About this report 

The Northern Beaches Hospital is a private hospital that also provides public hospital services. The hospital was built in 2018 and is operated by a private operator, Healthscope, in a public-private partnership with the NSW Government.

Healthscope is contracted to operate the public portion of the hospital until 2038. 

This audit assessed how effectively and efficiently the Northern Beaches Hospital public-private partnership delivers public hospital services.

Conclusion 

The Northern Beaches Hospital public-private partnership is not effectively delivering the best quality integrated health services and clinical outcomes to the Northern Beaches community and the State – the standard required under the arrangement and the key objective of the project deed. 

The partnership is at risk of failure, with Healthscope requesting in November 2023, and again in December 2023, that the return of the public portion of the Northern Beaches Hospital be brought forward by 14 years. In its requests, Healthscope noted the risk to the viability of the Northern Beaches Hospital, citing insufficient funding, a lack of integration into the wider health network, and strained stakeholder relationships. 

NSW Health effectively manages the contract with Healthscope day-to-day on behalf of the State, ensuring that public hospital activity at the Northern Beaches Hospital is provided at a lower cost than if the State operated the hospital. However, the public-private partnership structure creates tension between commercial imperatives and clinical outcomes. 

The Northern Beaches Hospital has recorded concerning results for some hospital-acquired complications and has not taken sufficient actions to address some identified clinical safety risks. 

The project deed, which governs the partnership, does not support the hospital’s integration into the local health district and broader health network. This has an impact on patient journeys and access to services for patients in the Northern Beaches. Additionally, Healthscope has no obligation or commitment to implement NSW Health initiatives – such as the Safe Staffing Levels initiative. 

The Northern Beaches Hospital has achieved accreditation to ensure it meets national quality standards for hospital care but some quality and safety concerns remain. 

Recommendations 

The report made three recommendations:  

1. The NSW Government and NSW Health note the findings of the report and consider whether the Northern Beaches Hospital public-private partnership is the appropriate model to deliver the best quality integrated health care in the Northern Beaches region
    
2. Healthscope should resolve:
   1. safety and quality issues
   2. system issues
   3. reporting issues
       
3. NSW Health should consider issues raised for this public-private partnership for any future arrangement.

This chapter reports on the performance of the Northern Beaches Hospital. The first section reviews the performance of the Northern Beaches Hospital in terms of safety and quality. The second and third sections review the operational performance of the emergency department and elective surgery (including general surgery). One of the features of the Northern Beaches Hospital public-private partnership is the requirements of demand and volume management placed on Healthscope, the operator of the hospital. How that interacts with the performance of the emergency department and admitted patient areas is examined here. The fourth section reports on patient experience and complaints.

A key objective of the project deed is for the Northern Beaches Hospital to provide the best quality care for people in the Northern Beaches catchment and the people of NSW. The best quality care is operationalised in the project deed by requiring the Northern Beaches Hospital to perform in the top quartile of comparator hospitals for many measures. Only one of these measures relates to the scope of this audit – patients who left the emergency department after triage without being seen. Comparator hospitals are drawn from national hospitals for these measures.

When comparing results with NSW hospitals, the Northern Beaches Hospital is within the B1 hospital grouping, which includes Blacktown, Sutherland, Hornsby Ku-ring-gai and Campbelltown in metropolitan Sydney, and Orange, Tamworth, Wagga Wagga, Tweed Valley, Coffs Harbour, Port Macquarie and Lismore hospitals in regional NSW.

This chapter focuses on the role of the Northern Sydney Local Health District and Ministry of Health in managing the Northern Beaches Hospital public-private partnership for the State. The first section reviews identification and management of risks arising from this arrangement, including clinical risks and how NSW Health intervenes to address issues. (Chapter 3 also considered this question in relation to results for hospital-acquired complications and for sepsis and deteriorating patients). The second section looks at integration, which is one of the key objectives of the public-private partnership. Integration is the way the hospital fits into the surrounding NSW Health network. The third section then considers the efficiency of this arrangement for NSW Health.

Appendix 1 – Response from entities

Appendix 2 – Northern Beaches Hospital services and role delineation

Appendix 3 – Hospital-acquired complication data

Appendix 4 – 2023–24 abatable key performance indicators

Appendix 5 – About the audit

Appendix 6 – Performance auditing

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #404 released 17 April 2025.

About this report

Bus services in metropolitan Sydney are provided by private operators under contract to the NSW government. Transport for NSW (TfNSW) determines bus timetables, routes, stops, and frequency, while the operators deliver the specified bus services.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of TfNSW’s design and management of metropolitan Sydney bus service contracts. The audit focused on the nine regions where services are provided under the Greater Sydney Bus Contract (GSBC).

Conclusion

TfNSW is not effectively managing bus contracts to ensure that operators are meeting contracted obligations and customer needs. It has not responded strategically to major changes in commuter, work and travel patterns on metropolitan bus services.

TfNSW identified significant gaps in its strategic contract management capacity since 2022 but has not sufficiently addressed these. As a result, it has not undertaken essential medium to long term strategic activities required to effectively manage the GSBCs. It has not conducted a holistic, systematic review of service levels across all regions to fully address the impacts of the post-COVID-19 period, and other changes such as new infrastructure and travel options like the Sydney Metro M1 line.

First stop on time running has stabilised since January 2023. However, operators are not consistently meeting their performance obligations for on time running, cancelled trips and customer complaints.

There are gaps in TfNSW’s contract management specific procedures and delegations. These gaps mean that the risks of inappropriate exercise of delegations, non compliance with contractual requirements and/or inappropriate use of public funds are not fully addressed.

Recommendations

The audit recommends that TfNSW improve the capacity of its bus contracts management team. It should also close the gaps in its contract management specific procedures and delegations, and start regularly auditing operator responses to customer complaints.

TfNSW should implement strategic planning, including enhanced data analytics, aimed at improving bus operator performance.

On time running (OTR), customer complaints, tracking rates, and cancelled and incomplete trips are important key performance indicators (KPIs) as they represent significant facets of the customer experience.⁷ This chapter considers OTR KPIs in detail, since the start of the Greater Sydney Bus Contract (GSBCs).

OTR is defined in Schedule 4 of the GSBC with three KPIs – first, mid and last stop OTR. All three are measured as the percentage of timetabled bus trips that are on time at the specified location. GSBC operators are required to report to Transport for NSW (TfNSW) on these three KPIs every month.

For the first and mid stops ‘on time’ is defined as between 59 seconds early and five minutes and 59 seconds late compared to the timetable.

TfNSW has advised that mid transit stop OTR has been incorrectly calculated for multiple GSBC regions and that it was in the process of re-calculating this KPI for the operators that were affected. As a result, we do not report mid transit stop OTR numbers here or draw any conclusions about them.

OTR for the last transit stop on a route is measured as a percentage of bus trips arriving on time, where ‘on time’ is defined as no later than five minutes and 59 seconds after the timetable arrival time.

First stop OTR has decreased over the duration of the GSBCs, but it has stabilised in the period from January 2023 to May 2024

Figure 8 shows the aggregated first stop OTR performance data across metropolitan Sydney as a whole (excluding region 6) for the duration of the GSBCs. It also reflects advice received from TfNSW that there is a change in bus operator performance in January 2023 and splits the time period accordingly (April 2022 to December 2023 and January 2023 to May 2024).

During the audit, TfNSW emphasised the impact of the bus driver shortage on bus service performance against KPIs, as well as seasonal effects in OTR performance. Therefore, Figure 8 also shows the reported driver shortages for each month from June 2022, as well as the January and February seasonal effects.

Figure 8 shows that, while there is an overall downward trend in performance, first stop OTR becomes stable after January 2023. Prior to that point in time, performance was declining.⁸

This chapter considers operator performance against key performance indicators (KPIs) for bus tracking rates and cancelled and incomplete trips. From the perspective of bus passengers, tracking is important to ensure timetables and real-time data are accurate and reflects the reality of the services they are receiving. Tracking is also essential for the measurement of on time running (OTR) and cancelled and incomplete trips.

This chapter considers operator performance based on customer complaints received. Customer complaints are defined in Schedule 4 of the Greater Sydney Bus Contract (GSBC) as any report of a negative experience in relation to a bus service in the categories of ‘complaint’ and ‘feedback’. This excludes vexatious complaints, and any complaints about issues that are within Transport for NSW’s (TfNSW) control and not the operators.

Customer complaints have increased since the start of the GSBC

The number of customer complaints about bus services over the entire GSBC area has increased over time. The number of complaints per 100,000 boardings in May 2024 is approximately double that in April 2022 (28.9 complaints per 100,000 boarding compared to 14.4), reflecting increasing customer dissatisfaction with the services delivered.

Complaints are measured using several key performance indicators (KPIs) that represent factors such as the number of complaints per 100,000 boardings and the time it takes operators to respond to complaints. Figure 12 represents the number of customer complaints per 100,000 boardings across the GSBC operators over the GSBC period.

Appendix 1 – Response from Transport for NSW

Appendix 2 – The evolution of bus contracting in NSW from 2003

Appendix 3 – About the audit

Appendix 4 – Performance auditing

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #402 - released 29 January 2025.

About this report

Results and key themes from our audits of the state agencies’ financial statements for the year ended 30 June 2024.

It also includes observations on the following areas of focus:

• risk management
• capital projects
• shared service arrangements.

Findings

The Treasurer did not table the audited Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA) in Parliament as required by the Government Sector Finance Act 2018, and Responsible Ministers did not table 16 annual reports in Parliament by the required date.

Audit results

Unqualified opinions were issued for all but one agency.  The quality of financial statements submitted for audit improved, with reported misstatements down to a gross value of $3.9 billion in 2023–24, compared to $10.8 billion in 2022–23.

Key themes

Errors in accounting for assets led to financial statements adjustments of $1.4 billion. 

Our audits identified deficiencies in key controls across financial management, payroll, contract management and procurement.

Risk management

Risk management maturity is low across most agencies. Some of the largest 40 agencies self-assess their risk maturity as requiring improvement.

Capital projects

There is a lack of transparency in the NSW budget papers relating to significant capital projects. The estimated total costs for some major projects are not published as the amounts are considered commercially sensitive. The budget papers do not provide a complete and accurate reflection of the actual costs of large infrastructure projects.

Shared service arrangements

Three of the five agencies that provide shared services to 108 customer agencies did not obtain independent assurance over the effectiveness of their control environment. 

Recommendations

The report makes recommendations to agencies to improve controls and processes in relation to:

• financial reporting
• financial management
• risk management
• shared service arrangements
• capital projects.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence in, and transparency of, public sector decision making is enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations relating to the financial reporting of State Government agencies.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are also essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines observations and insights from our audits of financial statements of the 40 largest agencies in the State sector. These agencies are listed in Appendix 3.

This chapter outlines audit observations, conclusions and recommendations from our review of agencies’ risk maturity, assessment processes, governance, systems and culture across the 40 largest agencies in the state sector. These agencies are listed in Appendix 3.

This chapter outlines observations, conclusions and recommendations from our review of the 15 most significant capital projects in the State.

Shared service arrangements can centralise corporate services functions such as finance, human resources, procurement and information technology (IT). Across NSW Government agencies, many business processes and IT functions are provided on a shared services model, that is, one agency operates a business function or IT platform that is used by other agencies rather than each agency maintaining their own. These services are shared by several agencies (‘customers’), but generally are operated and managed by one agency or department (‘provider’).

This chapter outlines audit observations, conclusions and recommendations from our review of shared service arrangements provided and received by the 40 largest agencies in the state sector. These agencies are listed in Appendix 3.

This report outlines the findings on shared service arrangements.

Appendix 1 – Status of audits of consolidated entities

Appendix 2 – Status of audits of non-consolidated entities

Appendix 3 – Forty largest State agencies contents

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

About this report

Local councils in NSW manage a large proportion of roads across the state. Roads often represent a significant proportion of total council
expenditure.

How councils manage roads is impacted by their revenue, local conditions, and the needs of residents, businesses and other road users.

This audit was undertaken within the wider context of natural disasters and weather events that have significantly impacted the road network in NSW in recent years.

It assessed whether three councils had effectively managed their road assets to meet the needs of their communities, makes detailed findings and recommendations to each audited council, and identifies key lessons for the wider local government sector.

Key findings

All councils can improve how they link community consultation with planned service levels. Formalising these processes could help better demonstrate how current service levels meet community needs.

Clarence Valley Council

• has established a strategic priority for road asset management but not formal governance arrangements or a long-term capital works program
• is delivering and reporting on its work to respond to natural disasters but does not report against targets for road asset quality and service
• has set benchmarks for road asset maintenance, replacement and renewal but needs clear service levels.

Gwydir Shire Council

• did not have aligned, up-to-date asset plans during the audit period
• did not have a long-term capital works program but adopted a prioritisation program for capital works in August 2024
• did not effectively implement formal governance, or coordinate management oversight, to manage its road assets.

Wollondilly Shire Council

• has a strategic framework for road asset management and has used long-term plans to guide its asset capital and maintenance works
• has reported asset management outcomes against a planned capital works program but could improve how it uses KPIs to demonstrate performance.

This is the first performance audit of the local government sector that I am tabling in Parliament as Auditor-General for New South Wales.

Our performance audits are designed to provide valuable information to parliamentarians, sector stakeholders and the public. Ultimately, our aim is to ensure transparency, a principle that underpins effective and efficient use of public resources.

The management of roads and associated assets is a critical issue for local councils across the state. In recent years, many councils have had to contend with the immediate and ongoing effects of natural disasters.

These natural disasters, along with increased community expectations, population changes and complex regulatory obligations all contribute to financial sustainability risks for councils. Some councils have used short-term funding allocations (including emergency relief grants) to cover the costs of managing long-term assets. These councils do not have the capacity to generate sufficient income from their own sources, and therefore depend on assistance from other levels of government. Councils’ ability to plan and budget for the long term has also been disrupted by the need for new or restored infrastructure outside asset life cycles.

Several reports and inquiries in recent years have highlighted these significant financial sustainability risks. The parliamentary inquiry into the ‘Ability of local governments to fund infrastructure and services’,¹ due to be tabled soon, will be a critical input to a long-term solution.

The three councils audited in this report – Clarence Valley, Gwydir Shire and Wollondilly Shire –each experienced significant natural disasters, including fires, storms and floods during the audit period. Despite this, each audited council was able to deliver a large volume of road asset management works.

This report provides valuable lessons from these audited councils that can help all councils manage their roads more effectively in the face of evolving risks and competing resource demands.

I acknowledge this has been a difficult time for some councils across NSW. This report supports councils with practical steps to manage their roads as effectively as possible, improve their resilience to climate challenges and meet legislative requirements.

¹ The inquiry into the ‘Ability of local governments to fund infrastructure and services’ by the NSW Legislative Council Standing Committee on State Development commenced on 14 March 2024 to inquire into, and report on, the ability of local governments to fund infrastructure and services.

Background

Local councils in New South Wales (NSW) manage over 180,000 km of local and regional roads combined. These roads are crucial to travel within local government areas and across the state, improving community accessibility. Reliable roads ensure commercial and public transport can run on time, increase safety and keep the environment clean.

As roads age and deteriorate, they become more expensive to repair. Road surfaces and formations are vulnerable to both extreme heat and water exposure. These kinds of exposure have varying effects on the ways roads degrade, depending on the amount of traffic and the kinds of vehicles that use them.

Local conditions, business and road-user needs, and the impacts of natural disasters vary between councils and influence the way each council manages its roads. Regularly maintaining roads can keep roads functional and safe and prevent costly, unbudgeted repairs and replacements.

In the 2022–23 financial year (FY2022–23), the estimated total replacement cost of council road assets across NSW was around $102 billion. In the same year, local councils reported collective road asset maintenance expenditure of around $1 billion.

Since 2017, financial audits of local councils have identified asset management-related issues, including gaps in asset management processes, governance and systems. The Audit Office’s ‘Local Government 2023’ report outlined 266 asset management-related findings across the local government sector, including gaps in revaluation processes, maintenance of information in asset management systems and accounting practices.

Councils also provide a wide range of other services and infrastructure, including water and sewer infrastructure and services, waste management, environmental protection, housing, and community transport. Through integrated planning and reporting, councils determine how they will allocate resources to their services and infrastructure. Understanding community expectations for assets and services, alongside technical requirements, supports effective planning for function, cost and quality.

Audit objective

This audit assessed how effectively three councils – Clarence Valley Council, Gwydir Shire Council and Wollondilly Shire Council – are managing their road assets to meet the needs of their communities.

The audit assessed whether the selected councils:

• have a strategic framework in place for managing their road assets
• have effective governance, data and systems for road asset management
• are managing their road assets in line with planned service levels and quality outcomes.

Overview of findings

This audit assessed how effectively Clarence Valley Council, Gwydir Shire Council and Wollondilly Shire Council managed their road assets to meet the needs of their communities.

In assessing each Council’s performance, this audit concluded:

Clarence Valley Council has effectively established a strategic priority for road asset management, but delivery of this priority was not supported by formal governance arrangements or a long-term capital works program. While the Council is delivering and reporting on a large volume of road asset works in response to natural disasters, it does not report on consolidated targets for road asset quality and service. The Council has set benchmarks for maintenance, replacement and renewal of roads. It now needs to enhance this with clear service levels to ensure community needs and expectations are met.

Detailed conclusions and recommendations for the Council are outlined in sections 2.2 and 2.3. Recommendations include that Clarence Valley Council:

• updates and implements its asset management plan and associated improvement actions
• reviews and implements key performance indicators (KPIs)
• captures lessons learned from its natural disaster responses
• implements a long-term capital works program.

Gwydir Shire Council did not have aligned, up-to-date long-term asset management plans to support a strategic framework for road asset management across the audit period. The Council did not effectively implement formal governance and coordinated management oversight for its road assets. The Council implemented updates to its asset management plans in June 2024 and governance arrangements in July 2024.

The Council has reported on the large volume of works it is delivering, including in response to natural disasters, but is not reporting in the context of information about targets and quality benchmarks. The Council does not have a long-term capital works program, but adopted a prioritised rolling program of works in August 2024 to guide its priorities and efforts over time.

Detailed conclusions and recommendations for the Council are outlined in sections 3.2 and 3.3. Recommendations include that Gwydir Shire Council:

• implements its asset management plans and associated improvement actions
• formalises and documents community priorities and service level expectations for roads
• captures lessons learned from its natural disaster responses.

Wollondilly Shire Council has effectively applied a coordinated and strategic framework to deliver road asset management. The Council has long-term plans to guide its efforts and uses data to inform its approach. The Council has delivered a large volume of works in response to natural disasters during the audit period. The Council is reporting its road asset management outcomes and can demonstrate progress against a clearly defined capital works program, but its use of performance indicators could be improved.

Detailed conclusions and recommendations for the Council are outlined in sections 4.2 and 4.3. Recommendations include that Wollondilly Shire Council:

• finalises and implements its transport asset management plan
• reviews performance indicators for road assets
• formalises and documents community priorities within its integrated planning and reporting (IP&R) and asset management frameworks.

Key observations of good practice

While each council was separately audited, this report also identifies practices that contribute to effective road asset management across all local councils.

These include:

1. a good understanding and articulation of the community’s vision, priorities and purpose for local roads
2. asset management documents that are current and aligned with broader strategies and financial plans
3. long-term capital works planning that considers associated ongoing costs, and is supported by systematic prioritisation of works
4. clear and documented decision making processes
5. transparent performance reporting on progress and outcomes
6. reliable, accurate and assured data and systems
7. continuous improvement through both formal reviews and capturing lessons learned
8. resilience and responsiveness to natural disasters with a planned approach to disaster recovery.

Further lessons for local government can be found in Appendix 3.

Appendix 1 – Response from entity

Appendix 2 – Council expenditure profile

Appendix 3 – Lessons for local government road asset management

Appendix 4 – About the audit

Appendix 5 – Performance auditing

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #401 - released 21 November 2024.

About this report

Internal controls are key to the accuracy and reliability of agencies’ financial reporting processes. This report analyses the internal controls and governance of 26 of the NSW public sector’s largest agencies for the 2023–24 financial year.

Findings

There are gaps in key business processes, which expose agencies to risks. These gaps are identified in 121 findings across the 26 agencies—including 4 high risk, 73 moderate risk and 44 low risk findings. All four high-risk issues related to IT controls and 19% of control deficiencies were repeat issues. Thirty-five per cent of agencies had deficiencies in control over privileged access.

Shared IT services

Six agencies provide IT shared services to 120 other customer agencies. All six had control deficiencies—three of these were high risk. Four agencies provide no independent assurance to their customers about the effectiveness of their own IT controls.

Cyber security

Eighteen agencies assessed cyber risk as being above their risk appetite. Fourteen of these agencies had not set a timeframe to resolve these risks and two agencies have not funded plans to improve cyber security.

Fraud and corruption control

Agencies need to improve fraud and corruption control. Instances of non-compliance with TC18-02 NSW Fraud and Corruption Policy were identified, including gaps such as a lack of comprehensive employment screening policies and not reporting matters to the audit and risk committee.

Gifts and benefits

Management of gifts and benefits requires better governance and transparency. All agencies had policy and guidance but all had gaps in management and implementation—such as not publishing registers nor providing ongoing training.

Information Technology

Nine agencies did not effectively restrict or monitor user access to privileged accounts.

Recommendations

The report makes recommendations to agencies to implement proper controls and improve processes in relation to:

• organisational processes
• information technology
• cyber security
• fraud and corruption, and
• gifts and benefits.

Read the PDF report

Internal controls are processes, policies and procedures that help agencies to:

• operate effectively and efficiently
• produce reliable financial reports
• comply with laws and regulations
• support ethical government.

This chapter outlines the overall trends for agency controls and governance issues, including the number of audit findings, the degree of risk those deficiencies pose to the agency, and a summary of the most common deficiencies found across agencies.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations arising from our review of agency controls to manage key financial systems.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations arising from our review of agencies' cyber security.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations from our review of agencies' fraud and corruption control framework, policies and practices. Our Internal Controls and Governance 2018 found a number of fraud and corruption control gaps in NSW Government.

The NSW Treasury Circular TC18-02 NSW Fraud and Corruption Control Policy (the Circular) requires NSW government agencies to develop, implement and maintain a fraud and corruption control framework. The Circular sets out minimum standards for a NSW Government agency’s fraud and corruption control framework.

Previous Audit Office report on agency fraud and corruption control

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations arising from our review of agencies' managing of gifts and benefits.

Click here for the Easy English version of the report snapshot

The Easy English version is intended to meet the needs of some people with lower literacy skills, some people with an intellectual disability, and some people from different cultural backgrounds.

The Easy English document is not the final audit report that has been prepared and tabled in NSW Parliament under s.38EB and s.38EC of the Government Sector Audit Act 1983. It should not be relied on or quoted from as the final audit report.

About this report

Australian and state legislation protects the right of students with disability to a quality education, free from discrimination. These require that students with disability be supported to access and participate in education on the same basis as their peers without disability.

This audit assessed whether the NSW Department of Education is effectively supporting students with disability in NSW public schools.

Findings

The Department has effectively designed approaches and developed reforms under its 2019 Disability Strategy and related measures.

But it still hasn’t resolved longstanding issues with funding, access to targeted supports, monitoring school practice and tracking outcomes for students with disability.

This is despite the Department being made aware of these performance gaps for almost two decades across multiple audits, parliamentary inquiries and the recent national Disability Royal Commission.

Recommendations

The report makes five recommendations to address these gaps, including that the Department should:

• annually monitor the experiences and outcomes of students with disability to be able to identify and address emerging issues, and promote good practice
• reform funding to be better aligned to student needs
• enhance guidance and support to schools and families on making reasonable adjustments for students with disability.

Background

Australian legislation protects the right of students with disability to a quality education, free from discrimination, and describes the obligations of education providers to these students.

Under the federal Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and related legislated Disability Standards for Education 2005 (the Disability Standards), education providers have legal responsibilities to make education and training accessible to students with disability, including in enrolment, participation, curriculum and support services. This is to be done through providing ‘reasonable adjustments’ or measures and actions that assist students with disability to access education on the same basis as students without disability.

The NSW Department of Education (the Department) is responsible for supporting students with disability in NSW public schools. The Department and schools provide a range of adjustments and targeted supports, in consultation with the student and/or their parents/guardians. In 2023, approximately 206,000 children or young people in NSW public schools (around one-quarter of all public school students) had disability and received adjustments in NSW.

The state Education Act 1990, Disability Inclusion Act 2014 and Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 also protect the right of students with disability in NSW to a quality, accessible education free from discrimination. For public schools in NSW, legislative obligations are articulated in key policy and practice documents including the Inclusive Education Statement and Policy, NSW Wellbeing Framework for Schools, and Achieving School Excellence in Wellbeing and Inclusion tool and associated resources.

A number of key reviews conducted over the last two decades have considered the experiences of students with disability and the effectiveness of school and departmental practices in meeting their needs. In 2017, a NSW Parliamentary inquiry found that while there were many instances of excellence, the inclusive approach to education provision promoted in legislation and policy was not the reality experienced by many students with disability in NSW schools at that time. In response, the Department released its Disability Strategy in 2019 with a commitment to building a more inclusive education system in which all children thrive academically, physically, emotionally, and mentally. The strategy focused on four key reform areas:

• investing in teachers and other support staff
• developing new resource models and support to meet individual student needs
• streamlining processes and improving communication and access to information
• building an evidence base to measure progress.

Audit Objective

This audit assessed whether the Department of Education is effectively supporting students with disability in NSW public schools. It reviews relevant evidence relating to the six calendar years 2018–2023, guided by the following questions:

1. Has the Department designed and delivered approaches that effectively support students with disability?
2. Is the Department addressing the needs of students with disability?

Conclusion

The Department of Education has effectively designed approaches and developed reforms aimed at improving the support provided to students with disability. However, key initiatives that target longstanding and well-known issues have not been implemented in a timely way, limiting the effectiveness of the Department’s support for students with disability in NSW public schools.

The Department, in its 2019 Disability Strategy, committed to building a more inclusive education system, ‘one where all students feel welcomed and are learning to their fullest capacity’. Under the strategy the Department commenced new initiatives and strengthened existing ones to modify school funding, improve teacher skills and resources, enhance accessible school infrastructure, and increase engagement with students and families.

However, key initiatives have been in place for less than eighteen months, and some remain outstanding. The Department’s efforts have not resolved longstanding issues including unmet demand for targeted supports, gaps in professional learning and practice guidance for school staff, and inconsistent central monitoring of school practice and outcomes data. This is despite the Department being made aware of these issues for almost two decades across multiple audits, parliamentary inquiries and the recent national Disability Royal Commission.

Since 2018 the proportion of NSW public school students with disability has grown from one-fifth to one-quarter. While the Department is making efforts across a range of disability reform areas, many students, families and schools continue to feel they have not been adequately supported.

The Department does not know how effectively it is meeting the needs of students with disability because it has not consistently monitored outcomes for students with disability or schools’ inclusive education practices. Our own analysis of the Department’s data shows that there has been improvement in some student learning outcomes, but deterioration in some measures of student wellbeing.

Key findings

The Department effectively designed its Disability Strategy based on evidence and broad stakeholder input, and provides a range of supports to schools for students with disability

The Department defines an inclusive education system as one where all students feel welcomed and are learning to their fullest capacity. Under the 2019 Disability Strategy it committed to building this, and put in place a variety of measures to support schools in meeting the needs of students with disability.

In designing the strategy, the Department responded to the recommendations from the 2017 Parliamentary inquiry, and undertook a literature review analysis of evidence-based practices and personalised learning approaches. The Department also consulted widely, including with schools, experts and people with disability.

The Department introduced 15 new initiatives, and strengthened a similar number of existing ones, to better support students with disability in NSW public schools. These included initiatives aimed at:

• reforming the basis for relevant funding to better reflect student need
• increasing the provision of inclusive education courses in tertiary education and professional learning, and teaching resources for educators and school staff
• increasing access to allied health and school counsellor/psychologist services
• creating more inclusive learning spaces in school infrastructure
• improving communication to, and exploring ways to obtain better feedback from, students and parents/guardians.

The Department has established governance arrangements focused on inclusive education, and provides professional development and teaching resources for schools. Some specialist central staff roles are funded in regional teams and in schools across the state to advise schools in making reasonable adjustments for individual students with disability. The Department provides disability-specific funding on top of base school allocations, and funds infrastructure integration works in response to individual student needs for accessible school grounds. A full list of initiatives and supports for students with disability in NSW public schools is at Appendix two.

The Department’s efforts to reform support for students with disability have not been timely

Performance gaps in Department and school supports for students with disability have been repeatedly identified through public reviews over the last two decades. This includes unmet demand for targeted supports, gaps in professional learning and practice guidance for school staff, and inconsistent central monitoring of school practice and outcomes data. The 2017 Parliamentary inquiry, which the 2019 Disability Strategy responded to, found many of the same issues that were identified in our 2006 audit Educating Primary School Students with Disabilities conducted eleven years earlier. These concerns were also highlighted in a 2010 NSW Parliamentary inquiry and in five-yearly reviews of the federal Disability Standards. The Disability Strategy initiatives came thirteen years after many of the same risks were identified in our 2006 audit. Had these been implemented sooner, an entire cohort of students with disability who completed primary and secondary education in that time may have had a different schooling experience.

While the Department has delivered almost all the Disability Strategy initiatives since it commenced in 2019, the few that are outstanding are fundamental to determining the success of the Disability Strategy:

• reforming all streams of disability funding to be based on student needs, so that schools have more resources, and those resources will be more flexible
• consistently tracking outcomes for students with disability, families and teachers to understand what is changing in their lived experiences of education.

The Department did not examine whether actions in the Strategy were addressing the intent of previous recommendations

The reform areas and initiatives in the Disability Strategy reflected evidence from previous reviews, as well as contemporary research literature and broad stakeholder consultation. Stakeholders we heard from - including academics, advocates and peak bodies - broadly agreed that the strategy addressed the right areas for action.

The strategy reform initiatives targeted areas that had been repeatedly identified as issues in previous public inquiries held over the past twenty years including: insufficient funding, workforce constraints, gaps in professional learning, inadequate outcomes tracking, and limited engagement with students and families.

While the Department advised that it has implemented the accepted recommendations from previous reviews into disability support and inclusive education, the Department’s approach to tracking recommendations does not include assessing whether the action taken has met the intent of the relevant recommendation. Without this, there is a risk that previously identified gaps and performance issues are not addressed and persist or recur in the future.

While the Department’s governance arrangements were suitable for the design and implementation of the Disability Strategy, the Department did not consider why areas that had been repeatedly identified were still not resolved. This audit found that students, families and schools continue to feel the impact of issues that the recommendations from past reviews aimed to improve, raising questions about the accountability for, and effectiveness of, the Department’s responses.

The Department does not know how effectively it is meeting the needs of students with disability

Schools are legally required to provide individualised supports to students with disability where these are needed for students with disability to be able to access and participate in education on the same basis as their peers without disability. The Department captures schools’ data on the reasonable adjustments they are making for students with disability through the annual Nationally Consistent Collection of Data on students with disability (NCCD).

Where students with disability receive targeted supports such as placement in a support class or specific school funding to learn effectively in a mainstream class, schools are also required to annually review student needs in consultation with the student, their families and teachers, and respond to any changes.

The Department provides schools with guidance and specialist staff to support making reasonable adjustments for students with disability to access and participate in education on the same basis as their peers. However, the Department does not independently verify school evidence on adjustments made and does not have visibility of where reasonable adjustments provided are not meeting students’ needs (for example, where targeted supports are not available) unless a complaint is made or escalated to the Department.

Stakeholders we heard from – both from schools and families – said that there can still be conflicting views about what reasonable adjustments are required in particular situations, and that information provided is vague. The Department has accepted the recommendations of previous reviews and the Disability Royal Commission to improve its guidance and resources for schools and families about reasonable adjustments.

The Department also has a legislative and policy obligation to understand and address the particular needs and potential barriers to accessing supports that may be experienced by students with disability who also have other identities or characteristics such as being Aboriginal, living in rural or remote areas, socioeconomic disadvantage, or speaking English as an additional language or dialect (also known as intersectionality).

While the Department has taken some steps to consider intersectionality for students with disability in its policies and resources, it has not reduced the impacts where these create compounding factors of disadvantage. The Department was unable to demonstrate that it was meeting the needs of these students.

The Department’s criteria for accessing targeted supports for disability has not been updated in over 20 years

If a student with disability has moderate to high needs and requires specialist support that cannot be met with existing school funding and staffing resources, their school may apply to the Department for targeted supports through the ‘access request’ process. Applications are decided by a panel of regional departmental staff including learning and wellbeing staff; primary, high school and Schools for Specific Purposes principal representatives; and a senior education psychologist.

Access to almost all targeted supports is limited to eligible students with disability who have a confirmed medical diagnosis that falls within the Department’s 2003 disability criteria. These criteria exclude those students with undiagnosed disability or with diagnosed disabilities that fall outside the Department’s criteria, such as attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and dyslexia.

Despite limitations with the current criteria being highlighted in multiple parliamentary inquiries over the past 13 years, the Department has not updated these criteria since 2003. It advises that updated criteria will be released from term four, 2024.

The Department does not have a clear and accurate picture of demand compared to supply, or the time taken for targeted supports to be provided to students

The Department tracks if applications for targeted supports have been supported, deferred, declined or withdrawn through the access request panel process. However, the rationale for why an application has been deferred or declined is not consistently recorded in the system.

The Department does not maintain waiting lists for students deemed eligible for targeted supports where the support is not available. In particular, for support classes, while the Department has centralised statewide oversight of class numbers and locations to inform decisions about establishing new classes each year, it does not have a clear picture of demand at local geographic levels at any point in time.

Although recommended in our 2006 audit, the Department still does not monitor the time taken for targeted supports to be provided to eligible students after an application has been approved for provision, so cannot tell how long students with identified needs are waiting for supports to reach them.

The Department has not consistently monitored outcomes for students with disability

The Department started to develop a framework to measure the outcomes of students with disability, at a system level, in 2019. These include wellbeing, independence and learning growth outcomes, informed by measures including students’ perceptions, supports provided, educators’ understanding and skills, and satisfaction of parents/guardians. The framework is comprehensive and evidence-based, and includes existing datasets to minimise the administrative burden on schools. The Department tested proposed measures to validate their reliability.

While there are many complexities in comparing progress and experiences across all students with disability due to the diversity across this cohort, and a range of data limitations that needed to be addressed, the implementation of this framework was not timely. Although the domains, outcomes and metrics for the disability outcomes framework were endorsed by the Department executive in 2022, the framework was still not fully operational in September 2024. Since executive endorsement, the Department has updated the framework to reflect the final accepted recommendations of the Disability Royal Commission and to ensure alignment with the NSW Government’s 2023-2027 Plan for Public Education. It advises that it has started to implement the framework in a staged approach.

The Department has the ability to link data which identifies students with disability with a variety of its other datasets, such as student attendance, suspensions and expulsions, participation and results in the National Assessment Program – Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN) and the Higher School Certificate (HSC). The Department uses these linked datasets to inform the development of statewide policy and guidance on practice in schools periodically. However, it is not using the datasets to regularly monitor school practice, identify and address emerging issues, or identify and promote ‘what works’ to support students with disability.

The Department’s School Excellence Framework involves schools self-assessing and peer-reviewing their performance in learning, teaching and leading at least once every five years, but this has not had a specific focus on inclusive education to date. A policy monitoring process involves schools reporting on their compliance with specific policies annually, but this did not include the Disability Standards until 2024. Schools provide some information in their public annual reports about their disability funding expenditure, but this reporting is not outcomes-focused.

The Department runs annual surveys of students, parents/guardians and teachers called ‘Tell Them From Me’. This survey gives students with disability and their families a direct voice to schools and the Department, although the survey is voluntary and not accessible for some students with complex learning and communication needs (the Department is developing a suite of accessible tools to be able to seek feedback from these students in the future). However, the Department does not regularly analyse the Tell Them From Me survey response data to understand whether the experiences of students with disability or their families are changing since the Disability Strategy and related efforts.

Complaints are another way by which the Department can obtain insight into school practice and student outcomes. However, the Department does not have oversight of the number, type or trends in complaints that arise and are resolved at the school level, including those concerning students with disability.

The Department was aware from the 2017 Parliamentary inquiry and the Disability Royal Commission that students with disability and their families can be reluctant to make complaints to their principal about their school, perceiving a conflict of interest and risk of negative consequences. However, the Department was not seeking feedback from complainants about the resolution of their complaint when these were made at the school level, or from students with disability and their families more broadly (in the absence of complaints). The Department advises that it is taking steps in 2024 to seek and address feedback from parents/guardians on their experience in raising concerns at the school level.

The Department has not tracked the impact of the Disability Strategy on the experiences of students, families and schools

Although the Disability Strategy outlined a vision for inclusive education and success measures that sought changed experiences of students, families and teachers, the Department did not establish a time horizon by which the strategy vision and success measures were expected to be realised, nor baseline information against which change could be assessed.

While it evaluated some individual initiatives under the strategy, it did not have an evaluation framework in place for the strategy as a whole and has not assessed how the experiences of students, families and schools have or haven’t changed as a result of the implementation of the Disability Strategy overall.

The Department has taken steps to reform the distribution of disability funding, but this was not timely, and evidence on whether resourcing is adequate to meet the needs of students with disability remains unclear

The Department has publicly acknowledged that ‘effectively resourcing schools is crucial to building an inclusive education system and improving outcomes for, and experiences of, students with disability.’

Stakeholders to this audit – including parents/guardians, school staff and advocacy organisations – consistently said that existing funding to support students with disability is not sufficient to meet their learning needs. Most of the previous public reviews also identified inadequate funding as a key challenge to providing inclusive education.

The Department allocated annual disability-specific funding to NSW public schools totalling approximately $1.1 billion in 2018 rising to $1.9 billion in 2023. This represents an annual average cost above the base allocations of $7,300 per student with disability in 2018 and $9,300 in 2023.

The Department commenced a program of work in 2020 to review and reform the disability-specific funding provided to schools. This sought to change the distribution of funding so that resourcing is linked to a student’s functional needs at school and reflects a school’s efforts to support a student with disability relative to these needs, rather than relying on students’ medical diagnoses or academic performance.

During the audit review period the Department:

• forecasted future funding needs
• revised the funding model for the disability equity loading allocated to mainstream schools to use towards all their students with disability who need supports, regardless of diagnoses – the Department estimated this would more than double the number of students who could be supported by this funding
• provided supplementary funding to Schools for Specific Purposes for 2020–2024, and
• sought government approval and resourcing to change the thresholds for targeted funding support for individual students with disability who have moderate to high learning needs in mainstream classrooms (not yet implemented).

While the Department made important advances in funding reforms, these efforts were not timely, coming around a decade after being recommended by the 2010 Parliamentary inquiry.

Nationally, evidence on the costs to schools to make adjustments to support students with disability is not clear. A 2019 federal review into the Australian Government disability loading for states and territories concluded that there was significant variation in these cost estimates and recommended that joint work be undertaken by the Australian, state and territory governments to produce more nuanced estimates.

In late 2023, the Disability Royal Commission made several recommendations to review disability funding and transparency in the education sector, which the Australian Government and state and territory governments jointly accepted in principle in July 2024.

The Department’s data shows mixed results for students with disability

Our analysis of the Department’s data showed that there had been some improvements for students with disability in the time of the Disability Strategy. This includes an overall reduction in the number of suspensions and expulsions for students with disability, and an increase in the number of students with disability receiving HSC results.

However, there was limited individual student growth in NAPLAN exams over this time, and deterioration in some measures of student wellbeing relating to self-reports of a sense of belonging and experiences of bullying at school. Aboriginal students with disability were worse off than their non-Aboriginal peers with disability in relation to suspension, expulsion, individual student growth and reported experiences of bullying.

Recommendations

By January 2026, the Department of Education should:

1. At least annually, monitor the experiences and outcomes of students with disability to:
   1. identify and address emerging issues
   2. identify and promote good practice
   3. take effective steps where there is a need to improve longer-term student outcomes, and
   4. consider the impacts of intersectionality.
2. Continue to expand the use of NCCD data to support funding allocation in accordance with the needs of students with disability.
3. Work with the Australian Government on reviews of the disability loading settings to ensure NSW public schools are adequately funded to support students with disability.
4. Work with stakeholders to enhance guidance and practical support to public schools and families on reasonable adjustments for students with disability, including ways to resolve conflicting views in a timely manner.
5. Improve the planning and delivery of targeted supports by:
   1. obtaining a clear and timely picture of the supply of, and demand for, targeted supports at a local and statewide level to identify and address constraints
   2. monitoring the time taken for targeted supports to be provided to eligible students, and addressing delays so that adequate support is put in place once need is identified
   3. reducing the administrative burden for schools in applying for targeted supports, and
   4. making the basis for decisions transparent to schools and families.

Under the Disability Strategy, the Department released the Inclusive Education Statement to provide direction and guidance on supporting the inclusion of students with disability in NSW public schools (section 3.2 above). The statement expressed a commitment of the Department to ‘building a more inclusive education system… where every student is known, valued and cared for and all students are learning to their fullest capability.’ 

However, as the Department does not consistently monitor outcomes for students with disability or schools’ inclusive education practices (section 3.6 above), it does not have oversight of whether the Inclusive Education Statement is being given effect and achieving desired outcomes for students with disability, parents/guardians and schools. 

Our 2006 audit Educating primary school students with disabilities found that it was not possible to determine whether the performance of ‘special education’ services had improved over time as there had been no mechanism in place to measure results. It recommended that the Department develop a suite of performance indicators to monitor and manage supports for students with disability at a school, region and state level. This is still not being done systematically, and the Department cannot tell whether things are improving for students with disability in NSW. 

Our analysis of the Department’s data shows that over the audit review period 2018-2023 there has been improvement in some measures of school practice such as the use of suspensions and expulsions, and improvement in some student learning outcomes, but deterioration in some measures of student wellbeing. 

Self-reported survey data shows improvements in the experiences of students with disability in primary school but these have worsened for students in secondary school 

Statewide data from the annual Tell Them From Me student survey shows that secondary students with disability are less likely to agree with statements related to receiving support from teachers in 2023 compared to 2018 (47% agreeing in 2018 declining to 44% in 2023). Results for students with disability in primary school to similar survey questions have remained steady with around 70% agreeing that their teacher supports them in both 2018 and 2023. 

A higher proportion of primary school students overall reported that they had never been bullied in 2023 compared to 2018. For students with disability in primary schools, the proportion reporting that they had never been bullied lifted from 66% in 2018 to 69% in 2023, however there was variability across individual years. For primary school students without disability, 75% reported that they had never been bullied in 2018, compared to 76% in 2023. 

The proportion of students with disability in secondary school reporting that they had never been bullied increased from 65% in 2018 to 69% in 2020, but then dropped to 66% in 2023. By comparison, the rate of students without disability reporting that they had never been bulled improved between 2018 and 2020 (from 75% to 78%) but then worsened in 2023 (74%). 

Students with disability in both primary and secondary schools were less likely to agree with questions about having a sense of belonging at school in 2023 compared to 2018. For secondary school students with disability, 49% agreed with questions relevant to belonging in 2018, which dropped to 43% in 2023. In primary schools, where survey results indicate there was a greater sense of belonging amongst all students than in secondary schools, there was also a drop for students with disability from 62% in 2018 to 57% in 2023.

There has been an overall increase in parents/guardians completing the Tell Them From Me parent/guardian survey since 2018. Survey results show that parents/guardians of children with disability are less likely to have their child enrolled at their first choice of public school than parents/guardians of children without disability. The proportion of parents/guardians of children with disability reporting that their child was enrolled at their first choice has slightly worsened between 2019 (when the question was first included in the survey) and 2023, from 87% in 2019 to 85% in 2023. The proportion of parents/guardians of students without disability who said their child was enrolled at their first choice of public school remained steady between 2019 to 2023 at close to 90%. 

There was limited individual student growth in NAPLAN results for the majority of students with disability 

Individual student growth is a measure of the progress of individual students in their NAPLAN results across their educational journey from Year 3 to Year 9. NAPLAN is an annual national assessment for all students in Years 3, 5, 7 and 9. It tests skills in reading, numeracy, writing, spelling and grammar. 

For most of the audit review period, all students participating in NAPLAN were assessed against national minimum standards in each exam as being below, at, or above standards. NAPLAN assessments and reporting changed in 2023, with four proficiency standards replacing the previous 10-band structure and the national minimum standards. For this reason, NAPLAN results from 2023 cannot be compared with those from earlier years. 

Our analysis of the Department’s data found that, for students with disability who participated in a NAPLAN exam more than once between 2018 and 2022: 

• 60% had no change in whether they placed below, at or above the national minimum standards (compared to 83% of students without disability). 
• 11% had an improvement, either moving from below the national minimum standards to be at the standards, or moving from being at to above the standards (compared to 4% of students without disability). 
• 22% had a decline, either moving from being above the national minimum standards to be at the standards, or from being at the standards to being below them (compared to 9% of students without disability). 

Exhibit 23 provides a breakdown of our analysis of student growth for each test type for students with disability between 2018 and 2022.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Relevant initiatives and supports 

Appendix three – NCCD definitions 

Appendix four – The Department’s principles of inclusive education 

Appendix five – Student behaviour management and restrictive practices 

Appendix six – Relevant funding for NSW public schools 

Appendix seven – The Department’s Disability Criteria (2003) 

Appendix eight – About the audit 

Appendix nine – Performance auditing

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 Parliamentary reference - Report number #400- released 26 September 2024.

If you have questions or feedback about individual matters, you can:

• contact the NSW Department of Education through the website
• make a complaint to the NSW Ombudsman online or by calling 1800 451 524.

About this report

NSW Ambulance delivers emergency and non emergency medical services and transport to patients in New South Wales, and connects patients who do not need an emergency medical response with the most appropriate health provider.

NSW Ambulance operates as part of a network of public health services. 

This audit assessed the efficiency and effectiveness of ambulance services in regional New South Wales.

Findings

NSW Health is maintaining effective ambulance services in regional New South Wales, despite increasing demand. 

NSW Ambulance and the Ministry of Health use effective governance arrangements to monitor regional ambulance performance. NSW Ambulance and Local Health Districts (LHDs) communicate effectively to manage day-to-day operational challenges. However, the audit identified opportunities to improve the Ministry’s oversight of regional performance, and to enhance information sharing between NSW Ambulance and LHDs.

NSW Health is working to identify opportunities to reduce demand on the NSW Ambulance fleet and hospital emergency departments in regional New South Wales.

NSW Ambulance undertakes holistic service planning to efficiently deliver ambulance services in regional New South Wales.

Recommendations

The audit recommends that:

• The Ministry of Health, eHealth and NSW Ambulance implement a new NSW Ambulance Electronic Medical Record system
• The Ministry of Health and NSW Ambulance improve system oversight, monitoring and reporting of ambulance performance at the regional and metropolitan level
• The Ministry of Health finalise its Transport for Health strategy and undertake a review of all non-emergency patient transport operators across the state
• NSW Ambulance and LHDs improve strategic engagement with other NSW Health entities.

NSW Ambulance is a front line health service provider, delivering emergency and non-emergency medical services and transport to patients in New South Wales. It provides medical help to patients experiencing life-threatening injuries (referred to as high acuity patients), illness, and trauma, and connects patients who do not need an emergency medical response (referred to as low acuity patients) with the most appropriate health provider.

NSW Ambulance operates as part of a network of public health services. For NSW Ambulance to efficiently transfer patients to hospitals, hospitals need to have sufficient capacity to accept new patients. In regional contexts, distance is an important factor in the effective delivery of ambulance services.

The objective of this audit is to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of ambulance services in regional New South Wales, by answering the following questions:

1. Does NSW Health work effectively and efficiently to deliver ambulance services in regional and rural New South Wales?
2. Is NSW Health effectively and efficiently planning and allocating ambulance services in regional New South Wales?
3. Is the effectiveness of ambulance services in regional and rural New South Wales increasing over time?

The NSW Health agencies included in this audit are NSW Ambulance, the Ministry of Health, Murrumbidgee and Southern NSW Local Health Districts, eHealth NSW and HealthShare NSW.

The Ministry of Health expects Local Health Districts and state wide health services (such as NSW Ambulance) to engage and collaborate with stakeholders throughout service planning, but it is unclear whether the Ministry ensures that this occurs

The Ministry of Health is responsible for setting policy and strategy direction for the overall NSW Health system and provides guidance to all NSW Health entities (including Local Health Districts and NSW Ambulance) to inform service planning. Local Health Districts are responsible for ensuring that relevant policy objectives are achieved through the planning and funding of the range of health services that best meet the needs of their communities.

Service plans describe how services will achieve measurable health improvements and outcomes. NSW Health entities create service plans within a broader framework of system-wide goals, objectives and priorities. The Guide to Service Plans notes the importance of active and inclusive stakeholder engagement and requires that stakeholders should be engaged throughout the planning process. It also notes that state-wide health and shared services impacted by planning should be engaged to assist with the assessment of service requirements and resource implications.

The audit identified several examples of service plans and key initiatives developed within Southern NSW Local Health District which directly related to ambulance services, but where NSW Ambulance was not identified as a stakeholder. These include:

• A business case for a new MRI service at Goulburn hospital: prior to the establishment of MRI services in Goulburn, there were no MRI services available within Southern NSW Local Health District, with the closest available provider located in Bowral (a private provider) or at the Canberra Hospital. This business case included decreased reliance on patient transport for imaging as a benefit.
• The clinical service plan for Batemans Bay Community Health Centre (which will provide urgent care services in Southern NSW Local Health District).

Southern NSW Local Health District included NSW Ambulance as a stakeholder in cross-border service planning, including NSW Ambulance as a signatory in a cross-border memorandum of understanding for stroke patient transfers between Southern NSW Local Health District, Murrumbidgee Local Health District, Canberra Health Services and NSW Ambulance.

In Murrumbidgee Local Health District, the audit identified one example of the Local Health District including NSW Ambulance as a stakeholder in planning activities. In an updated terms of reference document for the Cootamundra Partnership Reference Committee, which was established to develop a new Health Service Plan for the Cootamundra Health Service, NSW Ambulance has been included as an invitee to this forum.

No health entities undertake whole-of-system service planning for non-emergency patient transport services in rural and regional New South Wales

Non-emergency patient transport services in regional and rural Local Health Districts are provided by HealthShare NSW (in Hunter New England Local Health District and Illawarra Shoalhaven Local Health District), Local Health Districts and NSW Ambulance. Both Southern NSW Local Health District and Murrumbidgee Local Health District engage private providers and community transport providers to supplement their patient transport capacity. When non-emergency patient transport services are at capacity, Local Health Districts rely on NSW Ambulance to assist with facilitating patient transfers.

Despite these challenges, there is no whole-of-system approach to service planning for patient transport. Whole-of-system planning would enable NSW Health to better manage risk and reduce reliance on the use of the NSW Ambulance fleet for patient transport in rural and regional New South Wales.

NSW Ambulance undertakes holistic service planning, but it did not engage Local Health Districts as stakeholders in the development of its recent Clinical Services Plan

As a state-wide health service, NSW Ambulance’s service planning broadly reflects the key deliverables articulated in its Service Agreement with the Secretary of Health. The Ministry of Health, in its responsibility for planning key services and as the ‘purchaser’ of ambulance services, ensures that NSW Ambulance service planning gives regard to the broader strategic policy environment.

In 2023, NSW Ambulance developed a new Clinical Services Plan 2024–2029 which includes a focus on supporting innovative approaches to clinical redesign and the delivery of new clinical programs. This includes strengthening collaboration between NSW Ambulance and Local Health Districts (particularly in care models for smaller rural communities and the involvement of paramedics in care and management of patients with chronic diseases).

NSW Ambulance consulted with the Ministry in the development of the Clinical Services Plan. It advised the audit that as the Clinical Services Plan largely reflects the objectives contained in its Strategic Plan, specific consultation with Local Health Districts was not required.

While NSW Ambulance is currently developing a five-year roadmap for the implementation of its Clinical Services Plan, it is unclear how NSW Ambulance intends to implement and resource these objectives in a timeframe that complements similar work across NSW Health.

The Southern NSW Local Health District Clinical Services Plan does not include specific consideration of the provision of patient transport and it is not clear whether it consulted NSW Ambulance during development

Southern NSW Local Health District’s 2023–28 Clinical Services Plan notes development of the plan was informed by local, state and national strategic directions for the health system, as well as outcomes and recommendations of relevant NSW Health and local reviews and inquiries.

Southern NSW Local Health District identified five focus areas in its 2023–28 Clinical Services Plan:

• Supporting health and wellbeing through primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention
• Providing care closer to home
• Ensuring the sustainability of our existing services
• Planning for growth and ageing in our population
• Ensuring equity of access to care.

The Southern NSW Local Health District conducted community stakeholder consultation during development of its Clinical Services Plan, which resulted in feedback relating to challenges accessing health services. Community consultation feedback provided to Southern NSW Local Health District included the below key points relating to transportation to access health services:

• a lack of public and/or private transport to and from health facilities
• the additional burden on rural residents to access health care, noting that rural communities are often long distances from tertiary facilities
• difficulties with transportation, noting community transport options are limited and it can be difficult to coordinate timing.

Southern NSW Local Health District’s Clinical Services Plan acknowledges the District consulted with internal stakeholders and other service providers to develop the plan, however, it is not clear whether Southern NSW Local Health District included NSW Ambulance in consultation for feedback. Additionally, while actions to address the areas of focus for the Clinical Services Plan relate to more localised access to care and delivery of care, as well as increased capacity and access, the plan does not include any actions specific to the provision of health related transportation.

Southern NSW Local Health District has committed to improve access to clinical services in rural and remote settings through the delivery of virtual care models

In its 2023-28 Clinical Services Plan, Southern NSW Local Health District commits to establishing a single point of entry so that patients can access appropriate care in ‘the right place, at the right time’ through (among other actions), an enhancement and expansion of its Virtually enhanced Community Care program and establishment of the Virtual Rural Generalist Service.

This audit identified some examples of Local Health Districts partnering to improve access to clinical service in rural and remote settings. In Southern NSW Local Health District, the Local Health District has partnered with Western NSW Local Health District to implement the Rural Virtual Generalist Service in smaller facilities across the District.

NSW Ambulance’s workforce planning effectively considers demand, workload, coverage, and capability requirements and it uses this evidence to allocate personnel and other resources to efficiently deliver ambulance services in regional New South Wales

NSW Ambulance has a well evolved and evidenced service planning methodology. NSW Ambulance established a service planning capability in 2010, and the current methodology (developed in 2022–23) includes analysis at the station and local network level of demand projections, staffing levels required, the drivers of effective and efficient supply provision, models of care, specialty resources and capital and infrastructure requirements. It includes a substantial focus on station location and the type of resource required.

Service planning informs (and is informed by) benefits realisation for new programs and initiatives (such as SWEP, SWIFT). NSW Ambulance has also developed a model to assess ‘unmet demand’ which it uses when determining sites for potential resource allocation and supplementation. NSW Ambulance continuously monitors its need and priority for additional or enhanced ambulance services and considers the following criteria:

• volume of demand in town and surrounding area
• distance from any ambulance service
• current response times to emergency incidents
• modelled improvement in response times if an ambulance station was commissioned
• assessment of capacity and condition of closest ambulance station
• capacity of NSW Ambulance volunteer service to provide a response.

NSW Ambulance continuously reviews key inputs into the service planning methodology, in particular its demand project methodology.

The main output of NSW Ambulance’s service planning methodology is the creation of a whole-of-state service model which describes the clinical service levels for each ambulance station. A station’s clinical service level determines both the number of clinical staff required and its specific roster pattern, as well as the staff type (graduate paramedic, specialist paramedic, etc.). NSW Ambulance then creates station rosters in alignment with this model.

In addition to the demand- and activity-based evidence sources NSW Ambulance uses to inform its service planning, NSW Ambulance includes evidence-based analysis in its business cases to support NSW Government funding requests, which also contain thorough descriptions of how the proposed funding would be allocated.

Recent investments in the regional paramedic workforce have allowed NSW Ambulance to reduce the use of on-call rostering and improve the working conditions of regional paramedics

NSW Ambulance rostering practices allow for some stations to utilise on-call resources, which can cause fatigue among paramedics rostered on shift following an on-call period.

Announced in the 2018–19 NSW Budget, the NSW Government announced funding for the recruitment of an additional 750 FTE paramedic and call-centre staff over four years commencing in 2018–19. The Statewide Workforce Enhancement Program (SWEP) was designed by NSW Ambulance to enable improvements in efficiency, coverage, quality, safety and performance across New South Wales and achieve response performance targets.

The SWEP business case detailed the extent to which NSW Ambulance relied upon various forms of premium labour in order to maintain service delivery and to meet community expectations in terms of response performance. The SWEP business case identified that $20 million in premium labour savings after the four-year implementation program would be achieved by reducing over-reliance on overtime.

SWEP resulted in an additional 376 FTE positions across ambulance stations in regional NSW, and allowed NSW Ambulance to reduce on-call rostering:

• 22 regional/rural locations were converted to a 24/7 operating model removing overnight on-call
• Removal of on-call at four locations that were previously operating on a 24/7 roster with overnight on-call
• Reduction in on-call at eight locations.

NSW Ambulance measured premium labour savings achieved by monitoring callouts, crib-penalty payments, and dropped-shift overtime. In August 2022, as part of an internal review of the SWEP program, NSW Ambulance noted that the SWEP program achieved the reduction in premium labour expenditure and improved the working conditions of regional paramedics.

NSW Ambulance anticipates that recent changes to funding arrangements will result in a key program not achieving its intended benefits

In June 2022, the NSW Government announced a $1.76b investment in NSW Ambulance over a four-year period to fund 210 ambulance support staff (including the ongoing establishment of NSW Ambulance’s Virtual Clinical Care Centre (VCCC)), 1,878 new paramedics, 52 nurses, eight doctors, and build 30 stations.

Known as the Strategic Workforce InFrastructure Team program (SWIFT), NSW Ambulance designed the program to meet two objectives:

• firstly, to improve patient outcomes, and the probability of survival from immediately life threatening conditions.
• to achieve compliance with WHS obligations through the reduction of overrun shifts, overtime, and increase staff meal breaks.

When it was announced as part of the 2022–23 NSW Government budget, SWIFT was designed as a four-year program. However, recent changes to funding arrangements have changed the SWIFT timeframe and the program will now be delivered over seven years (at the same cost).

One of the key objectives of the SWIFT business case was to improve patient outcomes and the probability of patient survival by achieving response times within 15 minutes for 85% of P1 incidents by 30 June 2026. NSW Ambulance regularly reports and tracks performance on SWIFT indicators, and advises that as at 21 December 2023, the program was on track to meet the target.

NSW Ambulance modelled that the impact of extending the funding window from four years to seven years would add three years of additional demand growth and result in the program failing to achieve the 85% target by June 2026.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – NSW Ambulance performance data

Appendix three – NSW Ambulance regional station map

Appendix four – NSW Ambulance key performance indicators

Appendix five – Types of patient transport operational across New South Wales

Appendix six – Scheduled psychiatric interhospital patient transfers

Appendix seven – NSW Ambulance governance bodies

Appendix eight – About the audit

Appendix nine – Performance auditing

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 Parliamentary reference - Report number #398 released 27 June 2024.

About this report

The Regional Digital Connectivity program (RDCP) is intended to improve mobile coverage and internet connectivity in regional NSW.

The RDCP includes two funding programs, one for improving mobile coverage and the other for improving internet connectivity. Both programs provide grant funding to commercial telecommunications providers for eligible mobile and internet projects.

This audit assessed whether the Department of Regional NSW (the department) is effectively administering the RDCP to meet program objectives.

Findings

The department's approach to identifying priority areas for RDCP funding was comprehensive and it largely distributed funding in line with these priorities.

The department has not specifically defined the overall objectives of the RDCP. The department has developed business cases that set out each program’s respective objectives, but these do not consistently describe the objectives of the RDCP.

The department also has not developed an overarching investment strategy, which would assist it in addressing potentially conflicting priorities.

Deficiencies in project and risk management have contributed to delays in the department’s implementation of the program.

The department is not monitoring progress against outcomes, which limits its ability to demonstrate that the program is achieving its intended purpose.

The department did not meet its original mobile coverage performance target but met its internet connectivity target.

Recommendations

To improve RDCP administration, the report recommends that by June 2025, the department should:

1. develop an overarching investment strategy for the RDCP
2. outline the expected timelines for RDCP projects and ensure that these timelines are updated regularly
3. develop and report on RDCP outcome indicators
4. update the RDCP evaluation plan
5. update the expected benefits of the program to reflect changes in the RDCP.

The Regional Digital Connectivity program (RDCP) is funded through the Snowy Hydro Legacy Fund (SHLF). Under the Snowy Hydro Legacy Fund Act 2018 (SHLF Act), the purpose of the SHLF is to improve economic development in regional New South Wales and to fund infrastructure projects that primarily benefit regional New South Wales. A priority area for SHLF investment is delivering improved mobile coverage and internet connectivity in underserved and remote communities.

The RDCP has been implemented by the Department of Regional NSW (the department) since 2019. The RDCP is broadly split into two funding programs. The larger funding program is for improving mobile coverage and the other funding program is for improving internet connectivity and is referred to as the Gig State program. Both programs provide grant funding to commercial telecommunications providers for eligible mobile and internet projects.

Over $300 million from the RDCP was allocated to improve mobile phone coverage and increase the number of mobile service providers across regional NSW. The mobile coverage program is being delivered through the following sub-programs:

• Snowy Mountains Highway Safety project – co-funding with Snowy Hydro Limited to build five mobile towers along the Snowy Mountains Highway to improve mobile coverage.
• Active Sharing Partnership (ASP) pilot – co-funding with private providers to deliver active sharing mobile technology in regional areas.
• ASP main program – This is the main round of the mobile coverage program. A business case has been developed, but no funding has been distributed through this sub-program.
• Mobile Black Spot Program Round 5A – co-funding with the Australian Government’s Mobile Black Spot Program to deliver new or upgraded mobile towers in regional and remote locations.
• Mobile Black Spot Program Round 7 (MBSP7) – co-funding with the Australian Government’s Mobile Black Spot Program to deliver new mobile infrastructure.

Over $100 million from the RDCP was allocated to the Gig State program to improve regional internet connectivity through partnering with multiple providers and using a range of technologies suitable for rural and regional locations. The Gig State program was launched in 2019 and underwent significant changes in 2021 following an Infrastructure NSW deep dive review into the project. These changes to the program are referred to as the Gig State addendum. The Gig State program is being delivered through the following sub-programs:

• Cobar corridor connectivity – providing fixed wireless internet access to five locations between Narromine and Cobar.
• nbn regional NSW fixed wireless – co-funding with nbn to deliver new or co-located fixed wireless broadband towers in 56 locations.
• Wamboin, Bywong and Sutton connectivity – improving internet connectivity in these three towns as part of a NSW Government commitment.
• Regional Connectivity Program Round 3 (RCP3) – co-funding with the Australian Government’s Regional Connectivity Program to provide additional internet infrastructure.

The objective of this audit was to assess whether the Department of Regional NSW is effectively administering the Regional Digital Connectivity program to meet program objectives. The audit examined:

• how effectively the department identifies priority areas to target RDCP funding
• how effectively the department distributes RDCP funding in line with program objectives
• how effectively the department measures the performance of the RDCP.

The department has not specifically defined the overall objectives of the RDCP

The RDCP is delivered as part of the SHLF. Under the SHLF Act, the purpose of the SHLF is to improve economic development in regional New South Wales and, for that purpose, to fund infrastructure projects that primarily benefit regional New South Wales. One of the priority areas for SHLF investment is digital connectivity, which is being delivered through the RDCP.

While the purpose of the SHLF is set out in the SHLF Act, the department has not specifically set out the overall purpose and objectives of the RDCP and how it will focus the RDCP on achieving the SHLF’s purpose. Such a document would support future business case development, and support the coordination and prioritisation of objectives across the business cases that have already been developed.

While the overall objectives of the RDCP are yet to be defined, there are objectives set out in the business cases for the separate programs but these are not consistently described. The Gig State business case advises that the RDCP’s goal is to enable transformative long-term benefits for regional areas through investment in digital connectivity. This goal aligns with the purpose of the SHLF Act. However, this objective is not set out in the mobile coverage business case, or any other document, and it is not clear how the RDCP is intended to fulfil this objective.

The Gig State business case sets out three objectives for the RDCP that provide further definition to the SHLF Act’s purpose, though it is unclear how these were determined and whether these are intended to cover the entire RDCP:

• address the digital divide between regional and metro NSW
• resolve market failures in the regional NSW telecommunications market
• leverage Government assets and capabilities wherever possible.

The mobile coverage ASP pilot business case sets out a similar set of objectives, though there are some differences, such as the third objective being to ‘leverage Government assets and capabilities to achieve transformative results.’ It is important for the department to clarify the RDCP’s objectives to ensure a unified approach to investment decisions. At the time of the audit, the department’s website had a different set of objectives for the RDCP. They are:

• build digital infrastructure to increase capacity
• expand mobile coverage and provider choice
• improve internet service, speed and quality
• bridge the digital divide between regions and cities.

The department also provided a 2022–23 ‘division plan’, with goals for the mobile coverage and Gig State programs. These include:

•  extend and improve internet coverage to deserving locations in regional NSW
• investigate emerging digital technologies to improve connectivity
• deliver new and improved mobile coverage to regional NSW communities
• encourage competition in the regional telecommunications market.

While these different sets of objectives broadly align, there is no consistency across these business cases in describing the objectives of the RDCP. This indicates that there is a lack of clarity about the intended objectives of the RDCP. Further, the origin of the list of objectives in the ‘division plan’ is unclear. This reinforces the need to clearly define objectives for the overall RDCP.

Each business case the department has developed for RDCP programs has defined objectives that align with the SHLF’s purpose

The Gig state and mobile coverage business cases also define objectives for each program. These objectives align with the SHLF’s purpose, set out above. The Gig State business case advises that the purpose of the Gig State program is to:

• address the digital divide between metro and regional NSW so that the price, quality, and choice of digital connectivity options in metro areas are made available in regional areas of NSW
• resolve market failures in regional NSW telecommunications
• leverage Government assets or investment where appropriate to achieve transformative long-term benefits for regional areas.

The ASP pilot business case states similar objectives, though it does not mention the ‘price, quality, and choice’ stated in the Gig State business case. The ASP pilot business case also lists another three objectives:

• address mobile black spots where people live and work
• investigate new and emerging technologies to future proof mobile coverage in regional NSW
• promote consumer choice in the delivery of mobile services.

The ASP main program has a different set of objectives to the ASP pilot and include:

• reduce the digital divide and enhance social inclusion by improving mobile coverage in regional locations not covered by existing programs
• encourage competition in the regional telecommunications market to provide consumers greater choice, lower prices and improved services
• address commercial viability and technical constraints to providing mobile coverage in regional areas
• improve community resilience to emergency events through improved regional mobile service.

The RDCP program objectives align with relevant whole-of-government strategic objectives

There are several whole-of-government strategies that seek to guide government investment in digital infrastructure. While there is no document setting out the overarching objectives of the RDCP, the objectives set out for the mobile coverage program and the Gig State program align with these whole-of-government objectives.

The objectives align with the 2018 and 2021 ‘20 Year Economic Vision for Regional NSW’. For example, the 2018 ‘20 Year Economic Vision for Regional NSW’ sets out principles for regional NSW investment, including ‘Affordable, reliable and fast internet to support people and businesses.’

The RDCP sub-programs also align with the 2018 and 2022 State Infrastructure Strategies. In particular, the 2018 strategy has a set of recommendations around improving connectivity across NSW and another set of recommendations around investing in technology that improves productivity and social outcomes. One of the roles of the Gig State program is to help to implement the 2018 strategy’s recommendation to support statewide access to 50Mbps download and 10Mbps upload capacity by 2025. These speeds are specifically stated in the Gig State grant guidelines as an eligibility requirement for funded programs.

Both sub-programs of the RDCP also align with the NSW Connectivity Strategy. The NSW Connectivity Strategy has two directions of particular relevance: ‘All customers have metropolitan equivalent digital capacity’ and ‘Connectivity blackspots continually decrease across the State’. The first of these objectives has three strategic directions which are directly relevant to both the Gig State program and the mobile coverage program:

• remote, rural and peri-urban citizens can access and effectively use digital systems and services for employment, justice, education, health, social, personal and entertainment use
• Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities have equitable access to connectivity that meets their local community needs
• connectivity services are affordable for citizens no matter where they live, with access to a choice of providers.

Elements of both the Gig State and mobile coverage programs align with these, including the focus on expanding access and affordability.

In regard to regional Aboriginal communities, the RDCP may also contribute to the NSW Closing the Gap Implementation Plan, as the merit criteria in the grant guidelines for mobile coverage and Gig State grants include the extent to which the project will contribute to sustainable procurement and employment outcomes, including supporting Aboriginal businesses and employment. The criteria for prioritising locations for mobile coverage also includes extending coverage to discrete Aboriginal communities as something which could improve the score given to an application. However, this is not set out as an explicit objective of the program.

The department has not set out an overarching investment strategy for the RDCP to address potentially conflicting priorities or identify situations where funding may not align with program objectives

As noted above, the overall objectives of the RDCP have not been defined. The department does not have an overarching strategy setting out program objectives, how funding will be aligned with these objectives, and how the objectives will be prioritised. It is important to set out funding principles to establish how the elements of the stated objectives will be delivered and prioritised. Not setting these out risks funding decisions that do not align with program objectives.

As noted above, the mobile coverage ASP pilot business case lists two objectives around addressing mobile black spots and promoting consumer choice in the delivery of mobile services. These objectives may be potentially in conflict as expanding coverage can be done by funding one carrier to expand their own network, while promoting consumer choice could conceivably be done by funding a carrier to expand their network into areas already covered by only one existing carrier, thus increasing competition in those areas.

The department has not set out the relative weighting of its objectives across the RDCP funding packages and how it will prioritise funding in accordance with them. An overarching strategy would assist the department with prioritising funding in accordance with the objectives of the program, including determining the relative weight of each objective.

In addition, the department has not described the extent to which price reductions in the cost of internet will be prioritised as an objective of the Gig State program. The Gig State business case sets out that one of the objectives of the program will be to provide metropolitan equivalent or better service, quality and pricing for internet services in regional areas. It is unclear how internet pricing fits into the overarching objectives of the RDCP given that it is not mentioned as an objective of the SHLF. There would be value in setting out strategic investment principles and objectives to guide this decision-making and clarify the extent to which internet investment is intended to fulfil this purpose.

A lack of clarity about program objectives may also have impacted decisions about funding priorities. For example, the Gig State program business case sets out a plan to invest in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites through a subsidy program. As noted above, the Gig State business case sets out some objectives for the RDCP, including leveraging government assets. While an investment in LEO satellites through subsidies may assist with bridging the digital divide, it is not clear how this aligns with the objective of leveraging government assets. More clarity over program objectives and a clear investment strategy may assist with clarifying this and similar investment decisions in future. As discussed below, the investment in LEO satellites did not proceed.

The department comprehensively identified priority areas that require improved mobile coverage for the mobile coverage program

As outlined above, the final business case for the mobile coverage ASP pilot program identifies three objectives for the mobile coverage program, including addressing the digital divide between metropolitan and regional NSW, and resolving market failures in regional NSW telecommunications. The department identified priority areas for improved mobile coverage in line with these objectives. The department refined its approach to prioritising locations for the mobile coverage ASP main program which resulted in a more comprehensive analysis of potential sites.

The department developed and implemented a structured process using a range of criteria to identify and prioritise suitable locations for funding. Before allocating funding to its mobile coverage program, it was necessary for the department to determine areas that required additional mobile coverage. The department undertook this work for both its mobile coverage ASP pilot program and the ASP main program as part of designing the grant programs. A key source of information it relied on for identifying priority areas for the pilot program was the Australian Government’s National Mobile Black Spot Database. The database identified around 4,000 mobile black spot locations across NSW. This database is no longer in use as it relied on community reports of mobile black spots which were unverified.

For its mobile coverage ASP pilot program, the department applied a series of filters to the mobile black spots identified in the database. It removed metropolitan areas, areas within a 10km radius of an existing mobile tower site, and areas that had already been selected for funding under either Commonwealth or State funded programs, such as the Connecting Country Communities Fund. This left the department with a list of around 1,200 potential sites.

The department then mapped the 1,200 identified black spot sites to their respective 383 unique locations and assessed and prioritised the mobile black spots and locations against a range of economic, community and feasibility criteria. Under the economic criteria, the department prioritised areas that had higher numbers of employed persons and higher proportions of land being used for agriculture or farming. Under the community criteria, the department prioritised areas based on the increase in the population that would benefit from expanded coverage, the increase in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people that would benefit from the coverage, the increase in the kilometres of highway and main roads that would benefit that were within five kilometres of a mobile black spot, and areas with more square kilometres prone to bushfires or flooding that would benefit. Under feasibility criteria, the department prioritised areas that were closer to government and nbn infrastructure. This process resulted in 50 prioritised locations containing 307 black spot sites across 34 Local Government Areas in NSW.

For its mobile coverage ASP main program, the department undertook a detailed coverage analysis to identify locations with no and limited mobile coverage. It identified these using the latest publicly available coverage maps from the three mobile network operators and the distance of locations from existing sites/towers as published by the Australian Communications and Media Authority and the Radio Frequency National Site Archive databases. Using this data as the key source of information in determining mobile coverage resulted in a more comprehensive outcome than relying on the National Mobile Black Spot Database. The department did not use the National Mobile Black Spot Database, as this information was considered unreliable and had not been updated since 2018, and the coverage maps were more reliable.

The analysis focused on locations with small populations, road corridors, and tourism locations. It identified 257 locations with no or poor coverage consisting of 68 small population locations, 117 road corridors and 72 tourism locations. The department then analysed these possible locations against a range of criteria. These included maximising the number of people and businesses that would be supported, increasing the extent of existing coverage, determining whether coverage would support government strategies or Premier’s Priorities, other positive social impacts, focusing on the greatest length of road and most heavily used roads, and maximising the number of tourism businesses and points of interest impacted.

The department conducted analysis based on these criteria and shortlisted 24 small population locations, 24 road corridor locations and 12 visitor economy locations. These locations were taken forward for concept design, cost estimation, and economic and financial appraisal as part of the final business case.

The department’s initial approach to prioritising Gig State funding was based around larger regional centres

The department undertook a two-stage process for identifying priority areas for Gig State program investment. The first involved the identification of larger NSW towns that would benefit from additional internet coverage and where data centres could be located, and the second involved a selection of more remote locations to receive additional funding.

The department did not undertake an initial detailed analysis of internet coverage across NSW to prioritise funding for the Gig State program. Undertaking this work would have been in line with the Gig State program objectives of addressing the digital divide between metropolitan and regional NSW and resolving market failures in regional NSW telecommunications. In order to meet these objectives, it was important to first establish the extent of the digital divide and market failure before seeking to resolve it.

Instead, it categorised NSW towns according to their relative size and importance from a connectivity perspective. It prioritised towns with larger populations and more business users to maximise the potential benefit of the infrastructure. The department also prioritised locations that were closer to other telecommunications infrastructure, and it also considered proximity to other potential elements of the Gig State network for greater connectivity and to ensure that it was taking a whole-of-State approach to investment decisions. This process identified 14 major regional towns.

The department then prioritised two of these regional towns, Dubbo and Wagga Wagga, due to the higher prices paid by NSW Government agencies in the two locations for average internet bandwidth usage when compared to other regional and metropolitan population centres across NSW. The costs to government were considered a proxy for how much business users are likely to be charged for connectivity services in regional NSW towns. The department conducted surveys in both towns indicating that business users were paying higher prices than their metropolitan counterparts for higher-grade connectivity. This aligned with the department’s Gig State program objectives which related to providing price, quality and choice.

The department also included five satellite towns along the road from Dubbo to Cobar (Cobar corridor) in the Gig State final business case as well as the towns of Wamboin, Bywong and Sutton. The department’s prioritisation of funding for these locations was not based on any detailed analysis of need. The department identified that as part of its initial plan to expand the internet connectivity from Dubbo to Cobar, it would be able to connect a number of towns between those two at a reduced cost. There was no analysis of alternative options for expending this money, such as expanding coverage to other areas, or to determine the extent of coverage required in each town. The Wamboin, Bywong and Sutton project was prioritised as a result of a $5 million NSW Government commitment. This project is discussed further below.

The department strengthened its approach to targeting Gig State funding in 2021

The department reviewed and updated its approach to the Gig State program in September 2021. As part of this, it revised its approach to targeting funding, including the use of additional data and identifying areas with greater digital connectivity issues. This represented an improved approach compared to the original business case and aligned more closely with the changes that were made to the Gig State program in 2021, outlined in the Gig State addendum, which focussed more on the delivery of fixed wireless services rather than data centres.

The department carried out an analysis of areas that only have satellite internet coverage (i.e., no fibre or fixed wireless internet availability) to identify areas suitable for different types of technology such as fibre optic cables, fixed wireless and LEO satellites. This was more in line with the Gig State program objectives of addressing the digital divide and resolving market failures. It identified that these locations had challenging digital connectivity issues that were not likely to be resolved without government intervention. This process identified around 1,000 locations. This list was then refined by looking to maximise the number of premises and businesses, maximising the density of premises, prioritising locations with other Government assets, mobile sites and other technology available in the area, and locations close to an existing exchange to leverage existing infrastructure.

The location list was then prioritised based on scoring criteria for economic drivers, feasibility, risk and stakeholders. The economic criteria included the number of residential and business premises, the number of businesses, and the estimated construction costs for the infrastructure. The feasibility criteria included availability of existing and planned infrastructure. Stakeholder related criteria included identifying synergies with other government led programs, as well as sites that scored low on Australian Digital Inclusion Index (ADII) scores and the Socio-Economic Indexes for Areas. These criteria are appropriate and align with the objectives of the Gig State program.

The department’s process resulted in a list of 23 prioritised areas. These were generally areas with a higher density of premises and affordable access to infrastructure for power supply and data transmission.

The department considered socio-economic data when planning for Gig State and mobile coverage programs but did not use this to inform its pilot mobile coverage program

NSW Government Business Case Guidelines (TPP18-06) state that one of the main reasons for government action is promotion of equity where the distribution of economic costs and benefits is considered inequitable. It is therefore important for the department to consider socio-economic data in the planning of the RDCP.

The department has included some socio-economic data and ADII scores in the profiles it developed for each Local Government Area. It applied socio-economic data to identify additional priority areas for new and improved internet coverage through the Gig State program. However, it did not apply this data to identify priority areas across the pilot mobile coverage program of the RDCP. It improved its approach when developing the ASP main program by including socio-economic data as a component of its scoring for prioritising locations.

The department considered socio-economic data when selecting locations for grant funding. The mobile coverage grant guidelines and the Gig State grant guidelines both include merit criteria that consider whether the proposed solution would address disadvantage within a community. Both guidelines ask the grant applicants to consider the Index of Relative Socio-economic Advantage and Disadvantage.

The department engaged with key stakeholders when developing the RDCP

Under TPP18-06, NSW Government departments are required to identify and consult with key stakeholders as they can contribute to the development of the investment proposal by providing their expert opinions, research, and evidence.

The department identified key stakeholders, developed stakeholder engagement plans, and used feedback gained through consultations to design and adjust the RDCP. Key stakeholders have been involved on the RDC Steering Committee and the RDC Project Control Group ensuring that they have an avenue to provide input into the overall RDCP. This includes the Commonwealth department responsible for telecommunications infrastructure and telecommunication providers.

The department engaged with stakeholders when developing the ASP pilot program. As discussed below, the department transitioned the program from a one-stage pilot program, where telecommunication providers would be procured to provide the solution, to a two-stage program where the department would first work with telecommunication providers to identify technical solutions and then carry out the procurement. This involved significant engagement with stakeholders to identify the technical solution and procurement model.

The department has assessed the suppliers of internet and mobile connectivity to determine their capacity and willingness to participate in RDCP sub-programs

As part of procurement planning, when building a business case, NSW Government agencies are required to analyse and engage with the market. This involves developing a profile of the market, the capabilities of suppliers, innovative and emerging technology, and factors that influence the market such as customer preferences and competition.

The department considered the capacity of telecommunications suppliers, their level of interest, and willingness to participate in the program when developing the business cases for its mobile and internet coverage programs. In addition to doing this when constructing initial business cases, the department adjusted its approach when market factors changed, as evidenced by the changes it made to its Gig State program in 2021. In September 2020, the nbn announced an expansion of its fibre network nationally, with a focus on regional improvements. This meant that internet coverage for some of the locations included in the Gig State business case would be addressed by nbn and continued investment was not needed in those areas. The initial Gig State business case also planned an initial investment in data centres in regional NSW. Following this, a private market operator also announced plans to construct 14 regional data centres across NSW. This meant that the planned Gig State data centres were no longer required. The department changed it approach to avoid duplication by ceasing its planned internet coverage expansion into regional centres, including the data centres, and prioritising a range of new sites for coverage.

Conflicts of interest and probity procedures have largely been followed, although there were some gaps in declarations

Maintaining a record of conflict of interest declarations is important to provide a higher level of transparency, and therefore control, over officials in high-risk roles. Disclosing an interest before it becomes a conflict of interest also reduces the likelihood that an official will be tempted to conceal or favour the interest.

Conflict of Interest declaration forms have been completed for staff involved in the mobile coverage program, Gig State program and the Australian Government co-funded Regional Connectivity Program Round 3 (RCP3) and Mobile Black Spot Program Round 7 (MBSP7). Whilst the list of declarations is extensive, it is unclear whether it includes all relevant staff from the department, the NSW Telco Authority and consultants involved with the program.

In relation to the mobile coverage and Gig State programs, there was no declaration recorded for one consultant and three staff from the department, including the program sponsor. These omissions have the potential to create risks that conflicts of interest go unmanaged. The department advises that the register is now complete for all those working directly on the program. It also advises that, due to the breadth of programs senior staff oversee, conflicts of interest are managed by the department's Governance team centrally through a Declarations App.

Four declarations of a ‘real, potential or perceived conflict of interest’ were made under the RCP3 and MBSP7 grant programs, which were co-funded with the Australian Government. No declared conflicts were made for the other programs. The identified conflicts of interest have documented actions to manage them, and there is evidence to indicate that these were implemented. For example, a senior staff member and a consultant excluded themselves from parts of a grant process due to declared conflicts.

The NSW Grants Administration Guide states that officials must seek probity advice for all grant opportunities that are complex, high-risk or high-value, to support the design, application, assessment and decision-making phases. The department followed appropriate probity processes throughout and these probity reports did not find any material breaches of probity in the grant processes.

There have been delays in all streams of the RDCP which may have been reduced through proactive project and risk management

The business cases set out expected timelines for each program of the RDCP. The department has not met any of these expected timelines, with some projects delayed by over a year compared to their initial planned timelines. Some of these delays have been caused by changes to the department’s approach to the mobile coverage and Gig State business cases. While some of these changes were outside of the department’s control, others could have been anticipated and better managed by a stronger approach to project management and risk management.

Exhibits 1 and 2 set out the status of each Gig State and mobile coverage project reviewed as part of this audit as at April 2024 and the planned completion date for that project at the outset of the program. Note that this does not include projects co-funded by the Australian Government due to the department’s limited ability to influence the process. This also excludes projects which have not yet distributed funding, such as the mobile coverage ASP main program.

Source: Audit Office analysis.

Source: Audit Office analysis.

As can be seen from Exhibits 1 and 2, each project in the RDCP has been delayed past its initially planned completion date, and the Wamboin, Bywong and Sutton project has been delayed past both its original planned completion date and also the revised completion date in the Gig State addendum.

Some of these delays can be accounted for by the fact that the department revised its approach to both the mobile coverage ASP pilot and the Gig State programs. While some of these changes were outside of the department’s control, others could have been anticipated and managed by more proactive risk management. In the case of the mobile coverage program, some of this change in approach may have been foreseeable. The March 2021 mobile coverage ASP pilot business case set out a one-stage tendering process with construction planned for completion in June 2022. The department revised this approach in July 2021, when it changed to a two-stage process involving a technical stage and then a grant process. This was the result of additional research by the department that identified that the market may not have sufficient interest in the initial proposed approach. Undertaking this additional research earlier may have allowed for this alternative approach to be identified sooner.

In addition, the department only allowed two months in the business case for contract negotiations with providers for the mobile coverage ASP pilot program, however this has taken a significantly longer time and in one case has been ongoing for over twelve months. Given the complexities of the funding deed negotiations, this may also have been foreseeable. The department advised that some delays in the mobile coverage program can be attributed to the proposed merger of major mobile network operators which delayed funding deed negotiations.

As with the mobile coverage program, the Gig State program was also delayed by a change in approach, though this was driven by market changes. As part of the original Gig State business case, the department intended to deliver data centres in regional NSW, as well as expanding internet coverage. The business case was approved in December 2019 and the department intended to complete the Gig State program in June 2022. Little progress had been made by the time that the Gig State program underwent a significant change in scope following a review in September 2021. The department removed some aspects of the original business case, such as the construction of data centres in regional NSW, and changed the approach to other parts of the business case. The revised business case, called the Gig State addendum, delayed the planned delivery date of some projects into 2022.

The most significantly delayed sub-program has been the expansion of internet access to the towns of Wamboin, Bywong and Sutton as part of the Gig State program. In January 2019, the NSW Government announced $5 million of funding to provide internet access to these towns. The department ran a tender for this work in mid-2021 with a plan to start construction in late 2021. However, this tender resulted in no contract being awarded due to no providers being willing to provide the project within the proposed $5 million budget. The department started working on technical solutions with providers in late 2021 and gave them until May 2022 to identify solutions and potential budgets. The contract for Wamboin, Bywong and Sutton was executed in June 2022, with an expected completion date of June 2024, though given delays with construction this date will not be met. As discussed below, if the department had provided better advice to Government on the expected costs at the planning stage, it may have reduced the delays in this sub-program.

The department has not effectively managed RDCP timelines

The department has provided limited evidence of effective project management in place to monitor overall progress against program timelines, such as regularly updating a detailed project plan. The department may have identified and managed the above delays sooner through a stronger project management approach.

The department set out timelines at the outset of each of the sub-programs. This was not always done in detail but for all the sub-programs at least key milestones were mapped. While this was done at the outset, there is no evidence that the department regularly updated timelines across the various sub-programs to ensure that these projects were on track and to monitor expected completion dates.

The department provided regular updates on project status to relevant governance committees. This included providing information on upcoming milestones and associated delays. However, holistic monitoring of program completion dates and the impact of delays on subsequent milestones was not presented to the governance committees. As a result, there has been little monitoring and oversight of how projects are tracking against their target end dates.

Gaps in the governance framework have limited the oversight of the implementation of the RDCP

There are three key committees that oversee the implementation of the RDCP: the SHLF Steering Committee, the RDC Steering Committee, and the RDC Program Control Group. These three committees are intended to provide oversight of the implementation of the RDCP, however there are deficiencies that limit the effectiveness of their oversight.

The SHLF Steering Committee is intended to provide oversight of all programs funded through the SHLF, including the RDCP. Despite an intended meeting schedule of quarterly, the committee only met once in 2023 and three times in each of 2021 and 2022. While the Committee did receive reports on each of the programs funded through the SHLF at these meetings, this reporting did not identify any key risks for these projects that might affect achieving the objectives of the SHLF. This reduces the level of oversight that the SHLF Steering Committee can provide for these projects.

The RDC Steering Committee provides oversight of the RDCP and is intended to act as an escalation point for key issues in the program. While the committee receives regular reports on the components of the RDCP, including on program risks, there are some gaps that limit the oversight it can provide. The committee operated throughout 2021, 2022 and 2023 without finalised terms of reference, which were finalised in February 2024. Prior to this, it was unclear how often the RDC Steering Committee was intended to meet, but it met only four times in 2023 compared to six in 2022.

The RDC Steering Committee terms of reference include a role for the committee in making key decisions around program strategy and implementation. Prior to 2023, the committee was involved in many key decisions. For example, in 2022 it endorsed decisions around the ASP pilot grant guidelines. By contrast, a review of meeting minutes since the start of 2023 shows that the RDC Steering Committee has not made decisions or provided endorsements for any key decisions. The committee was not involved in endorsing the MBSP7 and RCP3 grant guidelines in 2023 and was not involved in strategic decision-making about the budget reprofiling in 2023 and the decision to remove the LEO satellite pilot from the Gig State program scope.

The RDC Program Control Group did not have terms of reference until February 2024. The purpose of the RDC Program Control Group is to oversee and support the strategic direction and implementation of the RDCP. This should be carried out through regular meetings and reporting, however the control group only met six times in 2023 despite an intention that they would meet monthly. The expected meeting frequency has since changed to every six weeks.

The RDC governance committees routinely discuss risks, but the department did not identify or mitigate all key risks at the outset of the program

The department has a structured approach to risk management for the RDCP, though this risk management approach has not always succeeded at mitigating key risks. The RDCP program team identified a number of key risks at the outset of each program and designed mitigations for them. In addition, the RDC Steering Committee and RDC Project Control Group both receive risk reports and discuss risks at meetings where appropriate. This reporting indicates a proactive approach to risk management throughout the program.

However, not all key risks were successfully mitigated or identified at the outset of the program. For example, one of the key causes of delays with the mobile coverage program has been protracted contract negotiations. Despite the fact that the program team understood the complexities of the mobile contract negotiations that would be required, this was not identified as a risk at the outset of the program. Later in the program this was identified by the RDC Program Control Group and Steering Committee as a key risk. While the risk was identified, it was not sufficiently mitigated, as demonstrated by the delays that resulted from the contract negotiations.

Other risks were not identified at the outset of the program. For example, the Snowy Mountains Highway Safety program was delayed due to the need to get development approval from the National Parks and Wildlife Service. There is no separate risk register for the Snowy Mountains Highway Safety program, and the potential for delays due to approval processes is not mentioned in any of the overall mobile business cases. Stronger initial project management may have allowed for this to be identified.

The Wamboin, Bywong and Sutton internet coverage program has been delayed numerous times throughout the course of its delivery. One of the key delays in 2023 was that, after the contract was signed and building works had commenced, it was discovered that challenging ground conditions with a higher than anticipated rock concentration around the towns was delaying construction. Potential delays from construction issues were not foreseen in the Gig State program risk register. While the specific issues relating to ground conditions may not have been easily foreseeable at the outset of the program, the department’s evaluation of potential providers in 2021 noted that rock was present and could have an impact on the cost of the program. It is reasonable to expect that this would have led to additional risk mitigation at the time, detailing the potential impact of the rock concentration on both cost and timelines. When the issue was eventually discussed in the RDC Project Control Group in 2023, the only mitigation for the risk was to review and monitor the existing and future schedule. This was not sufficient to mitigate the risk.

The department conducted cost-benefit analyses for all RDCP sub-programs, but did not implement the element with the highest return on investment

The ‘NSW Government Guide to Cost-Benefit Analysis’ requires that a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) be undertaken for capital, recurrent or ICT projects valued at more than $10 million. Undertaking a CBA provides a benefit-cost ratio (BCR) which helps to determine if a program will provide a net benefit to the people of New South Wales. A BCR greater than one indicates that the benefits will exceed the costs. For programs funded through the SHLF, such as the RDCP, there is no requirement for a program to achieve a BCR of greater than one.

The department conducted a CBA for the Gig State and mobile coverage programs, as well as all the sub-programs under both programs, including revising the CBA for the Gig State program after it was reviewed in late 2021. The BCR for the mobile coverage and Gig State programs are shown in Exhibit 3. Only the Gig State initial business case achieved a BCR of one, meaning that it delivers benefits equivalent to its costs. However, when this program was amended in 2021, this BCR reduced to 0.62. When combined, the RDCP does not have a BCR greater than one, meaning that it represents a net cost to New South Wales. However, as noted above, there is no requirement for the RDCP to reach a BCR of one.

Source: Department of Regional NSW.

The highest BCR was calculated for the planned investment in Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites which is an element of the Gig State addendum, but this investment did not go ahead. LEO satellites can be used to provide digital connectivity to isolated properties. They sit closer to the Earth’s surface than a geostationary satellite and can transmit data with lower delay and improved connectivity. This LEO satellite pilot was identified to deliver a BCR of 2.62, including approximately 40% of the benefits attributable to the Gig State addendum. The Gig State addendum anticipated that the pilot would commence in 2022, however the department did not proceed with this. The 2023 budget reduced the funding for the Gig State program, and the department decided to discontinue the proposed pilot. The department advises it plans to revisit the LEO satellite project in mid 2025.

The RDCP’s grant guidelines largely comply with mandatory NSW Government requirements

In September 2022, the NSW Government released the revised ‘Grants Administration Guide’ (the guide) which, among other things, sets out mandatory requirements for NSW Government grant guidelines. Premier’s Memorandum ‘M2022-07 Grants Administration Guide’ makes it mandatory for agencies to follow the requirements of the guide for all grants released from 19 September 2022.

The guide states that clear and consistent grant guidelines must be prepared that contain the purpose and objectives of the grant, selection criteria (comprising eligibility and assessment criteria) and assessment process, grant value, opening and closing dates, application outcome date, the source agency, and the decision-maker.

The department developed grant guidelines for grant schemes funded by the RDCP. The guidelines explain the application and selection process, eligibility criteria and assessment criteria, and key dates. These include:

• Mobile Coverage Project – Active Sharing Partnership Grant Guidelines (September 2022)
• Gig State Grant Guidelines (October 2022)
• NSW Government Co-Investment in RCP3 and MBSP7 Program Guidelines (July 2023).

The guidelines for these three grant programs largely align with the requirements of the guide, but there were some gaps. The ASP pilot and Gig State program guidelines both note the contact person for complaints, but the RCP3 and MBSP7 guidelines do not state this. While the RCP3 and MBSP7 guidelines set out the relevant decision-maker and the role of key individuals in the assessment process, the guidelines for the ASP pilot did not identify the decision-maker and the Gig State Grant Guidelines did not provide the membership of the assessment panel making the recommendations.

The department’s grant programs were designed to target identified priority locations

Across the RDCP sub-programs, the department designed grant programs in a way that targeted funding towards its priority locations and other locations that met its eligibility criteria. The department has not been prescriptive about locations that would be funded through grant programs, but designed the programs in a way that encouraged providers to co-fund either the target locations or those that fit the criteria that the department was interested in funding.

For the Gig State grant program, the department released a list of preferred locations to potential applicants. The grant guidelines make clear that any proposals to build infrastructure to provide coverage to these areas would be given preferential treatment. The merit criteria are also aligned with this as the department awarded additional points for providing coverage to the target areas. Locations outside the preferred list were also eligible, provided they met the grant program’s objectives and eligibility criteria.

Similarly, for the mobile coverage ASP pilot program, the department released a list of preferred locations to potential applicants. The grant guidelines similarly encouraged potential applicants to follow this target list, both in terms of eligibility and also in terms of the way that the grants program provided additional points for providing coverage to the target areas. In addition, applicants could consider locations outside of the preferred list provided they met the grant program’s objectives and eligibility criteria set out in the grant guidelines.

For the co-funding opportunity with the Australian Government’s RCP3 and MBSP7 programs, a list of target locations was again provided. Applicants could consider locations outside of the target locations provided they were still eligible under Australian Government requirements for the RCP3 and MBSP7. Alternative solutions that provide mobile coverage on road corridors and mobile solutions for First Nations communities in other remote and very remote NSW locations could also be considered, however, funding was to be allocated to target locations and target transport corridors as a priority.

The department was not able to demonstrate a similar approach for the co-investment in the Mobile Black Spot Program Round 5A. The Australian Government developed eligibility criteria for the program, which align with the department’s mobile program objectives.

The department has selected grant recipients in line with its funding priorities

The department developed grant guidelines and an assessment methodology for the Gig State program and the ASP pilot program to guide its assessment panel, and applicants, through the process. The department assessed the applications for the Gig State and the ASP pilot grant programs against the eligibility and merit criteria contained in its guidelines, and in accordance with its assessment methodology. This resulted in the department funding locations that aligned with its target locations or areas that were in line with the purpose of each grant opportunity.

For the Gig State grant program, the department determined that projects were to be located in one of the 93 regional NSW Local Government Areas (LGA) identified in the grant guidelines. Eligible locations were in areas where internet access was via satellite services only and there were no committed or planned projects for fixed services in the area. The assessment panel for the Gig State grants recommended projects in 34 eligible locations from four applicants, for funding totalling $58.3 million (excl. GST), intended to bring improved connectivity to around 13,900 premises.

For the ASP pilot program, eligible locations were areas of regional NSW, where there was no existing handheld coverage provided by any Mobile Network Operators (MNO) or existing handheld coverage was provided by only one MNO. The assessment panel for the ASP pilot grants recommended 32 projects for funding totalling $30.4 million (excl. GST), intended to improve mobile coverage across ten regional LGAs. All other projects were considered not suitable for funding or ineligible.

The department provided a list of preferred locations for both grant programs. Applicants received a marginally higher score against assessment criteria if they put forward a preferred location but the location they identified could still be accepted if it was not in a preferred location but met the eligibility criteria. Funding was allocated to the majority of the Gig State program preferred locations identified in the Gig State business case addendum, but funding was allocated to only two of the 23 preferred locations identified in the business case for the ASP main program.

For the grants co-funded by the Australian Government (RCP3 and MBSP7), the department prioritised and selected grant recipients based on whether they met the eligibility criteria. It developed an assessment methodology to guide the assessment panel through this process. A probity advisor was present at both assessment panel meetings.

The department intends to further verify the RCP3 and MBSP7 application’s compliance with the RDCP objectives and eligibility criteria, following the assessment of applications by the Australian Government. Once verified, deeds will be negotiated and issued.

The department did not advise Government on the full cost of the Wamboin, Bywong and Sutton project, leading to a protracted and difficult process

The department’s process for awarding the grant to construct a fibre network for internet connectivity in the Wamboin, Bywong and Sutton regions was complex. The department appears to have estimated the initial costs of this program to be significantly higher than the funds allocated to the project. The department did not advise Government of this, and conducted the tender process based on the budget of $5 million committed by the Government. This budget proved insufficient, and the department had to request additional funds to contract the project. Not providing this advice to Government at an earlier stage means that the process which followed was more complex and protracted than it may have been if the department had provided this advice.

In January 2019, the NSW Government announced that it would provide $5 million to upgrade internet in the Wamboin, Bywong and Sutton region based on costings undertaken by a local community organisation. The department included this cost in the Gig State business case in December 2019 and also the Gig State addendum in September 2021. Documentation from late 2020 indicates that the department conducted an initial estimate that the full cost of the Wamboin, Bywong and Sutton project would be up to $16.3 million. It is unclear whether this was conducted before the Gig State business case was completed. The department was unable to provide the analysis that led to this initial cost estimate to the audit team. However, this indicates that the department was aware that the cost of the project would be greater than $5 million but did not provide this advice to Government. The additional cost was to be funded from the remainder of the Gig State business case.

In mid-2021, the department commenced a tender process with a budget of $5 million in January 2021. Only two applicants responded to this initial request for tender, and only one was evaluated as meeting the technical and construction requirements of the project. The cost estimates provided in the complying tender response were significantly higher than $5 million. As a result, the department did not award a contract following this tender.

The department then planned to undertake an in-depth analysis into alternative technology options. It noted the most promising option in terms of speed of delivery, quality of service, and value for money was LEO satellites. The department was unable to provide a copy of this analysis and so it is unclear the extent of the work undertaken to find alternative solutions for Wamboin, Bywong and Sutton rather than the construction of a fibre network to the premises.

After the initial market approach resulted in no contract being awarded, the department altered its procurement approach. A closed Expression of Interest (EOI) was sent to both respondents to the request for tender in November 2021 seeking a recommended technical solution, a proposed delivery method and timeframes. Both respondents achieved satisfactory scores for the EOI and were invited to submit a detailed design. As the department had determined through the tender process that the budget of $5 million was insufficient to ensure that it could provide internet services across the Wamboin, Bywong and Sutton region, the budget limit for the procurement was increased.

Both respondents submitted a detailed design and in May 2022 the department received approval to negotiate. The unsuccessful respondent scored marginally higher against the selection criteria. However, the assessment team considered that their proposal contained too much unmitigated risk. In May 2022, the department received approval to proceed to the negotiation phase with the successful proponent. Following this negotiation, a $9.5 million grant was awarded to the successful respondent to connect 1,352 premises. Around 140 premises were not included in the scope due to the significantly higher costs in connecting these premises.

The project cost has since increased to over $12 million, in part due to challenging terrain and ground conditions. Additional funding of around $1.7 million was also approved to connect an additional 134 properties that were identified during the detailed design phase. The department advises that these were initially missed due to boundary changes, incorrect council records and quality issues in the geospatial databases. It indicated that this is a separate group of properties to the 140 premises that were excluded due to higher connection costs.

The fact that the Wamboin, Bywong and Sutton project has a total cost of over $12 million, more closely aligned with the department’s internal cost estimate, indicates that fully advising Government of the costs may have saved significant time in the delivery of the project.

The department monitors the progress of its grant agreements but has not formalised its acquittal process

The department receives progress reports and milestone reports from grant recipients to assist in monitoring the progress of RDCP projects and assess if works provided match the requirements listed in the grant funding agreements. It also advises it has regular meetings with grant recipients, although no minutes are kept of these meetings.

The projects that have progressed to the construction phase are:

• Mobile coverage to Brewarrina and Wilcannia through the mobile coverage ASP pilot
• Improved internet to Wamboin, Bywong and Sutton.

The department receives regular progress reports for both projects, including some photographs and technical drawings. The reports provide information on progress against milestones and any changes to expected completion dates.

The department receives quarterly progress reports on improved internet for the Cobar corridor and the 56 other sites scheduled for fixed wireless internet, which are yet to progress to construction. The current scheduled completion date is March 2025. It also receives monthly reports on progress with mobile towers it is co-funding with the Australian Government as part of the Mobile Black Spot Program Round 5A.

The department provided few acquittal process documents or milestone acquittal documents, apart from the site qualification report for the Cobar corridor and its evaluation of the detailed design for the Wamboin, Bywong and Sutton project. The department advises it has an acquittal process in place for processing milestone reports, however it is yet to formalise this process. The three projects which have progressed enough to require acquittal are Wamboin, Bywong and Sutton, Wilcannia and Brewarrina, and the Cobar corridor.

The department has provided funding deeds for each project it has funded. Whilst the deeds include milestones, they do not include the dates for each milestone making it more difficult for the department to track the progress of each project.

The department’s approach to reporting its expenditure on consultants is inconsistent and does not always meet reporting requirements

Under the Annual Reports (Departments) Regulation 2015 agencies are required to report any consultancy engagements over $50,000 in their annual reports. The NSW Procurement Board Direction PBD-2023-05 Engagement of professional services suppliers defines a consultancy agreement as a type of professional services agreement where a person or organisation is engaged to provide recommendations or professional advice to assist decision-making by management.

The department has several professional services agreements as part of the RDCP, some of which are consultancy engagements within this definition and some of which contain elements of the contract that would be considered a consultancy agreement. For example, one of the major consultancy agreements involves providing strategic advice across the Gig State program, as well as providing advice on market engagement, and reviewing technical advice. This aligns with the definition of a consultancy agreement as the contracted organisation is providing professional advice to assist decision-making by management.

The department has not reported any of its agreements used as part of the RDCP in its annual reports, despite having several agreements that exceeded the $50,000 threshold which may fall into this definition.

The department advises that the agreements are categorised in the General Ledger as contractors and as such, are not required to be reported in the Department’s Annual Report. This interpretation is not in accordance with NSW Treasury and NSW Procurement Board requirements. It also identifies one contracted consultant as a ‘consultancy’ in its contract variation documentation but has not reported this expenditure in its annual reports.

Further, the department has not applied its interpretation consistently. For example, it has reported the preparation of some strategic and business planning documents as consultancies in its annual reports and not others.

The department is not monitoring the outcomes of the RDCP

Measuring outcomes of a program is important to determine whether that program is fulfilling its intended purpose. While many elements of the RDCP are still at an early stage, there is value in monitoring the outcomes of those elements which have completed construction to inform project implementation. There are no outcome measures for the effectiveness of the RDCP as a whole, and only limited measures for the mobile and Gig State programs. The department has the following outcome that it has set out for the Gig State program:

• Improve the digital connectivity (accessibility) in rural and remote NSW communities.

When developing the final business case for the Gig State program, the department utilised the ADII scores to identify the digital divide between Metropolitan Sydney and rural NSW. The ADII uses data from the Australian Internet Usage Survey to measure digital inclusion across three dimensions of access, affordability and digital ability. While the department utilised the ADII to determine the baseline for accessibility of digital connectivity in regional and remote NSW communities, the department is not using the ADII to measure whether the program has led to improvements in these communities. This limits the department’s ability to determine whether the RDCP has met its objectives.

At the time of the Gig State business case being developed, rural NSW ADII scores were reported, allowing the department to utilise the figures as a baseline, but since 2020 these are not publicly reported. The department is in the process of determining how it can use ADII scores to measure the performance of the program over time.

In addition to the Gig State program outcome measure, the department has one outcome measure for its mobile coverage program:

• Square kilometres with improved mobile coverage in regional NSW.

This outcome measure will not allow the department to understand the impact of the RDCP’s mobile coverage program. While measuring the number of square kilometres of coverage will allow the department to determine whether the mobile towers it is funding are achieving the intended extent of new mobile coverage, it will not allow the department to measure the quality of service, price of coverage, and other key information that could measure the impact of the new coverage.

In December 2023, the NSW Telco Authority released the NSW Digital Connectivity Index (DCI), which provides an overview of connectivity in each LGA and suburb across NSW. Each LGA and suburb is given a score out of 100 for access, affordability and demographics (as a proxy for the ability to use technology). The DCI includes several data points, including coverage from telecommunications providers, mobile signal strength, and internet speed. Given that the DCI includes useful data points and can allow for data to be inspected at the suburb level, there is an opportunity for the department to use this to identify the impact of its program both at a statewide level and in regions targeted for funding. However, the department has no plans to utilise the DCI to measure program performance.

In addition to not collecting data to measure the overall effectiveness of the RDCP, the department is also not collecting data to measure whether a number of the objectives of the Gig State and mobile coverage programs are being achieved. For example, both programs aim to reduce the price of digital services in regional areas, however there is no measurement of price in place to determine whether this is being achieved. Similarly, there is no plan in place to measure the speed of internet services or signal strength for mobile services, despite improvements in these things being part of the objectives of both programs as set out in their business cases.

The department is also not measuring whether there are improvements in competition in the mobile market through the mobile coverage program, despite one of the objectives of that program being to encourage competition in the regional telecommunications market. The department also has no plans to measure its contribution to the Closing the Gap target to understand the impact of the RDCP on Aboriginal communities. This is despite it identifying that seven locations with current or pending funding will support discrete Aboriginal communities. Four of these locations are part of the ASP project for Wilcannia and Brewarrina, and the other three are funded through the MBSP7 project.

The department has some output performance measures in place for the RDCP, but these focus on contracted outputs rather than outcomes

The department has identified performance measures for the program in reporting templates, in its final business cases for the Gig State and mobile coverage programs, and in its evaluation plan for the RDCP. These performance indicators measure the outputs of the program rather than the outcomes that would demonstrate whether program objectives have been met.

The measures that the department uses to report to NSW Treasury as part of its budgeting process have changed over time. Until June 2023, the department used two key output measures to determine the progress of the RDCP:

• Number of premises covered by signed contracts to deliver upgraded internet connectivity.
• Number of sites with signed contracts for new mobile coverage.

As noted, these are output measures and will not enable the department to determine whether the project is delivering its intended purpose. Since July 2023, the department has used two output measures:

• Number of premises covered by signed contracts to deliver upgraded internet connectivity.
• Contracted square kilometres for new and improved mobile coverage.

These four measures relate only to contracted coverage and do not provide a clear picture of ongoing progress with the construction and connection of new mobile and internet projects. Projects can have long lead times for a variety of reasons such as acquiring access to land, designing a solution and the time required to construct the solution. In addition, only measuring contracted coverage will not enable the department to determine whether these outputs are being delivered and will not reflect delays in those stages, nor will it enable the department to determine whether the towers are achieving their intended purpose. While there is value in measuring contracted coverage as an early lead indicator of performance, there is also value in reflecting the current state more accurately through measuring the progress of the construction of each project.

The department did not meet its original mobile coverage performance targets but met its Gig State program target

As noted above, the department had three metrics that it was using to measure the RDCP until June 2023. The department successfully achieved its Gig State program target but did not achieve its mobile coverage program targets. Exhibit 4 shows the results against targets for the RDCP measures. As can be seen, the result for square kilometres of improved mobile coverage delivered was significantly below the target.

* This comprises two towers funded through the ASP project and 22 towers co-funded through the Australian Government’s Mobile Black Spot Round 5A. This does not include five small towers for the Snowy Mountains Highway Safety project as the department has identified these as a temporary service.

Source: Audit Office analysis.

The department revised its performance measures after June 2023. This included revising output targets for the mobile and Gig state programs. The updated performance targets can be seen in Exhibit 5. The mobile coverage program performance measure was changed to measure the contracted square kilometres of new coverage rather than the actual square kilometres of new coverage. At the same time, the target value increased from 36,000 square kilometres to 60,000 square kilometres. The target value for the Gig State program was also updated compared to the 2023–24 target.

Source: Department of Regional NSW.

The department had nearly achieved its December 2025 target for contracted upgrades to internet connectivity by June 2023. As can be seen in Exhibit 4, 13,330 premises were covered by signed contracts to deliver upgraded internet connectivity as at June 2023.

In early 2023, the department estimated that it would have 12,279 square kilometres of new or improved mobile coverage delivered by December 2025. The department advised that it is likely to deliver on this forecast as early as December 2024, through its co-funding of two ASP locations and 22 locations under the Commonwealth’s Mobile Back Spot Program 5A.

There is uncertainty around whether the data the department is using is reliable to measure its performance

The department is collecting or planning to collect data from grant recipients to determine whether they are delivering the intended projects to the required quality. The funding deeds contain obligations on the quality and extent of the services to be provided by grant recipients and require that the contracted organisations report to the department on the construction and the extent of coverage (new ground covered for the mobile towers and number of premises connected for internet coverage). This aligns with the output measures set out above. The department is not collecting information that it could use to inform outcome measurement as part of its grant funding deeds with each grant recipient.

Grant recipients provide the department with the data that it has requested in line with the terms of the funding deeds. This information is collected through a regular schedule of status reporting. These status reports include information on progress with internet or mobile coverage, including the number of premises that will be able to connect to a service.

Information on the availability of fixed fibre connections to premises should be reliable, as with the Wamboin, Bywong and Sutton project. However, data on the availability and quality of fixed wireless internet connectivity and mobile coverage is likely to vary with terrain. While the department is collecting this information, it currently has no plans or a formal process to undertake validation testing following each project completion. This means that the department will not be able to provide assurance that the information collected is accurate.

The department has not updated the expected benefits of the program despite significant changes in scope

In September 2021, following a review of the Gig State program, the department prepared an addendum to the original Gig State business case to change the program from capital expenditure to operational expenditure, and set out a range of other changes. The department’s addendum to the business case noted that the approach to delivering benefits would remain the same, and it did not revisit the benefits realisation register nor attempt to recalculate expected benefits. Given the significant scope changes in the business case addendum, it is likely that there would have been an impact on expected benefits that would justify recalculating the program benefits.

This was not the only time where significant changes in the Gig State program’s operations did not result in an updated benefits realisation register. As noted in the introduction, the RDCP budget was reduced in the 2023 budget, and the remaining budget was extended out to 2028. As discussed above, the change in budget coincided with the department’s decision to discontinue the LEO satellite pilot, which was anticipated to deliver 40% of the financial benefits of the program. The change in budget profile for the program has likely led to a change in the benefits profile of the program, however the department has not updated its program assumptions in line with this change.

The department has documented key lessons learned from its funding rounds to date

Documenting lessons learned from early delivery of any given program is important, particularly pilot programs, to ensure that these can be incorporated into future program development. The department has documented lessons learned across the two programs of the RDCP, including the early grant rounds.

For its Gig State program, the department documented lessons learned in relation to the management of grants, industry engagement, the grant guidelines, the assessment of grants, and the time that the grants went to market. These lessons include reinforcing positive experiences, such as releasing a list of preferred locations to applicants, which the department believes served to encourage funds to be directed to those areas. The department also identified potential improvements, including how it communicated with industry and the data that it would request from future applicants. There have been no grant programs run through the Gig State program since these lessons were documented so it is not yet clear whether the department will implement changes as a result of these lessons learned.

As noted above, the mobile coverage ASP pilot program was delivered across two phases: the first phase involved working with industry to determine potential technical solutions, and the second phase was a grant program to deliver the preferred solutions. The department commissioned a lessons learned report of the first phase of the ASP pilot program with the intention of using this to inform the mobile coverage ASP main program business case development. The lessons learned report and the mobile coverage ASP main program business case were both completed in the same month, however, meaning that lessons could not be fully incorporated into that business case. The department has also identified additional lessons learned specifically in relation to the grant process. There have been no grant programs run through the mobile coverage ASP main program since these lessons were documented so it is not yet clear whether the department will implement changes as a result of these lessons learned.

In addition, the department has conducted an internal audit on the governance of the RDCP. The internal audit had largely positive findings about the governance structures and the grant guidelines. The internal audit did not make findings on the governance issues outlined above, such as not having finalised terms of reference. However, the internal audit did note that not all probity advice had been documented and some had been provided verbally, which increased the risk of grant processes not being undertaken with integrity.

The department has planned evaluations for all grant programs within the RDCP

The department has a draft evaluation plan for the RDCP that includes evaluations for each program to validate whether they have achieved their objectives, as well as finalised evaluation plans for each of the programs. Both process and outcome evaluations are planned. Process evaluations ensure that planned processes were followed and that lessons are learned for future grant programs. The department is planning process evaluations for when all funding deeds have been signed and outcome evaluations are planned for after project delivery is largely complete.

The sub-programs have not yet reached the point where the department will undertake outcome evaluations. The department has indicated that the outcome evaluations will be undertaken when each project has been delivered, which means that while it will determine whether the project has achieved its objectives, it will not be measuring outcomes on an ongoing basis to determine whether changes are needed for the program to meet its objectives. The funding deeds with grant recipients make it clear that the department will undertake an evaluation and may collect relevant information for this purpose. While the department should be able to collect information, the limitations in data collection noted above may need to be resolved to ensure that required data is available.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #397 released 27 June 2024.

About this report

Financial audit results of the NSW public universities’ financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2023.

Audit findings

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all ten universities.

Eight universities reported net deficits. Three of these improved on their 2022 results.

Total fees and charges returned to pre-pandemic levels, with 40.5% earned from overseas students from three countries.

Employee related expenses increased 10.2% in 2023 mainly due to an additional 2,830 full time equivalent staff, in response to increased teaching and research activities.

Key issues

The number of findings reported to management has increased to 111 matters in 2023 up from 88 in 2022.

These included one high risk finding and 62 moderate risk findings, a 72% increase from last year.

Gaps identified in universities governance processes included delays in responding to findings and recommendations; staff not attesting compliance with codes of conduct annually; and not capturing and recording staff conflicts of interests within central registers.

Seven of the ten universities have cyber security risks above what they determine as an acceptable risk. Four universities did not have a cyber security uplift program.

Recommendations

Universities should address all recommendations made in the report (see Appendix one for a summary of these).

In particular, there should be a focus on prioritising remediation of wage underpayments to affected employees; ensuring a centralised conflict of interest register is maintained for all staff; considering emerging risks in university risk registers; ensuring controlled entities are considered when determining internal audit plans; and focusing efforts to improve cyber security risk management and cyber resilience capability.

This report provides NSW Parliament with the results of our 2023 financial audits of universities in New South Wales and their controlled entities, including analysis, observations and recommendations in the following areas:

• financial reporting
• internal controls and governance
• teaching and enrolments
• cyber security.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in university sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines audit observations related to the financial reporting of universities in NSW for 2023.

Appropriate financial controls help to ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making. Effective governance is essential for the stability, sustainability and ethical operation of universities. It ensures accountability, transparency and promotes responsible decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of NSW universities.

Our audits do not review all aspects of internal controls and governance every year. The more significant issues and risks are included in this chapter. These, along with the less significant matters, are reported to universities for management to address.

Universities' primary objectives are the functions of teaching and research. They invest most of their resources aiming to achieve quality outcomes in academia and student experience. Universities have committed to achieving certain government targets and compete to advance their reputation and their standing in international and Australian rankings.

This chapter outlines teaching and enrolment outcomes for universities in NSW for 2023.

This chapter of the report focuses on the cyber risk environment for universities, how universities have assessed that risk, what frameworks they use to strategically identify controls that respond to those risks, and the extent to which they have implemented or have plans to implement those controls. We also address some specific controls in respect of cyber resilience.

Appendix one – List of 2023 recommendations

Appendix two – Status of 2022 recommendations

Appendix three – Universities' controlled entities

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

About this report

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the Department of Communities and Justice (DCJ) in planning, designing, and overseeing the NSW child protection system.

The audit used 'follow the dollar' powers to assess the performance of five non-government organisations (NGOs), that were contracted to provide child protection services. More information about how we did this is included in the full report.

Findings

The NSW child protection system is inefficient, ineffective, and unsustainable.

Despite recommendations from numerous reviews, DCJ has not redirected its resources from a ‘crisis driven’ model, to an early intervention model that supports families at the earliest point in the child protection process.

DCJ's organisational structure and governance arrangements do not enable system reform.

DCJ has over 30 child protection governance committees with no clarity over how decisions are made or communicated, and no clarity about which part of DCJ is responsible for leading system improvement.

DCJ's assessments of child protection reports are labour intensive and repetitive, reducing the time that caseworkers have to support families with services.

DCJ has limited evidence to inform investments in family support services due to a lack of data about the therapeutic service needs of children and families. This means that DCJ is not able to provide relevant services for families engaged in the child protection system. DCJ is not meeting its legislated responsibility to ensure that families have access to services, and to prevent children from being removed to out of home care.

DCJ does not monitor the wellbeing of children in out of home care. This means that DCJ does not have the information needed to meet its legislative responsibility to ensure that children 'receive such care and protection as is necessary for their safety, welfare and well-being’.

In August 2023, there were 471 children living in costly and inappropriate environments, such as hotels, motels, and serviced apartments. The cost of this emergency accommodation in 2022–2023 was $300 million. DCJ has failed to establish ‘safe, nurturing, stable and secure’ accommodation for children in these environments.

Since 2018–19, the number of children being returned to their parents from out of home care has declined. During the five years to 2022–23, families have had limited access to restoration services to support this process.

Recommendations

The audit made 11 recommendations to DCJ. They require the agency to identify accountability for system reform, and to take steps to ensure that children and families have access to necessary services and support.

The child protection system aims to protect children and young people under 18 years old from risk of abuse, neglect, and harm. In NSW, child protection services can include investigations of alleged cases of child abuse or neglect, referrals to therapeutic services for family members, the issuing of care and protection orders, or the placement of children and young people in out of home care if it is deemed that they are unable to live safely in their family home.

A key activity in the child protection process is to determine whether a child is at ‘risk of significant harm’ as defined by Section 23 of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998. The Act describes significant harm as when ‘the child's or young person's basic physical or psychological needs are not being met or are at risk of not being met'. The Department of Communities and Justice (DCJ) has developed a process for determining risk of significant harm. It requires multiple assessments of child concern reports and at least two separate assessments of the child in the home. This process can take a number of months, and until all of these activities are complete, DCJ describes the child as suspected or presumed to be at risk of significant harm.

DCJ has primary responsibility for the child protection system in NSW. DCJ is both a provider of child protection services and a purchaser of child protection services from non-government organisations (NGOs). As system steward, DCJ has a role to establish the policy environment for child protection services and operations. In addition, DCJ is responsible for all governance and reporting arrangements for the commissioned NGOs that deliver services on its behalf, as well as for the governance and reporting arrangements of its own DCJ staff. DCJ must ensure that the child protection system is achieving its intended outcomes – to protect and support children in ways that meet their best interests - as described in legislation.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of DCJ’s planning, design, and oversight of the statutory child protection system in NSW. We assessed whether DCJ was effective in ensuring:

• there is quality information to understand and effectively plan for child protection services and responses
• there are effective processes to manage, support, resource, and coordinate child protection service models and staffing levels
• there is effective oversight of the quality and outputs of child protection services and drivers of continuous improvement.

To do this, the audit assessed the statutory child protection system with a particular focus on:

• initial desktop assessments and triaging of child protection reports
• family visits and investigations of child protection reports
• case management services and referrals to services
• the management of all types of care and protection orders
• the assessments and placements of children in out of home care.

The audit also assessed the performance of five NGOs that provide commissioned child protection services. Collectively, in 2021–2022, the five audited NGOs managed approximately 25% of all out of home care services in NSW. The policies, practices, and management reporting of the five NGOs was assessed for effectiveness in relation to the following:

• quality of data used to understand service requirements
• arrangements for operational service delivery to meet identified needs
• governance arrangements to deliver safe and quality out of home care services under contract arrangements with DCJ.

This audit was conducted concurrently with another audit: Safeguarding the rights of Aboriginal children in the child protection system.

The child protection system aims to protect children and young people (aged less than 18 years) from the risks of abuse, neglect, and harm. Child protection services can include investigations, (which may or may not lead to substantiated cases of child abuse or neglect), care and protection orders, and out of home care placements.

The Department of Communities and Justice (DCJ) has statutory responsibility for assessing whether a child or young person is in need of care and protection. DCJ’s Child Protection Helpline receives and assesses reports of possible child abuse or neglect. If the information in the report is assessed as meeting a threshold for risk of significant harm, DCJ caseworkers at Community Service Centres investigate the report and decide on a course of action. Follow-up actions can include referring the family to services, visiting the family to conduct ongoing risk and safety assessments of the child, or closing the case. If a child is determined to be unsafe, the child may be removed from the family home and placed in out of home care.

Non-government organisations (NGOs) are funded by the NSW Government to provide services to children and young people who require out of home care and other support services. NGOs provide approximately half of all out of home services in NSW, and DCJ provides the other half.

Government agencies such as Health, Education and Police also play a role in child protection processes, particularly in providing support for children and families where there are concerns about possible abuse or neglect. NSW Health provides some support services for families, along with the Department of Communities and Justice. Exhibit 1 shows some headline child protection statistics for NSW in 2022–2023.

Source: Audit Office summary of DCJ data on child protection statistics.

DCJ has not made progress in shifting the focus and resources of the child protection system to an early intervention model of care, as recommended by major system reviews

DCJ has not readjusted its resource profile so that its operating model can take a more preventative approach to child protection. A preventative approach requires significant early intervention and support for families and children soon after a child has been reported as being at risk of significant harm. This approach has been recommended by a number of reviews into the child protection system.

In 2015, the Independent Review of Out of Home Care in New South Wales recommended an investment approach that uses client data and cost-effective, evidence-based interventions to reduce entries to out of home care and improve outcomes for families and children.

The NSW Government response to the Independent Review of Out of Home Care in New South Wales was a program entitled: Their Futures Matter. This program commenced in November 2016 and was intended to place vulnerable children and families at the heart of services through targeted investment of resources and services. A 2020 report from our Audit Office found that ‘while important foundations were laid and new programs trialled, the key objective of establishing an evidence-based whole of government early intervention program … was not achieved. The majority of $380 million in investment funding remained tied to existing agency programs, with limited evidence of their comparative effectiveness.’

DCJ’s expenditure since 2018–2019 shows that most additional funding has been used to address budget shortfalls for out of home care, and to expand the numbers of frontline case workers. Budget increases show that during the period from 2018–2019 to 2022–2023, DCJ’s expenditure on out of home care increased by 36%, and expenditure on caseworkers increased by 26%. DCJ’s expenditure on family support services, including early intervention and intensive support services, increased by 31% during the audit period.

These resourcing priorities indicate that DCJ has not shifted its focus or expenditure in ways which reorient the child protection system. DCJ has not dedicated sufficient resources to early intervention, and therapeutic support for families and children, in order to implement the recommended changes made by systemwide child protection reviews.

In 2019, the Family is Culture Review recommended increased investment in early intervention support services to prevent more Aboriginal children entering out of home care, with a preference for these services to be delivered by Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations. Progress towards enhancing a culturally appropriate service profile has been limited. DCJ last published progress against the Family is Culture recommendations in August 2021, when it reported that projects to increase financial investment in early intervention services were under review.

Data from March 2023 shows that 89% of the DCJ-funded, family support service volume across NSW is delivered by mainstream providers compared with ten per cent provided by Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations, and one per cent by culturally specific providers. Given that Aboriginal children make up approximately half of all children in out of home care, there is still significant work required to shift the service profile.

DCJ’s governance arrangements are not structured in a way that ensures transparency and accountability for system reform activity and service improvements

DCJ’s organisational structure reflects multiple operational and policy functions across its three branches - the Commissioning Branch, the Operational Branch, and the branch responsible for Transforming Aboriginal Outcomes. Some branches have responsibility for similar functions, and it is not clear where overall executive-level accountability resides for system reform. For example, all three branches have a policy function, and there is no single line of organisational responsibility for this function, and no indication about which branch is responsible for driving system reform.

DCJ has over 30 governance committees and working groups with responsibilities for leadership and oversight of the statutory child protection and out of home care system. DCJ’s governance committees include forums to provide corporate and operational direction, to make financial and resourcing decisions, and to provide leadership and program oversight over the different functions of child protection and out of home care. Some committees and working groups oversee DCJ’s activity to meet government strategic priorities and respond to the findings and recommendations of child protection and out of home care reviews and commissions of inquiry.

Much of DCJ’s work in child protection and out of home care is interdependent, but its governance arrangements have not been structured in a way that show the lines of communication across the Department. There is no roadmap to show the ways in which decisions are communicated across the various operational and corporate segments of DCJ’s child protection and out of home care business operations.

In 2022, DCJ commenced activity to reorganise its operational committees into a four-tier structure, with each tier representing a level in the hierarchy of authority, decision-making and oversight. Draft documents indicate the ways in which the new organisational structure will facilitate communication through the different business areas of DCJ to the Operations Committee where most of the high-level decisions are made or authorised before being referred to the Executive Board for sign off. The new governance arrangements indicate a more transparent process for identifying Department and divisional priorities across policy and programs, though the process for reforming governance processes was not complete at the time of this audit.

DCJ’s strategic planning documents do not contain plans to address the pressure points in the child protection system or address the increasing costs of out of home care. After the merger of the Department of Family and Community Services (FACS) and the Department of Justice, DCJ’s Strategic Directions 2020–2024 document sets out the direction for the expanded Department in generalised terms. While it describes DCJ’s values, and describes an intention to improve outcomes for Aboriginal people and reduce domestic and family violence, it does not contain enough detail to describe a blueprint for Departmental action.

In April 2023, DCJ published a Child Safe Action Plan for 2023 to 2027. This plan includes a commitment to hear children’s voices and to ‘improve organisational cultures, operations and environment to prevent child abuse’. In September 2023, the NSW Government committed to develop ‘long-term plans to reform the child protection system and repair the budget, as part of its plan to rebuild essential services and take pressure off families and businesses'. Any activity to implement these commitments was not able to be audited, as it was too soon to assess progress at the time of this report publication.

DCJ’s expenditure priorities predominantly reinforce its longstanding operating model – to focus on risk assessments and out of home care services rather than early intervention

More than 60% of DCJ’s budget for child protection is spent on out of home care. In the five years from 2018–2019, DCJ’s expenditure on out of home care increased by 36% from $1.39 billion in 2018−19 to $1.9 billion in 2022–23.

During the same timeframe, DCJ’s expenditure on risk report assessments and interventions at the Helpline and Community Service Centres increased by 25%. It grew from $640 million in 2018–2019 to $800 million in 2022–2023. This not only reinforced the existing model of child protection, it expanded upon it, at the expense of other activity.

While DCJ’s expenditure on family support services increased by 31% from $309 million in 2018–2019 to $405 million in 2022–2023, it remains a small component of DCJ’s overall expenditure at 13% of the total budget spend in 2022−2023, as shown at Exhibit 6.

Note: Expenditure is actual spending in each year, not adjusted for inflation. Totals may be more than the sum of components due to rounding. percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding.

Source: Audit Office analysis of Productivity Commission data published in Reports on Government Services 2024, Table 16A.8.

DCJ has not done enough to support the transition of Aboriginal children to the Aboriginal community controlled sector as planned

In 2012, the NSW Government made a policy commitment to ensure the transfer of all Aboriginal children in out of home care to Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations. DCJ acknowledges that over the past 12 years, the NSW Government has made limited progress in facilitating this transition.

In June 2023, a total of 1,361 children were managed by Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations across NSW. At the same time, 1,746 Aboriginal children were being case managed by non-Aboriginal NGO providers, and 3,456 Aboriginal children were case managed by DCJ. In total there were 5,202 Aboriginal children waiting to be transferred to Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations in June 2023.

The transition process was planned and intended to occur over a ten year timeframe from 2012 to 2022. This has not been successful. DCJ has revised its timeframes for the transition process, and now aims to see the transfer of the ‘majority’ of Aboriginal children to Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations by June 2026. At the current rate of transition, it would take over 50 years to transfer all 5,202 children to Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations, so this timeframe is ambitious and will require close monitoring by DCJ.

The cost of transitioning all 5,202 Aboriginal children from DCJ and the non-Aboriginal NGOs to the Aboriginal Community Controlled sector will add close to $135 million to the NSW Government out of home care budget. The increased costs are due to the higher costs of administration, accreditation, and oversight of services provided by the Aboriginal Community Controlled sector.

DCJ has prioritised the transfer of Aboriginal children from non-Aboriginal NGOs to Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations before the transfer of Aboriginal children from DCJ’s management. This prioritisation is due, in part, to the fact that most of the non-Aboriginal carers of Aboriginal children are with NGOs. NGO contract requirements should have been one of the drivers of the transition of Aboriginal children to Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations.

The most recent NGO contracts, issued in October 2022, required that NGOs develop an Aboriginal Community Controlled transition plan by 31 December 2022. This timeframe was extended to 30 June 2023. All of the NGOs we audited have now prepared detailed transition plans for the transition of Aboriginal children, including service plans that identify risks and document collaborative efforts with Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations.

One important requirement in the success of the transitions, is the willingness of carers to switch from their existing NGO provider to an Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisation. During the period of this audit DCJ failed to provide sufficient information to carers, to assure them of the NSW Government’s commitment to the transition process. Since July 2023 DCJ has written to carers of Aboriginal children case managed by non-Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations and provided them with more information about the transition process.

NGOs have had limited success in transitioning Aboriginal children to Aboriginal services, and can do more to report on activity, so that system improvements can be made

Non-Aboriginal NGOs have had limited success in transferring Aboriginal children to the Aboriginal-controlled out of home care sector. For example, of the approximately 1,700 Aboriginal children that were managed by non-Aboriginal providers in 2022–2023, 25 Aboriginal children were transferred from non-Aboriginal NGOs to Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations in that year. While DCJ controls the key drivers in this transition, there is limited evidence that NGOs have initiated consultations with Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations during the audit period.

NGOs advised that some of their carers do not want to transition to Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations, and this is slowing the transfer process. NGO contracts in force until September 2022 required that: ‘The express agreement of carers must be sought prior to the transfer of an Aboriginal Child to an Aboriginal Service Provider.’ This audit was not able to verify the extent to which carers have resisted the move to Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations.

DCJ did not provide NGOs with sufficient direction, coordination, or governance through its contract arrangements to effect transitions from non-Aboriginal NGOs to Aboriginal NGOs. DCJ has established a project control group with representatives from NGO peak bodies and has set up an internal program management office to manage the transition.

There are limited drivers for the transition of Aboriginal children to Aboriginal-controlled services, and financial risks for both Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations and non-Aboriginal NGOs in the process

Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations and non-Aboriginal NGOs are carrying significant financial risk due to a lack of certainty in the transition process of Aboriginal children to the Aboriginal Community Controlled sector. These agencies are responsible for planning and making changes to their business models in order to facilitate the transition process. DCJ does not provide funds for this activity.

Some non-Aboriginal NGOs have high numbers of Aboriginal children in their care. These agencies risk financial viability if children and their carers are transitioned in a short space of time. There is a degree of uncertainty about the timelines for transitions to Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations, and the numbers of children that will be transitioned at any given time.

Non-Aboriginal NGOs are not in a position to require Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations to take Aboriginal children. Similarly, Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations cannot compel the transition of children to their care. There are no real system drivers for this activity, and some financial disincentives for NGOs supporting large Aboriginal caseloads.

Throughout 2023, some Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations have been upscaling their businesses to prepare for the transition of Aboriginal children to their care. They have employed additional caseworkers and enhanced administrative and infrastructure arrangements to take on new children, without receiving new intakes. They report that they have been financially disadvantaged by the failure of the transition process. Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations advise that they don’t expect confirmation of the child transition process and timelines until 2024 and must carry the financial consequences of upscaling.

DCJ does not collect sufficient data to assess the effectiveness of its child protection service interventions and does not know whether they lead to improved outcomes

DCJ does not collect sufficient information to understand whether its child protection risk and safety interventions are effective in protecting children from abuse, neglect, exploitation, and violence.

DCJ is the sole entity with responsibility to make assessments of children after there has been a child protection report. After a child has been reported, DCJ caseworkers conduct a range of assessments of the child and family context, to determine whether the child is at risk of significant harm. If DCJ caseworkers determine that a child is ‘in need of care and protection,’ Section 34 of the Care Act requires DCJ to ‘take whatever action is necessary to safeguard and promote the safety, welfare and well-being of the child or young person’, including ‘providing, or arranging for the provision of, support services for the child or young person and his or her family’.

DCJ has limited measures to assess the effectiveness of its service interventions. DCJ monitors and reports on the number of children who are re-reported within 12 months after receiving a DCJ caseworker intervention. However, DCJ does not monitor or report any comparative data that would potentially demonstrate the effectiveness of its service interventions. For example, DCJ does not collate and publish data on re-report rates of children who do not receive a DCJ service intervention. This comparative data would give DCJ greater understanding about the effectiveness of its service interventions.

In addition, DCJ’s re-report data does not differentiate between re-reports of children that are substantiated, from those that are not. Children can be re-reported for a variety of reasons. Some re-reports are of children who are not at increased risk of significant harm. Therefore, the current re-report data is a limited measure of the effectiveness of DCJ’s service interventions.

DCJ does not collect data or compare outcomes based on the kinds of services that are accessed by children and families. For example, DCJ does not report on instances where families were denied service interventions because support services were full, or did not exist in their region. DCJ does not collect data or report on children who were taken into out of home care in areas where there were no available services to support the family.

DCJ caseworkers can support families by making referrals to drug and alcohol rehabilitation services, family violence services, parenting support courses, or mental health services. It is not known whether families receive services that are relevant to their needs. Some services are offered as additional DCJ caseworker support, some are NGO funded support packages, some offer therapeutic interventions, and some are provided via external government agency services, such as NSW Health. Support services are highly rationed in NSW, and many families engaged in the child protection system do not have access to them.

Limited outcomes data and reporting means that DCJ cannot demonstrate how its actions and service interventions are reducing risks and harms to children, and promoting their safety, welfare, and wellbeing in line with the Care Act.

While child protection reports have significantly increased over the past ten years, around 40% do not meet the threshold for suspected abuse and neglect to warrant a response

The overall number of child protection reports received by the Helpline has increased significantly over the past ten years. Reports to the Helpline ensure that children at risk of significant harm come to the attention of DCJ, but around 40% of reports do not meet the threshold of abuse and neglect to warrant a child protection report and response from child protection caseworkers. DCJ has finite resources, and responding to reports that do not require intervention reduces the capacity of DCJ to effectively respond to children who are at risk of significant harm.

In 2022–2023, the Helpline received 404,611 concern reports, an increase of over 60% since 2012–2013 when there were 246,173 reports. Between 2012–2013 and 2017–2018, reports grew slowly, then increased rapidly for three following years up until 2021. While the number of Helpline reports fell in 2021–2022, this reduction was partly due to a drop in reports by teachers during COVID school closures, and was not maintained in 2022–2023.

DCJ attributes the rapid growth in child protection reports to increasing awareness amongst mandatory reporters about their statutory responsibilities to report, along with the introduction of the online reporting option. Mandatory reporters include medical practitioners, psychologists, teachers, social workers, and police officers. These personnel are legally required to report children that they suspect are at risk of significant harm. In one 3-month period from April to June 2021 there were over 40,000 reports from mandatory reporters that did not meet the threshold that activates a statutory child protection response from DCJ caseworkers. The assessment of these reports consumes significant resources, costing over $4 million during the three month period in 2021, which equates to over $15 million per annum.

In 2010, Child Wellbeing Units were established so that mandatory reporters from Education, Police and Health could be assisted in child protection reporting. The units were established in response to recommendations made by the Wood Special Commission of Inquiry into Child Protection Services. They aimed to reduce the number of reports to the Helpline and to support mandatory reporters to assist children and families to receive an appropriate response. DCJ managers advise that the units are underutilised, and mandatory reporters continue to submit reports to the Helpline. The Child Wellbeing Units have not successfully reduced the overall number of reports to the Helpline.

DCJ advised that it is evaluating the Child Wellbeing Units and is developing new guidance for mandatory reporters that aims to address the culture of over-reporting.

Exhibit 7 shows the ten years of Helpline reports from 2012–2013 to 2022–2023.

DCJ does not collate or analyse its service referral data, and as a result, is unable to commission relevant services for families engaged in the child protection system

DCJ lacks data to understand the supply and demand requirements for therapeutic services across the child protection system. DCJ does not collect or report aggregate data about service referrals for children and families, nor does DCJ report data about service uptake across its Districts. DCJ does not collect the necessary information to plan for commissioned therapeutic services, or to fill its service gaps. DCJ does not know whether its funded services are competing with, or complimentary to, services funded by other agencies.

DCJ is required to monitor its therapeutic service interventions in order to comply with the objectives and principles of the Care Act. The Care Act requires that ‘appropriate assistance is rendered to parents and other persons … in the performance of their child-rearing responsibilities in order to promote a safe and nurturing environment’, and that any intervention ‘must … promote the child’s or young person’s development.

DCJ does not collect reliable data on the success of service referrals after a child has been identified as being at risk of significant harm. DCJ does not collect information or report on the uptake and outcomes of its referrals where there is a low to intermediate risk of significant harm to the child or young person. In most cases, DCJ does not know whether children or families received a therapeutic service after a referral. The uptake of referrals is voluntary, and families may decide that they do not want to access therapeutic services. DCJ does not routinely record data about the numbers of families that decline services.

DCJ does not collect data on instances where a referral was needed but not made because there was no available service in the District or there were no available places in the service. It is well known within DCJ that therapeutic services are lacking in regional and remote NSW. These include poor access to paediatricians and adolescent psychiatrists, disability assessors, mental health services, alcohol and other drug rehabilitation services, and domestic violence services.

Over the past five years, there is no evidence that DCJ has conducted an assessment of the statewide therapeutic service needs of children and families in NSW, or matched its statewide service profile to these needs through the targeted commissioning of therapeutic services. There has been a lack of system stewardship to ensure there is equity of service access for children and families in all Districts.

In each District, Commissioning and Planning units undertake market analyses at the point when programs are due for recommissioning, generally every three to five years. This market analysis includes an assessment of the availability of local services. There is no consistency in how this work is done across the Districts. While the purpose of District-level, market analysis is to identify gaps and opportunities for services, we did not find evidence of services being newly commissioned where gaps were identified.

District-level Commissioning and Planning units conduct some assessment of the demographics of the local area, as well as information about socio-economic characteristics, and expected population growth. For example, one DCJ District identified that their population is expected to grow by 33% by 2031. This means that more contracts for family preservation places will be needed. Another District identified that they do not have culturally appropriate services. However, the contracts for this District are in place for at least three years, so the District cannot provide the required service profile for local families.

While DCJ is taking some steps to arrange an expanded service profile, the efforts are piecemeal. Different programs are managed and commissioned across different parts of DCJ. For example, one District has developed a localised partnership with the Ministry of Health, but DCJ has not developed a state-wide Memorandum of Understanding with NSW Health to give priority access to all children engaged in the statutory child protection system.

In 2015, the Independent Review of Out of Home Care in New South Wales recommended that DCJ ‘establish local cross-agency boards in each … district to provide local advice, and commission services in line with its priorities and defined outcomes.’ In response, DCJ developed a program known as Their Futures Matter. In 2020, the NSW Audit Office’s assessed this program and found that DCJ had not established any cross-agency boards with the power to commission services. At the time of this audit, in 2024, there is no evidence that DCJ has created cross-agency boards.

DCJ advises that, in future, it plans to issue extra contracts to increase the number of intensive therapeutic care services. DCJ is using data on the locations of children in emergency out of home care placements as part of its needs analysis. The process includes mapping the service system across the State. DCJ’s work to date, has identified a lack of intensive therapeutic care places in Western NSW. The lack of services in Western NSW impacts on the ability of DCJ to keep Aboriginal children on their traditional country, and connected to family and kin.

DCJ is using District-level data in its future-focused recommissioning for family preservation services. DCJ advises that, commencing in 2024, the agency will identify family support service requirements by matching data on instances of risk of significant harm to children by category of harm, and assess service availability at the District level. This audit has not received evidence that the work has begun.

DCJ lacks an integrated performance management system to collect, collate, and compare data about the effectiveness of NGO providers or the outcomes of child support programs

DCJ does not have an integrated performance management system to manage its many programs and contracts with NGO service providers. DCJ advises that at March 2024, it had 1,816 active contracts in its contract management system. DCJ has multiple reporting systems for its different program streams, with information on early intervention programs provided through a different information technology system than the system that is used for out of home care placements. Central program teams do not have good oversight of historical data or trends.

Until 2022, data related to DCJ’s Family Preservation Program was collected separately from each NGO provider, via quarterly spreadsheets. There was no consistency in the ways in which the data was collated or analysed. This means that DCJ does not know how many families entered the Brighter Futures program in each District, even though contracts were issued at a District level and over 7,000 families entered Brighter Futures program in 2018–2019, 2019–2020 and 2020–2021. DCJ does not have a statewide view of the location or effectiveness of this, or any of its other family preservation services.

Contracts with NGOs for out of home care contain service volume requirements, for example a minimum number of children in out of home care each year. Contracts also include performance measures and financial penalties for underperformance. Underperformance includes failure to notify DCJ about out of home care placement changes within contracted time periods. Due to problems with NGOs accessing the ChildStory system, DCJ does not collect reliable data on out of home care placements provided by NGOs and therefore DCJ is not able to issue financial penalties.

DCJ has also failed to deliver expected outcomes from the Human Services Dataset. The dataset was recommended by the 2015 Independent Review of Out of Home Care, and approved by the NSW Government in August 2016. The aim of the dataset was to bring together a range of service demand data in order to prioritise support for the most vulnerable children and families. It was intended to deliver whole-of-system reform that would lead to improved outcomes for children and families with the highest needs.

The dataset brings together 27 years of data, and over seven million records about children, young people, and families. The records contain de-identified information about all NSW residents born on or after 1 January 1990 (the Primary Cohort) and their relatives such as family members, guardians, and carers (the Secondary Cohort). The Independent Review of Out of Home Care recommended that the dataset include information about the service requirements of the most vulnerable families. This recommendation has not been implemented to date. The Human Services Dataset does not contain records about the service interventions made by NGOs, and has minimal child protection and out of home care placement data.

DCJ’s package-based funding system has not been successful in tailoring services to children in out of home care

When a child is transferred to an NGO for out of home care services, DCJ provides the NGO with relevant funding packages to support the child. NGOs receive different funding packages according to the care needs of the child. Some packages relate to the placement of the child, whether it be a foster care placement, or an intensive therapeutic care placement for children with complex needs. Other packages relate to the permanency goals for each child. These goals can include restoring the child to their parents, establishing the child in long-term foster care, or supporting the child through an adoption process. Each funding package is based on an average cost for the different service type.

While the funding packages are attached to individual children, in practice, NGOs can allocate this funding flexibly. NGOs can integrate the funds from the packages into their global budgets and use the funds for a range of activities. The package-based system that was intended to deliver tailored services to individual children in out of home care, is not being implemented in the ways it was intended.

NGOs do not receive funding for administrative or management costs. They are not funded for supporting Children’s Court work, or the recruitment of new foster carers. NGOs calculate how much they need for these different activities, and use the required funds from funding packages and other sources of income.

DCJ does not collect data from NGOs to determine the nature of the services that were delivered to the child against the funding for each package. In fact, NGOs are not required to report on the expenditure of package funds in relation to any outcomes that relate to the child’s health, wellbeing, cultural, or educational needs.

An external evaluation of the permanency support package system was completed in 2023. It found that children receiving permanency support packages did not achieve better outcomes than children in a control group who did not receive them. This indicates that the package-based system has not achieved its objective to shift the out of home care system from a bed per night payment model, to a child-centred funding model, aimed at supporting safety, wellbeing, and permanency in out of home care.

DCJ’s contract arrangements for NGO funding are overly complex and administratively burdensome

NGO recipients of package-based funding must liaise with separate DCJ contract managers for the different types of funding packages they receive. Within each DCJ District, a range of contract managers have oversight of the different package types – including the packages for out of home care placements, and for the family preservation program. In addition, many NGOs have contracts in more than one DCJ District. This means that NGOs must liaise with a number of different contract managers and operational teams across different units in multiple DCJ Districts. NGOs advise that the time spent navigating the DCJ system reduces the time they can spend actively supporting children and families.

NGOs report that DCJ District personnel can vary in their preferred communication styles and channels. Some District staff prefer email contact, others prefer phone calls, and some prefer service requests that are entered into ChildStory. NGOs must adapt to these different styles depending on the District.

DCJ Districts also vary in the processes that NGOs must follow to have a child’s needs reassessed. This is a routine process, but some Districts take three months to consider and approve a reassessment, while others complete the process more rapidly. If a child is reassessed as requiring a higher category of support, DCJ does not back-pay any increased allowances. This is regardless of the time during which the NGO has provided the child with increased services. In these Districts, NGOs must carry the financial burden for the time it takes for re-assessment approval processes.

The NSW Procurement Policy Framework includes an objective of ‘easy to do business’. This includes a requirement to pay suppliers within specific timeframes, and recommends that government agencies should limit contract length and complexity.

An external evaluation of the package-based system found that that the funding packages are complex and administratively burdensome, and that DCJ Districts have different models and approaches to implementing them. As a result, a child and family living in one District could receive very different care from a child in another District. In 2023, DCJ advised that it is considering the recommendations of the evaluation with the aim of operationalising relevant system reforms, while not increasing the administrative burden on NGOs.

Exhibit 16 shows the multiple stages that NGOs must navigate in DCJ’s complex, contract environment.

DCJ’s case management system lacks an effective business to business interface with NGO partners, and has not produced data on key deliverables

DCJ’s case management system promised a single entry point for NGOs to interact with DCJ. In 2017, DCJ commenced the rollout of ChildStory, its new case management system, at a cost of more than $130 million. While the ChildStory system has become an important repository for information about children in the child protection system, it has failed to deliver on some of its key intended functionalities. ChildStory does not provide an integrated business to business system interface with commissioned NGOs where they can record information about children and families in their care.

Most of the ChildStory system is locked off to NGOs, meaning that NGOs cannot use it as a case management system. NGO personnel must enter data into their own client information systems before manually replicating any required data into the ChildStory system. Until June 2022, NGO staff lost access to ChildStory if they did not log onto the system for a three month period, and staff had to reapply for access, increasing the administrative burden on some NGO personnel.

The lack of an integrated business to business interface between DCJ’s ChildStory and the NGO case management systems, has vastly increased levels of administrative handling for all parties, and frequently results in mismatched data between DCJ and NGOs. The process for NGOs to correct data errors in ChildStory requires contact with DCJ, and the process can be protracted. NGOs advise that they spend significant time on complex data reconciliation processes and that these processes have financial implications. In some instances, NGOs are asked to repay contract ‘underspends’ as a result of DCJ data errors.

The lack of system interface between DCJ and NGOs has been a lost opportunity to produce and report NGO trend data on a wide range of metrics. While some data is manually entered by NGOs into ChildStory Partner, and some systemwide data produced, it is only available for a limited number of key performance indicators. For example, it was intended that ChildStory would be used to collect and collate information about the status and wellbeing of children. According to DCJ, this has not been possible, as the system does not have the functionality to collate data from questionnaires or instruments that assess child wellbeing.

Given that many of the smaller NGO data systems have limited sophistication and functionality, the failure of ChildStory to become a case management system for all NGOs, means they are not able to produce trend data on a wider range of metrics. The inability to collate key data from all NGO service providers limits the statewide data that is available for service planning.

Until 2022−2023, DCJ did not contribute all required data to a national, publicly-reported dataset on child protection. The Australian Institute for Health and Wellbeing (AIHW) collates data from Australian states and territories every year. Child protection information is published on the AIHW website and provided to the Productivity Commission for the annual Report on Government Services. Since 2014−2015, AIHW requested that all states and territories provide anonymised child-level data for reporting and research purposes. DCJ did not provide this requested child-level data until 2022−2023. In previous years, DCJ provided the AIHW with aggregated data tables that lacked some of the required information.

ChildStory has not been effective for the contract management of NGOs and commissioned services. The system cannot be used to report and generate information about NGO contract activity, nor can it be used to make payments to NGOs.

Caseworkers advise that they spend significant time updating the case management system, limiting the time they have for child and family visits

DCJ has not quantified the amount of time that staff spend entering information and updating records. While DCJ completed a time and motion study on caseworker activity in 2021, the study did not include information on the time it takes for caseworkers to enter data for individual tasks. The DCJ caseworkers who were interviewed for this audit, advised that they spend a large proportion of their total working week entering data into the case management system, rather than visiting families or providing phone support to families.

DCJ’s ChildStory system does not display all of the summary information that caseworkers need in order to be efficient and effective in their role. For example, triage caseworkers need to know when a report was made to the Helpline, in order to meet the statutory period for response of 28 days after the report was received. This information is not shown in the triage transfer list and is only visible by clicking into case notes for each child, one at a time.

ChildStory does not contain accurate information about decisions made by frontline staff. Caseworkers are required to choose a reason when they close a child protection case. Reasons can include that the family was referred to an external service. There is no field for a caseworker to indicate that a case was closed because the child protection report related to a person who was external to the family. ChildStory does not have a case closure field to record that the parents were protective in instances when a child was at risk from someone outside the home. These cases are closed with the reason ‘No capacity to allocate’, resulting in inaccurate management reporting. This incorrect record keeping can be problematic for the family. It can mean that if the child is re-reported, there may be unnecessary interventions by DCJ in future.

DCJ advises that ChildStory is not being used to its full functionality and that District DCJ Offices have created arrangements that increase the administrative burden on staff. For example, in some Districts before a caseworker can submit an approval request in ChildStory to the relevant Director, the caseworker must attach an email with the same Director’s written approval. DCJ managers advise that ChildStory is not being used in ways that would allow for efficient approvals of ‘out of guidelines’ expenses. It is not known whether this is a training deficit, or related to another matter.

Up until recently, DCJ’s information management system did not have functionality to record and collate information about the service needs of children and families. DCJ advises that in 2022, a referral function was added to ChildStory. While DCJ advise that this functionality is being used for referrals to family preservation services, there is no evidence that caseworkers are using the function, or that referral data is collated and reported. Prior to July 2022, decisions to refer a child or family to therapeutic services were recorded in individual ChildStory case notes, and could not be extracted and reported as trend data.

Some Districts have developed local monitoring systems to track vacancies in local family preservation and targeted early intervention services. These local initiatives go some way to improving the planning for child protection services responses at the local level, but they are yet to be systematised.

DCJ advises that it is developing a service vacancy dashboard and it is due to be rolled out to all Districts in late 2023. In order for service information to be visible to DCJ staff, NGO partner agencies will need to regularly update their service vacancy information in the dashboard. Initially DCJ will collect data on which families were referred to services, and NGOs will be expected to enter information on attendance at program sessions at a later date.

DCJ has management reporting systems to track activity and outputs for child protection work, however some key metrics are missing

DCJ’s interactive internal dashboards effectively report against an agreed performance framework that measures caseworker activity. This provides DCJ managers with caseworker progress against targets such as seeing new children and families within specified timeframes. Managers can drill into the dashboard data to see individual cases and the caseworkers behind the numbers. This assists managers in allocating new cases to their frontline staff. While DCJ managers advise that they use the dashboards on a daily or weekly basis, they raised concerns that dashboards did not account for staff vacancies or new recruits who cannot carry a full caseload.

DCJ dashboards do not allow managers to focus on groups of children who are at greater risk of harm, or on children who require a tailored service. This limits the effectiveness of DCJ’s response. While Aboriginal children are identified on most internal dashboards, there are gaps in the identification of Aboriginal children, especially at the early Helpline assessments of child protection reports and at the initial caseworker assessment of child safety and risk. There is no indication in DCJ’s system to show whether a family has experienced intergenerational removal, despite these families needing a specific trauma-informed response. Children from Culturally and Linguistically Diverse (CALD) backgrounds are not reported clearly on dashboards and refugee children are not flagged.

Children and parents with disability are not identified accurately in ChildStory and are not reported on dashboards. The Disability Royal Commission found that parents with disability are over-represented in all stages of the child protection system, and that they are more likely to have their children removed from their care. The Commission found that child protection agencies are less likely to try to place children back in the care of parents with disability.

DCJ data is stored in a Corporate Information Warehouse, which combines child protection data and data about children in out of home care. This information is sourced from ChildStory. The Corporate Information Warehouse also includes staffing data, and contract management data from the Contracting Online Management System. The Warehouse is updated every night to ensure that management reports and dashboards are current. However, some key datasets are not included in the Warehouse, such as the Helpline report backlog, which means that the DCJ Executive does not have easy visibility of Helpline workload or delays in responding to electronic reports.

DCJ’s external dashboards provide limited public transparency about child protection and out of home care activity. Until early 2024 the dashboards did not show the numbers of children in emergency out of home care. In addition, the main quarterly and annual dashboards do not show the average time that children have been in out of home care. 

External reporting is managed by DCJ’s Insights Analysis and Research directorate, known as FACSIAR. In addition to quarterly and annual dashboards reporting key statistics, FACSIAR hosts monthly seminars presenting research findings aimed at improving caseworker practice. The seminars are well attended by DCJ and NGO caseworkers. FACSIAR also maintains a public evidence hub summarising research papers and evaluations.

While regular quantitative data is necessary for day-to-day management purposes, it is not sufficient to understand the experience and outcomes of children in out of home care. In order to deliver additional insights, DCJ has invested in a long-term study of children in out of home care through the Pathways of Care Longitudinal Study. This study follows children who entered care in NSW for the first time between May 2010 and October 2011 and includes data from external sources such as Medicare data, health and education records, and youth offending data. DCJ has used this data for research studies on topics such as outcomes for children with disability in out of home care, and to assist caseworkers in working with children and families through Evidence to Action notes.

DCJ’s system for requesting out of home care placements is ineffective, resulting in multiple unsuccessful requests to NGOs to place children

DCJ does not have a centralised system where its NGO service providers can indicate that they are able to take on new children requiring out of home care. There are almost 50 providers of out of home care services across the State, but no consolidated database showing that there are foster carers who are able to take on new children by location.

DCJ uses a system (known as the broadcast system) to notify NGOs that it needs a foster care placement or another placement type for a child. The number of placement broadcasts has increased from around 450 per month in 2018–2019, to over 1200 per month in 2022–2023, even though the number of children in out of home care has not risen during this timeframe.

Exhibit 17 shows the monthly numbers of children that were ‘broadcast’ to NGOs as requiring out of home care placements from July 2018 to June 2023.

Appendix one – Response from entities

Appendix two – DCJ Organisational Structure for Child Protection

Appendix three – Child protection flowchart from Family is culture review report 2019

Appendix four – About the audit

Appendix five – Performance auditing

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Parliamentary reference - Report number #394 - released 6 June 2024