ coordination (focused on the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Health, the NSW Police Force, Resilience NSW and the Department of Customer Service) of the COVID-19 response in selected Local Government Areas (LGA) (Fairfield City Council and Dubbo Regional Council) after June 2021.

The audit investigated whether:

  • government decisions to apply LGA-specific Public Health Orders were supported by effective crisis management governance and planning frameworks
  • agencies effectively coordinated in the communication (and enforcement) of Public Health Orders.

While focusing on the coordination of NSW Government agencies’ response to the Delta variant in June through to November 2021, the audit also considered relevant planning and preparation activities that occurred prior to June 2021 to examine how emergency management and public health responses learned from previous events.

This audit does not assess the effectiveness of other specific COVID-19 responses such as business support. It refers to the preparedness, planning and delivery of these activities in the context of supporting communities in selected LGAs. NSW Health's contribution to the Australian COVID-19 vaccine rollout was also subject to a separate audit titled 'New South Wales COVID-19 vaccine rollout' tabled in NSW Parliament on 7 December 2022. 

This audit is part of a series of audits which have been completed, or are in progress, regarding the New South Wales COVID-19 emergency response. The Audit Office of New South Wales '2022–2025 Annual Work Program' details the ongoing focus our audits will have on providing assurance on the effectiveness of emergency responses.

In this document Aboriginal refers to the First Nations peoples of the land and waters now called Australia, and includes Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.

Conclusion

Prior to June 2021, agencies worked effectively together to adapt and refine pre-existing emergency management arrangements to respond to COVID-19. However, lessons learned from prior reviews of emergency management arrangements, and from other jurisdictions, had not been implemented when Delta emerged in June 2021. As a result, agencies were not as fully prepared as they could have been to respond to the additional challenges presented by Delta.

In the period March 2020 to June 2021, the State's Emergency Management (EM) arrangements coordinated the New South Wales emergency response to COVID-19 with support from the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) which led the cross-government COVID-19 Taskforce. NSW Government agencies enhanced the EM arrangements, which until then had typically been activated in response to natural disasters, to meet the specific circumstances of the pandemic.

However, the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC), supported by Resilience NSW, did not address relevant recommendations arising from the 2020 Bushfires Inquiry before June 2021 and agencies did not always integrate lessons learned from other jurisdictions or scenario training exercises into emergency management plans or strategies before Delta. As a result, deficiencies in the EM arrangements, including representation of vulnerable communities on EM bodies, well-being support for multicultural communities in locked down environments and cross-agency information sharing, persisted when Delta emerged in June 2021.

It should be noted that for the purposes of this audit there is no benchmark, informed by precedent, that articulates what level of preparation would have been sufficient or proportionate. However, the steps required to address these gaps were reasonable and achievable, and the failure to do so meant that agencies were not as fully prepared as they could have been for the scale and escalation of Delta’s spread across the State.

The Delta Microstrategy complemented the EM arrangements to support greater coordination and agencies are working to improve their capability for future events

The Delta Microstrategy (the Microstrategy) led to innovations in information sharing and collaboration across the public service. Agencies involved in the response have completed, or are completing, reviews of their contribution to the response. That said, none of these reviews includes a focus on whole-of-government coordination.

On 23 July 2021, the NSW Government approved the establishment of the Microstrategy to respond to the additional challenges presented by Delta including the need to support communities most impacted by restrictions to movement and gathering in the LGAs of concern. An extensive range of government agencies were represented across eight Microstrategy workstreams, which coordinated with the existing EM arrangements to deliver targeted strategies to communities in high-risk locations and improve data and information sharing across government. This enhanced the public health, compliance, income and food support, communications and community engagement aspects of the response.

Agencies also leveraged learnings from early weeks of the Delta wave and were able to replicate those lessons in other locations. The use of pre-staging hubs in Fairfield to support food and personal hamper distribution was used a month later in Dubbo which acted as a central hub for more remote parts of the State.

Emergency management plans did not enable government to respond immediately to support vulnerable communities in high-risk LGAs or regional NSW

There are gaps in the emergency management plans relating to the support for individuals, families and businesses impacted by the stay-at-home orders and other restrictions to movement and gathering. These gaps affected agencies' ability to respond immediately when the need arose during Delta.

Emergency management plans and supporting instruments did not include provision for immediate relief for households, which meant arrangements for isolation income support and food security measures had to be designed in the early stages of Delta before it could be approved and deployed.

There were delays – sometimes only days, on occasion, weeks - in providing support to affected communities. In particular, there were delays to the provision of income support and in scaling up efforts to coordinate food and grocery hampers to households in isolation. In LGAs of concern, modest delays of a few days had a significant impact on people, especially those most vulnerable.

Although government issued stricter restrictions for workers in the Fairfield LGA on 14 July 2021, it only approved targeted income support for people in LGAs of concern on 16 August 2021.

Overall, agencies coordinated effectively to provide advice to government but there are opportunities to learn lessons to improve preparedness for future events

Agencies coordinated in providing advice to government. The advice was supported by timely public health information, although this was in the context of a pandemic, where data and information about the virus and its variants was changing regularly. However, agencies did not always consider the impact on key industries or supply chains when they provided advice to government, which meant that Public Health Orders would sometimes need to be corrected.

Public Health Orders were also updated as the response to Delta intensified or to address unintended consequences of previous orders. The frequency of changes hampered agencies' ability to effectively communicate changes to frontline staff and the community in a rapidly evolving situation.

The audit identified several occasions where there were delays, ranging from three to 21 days, between the provision of advice to government and subsequent decision-making (which we have not detailed due to the confidentiality of Cabinet deliberations). Agency officers advised of instances where they were not provided sufficient notice of changes to Public Health Orders to organise local infrastructure (such as traffic support for testing clinics) to support compliance with new requirements.

The COVID-19 pandemic arrived in Australia in late January 2020 as the bushfire and localised flooding emergencies were in their final stages. Between 2020 and mid-2021, agencies responded to the initial variants of COVID-19, managed a border closure with Victoria that lasted nearly four months and dealt with localised ‘flare-ups’ that required postcode-based restrictions on mobility in northern parts of Sydney and regional New South Wales. During this period, New South Wales had the opportunity to learn from events in Victoria which imposed strict restrictions on mobility across the State and the growing emergence of the Delta variant (Delta) across the Asia Pacific.

This section of the report assesses how emergency management and public health responses adapted to these lessons and determined preparedness for, and responses to, widespread community transmission of Delta in New South Wales.

The previous chapter discusses how agencies had refined the existing emergency management arrangements to suit the needs of a pandemic and describes some gaps that were not addressed. This chapter explores the first month of Delta (mid-June to mid-July 2021). It explores the areas where agencies were prepared and responses in place for the outbreak. It also discusses the impact of the gaps that were not addressed in the period prior to Delta and other issues that emerged.

NSW Health provided advice on the removal of restrictions based on up-to-date advice

The NSW Government discussed the gradual process for removing restrictions using the Doherty Institute modelling provided to National Cabinet on 10 August 2021. NSW Health highlighted the importance of maintaining a level of public health and safety measure bundles to further suppress case numbers. This was based on additional modelling from the Doherty Institute.

The Department of Regional NSW led discussion and planning around reopening with a range of proposal through August and September 2021. The Department of Premier and Cabinet and NSW Health jointly developed a paper to provide options on the restrictions when the State reached a level of 70% double dose vaccinations.

The roadmap to reopening was originally published on 9 September 2021. However, by 11 October 2021, the restrictions were relaxed when the 70% double dose threshold was reached to allow:

  • up to ten fully vaccinated visitors to a home (increased from five)
  • up to 30 fully vaccinated people attending outdoor gatherings (increased from 20)
  • weddings and funerals limits increased to 100 people (from 50)
  • the reopening of indoor pools for training, exercise and learning purposes only.

On the same day, the NSW Government announced further relaxation of restrictions once the 80% double dose threshold was reached. These restrictions were further relaxed on 8 November 2021. This included the removal of capacity restrictions to the number of visitors to a private residence, indoor pools to reopen for all purposes and density limits of one person for every two square metres, dancing allowed in nightclubs and 100% capacity in major stadia.

The NSW Government allowed workers in regional areas who received one vaccination dose to return to their workplace from 11 October 2021.

The Premier extended the date of easing of restrictions for unvaccinated people aged over 16 from 1 December to 15 December 2021.

Many agencies have undertaken reviews of their response to the Delta outbreak but a whole-of-government review has yet to be conducted

Various agencies and entities associated with the response to the Delta outbreak conducted after-action review processes. These processes assessed the achievements delivered, lessons learned and opportunities for improvement. However, a whole-of-government level review has not been conducted. This limits the New South Wales public service's ability to improve how it coordinates responses in future emergencies.

The agencies/entities that conducted reviews included:

  • South West Metropolitan region, Western NSW region, Fairfield Local Emergency Management Committee (LEMC), Dubbo Local Emergency Operations Controller (LEOCON), which were collated centrally by the State Emergency Operations Centre (SEOC)
  • Aboriginal Affairs NSW assessed representation and relevance of the emergency management arrangements for Aboriginal communities following the 2019 bushfires
  • Resilience NSW developed case studies to capture improved practice with regard to food security and supply chains
  • a community support and empowerment-focused after-action review undertaken by the Pillar 5 workstream of the Microstrategy.

Key lessons collated from the after-action reviews include:

  • the impact of variation in capability across agencies on the management of key aspects of the response including welfare support and logistics
  • issues with boundary differences between NSW Police Force regions, local government areas (LGA and local health districts (LHD) caused issues in delivering and coordinating services in an emergency situation 
  • the need to improve relationships between state and local Government outside of acute emergency responses to improve service delivery 
  • issues arising from impediments to information sharing between agencies and jurisdictions, such as:
    • timeliness and accuracy of data used to direct compliance activities
    • the impact of insufficient advance notice on changes to Public Health Orders
    • timely access to data across public sector agencies and other jurisdictions to inform decision-making, analysis and communications
    • gaps in data around ethnicity, geolocation of recent positive cases and infection/vaccination rates in Aboriginal communities.
  • the lack of Aboriginal community representation on many LEMCs
  • compared with the response to COVID-19 in 2020, improved coordination of communications with Culturally and Linguistically Diverse (CALD) populations with a reduction in overlapping messages and over-communication
  • improved attendance from agency representatives in LEMCs, and regional emergency operations centres (REOC) to improve interagency communications, planning, capability development and community engagement issues
  • deficiencies in succession planning and fatigue management practices
  • the potential for REOC Welfare/Well-being subgroups to be included as part of the wider efforts to community needs during emergencies.

NSW Health commenced a whole of system review of its COVID-19 response in May 2022. At the time of writing, the completion due date for the debrief is 7 November 2022. This debrief is expected to explore:

  • governance
  • engagement 
  • innovation and technology 
  • community impact 
  • workforce impact
  • system impact and performance.

NSW Health is also undertaking a parallel Intra-Action Review that is focused on the public health aspects of the response with finalisation estimated for the end of November 2022. At the time of completing this performance audit report, NSW Health had not finalised these reviews and, as a result, we cannot validate their findings against our own observations.

Recent inquiries are likely to impact the governance of emergency management in New South Wales

In March 2022, the NSW Government established an independent inquiry to examine and report on the causes of, preparedness for, response to and recovery from the 2022 floods. The Flood Inquiry report made 28 recommendations, which the NSW Government supported in full or in principle. Some of the recommendations relate directly to the governance and leadership of emergency management arrangements in New South Wales. 

The State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC) will likely be involved in, and impacted by, the recommendations arising from the Flood Inquiry with potential changes to its membership and reshaping of functional areas and agencies. At the same time, the SEMC may have a role in overseeing the changes that emerge from the SEOC consolidated after-action reviews. This can also extend to ensuring local and regional bodies have incorporated the required actions. There is a risk that the recommendations from the pandemic-based after-action reviews may not be considered due to the priority of action resulting from the Flood Inquiry.

Furthermore, there is potential for the SEMC to work with NSW Health during its system-wide review. Such an approach is likely to improve preparedness for future events.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – Chronology 2020–2021

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #371 - released 20 December 2022

Published

Actions for Internal controls and governance 2022

Internal controls and governance 2022

Whole of Government
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Fraud
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Procurement
Risk

What the report is about

This report analyses the internal controls and governance of the 25 largest agencies in the NSW public sector, excluding state-owned corporations and public financial corporations, for the year ended 30 June 2022.

What we found

Internal control trends

The proportion of control deficiencies identified as high-risk this year increased to 8.2% (5.9% in 2020–21). Sixteen of the 23 high-risk findings related to financial controls while seven related to IT controls.

Repeat findings of control deficiencies now represent 48% of all findings (47% in 2020–21).

Information technology

There continues to be a high number of deficiencies relating to IT general controls, particularly around user access reviews, which affected 56% of agencies.

Cyber security

Agencies' self-assessed maturity levels against the NSW Cyber Security Policy mandatory requirements are lower than target levels. Overall, maturity levels against the Australian Cyber Security Centre's Essential Eight controls have not improved since last year.

Management of cyber risks relating to third party IT service providers should be improved. IT service providers may pose risks to the agency if the provider's cyber security controls have weaknesses.

Consultants and contractors

Agencies risk over-reliance on the same consultants and contractors. A quarter of agencies have re-engaged the same contractor over the past five years.

Employment screening Twenty-four per cent of agencies have not complied with the employment screening requirements of the Government Sector Employment Act 2013 with regard to citizenship or residency. Screening and induction practices for non-permanent workers are often less stringent than for permanent employees. This can pose increased risks to an entity of not detecting applicants with false credentials or a history of corrupt conduct.

Contract management

Half of all agencies' procurement contract registers are incomplete, which is non-compliant with the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009.

What we recommended

Agencies should:

  • prioritise actions to address repeat control deficiencies
  • prioritise improvements to their cyber security and resilience
  • reinforce mandatory cyber training to all staff and improve completion rates
  • ensure that contractor engagements that have been renewed over multiple years are periodically reassessed against the market.

Internal controls are processes, policies and procedures that help agencies to:

  • operate effectively and efficiently
  • produce reliable financial reports
  • comply with laws and regulations
  • support ethical government.

This chapter outlines the overall trends for agency controls and governance issues, including the number of audit findings, the degree of risk those deficiencies pose to the agency, and a summary of the most common deficiencies we found across agencies. The rest of this report presents this year's controls and governance findings in more detail.

For consistency and comparability, we have adjusted the 2021 results to incorporate additional audit findings that were reported after the date of the 'Internal controls and governance 2021' report. Therefore, the 2021 figures will not necessarily align with those reported in our 2021 report.

This section also covers how agencies have complied with TD 21-04 during 2021–22.

Section highlights

We identified 23 high-risk findings, compared to 20 last year, with ten repeated from last year. Sixteen of the 23 findings related to financial controls and seven related to IT controls.

  • The proportion of repeat deficiencies has increased from 47% in 2020–21 to 48% in 2021–22.
  • We identified a low level of compliance with TD 21-04 during 2021–22. Most agencies do not have a policy on gifts of government property, and did not annually certify their register of gifts of government property or attest that the agency has not made any gifts.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations arising from our review of agency controls to manage key financial systems.

Section highlights

  • We continue to see a high number of deficiencies related to IT General Controls, particularly those related to user access administration and privileged user access.
  • We identified deficiencies within IT governance related to IT policies and procedures not effective in managing IT risks. We also identified weaknesses in arrangements with third-party IT service providers which can increase cyber security risk.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations arising from our review of agencies' cyber security planning and governance arrangements.

Section highlights

  • Only 80% of agencies specify how they monitor or ensure that third-party IT service providers comply with the agencies' cyber security policies. IT service providers may pose certain risks to the agency if the provider's cyber security controls have weaknesses.
  • There are inconsistent practices and definitions of cyber security incidents across agencies with respect to maintaining incident registers. Five agencies reported nil incidents in their registers for 2021–22, while other agencies recorded up to 1,913 incidents.
  • Agencies' self-assessed maturity levels against the NSW Cyber Security Policy mandatory requirements are lower than their target levels in at least one requirement. Maturity levels against the Australian Cyber Security Centre's Essential Eight controls have not improved since last year. 

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations arising from our review of agencies' practices in engaging external experts, such as consultants and contractors.

Section highlights

  • Agencies risk over-reliance on the same consultants, as some firms continue to be the highest paid consultants at 60% of agencies for at least three of the past five years.
  • Agencies could improve their policies on engaging consultants to include consideration of:
    • probity requirements/conflict of interests
    • rotation of independent consultants from time-to-time
    • additional review where multiple consultants are engaged on the same topic to address the risk of opinion shopping.
  • A quarter of agencies have re-engaged the same contractor over the past five years, with one contractor engaged for 19 years. Long-term engagements without reassessment against market increase the risk of dependency on the contractor.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations arising from our review of agencies' employment screening practices.

Section highlights

  • We identified that most agencies do not include the risk of employment application fraud in their risk registers.
    Post-employment screening has an important role in preventing fraud and managing risk as roles often change and the initial employment screening procedures may not be sufficient to control risk over time. Only 57% of agencies that have an employment screening policy include post-employment screening guidance.
  • Screening and induction practices for non-permanent workers are often less stringent than for permanent employees. There is an increased risk that agencies will:
    • fail to identify an applicant with a past history of corrupt or criminal conduct
    • not identify applications with false credentials
    • hire a worker with unsuitable qualifications, skills or experience.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations arising from our review of agencies' contract management processes.

Section highlights

  • All agencies maintain a central contract register but 40% are incomplete, risking non-compliance with the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (GIPA Act).
  • The contract renewal process could be improved. We identified only 76% of agencies assessed value for money before deciding to renew/extend the contract.
  • Most agencies provide some training and support to staff on procurement procedures. Ongoing training and awareness programs allow agencies to communicate to all staff their responsibilities and obligations in relation to procurement activities. 

Published

Actions for Stronger Communities 2022

Stronger Communities 2022

Justice
Community Services
Asset valuation
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Risk

What the report is about

Results of the Stronger Communities cluster agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2022.

What we found

Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all completed 30 June 2022 financial statement audits. One audit is ongoing.

All 13 cluster agencies that have accommodation arrangements with Property NSW derecognised right-of-use assets and lease liabilities of $917 million and $1 billion respectively. The agencies also collectively recorded a gain on derecognition of $136 million.

The Department of Communities and Justice (the department) assumed the responsibility for delivery of the Process and Technology Harmonisation program from the Department of Customer Service. In 2021–22, the department incurred costs of $42.8 million in relation to the project, which remains ongoing.

The number of monetary misstatements identified during the audits decreased from 50 in 2020–21 to 48 in 2021–22.

What the key issues were

Six of the 15 cluster agencies required to submit 2021–22 mandatory early close procedures did not meet the statutory deadlines. One agency did not complete all mandatory procedures.

Five high-risk findings were identified in 2021–22. They related to deficiencies in:

  • user access administration at the department, NSW Rural Fire Service and New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council (NSWALC)
  • segregation of duties at the NSW Trustee and Guardian and NSWALC.

Recommendations were made to those agencies to address these control deficiencies.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Stronger Communities cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster (the cluster) for 2022.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all completed 30 June 2022 financial statement audits of cluster agencies, including the acquittal and compliance audits for the Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales and Crown Solicitor's Office. One audit is ongoing.

  • Reported corrected misstatements decreased from 30 in 2020–21 to 23 with a gross value of $187 million in 2021–22 ($101 million in 2020–21). Reported uncorrected misstatements increased from 20 in 2020–21 to 25 with a gross value of $92.3 million in 2021–22 ($107 million in 2020–21).

  • Six of the 15 cluster agencies required to submit 2021–22 early close financial statements and all other mandatory procedures did not meet the statutory deadlines. One agency did not complete all mandatory procedures.

  • All 13 cluster agencies that have accommodation arrangements with Property NSW accepted the changes in the Client Acceptance Letters, resulting in the derecognition of right-of-use assets and lease liabilities of $917 million and $1 billion respectively. The agencies also collectively recorded a gain on derecognition of $136 million.

  • The Department of Communities and Justice (the department) assumed the responsibility to deliver the Process and Technology Harmonisation program from the Department of Customer Service. In 2021–22, the department incurred costs of $42.8 million in relation to the project.

  • In 2021–22, the department continued to implement the International Financial Reporting Standards Interpretations Committee's agenda decision on 'Configuration or customisation costs in a cloud computing arrangement'. The department's review of the remaining arrangements, with a net book value of $233 million at 30 June 2021, resulted in the recognition as an expense (through accumulated funds at 1 July 2020) of previously capitalised intangible assets totalling $106 million.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster.

Section highlights

  • The number of issues reported to management has decreased from 130 in 2020–21, to 110 in 2021–22, and 43% were repeat issues (51% in 2020–21). Many repeat issues related to information technology, governance and oversight controls, and non-compliance with key legislation and/or agency policies.

  • Five high-risk issues were identified in 2021–22, all of which are repeat issues and related to user access administration and segregation of duties.

  • Of the 24 newly identified moderate risk issues, 11 related to information technology. The rest related to governance and oversight controls and internal control deficiencies or improvements in payroll, asset management and other processes.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Health 2022

Health 2022

Health
Whole of Government
Asset valuation
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Information technology
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

What the report is about

Result of Health cluster (the cluster) agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2022.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for the financial statements for all Health cluster agencies.

The COVID-19 pandemic continued to increase the complexity and number of accounting matters faced by the cluster. The total gross value of corrected misstatements in 2021–22 was $353.3 million, of which $186.7 million related to an increase in the impairment provision for Rapid Antigen Tests (RATs).

A qualified audit opinion was issued on the Annual Prudential Compliance Statement related to five residential aged care facilities. There were 20 instances (19 in 2020–21) of non-compliance with the prudential responsibilities within the Aged Care Act 1997.

What the key issues were

The total number of matters we reported to management across the cluster decreased from 116 in 2020–21 to 67 in 2021–22. Of the 67 issues raised, four were high risk (three in 2020-21) and 37 were moderate risk (57 in 2020–21). Nearly half of all control deficiencies reported in 2021–22 were repeat issues.

Three unresolved high-risk issues were:

  • COVID-19 inventories impairment – we continued to identify issues relating to management’s impairment model which relies on anticipated future consumption patterns. RATs had not been assessed for impairment.

  • Asset capitalisation threshold – management has not reviewed the appropriateness of the asset capitalisation threshold since 2006.

  • Forced-finalisation of HealthRoster time records – we continued to observe unapproved rosters being finalised by system administrators so payroll can be processed on time. 2.6 million time records were processed in this way in 2021–22.

What we recommended

  • COVID-19 inventories impairment – ensure consumption patterns are supported by relevant data and plans.

  • Assets capitalisation threshold – undertake further review of the appropriateness of applying a $10,000 threshold before capitalising expenditure on property, plant and equipment.

  • Forced-finalisation of HealthRoster time records – develop a methodology to quantify the potential monetary value of unapproved rosters being finalised.

This report provides Parliament and other users of Health cluster (the cluster) agencies' financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting

  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Health cluster (the cluster) for 2022.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all cluster agencies required to prepare general purpose financial statements.

  • The total gross value of corrected monetary misstatements for 2021–22 was $353.3 million, of which, $186.7 million related to an increase in the impairment provision for Rapid Antigen Tests.

  • A qualified audit opinion was issued on the ministry's Annual Prudential Compliance Statements.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the cluster.

Section highlights

  • The total number of internal control deficiencies has decreased from 116 in 2020–21 to 67 in 2021–22. Of the 67 issues raised in 2021–22, four were high (2020–21: 3) and 37 were moderate (2020–21: 57); with nearly half of all control deficiencies reported in 2021–22 being repeat issues.

  • The following four issues were reported in 2021–22 as high risk:

    • impairment of COVID-19 inventories

    • inadequate review over the appropriateness of asset capitalisation threshold

    • forced-finalisation of HealthRoster time records

    • COVID-19 vaccination inventories – data quality issue at 31 March 2022.

  • Management of excessive leave balances and poor quality or lack of documentation supporting key agreements continued to be the key repeat issues observed in the 2021–22 financial reporting period.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Education 2022

Education 2022

Education
Asset valuation
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Procurement
Risk

What the report is about

Result of the Education cluster financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2022.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for Education cluster agencies.

An 'other matter' paragraph was included in the TAFE Commission's independent auditor's report as it did not have a delegation or sub-delegation from the Minister for Education and Early Learning to incur expenditure from cluster grants.

What the key issues were

Annual fair value assessments of land and buildings showed material differences in their carrying values. As a result, the Department of Education and the TAFE Commission completed desktop revaluations of land and buildings, collectively increasing the value of these assets by $1.2 billion and $4.7 billion respectively.

The Department of Education and the NSW Education Standards Authority accepted changes to their office leasing arrangements managed by Property NSW. These changes resulted in the collective derecognition of $270.6 million of right-of-use assets and $382.9 million in lease liabilities.

What we recommended

A high-risk matter was reported in the management letter for the TAFE Commission highlighting non-compliance with policies and procedures guiding appropriate use of purchasing cards.

We recommended cluster agencies prioritise and address internal control deficiencies.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Education cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Education cluster (the cluster) for 2022.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the financial statements of cluster agencies.
  • An 'other matter' paragraph was included in the independent auditor's report for the Technical and Further Education Commission (TAFE Commission) as they did not have a delegation or sub-delegation from the Minister for Education and Early Learning to incur expenditure from cluster grants.
  • The Department of Education and the TAFE Commission's land and buildings were revalued upwards by a collective $5.9 billion. These uplifts were the result of managerial fair value assessments showing that the carrying values of land and buildings had materially departed from fair value.
  • Changes to accommodation arrangements managed by Property NSW on behalf of the department and the NSW Education Standards Authority resulted in the collective derecognition of approximately $270.6 million in right-of-use assets and corresponding lease liabilities totalling $382.9 million from the balance sheets of these agencies. 

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Education cluster.

Section highlights

  • The 2021–22 audits identified 18 moderate issues across the cluster. Seven moderate risk issues were repeat issues related to general and application information technology controls and control deficiencies in key transactional systems used in preparing financial statements.
  • Of the 11 newly identified moderate risk issues, five related to information technology controls deficiencies; and five related to internal control deficiencies in key transactional systems used in preparing financial statements.
  • A high-risk matter was raised at the TAFE Commission relating to identified instances of non-compliance with policies and procedures guiding purchasing card use. 

The number of findings reported to management has increased, and 31% were repeat issues

Breakdowns and weaknesses in internal controls increase the risk of fraud and error. Deficiencies in internal controls, matters of governance interest and unresolved issues were reported to management and those charged with governance of agencies. The Audit Office does this through management letters, which include observations, related implications, recommendations and risk ratings.

In 2021–22, there were 29 findings raised across the cluster (28 in 2020–21). Thirty-one per cent of all issues were repeat issues (50% in 2020–21).

The most common new and repeat issues related to internal control deficiencies in agencies’ information technology general controls, application controls, and procurement and payroll practices.

A delay in implementing audit recommendations increases the risk of intentional and accidental errors in processing information, producing management reports and generating financial statements. This can impair decision-making, affect service delivery and expose agencies to fraud, financial loss and reputational damage. Poor controls may also mean agency staff are less likely to follow internal policies, inadvertently causing the agency not to comply with legislation, regulation and central agency policies. 

A high-risk matter was reported at the TAFE Commission highlighting instances of non-compliance with policies and procedures guiding appropriate purchasing card use

As part of our audit of the TAFE Commission, we integrated the use of data analytics into the audit approach. We performed data analytics over aspects of payroll, procurement and accounts payable activities. This helped us to highlight anomalies or risks in those data sets that are relevant to the audit of the TAFE Commission and plan testing procedures to address those risks. Data analytics also assisted us in providing an insight into the internal control environment of the TAFE Commission, highlighting areas where key controls are not in place or are not operating as management intended.

Our analysis over purchasing card data supplied by the TAFE Commission for the period July 2021 to March 2022 found deficiencies in the provisioning, use and cancellation of purchasing cards. This included identified instances of:

  • controls effectively bypassed when a purchasing card surrendered by a former employee had been used by another employee
  • split payments, circumventing delegation / cardholder limits
  • delays in the submission and approval of purchasing card transactions.

The table below describes the common issues identified across the cluster by category and risk rating:

Risk rating Issue
Information technology

High: 0 new, 0 repeat 1

Moderate: 5 new, 3 repeat 2

Low: 2 new, 1 repeat 3

The financial audits identified areas for agencies to improve information technology processes and controls that support the integrity of financial data used to prepare agencies' financial statements. Of note were deficiencies identified in:

  • agencies' user access administration and change management procedures, notably in the timing and frequency of managerial reviews over the granting and revocation of access to key systems relevant to financial reporting
  • the level of cyber security maturity
  • the monitoring of privileged user activities.
Internal control deficiencies or improvements

High: 1 new, 0 repeat 1

Moderate: 5 new, 3 repeat 2

Low: 4 new, 1 repeat 3

The financial audits identified internal control weaknesses across key business processes relevant to financial reporting. Of note were deficiencies identified in:

  • the adequacy of monitoring and oversight activities over the use of multiple financial delegation configurations in finance systems for specific users
  • the timely recording and approval of overtime claims and higher duties allowances
  • the timely finalisation of policies and procedures
  • the management of excessive annual leave balances
  • formalisation of service-provider arrangements between government agencies
  • non-compliance with policies and procedures to guide secondary employment and pecuniary interest declarations
  • non-compliance with policies and procedures to guide the appropriate use of purchasing cards.
Financial reporting

High: 0 new, 0 repeat 1

Moderate: 1 new, 1 repeat 2

Low: 2 new, 0 repeat 3

The financial audits identified:

  • opportunities for agencies to strengthen their financial preparation processes to facilitate a timelier and more efficient year-end audit
  • matters in respect of the timely capitalisation of work-in-progress
  • the need for agencies with non-financial assets subject to fair value to reconsider policy settings governing the frequency of revaluations
  • refinements in considering the outcomes of interim fair value assessments to ensure asset carrying values reflect fair value at each balance date.

1 High risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
2 Moderate risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
3 Low risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
Note: Management letter findings are based either on final management letters issued to agencies, or draft letters where findings have been agreed with management.

 

Recommendation

We recommend cluster agencies prioritise and action recommendations to address the internal control deficiencies outlined above.