Reports
Service NSW's handling of personal information
The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining the effectiveness of Service NSW’s handling of customers’ personal information to ensure its privacy.
The audit found that Service NSW is not effectively handling personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy. Service NSW continues to use business processes that pose a risk to the privacy of personal information. This includes the routine emailing of personal information between Service NSW service centres and other agencies, which is one of the processes that contributed to the data breach earlier this year. The audit found that previously identified risks and recommended solutions had not been implemented on a timely basis.
The Auditor-General made eight recommendations aimed at ensuring improved processes, technologies, and governance arrangements for how Service NSW handles customers’ personal information.
The Hon. Victor Dominello, MP, Minister for Customer Service, requested this audit under section 27(B)(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 following public reports in May 2020 of a cyber security attack which had led to a breach of Service NSW customer information. This audit also included the Department of Customer Service which supports Service NSW with privacy, risk and governance functions.
Service NSW was established in 2013 with the intention that it would, over time, 'become the primary interaction point for customers accessing New South Wales Government transaction services'.
Service NSW's functions are set out in the Service NSW (One stop Access to Government Services) Act 2013. This legislation allows for other NSW Government agencies to delegate to and enter into agreements with the Chief Executive Officer of Service NSW in order for Service NSW to undertake service functions for the agency.
Service NSW now has agreements with 36 NSW Government client agencies to facilitate over 1,200 types of interactions and transactions for the community.
The nature of each agreement between Service NSW and its client agencies varies. Some client agencies have delegated authority to allow Service NSW staff to conduct transactions on their behalf in the agencies' systems. Other arrangements do not include the same degree of delegation. In these cases, Service NSW provides services such as responding to enquiries and validating documents.
In addition, Service NSW conducts transactions for its own programs, such as the Seniors Card. Personal information for these programs, as well as information for customers' MyServiceNSW accounts, are stored by Service NSW on its Salesforce Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system.
In March 2020, Service NSW suffered two cyber security attacks in short succession. Technical analysis undertaken by the Department of Customer Service (DCS) concluded that these attacks resulted from a phishing exercise through which external threat actors gained access to the email accounts of 47 staff members. These attacks resulted in the breach of a large amount of personal customer information that was contained in these email accounts. See Section 1.1 for further details.
This audit is being conducted in response to a request from the Hon. Victor Dominello, Minister for Customer Service, under section 27B(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983. Minister Dominello requested that the Auditor General conduct a performance audit in relation to Service NSW's handling of sensitive customer and business information.
This audit assessed how effectively Service NSW handles personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy.
It addressed the following:
- Does Service NSW have processes and governance in place to identify and manage risks to the privacy of personal customer and business information?
- Does Service NSW have policies, processes and systems in place that support the effective handling of personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy?
- Has Service NSW effectively implemented its policies, processes and systems for managing personal customer and business information?
ConclusionService NSW is not effectively handling personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy. It continues to use business processes that pose a risk to the privacy of personal information. These include routinely emailing personal customer information to client agencies, which is one of the processes that contributed to the March 2020 data breach. Previously identified risks and recommended solutions had not been implemented on a timely basis.Service NSW identifies privacy as a strategic risk in both its Risk Management Guideline and enterprise risk register and sets out a zero level appetite for privacy risk in its risk appetite statement. That said, the governance, policies, and processes established by Service NSW to mitigate privacy risk are not effective in ensuring the privacy of personal customer and business information. While Service NSW had risk identification and management processes in place at the time of the March 2020 data breach, these did not prevent the breach occurring. Some of the practices that contributed to the data breach are still being followed by Service NSW staff. For example, business processes still require Service NSW staff to scan and email personal information to some client agencies. The lack of multi factor authentication has been identified as another key contributing factor to the March 2020 data breach as this enabled the external threat actors to gain access to staff email accounts once they had obtained the user account details through a phishing exercise. Service NSW had identified the lack of multi factor authentication on its webmail platform as a risk more than a year prior to the breach and had committed to addressing this by June 2019. It was not implemented until after the breach occurred. There are weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system, which holds the personal information of over four million NSW residents.Internal audits carried out by Service NSW, including one completed in August 2020, have identified significant weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce CRM system. These include deficiencies in the management of role based access, monitoring and audit of user access, and partitioning of program specific transaction information. These deficiencies create an increased risk of unauthorised access to the personal information of over four million customers held in the system. Lines of responsibility for meeting privacy obligations are not clearly drawn between Service NSW and its client agencies.Service NSW has agreements in place with client agencies. However, the agreements lack detail and clarity about the roles and responsibilities of the agencies in relation to the collection, storage and security of customer's personal information. This lack of clarity raises the risk that privacy obligations will become confused and missed between the agencies. Service NSW carries out privacy impact assessments for major new projects but does not routinely review existing processes and systems.Service NSW carries out privacy impact assessments as part of its routine processes for implementing major new projects, ensuring that privacy management is considered as part of project design. Service NSW does not regularly undertake privacy impact assessments or reviews of existing or legacy processes and systems, which has resulted in some processes continuing despite posing significant risks to the privacy of personal information, such as the scanning, emailing, and storing of identification documents. |
1. Key findings
Service NSW identifies privacy risks, but the controls and processes it put in place to mitigate these privacy risks were not adequate to prevent or limit the extent of the data breach that occurred in March 2020
Service NSW’s approach to risk management is framed by its Risk Management Guideline, which defines 'privacy and compliance' as one of the key types of risk for the agency. Service NSW's enterprise risk register identifies four strategic privacy related risks. Service NSW has set out a zero level appetite for privacy risk in its risk appetite statement.
Service NSW has assessed the adequacy of its controls for privacy risks as needing improvement. To be fully effective, the Risk Management Guideline says that these controls should have a focus that is ‘largely preventative and address the root causes’.
One of the business processes that was a key contributing factor to the data breach was the emailing of personal information by Service NSW staff to client agencies.
This process had been identified as a risk prior to the breach and some steps had been put in place to mitigate the risk. In particular, staff were required to manually delete emails that contained personal information. However, these measures were ineffective in preventing the breach, as the external threat actors still gained access to 47 staff email accounts that contained a large amount of personal information.
It is unclear why Service NSW did not effectively mitigate this risk prior to the breaches. However, Service NSW has advised that it implemented measures in June and October 2020 to automatically archive emails likely to contain personal information. This is expected to limit the quantity of information retained in email accounts for extended periods.
Service NSW has not put in place any technical or other solutions to avoid Service NSW staff having to scan and email personal information to some client agencies. Urgent action is needed to remove the requirement for staff to email personal information to client agencies, thereby mitigating the risk inherent in sending and storing this information using email.
There are weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce CRM system, which holds the personal information of over four million customers
There are weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce CRM system. These weaknesses include deficiencies in governance of role based access, monitoring and audit of staff access, and partitioning of program specific transaction information. These deficiencies create an increased risk of unauthorised access to the personal information of over four million customers which is stored in this system.
In addition, there is an absence of important controls to safeguard customers' privacy, such as multi factor authentication and reviewable logs of access history to their information. Such controls, when properly implemented, would enhance the control that customers are able to exercise over their personal information.
A privacy impact assessment conducted on Service NSW’s Salesforce CRM system in 2015 recommended that the system include the ability for customers to review access history to their personal information, as well as the option for customers to apply multi factor authentication to their accounts. While both these recommendations appeared positively received by Service NSW, neither have been implemented.
Since its inception, Service NSW’s use of Salesforce has extended to storing transaction data, particularly for transactions for which Service NSW is responsible, such as the Seniors Card. It also holds details of over four million MyServiceNSW account holders, including name, email address and phone number, and optional address details. It was not originally intended for the system to hold this volume and nature of customer information.
Lines of responsibility for meeting privacy obligations are unclear between Service NSW and its client agencies
Service NSW's privacy management plan does not clearly set out the privacy obligations of Service NSW and its client agencies. It sets out that 'compliance with the privacy principles will primarily be the responsibility of that [client] agency'. However, Service NSW has its own obligations under the security principles of the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (PPIP Act) to take reasonable steps to prevent unauthorised access to personal information, which is not made clear in the privacy management plan.
The agreements between Service NSW and client agencies reviewed for this audit only include general and high level references to privacy. Most do not include details of each parties' privacy responsibilities such as: which agency will provide the customer with a privacy notice explaining how their personal information will be handled, how personal information will be kept secure, how long Service NSW will retain information, what processes will be followed for internal reviews, and what specific planning is in place to respond to data breaches.
Service NSW's privacy management plan has not been updated to include new programs and governance changes
Service NSW's privacy management plan includes most of the matters required by law or good practice, with some exceptions. It does not explain any exemptions that the agency commonly relies on under the PPIP Act and does not address any health information that Service NSW may handle. It had also not been updated to reflect governance changes and the fact that, at the time this audit commenced, Service NSW was disclosing the content of internal review applications (the formal expression for 'complaints') to the Department of Customer Service (DCS). These governance changes were part of the centralisation of Service NSW's corporate support functions into DCS in late 2019, though internal review staff were seconded back into Service NSW during the course of this audit.
The current July 2019 privacy management plan has also not been updated since the rollout of a number of major new initiatives in 2020. These include 2019–20 bushfire emergency recovery initiatives (such as small business grants) and COVID 19 pandemic response initiatives (such as small business grants, border permits and the COVID safe check in app).
Service NSW routinely conducts privacy impact assessments for new initiatives, though privacy risks remain in legacy systems and processes
Service NSW routinely conducts privacy impact assessments for major new initiatives and the assessments reviewed for this audit largely accorded with good practice guidance.
Service NSW does not routinely review existing processes and systems to ensure that they are effective in ensuring the privacy of customer personal information. Business processes that create the highest risk to privacy, such as emailing of personal information, are more common in these longstanding legacy systems.
Service NSW's significant and rapid growth has outpaced the establishment of a robust control environment which has exacerbated privacy risks
Since it was established in 2013, Service NSW has experienced significant growth in the number and diversity of the types of transactions it provides, as well as the number of client agencies with which it works. The pace and extent of this growth has contributed to important controls not being properly implemented on a timely basis, which has heightened privacy risks, particularly in regard to existing, legacy systems and processes.
The pace of change and increasing demand for new program implementation has limited the opportunity for Service NSW, in collaboration with its client agencies, to revisit and redesign legacy business practices which pose a greater privacy risk. This includes the scanning and emailing of personal information.
While 2019–20 has seen additional demands placed on Service NSW in responding to the 2019–20 bushfire emergency and COVID 19 pandemic, it is the nature of the agency’s work that it operates in a fast paced and complex environment, where it is required to respond to multiple client agencies and stakeholders. Ensuring customer privacy should be integral to Service NSW’s business as usual operations.
2. Recommendations
Service NSW commissioned a number of external reviews and investigations stemming from the data breaches. The Auditor General's recommendations below have taken these other reviews into account. In order to offer assurance that it is appropriately protecting the privacy of its customers, Service NSW should address the full breadth of findings and recommendations made across all relevant reviews.
As a matter of urgency, Service NSW should:
1. in consultation with relevant client agencies and the Department of Customer Service, implement a solution for a secure method of transferring personal information between Service NSW and client agencies
2. review the need to store scanned copies of personal information and, if still required, implement a more secure method of storing this information and regular deletion of material.
By March 2021, Service NSW should:
3. ensure that all new agreements entered into with client agencies from 1 April 2021 address the deficiencies identified in this audit, including that they provide clarity on:
- the content and provision of privacy collection notices
- the terms by which personal information will be retained, stored, archived, and disposed of when no longer required
- steps that will be taken by each agency to ensure that personal information is kept secure
- the circumstances in which, and processes by which, applications for internal review will be referred by one agency to the other
- how identified breaches of privacy will be handled between agencies
4. in collaboration with the Department of Customer Service, review its privacy management plan to address the deficiencies raised in this audit, including:
- to clarify Service NSW's understanding of how responsibility for meeting privacy obligations are delineated between Service NSW and client agencies
- to better reflect the full scope and complexity of personal information handled by Service NSW
- to better explain how applications for internal review are handled between Service NSW and the Department of Customer Service
- to ensure regular ongoing review, either according to a schedule or when Service NSW experiences substantial change to its programs and handling of personal information
5. in consultation with the Department of Customer Service, review its policies and processes for the management of privacy risks, including to:
- ensure that there are appropriate mechanisms to escalate identified privacy risks from business units to the Executive Leadership Team
- ensure that there are action plans to address strategic privacy risks that are assessed as having ineffective controls.
By June 2021, Service NSW should:
6. address deficiencies in the controls over, and security for, its Salesforce customer relationship management and related systems that hold customer personal information, including:
- establish policies and processes for regular access reviews and monitoring of user activity in these systems, including for privileged users
- enable partitioning and role based access restrictions to personal information collected for different programs
- provide customers the choice to use multi factor authentication to further secure their MyServiceNSW accounts
- enable customers to view the transaction history of their personal information to detect possible mishandling.
By December 2021, Service NSW should:
7. ensure that all existing agreements with client agencies address the deficiencies identified in this audit, including that they provide clarity on:
- the content and provision of privacy collection notices
- the terms by which personal information will be retained, stored, archived, and disposed of when no longer required
- steps that will be taken by each agency to ensure that personal information is kept secure
- the circumstances in which, and processes by which, applications for internal review will be referred by one agency to the other
- how identified breaches of privacy will be handled between agencies
8. carry out a risk assessment of all processes, systems and transactions that involve the handling of personal information and undertake a privacy impact assessment for those that:
- are identified as high risk and have not previously had a privacy impact assessment
- have had major changes or updates since the privacy impact assessment was completed.
Appendix one – Responses from agencies
Appendix two – About the audit
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Education 2020
The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today titled Education 2020. This report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent audits of agencies in the Education cluster.
Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all cluster agencies’ financial statements. However, internal control deficiencies were identified across the cluster agencies, including deficiencies in the management of purchasing cards and 15 internal control issues that were repeated from the previous year.
The 2019–20 natural disasters caused widespread damage in both Northern and Southern NSW. The COVID‑19 pandemic further challenged agencies, requiring social distancing and other infection control measures which disrupted the traditional means of teaching students. Agencies have adjusted their operations to respond to these emergency events.
The TAFE Commission’s revenues 2019–20 were impacted by the pandemic. Lower enrolments and an increase in fee-free short courses offered during the year contributed to the result.
This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of entities within the Education cluster for the year ended 30 June 2020. The table below summarises our key observations and recommendations.
1. Financial reporting
| Audit opinions | Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all cluster agencies' 30 June 2020 financial statements audits. |
| New accounting standards |
Agencies implemented three new accounting standards during the year. Our financial statement audits of the Department of Education (the Department) and NSW Education Standards Authority (NESA) identified issues with the leasing information provided by Property NSW (PNSW). Despite the outsourcing arrangement, both the Department and NESA remain ultimately responsible for the completeness and accuracy of this information, which would have benefited from a more thorough quality assurance, validation and review process before they placed reliance upon it. Recommendation: We recommend the Department and NESA:
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| Changes were made to the financial reporting requirements this year to account for the impact of the pandemic |
Emergency legislation was enacted during the year in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The legislation revised the statutory reporting deadlines for agencies to submit their financial statements and allowed the Treasurer to continue authorising payments from the consolidated fund until the enactment of the 2020–21 budget. All cluster agencies prepared their financial statements on a going concern basis and submitted their financial statements within the revised statutory deadlines. The State provided $159.0 million in stimulus funding to support the operations of cluster agencies during emergency events. Nearly half of this funding was to support cleaning activities by the Department and the Technical and Further Education Commission (the TAFE Commission) during the COVID-19 pandemic. |
| Quality and timeliness of financial reporting |
The number of monetary misstatements identified in agencies' financial statements decreased to 14 (23 in 2018–19). While the number of corrections made to the financial statements after the submission date increased to eight (two in 2018–19), it is important to note these corrections provide parliament and other users of the financial statements increased confidence in the accuracy and presentation of agencies' performance and financial position. |
| Sustainability of cluster agencies | The TAFE Commission's enrolments declined, and operating margins reduced, both being impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. |
2. Audit observations
| Internal control deficiencies |
We identified 33 internal control issues, including 15 findings that were repeated from previous years. A high-risk issue was reported at the Department relating to the inadequate monitoring and follow up of privileged user activity in its enterprise resource planning system – SAP. Repeat findings relate to ongoing deficiencies in information technology controls and management policies, practices and procedures. Recommendation: Cluster agencies should:
|
| Agency responses to emergency events |
The Department established a separate bushfire relief directorate and COVID-19 Taskforce to assist and support school communities in response to recent emergencies. Other cluster agencies have established committees or response teams to oversee and address all aspects of the impact of COVID-19. |
| Schools review 2019 | We continue to identify instances of non-compliance in relation to cash management and procurement at schools. |
| Use of purchasing cards at the Department of Education |
Since 2015, the NSW Government has encouraged the use of purchasing cards by public sector agencies. Purchasing cards are efficient to transact low value, high volume procurement of goods and services, but the use must be effectively monitored. Our review of the Department's purchasing cards identified weaknesses in its oversight and monitoring controls, including the issue and cancellation of purchasing cards Opportunities exist for the Department to better monitor card use. Tools such as data analytics are an efficient and effective detective control to identify irregular activity or misuse by cardholders. Recommendation: The Department should:
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This report provides parliament and other users of the Education cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- audit observations
- the impact of emergencies and the COVID-19 pandemic.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
The COVID-19 Legislation Amendment (Emergency Measures–Treasurer) Act 2020 amended legislation administered by the Treasurer to implement further emergency measures as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. These amendments:
- allowed the Treasurer to authorise payments from the consolidated fund until the enactment of the 2020–21 budget – supporting the going concern assessments of cluster agencies
- revised budgetary, financial and annual reporting time frames – impacting the timeliness of financial reporting
- exempted certain statutory bodies and departments from preparing financial statements.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Education cluster for 2020, including any financial implications from the recent emergency events.
Section highlightsUnqualified audit opinions were issued on the financial statements of cluster agencies.
All cluster agencies met the revised statutory deadlines for completing early close procedures and submitting their financial statements. Emergency legislation allowing the Treasurer to continue authorising payments from the consolidated fund under the existing Appropriations Act enabled cluster agencies to prepare financial statements on a going concern basis.
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Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.
This chapter outlines our:
- observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Education cluster. It also comments on our review of elements of the financial control framework applied by schools in NSW whose financial results form part of the Department of Education's (the Department) financial statements.
- assessment of how well cluster agencies adapted their systems, policies and procedures, and governance arrangements in response to recent emergencies.
Section highlights
|
Appendix one – List of 2020 recommendations
Appendix two – Status of 2019 and 2018 recommendations
Appendix three – Financial data
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Integrity of data in the Births, Deaths and Marriages Register
This report outlines whether the Department of Customer Service (the department) has effective controls in place to ensure the integrity of data in the Births, Deaths and Marriages Register (the register), and to prevent unauthorised access and misuse.
The audit found that the department has processes in place to ensure that the information entered in the register is accurate and that any changes to it are validated. Although there are controls in place to prevent and detect unauthorised access to, and activity in the register, there were significant gaps in these controls. Addressing these gaps is necessary to ensure the integrity of information in the register.
The Auditor-General made nine recommendations to the department, aimed at strengthening controls to prevent and detect unauthorised access to, and activity in the register. These included increased monitoring of individuals who have access to the register and strengthening security controls around the databases that contain the information in the register.
The NSW Registry of Births Deaths and Marriages is responsible for maintaining registers of births, deaths and marriages in New South Wales as well as registering adoptions, changes of names, changes of sex and relationships. Maintaining the integrity of this information is important as it is used to confirm people’s identity and unauthorised access to it can lead to fraud or identity theft.
The NSW Registry of Births Deaths and Marriages (BD&M) is responsible for maintaining registers of births, deaths and marriages in New South Wales. BD&M is also responsible for registering adoptions, changes of name, changes of sex and relationships. These records are collectively referred to as 'the Register'. The Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (the BD&M Act) makes the Registrar (the head of BD&M) responsible for maintaining the integrity of the Register and preventing fraud associated with the Register. Maintaining the integrity of the information held in the Register is important as it is used to confirm people's identity. Unauthorised access to, or misuse of the information in the Register can lead to fraud or identity theft. For these reasons it is important that there are sufficient controls in place to protect the information.
BD&M staff access, add to and amend the Register through the LifeLink application. While BD&M is part of the Department of Customer Service, the Department of Communities and Justice (DCJ) manages the databases that contain the Register and sit behind LifeLink and is responsible for the security of these databases.
This audit assessed whether BD&M has effective controls in place to ensure the integrity of data in the Births, Deaths and Marriages Register, and to prevent unauthorised access and misuse. It addressed the following:
- Are relevant process and IT controls in place and effective to ensure the integrity of data in the Register and the authenticity of records and documents?
- Are security controls in place and effective to prevent unauthorised access to, and modification of, data in the Register?
ConclusionBD&M has processes and controls in place to ensure that the information entered in the Register is accurate and that amendments to the Register are validated. BD&M also has controls in place to prevent and detect unauthorised access to, and activity in the Register. However, there are significant gaps in these controls. Addressing these gaps is necessary to ensure the integrity of the information in the Register. BD&M has detailed procedures for all registrations and amendments to the Register, which include processes for entering, assessing and checking the validity and adequacy of source documents. Where BD&M staff have directly input all the data and for amendments to the Register, a second person is required to check all information that has been input before an event can be registered or an amendment can be made. BD&M carries out regular internal audits of all registration processes to check whether procedures are being followed and to address non-compliance where required. BD&M authorises access to the Register and carries out regular access reviews to ensure that users are current and have the appropriate level of access. There are audit trails of all user activity, but BD&M does not routinely monitor these. At the time of the audit, BD&M also did not monitor activity by privileged users who could make unauthorised changes to the Register. Not monitoring this activity created a risk that unauthorised activity in the Register would not be detected. BD&M has no direct oversight of the database environment which houses the Register and relies on DCJ's management of a third-party vendor to provide the assurance it needs over database security. The vendor operates an Information Security Management System that complies with international standards, but neither BD&M nor DCJ has undertaken independent assurance of the effectiveness of the vendor's IT controls. |
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #330 - released 7 April 2020.
Education 2018
The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released her report today on the results of the financial audits of agencies in the Education cluster. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial audits of these agencies. 'I am pleased to report that unqualified audit opinions were issued on the financial statements of both agencies in the Education cluster', the Auditor-General said. Statements were submitted and audited within statutory deadlines.
This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Education cluster for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.
This report provides parliament and other users of the Education cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- audit observations
- service delivery.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Education cluster for 2017–18.
| Observation | Conclusions and recommendations |
| 2.1 Quality of financial reporting | |
| Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the financial statements of both cluster agencies. | Sufficient audit evidence was obtained to conclude the financial statements were free of material misstatement. |
| 2.2 Timeliness of financial reporting | |
| Both cluster agencies met the statutory deadlines for completing early close procedures and submitting financial statements. | Early close procedures continue to facilitate the timely preparation of cluster agencies’ financial statements and completion of audits, but scope exists to improve outcomes by resolving issues and supplying supporting documentation earlier. |
| 2.3 Key issues from financial audits | |
| Inconsistencies in the Department’s annual leave and long service leave data, identified over the past three audits, remain unresolved. This issue impacts the Department’s liability estimates for annual leave and long service leave, including associated on-costs. It also on-flows to the Crown Entity, which assumes the Department's liability for long service leave. | Recommendation: The Department should confirm leave data and review assumptions following deployment of the new HR/Payroll system to better estimate the liability for employee benefits and the amount to be assumed by the Crown Entity. |
| 2.4 Key financial information | |
| Cluster agencies recorded net deficits in 2017–18. |
The Department recorded a net deficit of $30.7 million in 2017–18 against a budgeted surplus of $122 million. The NSW Education Standards Authority recorded a net deficit of $4.1 million against a budgeted deficit of $4.7 million. |
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.
This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:
- our financial statement audits of agencies in the Education cluster for 2018
- the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office work program.
The Audit Office Annual Work Program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each of the NSW Government clusters.
| Observation | Conclusions and recommendations |
| 3.1 Internal controls | |
| Twenty internal control deficiencies were identified during our audits of cluster agencies. We assessed one as a high risk finding. | |
| Eight internal control weaknesses were repeat issues from previous financial audits that had not been fully addressed by management. | Recommendation: Management should prioritise and action recommendations to address internal control weaknesses. |
| 3.2 Information technology | |
| Delivery of the Learning Management and Business Reform (LMBR) program is complete. |
The LMBR program has been a major project for the Department since it was established in 2006. A staged approach was adopted for implementing the Department’s new HR/Payroll system to manage the risks associated with this large-scale roll-out. |
| 3.3 Valuation of the Department’s land and buildings | |
| The Department completed a revaluation of land and building assets during 2017–18. |
A market approach was used to revalue the Department’s land, resulting in a revaluation increment of $2.3 billion. A current replacement cost approach was used to revalue the Department’s school buildings, resulting in an increment of $6.2 billion. |
| 3.4 Maintenance of school facilities | |
| The Department regularly assesses the condition of school buildings and uses Life Cycle Costing to predict maintenance and capital renewal, and to prioritise maintenance activities. | The Life Cycle Costing assessment conducted by the Department in 2017–18 rated 70 per cent of school buildings as being in either as new or good condition. No school buildings were rated as being in end-of-life condition. |
| 3.4 School asset delivery | |
| The Department’s School Assets Strategic Plan is designed to ensure that there are sufficient fit-for-purpose places for students up to 2031. | The Department created a new division, School Infrastructure NSW, to oversee the planning, supply and maintenance of schools and implement major school infrastructure projects. |
This chapter provides service delivery outcomes for the Education cluster for 2017–18. It provides important contextual information about the cluster's operation, but the data on achievement of these outcomes is not audited. The Audit Office does not have a specific mandate to audit performance information.
Internal Controls and Governance 2018
The Auditor-General for New South Wales Margaret Crawford found that as NSW state government agencies’ digital footprint increases they need to do more to address new and emerging information technology (IT) risks. This is one of the key findings to emerge from the second stand-alone report on internal controls and governance of the 40 largest NSW state government agencies.
This report analyses the internal controls and governance of the 40 largest agencies in the NSW public sector for the year ended 30 June 2018.
This report covers the findings and recommendations from our 2017–18 financial audits that relate to internal controls and governance at the 40 largest agencies (refer to Appendix three) in the NSW public sector.
This report offers insights into internal controls and governance in the NSW public sector
This is our second report dedicated to internal controls and governance at NSW State Government agencies. The report provides insights into the effectiveness of controls and governance processes in the NSW public sector by:
- highlighting the potential risks posed by weaknesses in controls and governance processes
- helping agencies benchmark the adequacy of their processes against their peers
- focusing on new and emerging risks, and the internal controls and governance processes that might address those risks.
Without strong governance systems and internal controls, agencies increase the risks associated with effectively managing their finances and delivering services to citizens. The way agencies deliver services increasingly relies on contracts and partnerships with the private sector. Many of these arrangements deliver front line services, but others provide less visible back office support. For example, an agency may rely on an IT service provider to manage a key system used to provide services to the community. The contract and service level agreements are only truly effective where they are actively managed to reduce risks to continuous quality service delivery, such as interruptions caused by system outages, cyber security attacks and data security breaches.
Our audits do not review all aspects of internal controls and governance every year. We select a range of measures, and report on those that present heightened risks for agencies to mitigate. This report divides these into the following five areas:
- Internal control trends
- Information technology (IT), including IT vendor management
- Transparency and performance reporting
- Management of purchasing cards and taxis
- Fraud and corruption control.
The findings in this report should not be used to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of individual agency control environments and governance arrangements. Specific financial reporting, controls and service delivery comments are included in the individual 2018 cluster financial audit reports, which will be tabled in Parliament from November to December 2018.
The focus of the report has changed since last year
Last year's report topics included asset management, ethics and conduct, and risk management. We are reporting on new topics this year. We plan to introduce new topics and re-visit our previous topics in subsequent reports on a cyclical basis. This will provide a baseline against which to measure the NSW public sectors’ progress in implementing appropriate internal controls and governance processes to mitigate existing, new and emerging risks in the public sector.
Agencies selected for the volume account for 95 per cent of the state's expenditure
While we have covered only 40 agencies in this report, those selected are a large enough group to identify common issues and insights. They represent about 95 per cent of total expenditure for all NSW public sector agencies.
Internal controls are processes, policies and procedures that help agencies to:
- operate effectively and efficiently
- produce reliable financial reports
- comply with laws and regulations
- support ethical government.
This chapter outlines the overall trends for agency controls and governance issues, including the number of findings, level of risk and the most common deficiencies we found across agencies. The rest of this volume presents this year’s controls and governance findings in more detail.
| Observation | Conclusions and recommendations |
|---|---|
| 2.1 High risk findings | |
| We found six high risk findings (seven in 2016–17), one of which was repeated from both last year and 2015–16. | Recommendation: Agencies should reduce risk by addressing high risk internal control deficiencies as a priority. |
| 2.2 Common findings | |
| We found several internal controls and governance findings common to multiple agencies. | Conclusion: Central agencies or the lead agency in a cluster can play a lead role in helping ensure agency responses to common findings are consistent, timely, efficient and effective. |
| 2.3 New and repeat findings | |
| Although internal control deficiencies decreased over the last four years, this year has seen a 42 per cent increase in internal control deficiencies. | The increase in new IT control deficiencies and repeat IT control deficiencies signifies an emerging risk for agencies. |
| IT control deficiencies feature in this increase, having risen by 63 per cent since last year. The number of repeat IT control deficiencies has doubled and is driven by the increasing digital footprint left by agencies as government prioritises on-line interfaces with citizens, and the number of transactions conducted through digital channels increases |
Recommendation: Agencies should reduce IT risks by:
|
Government agencies’ financial reporting is now heavily reliant on information technology (IT). IT is also increasingly important to the delivery of agency services. These systems often provide the data to help monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of agency processes and services they deliver. Our audits reviewed whether agencies have effective controls in place to manage both key financial systems and IT service contracts.
| Observation | Conclusions and recommendations |
|---|---|
| 3.1 Management of IT vendors | |
| Contract management framework Although 87 per cent of agencies have a contract management policy to manage IT vendors, one fifth require review. |
Conclusion: Agencies can more effectively manage IT vendor contracts by developing policies and procedures to ensure vendor management frameworks are kept up to date, plans are in place to manage vendor performance and risk, and compliance with the framework is monitored by:
|
| Contract risk management Forty-one per cent of agencies are not using contract management plans and do not assess contract risks. Half of the agencies that did assess contract risks, had not updated the risk assessments since the commencement of the contract. |
Conclusion: Instead of applying a 'set and forget' approach in relation to management of contract risks, agencies should assess risk regularly and develop a plan to actively manage identified risks throughout the contract lifecycle - from negotiation and commencement, to termination. |
|
Performance management Only 24 per cent of agencies sought assurance about the accuracy of vendor reporting against KPIs, yet sixty-seven per cent of the IT contracts allow agencies to determine performance based payments and/or penalise underperformance. |
Conclusion: Agencies are monitoring IT vendor performance, but could improve outcomes and more effectively manage under-performance by:
|
|
Transitioning services Where IT vendor contracts do make provision for transitioning-out, only 28 per cent of agencies have developed a transitioning-out plan with their IT vendor. |
Conclusion: Contract transition/phase out clauses and plans can mitigate risks to service disruption, ensure internal controls remain in place, avoid unnecessary costs and reduce the risk of 'vendor lock-in'. |
| Contract Registers Eleven out of forty agencies did not have a contract register, or have registers that are not accurate and/or complete. |
Conclusion: A contract register helps to manage an agency’s compliance obligations under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (the GIPA Act). However, it also helps agencies more effectively manage IT vendors by:
Recommendation: Agencies should ensure their contract registers are complete and accurate so they can more effectively govern contracts and manage compliance obligations. |
| 3.2 IT general controls | |
| Governance Ninety-five per cent of agencies have established policies to manage key IT processes and functions within the agency, with ten per cent of those due for review. |
Conclusion: Regular review of IT policies ensures risks are considered and appropriate strategies and procedures are implemented to manage these risks on a consistent basis. An absence of policies can lead to ad-hoc responses to risks, and failure to consider emerging IT risks and changes to agency IT environments. |
|
User access administration
|
Recommendation: Agencies should strengthen the administration of user access to prevent inappropriate access to key systems. |
| Privileged access Forty per cent of agencies do not periodically review logs of the activities of privileged users to identify suspicious or unauthorised activities. |
Recommendation: Agencies should:
|
| Password controls Twenty-three per cent of agencies did not comply with their own policy on password parameters. |
Recommendation: Agencies should ensure IT password settings comply with their password policies. |
| Program changes Fifteen per cent of agencies had deficient IT program change controls mainly related to segregation of duties and authorisation and testing of IT program changes prior to deployment. |
Recommendation: Agencies should maintain appropriate segregation of duties in their IT functions and test system changes before they are deployed. |
This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations from our review of how agencies reported their performance in their 2016–17 annual reports. The Annual Reports (Statutory Bodies) Regulation 2015 and Annual Reports (Departments) Regulation 2015 (annual reports regulation) currently prescribes the minimum requirements for agency annual reports.
| Observation | Conclusion or recommendation |
| 4.1 Reporting on performance | |
|
Only 57 per cent of agencies linked reporting on performance to their strategic objectives. The use of targets and reporting performance over time was limited and applied inconsistently. |
Conclusion: There is significant disparity in the quality and consistency of how agencies report on their performance in their annual reports. This limits the reliability and transparency of reported performance information. Agencies could improve performance reporting by clearly linking strategic objectives to reported outcomes, and reporting on performance against targets over time. NSW Treasury may need to provide more guidance to agencies to support consistent and high-quality performance reporting in annual reports. |
|
There is no independent assurance that the performance metrics agencies report in their annual reports are accurate. Prior performance audits have noted issues related to the collection of performance information. For example, our 2016 Report on Red Tape Reduction highlighted inaccuracies in how the dollar-value of red tape reduction had been reported. |
Conclusion: The ability of Parliament and the public to rely on reported information as a relevant and accurate reflection of an agency's performance is limited. The relevance and accuracy of performance information is enhanced when:
|
| 4.2 Reporting on reports | |
|
Agency reporting on major projects does not meet the requirements of the annual reports regulation. Forty-seven per cent of agencies did not report on costs to date and estimated completion dates for major works in progress. Of the 47 per cent of agencies that reported on major works, only one agency reported detail about significant cost overruns, delays, amendments, deferments or cancellations. |
NSW Treasury produce an annual report checklist to help agencies comply with their annual report obligations. Recommendation: Agencies should comply with the annual reports regulation and report on all mandatory fields, including significant cost overruns and delays, for their major works in progress. |
|
The information the annual reports regulation requires agencies to report deals only with major works in progress. There is no requirement to report on completed works. Sixteen of 30 agencies reported some information on completed major works. |
Conclusion: Agencies could improve their transparency if they reported, or were required to report:
|
This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency preventative and detective controls over purchasing card and taxi use for 2017–18.
| Observation | Conclusion or recommendation |
| 5.1 Management of purchasing cards | |
| Volume of credit card spend Purchasing card expenditure has increased by 76 per cent over the last four years in response to a government review into the cost savings possible from using purchasing cards for low value, high volume procurement. |
Conclusion: The increasing use of purchasing cards highlights the importance of an effective framework for the use and management of purchasing cards. |
| Policy framework We found all agencies that held purchasing cards had a policy in place, but 26 per cent of agencies have not reviewed their purchasing card policy by the scheduled date, or do not have a scheduled revision date stated within their policy. |
Recommendation: Agencies should mitigate the risks associated with increased purchasing card use by ensuring policies and purchasing card frameworks remain current and compliant with the core requirements of TPP 17–09 'Use and Management of NSW Government Purchasing Cards'. |
| Preventative controls We found that:
|
Agencies have designed and implemented preventative controls aimed at deterring the potential misuse of purchasing cards. Conclusion: Further opportunities exist for agencies to better control the use of purchasing cards, such as:
|
|
Detective controls Major reviews, such as data analytics (29 per cent of agencies) and independent spot checks (49 per cent of agencies) are not widely used. |
Agencies have designed and implemented detective controls aimed at identifying potential misuse of purchasing cards. Conclusion: More effective monitoring using purchasing card data can provide better visibility over spending activity and can be used to:
|
| 5.2 Management of taxis | |
| Policy framework Thirteen per cent of agencies have not developed and implemented a policy to manage taxi use. In addition:
|
Conclusion: Agencies can promote savings and provide more options to staff where their taxi use policies:
|
| Detective controls All agencies approve taxi expenditure by expense reimbursement, purchasing card and Cabcharge, and have implemented controls around this approval process. However, beyond this there is minimal monitoring and review activity, such as data monitoring, independent spot checks or internal audit reviews. |
Conclusion: Taxi spend at agencies is not significant in terms of its dollar value, but it is significant from a probity perspective. Agencies can better address the probity risk by incorporating taxi use into a broader purchasing card or fraud monitoring program. |
Fraud and corruption control is one of the 17 key elements of our governance lighthouse. Recent reports from ICAC into state agencies and local government councils highlight the need for effective fraud control and ethical frameworks. Effective frameworks can help protect an agency from events that risk serious reputational damage and financial loss.
Our 2016 Fraud Survey found the NSW Government agencies we surveyed reported 1,077 frauds over the three year period to 30 June 2015. For those frauds where an estimate of losses was made, the reported value exceeded $10.0 million. The report also highlighted that the full extent of fraud in the NSW public sector could be higher than reported because:
- unreported frauds in organisations can be almost three times the number of reported frauds
- our 2015 survey did not include all NSW public sector agencies, nor did it include any NSW universities or local councils
- fraud committed by citizens such as fare evasion and fraudulent state tax self-assessments was not within the scope of our 2015 survey
- agencies did not estimate a value for 599 of the 1,077 (56 per cent) reported frauds.
Commissioning and outsourcing of services to the private sector and the advancement of digital technology are changing the fraud and corruption risks agencies face. Fraud risk assessments should be updated regularly and in particular where there are changes in agency business models. NSW Treasury Circular TC18-02 NSW Fraud and Corruption Control Policy now requires agencies develop, implement and maintain a fraud and corruption control framework, effective from 1 July 2018.
Our Fraud Control Improvement Kit provides guidance and practical advice to help organisations implement an effective fraud control framework. The kit is divided into ten attributes. Three key attributes have been assessed below; prevention, detection and notification systems.
This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency fraud and corruption controls for 2017–18.
| Observation | Conclusion or recommendation |
| 6.1 Prevention systems | |
|
Prevention systems Only 54 per cent of agencies have an employment screening policy and all agencies have IT security policies, but gaps in IT security controls could undermine their policies. |
Conclusion: Most agencies have implemented fraud prevention systems to reduce the risk of fraud. However poor IT security along with other gaps in agency prevention systems, such as employment screening practices heightens the risk of fraud and inappropriate use of data. Agencies can improve their fraud prevention systems by:
|
| Twenty-three per cent of agencies were not performing fraud risk assessments and some agency fraud risk assessments may not be as robust as they could be. | Conclusion: Agencies' systems of internal controls may be less effective where new and emerging fraud risks have been overlooked, or known weaknesses have not been rectified. |
| 6.2 Detection systems | |
| Detection systems Several agencies reported they were developing a data monitoring program, but only 38 per cent of agencies had already implemented a program. |
Studies have shown data monitoring, whereby entire populations of transactional data are analysed for indicators of fraudulent activity, is one of the most effective methods of early detection. Early detection decreases the duration a fraud remains undetected thereby limiting the extent of losses. Conclusion: Data monitoring is an effective tool for early detection of fraud and is more effective when informed by a comprehensive fraud risk assessment. |
| 6.3 Notification systems | |
| Notification system All agencies have notification systems for reporting actual or suspected fraud and corruption. Most agencies provide multiple reporting lines, provide training and publicise options for staff to report actual or suspected fraud and corruption. |
Conclusion: Training staff about their obligations and the use of fraud notification systems promotes a fraud-aware culture |
Matching skills training with market needs
In 2012, governments across Australia entered into the National Partnership Agreement on Skills Reform. Under the National Partnership Agreement, the Australian Government provided incentive payments to States and Territories to move towards a more contestable Vocational Education and Training (VET) market. The aim of the National Partnership Agreement was to foster a more accessible, transparent, efficient and high quality training sector that is responsive to the needs of students and industry.
The New South Wales Government introduced the Smart and Skilled program in response to the National Partnership Agreement. Through Smart and Skilled, students can choose a vocational course from a list of approved qualifications and training providers. Students pay the same fee for their chosen qualification regardless of the selected training provider and the government covers the gap between the student fee and the fixed price of the qualification through a subsidy paid to their training provider.
Smart and Skilled commenced in January 2015, with the then Department of Education and Communities having primary responsibility for its implementation. Since July 2015, the NSW Department of Industry (the Department) has been responsible for VET in New South Wales and the implementation of Smart and Skilled.
The NSW Skills Board, comprising nine part-time members appointed by the Minister for Skills, provides independent strategic advice on VET reform and funding. In line with most other States and Territories, the Department maintains a 'Skills List' which contains government subsidised qualifications to address identified priority skill needs in New South Wales.
This audit assessed the effectiveness of the Department in identifying, prioritising, and aligning course subsidies to the skill needs of NSW. To do this we examined whether:
- the Department effectively identifies and prioritises present and future skill needs
- Smart and Skilled funding is aligned with the priority skill areas
- skill needs and available VET courses are effectively communicated to potential participants and training providers.
Smart and Skilled is a relatively new and complex program, and is being delivered in the context of significant reform to VET nationally and in New South Wales. A large scale government funded contestable market was not present in the VET sector in New South Wales before the introduction of Smart and Skilled. This audit's findings should be considered in that context.
The Department needs to better use the data it has, and collect additional data, to support its analysis of priority skill needs in New South Wales, and direct funding accordingly.
- funding scholarships and support for disadvantaged students
- funding training in regional and remote areas
- providing additional support to deliver some qualifications that the market is not providing.
The Department needs to evaluate these funding strategies to ensure they are achieving their goals. It should also explore why training providers are not delivering some priority qualifications through Smart and Skilled.
Training providers compete for funding allocations based on their capacity to deliver. The Department successfully manages the budget by capping funding allocated to each Smart and Skilled training provider. However, training providers have only one year of funding certainty at present. Training providers that are performing well are not rewarded with greater certainty.
The Department needs to improve its communication with prospective students to ensure they can make informed decisions in the VET market.
The Department also needs to communicate more transparently to training providers about its funding allocations and decisions about changes to the NSW Skills List.
The Department relies on stakeholder proposals to update the NSW Skills List. Stakeholders include industry, training providers and government departments. These stakeholders, particularly industry, are likely to be aware of skill needs, and have a strong incentive to propose qualifications that address these needs. The Department’s process of collecting stakeholder proposals helps to ensure that it can identify qualifications needed to address material skill needs.
It is also important that the Department ensures the NSW Skills List only includes priority qualifications that need to be subsidised by government. The Department does not have robust processes in place to remove qualifications from the NSW Skills List. As a result, there is a risk that the list may include lower priority skill areas. Since the NSW Skills List was first created, new additions to the list have outnumbered those removed by five to one.
The Department does not always validate information gathered from stakeholder proposals, even when it has data to do so. Further, its decision making about what to include on, or delete from, the NSW Skills List is not transparent because the rationale for decisions is not adequately documented.
The Department is undertaking projects to better use data to support its decisions about what should be on the NSW Skills List. Some of these projects should deliver useful data soon, but some can only provide useful information when sufficient trend data is available.
Recommendation
The Department should:
- by June 2019, increase transparency of decisions about proposed changes to the NSW Skills List and improve record-keeping of deliberations regarding these changes
- by December 2019, use data more effectively and consistently to ensure that the NSW Skills List only includes high priority qualifications
Only qualifications on the NSW Skills List are eligible for subsidies under Smart and Skilled. As the Department does not have a robust process for removing low priority qualifications from the NSW Skills list, some low priority qualifications may be subsidised.
The Department allocates the Smart and Skilled budget through contracts with Smart and Skilled training providers. Training providers that meet contractual obligations and perform well in terms of enrolments and completion rates are rewarded with renewed contracts and more funding for increased enrolments, but these decisions are not based on student outcomes. The Department reduces or removes funding from training providers that do not meet quality standards, breach contract conditions or that are unable to spend their allocated funding effectively. Contracts are for only one year, offering training providers little funding certainty.
Smart and Skilled provides additional funding for scholarships and for training providers in locations where the cost of delivery is high or to those that cater to students with disabilities. The Department has not yet evaluated whether this additional funding is achieving its intended outcomes.
Eight per cent of the qualifications that have been on the NSW Skills List since 2015 are not delivered under Smart and Skilled anywhere in New South Wales. A further 14 per cent of the qualifications that are offered by training providers have had no student commencements. The Department is yet to identify the reasons that these high priority qualifications are either not offered or not taken up by students.
Recommendation
The Department should:
- by June 2019, investigate why training providers do not offer, and prospective students do not enrol in, some Smart and Skilled subsidised qualifications
- by December 2019, evaluate the effectiveness of Smart and Skilled funding which supplements standard subsidies for qualifications on the NSW Skills List, to determine whether it is achieving its objectives
- by December 2019, provide longer term funding certainty to high performing training providers, while retaining incentives for them to continue to perform well.
In a contestable market, it is important for consumers to have sufficient information to make informed decisions. The Department does not provide some key information to prospective VET students to support their decisions, such as measures of provider quality and examples of employment and further education outcomes of students completing particular courses. Existing information is spread across numerous channels and is not presented in a user friendly manner. This is a potential barrier to participation in VET for those less engaged with the system or less ICT literate.
The Department conveys relevant information about the program to training providers through its websites and its regional offices. However, it could better communicate some specific information directly to individual Smart and Skilled training providers, such as reasons their proposals to include new qualifications on the NSW Skills List are accepted or rejected.
While the Department is implementing a communication strategy for VET in New South Wales, it does not have a specific communications strategy for Smart and Skilled which comprehensively identifies the needs of different stakeholders and how these can be addressed.
Recommendation
By December 2019, the Department should develop and implement a specific communications strategy for Smart and Skilled to:
- support prospective student engagement and informed decision making
- meet the information needs of training providers
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - About the audit
Appendix three - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #305 - released 26 July 2018
Performance audit insights: key findings from 2014-2018
A report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, presents key findings from four years of performance audits. The report findings are presented around six areas of government activity including planning for the future, meeting community expectations for key services, investment in infrastructure, managing natural resources, ensuring good governance and digital disruption.
In this report, we present common findings and lessons from the past four years of performance audits, and offer insights to the public sector on elements of effective performance. We have analysed the key findings and recommendations from 61 performance audits tabled in the NSW Parliament between July 2014 and June 2018, spanning varied areas of government activity. We will also use this report to help determine areas of unaddressed risk across all parts of government, and to shape our future audit priorities.
Governments play an important stewardship role. Their decisions need to consider intergenerational equity by ensuring that investment strategies are sustainable. Governments also need to consider the impact of their decisions on different parts of the community. We recognise that governments face challenges in delivering programs and services, targeting complex social issues with finite resources.
Governments are changing how they deliver services to respond to citizen needs and deliver greater value for money. In this section, we reflect on audits that looked at how government entities are planning their activities to meet the needs of the community into the future.
State and local government exist to provide services to citizens, and citizens are playing a greater role in defining what services they want or need. Expectations about consultation, ease of access, timeliness, and customisation of services are rising. Governments face challenges to continually improve the way they plan and deliver services to meet these expectations. Governments also need to provide quality services for a growing and ageing population whilst working within a constrained financial environment.
Over the past four years, our performance audits have assessed aspects of State and local government services, including education, health services, disability support, corrective services, and many others. In this section, we draw together common findings that government entities should reflect on when providing services to the community.
The NSW Government’s 2018–19 Budget forecasts an $87.2 billion infrastructure investment program over the next four years. Infrastructure investment of this size carries significant opportunities and risks. Competition for resources is high and maintaining the capability to manage and deliver projects effectively is challenging. Governments also need to plan effectively to ensure infrastructure built today will meet future needs.
Over the past four years, we have looked at some of the ways NSW Government agencies justify and prioritise projects for funding, work with contractors to deliver projects, and track and report on progress. In this section, we draw together common findings from our audits that government entities should consider when planning future infrastructure projects.
Governments face challenges in balancing the use of natural resources to meet diverse interests, while supporting a sustainable natural environment for the future. They need to supply communities with water, produce energy, protect natural habitats, and support farming, industry, and economic development.
Some of our recent audits have considered how government agencies are managing natural resources and protecting the environment for future generations. In this section, we have drawn together common findings across our audits that government entities should consider in managing the environment and natural resources.
A range of checks and balances is needed to support public confidence in government decision making. To maintain trust, government agencies should act transparently, and in accordance with relevant legislation and policy. This is particularly important as the public sector increasingly engages with external partners to deliver services and provide a more contestable environment.
Good governance arrangements should result in improved service delivery and more effective and efficient use of resources. Our audits have looked at many different elements of governance, including making sure the necessary processes and workplace cultures are in place to help government entities achieve their aims. In this section, we have drawn together various aspects of governance that government entities should consider.
The global increase in digital technology provides governments with opportunities to interact with citizens in more immediate and responsive ways than was previously possible. Data can be used in powerful ways such as predicting future demand for services, targeting interventions, responding to crises, and evaluating outcomes. Governments face challenges in doing this while maintaining secure digital environments that protect citizen interests, privacy, and autonomy.
Our audits have assessed some of the ways that government entities are incorporating digital change into their work. In this section, we draw together common themes that governments could consider in protecting their digital assets, or expanding their digital capabilities.
Managing risks in the NSW public sector: risk culture and capability
The Ministry of Health, NSW Fair Trading, NSW Police Force, and NSW Treasury Corporation are taking steps to strengthen their risk culture, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford. 'Senior management communicates the importance of managing risk to their staff, and there are many examples of risk management being integrated into daily activities', the Auditor-General said.
We did find that three of the agencies we examined could strengthen their culture so that all employees feel comfortable speaking openly about risks. To support innovation, senior management could also do better at communicating to their staff the levels of risk they are willing to accept.
Effective risk management is essential to good governance, and supports staff at all levels to make informed judgements and decisions. At a time when government is encouraging innovation and exploring new service delivery models, effective risk management is about seizing opportunities as well as managing threats.
Over the past decade, governments and regulators around the world have increasingly turned their attention to risk culture. It is now widely accepted that organisational culture is a key element of risk management because it influences how people recognise and engage with risk. Neglecting this ‘soft’ side of risk management can prevent institutions from managing risks that threaten their success and lead to missed opportunities for change, improvement or innovation.
This audit assessed how effectively NSW Government agencies are building risk management capabilities and embedding a sound risk culture throughout their organisations. To do this we examined whether:
- agencies can demonstrate that senior management is committed to risk management
- information about risk is communicated effectively throughout agencies
- agencies are building risk management capabilities.
The audit examined four agencies: the Ministry of Health, the NSW Fair Trading function within the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation, NSW Police Force and NSW Treasury Corporation (TCorp). NSW Treasury was also included as the agency responsible for the NSW Government's risk management framework.
In assessing an agency’s risk culture, we focused on four key areas:
Executive sponsorship (tone at the top)
In the four agencies we reviewed, senior management is communicating the importance of managing risk. They have endorsed risk management frameworks and funded central functions tasked with overseeing risk management within their agencies.
That said, we found that three case study agencies do not measure their existing risk culture. Without clear measures of how employees identify and engage with risk, it is difficult for agencies to tell whether employee's behaviours are aligned with the 'tone' set by the executive and management.
For example, in some agencies we examined we found a disconnect between risk tolerances espoused by senior management and how these concepts were understood by staff.
Employee perceptions of risk management
Our survey of staff indicated that while senior leaders have communicated the importance of managing risk, more could be done to strengthen a culture of open communication so that all employees feel comfortable speaking openly about risks. We found that senior management could better communicate to their staff the levels of risk they should be willing to accept.
Integration of risk management into daily activities and links to decision-making
We found examples of risk management being integrated into daily activities. On the other hand, we also identified areas where risk management deviated from good practice. For example, we found that corporate risk registers are not consistently used as a tool to support decision-making.
Support and guidance to help staff manage risks
Most case study agencies are monitoring risk-related skills and knowledge of their workforce, but only one agency has addressed the gaps it identified. While agencies are providing risk management training, surveyed staff in three case study agencies reported that risk management training is not adequate.
NSW Treasury provides agencies with direction and guidance on risk management through policy and guidelines. In line with better practice, NSW Treasury's principles-based policy acknowledges that individual agencies are in a better position to understand their own risks and design risk management frameworks that address those risks. Nevertheless, there is scope for NSW Treasury to refine its guidance material to support a better risk culture in the NSW public sector.
Recommendation
By May 2019, NSW Treasury should:
- Review the scope of its risk management guidance, and identify additional guidance, training or activities to improve risk culture across the NSW public sector. This should focus on encouraging agency heads to form a view on the current risk culture in their agencies, identify desirable changes to that risk culture, and take steps to address those changes.
Appendix one - Response from agencies
Appendix three - About the audit
Appendix four - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #298 - released 23 April 2018
Detecting and responding to cyber security incidents
A report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, found there is no whole-of-government capability to detect and respond effectively to cyber security incidents. There is very limited sharing of information on incidents amongst agencies, and some agencies have poor detection and response practices and procedures.
The NSW Government relies on digital technology to deliver services, organise and store information, manage business processes, and control critical infrastructure. The increasing global interconnectivity between computer networks has dramatically increased the risk of cyber security incidents. Such incidents can harm government service delivery and may include the theft of information, denial of access to critical technology, or even the hijacking of systems for profit or malicious intent.
This audit examined cyber security incident detection and response in the NSW public sector. It focused on the role of the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation (DFSI), which oversees the Information Security Community of Practice, the Information Security Event Reporting Protocol, and the Digital Information Security Policy (the Policy).
The audit also examined ten case study agencies to develop a perspective on how they detect and respond to incidents. We chose agencies that are collectively responsible for personal data, critical infrastructure, financial information and intellectual property.
Some of our case study agencies had strong processes for detection and response to cyber security incidents but others had a low capability to detect and respond in a timely way.
Most agencies have access to an automated tool for analysing logs generated by their IT systems. However, coverage of these tools varies. Some agencies do not have an automated tool and only review logs periodically or on an ad hoc basis, meaning they are less likely to detect incidents.
Few agencies have contractual arrangements in place for IT service providers to report incidents to them. If a service provider elects to not report an incident, it will delay the agency’s response and may result in increased damage.
Most case study agencies had procedures for responding to incidents, although some lack guidance on who to notify and when. Some agencies do not have response procedures, limiting their ability to minimise the business damage that may flow from a cyber security incident. Few agencies could demonstrate that they have trained their staff on either incident detection or response procedures and could provide little information on the role requirements and responsibilities of their staff in doing so.
Most agencies’ incident procedures contain limited information on how to report an incident, who to report it to, when this should occur and what information should be provided. None of our case study agencies’ procedures mentioned reporting to DFSI, highlighting that even though reporting is mandatory for most agencies their procedures do not require it.
Case study agencies provided little evidence to indicate they are learning from incidents, meaning that opportunities to better manage future incidents may be lost.
Recommendations
The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should:
- assist agencies by providing:
- better practice guidelines for incident detection, response and reporting to help agencies develop their own practices and procedures
- training and awareness programs, including tailored programs for a range of audiences such as cyber professionals, finance staff, and audit and risk committees
- role requirements and responsibilities for cyber security across government, relevant to size and complexity of each agency
- a support model for agencies that have limited detection and response capabilities
- revise the Digital Information Security Policy and Information Security Event Reporting Protocol by
- clarifying what security incidents must be reported to DFSI and when
- extending mandatory reporting requirements to those NSW Government agencies not currently covered by the policy and protocol, including State owned corporations.
DFSI lacks a clear mandate or capability to provide effective detection and response support to agencies, and there is limited sharing of information on cyber security incidents.
DFSI does not currently have a clear mandate and the necessary resources and systems to detect, receive, share and respond to cyber security incidents across the NSW public sector. It does not have a clear mandate to assess whether agencies have an acceptable detection and response capability. It is aware of deficiencies in agencies and across whole‑of‑government, and has begun to conduct research into this capability.
Intelligence gathering across the public sector is also limited, meaning agencies may not respond to threats in a timely manner. DFSI has not allocated resources for gathering of threat intelligence and communicating it across government, although it has begun to build this capacity.
Incident reporting to DFSI is mandatory for most agencies, however, most of our case study agencies do not report incidents to DFSI, reducing the likelihood of containing an incident if it spreads to other agencies. When incidents have been reported, DFSI has not provided dedicated resources to assess them and coordinate the public sector’s response. There are currently no formal requirements for DFSI to respond to incidents and no guidance on what it is meant to do if an incident is reported. The lack of central coordination in incident response risks delays and increased damage to multiple agencies.
DFSI's reporting protocol is weak and does not clearly specify what agencies should report and when. This makes agencies less likely to report incidents. The lack of a standard format for incident reporting and a consistent method for assessing an incident, including the level of risk associated with it, also make it difficult for DFSI to determine an appropriate response.
There are limited avenues for sharing information amongst agencies after incidents have been resolved, meaning the public sector may be losing valuable opportunities to improve its protection and response.
Recommendations
The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should:
- develop whole‑of‑government procedure, protocol and supporting systems to effectively share reported threats and respond to cyber security incidents impacting multiple agencies, including follow-up and communicating lessons learnt
- develop a means by which agencies can report incidents in a more effective manner, such as a secure online template, that allows for early warnings and standardised details of incidents and remedial advice
- enhance NSW public sector threat intelligence gathering and sharing including formal links with Australian Government security agencies, other states and the private sector
- direct agencies to include standard clauses in contracts requiring IT service providers report all cyber security incidents within a reasonable timeframe
- provide assurance that agencies have appropriate reporting procedures and report to DFSI as required by the policy and protocol by:
- extending the attestation requirement within the DISP to cover procedures and reporting
- reviewing a sample of agencies' incident reporting procedures each year.
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - ISMS maturity model
Appendix three - About the audit
Appendix four - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #297 - released 2 March 2018
Volume Nine 2012 focusing on Education and Communities
In New South Wales in 2011, around 20 per cent of public school teachers were under 35 and less than 10 per cent were under 30. Nothing has changed during 2012. We need to do more to attract and retain young teachers to a profession that is essential for our children and our future prosperity.
