Refine search Expand filter

Reports

Published

Actions for Report on Education 2017

Report on Education 2017

Education
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Workforce and capability

The Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford released her report on the results of the financial audits of agencies in the Education cluster. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent audits of these agencies.

'I am pleased to report that unqualified audit opinions were issued on the financial statements for all agencies in the Education cluster', the Auditor-General said. 'The quality and timeliness of financial reporting remains strong'.

Published

Actions for Justice 2017

Justice 2017

Justice
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Fraud

The following report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent audits of law and order and emergency services agencies in the Justice cluster.

No qualified audit opinions were issued on Justice agencies' financial statements. However, agencies that used the Department of Justice as their service provider experienced difficulties finalising their accounts. This was due to issues with the department’s implementation of a new financial accounting and reporting system and the continued establishment of its Business Support Centre. The Department is working to remediate the new finance system.

1. Financial reporting and controls

Financial reporting Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' 30 June 2017 financial statements. However, some agencies' year end financial reporting procedures were impacted by the implementation of a new finance system and processes at the Department.     
Early Close Early close procedures continue to help agencies present audited financial statements on time, but there is room for further improvement.
NSW Police Force Death and Disability Scheme The cost of the NSW Police Force Death and Disability Scheme was higher than the statutory target.
Fire and Rescue NSW Death and Disability Scheme The Fire and Rescue NSW Death and Disability Scheme liability was $179 million, but is projected to reach $257 million by 30 June 2022.
Internal Controls

The Department experienced significant, but avoidable internal control issues in its payroll and finance functions following implementation of a new IT finance system (Justice SAP) and continued establishment of its Business Support Centre.

We found 94 internal controls issues, including 28 findings repeated from the previous year.

Human Resources Agencies have not met State targets for managing annual leave balances.

 2. Service Delivery

Domestic violence reoffending            The Department reports decreases in domestic violence reoffending rates, but they remain above the Premier's target
Rates of reoffending      Adult reoffending rates remain above the State's priority target. Last year, more than half had returned to prison or Corrective Services within two years of release. The Department has introduced initiatives to reduce reoffending, but their impact will not be known for several years
Road Fatalities New South Wales' road fatalities decreased slightly in 2016–17, but remains slightly above the State priority target..
NSW crime trends NSW Bureau of Crime statistics and Research data shows the trend in most crime categories in New South Wales has been better than national trends over the last five years.
Adult inmate numbers Departmental data shows that NSW prisons remained overcrowded in 2016–17, but the rate of growth in inmate numbers slowed.
Adult inmate resources Data from the Department and the Justice Heath and Forensic Mental Health Network shows inmate access to some resources and services has not kept pace with increases in prison populations.
NSW District Court case backlog After falling last year, the backlog of cases in the NSW District Court again increased but the age of backlog cases decreased, according to Departmental data.
Hazard Reduction works The Office of the NSW Rural Fire Service advise adverse weather conditions reduced the total hectares of completed hazard reduction works by 50.7 per cent in 2016–17 compared to 2015–16.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Justice cluster agencies' financial statements with audit results, observations, conclusions and recommendations for:

  • Financial reporting and controls
  • Service delivery.

The commentary in this report covers the following cluster agencies:

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence in public sector decision making and transparency is enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely. Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines audit observations, conclusions and recommendations for financial reporting and controls of Justice cluster agencies.

Observation Conclusion or recommendation
2.1 Financial reporting
Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements. Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' 30 June 2017 financial statements. The Department and agencies that used the Department as their service provider, were impacted by the Department's Justice SAP, and Business Support Centre implementations.
2.2 Timeliness of financial reporting
Most agencies complied with the statutory timeframes for completion of early close procedures and preparation and audit of financial statements. Early close procedures continue to facilitate the timely preparation of financial statements and completion of audits. Early close procedures for some agencies was diminished by the Department's Justice SAP and Business Support Centre implementations.
2.3 Death and disability schemes

The cost of the NSW Police Blue Ribbon scheme reportedly decreased, but remains above the statutory target of 4.6 per cent of total NSW Police Officer's remuneration.

 

The Fire and Rescue Death and Disability Scheme liability has almost doubled over the past five years.

The Blue Ribbon Scheme cost $12.7 million or 10.4 per cent less in 2016–17 following an improvement in claims' experience. The was reflected in the cost of the scheme, which decreased from 6 per cent to 5.45 per cent of total NSW Police Officers’ remuneration.



The Scheme’s liability was $179 million at 30 June 2017, almost double the $92 million recorded at 30 June 2013. A five-year period has been used due to the sensitivity of annual movements in the liability to changes in discount rates. According to Fire and Rescue NSW projections the liability will reach $257 million by 30 June 2022.
2.5 Internal Controls
There were significant payroll and general finance related issues resulting from the Department's Justice SAP system implementation and establishment of the Business Support Centre. Recommendation: The Department should reinstate controls over financial information as soon as possible, and capture and apply lessons learned from recent project implementations, including LifeLink, in any relevant future implementations.
2.7 Human Resources    
More than a third of Justice cluster employees have annual leave balances above the State's target. Recommendation: Cluster agencies with annual leave balances above the State's target should proactively manage their leave balances. Particular focus should be given to employees who have taken little or no leave in the last 12 months.

Achievement of government outcomes can be improved through effective delivery of the right mix of services, whether from the public, private or not for profit sectors. Service delivery reform will be most successful if there is clear accountability for service delivery outcomes, decisions are aligned to strategic direction and performance is monitored and evaluated.

The Justice cluster is an integrated cluster with key service delivery inter-dependencies. Achieving State priorities and ensuring communities are safe requires both upstream and downstream agencies to be adequately resourced. This is a delicate balance. Increases in frontline policing can subsequently impact the court system. Court backlogs can in turn increase prison overcrowding, and limit the opportunities for inmate rehabilitation. Failure to successfully rehabilitate prisoners and prevent reoffending could impact future police resourcing.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations related to service delivery by agencies in the Justice cluster for 2016–17.

Observation Conclusion or recommendation
Data from the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research shows that domestic violence reoffending decreased from 15.9 per cent in 2014–15 to 15.5 per cent in 2015–16, but remains 4.8 percentage points above the Premier's target. Reducing domestic violence reoffending is challenging. While there was a marginal improvement in 2015–16, the Justice cluster needs to continue efforts to reduce reoffending rates, if the Premier's priority target is to be met by 2019. 
Productivity Commission data shows that in the year to 30 June 2016, 50.7 per cent of released prisoners had returned to prison and 55.1 per cent to Corrective Services, within two years of release. There has been a consistent increase in reoffending rates over the last five years.

Recommendation: The Department should reassess the sufficiency and effectiveness of measures aimed at reducing reoffending, including the recently announced initiatives, if the State priority target is to be met by 2019.

A $237 million program to reduce reoffending was announced in August 2016. While new initiatives were introduced in 2016–17, their impact on reoffending rates will not be known for several years.
New South Wales' road fatalities per 100,000 people slightly exceeded the 2016–17 target. Statistics from the NSW Centre for Road Safety shows that New South Wales' road fatalities decreased to 4.6 deaths per 100,000 people in 2016–17, slightly above the State priority target of 4.3 deaths. This is better than the 5.1 deaths recorded in 2015–16, but worse than the 4.0 deaths in 2014–15.
 
Between 31 December 2012 and 31 December 2016, the number of crimes has trended down in most crime categories, except for sexual assault, which has increased in each of the last five years. The downward trend in most crime categories indicates the cluster is effectively achieving the State’s priority to prevent and reduce crime. However, the Department should assess whether the mix of offered programs is consistent with crime trends.
Department data shows that the NSW prison system remained overcrowded in 2016–17.

Overcrowding of correctional centres can negatively impact all aspects of custodial life, and ultimately higher reoffending rates.

 
Data from the Department shows that the inmate population reached 13,253, compared to an operational capacity of 13,402 beds on 27 August 2017. This equates to an operational vacancy rate of 1.1 per cent, which is significantly less than the recommended 5.0 per cent buffer. However, the rate of inmate growth slowed to 5.1 per cent, from 11.8 per cent in 2015–16.

The Department should ensure that measures aimed at reducing reoffending are not compromised by continued overcrowding. Reoffending, will in the long term contribute to further overcrowding.
 
Adult inmate resources. Inmate access to some resources and services has not kept pace with increases in prison populations, such as the ratio of nurses to inmates. In addition, Productivity Commission information on out-of-cell hours in 2015–16 shows New South Wales prisoners' average time out-of-cell of 7.8 hours was the lowest of any Australian jurisdiction. 
After falling in 2015–16, the backlog of cases in the NSW District Court increased again in 2016–17. The age of cases however decreased in 2016–17 compared to 2015–16. A working group which includes the Department and the Chief Judge of the District Court has identified a number of new measures to address the backlog. The Department needs to assess whether these measures will be sufficient, given that the backlog increased again in 2016–17. As noted in financial reporting and controls chapter, staffing levels in a number of just cluster agencies increased in 2016–17, in response to the backlog.
Department data shows the annual cost of a juvenile detainee decreased from $355,444 to $335,840 (5.5 per cent) in the three-year period between 2014–15 and 2016–17. The Department has been analysing the Juvenile Justice division's operating costs in the context of declining custodial numbers, and has achieved some cost savings. The savings in part reflect decreases in the number of detainees.    
The Office of the NSW Rural Fire Service data shows that completed hazard reduction works decreased in 2016–17. The total hectares of completed hazard reduction works decreased 50.7 per cent in 2016–17 compared to 2015–16. The Office of the NSW Rural Fire Service attributes the decrease to adverse weather conditions during the peak burning period

Published

Actions for Government Advertising: Campaigns for 2015–16 and 2016–17

Government Advertising: Campaigns for 2015–16 and 2016–17

Premier and Cabinet
Justice
Local Government
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement

The 'Stronger Councils, Stronger Communities' and the 'Dogs deserve better' government advertising campaigns complied with the Government Advertising Act and most elements of the Government Advertising Guidelines.

However, some advertisements were designed to build support for government policy and used subjective or emotive messages. This is inconsistent with the requirement in the Government Advertising Guidelines for 'objective presentation in a fair and accessible manner'.

Advertisements in the 'Stronger Councils, Stronger Communities' campaign used subjective statements such as 'the system is broken' and 'brighter future'. While advertisements in the 'Dogs deserve better' campaign used confronting imagery such as gun targets, blood smears and gravestones.

The Government Advertising Act 2011 (the Act) requires the Auditor-General to conduct a performance audit in relation to at least one government advertising campaign in each financial year. The performance audit assesses whether advertising campaigns were carried out effectively, economically and efficiently and in compliance with the Act, the regulations, other laws and the Government Advertising Guidelines (the Guidelines). In this audit, we examined two campaigns:

  • the ‘Stronger Councils, Stronger Communities’ campaign run by the Office of Local Government and the Department of Premier and Cabinet
  • the ‘Dogs deserve better’ campaign run by the Department of Justice.    

Section 6 of the Act details the specific prohibitions on political advertising. Under this section, material that is part of a government advertising campaign must not contain the name, voice or image of a minister, member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament or the name, logo or any slogan of a political party. Further, a campaign must not be designed so as to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party.

The ‘Stronger Councils, Stronger Communities’ government advertising campaign was run by the Office of Local Government and the Department of Premier and Cabinet in four phases from August 2015 to May 2016. The total cost of the campaign was over $4.5 million. See Appendix 2 for more details on this campaign.

The ‘Stronger Councils, Stronger Communities’ advertising campaign has not breached the specific provisions of Section 6 of the Act which prohibits political advertising.

Two factors potentially compromised value for money for the campaign. The request for quotes for the design of the Phase 1 advertisement did not reflect the full scale of work to be undertaken, which was substantially greater than initially quoted. Further, the department did not meet all recommended timeframes to minimise media booking costs for all phases of the campaign.

The campaign did not comply with all administrative requirements in all phases. Advertising for Phase 1 commenced before the compliance certificate was signed. There was no evidence that a compliance certificate was signed for Phase 2 extension. The cost benefit analyses for Phase 2 and Phase 2 extension did not sufficiently consider alternatives to advertising, as is required by the Government Advertising Guidelines.

Advertisements adopted subjective messages designed to build public support for council mergers and directed audiences to websites for more detailed information. Campaign research identified statements that were most likely to reduce resistance to mergers. Some advertising content used subjective language, which we consider inconsistent with the requirement for ‘objective presentation’. Evaluations of advertising effectiveness also measured the success of the advertisements in increasing public support for council mergers.

No breach of specific prohibitions in the Act

Section 6 of the Act prohibits the use of government advertising for political advertising. A government advertising campaign must not:

  • be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party
  • contain the name, voice or image of a minister, any other member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament
  • contain the name, logo or any slogan of, or any other reference relating to, a political party.

We did not identify any breach of the specific prohibitions listed above in the advertising content of this campaign.

Request for quotes to design advertisement did not reflect the full scope required

The request for quotes for the design of the Phase 1 advertisement did not reflect the full scale of work that was to be undertaken, and this created a risk to achieving value for money. The Office of Local Government sought quotes for design of a television advertisement only. It did not request an estimate for radio, online advertisements, or translation for linguistically diverse audiences, which were ultimately required for the campaign.
 

A full and fair assessment of which supplier could provide the best value for money could not be made given that the quotes obtained did not reflect the full scope of work. The final amount paid for the design of Phase 1 was 2.7 times the original quote. It is possible that another supplier that provided a quote could have provided overall better value for money.

The Office of Local Government continued to use the Phase 1 supplier for Phase 2 and Phase 2 extension (Exhibit 4). Where there are other suppliers that could feasibly compete for a contract, direct negotiation increases the risk the agency has not obtained the best value for money. The department advised that it continued with the same agency to avoid costs involved in briefing a new agency on the campaign.

The ‘Dogs deserve better’ government advertising campaign was run by the Department of Justice from August 2016, after the government announced its decision to prohibit greyhound racing, and was terminated in October 2016 after a change of government policy. The campaign had a budget of $1.6 million, with an actual spend of $1.3 million. See Appendix 2 for more details on this campaign.

The ‘Dogs deserve better’ advertising campaign has not breached the specific provisions of Section 6 of the Act which prohibits political advertising.

The Secretary of the department determined that urgent circumstances existed that required advertising to commence prior to completing a cost benefit analysis and peer review. There was a concern that industry participants may make impulse decisions to destroy greyhounds without further information on support services; there was also an identified need to promote public greyhound adoptions.

Phase 1 advertisements focused on explaining the reasons for the prohibition on greyhound racing with a reference to a website for further information. While industry participants were identified as the primary audience, media expenditure was not specifically targeted to this group. Phase 2 advertisements more effectively addressed the originally identified ‘urgent needs’ of providing information on support services for greyhound owners and information on how the public could adopt a greyhound.

The urgency to advertise potentially compromised value for money. The department did not use price competition when selecting a creative supplier due to a concern this would add to timeframes. Further, the department did not meet recommended timeframes to minimise media booking costs.

We identified three other areas in Phase 1 advertisements that were inconsistent with government advertising requirements. Advertisements used provocative language and confronting imagery, which we consider to be inconsistent with the requirement for ‘objective presentation’. Two statements presented as fact based on the Special Commission’s Inquiry report were inaccurate; one of these was due to a calculation error. Radio advertisements did not clearly identify that they were authorised by the New South Wales Government for the first few days of the campaign.

No breach of specific prohibitions in the Act

Section 6 of the Act prohibits the use of government advertising for political advertising. A government advertising campaign must not:

  • be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party
  • contain the name, voice or image of a minister, any other member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament
  • contain the name, logo or any slogan of, or any other reference relating to, a political party.

We did not identify any breach of the specific prohibitions listed above in the advertising content of this campaign.
 

Animal welfare concerns were identified as the reason for urgent advertising

A brief prepared by the department in July 2016 raised concerns about the welfare of greyhounds following the NSW Premier’s announcement that the government would prohibit greyhound racing. The brief raised the risk that industry members may make impulse decisions to destroy their greyhounds without information on support that was being offered.

The department used the provisions in Sections 7(4) and 8(3) of the Act to expedite the release of advertising due to ‘other urgent circumstances’. This provision allows advertising to commence prior to completing the peer review process and cost benefit analysis.

In introducing the Government Advertising Bill to parliament in 2011, the then Premier noted that exceptional circumstances would cover situations ‘such as a civil emergency or sudden health epidemic’. There is no other guidance on when it is appropriate to use this section. It is at the discretion of a government agency head to determine whether a campaign is urgent.
 

Phase 1 advertisements did not focus on the urgent needs

This advertising campaign had three overarching objectives:

  • to increase public awareness of the animal welfare reasons for the closure of the greyhound racing industry
  • to change the behaviour of dog owners from potentially harming their greyhounds to treating them humanely, by accessing the support options and packages available
  • to promote greyhound adoptions by the public.

Alongside advertising, the department took other steps to engage with the greyhound racing industry. This included direct mail, face to face meetings around the State, setting up a call centre and community consultation through an online survey. Other government agencies and animal welfare agencies were also engaged to reach out to affected stakeholders.

Phase 1 advertising content focused on providing information about the reasons for the closure of the industry. The department’s radio and television advertisements did not refer to support packages or encourage the public to adopt a greyhound. While print advertisements did mention these things, this was only presented in fine print. In all advertisements, audiences were referred to a website for further information.

The focus of advertisements on the reasons for industry closure was not consistent with the identified needs to urgently commence advertising to influence the behaviour of dog owners and encourage the public to adopt a greyhound.

The content in Phase 2 advertisements, which began around four weeks after the first phase, was more explicit in highlighting the services and support for industry members such as offering business and retraining advice. These advertisements also referred audiences to a call centre number as well as the website.

Peer review process limited to influencing second phase of advertisements

In urgent circumstances, the Act allows for peer review to be completed after advertising has commenced. For this campaign, the peer review process was completed on 19 August 2016, two weeks after advertising had commenced. Where advertising commences before the peer review process is completed, the usefulness of peer reviewers’ recommendations is limited to informing subsequent phases of advertising and the post-campaign evaluation.

The peer review report found the messages in Phase 1 advertisements were not clearly defined, and the role of advertising was not clearly defined amongst other campaign activities. These recommendations informed the second phase of advertising, which ran from 27 August 2016 until the campaign was terminated in October 2016.
 

The department could not demonstrate value for money was achieved for creative work

The department provided a fixed budget for creative work when requesting quotes from creative agencies to develop advertising material. This is not consistent with the quotation requirements in the government’s Guidelines for Advertising and Digital Communication Services. This approach creates risks to achieving value for money as creative agencies are not required to compete on price for their services. The department advised that it had pre-set the creative costs based on a comparative government campaign of a similar size. This was done due to a concern that requiring agencies to compete on price would affect the short timeframe given to develop creative material.

Three creative agencies accepted the opportunity to present design ideas for the campaign. The department was unable to provide evidence of how it chose the preferred supplier out of these three agencies. Records are important for accountability and allow a procurement decision to be audited after an urgent decision.     
 

Short notice did not allow for cost-efficient media booking for all phases

Placement of advertisements in various media channels was done through the State’s Media Agency Services contract. This contract achieves savings as the government can use its aggregated media spend to gain discounts from the media supplier.

The Department of Premier and Cabinet provides guidance to ensure cost efficient media booking. For example, media time for a television advertisement should be booked at least 6 to 12 weeks in advance. Radio advertisements should be booked at least 2 to 8 weeks in advance.

The peer review report noted that the department did not have adequate time to look for the most cost-efficient way to advertise. In its response to the peer reviewers, the department acknowledged this to be due to the urgency to start advertising. The media booking authority was signed by the department one day before the campaign commenced.
 

The department used a wide public campaign for a narrow target audience

The campaign identified greyhound industry participants as the primary target audience. In 201516 there were 1,342 greyhound trainers, 1,695 owner/trainers, 983 attendants and 1,247 breeders in New South Wales. The department’s advertising submission identified ‘concerns that industry members could make impulsive decisions, potentially jeopardising the welfare of a large number of dogs, prior to the shutdown of the industry’.

The submission’s evidence of advertising effectiveness focused on increasing the level of wider community support for the ban rather than stopping industry members from making impulse decisions. It used an early opinion poll to show that total support for the ban on greyhound racing rises by 17 points and opposition drops by four points following explanation of the findings of the Special Commission of Inquiry report.

The peer review report noted that the role of advertising was not clearly defined amongst the department’s range of other direct and targeted communications and consultations held with industry members.

No demonstrated basis for use of confronting imagery and provocative language

The Guidelines require ‘objective presentation in a fair and accessible manner’. Neither the Guidelines or Handbook further explain what objective presentation means. We have used an ordinary definition of this term as ‘not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts’. This is synonymous with terms like ‘impartial’, ‘neutral’, and ‘dispassionate’ and opposite to ‘subjective’. We consider that to meet the current requirements in the Guidelines for objectivity, advertising content should contain accurate statements or facts, and avoid subjective language.

Phase 1 focussed on the ongoing consequences if no action was taken to close the industry. The advertisements used provocative language, for example ‘Up to 70 per cent of dogs are deemed wastage by their own industry. Wastage! Slaughtered just for being slow’. Advertisements used confronting imagery like gravestones, blood smears and gun targets.

Our literature review into this area highlighted mixed findings on the effectiveness of confrontational advertising materials. In some cases, shock campaigns may cause an audience to reject or ignore the message, and may even encourage people to do the opposite of the intended behaviour. In other cases, such as in road safety campaigns, this style of advertising can be successful. This shows the importance of conducting pre-campaign research before adopting a confrontational or emotive approach in advertising.

The Government Advertising Handbook recommends that an agency explain the rationale and the evidence for their chosen advertising approach. There was no evidence that the department researched the effectiveness of its advertising approach with its target audience. The department had planned to undertake creative concept testing as part of a strategy to ensure the creative material was understood by its audience. The department advised that due to the urgency of the campaign, it did not have time to conduct this testing.

Not all Phase 1 radio advertisements clearly identified that they were authorised by the New South Wales Government

For the first few days on air, Phase 1 radio advertisements ended by referring the audience to a government website, instead of clearly identifying that it had been authorised by the New South Wales Government. Government authorisations and logos ensure the work and the programs of the NSW Government are easily identifiable by the community.    

The department’s cost benefit analysis did not consider alternatives to advertising

For government advertising campaigns that cost over $1.0 million, the Act requires the advertising agency to carry out a cost benefit analysis and obtain approval from the Cabinet Standing Committee on Communications, prior to commencing the campaign.

The department engaged with audiences through direct mail, face to face forums, and a telephone helpline in addition to advertising. However, the department’s cost benefit analysis did not meet the requirements in the Guidelines to specify the extent to which expected benefits could be achieved without advertising, and to compare costs of options other than advertising that could be used to successfully implement the program (see Exhibit 6).

The cost benefit analysis made optimistic assumptions about the impact of the campaign on greyhound adoptions. It estimated that 2,360 greyhounds would be adopted if the campaign was run. This is significantly higher than the ‘most optimistic outcome’ of re-homing in the Special Commission Inquiry report (we calculated this to be 1,467 greyhounds). There was insufficient evidence to support the higher number of adoptions in the cost benefit analysis.

The sensitivity analysis shows that using the Special Commission’s ‘most optimistic outcome’ figure of re-homing would reduce the net present value of advertising to be negative. Further, the cost benefit analysis also assumed that increased government funding would be made available to animal welfare and rehoming organisations to support more adoptions, but did not estimate or include this cost when calculating the net present value of advertising.
 

There were two factual inaccuracies in key messages used for Phase 1 advertisements

Section 8(2) of the Act requires the head of a government agency to certify that the proposed campaign ‘contains accurate information’. The Secretary of the Department of Justice signed the compliance certificate on 29 July 2016, before advertisements commenced.

We examined the accuracy of factual claims in this advertising campaign, by comparing the key statements to the report of Special Commission of Inquiry into the Greyhound Racing Industry (the Commissioner report). The Commissioner report was quoted by the NSW Government as the basis for its policy to transition the greyhound racing industry to closure.

We identified that two of the key statements used in Phase 1 advertisements to support the animal welfare reasons for industry closure were inaccurate (Exhibit 7).    

Published

Actions for Sharing school and community facilities

Sharing school and community facilities

Education
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Risk
Shared services and collaboration

Schools and the community would benefit if school facilities were shared more often. 

The Department of Education’s ‘Community Use of School Facilities Policy’ encourages but does not require schools to share facilities. Sharing depends heavily on the willingness of school principals and there are few incentives. There are many challenges in developing agreements with community users and there is only limited support available from the Department.

There are strategies and plans to support the sharing of facilities between schools and the wider community, but none are backed up with budgets, specific plans or timeframes.

Governments should strive for the best use of assets. This is particularly important in the context of a growing New South Wales population, fiscal constraints and increasing demand for services. 

Lack of available land, rising land costs and population growth highlighted in our April 2017 'Planning for school infrastructure' performance audit report mean that new and existing schools will need to share their facilities with communities more than is currently the case.

This audit assessed how effectively schools share facilities with each other, local councils and community groups. In making this assessment, the audit examined whether the Department of Education (Department):

  • has a clear policy to encourage and support facilities sharing
  • is implementing evidence-based strategies and procedures for facilities sharing
  • can show it is realising an increasing proportion of sharing opportunities.

Facilities sharing is the use of a physical asset, such as a building, rooms, or open spaces, by more than one group for a range of activities at the same time or at different times. For the purposes of this audit, we have divided sharing arrangements into two types: shared use and joint use.

Shared use refers to arrangements where existing school assets are hired out for non-school purposes, usually for a limited time. The assets remain under the control of the school. Generally, there is little alteration or enhancement to the asset required to enable shared use. Shared use can also refer to schools using external facilities, such as council pools, but these arrangements are not included within the scope of this audit. 

Joint use refers to arrangements where new or upgraded school and non-school facilities or community hubs are planned, funded, built and jointly shared between a school and other parties, usually involving significant investment. 

Both shared use and joint use agreements are governed by contractual obligations.

Conclusion
The sharing of school facilities with the community is not fully effective. The Department of Education is implementing strategies to increase shared and joint use but several barriers, some outside the Department’s direct control, must be addressed to fully realise benefits to students and the community of sharing school facilities. In addition, the Department needs to do more to encourage individual schools to share facilities with the community. 

A collaborative, multi-agency approach is needed to overcome barriers to the joint use of facilities, otherwise, the Department may need significantly more funds than planned to deliver sufficient fit-for-purpose school facilities where and when needed.
Government policies encourage, but do not mandate, shared and joint use of facilities.

Since the early 2000’s, several reviews in NSW and other jurisdictions have commented on the benefits of and need to increase the sharing of school facilities. 

Several NSW Government strategies and plans support shared and joint use of facilities between schools and the wider community, but none are backed up with financial incentives, or specific plans with implementation timeframes. In Victoria and Queensland whole-of-government processes are in place to support a more coordinated approach to planning, building and sharing community facilities. For example, Victoria has a comprehensive policy framework encompassing both existing and future use of community facilities and a $50 million program to seed the development of community facilities on school sites over the next four years.  
The Department recognises benefits from the shared use of school facilities, but provides insufficient support to Principals to ensure costs are recovered and that money raised from shared use can be spent by the school in a timely manner. 

There are examples of successful shared use, but more can be done. Information about the available facilities is not readily available to potential community users. Schools should work more closely with councils and other stakeholders to leverage shared use. 

Currently, the administrative burden, costs and risks associated with shared use can exceed the perceived benefits to schools, leading to reluctance amongst some Principals to share. In addition, a substantial backlog of school-initiated infrastructure proposals awaiting Departmental approval means that schools that raise money from sharing their facilities find it difficult to use the funds they raise on improved infrastructure. Some of these proposals have been waiting for approval for more than 12 months. 

The Department could do more to support Principals by ensuring the fees charged for facilities cover the costs incurred by schools, that Principals can access help with negotiating and managing contracts, and that infrastructure proposals initiated and funded by schools are approved in a timely manner. 

The Department is not monitoring shared use across the State, and does not evaluate different approaches as evidence to influence policies and procedures.

Recommendations
By December, 2018, the Department should:
  • increase incentives and reduce impediments for school Principals to share school facilities, including:
    • review the methodology for calculating fees charged for facilities to ensure that shared use of school facilities does not result in a financial burden to schools or the Department 
    • improve support provided to Principals by School Infrastructure NSW, including reducing the backlog of school-initiated infrastructure proposals awaiting approval
    • develop service standards, including timeframes, for assessing and approving school-initiated infrastructure proposals.
  • provide readily-accessible information about available school facilities to community groups and local councils
  • implement processes to monitor and regularly evaluate the implementation of the shared use policy and promote better practice to drive improvements.
The Department is planning a more strategic approach to increase the joint use of school facilities. However, several barriers, some outside the Department’s control, must be addressed to fully realise benefits of joint use agreements.

As discussed in our 2017 audit report on ‘Planning for school infrastructure’, joint use agreements are a key direction of the School Assets Strategic Plan. Joint use of school facilities will be necessary to ensure that there will be enough fit-for-purpose learning spaces for students when and where needed. Under the ‘Community Use of School Facilities Policy’ Principals play the leading role in identifying opportunities, and developing and managing agreements for sharing school facilities. This is impractical for joint use projects which involve substantial investment in new or refurbished assets, in particular for joint use projects in schools that are yet to be built. In addition, the policy does not address joint-use facilities built on land not owned by the Department. For these reasons, the Department is developing a new policy. 

The Department is planning to develop joint use agreements in a more systematic way as part of school community planning, previously known as cluster planning, with a special focus on local councils. Several agreements are currently being piloted, and will be evaluated to provide an evidence-based foundation for this new approach. 

To develop or refurbish school facilities for joint use, the Department, councils and other key stakeholders must work together and prioritise joint use from the earliest stages of any project. A collaborative, multi-agency approach is needed to ensure sufficient fit-for-purpose facilities are available for school students within the funding framework proposed in the School Assets Strategic Plan. 

To increase shared and joint use, the Department is recruiting specialist staff in its Asset Division to assist with the brokerage, community engagement and development of agreements, but these staff are not dedicated to joint use projects and their available time may not be sufficient to provide the necessary support in the timeframes required.

Recommendations
By December, 2018, the Department of Education should:
  • ensure that the implementation of the new ‘Joint Use of School Facilities and Land Policy’ is adequately resourced, and has the support of Principals
  • implement processes to monitor and regularly evaluate the implementation of joint use policy and promote better practice to drive improvements.  

Published

Actions for State Finances 2017

State Finances 2017

Finance
Health
Industry
Justice
Local Government
Planning
Premier and Cabinet
Treasury
Universities
Whole of Government
Environment
Asset valuation
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance

Total State Sector Accounts received an unqualified audit opinion for the fifth consecutive year.

There was a $5.7 billion State budget surplus and continued investment in new infrastructure, in part funded by the long-term leases of Ausgrid and Endeavour Energy assets. This report also comments on key accounting matters, including the correction of some previously reported balances and the first time reporting of combined Cabinet members’ compensation in the Total State Sector Accounts.

Pursuant to the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983, I present my Report on State Finances 2017.

You will note that the format of this report has changed from previous years.

The intent of this change is to draw attention to the key matters that have been the focus of our audit and highlight significant factors that have contributed to the outcome.

First, it is pleasing to report once again that I issued a clear audit opinion on the State’s consolidated financial statements. This outcome demonstrates the Government’s continued focus on the quality of financial reporting across the NSW public sector.

High quality financial management and reporting are crucial to properly inform the public and build community confidence in our system of government.

The Treasury’s Financial Management Transformation program also aims to improve financial governance, budgeting and reporting arrangements across the sector. My Office is working collaboratively with The Treasury on reforms to reduce the burden of reporting, without weakening established safeguards.

The reforms should include measures to provide independent assurance of the budget process, of outcome reporting by agencies, and the power to “follow the dollar” given the increasing use of non-government organisations to deliver Government programs.

This Report also highlights another year of strong financial performance. The State’s budget result was a $5.7 billion surplus, and investment in new infrastructure has continued, in part funded by the long-term leases of Ausgrid and Endeavour Energy assets.

Finally, could I take this opportunity to thank the staff of The Treasury for the way they approached this audit. Our partnership is critical to ensuring NSW is an exemplar of quality financial management and reporting.

02_Margaret_signature.jpg

Margaret Crawford 
24 October 2017

A clear audit opinion on the State’s consolidated financial statements was issued.

Timely and accurate financial reporting is essential for informed decision making, effective management of public funds and enhancing public accountability.

This year’s clear audit opinion reflects the Government’s continued efforts to improve the quality of financial reporting across the NSW public sector.

Since the introduction of ‘early close procedures’ in 2011-12, the number of significant errors in financial statements of agencies has generally fallen largely due to identifying and resolving complex accounting issues early. Agencies’ 2016-17 financial statements submitted for audit contained nine errors exceeding $20 million. All errors were subsequently corrected in the individual agencies financial statements.

Agencies should continue to respond to key accounting issues as soon as they are identified. Where issues are identified, accounting position papers should be prepared for consideration by the Audit Office, their Audit and Risk Committee members, and when relevant, The Treasury.

The State addressed the following key accounting matters during 2016-17. 

The State recognised rail tunnels and earthworks valued at $8.5 billion.

Some rail tunnels and earthworks have never been valued by the State. These include the City Circle, the country rail network and other tunnels and earthworks built before the year 2000. Some of these tunnels and earthworks date back to the early 1900s.

For many years, the State did not account for these assets as they believed that their value could not be reliably measured. This year an independent valuer was engaged to perform a comprehensive valuation. The methodology used demonstrated
that the assets could have been reflected in the financial statements earlier.

The State recorded an additional $8.5 billion to correct the value of infrastructure assets at 1 July 2016.

Cabinet member’s compensation and related party transactions were reviewed.

Due to changes in Accounting Standards, the State had to consider 'related party information' in the financial statements. Previously this only applied to for-profit entities.

This year, requirements to report related party information extended to members of Cabinet, considered to be “key management personnel” of the State, as defined by Accounting Standards.

The Treasury implemented a process to assess and report Cabinet member’s compensation, and transactions between Cabinet members and/or their close family members, and government agencies.

Collectively, Cabinet members’ remuneration was $8.8 million, which was mainly salaries and allowances, and $3.5 million of non-monetary benefits such as security and drivers. The Treasury determined there were no other specific “related party” transactions or balances that required disclosure in the State’s financial statements.

Information system limitations continue at TAFE NSW.

TAFE NSW has experienced ongoing issues with its student administration system.

TAFE NSW has again implemented additional processes to verify the accuracy and completeness of revenue from sales of goods and services.

TAFE NSW expects to spend up to $89 million on a new information system to address these issues. Modules of the new student enrolment system are expected to be in place for the 2018 enrolment period.

Restatements relating to the General Government Sector's investment in the commercial sector.

The State corrected two previously reported balances relating to the General Government Sector’s investment in the commercial sector.

Accounting Standards require the General Government Sector to effectively store gains or losses related to its investment in the commercial sector in reserves until the investment is derecognised.

When these investments are disposed of, the cumulative gains and losses must be cleared and recognised in the operating result. However, the Government had previously cleared the cumulative gains and losses directly to Accumulated Funds within equity.

To comply with Accounting Standards, a total of $6 billion previously reported as a movement in equity  at 30 June 2016, has now been corrected to the operating result.

In addition, Accounting Standards only allow gains or losses on its investments to be stored in reserves. In past years, the State recognised all changes in the value of its investment in Available for Sale Reserves, including the capital contributed to establish the State’s investment. In 2016-17, a total of $23.4 billion of contributed capital was corrected to accumulated funds at 1 July 2015.

The State’s budget result was a $5.7 billion surplus, $2.0 billion higher than the budget estimate.

The Total State Sector comprises 310 entities controlled by the NSW Government.

Of the total, the General Government Sector comprises 215 entities that provide goods and services not directly paid for by consumers.

The non-General Government Sector comprises 95 Government businesses that provide goods and services such as water and electricity, or financial services.

A principal measure of a Government’s overall performance is its Net Operating Balance, or Budget Result. The Net Operating Balance reports the difference between the cost of General Government service delivery and the revenue earned to fund these sectors.

The State has recorded budget surpluses and exceeded the original budget result in nine of the last ten years.

The State maintained its AAA credit rating.

The object of the Act is to maintain the AAA credit rating.

NSW’s finances are managed in alignment with the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012 (the Act).

The Act established the framework for fiscal responsibility and strategy needed to protect the State’s AAA credit rating and service delivery to the people of NSW.

The purpose of maintaining the AAA credit rating is to reduce the cost of, and ensure the broadest access to, borrowings.

A triple-A credit rating also helps maintain business and consumer confidence so economic activity and employment are sustained. The legislation sets out targets and principles for financial management to achieve this.

New South Wales has credit ratings of AAA/Negative from Standard & Poor’s and Aaa/Stable from Moody’s Investors Service.

The fiscal targets for achieving this objective are:

General Government expenditure growth is lower than long term revenue growth.

General Government expenditure growth was 4.2 per cent in 2016-17, below the long-term revenue growth of 5.6 per cent.

Eliminating unfunded superannuation liabilities by 2030.

The Act sets a target of eliminating unfunded defined benefit superannuation liabilities by 2030. The State’s net superannuation liability was $58.6 billion at 30 June 2017 ($71.2 billion at 30 June 2016).

The Government predicts the 2030 target will be achieved. The State’s funding plan is to contribute amounts escalated by five per cent each year so the schemes will be fully funded by 2030. In 2016-17, the State made employer contributions of $1.5 billion, which is largely consistent with contributions over the past five years.

The liability values in the graph below do not reflect the values recorded in the Total State Sector Accounts. For financial reporting purposes, Accounting Standards (AASB 119 Employee Benefits) require the State to discount its superannuation liability using the government bond rate (refer to page 10 of this report). 

The relevant government bond rate in the current economic climate is 2.62 per cent.

The State’s target for the unfunded superannuation liability is measured using AASB 1056 Superannuation Entities. This is because it adopts a measurement basis that reflects expected earnings on fund assets, which are currently between 5.9 and 7.4 per cent. Using these rates, the liability is $15.0 billion at 30 June 2017 ($16.1 billion at 30 June 2016). The unfunded liability is $2.4 billion less than when the Act was introduced.

The State’s assets grew by $31.6 billion during 2016-17 to $409 billion.

Valuing the State’s physical assets.

When we audit the financial statements, we focus on areas we consider as higher risk. These areas are often complex, and require the use of estimates and judgements.

The State has $307.2 billion of physical assets measured at fair value in accordance with Australian Accounting Standards. Fair value calculations are inherently complex and sensitive to assumptions and estimates, increasing the risk these assets are incorrectly valued.

In our audits, we assess the reasonableness and appropriateness of assumptions used in valuing physical assets. This includes obtaining an understanding of the valuation methodologies applied and judgements made. We also review the completeness of asset registers, and the mathematical accuracy of valuation models.

Net movements between years includes additions, disposals, depreciation and valuations. This year, valuations of physical assets added $16.2 billion to the State’s assets, comprising: 

  • Transport for NSW and Railcorp $8.5 billion

  • New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation $4.8 billion

  • Roads and Maritime Services $930 million

  • Crown Entity $400 million.    

The State’s financial assets increased $27.5 billion in 2016-17

The State’s financial assets have increased by 88 per cent over the past four years. In 2016-17, financial assets increased primarily due to proceeds from the sale of government assets and businesses.

The Government implemented reforms to better use the State’s financial assets. A key element was the creation of an Asset and Liability Committee (ALCO) to provide advice on ways to improve balance sheet management.

Since the creation of the ALCO, reforms include:

  • Establishment of the New South Wales Infrastructure Future Fund (NIFF). The net proceeds from the State’s asset recycling program are invested into the NIFF, which is managed by TCorp, with a balance of $14.6 billion by 30 June 2017. Funds raised are invested through the NIFF until the Government requires them for critical infrastructure projects that are part of the Restart NSW and Rebuilding NSW program of works. ALCO and TCorp provide advice on the NIFF’s performance and management

  • Establishment of the Social and Affordable Housing Fund ($1.1 billion at 30 June 2017). ALCO oversees the Fund to ensure an appropriate investment approach that will maintain funding certainty for new social and affordable housing stock

  • Cash and liquidity management reforms to centralise cash previously held by agencies in the Treasury Banking System. This reform is designed to ensure agencies have adequate levels of liquidity but with surplus funds invested centrally for better returns.

The State’s liabilities decreased by $13.1 billion during 2016-17 to $182 billion.

Valuing the State’s liabilities relies on an actuarial assessment.

Nearly half of the State’s liabilities relate to its employees. This includes unfunded superannuation, and employee benefits, such as long service and recreation leave.

Valuation of these obligations is subject to complex estimation techniques and significant judgements. Small changes in assumptions can materially impact the financial statements.

We address the risk associated with auditing these balances:

  • using actuarial specialists

  • testing controls around underlying employee data used in data models, and testing the accuracy of the calculations

  • evaluating assumptions applied in calculating employee entitlements such as the discount rate and the probability of long service leave vesting conditions being met.

The State’s superannuation obligations reduced by $12.6 billion in 2016-17.

The State’s $58.6 billion superannuation liability represents obligations for past and present employees, less the value of assets set aside to meet those obligations. The superannuation liability decreased from $71.2 billion to $58.6 billion, largely due to an increase in the discount rate from 1.99 per cent to 2.62 per cent. This alone reduced the liability by $9.2 billion

The State’s borrowings totalled $70.6 billion at 30 June 2017.

The State’s borrowings totalled $70.6 billion at 30 June 2017, $9.5 billion less than the previous year. This was largely due to the repayment of borrowings when the assets of Ausgrid and Endeavour Energy were leased to the private sector.

TCorp issues bonds to raise funds for NSW Government agencies. The bonds are actively traded in financial markets providing price transparency and liquidity to public sector borrowers and institutional investors. All TCorp bonds are guaranteed by the NSW Government.

The Government manages its debt liabilities through its balance sheet management strategy. The strategy extends to TCorp, which applies an active risk management strategy to the Government’s debt portfolio.

General Government Sector debt is being restructured by replacing shorter-term debt with longer-term debt. This lengthens the portfolio to better match liabilities with the funding requirements of infrastructure assets and reduces refinancing risks. It also allows the Government to take advantage of the low interest rate environment.

The State recorded revenue of $83.5 billion in  2016-17, an increase of $5.3 billion from 2015-16.

The State’s results are underpinned by revenue growth in taxation, fees and fines.

Taxation, fees, fines and other revenue comprises $30.5 billion of taxation ($28.7 billion in 2015-16) and $5.3 billion of fees, fines and other revenue ($4.6 billion).

Tax revenue for the Total State Sector increased by $1.8 billion, or 6.4 per cent compared to 2015-16, primarily due to:

  • one-off business asset sales and lease transactions, including $718 million in transfer duty from the Ausgrid and Endeavour Energy lease transactions

  • $385 million increase in payroll tax from growth in NSW employment and average employee compensation

  • a $426 million increase in land taxes.

Growth in stamp duty is expected to slow over the next 4 years.

General Government Sector stamp duties have increased from $6.2 billion in 2012-13 to $11.5 billion in 2016-17, an annual average growth rate of 16.5 per cent. The Government’s budget forecasts the growth in stamp duties to decline, to an average annual growth rate of 2.6 per cent between 2016-17 and 2020-21.

The State received Commonwealth grants and subsidies of $30.8 billion in 2016-17.

The State received $30.8 billion from the Commonwealth Government in 2016-17, $1.6 billion more than in 2015-16. This was primarily due to transaction based asset recycling grants of $1.0 billion and a $720 million increase in national land transport grants. This increase was offset by a $435 million decrease in General Purpose Grants, which mainly comprises New South Wales’ share of the Goods and Services Tax (GST). 

The State spent $79.4 billion in 2016-17 to deliver services to the community, an increase of $3.9 billion from 2015-16.

Overall expenses increased 5.2 per cent from last year. Most of the increase was due to higher employee costs and operating costs.

Total salaries and wages increased by 4.2 per cent from 2015-16.

Total salaries and wages increased to $30 billion from $28.8 billion in 2015-16. The Government wages policy aims to limit the growth in remuneration and other employee costs to no more than 2.5 per cent per annum.

Operating expenses increased by 12.4 per cent from 2015-16.

Within operating expenses, payments for supplies, services and other expenses increased, in part, due to the State:

  • reacquiring mining licenses worth $482 million and additional land remediation costs of $101 million

  • spending more on health including additional drug supplies relating to Hepatitis C.

State spend on transport and communications increased by 68.1 per cent since 2012-13.

While spending on health and education remain the largest functional areas provided by Government, expenditure on transport and communication increased, on average, by 13.9 per cent annually between 2012-13 and 2016-17. This increase reflects the Government’s investment in transport infrastructure such as the Sydney Metro and Westconnex. Over the same period, spending on health increased by $3.9 billion.

Expenditure on fuel and energy has decreased by an average of 44.7 per cent since 2012-13, reflecting the State’s leases of electricity network assets.

In 2011, the Government established Restart NSW to fund high priority infrastructure projects.

Restart NSW projects are primarily funded from the proceeds from the asset recycling program enabling Government to deliver new infrastructure investment.

Restart NSW provides funding for the delivery of Rebuilding NSW, which is the Government’s 10-year plan to invest $20 billion in new infrastructure.

The State finalised long-term leases of Ausgrid and Endeavour Energy assets.

In June 2017, the Government finalised its long-term lease of 50.4 per cent of Endeavour Energy. This transaction follows on from the long-term leases of TransGrid in December 2015 and 50.4 per cent of Ausgrid in December 2016. Net proceeds of $15.0 billion were paid into Restart NSW relating to these transactions.

The Government also finalised an arrangement for the private sector to provide land titling and registry services to the public for 35 years. The State, through Restart NSW, received an upfront payment of $2.6 billion from the new operator.

Restart NSW is funding $29.8 billion of new infrastructure.

The Government has detailed its plan to invest $20 billion into the Rebuilding NSW plan from Restart NSW.

At 30 June 2017, around $2.9 billion has already been spent on Rebuilding NSW projects from Restart NSW, with a further $9 billion included in the budget aggregates. The Government has also earmarked a further $8.1 billion in Restart NSW for future projects.

The most significant project is the Sydney Metro. The Government has committed $7.0 billion from Restart NSW to build a 30-kilometre metro line, linking Sydney Metro Northwest at Chatswood, through new stations in the lower North Shore, the Sydney CBD and southwest to Bankstown. At 30 June 2017, $2.4 billion has been spent on this project from Restart NSW.

Other significant projects funded by Restart NSW include a $1.8 billion contribution to WestConnex and reserved funding of $1 billion towards the State’s Major Stadia Network program.

The Treasury initiated the Financial Management Transformation (FMT) program with the aim of changing and improving financial governance, budgeting and reporting arrangements of the New South Wales public sector.

FMT aims to deliver better outcomes for the people of New South Wales and focuses on transparency and accountability for expenditure, and better value for money.

New Financial Management System

PRIME is the Information Technology (IT) solution component of the FMT program, replacing several historical systems. PRIME will provide both financial and performance information within one IT platform for all agencies in the NSW public sector.

It is expected to give Government more timely information to plan and deliver its policy priorities and the budget.

Independent assurance over the budget process would improve confidence in the reliability of the State’s financial information.

Published

Actions for Energy rebates for low income households

Energy rebates for low income households

Planning
Industry
Compliance
Fraud
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration

The Department of Planning and Environment provides more than $245 million in energy rebates to around 27 percent of NSW households. This report highlights that the department is not monitoring the rebate schemes to understand whether they are delivering the best outcomes.

Most rebates are ongoing payments applied directly to energy bills reducing the amount payable by the householder. The structure of these rebates is complex and can be inequitable. Some households are eligible for four different rebates, each with its own eligibility criteria.  Also, some households in very similar circumstances receive different levels of support depending on what type of energy is used in their home or which adult in the house is the energy account holder. For example, a household using both electricity and gas receives more assistance than a household with electricity alone even if total energy bills are the same. 

The Department of Planning and Environment (Department) administers five energy rebate schemes targeted to low-income households. The five rebates are of two key types:

1. Ongoing support to pay energy bills
2. Crisis Support  

More than one million rebates are paid each year to over 800,000, or around 27 per cent, of NSW households. Households learn about rebates from a variety of sources including: Service NSW, government and energy retailer websites, energy retailer welcome packs, Department marketing efforts, information on energy bills, and Centrelink.  

The budget for energy rebates is increasing every year and in 2017–18 is more than $245 million. The Department delivers most rebates through a network of partnership arrangements with:

  • energy retailers, who apply rebates directly onto energy bills
  • more than 340 charities and other NGOs who assess households' eligibility for crisis support and distribute support through the Energy Accounts Payment Assistance scheme (EAPA)
  • Service NSW, who informs NSW households about rebates through their call centre.

The energy rebates budget is substantial and the distribution arrangements are complex. The objective of the audit was to assess whether the current design and distribution of energy rebates schemes is effective.

Conclusion
The Department administers the rebate schemes using partners to ensure funds are directed towards energy bills as intended. Ongoing support schemes provide assistance to low-income households as intended, but have no measurable objectives or outcome measures and therefore can't be assessed for their effectiveness. Crisis support (EAPA) has a clear objective, to keep households experiencing financial crisis connected to energy services, but the Department does not monitor the performance of EAPA against this objective.  

The structure of rebates providing ongoing support is complex and can be inequitable for some households. Reducing the number of separate schemes and simplifying eligibility requirements offers the most scope for improving effectiveness of ongoing support schemes.  

The growth of embedded networks1 represents a future administrative risk to the Department.

Partnering with energy retailers, charities and NGOs delivers advantages, but stronger oversight is required over partner organisations.

The Department and partner organisations administer the rebate schemes as designed

The Department oversees a complex package of rebate schemes in partnership with 25 retailers and around 340 charities and NGOs. The partnership arrangements ensure that funds are distributed directly to energy bills as intended. The schemes provide support to recipients and are administered in line with government decisions about eligibility.  

Communication about rebates does not reach all eligible households

Households learn about rebate schemes through a mix of communication channels including retailer websites and call centres, Department websites, Centrelink, financial counsellors, EAPA Providers, the Energy and Water Ombudsman and Service NSW. Some low-income groups, such as those with poor English language skills, do not find out about energy rebates.

Scheme objectives are not measurable

Rebate schemes that provide ongoing support do not have measurable objectives or outcome measures. Without clear and measurable objectives, the Department cannot report to government on whether the schemes are achieving the intended policy outcomes, nor recommend improvements to ensure the schemes deliver the greatest benefit to the most financially vulnerable households.

The EAPA crisis support scheme has a clearer objective in that it aims to keep households experiencing financial crisis connected to energy services. However, the Department does not measure outcomes from providing this type of support, and does not know if the crisis support achieves this objective.  

The structure of rebate schemes for ongoing support is complex

The Low Income Household Rebate accounts for 80 per cent of the budget for ongoing support rebates. The remaining 20 per cent of the budget is administered through four separate schemes: Gas Rebate, Medical Energy Rebate, Family Energy Rebate and Life Support Rebate.

Each of these rebates has its own eligibility criteria and some require separate application processes. The Family Energy Rebate is complex to access and apply for, and around one third of households do not reapply each year. Eligible households that receive energy through embedded networks apply directly to the Department for rebates, which are paid by the Department into bank accounts. Embedded networks are energy supply arrangements where the manager of a residential facility such as a caravan park, retirement village or apartment block, buys energy in bulk and then on-sells it to residents. The Department is yet to develop strategies to address a forecast increase in such households.

The design of the rebate schemes creates some inequities

Households in similar circumstances can receive different levels of assistance depending on which adult in the house is the energy account holder, the mix of energy types used in the home, or the EAPA Provider they turn to when in financial crisis.

Households with both gas and electricity connections receive more assistance than those with only electricity. Households in rural and regional areas receive the same value rebate as households closer to Sydney, despite higher distribution charges. Family Energy Rebate is a two-tier payment, with a higher amount available to families with greater means. Lower-income families receive a much smaller Family Energy Rebate on the assumption that they already receive Low Income Household Rebate. Charities and NGOs distributing EAPA crisis support apply inconsistent standards when assessing household need, which leads to inequitable levels of assistance.

Departmental oversight of energy retailers and EAPA Providers is not strong enough

While partnering with energy retailers and EAPA Providers delivers advantages, stronger management is needed to ensure that partners follow Departmental guidelines and to minimise the potential for fraud. The Department's accreditation process for potential EAPA Providers does not consider the applicant's financial governance standards and the most recent audit of EAPA Providers was 2013.


[1] Embedded networks are energy supply arrangements where the manager of a residential facility such as a caravan park, retirement village or apartment block, buys energy in bulk and then on-sells it to residents.

By September 2018, the Department of Planning and Environment should:

  1. Ensure effective strategies are in place to make information about rebates available to all eligible, low-income households
     
  2. Evaluate alternative models and develop advice for government to reduce complexity and improve equity of ongoing rebates
     
  3. Establish measurable objectives for schemes that provide ongoing support, and monitor and measure performance of all schemes against objectives and outcome measures
     
  4. Assess the impacts of the forecast increase in embedded networks and develop strategies to manage any increased administrative risk
     
  5. Strengthen assurance that EAPA is being provided in accordance with its objectives and guidelines by implementing accreditation and compliance programs
     
  6. Ensure those eligible for EAPA financial support are not disadvantaged by inflexible payments, inconsistent provider practices, or inability to access an EAPA provider in a timely manner. Options include:
    • moving from a fixed-value voucher to a flexible payment based on need irrespective of energy type
    • establishing a ‘Provider of Last Resort’ facility for households that cannot access an EAPA Provider.

Appendix one - Response from the Agency

Appendix two - About the audit

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #292 - released 19 September 2017 

Published

Actions for Information and Communication Technologies in schools for teaching and learning

Information and Communication Technologies in schools for teaching and learning

Education
Information technology
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

Several factors are reducing effective use of information and communication technology (ICT) in the classroom.

These are primarily:

  • ageing ICT equipment and inadequate wireless networks
  • variable student access to devices at school
  • variable teacher access to centrally provided devices for use outside of the classroom.

Information and communication technologies (ICT) are pervasive in modern life. Australian research has identified that the workforce demand for digital literacy and advanced digital skills is growing across most areas of work. There is broad agreement internationally and in Australian school systems that digital literacy is a core skill for the workforce and students will need to be confident with ICT. Education systems around the world are using ICT in classrooms to support learning and employment goals.  

The New South Wales Department of Education’s (the Department’s) overall strategic directions for teaching and learning with ICT are set in the 'Strategic Information Technology Plan 2016–19'. The Department centrally provides a base level of resources to schools for ICT and schools supplement funding from their existing school budget and Parents and Citizens Associations. Each school decides how to allocate these funds to meet local needs. Schools also set expectations for how teachers and students will use technology to help deliver outcomes.

This audit assessed how well New South Wales public schools are using ICT to improve teaching and learning. It focussed on planning and teacher and student use of ICT. We examined whether:

  • the Department identifies key strategic opportunities to enhance the use of ICT platforms and technologies in schools
  • teachers are integrating ICT into classroom practice
  • the Department monitors the impact of ICT on student learning.
Conclusion 

Several factors are reducing the effective use of ICT in the classroom. These are primarily:

  • ageing ICT equipment and inadequate wireless networks
  • variable student access to devices at school
  • variable teacher access to centrally provided devices to use outside of the classroom.

Many schools are struggling to keep up with growing ICT needs within available funding. The Department needs to review whether its current technology programs provide schools with sufficient resources and support to meet the Department’s strategic goals for 21st Century classrooms. The Department should also target additional support to schools to improve planning for ICT resources.  

Most teachers are using ICT in the classroom, however, teacher access to devices outside the classroom varies between schools. In practice, teacher working days extend outside classroom hours. Teachers need access to devices for activities such as lesson preparation and student assessment. With limited access to devices outside of the classroom, teachers may not be able to effectively integrate ICT into lessons. Teachers also require further professional learning to support them to develop their skills in using ICT.  

The Department is not sufficiently monitoring the digital literacy of New South Wales students, which has declined in national tests. Teachers could benefit from support to assess these skills at a school level. The Department also needs to investigate links between student use of ICT and learning outcomes, so they can better support teachers with evidence-based approaches to enhancing learning through ICT.

Old equipment and wireless networks are not keeping pace with modern demands

The Department’s vision for ICT is to enable ‘any learning opportunity, anywhere, anytime’. This vision is at risk due to an ageing stock of devices and wireless networks. The average age of devices in New South Wales schools is over four years. Older devices are less reliable, require greater maintenance and support, and cannot run demanding applications. Further, many school wireless networks are beyond the end of their useful life. This limits the number of teachers and students who can access online content on wireless networks at the same time.

The central funding model for ICT in schools is not meeting current needs

Funding for the Technology for Learning program to deliver ICT in schools has not increased since 2004, despite an increase in the number of students and emphasis placed on ICT in teaching and learning during this time. Schools supplement funding for ICT from their existing school budget and Parents and Citizens Associations.  

The Department’s current funding model for ICT is not adequately addressing a growing gap in the provision of contemporary ICT in classrooms between schools able to access funding from other sources and those which cannot. The Department needs to review whether the Technology for Learning program is equitable in equipping all schools with the modern technology needed to achieve its vision.

Many teachers are not provided with devices for use outside of the classroom

School Principals we interviewed reported that technology is an essential part of a modern classroom and teacher access to devices outside of the classroom can impact how they use ICT. This is because, in practice, teacher working days extend outside classroom hours and teachers need access to devices for activities such as lesson preparation and student assessment. The Department provides teachers with access to a suite of software tools for these tasks.

The Commonwealth Government’s Digital Education Revolution program provided teachers of secondary school students with laptops from 2009 to 2013. The Department’s evaluation of the Digital Education Revolution program found that teachers reported greater confidence with, and use of, ICT throughout the program.  
Providing desktop computers, laptops or tablets for teachers is now a school level decision and arrangements vary across schools. Each school must trade-off between allocating devices for students and teachers. Most other States and Territories provide all teachers with a laptop for use in and outside of the classroom or offer subsidised access to one.  

There is limited teacher professional learning in the use of ICT

The Department’s research has identified that professional learning is an important factor in how effectively teachers use ICT to enhance teaching and learning. Despite this, the Department provides few courses on using ICT in the classroom directly, and most of these are offered in Sydney. This limits accessibility for teachers outside of the metropolitan area. Schools we visited reported that the costs of courses and providing relief teachers limits the number of external courses or events that teachers attend, especially for rural and regional schools. Increasing the use of online learning would improve access for teachers in these areas.  

The Department is not adequately monitoring trends in professional learning in ICT or evaluating the overall effectiveness of courses. A recent upgrade to the professional learning system may provide the Department with better quality data to do this.

Greater monitoring and reporting on technology use in schools is required

The Local Schools, Local Decisions policy gives schools greater authority to make strategic decisions on the use of ICT appropriate to their local contexts. To support this, the Department needs to better monitor current trends, and identify emerging needs to determine future direction and how best to support schools.  

For example, the Department does not currently know how many devices are allocated to teachers or how many schools have implemented a student Bring Your Own Device scheme. This affects how schools are using ICT, and places demand on the network and the type of support the Department must provide. An assessment of the ICT maturity of schools would help the Department target its resources to schools requiring greater assistance with planning.

The Department does not regularly monitor or report on student capabilities with ICT. A national assessment found that the ICT literacy of a sample of Year 6 and Year 10 New South Wales students fell between 2011 and 2014. The fall was greater in New South Wales than in other States and Territories. Without more regular assessment or reporting, the reasons behind this fall and the distribution of student capabilities between schools will remain unknown. 

By July 2018, the Department of Education should:

  1. Review the Technology for Learning program and school ICT support resourcing to determine whether resourcing is adequate for modern school requirements.
     
  2. Develop a program to improve wireless networks in all NSW schools, for instance by expanding the Connecting Country Schools Program to all NSW schools.  
     
  3. Implement an assessment of school ‘ICT maturity’ and use this to target assistance to those schools requiring support with forward planning for ICT.
     
  4. Improve the use of evidence to inform plans and strategies, including:
    • more detailed monitoring of teacher and student access to and use of ICT
    • evaluating the impact of teacher professional learning on student outcomes 
    • further examining the links between ICT and student outcomes.
       
  5. Improve teacher access to devices for use outside of the classroom to improve how effectively they integrate ICT into teaching and learning.
     
  6. Improve teacher professional learning by providing more:
    • online learning opportunities for teachers in regional and remote areas
    • courses focused on pedagogy to make best use of ICT.
       
  7. Identify the ICT skills students need, and provide teaching resources to develop these skills and monitor their achievement.

Appendix One - Response from the Agency

Appendix Two - About the audit

Appendix Three - Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #289 - released 6 July 2017 

Published

Actions for Sydney Road Maintenance Contracts

Sydney Road Maintenance Contracts

Transport
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management

In November 2013, Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) outsourced the maintenance of State roads in the Sydney region south and west zones using an innovative contracting approach called the Stewardship Maintenance Contract (SMC). The SMC links risk to reward, and uses a performance framework where outcomes should drive improved performance over time.

RMS’ SMC contract management includes most elements of good practice, including governance and dispute resolution mechanisms. However, key elements are missing which reduces its effectiveness.

Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) is responsible for the Sydney region State roads network This includes over 2,800 kilometres of roads and associated road corridor infrastructure such as bridges, tunnels and drainage structures. RMS divides the network into three geographical areas: south, west and north zones.

In 1995, RMS first outsourced road corridor infrastructure maintenance for the north zone through a Performance Specified Maintenance Contract (PSMC). The current 10-year PSMC for the north zone will expire in October 2018. Prior to November 2013, RMS maintained roads in the south and west zones through its Road and Fleet Services unit. 

In November 2013, RMS outsourced road maintenance services for the south and west zones using Stewardship Maintenance Contracts (SMC). The contracts run for seven years with an option for a further three years at RMS’ discretion. RMS estimated that the annual cost of these contracts was around $240 million in total. In March 2018, the contract prices are due to be reset by negotiation to reflect the contractors’ experience with, and better information about, the road networks and routine maintenance requirements. 

The SMC model adopted stewardship principles to improve value for money. RMS defined stewardship principles as a broad set of values, attitudes and behaviours, required of the contractor to effectively manage the assets on behalf of RMS. The SMC also includes commercial principles, such as linking risk to reward, and a performance framework where outcomes drive performance.

This audit assessed whether RMS had effectively managed the outsourcing of road maintenance in the Sydney region south and west zones. In making this assessment, we answered the following questions:

  1. Did RMS justify the decision to adopt the SMC model?
  2. Do SMCs include key performance indicators (KPIs) and incentives which promote efficiency and effectiveness? 
  3. Does RMS collect high quality information on contractor performance and take action to correct performance deficiencies?
  4. Are the expected benefits being achieved?

Conclusion

RMS developed an innovative contracting approach with the SMC. RMS has realised some benefits in the first year, including savings, from outsourcing road maintenance in the Sydney region south and west zones using the SMC. However, RMS’ management of the SMC has key elements missing which reduces its effectiveness.

The SMC includes performance measures and incentives to drive efficiency and effectiveness improvements over time.  

RMS has established a contract management framework which includes most elements of good practice, including governance and dispute resolution mechanisms. However, it does not have procedures to guide its contract managers in managing specific provisions of the SMC. Consequently, RMS has not exercised several significant SMC requirements, such as having the contractor account for an efficiency dividend in its pricing at the start of each three-year works period. It also has not done enough to assure itself that the contractor provided performance and financial data are correct. This is important because the data is used to measure performance and calculate contractor payments.  

RMS assessed that it had achieved around 80 per cent of the expected cost benefit in the initial year of the SMC. However, it has not tracked its achievement of benefits since then.

The Stewardship Maintenance Contract

RMS justified adopting the SMC model and included KPIs to drive efficiency and effectiveness

The SMC model includes features that RMS had not previously used for road maintenance contracts. These included adopting stewardship principles and transferring price risk to the contractor over time as the contractor becomes familiar with the assets being maintained.

The SMC model meets RMS’ requirements for flexibility in pricing models, the need for collaboration in asset maintenance planning, promoting innovation and effective performance management.

RMS used many good practices to develop the SMC model, including:

  • preparing a robust business case comparing the SMC model to RMS maintaining the road network itself, as well as assessing whether two other contracting models
    (traditional and alliance) would meet its requirements
  • assessing experiences with similar arrangements in other jurisdictions and identifying elements that worked to get the best outcomes
  • developing a robust performance framework, which included a mix of efficiency and effectiveness KPIs that reflected NSW Government policy and RMS priorities
  • incorporating risk and reward incentives delivered through cost sharing arrangements which change as the contract matures
  • using a contract duration that supports RMS priorities and provides an incentive for better quality outcomes.

RMS uses data provided by the contractor to measure performance and calculate payments to the contractor. The SMC includes a specific sanction if RMS finds that the contractor provided incorrect performance data, but no specific sanction if the contractor provides incorrect financial data. If RMS finds that the contactor provided incorrect performance or financial data, RMS can only recover over-payments which may have been made using the incorrect data.  

To provide a stronger incentive for the contractor to ensure data it provides is accurate, RMS should consider whether to incorporate stronger sanctions when negotiating the commercial reset due in mid-2018 for south and west zones. RMS should also consider this for the new contract for the north zone when the current PSMC contract expires in October 2018.

RMS' contract management approach and benefits realization

RMS can improve the effectiveness of its oversight and management of the SMC

RMS does not have SMC specific contract procedures to guide its contract managers. Consequently, RMS has not exercised several significant SMC requirements, such as having the contractors account for an efficiency dividend in their pricing at the start of each three-year works period. Effective contract management should be supported by contract specific procedures, with explanations of, and allocation of responsibility for, the various interventions that RMS may be required to exercise in the SMC.

Performance and financial reporting under the SMC is based on a mix of RMS and contractor provided data. While there are a range of audits of contractor provided performance and financial data that RMS can conduct each year under the SMC, it does not have a schedule of audits it will conduct and when.  
During the first year of the SMC, RMS commissioned some limited audits of financial data. In the first three years of the SMC, RMS did not conduct any audits of performance data. Had there been SMC specific procedures in place, this would have reduced the risk of RMS not implementing a systematic audit program to give it reasonable assurance on the quality of the data that the contractor has provided. This is important because the data is used to measure performance and calculate contractor payments.

RMS has been aware of data quality issues since 2015. While RMS advised that it commenced addressing some data quality issues in response to a series of reviews conducted in 2015, a recent internal audit report indicates that RMS has not resolved the data quality issues.  

RMS achieved benefits in the first year, but has not tracked benefits since

As part of the business case, RMS agreed to implement a benefits realisation strategy, including a benefits tracking tool. RMS commenced tracking benefits, but did not establish a comparative baseline pre-SMC on non-financial benefits, and has not tracked benefits past year one.

In 2015, a benchmarking study commissioned by RMS found that it had achieved 80 per cent of the expected recurrent cost savings and other benefits, such as improved workplace safety, in the first full year of the SMC. However, there was no clear baseline to measure
non-financial performance. The study was qualified due to gaps in available data. The study also did not reconcile the actual one-off transition costs to the business case estimate.

During the course of the audit, RMS advised that it intends to repeat this type of study to determine whether it has achieved all expected benefits (and their value), and that it would use the results to inform its negotiation with the SMC contractors as part of the commercial reset due in mid-2018.

Roads and Maritime Services is responsible for the State Roads network in the Sydney region

Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) is responsible for the Sydney region State roads network. This includes over 2,800 kilometres of roads and associated road corridor infrastructure such as bridges, tunnels and drainage structures. The network is divided into three geographical areas: south, west and north zones. Prior to November 2013, RMS maintained roads in the Sydney region south and west zones through its Road and Fleet Services unit.  

In 1995, RMS first outsourced road corridor infrastructure maintenance for the north zone through a Performance Specified Maintenance Contract (PSMC). The current 10-year PSMC for the north zone will expire in October 2018. This contract is worth around $35 million per annum.  

NSW Government priorities and road maintenance

Efficient and effective road maintenance contributes to the following NSW Government priorities:

  • improving road travel reliability
  • ensuring on-time running of public transport
  • reducing road fatalities
  • improving government services
  • keeping our environment clean.

The NSW Commission of Audit recommended outsourcing the maintenance of State roads

The NSW Commission of Audit in its Final Report on Government Expenditure (May 2012) recommended contestability as an appropriate strategy to consider for improving road maintenance service delivery for State roads.  

The Commission benchmarked RMS’ road surface quality and cost per lane kilometre against those of Western Australia, Victoria, and Queensland. This showed that New South Wales lagged the other states on both these measures.  

Exhibit 1: Interjurisdictional comparison of road maintenance outcomes 2009–10
  WA VIC QLD NSW
Roads managed (lane kms) 52,659 50,510 71,353 80,348
Estimated spend ($/lane km) 5,000 4,500 6,000 7,000
Road quality measure (%) 99 99 94 91

Source: NSW Commission of Audit Final Report May 2012.

The Commission noted that RMS had conducted two independent reviews to examine the potential for extending road maintenance contestability. The Commission found that there was inadequate and inconclusive benchmarking to establish the efficiency of RMS’ Road and Fleet Services unit when compared to outsourcing. It recommended that RMS bring forward a proposal to conduct a competitive tender for the road maintenance of the Sydney region south zone road network to inform the feasibility of a progressive rollout of road maintenance contestability across other areas of the State. In August 2012, the NSW Government adopted the Commission’s recommendation.

The NSW Government introduced road maintenance contestability through Stewardship Maintenance Contracts

In April 2013, the NSW Government announced that it would introduce road maintenance contestability across the Sydney region, using a Stewardship Maintenance Contract (SMC) model to improve value for money. In doing so, it excluded RMS’ Road and Fleet Services unit from tendering.  

The SMC model is based on the following key commercial and performance principles set by RMS:

  • performance driven by outcomes
  • flexible and adaptable
  • transparent and measurable
  • linking risk to reward
  • continuous improvement
  • criteria for selection of, and transition to, different payment models.

The following key stewardship principles underpin the SMC’s broad set of values, attitudes and behaviours, which are required of the contractor to effectively manage the assets on behalf of RMS:

  • putting RMS’ customers (road users and the general public) first and being responsive to them
  • being responsible and accountable for the outcomes resulting from the management of the assets
  • managing the assets diligently, efficiently and effectively with limited direction from RMS
  • working collaboratively with RMS to deliver services that are tailored to meet RMS’ evolving needs
  • acting with integrity and transparency in performing the services
  • performing the services in the best interests of RMS and asset users.

Other key features of the SMC include:

  • service requirements which describe the scope of the services, and the standards the contractor must meet
  • a commercial framework which defines how payments are structured, how performance assessment will impact on payments and outlines the key commercial principles. SMCs primarily divide payments into two main mechanisms, these being the priced component (or fixed price) and the target cost calculated as follows:
    • fixed price – the contractor is paid a pre-agreed amount for specific services being provided, regardless of the actual costs incurred
    • target cost – RMS and the contractor agree on a target cost for a project, and any cost overruns or underruns are shared between them
  • a performance framework which provides mechanisms for assessing contractor performance. This includes a comprehensive listing of the key result areas (KRAs) and key performance indicators (KPIs) against which RMS measures the contractor’s performance. The framework also outlines the scoring methodology that RMS uses to determine whether the contractor’s bid margin (profit and overheads) is reduced due to less than satisfactory performance or whether a bonus is paid if a threshold performance score is exceeded.

Road maintenance under SMCs for Sydney region south and west zones commenced in November 2013

In November 2013, RMS awarded SMCs to the Leighton Boral Amey consortium, now named Ventia Boral Amey (VBA), for the south zone and the DownerMouchel (DM) consortium for the west zone. The contracts run for seven years with an option for a further three years at RMS’ discretion. In April 2014, full services commenced following a four-month transition period. RMS estimated that the annual cost of these contracts was around $240 million in total. In March 2018, the contract prices are due to be reset by negotiation to reflect the contractors’ experience with, and better information about, the road networks and routine maintenance requirements. 

  1. Roads and Maritime Services should consider whether to incorporate stronger sanctions in the Stewardship Maintenance Contract if the contractor provides incorrect performance or financial data to RMS, when:
     
    1. negotiating the commercial reset for the next works period with the Sydney region south and west zone contractors due in July 2018.
    2. finalising a new SMC contract for the Sydney region north zone, due to commence in October 2018.

Roads and Maritime Services should, by September 2017:

2.  Review its contract management framework for SMCs to ensure that all authorities and accountabilities of
     contract managers are clearly defined, including:

a) accountability and procedures for exercising all operational clauses in the SMC where RMS may opt to, or be required to intervene, or make a decision

b) authority to approve or initiate the interventions RMS is required to, or may, exercise under the SMC

c) the audits that RMS will conduct to systematically validate the performance and financial data that the SMC contractors provide

d) the accountabilities of RMS contract managers to systematically review audits and quality reviews that the SMC contractors must conduct to demonstrate compliance with their service plans

e) the accountabilities of RMS contract managers to check that the monthly and annual reports provided by SMC contractors do not contain errors, omissions or inaccuracies.

3.  Improve its management of benefits realisation by:

a) initiating a further benefits realisation review and record the benefits delivered against those
    estimated following the tender process, including the one-off transition costs

b) identify any benefits, including savings, not yet attained and develop strategies to address any short-falls

c) establish a tool to track the ongoing realisation of benefits.

Published

Actions for NorthConnex

NorthConnex

Premier and Cabinet
Treasury
Transport
Compliance
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement

The processes used to assess NorthConnex adequately considered value for money for taxpayers.This report also found that the impact of tolling concessions on road users and the motorway network was consistent with policy objectives described in the 2012 NSW Long Term Transport Master Plan.

NorthConnex is a nine-kilometre tolled motorway tunnel between the M1 Pacific motorway at Wahroonga and the M2 Hills motorway at West Pennant Hills. The total cost for the project is $3.1 billion. NorthConnex will be funded through toll charges, and contributions from the NSW and Australian Governments of up to $405 million each. In January 2015, the NSW Roads Minister signed the final contracts for NorthConnex.

By December 2017, the Department of Premier and Cabinet should:

1. publish an updated ‘Unsolicited Proposals – Guide for Submission and Assessment’ which clarifies obligations with requirements in other NSW Government policies such as the NSW PPP guideline and Infrastructure Investor Assurance Framework. The update should require:

a) a business case to be prepared, and a business case gateway review completed, as part of the assessment of the detailed proposal (currently stage 2)

b) probity reports must be completed and considered before the decision to proceed to the next stage.
 

The Department of Premier and Cabinet and NSW Treasury should immediately:

2. improve record keeping to ensure compliance with the State Records Act 1998 and the NSW Government Standard on Records Management.

 

Published

Actions for Mining Rehabilitation Security Deposits

Mining Rehabilitation Security Deposits

Planning
Industry
Environment
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Project management

The Department of Planning and Environment requires mining companies to rehabilitate sites according to conditions set in the mining development approval. The Department holds mining rehabilitation security deposits that are meant to cover the full cost of rehabilitation if a mining company defaults on its rehabilitation obligations.

The total value of security deposits held has increased from $500 million in 2005 to around $2.2 billion in 2016, covering around 450 mine sites in New South Wales.

While there have been substantial increases in total deposits held, mine rehabilitation security deposits are still not likely to be sufficient to cover the full costs of each mine's rehabilitation in the event of a default.

This audit was undertaken when the Department of Industry, Skills and Regional Development was responsible for ensuring land disturbed by mining activities is rehabilitated in accordance with the relevant development approval, including the administration of mining rehabilitation security deposits. On 1 April 2017, this responsibility was transferred to the Department of Planning and Environment (the Department).  

This audit assessed whether the Department maintains adequate security deposits to cover the liabilities associated with mine closures, including rehabilitation. Companies authorised by the Department to undertake mining activities must provide a security deposit to cover the full costs of rehabilitation in the event of default by the company. Rehabilitation is the treatment of disturbed land or water to establish a safe, stable, non-polluting and sustainable environment.

Mining companies must provide an estimate of rehabilitation costs for each site. The Department provides a Rehabilitation Cost Calculation tool to assist companies calculate the deposit amount. Companies are also required to ensure that the cost estimate is in accordance with the approved Mining Operations Plan (MOP). The MOP is intended to be a mine rehabilitation and closure plan, and forms the basis for the estimation of the security deposit. The Department reviews the estimates and determines the deposit for each site.  

Security deposits are an option of last resort. The Department has other legislative and regulatory tools which it normally uses to promote compliance with rehabilitation requirements before accessing a security deposit. It can direct action by the mining company, issue fines and even have the Minister revoke a mining lease. To date, the Department has never had to access a security deposit for a state significant development mine site.

Conclusion

The Department holds security deposits for mining rehabilitation consistent with the amounts it has requested from mining companies, and it should be able to claim on a deposit if a mining company defaults on its rehabilitation obligations. The total value of deposits has increased from $500 million in 2005 to around $2.2 billion in 2016, covering around 450 mine sites. The Department’s management of the security deposit process has improved in recent years, and it has well advanced plans for further improvement, including a revised cost calculation tool.

The Department’s policy is that each mine’s security deposit should cover the full costs of rehabilitation for that mine. The security deposits the Department holds are not likely to be sufficient to cover the full costs of each mine’s rehabilitation in the event of a default. The rates and allowances in the current cost calculation tool have not been updated since 2013 and some activities required for effective rehabilitation are not covered, or not covered adequately.

Security deposits also do not include sufficient contingency given the substantial risks and uncertainties associated with mine rehabilitation and closure, particularly in the absence of a detailed closure plan. This risk is exacerbated by the limited independent verification of mining company claims about the size of the outstanding rehabilitation task, which remains the case despite recent improvements to monitoring and review procedures and practices.  

There is also no financial assurance held over the risk of significant unexpected environmental degradation in the long-term after a mine is deemed to be rehabilitated and the security deposit is returned. A security deposit is not an appropriate vehicle for covering this risk.

Security deposits are close to calculated value and should be accessible if needed

The value of securities held by the Department aligns with the latest approved rehabilitation cost estimates. This contrasts with the situation found by investigations in Victoria and Queensland, where deposit amounts held fell below the calculated costs.

The security deposits are usually in the form of a bank guarantee or cash. The Department has obtained legal advice indicating that it should be able to claim on these bank guarantees if the need arises. As the guarantee is between the financial institution and the Department, if a mining company goes into liquidation the Department should still be able to access the funds.  

When the latest estimate of rehabilitation costs is higher than the existing deposit, the Department will request additional security. It has experienced extensive delays in obtaining additional security for some sites, increasing the risk that available funds will be insufficient if needed.

Rehabilitation cost estimates are not yet adequate, but improvements are planned

The Department’s policy is for security deposits to cover the full cost of rehabilitation. No discounts are provided to mining companies for past good behaviour or low likelihood of default, unlike in some other states. Discounting could undermine the policy position.  

Current security deposits are unlikely to cover the full cost of rehabilitation on each mine site. The Department provides a rehabilitation cost calculation tool to help mining companies calculate the cost of rehabilitation and the required deposit amount, but:

  • several activities required to effect closure are not included and others underestimated
  • it does not make provision for industry cost changes over time
  • the rates used in the tool have not been updated since 2013
  • it was not able to provide the basis for the rates and allowances in the tool.

The Department reviews cost estimates provided by mining companies, but its verification of the extent of rehabilitation work on which these estimates are based is limited. It relies instead on section 387C of the Mining Act 1992 which makes it an offence for mining companies to provide false or misleading information. It is not evident how the Department would establish that information provided was false or misleading without more verification work, and six of the 14 cost estimates we reviewed were not signed by the mine manager, making enforcement more difficult.  

The Department has developed a new calculation tool, and recently released it for industry consultation. The new tool should improve rehabilitation estimates. It updates rates and allowances, and includes additional items to better cover required rehabilitation tasks. While a substantial improvement, the new tool could be further improved by providing additional coverage for stakeholder engagement, additional planning approvals, insurance costs, and any additional design, research and verification work required for successful closure.

There is no financial assurance over long-term environmental risks

The Department does not hold any financial assurance to cover the costs associated with mitigating any future environmental degradation once a mine closes and the security deposit is relinquished to the mining company. Security deposits are probably not the appropriate mechanism to cover these long-term risks but the risk of potential post-closure environmental degradation still needs to be costed and covered. A fund to cover the state-wide risk, to which all mines would contribute, is a possible mechanism.

Rehabilitation and closure outcomes are vague, particularly for unplanned closure

Rehabilitation outcomes in the MOPs we reviewed were generally not specific. Any lack of specificity in MOPs translates into uncertainty about rehabilitation work required if a mining company defaults. Part of the problem is that rehabilitation outcomes established in planning approvals are usually not specific and may not address all closure requirements. The Department has recognised there is scope to improve the clarity and specificity of rehabilitation requirements in planning approvals, and has started a review focusing on open-cut mines.

Rehabilitation outcomes are even less specific in the event of an unexpected early closure because they will probably be different from that achievable from a planned closure.  

MOP guidelines do not cover management of some key closure matters, such as the requirements of environment protection licences issued by the Environment Protection Authority and the management of heritage sites during closure.

There were significant variations in quality of MOPs we reviewed and the way closure risks and uncertainties were identified and addressed. The Department plans to improve the quality of rehabilitation programs through enhanced guidance and oversight.

Monitoring is not adequate to effectively gauge rehabilitation progress

The Department was not able to show it has been monitoring operational mine sites effectively to gauge the progress of ongoing site rehabilitation and the management of closure risks. There was no protocol for site inspections and limited evidence of inspections for the sites we reviewed.

The Department receives annual environmental management reports from mining companies, with most describing the areas of disturbance and rehabilitation occurring at each mine site. The Department recently established procedures for reviewing these annual reports, and has developed a risk-based process for prioritising reviews.

Most annual reports we reviewed did not explain environmental changes over time, nor the risks to mine closure and the measures required to mitigate them. For example, analysis of changes to surface water and groundwater quality was limited despite its relevance for assessing future contamination risks.

The Department does not currently have adequate processes in place to effectively verify the reported areas of disturbance and rehabilitation. It is developing geographic information system-based tools to better measure areas of disturbance and rehabilitation, new rehabilitation guidelines, and a procedure for determining whether rehabilitation has been successful. These initiatives should improve the monitoring and reporting of rehabilitation progress at mine sites.

There is no mechanism to prevent a mine being in ‘care and maintenance’ indefinitely

The Department does not have a clear policy on the length of time and circumstances under which a mine can remain in ‘care and maintenance’. Indefinite postponement of rehabilitation and closure is therefore possible. 'Care and maintenance' is the period following temporary cessation of operations when infrastructure remains largely intact and the site continues to be managed. There are a range of valid reasons for a mining company to put a mine in ‘care and maintenance’, but it is also reasonable for the community to expect a limit to how long it has to wait for proper rehabilitation.

Mining operations make a significant contribution to the NSW economy, including over $1.3 billion in royalties each year. Around 400 mine sites throughout NSW provide over 40,000 jobs and are a major source of economic activity for many communities. Despite these benefits, it is important to ensure that mining companies fulfil their obligations to rehabilitate land disturbed as a result of mining activity.

We recommend that the Department should, by January 2018:

1. Improve the quality of rehabilitation and closure plans by:

  • ensuring plans submitted by mining companies include robust mine rehabilitation and closure risk assessments
  • clarifying the level of detail required in plans at each stage of a mine’s operation
  • specifying how requirements set under other legislative instruments (e.g. environment protection licences, heritage assets) should be addressed.

2. Improve assurance that security deposits are sufficient by:

  • ensuring its new cost calculation tool adequately covers all works needed for rehabilitation and closure
  • increasing the contingency for uncertainties associated with mine rehabilitation and closure, at least until the mining company provides a detailed closure plan
  • verifying the cost estimates for a sample of high risk sites annually
  • ensuring that when mining companies are required to provide increased security deposits, they do so with minimal delay.

3. Enhance oversight of mine rehabilitation by:

  • developing a protocol to ensure sufficient and adequate site inspections
  • ensuring mining companies report performance against rehabilitation targets and environmental changes clearly, including an analysis of long-term surface water and groundwater trends in terms of levels, flow and quality
  • improving how it determines the progress and success of mine rehabilitation
  • developing clear policy and procedures for ensuring a mine cannot be put into ‘care and maintenance’ indefinitely.

4. Collaborate with relevant agencies to establish a financial assurance mechanism, such as a sinking fund, to cover the risk of long-term environmental degradation after mines are closed and security deposits returned.

Appendix One - Response from the Department

Appendix Two - About the audit

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #285 - released 11 May 2017