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Planned

Actions for Water management and regulation

Water management and regulation

Planning
Environment
Compliance
Fraud
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Regulation
Service delivery

Water regulation aims to achieve sustainable environmental, economic and social outcomes from the management of water resources, consistent with the Water Management Act 2000. Following recommendations from reviews into water theft, reforms were made to strengthen water regulation, compliance and enforcement – including the establishment of the Natural Resources Access Regulator (NRAR) in 2018. The Department of Planning and Environment shares responsibility for issuing water access licences and approvals with the state-owned corporation, WaterNSW.

This audit could assess how effectively the Department, WaterNSW and NRAR are undertaking relevant planning, licensing and regulatory functions to ensure secure, sustainable and transparent water sharing in New South Wales. This topic could also consider how effectively the Department has implemented reforms to enhance water metering technology and rules, and the efficacy of NRAR’s activities to support this program.

Published

Actions for Universities 2020 audits

Universities 2020 audits

Universities
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance

What the report is about

Results of the financial statement audits of the public universities in NSW for the year ended 31 December 2020.

What we found

Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all ten universities.

Two universities reported retrospective corrections of prior period errors.

Universities were impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic with student enrolments decreasing in 2020 compared to 2019 by 10,032 (3.3 per cent). Of this decrease 8,310 students were from overseas.

In response to the pandemic, each university provided welfare support, created student hardship funds, provided accommodation and flexibility on payment of course fees. State and Commonwealth governments provided additional support to the sector.

Six universities recorded negative net operating results in 2020 (two in 2019). The combined revenues of the ten universities from fees and charges decreased by $361 million (5.8 per cent).

Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, which will continue to impact the financial results of universities in 2021, enrolments of overseas students in semester one of 2021 increased at two universities. This growth meant that total overseas student enrolments increased by 7,944 or 5.8 per cent across the sector as a whole. However, eight universities experienced decreases in overseas student enrolments compared to semester one of 2020. All universities have experienced growth in domestic student enrolments.

What the key issues were

There were 110 findings reported to universities in audit management letters.

Three high risk findings were identified. One related to the continued work by the University of New South Wales to assess its liability for underpayment of casual staff entitlements. The other two deficiencies were at Charles Sturt University, relating to financial reporting implications of major contracts, and resolving issues identified by an internal review of its employment contracts to reliably quantify the university’s liability to its employees.

What we recommended

Universities should prioritise actions to address repeat findings. Forty-five findings were repeated from 2019, of which 23 related to information technology.

Fast facts

There are ten public universities in NSW with 51 local controlled entities and 23 overseas controlled entities.

  • $10.9bn Total combined revenue in 2020, a decrease of $538.5 million (4.7 per cent) from 2019.
  • 106,984 Overseas student enrolments in 2020, a decrease of 8,310 students (7.2 per cent) from 2019.
  • 3 High risk management letter findings were identified.
  • $11.0bn Total combined expenditure in 2020, a decrease of $147.8 million (0.9 per cent) from 2019.
  • 182,683 Domestic student enrolments in 2020, a decrease of 1,722 students (0.9 per cent) from 2019.
  • 41% Of reported issues were repeat issues.

Further information

Please contact Ian Goodwin, Deputy Auditor-General on 9275 7347 or by email.

This report analyses the results of our audits of the financial statements of the ten universities in NSW for the year ended 31 December 2020. The table below summarises our key observations.

1. Financial reporting

Financial reporting The 2020 financial statements of all ten universities received unmodified audit opinions.

Two universities reported retrospective corrections of prior period errors. The University of Sydney reported errors relating to the underpayment of staff entitlements and the fair value of buildings. Charles Sturt University reported an error relating to how it had calculated right‑of‑use assets and lease liabilities on initial application of the new leasing standard in the previous year.

Impacts of COVID‑19

Student enrolments decreased in 2020 compared to 2019 by 10,032 (3.3 per cent). Of this decrease, 8,310 students were from overseas.

The ongoing impact of COVID‑19 in the short‑term, on semester one enrolments for 2021 compared to semester one of 2020, has been mixed:

  • all universities in NSW experienced a growth in their domestic student enrolments
  • eight universities experienced decreases in overseas student enrolments.

During 2020, universities provided welfare support to students, created student hardship funds, provided accommodation, and flexibility on payment of course fees.

State and Commonwealth governments provided additional support to the sector:

  • those university controlled entities eligible to receive JobKeeper payments received a combined amount under the Commonwealth scheme totalling $47.6 million in 2020
  • the NSW Government launched a University Loan Guarantee scheme.
Financial results

Six universities recorded negative net operating results in 2020 (two in 2019). While most universities experienced decreased revenue in 2020, only four had reduced their expenses to a level that was less than revenue.

Revenue from operations

Universities' revenue streams were impacted in 2020 by the COVID‑19 pandemic, with fees and charges decreasing by $361 million (5.8 per cent).

Government grants as a proportion of total revenue increased for the first time in five years to 34 per cent in 2020.

Nearly 40 per cent of universities' total revenue from course fees in 2020 (40.9 per cent in 2019) came from overseas students from three countries: China, India and Nepal (same in 2019). Students from these countries of origin contributed $2.2 billion ($2.4 billion in 2019) in fees. Some universities continue to be dependent on revenues from students from these destinations and their results are more sensitive to fluctuations in demand as a result.

Other revenues

Overall philanthropic contributions to universities increased by 32.2 per cent in 2020 to $222 million ($167.9 million in 2019). The University of Sydney and the University of New South Wales attracted 75.2 per cent of the total philanthropic contributions in 2020 (69.5 per cent in 2019).

Total research income for universities was $1.4 billion in 20191, with the University of Sydney and the University of New South Wales attracting 66.5 per cent of the total research income of all universities in NSW (65.2 per cent in 2018).

Expenditure Universities initiated cost saving measures in response to the COVID‑19 pandemic. The cost of redundancy programs increased employee related expenses in 2020 by 4.4 per cent to $6.5 billion ($6.2 billion in 2019). The cost of redundancies offered in 2020 across the universities totalled $293.9 million. Combined other expenses decreased to $2.8 billion in 2020, a reduction of $436 million (13.4 per cent).

2. Internal controls and governance

Internal control findings One hundred and ten internal control deficiencies were identified in 2020 (108 in 2019). Forty‑five findings were repeated from 2019, of which 23 related to information technology.

Recommendation: Universities should prioritise actions to address repeat findings on internal control deficiencies in a timely manner. Risks associated with unmitigated control deficiencies may increase over time.

Three high risk internal control deficiencies were identified, namely:

  • The University of New South Wales should continue work to assess its liability for the underpayment of casual staff entitlements. This issue was also reported last year.
  • Two high risk deficiencies were identified at Charles Sturt University. One related to misunderstanding the requirements of the new accounting standard in relation to recognising grant funding revenue for construction work. The second related to resolving issues identified by an ongoing internal review of its employment contracts to enable a reliable quantification as to the university's liability to its employees.

Gaps in information technology (IT) controls comprised the majority of the remaining deficiencies. Deficiencies included a lack of sufficient privileged user access reviews and monitoring, payment files being held in editable formats and accessible by unauthorised persons, and password settings not aligning with the requirements of information security policies.

Business continuity and disaster recovery planning All universities have a business continuity policy supported with a business impact analysis.

Except for Macquarie University, all other universities had disaster recovery plans prepared for all of the IT systems that support critical business functions. Macquarie University’s disaster recovery plans were still in progress at 31 December 2020.

Only half of the universities' policies require regular testing of their business continuity plans and six universities' plans do not specify staff must capture, asses and report disruptive incidents.

3. Teaching and research

Graduate employment outcomes Eight out of ten universities were reported as having full‑time employment rates of their undergraduates in 2020 that were greater than the national average.

Six universities were reported as having full‑time employment rates of their postgraduates in 2020 that were greater than the national average.

Student enrolments by field of education Enrolments at universities in NSW decreased the most in Management and Commerce courses and Engineering and Related Technologies courses. The largest increase in enrolments was in Society and Culture courses.
Achieving diversity outcomes Five universities in 2019 were reported as meeting the target enrolment rate for students from low socio‑economic status (SES) backgrounds.

Seven universities were reported to have increased their enrolments of students from Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander backgrounds in 2019. The target growth rate for increases in enrolments of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander students (to exceed the growth rate of enrolments of non‑indigenous students by at least 50 per cent) was achieved in 2019.

 1 2020 data, which is compiled by the Australian Department of Education and Training, is not yet available.

This report provides Parliament with the results of our financial audits of universities in NSW and their controlled entities in 2020, including our analysis, observations and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • internal controls and governance
  • teaching and research.

Financial reporting is an important element of governance. Confidence and transparency in university sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations on the financial reporting of universities in NSW for 2020.

Financial results

The graph below shows the net results of individual universities for 2020.

Appropriate and robust internal controls help reduce risks associated with managing finances, compliance and administration of universities.

This chapter outlines the internal controls related observations and insights across universities in NSW for 2020, including overall trends in findings, level of risk and implications.

Our audits do not review all aspects of internal controls and governance every year. The more significant issues and risks are included in this chapter. These along with the less significant matters are reported to universities for management to address.

Universities' primary objectives are teaching and research. They invest most of their resources to achieve quality outcomes in academia and student experience. Universities have committed to achieving certain government targets and compete to advance their reputation and their standing in international and Australian rankings.

This chapter outlines teaching and research outcomes for universities in NSW for 2020.

Published

Actions for WestConnex: changes since 2014

WestConnex: changes since 2014

Transport
Compliance
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Project management
Risk

What the report is about

The report examined whether Transport for NSW (TfNSW) and Infrastructure NSW (INSW) effectively assessed and justified major scope changes to the WestConnex project since 2014.

What we found

NSW Government decisions to fund WestConnex-related projects outside WestConnex's $16.812 billion budget have reduced transparency and understate the full cost of WestConnex.

The NSW Government's decision to separate Sydney Gateway from WestConnex has reduced transparency over the cost of the road component of Sydney Gateway. $1.76 billion of the cost to complete Sydney Gateway is funded outside the WestConnex budget.

Network integration costs, currently estimated at $2.3 billion, are also funded outside the WestConnex budget. Many of these costs are directly attributable to WestConnex and ought to be included in the reported budget.

The Parramatta Road Urban Amenity Improvement Program, costing $198 million, should also be included as part of the WestConnex reported budget.

Decisions to exclude or remove these elements from WestConnex without justification have seen $4.26 billion of projects funded outside the $16.8 billion budget.

Positively, robust analysis was used to develop and incorporate design improvements into the 2015 WestConnex Updated Strategic Business Case.

The separate components of WestConnex underwent all required assurance reviews. However, the NSW Government's assurance framework does not require ongoing ‘whole-of-program’ assurance for large and complex projects like WestConnex. The absence of a holistic review of WestConnex allows for some costs and benefits to avoid scrutiny.

What we recommended

TfNSW should:

  • review the impact of scope changes on project objectives, costs and benefits for complex infrastructure projects
  • ensure that estimated costs and benefits of works which are reasonably required to meet consent conditions are included in business cases for complex large infrastructure projects
  • establish centralised and project specific record keeping for major infrastructure projects.

Infrastructure NSW should provide transparent whole of program assurance on total costs and benefits when complex projects are split into sub-projects.

Government should consider enhancing public transparency of existing infrastructure assurance processes by requiring that large complex infrastructure programs undergo periodic review at a whole-of-program level.

Fast facts

  • $16.812b 2015 WestConnex business case budget
  • $2.3b current estimated cost of network integration works to enable WestConnex, funded outside the WestConnex budget
  • $1.76b cost to complete Sydney Gateway to enable WestConnex and also funded outside the WestConnex budget
  • $198m Parramatta Road Urban Amenity Improvement Program, originally part of WestConnex but now funded outside the WestConnex budget

WestConnex

WestConnex is a 33 km motorway network that will link the western and south‑western suburbs with the Sydney CBD and the Airport and Port Botany precinct. It will also connect with proposed future motorway links to the north shore, northern beaches, and southern Sydney. The project is being delivered in three stages, with completion scheduled for 2023.

When first conceived by Infrastructure NSW (INSW) in 2012, WestConnex was described as a single integrated concept. In August 2013, government approved a business case for an integrated concept of WestConnex, with an estimated cost of $14.881 billion (in nominal outturn costs). Transport for NSW (TfNSW) is the government agency (sponsor agency) accountable for the delivery of WestConnex in accordance with the business case. In August 2014, the NSW Government established the Sydney Motorway Corporation to fund, deliver and operate WestConnex.

In November 2015, the NSW Government publicly released an updated WestConnex business case with greater detail and design enhancements, which increased the estimated cost to $16.812 billion.

Subsequent to this update, further changes were made to the design, including realignment of the M4 to M5 Link connection to the Western Harbour Tunnel project, an expanded interchange at Rozelle, the deletion of the Camperdown Intersection, and the addition of the Iron Cove Link. The reported budget for WestConnex was not changed as a result of these design updates.

To fund WestConnex, Sydney Motorway Corporation consolidated a concessional loan of $2 billion from the Australian Government, private sector debt and equity funding from the State. The Australian Government also provided a $1.5 billion contribution to the State to partially fund construction of WestConnex.

In August 2018, the NSW Government sold 51 per cent of its stake in Sydney Motorway Corporation for $9.26 billion. At the time of writing, the NSW Government is in the process of selling its remaining 49 per cent stake of Sydney Motorway Corporation.

About this audit

In the course of delivering a complex major infrastructure project, it is reasonable to expect changes to the original design and scope. Changes may occur as the design moves from a high‑level concept to a detailed design for project delivery, as new risks or issues are identified, as demands change, or as other interdependent projects are approved. Changes can also occur in response to potential cost or delivery overruns which arise as a result of planning deficiencies. Where design and scope changes significantly change the project costs and/or expected benefits, the justification for these changes should be robust and transparent.

Following our 2014 performance audit, 'WestConnex: Assurance to the government', the NSW Government established the Infrastructure Investor Assurance Framework (IIAF) to improve accountability and transparency over major projects that are developed, procured, or delivered by government agencies. Under the framework, TfNSW, as project sponsor, is responsible for ensuring the WestConnex project meets all IIAF requirements. These include ensuring the project remains strategically aligned and viable, and benefits are on track. INSW is responsible for coordinating the assurance review process and reporting directly to NSW Cabinet on project delivery against time, budget and risks to project delivery.

The objective of this performance audit is to assess whether TfNSW and INSW effectively assessed and justified major scope changes to the WestConnex project since 2014.

 

Conclusion

Government decisions to separate WestConnex related projects and deliver them outside WestConnex's 2015 business case budget of $16.812 billion has understated the total cost of WestConnex achieving its objectives. The rationale for separating these elements from the WestConnex project scope has not been transparent. Together, these projects represent costs of $4.26 billion funded outside the $16.812 billion WestConnex budget.

Since 2015, the NSW Government has removed several projects from the scope described in the 2015 WestConnex business case, and funded them separately:
  • In mid‑2017, the Sydney Gateway became a separate project outside WestConnex. This project, estimated in 2015 to cost $800 million, now has an estimated cost of $2.56 billion. The project remains partly funded by an $800 million contribution from the $16.812 billion WestConnex budget, with $1.76 billion funded outside the WestConnex budget.
  • In late 2018, the Parramatta Road Urban Amenity Improvement Program became a separate project outside the 2015 WestConnex budget. This project was part of the 2015 WestConnex Business Case and is intended to create urban renewal opportunities around Paramatta Road. It is estimated to cost $198 million.

Work required to integrate WestConnex with existing roads ('network integration') was funded outside the $16.812 billion budget for the November 2015 WestConnex business case. TfNSW is obliged to deliver network integration works to meet the conditions of planning approval for WestConnex. As such, these costs should be included in the WestConnex budget. The current estimated cost of these network integration works is $2.3 billion.

The rationale to exclude or remove each of these elements from the WestConnex project scope has not been transparent, nor supported by robust analysis and justification. These elements are required for WestConnex to achieve its objectives. The additional project costs will also deliver additional benefits not included in the 2015 WestConnex business case. Removing them understates the total cost of achieving the objectives set out in the 2013 and 2015 WestConnex business cases.

WestConnex's complex financing arrangements further reduce transparency on costs.

Transparency over the total cost of WestConnex – including elements funded from other project budgets – is further limited by the project's complex financing arrangements.

Prior to 2018, the Audit Office provided assurance on costs borne and levied by Sydney Motorway Corporation and its controlled entities. Since the NSW Government sold its majority stake in WestConnex in August 2018, the Auditor‑General no longer has the mandate to provide this assurance. Considering this, and the lack of transparency on the cost of projects removed from the WestConnex project scope, there is no transparent or comprehensive view of the total cost to deliver WestConnex – nor of how these cost would be offset by the sale of the government's remaining stake.

There is no 'whole‑of‑program' assurance over the WestConnex program of works. This limits transparency and confidence that WestConnex will meet intended objectives within its budget.

After INSW conducted a gateway review of a draft of the 2015 WestConnex Business Case under the IIAF, the project was broken up into separate components to support staged delivery. Each of these projects, including the Sydney Gateway, as well as the Network Integration Program, underwent the required assurance reviews under the IIAF. INSW also provided monthly progress updates to government. These individual projects are, in themselves, significant in scale and complexity. Addressing them as discrete components for the purposes of the assurance review process is justified and there is no requirement under the IIAF to holistically review projects which together deliver final benefits of the WestConnex program. However, whole‑of‑program review would improve transparency over total costs and benefits.

In 2016, TfNSW revised the design of the M4‑M5 Link and Rozelle to address traffic and integration issues.

TfNSW identified that the concept designs used for the M4‑M5 Link and Rozelle Interchange in the 2015 WestConnex Business Case would not integrate well with surface roads, including the proposed Bays Precinct, and would result in increased traffic on Victoria Road and the ANZAC Bridge. Following a comprehensive review conducted in mid‑2016, TfNSW refined the design of the M4‑M5 Link and Rozelle Interchange to address these limitations without increasing the cost of delivery. TfNSW documented the rationale for the design changes, including how the changes improved on the original design to increase capacity, improve traffic conditions and create more open space.

1. Key findings

Government decisions to fund WestConnex related projects outside of WestConnex's $16.812 billion reported budget have reduced transparency over costs and understate the full cost of WestConnex

In 2015, the work required to integrate WestConnex with existing roads ('network integration') was funded as a separate project with an estimated cost of $1.534 billion outside the 2015 WestConnex budget of $16.812 billion. TfNSW then created the Network Integration Program to respond to the conditions of planning approval for WestConnex. The current estimated cost to deliver all network integration works is $2.3 billion.

Since the 2015 WestConnex Business Case, the NSW Government has removed several elements from the scope of WestConnex and funded them as separate projects, while keeping the published WestConnex budget at an estimated $16.812 billion. Projects removed include:

  • Sydney Gateway, currently costed at $2.56 billion (with an $800 million contribution from WestConnex)
  • Parramatta Road Urban Amenity Improvement Program, costed at $198 million in late 2018 and funded though new funding to the Greater Sydney Commission.

Together, these projects represent costs of $4.26 billion that are not included in the WestConnex budget, but are required for WestConnex to achieve the objectives of the 2013 and 2015 WestConnex Business Cases. The costs of these elements in supporting the objectives of WestConnex is not tracked centrally, and there is no single point of oversight over them. Exhibit 1 compares total WestConnex forecast costs (including related projects) between November 2015 and April 2021.

 

November 2015
($ million)

April 2021
($ million)
WestConnex
Stage 1
Stage 1A (M4 Widening) 497 517
Stage 1B (M4 East) 3,802 3,782
Total 4,299 4,299
Stage 2
King Georges Road Interchange 131 131
New M5 4,335 4,335
Sydney Gateway Contribution 800 800
Total 5,266 5,266
Stage 3
M4‑M5 Link and Rozelle Interchange 7,049 7,049
Urban renewal (Parramatta Road) 198 ‑‑
Urban renewal (Rozelle) ‑‑ 198
Total 7,247 7,247
Total reportable WestConnex 16,812 16,812

Exhibit 1: WestConnex and related projects forecast costs
  November 2015
($ million)
April 2021
($ million)
Related projects
Network integration 1,534 2,300
Urban renewal (Parramatta Road) ‑‑ 198
Sydney Gateway Road Component ‑‑ 1,760
Total 1,534 4,258

Source: AO research.

Many network integration costs are directly attributable to WestConnex and ought to be included in the reported budget for WestConnex

Prior to 2015, the scope of WestConnex included enabling works needed before or during construction, as well as funding for future works to address any adverse traffic outcomes created by WestConnex which become apparent after its opening. These works are also known as network integration works.

When government approved the 2015 WestConnex Business Case, it noted that the project would require $1.534 billion for network integration works to address the impacts of WestConnex on the road network. However, the WestConnex project budget of $16.812 billion did not include funding for network integration works. Instead, Roads and Maritime Services (RMS, now TfNSW) was to fund network integration through its normal budget allocation.

It is important to recognise these costs as part of the total WestConnex project cost because:

  • TfNSW created the Network Integration Program to respond to network traffic and transport elements of the planning conditions of approval for WestConnex granted by the then NSW Department of Planning and Environment under the Environment, Planning and Assessment Act 1979.
  • NSW Treasury guidelines for business cases note that accurate cost estimates include assessment of the financial impact of meeting the conditions of planning approval.
  • Travel time and vehicle operating cost benefits attributed to the WestConnex project in the 2015 WestConnex Business Case assume that some network integration works, then costed at $373 million, were in place.

Refer to Appendix two for more detail on network integration works.

Some of the projects in the WestConnex Network Integration Program provide community and place benefits, such as parklands and cycleways. These benefits have not been attributed to WestConnex. Additionally, some network integration works are likely to deliver additional traffic related benefits to WestConnex. As the Network Integration Program’s primary purpose is to meet the conditions of planning approval for WestConnex, TfNSW should attribute all the costs and benefits of the program to WestConnex.

To September 2021, the total funded cost of the Network Integration Program is approximately $2.077 billion. TfNSW estimates that it will need a further $222 million to complete all expected network integration works.

The NSW Government's decision to separate Sydney Gateway from WestConnex has reduced transparency and accountability for TfNSW's underestimation of the cost of the road component of Sydney Gateway

Sydney Gateway is a high‑capacity connection between the new St Peters Interchange and the Sydney Airport and Port Botany precinct. It includes a road and rail components. The road component was included in the scope of WestConnex in the 2015 WestConnex Business Case. The November 2015 design, which TfNSW costed at $800 million, involved separate roadways from the St Peters Interchange to the International terminal, and to the domestic terminals and Mascot airport precinct.

By October 2016, TfNSW was aware that the $800 million budget for Sydney Gateway was insufficient and revised the forecast cost for the road component to $1.8 billion. The original cost estimate did not sufficiently consider the cost of:

  • constructing a complex design adjacent to the airport precinct
  • obtaining access to land required for the project
  • managing environmental contamination.

On 9 August 2017, the then Minister for WestConnex announced that the Sydney Gateway project was not part of WestConnex.

The 2015 WestConnex Business Case notes that material changes to the WestConnex budget, funding, scope, or timeframe are subject to Cabinet approval processes. It states that, when seeking approval for material changes, the portfolio Minister will make a submission to the relevant Cabinet Committee. Changes in project scope required the approval of the then Cabinet Committee on Infrastructure and should have been endorsed by the WestConnex Interdepartmental Steering Committee.

TfNSW and the NSW Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) assert that there is no documentation to support the government’s decision to separate Sydney Gateway from the WestConnex Program, or the WestConnex Interdepartmental Steering Committee's endorsement of a submission to Cabinet seeking approval for the separation.

The established governance processes for major scope changes were not followed in this instance. The lack of transparency regarding government's decision to separate Sydney Gateway from WestConnex also reduces visibility of TfNSW's underestimation of the cost of delivering the road component of Sydney Gateway.

The November 2018 Final Business Case for Sydney Gateway, which was approved by the government, included an estimate of $2.45 billion (nominal outturn cost) for the road component. This estimate included an $800 million contribution from WestConnex. A more recent estimate (late 2020) for this project is $2.56 billion (nominal outturn cost).

The Parramatta Road Urban Amenity Improvement Program should be included as part of the WestConnex budget

A specific objective of the 2015 WestConnex Business Case was the creation of opportunities for urban renewal along and around Parramatta Road. The business case included an allocation of $198 million in the $16.812 billion WestConnex budget for the Parramatta Road Urban Amenity Improvement program, designed to implement aspects of the objective. In November 2018, the NSW Government removed the Parramatta Road Urban Amenity Improvement Program from the WestConnex program of works and reallocated the $198 million (inside the $16.812 billion WestConnex budget) for urban renewal works around the Rozelle Interchange. As part of this decision, government approved new funding of $198 million to the Greater Sydney Commission for the urban amenity program, outside the $16.812 billion WestConnex budget. This understates the cost of WestConnex meeting its objectives by $198 million.

There is no requirement for ongoing ‘whole‑of‑program’ assurance of the WestConnex program of works, including related projects

In August 2015, INSW conducted its first Gateway Review of WestConnex as a program consisting of composite projects. Following that review, TfNSW registered each of the components of WestConnex with INSW as individual projects, rather than keeping WestConnex registered as a program or mega‑project. This is not inconsistent with the IIAF and all WestConnex related projects, including Sydney Gateway and the Network Integration Program, have undergone independent assurance reviews as individual projects under the IIAF.

Once a program like WestConnex is broken down into its composite parts, there is no requirement for the sponsor agency (TfNSW) or INSW to provide independent assurance on the program as a whole until it is completed. This is then done as part of the Gateway review for benefits realisation, which examines whether project benefits are being measured and meet expectations. These individual projects are, in themselves, significant in scale and complexity. While addressing them as discrete components for the purposes of the assurance review process can be justified, the absence of strategic, holistic reviews of WestConnex allows for total costs and benefits to become opaque and avoid scrutiny. Programs of this scale require greater ongoing transparency on total costs and benefits in order to ensure confidence they will meet intended objectives within budget.

There is a lack of public transparency on the total costs and benefits of the WestConnex project

Prior to 2018, the Audit Office provided assurance on costs borne and levied by Sydney Motorway Corporation and its controlled entities. Since the NSW Government sold 51 per cent of its stake in WestConnex in August 2018, the Auditor‑General no longer has the mandate to provide this assurance. The Audit Office is also unable to provide any assurance regarding the performance of tolling concessions.

This means that the total costs of WestConnex, including those levied on road users through tolling, are not reported alongside the full cost of delivering the project. This information, and independent assurance over that information, would provide transparency and context to the outcome of government's sale of its interest in WestConnex.

To enhance the transparency of existing infrastructure assurance processes, government could consider requiring large and complex infrastructure programs to undergo periodic review at a whole‑of‑program level. This could take the form of annual reports to Parliament on the total costs and benefits of selected large and complex projects by the responsible agency. The reports could include an assessment of the cost to government and cost to the community of funding and financing. Independent assurance of the agency report would provide Parliament with greater confidence that infrastructure is delivered economically and providing value for money for the people of NSW.

The Australian National Audit Office provides similar assurance on selected Department of Defence acquisition projects as part of its annual Major Projects Report.

Design enhancements included in the 2015 WestConnex Updated Strategic Business Case were supported by robust analysis

The 2015 WestConnex Business Case contained more detail than the 2013 WestConnex business case. Design enhancements were made as a result of modelling analysis conducted over the two years since the 2013 business case. Enhancements included a full underground link between Kingsgrove and St Peters as part of the New M5 and re‑alignment of the M4‑M5 link tunnel (Stage 3) to include the Rozelle Interchange. The Rozelle Interchange will provide a direct connection to the Anzac Bridge and Victoria Road, and will enable a connection to the proposed Western Harbour Tunnel and Beaches Link. A map and description of these elements can be found at Exhibits 2 and 3 of this report.

In 2016, TfNSW revised the design of the M4‑M5 Link and Rozelle to address traffic and integration issues

As part of preparing the 2015 WestConnex Business Case, TfNSW prepared a Project Definition and Delivery Report (PDDR) for the M4‑M5 Link. This report describes the scope of the project, including a high‑level concept design. TfNSW identified limitations with the proposed design of the M4‑M5 in the PDDR, which it would need to address as the project moved to a detailed design stage. In particular, these limitations included:

  • poor integration with the Bays Precinct masterplan
  • traffic capacity constraints on Victoria Road and Anzac Bridge
  • construction complexity.

Following a comprehensive review in mid‑2016, TfNSW changed the design of the M4‑M5 Link and Rozelle Interchange to address these limitations. These changes included:

  • deletion of the Camperdown intersection to improve traffic conditions on Parramatta Road
  • a fully underground and larger Rozelle Interchange with 10‑hectare dedicated parklands
  • a toll‑free tunnel link from Iron Cove Bridge to Anzac Bridge
  • increasing the lanes in the dual tunnels from three to four each way.

TfNSW documented, but did not publish, the rationale for the design changes, including how the changes addressed the limitations of the previous design while providing increased community benefit through the creation of open space. TfNSW undertook cost comparison studies which estimated that these changes would have a neutral impact on the estimated project cost while achieving the same or improved benefits.

TfNSW's record‑keeping systems for large infrastructure investments negatively impact accountability and transparency

In response to our formal requests for relevant information, made during the conduct of this audit, TfNSW advised that complete and valid records of key decision‑making processes, analysis and advice were unavailable. Additionally, TfNSW often provided information that was incomplete or unverifiable (for instance, unsigned briefing notes). This is not consistent with accepted governance practices and does not comply with the requirements of the State Records Act 1998.

We also requested that TfNSW provide a list of relevant documents held by the Sydney Motorway Corporation (SMC). While TfNSW acknowledged that SMC may hold material relevant to the audit, TfNSW did not have a list or description of these documents. As SMC is now a majority privately held entity, both the Audit Office and TfNSW have limited power to require SMC to provide documentation.

The delivery timeframe for large and complex infrastructure projects such as WestConnex frequently exceeds five years, and some projects can take over a decade to deliver. These projects represent a significant investment of public resources and government agencies should expect independent review and assurance activities such as performance audits. The establishment of dedicated record keeping facilities for major infrastructure projects, such as data rooms, would improve transparency and accountability. This would ensure that the use of public resources is fully auditable in line with public expectations and the requirements of the Government Sector Finance Act 2018, the State Records Act 1998 and the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983.

2. Recommendations

By December 2021, TfNSW should:

1. review the impact of scope changes on project objectives, costs and benefits for complex infrastructure projects

2. when preparing business cases for complex large infrastructure projects, ensure that the estimated costs and benefits of works which are reasonably expected to meet consent conditions are included in the overall project cost and its benefits (as per Treasury guidelines)

3. establish and maintain centralised and project‑specific record keeping, including through dedicated project data rooms, to ensure major infrastructure projects can readily be subject to external oversight and assurance.

By June 2022, INSW should:

4. provide transparent whole‑of‑program assurance on total costs and benefits throughout the project life‑cycle when complex projects are split into sub‑projects.

By June 2022, NSW Government should:

5. consider enhancing the public transparency of existing infrastructure assurance processes by requiring that large complex infrastructure programs undergo periodic review at a whole‑of‑program level. This could take the form of reports to Parliament on the total costs and benefits on selected large and complex projects by the responsible agency, including cost to government and cost to community of funding and financing, as well as an accompanying independent assessment of the agency report.

Following our 2014 performance audit report 'WestConnex: Assurance to the government', the NSW Government established the Infrastructure Investor Assurance Framework (IIAF). INSW is responsible for the development, implementation and administration of the IIAF. The assurance framework involves gateway reviews, health checks, deep dive reviews, and project monitoring and reporting at various stages in the lifecycle of a project. The main aims of the IIAF are to help ensure major infrastructure projects are delivered on time and on budget, and to ensure that reports are regularly monitored by the Cabinet of the NSW Government. The IIAF gateway review process is compulsory for all significant investments and expenditure under the NSW Treasury Gateway Policy.

In accordance with the IIAF, INSW is responsible for the following:

  • providing a dedicated Assurance Team including Gateway Review Managers to coordinate Reviews
  • determining appropriate expert reviewers, and manages scheduling, commissioning and administration of Assurance Review reports. Infrastructure NSW is independent of the Expert Review Team
  • monitoring Tier 1 – High Profile/High Risk projects, Tier 2 and Tier 3 (if required) project performance through independent Assurance Reviews
  • providing independent analysis and advice on key risks and any corrective actions recommended for Tier 1 – High Profile/High Risk, Tier 2 and Tier 3 projects
  • escalating projects to Infrastructure Investor Assurance Committee (IIAC) and Cabinet where projects present ‘red flag issues’ and where corrective action is needed
  • working with delivery agencies to register all capital projects with an estimated cost greater than $10.0 million and ensures they are risk profiled and assigned a risk‑based project tier with an endorsed IIAF Project Registration report
  • preparing forward looking annual Cluster Assurance Plans
  • maintaining and continuously improves the IIAF process
  • reporting to the IIAC, Cabinet and Infrastructure NSW Board
  • regularly report to NSW Treasury on the performance of the IIAF.

In relation to WestConnex, TfNSW is the sponsor agency responsible for meeting relevant IIAF requirements, including:

  • registering and risk profiling projects
  • IIAF gateway, health check, and deep dive assurance reviews
  • regular reporting.

Under the IIAF, it is mandatory for all capital projects valued over $10.0 million to be registered with INSW. Capital projects can be registered either as a program (comprising of a group of related projects or activities) or as a project (which may or may not be part of a program).

According to the IIAF, programs tend to have a lifespan of several years and aim to deliver outcomes and benefits related to an organisation's strategic objectives. Projects tend to have a shorter lifespan, and deal with outputs. Projects can, however, be grouped under a single program if they are similar in nature or if they are aimed at collectively achieving a strategic objective. Complex projects can be delivered in multiple stages, under different contracts, and across different time periods.

The last assurance review of the entire WestConnex program of works as a whole was in 2015

INSW conducted the first IIAF gateway review of WestConnex in August 2015. TfNSW developed a draft WestConnex Updated Strategic Business Case to consolidate the latest analysis on WestConnex, and to confirm that the project remained fit for purpose, economically viable, and financially deliverable. The review followed a recommendation in our 2014 performance audit report that business cases be thoroughly revisited.

During September 2015, INSW conducted additional informal reviews to identify strategic risks associated with public release of the WestConnex business case. Subsequently, INSW gave the Premier of NSW its views on the draft business case, including the following points:

  • The $398 million budget for Sydney Gateway was insufficient to meet the benefits claimed in the business case for a ‘functional’ connection to Sydney Airport and Port Botany. INSW studies indicate a future‑proof solution would require a minimum spend of $755 million.
  • Enabling works for WestConnex estimated at $1.534 billion were excluded from the cost of WestConnex. Significant work remained for RMS to identify mitigation measures to address planning approvals and network performance issues.
  • Enabling works (a Southern Connector), an access ramp and surface road improvements within St Peters were excluded from the draft 2015 business case despite their inclusion in the WestConnex scope in the 2014–15 State Budget.
  • The overall cost of works not funded within the WestConnex budget ranged from $2.011 billion to $2.196 billion. This included the enabling works, access ramp and surface road improvements and the shortfall for Sydney Gateway.

All WestConnex related projects, including Sydney Gateway have undergone independent assurance reviews under the IIAF

Since INSW submitted the first WestConnex progress update report to Cabinet in June 2015, INSW has been reporting monthly on the different stages of the WestConnex Program, including Sydney Gateway, as the projects were registered with INSW as High‑Profile, High‑Risk projects. Separate reporting enabled INSW to report and review each stage with more detailed scrutiny, compared to the reporting and reviewing at a program level.

WestConnex Stage 2 (New M5) underwent both mandatory and non‑mandatory reviews at key points in the project lifecycle. Three mandatory gateway reviews – at Gate 2 (Final business case), Gate 3 (Readiness for market), and Gate 4 (Tender evaluation) – were conducted by TfNSW before the introduction of IIAF. Four non‑mandatory health check reviews and one non‑mandatory deep dive review were conducted after the introduction of the IIAF managed by INSW.

Similarly, WestConnex Stage 3 projects – M4‑M5 link, M4‑M5 Tunnels, and Rozelle Interchange – also underwent mandatory and non‑mandatory reviews at key points in their lifecycle under IIAF.

The M4‑M5 Link had two mandatory gateway reviews and one non‑mandatory health check review under IIAF. These reviews were conducted before Stage 3 was split into two stages, due to major design changes to the Rozelle Interchange and the M4‑M5 tunnels.

The M4‑M5 tunnels had two mandatory gateway reviews (at Gates 3 and 4), one non‑mandatory health check review, and one non‑mandatory deep dive review under IIAF.

Rozelle Interchange also underwent three mandatory gateway reviews at Gate 3 (part 1), Gate 3 (part 2), and Gate 4, two non‑mandatory health check reviews, and one non‑mandatory deep dive review under IIAF.

Since mid‑2017, the Sydney Gateway project has undergone required independent assurance reviews, as well as a number of optional assurance reviews

In November 2016, INSW conducted a mandatory Gate 1 gateway review on a strategic business case for the Sydney Gateway Project. TfNSW did not proceed with this business case. Following the separation of Sydney Gateway from WestConnex in mid‑2017, TfNSW developed a new business case for Sydney Gateway. It has undergone the required Gate 1, Gate 2, and Gate 3 gateway reviews, as well as two non‑mandatory health check reviews, and three non‑mandatory deep dive reviews under IIAF.

Network integration works have undergone all IIAF required assurance reviews

TfNSW completed a strategic business case for the Network Integration Program in August 2020, and INSW completed a gateway review in November 2020. This is despite network integration projects starting as early as 2015, with $645 million having been spent by June 2020. The strategic business case included a prioritisation process for completing remaining works in the program. Prior to November 2020, TfNSW registered individual network integration projects with INSW, and these projects have undergone gateway reviews where required.

The Network Integration Program strategic business case does not include Rozelle interchange network integration works ($353 million) and additional network integration works to settle a contractor claim adjacent to St Peters Interchange ($190 million). These were excluded from the business case on the basis they had already been approved by government, and as such were not subject to the prioritisation elements of the business case. TfNSW has not developed separate business cases for these works, although the scope of the St Peters Interchange works was developed through a negotiated process.

TfNSW did not prepare business cases for some network integration works which have commenced, including the $323 million Campbell Road/Euston Road works

Prior to its development of the August 2020 strategic business case, TfNSW did not prepare business cases for many network integration works that have commenced, and in some instances were completed, before 2019. Significantly, TfNSW did not prepare a business case for the Campbell Road/Euston Road works, which cost $323 million and have been completed.

In 2016, TfNSW’s Business Case Policy requires the creation of business cases for capital projects costing over $1.0 million. At the time of writing this report, TfNSW’s draft policy requires full business cases for capital projects costing $10.0 million or more.

There is no requirement for ongoing ‘whole‑of‑program’ assurance of the WestConnex program of works, including related projects

INSW conducted its first gateway review of WestConnex (as a program, which consisted of composite projects) in August 2015. Following that review, TfNSW registered each of the components of WestConnex with INSW as individual projects, rather than keeping WestConnex registered as a program or complex project. The IIAF allows this to occur.

Separate registration enabled INSW to report and review each stage with more scrutiny compared to whole‑of‑program level review.

Such an approach has merit, considering the individual stages (and components of these stages) are multi‑million dollar works in their own right. Each project has its own timing for gateway reviews at stages such as 'Readiness for Market' and 'Tender Evaluation'.

Once a program such as WestConnex is broken down into its composite parts, there is no requirement for the sponsor agency (TfNSW) or INSW to conduct independent assurance on the program of works as a whole until the whole program is completed as part of the Benefits Realisation (Gate 6) gateway review. The absence of strategic, holistic reviews of projects of the scale and complexity such as WestConnex during their delivery allows for total costs and benefits to become opaque and avoid scrutiny. Projects of this scale require greater ongoing transparency on total costs and benefits in order to ensure confidence they will meet intended objectives within budget.

INSW has advised us that it has prepared a proposal to expand its assurance function to include whole‑of‑program review of inter‑related infrastructure projects.

Appendix one – Responses from agencies

Appendix two – Network integration works

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #351 - released (17 June 2021).

Published

Actions for Report on Local Government 2020

Report on Local Government 2020

Local Government
Asset valuation
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Fraud
Information technology
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Procurement

What the report is about

Results of the local government sector council financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2020.

What we found

Unqualified audit opinions were issued for 127 councils, 9 county councils and 13 joint organisation audits in 2019–20. A qualified audit opinion was issued for Central Coast Council.

Councils were impacted by recent emergency events, including bushfires and the COVID-19 pandemic. The financial implications from these events varied across councils. Councils adapted systems, processes and controls to enable staff to work flexibly.

What the key issues were

There were 1,435 findings reported to councils in audit management letters.

One extreme risk finding was identified related to Central Coast Council’s use of restricted funds for general purposes.

Fifty-three high risk matters were identified across the sector:

  • 21 high risk matters relating to asset management
  • 14 high risk matters relating to information technology
  • 7 high risk matters relating to financial reporting
  • 4 high risk matters to council governance procedures
  • 3 high risk matters relating to financial accounting
  • 3 high risk matters relating to purchasing and payables
  • 1 high risk matter relating to cash and banking.

More can be done to reduce the number of errors identified in financial reports. 61 councils required material adjustments to correct errors in previous audited financial statements.

Fast facts

  • 150 councils and joint organisations in the sector
  • 99% unqualified audit opinions issued for the 30 June 2020 financial statements
  • 490 monetary misstatements were reported in 2019-20
  • 61 prior period errors reported
  • 53 high risk management letters findings identified
  • 49% of reported issues were repeat issues

Rural fire fighting equipment

Sixty-eight councils did not record rural fire fighting equipment worth $119 million in their financial statements.

The NSW Government has confirmed these assets are not controlled by the NSW Rural Fire Service and are not recognised in the financial records of the NSW Government.

What we recommended

The Office of Local Government should communicate the State's view that rural firefighting equipment is controlled by councils in the local government sector, and therefore this equipment should be properly recorded in their financial statements.

Central Coast Council

A qualified opinion was issued for Central Coast Council (the Council) relating to two matters.

Council did not conduct the required revaluation to support the valuation of roads.

Council also disclosed a prior period error relating to restrictions of monies collected for their water, sewer, and drainage operations, which, based on the NSW Crown Solicitor’s advice, should be considered a change in accounting policy.

What we recommended

The Office of Local Government should clarify the legal framework relating to restrictions of water, sewerage and drainage funds (restricted reserves) by either seeking an amendment to the relevant legislation or by issuing a policy instrument to remove ambiguity from the current framework.

Key financial information

In 2019-20, councils:

  • collected $7.3 billion rates and annual charges
  • received $4.7 billion grants and contributions 
  • incurred $4.8 billion of employee benefits and on-costs
  • held $14.2 billion of cash and investments
  • managed $160.0 billion of infrastructure, property, plant and equipment
  • entered into $3.3 billion of borrowings.

Further information

Please contact Ian Goodwin, Deputy Auditor-General on 9275 7347 or by email.

 

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence in and transparency of public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines audit observations related to the financial reporting of councils and joint organisations.

Highlights

  • The Office of Local Government within the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (OLG) extended the statutory deadline for councils and joint organisations to lodge their audited financial statements by an additional month to 30 November 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
  • One hundred and thirty-three councils and joint organisations (2019: 117) lodged audited financial statements with the OLG by the revised statutory deadline of 30 November (2019: 30 October). Sixteen (2019: 30) councils received extensions to submit audited financial statements to OLG. Canberra Region Joint Organisation did not submit their audited financial statements by the statutory deadline and did not formally apply for extension before the deadline lapsed.
  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued for 127 councils, nine county councils and 13 joint organisation audits in 2019–20. A qualified audit opinion was issued for Central Coast Council.
  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued for the 2018–19 financial audits of Hilltops, MidCoast and Murrumbidgee Councils, which were not completed at the time of tabling the 'Local Government 2019' report in Parliament.
  • The total number and dollar value of corrected and uncorrected financial statement errors increased compared with the prior year.
  • Sixty-eight councils did not record rural fire fighting equipment in their financial statements worth $119 million. The NSW Government has confirmed these assets are not controlled by the NSW Rural Fire Service and are not recognised in the financial records of the NSW Government.
  • The total number of prior period financial statement errors increased from 59 in the prior year to 61, but the total dollar value of the errors decreased from $1,272 million to $813 million.
  • Councils implemented three new accounting standards in 2019–20 relating to revenue and leases.

 

Recent emergency events, including drought, bushfires, floods and the COVID-19 pandemic have impacted councils.

This chapter will provide insights into how these events have impacted councils, including:

  • financial implications of the emergency events
  • changes to councils' operating models, processes and controls
  • accessibility to technology and the maturity of councils' systems and controls to prevent unauthorised and fraudulent access to data
  • receipt and delivery of stimulus packages or programs at short notice.

Highlights

  • All councils were impacted by the recent emergency events.
  • Councils changed governance, policies, systems and processes to respond to the recent emergency events.
  • Challenges were experienced adapting Information Technology (IT) infrastructure and controls to enable staff to work from home.
  • Sixty-five per cent of councils updated business continuity plans and 42 per cent updated disaster recovery plans as a response to recent emergency events.
  • Councils received various forms of assistance from government relating to the recent emergencies, which was used to provide support to local communities.

Recent emergency events significantly impacted councils

Recent emergencies, including drought, bushfires, floods and the COVID-19 pandemic have brought particular challenges for councils and their communities.

 

A strong system of internal controls enables councils to operate effectively and efficiently, produce reliable financial reports, comply with laws and regulations and support ethical government.

This chapter outlines the overall trends in governance and internal control findings across councils, county councils and joint organisations in 2019–20. It also includes the findings reported in the 2018–19 audits of Hilltops, MidCoast and Murrumbidgee councils as these audits were finalised after the Report on Local Government 2019 was published.

Financial audits focus on key governance matters and internal controls supporting the preparation of councils' financial statements. Audit findings are reported to management and those charged with governance through audit management letters.

Highlights

  • Total number of findings reported in audit management letters decreased from 1,985 in 2018–19 to 1,435 in 2019–20.
  • One extreme risk finding was identified in 2019–20 (2018–19: nil).
  • Total number of high-risk findings decreased from 82 in 2018–19 to 53 in 2019–20. Thirty per cent of the high-risk findings identified in 2018–19 were reported as high-risk findings in 2019–20.
  • Forty-nine per cent of findings reported in audit management letters were repeat or partial repeat findings.
  • Governance, asset management and information technology (IT) comprise over 61 per cent of findings and continue to be key areas requiring improvement.
  • Fifty-six councils could strengthen their policies, processes and controls around fraud prevention and legislative compliance.
  • Sixty-eight councils had deficiencies in their processes to revalue infrastructure assets.
  • Fifty-eight councils have yet to implement basic governance and internal controls to manage cybersecurity.
  • Sixty-four councils should formalise and periodically review their IT policies and procedures.

Total number of findings reported in audit management letters decreased

In 2019–20, 1,435 findings were reported in audit management letters (2018–19: 1,985 findings). An extreme risk finding was also identified this year related to Central Coast Council's use of restricted funds. The total number of high-risk findings decreased to 53 (2018–19: 82 high-risk findings).

Findings are classified as new, repeat or ongoing findings, based on:

  • new findings were first reported in 2019–20 audits
  • repeat findings were first reported in prior year audits, but remain unresolved in 2019–20
  • ongoing findings were first reported in prior year audits, but the action due dates to address the findings are after 2019–20.

Findings are categorised as governance, financial reporting, financial accounting, asset management, purchases and payables, payroll, cash and banking, revenue and receivables, or information technology. The high-risk and common findings across these areas are explored further in this chapter.

Audit Office’s work plan for 2020–21 onwards

Focus on local council's response and recovery from recent emergencies

Local councils and their communities will continue to experience the effects of recent emergency events, including the bushfires, floods and the COVID 19 pandemic for some time. The full extent of some of these events remain unclear and will continue to have an impact into the future. The recovery is likely to take many years.

The Office of Local Government (OLG) within the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment is working with other state agencies to assist local councils and their communities to recover from these unprecedented events.

These events have created additional risks and challenges, and changed the way that councils deliver their services.

We will take a phased approach to ensure our financial and performance audits address the following elements of the emergencies and the Local Government's responses:

  • local councils' preparedness for emergencies
  • its initial responses to support people and communities impacted by the 2019–20 bushfires and floods, and COVID-19
  • the governance and oversight risks that arise from the need for quick decision making and responsiveness to emergencies
  • the effectiveness and robustness of processes to direct resources toward recovery efforts and ensure good governance and transparency in doing so
  • the mid to long-term impact of government responses to the natural disasters and COVID-19
  • whether government investment has achieved desired outcomes.

Planned financial audit focus areas in Local Government

During 2020–21, the financial audits will focus on the following key areas:

  • cybersecurity, including:
    • cybersecurity framework, policies and procedures
    • assessing the controls management has to address the risk of cybersecurity incidents
    • whether cybersecurity risks represent a risk of material misstatement to council's financial statements
  • budget management
  • financial sustainability
  • quality and timeliness of financial reporting
  • infrastructure, property, plant and equipment
  • information technology general controls.

Audit, risk and improvement committees

All councils are required to have an audit, risk and improvement committee by March 2022

The requirement for all councils to establish an audit, risk and improvement committee was deferred by 12 months to March 2022 due to the COVID 19 pandemic.

Audit, risk and improvement committees are an important contributor to good governance. They help councils to understand strategic risks and how they can mitigate them. An effective committee helps councils to build community confidence, meet legislative and other requirements and meet standards of probity, accountability and transparency.

Local Government elections

Local Government elections were postponed for one year due to the COVID 19 pandemic

The Local Government elections were deferred for one year due to the COVID 19 pandemic and will now be held on 4 September 2021. As the statutory deadline for the 2020–21 financial statements is 30 October 2021, some of the newly elected councillors will be required to endorse them.

Implementation of AASB 1059

Accounting standards implementation continue next year

AASB 1059 is effective for councils for the 2020–21 financial year.

A service concession arrangement typically involves a private sector operator that is involved with designing, constructing or upgrading assets used to provide public services. They then operate and maintain those assets for a specified period of time and is compensated by the public sector entity in return. Examples of potential service concession arrangements impacting councils include roads, community housing, childcare services and nursing homes.

AASB 1059 may result in councils recognising more service concession assets and liabilities in their financial statements.

 

Appendix one – Response from the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment

Appendix two – NSW Crown Solicitor’s advice

Appendix three – Status of 2019 recommendations

Appendix four – Status of audits

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia

Acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia

Transport
Asset valuation
Compliance
Fraud
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Risk

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, has today released a report on Transport for NSW’s (TfNSW) acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue in Camellia.

This audit, which was requested on 17 November 2020 by the Hon. Andrew Constance MP, the Minister for Transport and Roads, examined:

  • whether TfNSW conducted an effective process to purchase 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia
  • whether TfNSW has effective processes and procedures to identify and acquire property required to deliver the NSW Government’s major infrastructure projects.

The audit found that TfNSW conducted an ineffective process when it purchased 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia. The audit also found that TfNSW’s internal policies and procedures to guide the transaction were, and continue to be, insufficient.

The Auditor-General has made seven recommendations to address the issues identified in the report.

On 17 November 2020, the Hon. Andrew Constance MP, the Minister for Transport and Roads, requested this audit under section 27B(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983.

On 15 June 2016, Transport for New South Wales (TfNSW) acquired 6.3 hectares of land at 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia, by agreement from Grand 4 Investments Pty Ltd. Grand 4 Investments was a business entity established by the owners of Billbergia Pty Ltd, a property development and investment company.

TfNSW paid Grand 4 Investments $53.5 million and assumed liability for addressing environmental issues and contamination associated with the site. This took place seven months after the vendor acquired the land as part of a competitive Expression of Interest process, in which TfNSW also participated, for $38.15 million.

TfNSW is the NSW Government agency responsible for most major transport infrastructure projects in New South Wales. TfNSW acquired the Camellia site for use as a stabling and maintenance depot to support the Parramatta Light Rail (PLR) project.

Consistent with the minister’s request, this audit assessed:

  • whether TfNSW conducted an effective process to purchase 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia
  • whether TfNSW has effective processes and procedures to identify and acquire property required to deliver the NSW Government’s major infrastructure projects.

In considering the effectiveness of the processes for this purchase, the audit considered:

  • the requirements of the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (the Act)
  • the application of sound processes to manage risk to the NSW Government and to achieve value for money
  • the application of disciplines associated with complex procurement, such as probity, in a NSW Government context.
The acquisition of the 4–6 Grand Avenue site in Camellia was consistent with a 2014 feasibility study for the PLR, but occurred before the completion of detailed project planning or an acquisition strategy.

TfNSW made two attempts to acquire the 4–6 Grand Avenue site in Camellia, and was successful on the second attempt. TfNSW recognised the risks associated with early acquisition and had high-level strategies in place should the site not be required.

The specific site had been identified in a feasibility study for the PLR commissioned by TfNSW in 2014 as one of several options in Camellia for a stabling and maintenance depot. However, TfNSW had not done any substantive analysis of the various options to identify a preferred location before the two opportunities to acquire 4–6 Grand Avenue were brought to TfNSW’s attention by the landowners (or their agents). On both occasions, TfNSW chose to actively pursue acquisition in advance of any such analysis.

The acquisition was also not informed by a Property Acquisition Strategy, which TfNSW policy recommends in order to guide the process and manage acquisition specific risks.

In 2015, TfNSW identified that it would require a stabling and maintenance depot in the Camellia area for the Parramatta Light Rail

In 2014, TfNSW commissioned an external engineering consultancy to undertake a feasibility design study for the Parramatta Light Rail - the Parramatta Transport Corridor Strategy Feasibility Design study (herein referred to as ‘the feasibility study’). In early 2015, TfNSW received the feasibility study, which was one of several key sources that informed the development of business cases for the PLR.

The feasibility study recommended that TfNSW should consolidate the maintenance and cleaning operations with overnight stabling facilities on one site. The study noted that the optimal location for any such site would be in close proximity to the proposed network, and noted that the site must have access to road connections to accommodate access for cars and trucks.

The study found that a centrally located stabling and maintenance facility would be required for all routes serving the Parramatta CBD, and that the Camellia industrial area was a preferred location for such a facility. The study noted that the Camellia area was contaminated.

The feasibility study notes that its conclusions were based on assumptions about the light rail system adopted and decisions made by the future operator of the system, who had not yet been selected or appointed.

TfNSW's decision to progress a potential acquisition in 2015 considered the risk that the site may not be required

TfNSW's FIC was responsible for making decisions on funding allocations at a whole of program level within TfNSW. FIC was also responsible for approving ‘high-risk/high-value’ variations to program budgets. Members of the FIC included:

  • Secretary of Transport for NSW
  • Deputy Secretary, Infrastructure and Services
  • Deputy Secretary, Freight, Strategy and Planning
  • Deputy Secretary, Customer Services
  • Deputy Secretary Finance and Investment
  • Deputy Secretary People and Corporate Services.

An April 2015 submission, from the then Deputy Director-General to the agency’s FIC, sought authorisation and funding approval to participate in an Expression of Interest sale process. It noted the risk that the project may not go ahead. The submission advised that:

By acquiring a strategic site now, it reduces the risk of having to pay an improved value or a value that may be subject to rapidly improving land values due to changes in land use and rezoning.

The property can be acquired for the project, held strategically and income generated by leasing the site as hardstand 1 space until the project requires the land for the Parramatta Light Rail project.

If the project does not proceed in the medium to longer term, the property can be sold at a premium to what has been paid today as property fundamentals improve.

This submission acknowledged the risks associated with environmental contamination and proposed that these risks would be managed by negotiating a contract where the remediation and associated expenses would be at the landowner’s cost. 

TfNSW assessed the 4–6 Grand Avenue site as one of several sites in Camellia that was a feasible location for a stabling and maintenance facility

The Departmental feasibility study assessed six potential sites for a stabling and maintenance facility, including 4–6 Grand Avenue, noting strengths and weaknesses of each site. A different site on Grand Avenue was assessed as the ‘base case’ option (1 Grand Avenue). The study’s comments on the 4–6 Grand Avenue site included the following:

With an area of approximately 63,000m2, this site has sufficient space for a depot with the required stabling yard and maintenance facilities. The location allows for good road access and LRT [light rail transit] access would be from Grand Avenue, which may require a road crossing or signalised intersection. The site has been used for general industrial uses; however the land has been cleared and is currently undergoing remediation 2. The site is not affected by flooding based on one in 100-year flood data.

In early 2015, once the opportunity to acquire 4–6 Grand Avenue emerged, TfNSW commissioned a specific feasibility study of the 4–6 Grand Avenue site. The feasibility studies clearly documented the existence of environmental contamination. In April 2015, the report concluded:

Given the limitations of this report and within the parameters that have been set it is concluded that from a spatial and geographic perspective the site at 6 Grand Avenue would be suitable as a stabling and maintenance depot for the Parramatta light rail project. There are few engineering and environmental constraints that would affect the feasibility level analysis of this site and all issues identified, within this desk study, are considered to be resolvable. However this being said there is a significant amount of work necessary to reach the final layout and definition of the stabling and maintenance depot. There are numerous items which require further consideration and conformation; planning approvals could impose restrictions on building heights, noise mitigation measures, light and visual impact requirements all of which can have significant impacts on the spatial requirements of any stabling and maintenance depot. 

The acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue was not informed by a Property Acquisition Strategy

For major projects, TfNSW typically requires the project team to complete a Property Acquisition Strategy, which is intended to guide both process as well as specific acquisition issues expected to be faced during the project. The Property Acquisition Strategy is not a mandated document but is a recommended tool to support property acquisition as part of major projects.

TfNSW did not have a Property Acquisition Strategy in place to guide the 2015 Expression of Interest process. On 6 November 2015, the then Project Director for the PLR project emailed the property team, noting a need to develop a Property Acquisition Strategy to close off the scoping design and preliminary business case.

In January 2016, TfNSW developed a draft Property Acquisition Strategy for the Parramatta Light Rail Project, although it was silent on the potential sites for the stabling and maintenance facility.

TfNSW focussed on 4–6 Grand Avenue because it was available and aligned to TfNSW's strategic interests

In early 2015, officials commenced monitoring the market for industrial real estate in the Camellia area and surrounds for possible sites for a stabling and maintenance facility.

In March 2015, then owner of the site, Akzo Nobel Pty Limited released the 4–6 Grand Avenue site through an Expression of Interest process managed by CBRE.

TfNSW’s then Deputy Director-General, Planning, sought approval from FIC to lodge an Expression of Interest up to $30.0 million. Approval was sought on the basis that it would ‘provide certainty for the Parramatta Light Rail project by allowing for a depot site in a suitable location and potentially avoid higher costs or longer timeframes associated with compulsory acquisition following completion of the project’s business case’. FIC approved the request at its meeting on 9 April 2015.

At this time, TfNSW had not conducted any analysis of financial or operational benefits and costs of the potential sites identified in earlier feasibility studies. TfNSW staff advised us that the decision to participate in the Expression of Interest process for 4–6 Grand Avenue was because it was available. There is no documentation substantiating this statement, which TfNSW staff provided verbally as part of this audit.

In November 2015, TfNSW was advised that it was unsuccessful in the Expression of Interest process and that Grand 4 Investments (a related entity of Billbergia) had purchased 4–6 Grand Avenue. TfNSW did not conduct any further analysis of alternative potential sites in Camellia between this date and commencing discussions with Grand 4 Investments in April 2016. In that time there had been some movement on other properties that were included in the feasibility study, including 37–39a Grand Avenue being under offer in September 2015.

In March 2016, TfNSW approached CBRE to organise a meeting with Grand 4 Investments. On 1 April 2016, TfNSW met with Grand 4 Investments.

TfNSW advises that a perceived benefit of the 4–6 Grand Avenue site was that it was not subject to other uses or leaseholds that would increase the cost of compulsory acquisition. Officers involved in the acquisition advised that other nominated sites in the feasibility study were subject to other uses or leaseholds. 


1  A hardstand space is a large, paved area to store cars, heavy vehicles and machinery.
2  Officers familiar with the acquisition could not confirm the nature of remediation being undertaken, but noted that the previous landowner had cleared buildings from the site, which may have been considered part of remediation.
TfNSW's independent valuation, which it commissioned and received after the acquisition, specifically excluded consideration of environmental contamination risk. As a result, TfNSW is exposed to the risk that the acquisition was not fully compliant with the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (the Act) because it did not use an accurate estimate of market value during negotiations. That said, the acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue by agreement was consistent with preferred processes described in the Act.

TfNSW acquired the site from the landowner by agreement, and this is consistent with provisions in the Act. Obtaining approval for compulsory acquisition should negotiations for agreement break down is also consistent with the Act. That said, TfNSW did not at any time assess whether a compulsory acquisition could have resulted in acquisition at a lower cost than what was negotiated by agreement.

Despite the high risks associated with the acquisition, TfNSW did not commission a formal valuation in time to inform the negotiation and purchase. Instead, TfNSW relied on internal advice to estimate market value, but did not obtain a formal valuation from those advisors. For high-risk transactions, the greater expertise and arm's-length independence of an external specialist valuer should be preferred over an agency's own staff.

On 15 June 2016, the settlement date for the acquisition, TfNSW commissioned a formal independent valuation of the site. On 23 November 2016, TfNSW received the final formal valuation report. By not obtaining a formal independent valuation of the property in advance of acquisition to inform the acquisition value, TfNSW exposed itself to non-compliance with the Act by not establishing the market value as the basis for the acquisition price. TfNSW also breached its own internal policies.

TfNSW instructed the valuer to conduct its valuation within the following parameters:

  • Market valuation on an ‘as is’ basis – market value based on the methodology described in the Act. This approach valued the site at $25.0 million.
  • Market valuation on a speculative development basis – market value based on the financial value of the vendor's intended use of the site which, in this case, involved leasing the site for industrial use. This approach valued the site at $52.0 million, and TfNSW advised us this valuation supported the purchase price.
  • Disregard the impact of environmental contamination – TfNSW specifically instructed the independent valuer to disregard any known (or unknown) site contamination. As TfNSW knew of the significant environmental contamination affecting the site, this parameter resulted in a valuation that overstated the value of the site as it did not consider the cost of environmental remediation. The valuer applied this assumption for both market valuation approaches.

Additionally, as the independent valuer completed the valuation after the purchase was finalised, there is a risk that the valuation may have been influenced by the known purchase price.

TfNSW's failure to acquire a formal valuation and an assessment of the financial impact of environmental remediation before it purchased 4–6 Grand Avenue represents ineffective administration and governance.
TfNSW acquired the site at a time when there was demand and increasing prices for industrial property in the area. However, TfNSW did not effectively assess and manage the risks associated with the acquisition, and gaps in process led to increased risk. Briefings to decision-makers did not contain important information, and we found no evidence that gaps in advice were queried or explored by decision-makers.

TfNSW did not have plans or advice in place to assist in managing risk, such as:

  • a property acquisition plan
  • a comprehensive and up-to-date risk management plan
  • a negotiation strategy, or any authorisation limit or minimal acceptable position
  • an independent professional evaluation
  • external expert advice (with the exception of legal advice relating to the contract of sale).

TfNSW was aware of contamination issues affecting the land and had access to considerable information about the environmental conditions, such as site environmental audit reports and information on the NSW Environment Protection Authority's contaminated land register. However, TfNSW had not analysed specific technical information about the contamination and therefore was not aware of the risk implications and cost for remediation. Despite this, TfNSW changed its position from not accepting the risks and costs of contamination, to acquiring the site unconditionally. The basis for this decision is unclear and undocumented.

Briefing to senior leaders on the acquisition was silent on a number of important matters that would have been important for approvers to consider, including:

  • an explanation of the 40 per cent increase in purchase price between November 2015 and May 2016, and a 165 per cent increase from TfNSW’s offer in April 2015
  • the contamination risks associated with the site and an evidence-based estimate of potential costs to remediate the site
  • advice that an independent valuation had not been obtained, inconsistent with TfNSW policy.

Consideration of the acquisition by FIC was based on a summary business paper and was managed out-of-session, thereby removing the ability for comprehensive consideration of the acquisition proposal and its risks.

The probity management controls and assurances in place for the acquisition of the 4–6 Grand Avenue site were insufficient. These insufficiencies were exacerbated by the probity risk profile of the transaction.

The 4–6 Grand Avenue acquisition was a high-risk/high-value transaction, undertaken in a volatile property market in a short timeframe under pressure from Grand 4 Investments. TfNSW was engaging in a direct negotiation in advance of detailed planning for the acquisition, or the PLR as a whole. These circumstances contribute to heightened probity risk.

TfNSW did not establish a probity plan and sought no probity support throughout the acquisition. Also, with one exception, the staff involved in the acquisition did not complete conflict of interest declarations.

TfNSW was aware of the potential for probity or integrity issues with the transaction when it commissioned an internal audit in connection with the transaction in 2019. Internal discussions considered whether a misconduct investigation may be more appropriate, however no such investigation was undertaken.

TfNSW's insufficient probity practices, in addition to its failure to keep complete or comprehensive records of negotiations or decisions, reduce transparency of the process and its outcome and expose TfNSW to a greater risk of misconduct, corruption and maladministration.

At the time of the transaction, the TfNSW policy framework was not sufficiently risk-focussed and did not provide clarity on when officers ought to apply specific guidance or procedures. TfNSW's policies and procedures are more focussed on acquiring land to meet project needs and timeframes, and less on assuring value for money and managing risks.

At the time of its acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue, TfNSW had property acquisitions policies and procedures in place. Each of these were broadly sound in their content and intent. However, they lacked specificity on how or when to apply guidance, and when risk levels should elevate the importance of recommended guidance.

TfNSW's key guidance was principles based and relied on agency staff using their experience and expertise to apply guidance according to the circumstances of an individual transaction. This guidance was not duly applied in the acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia. In addition, TfNSW does not have quality or control assurance to identify when TfNSW officers did not apply important policies or processes.

The primary focus of the TfNSW’s property acquisition guidance is to achieve vacant possession of land in a timeframe that meets the need of the relevant transport project. There is less specific focus on the need to meet the requirements of the NSW Government financial management framework.

Appendix one – Response from agency 

Appendix two – About the audit 

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Copyright Notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #349 - released (18 May 2021).

Published

Actions for Addressing public inquiry recommendations - Emergency response agencies

Addressing public inquiry recommendations - Emergency response agencies

Community Services
Justice
Environment
Internal controls and governance

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining how effectively NSW emergency response agencies address public inquiry recommendations.

The audit found that agencies’ governance arrangements to address public inquiry recommendations have important and consistent gaps. 

The agencies did not sufficiently verify that they had implemented accepted recommendations as intended, and in line with the outcomes sought. This creates a risk that issues with disaster prevention or responses highlighted by public inquiries are not addressed in a complete or timely way and may persist or recur in the future. 

The audit also found that agencies did not always nominate milestone dates or priority rankings for accepted recommendations, and so could not demonstrate they were managing or monitoring them effectively.

The audit examined how five emergency response agencies – Fire and Rescue NSW, National Parks and Wildlife Service, NSW Rural Fire Service, NSW State Emergency Service and Resilience NSW – have addressed accepted recommendations from public inquiries over the last ten years. The audit assessed the effectiveness of governance arrangements to track recommendation implementation.

The report makes six recommendations to improve disaster response agency arrangements to address public inquiry recommendations.  

While the focus of this audit was agencies that responded to natural disasters, the findings and recommendations from this report have the potential to be applied across the NSW public sector in response to public inquiries related to other areas of government activity.

Major disasters and emergencies often trigger public post-event inquiries and reviews. The purpose of these reviews is to identify the causes of disaster or emergency events and areas for future improvement in prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. Areas identified for future improvement are then the subject of recommendations to government or government agencies and, when accepted, become public commitments to action.

Responses to the bushfires of 2019–20 followed this pattern, producing both NSW and Australian Government commissioned inquiries: the NSW Bushfire Inquiry and the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements. Both highlighted the significant volume of inquiries in recent years. Both asked whether agency responses to previous inquiries were improving Australia's capacity to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from natural disasters. The inquiries reflected on the difficulty of answering this question due to insufficient clarity and transparency on whether the improvements and risks that inquiries identified have been addressed in practice.

This audit stems from similar questions about how effectively government agencies in NSW are delivering on public inquiry recommendations. It assessed how five emergency response agencies have addressed accepted recommendations from 17 public inquiries over the last ten years. For this audit, we considered inquiries and reviews that affected agencies' operational capacity to respond to and recover from bushfire, floods and storms. The in scope public inquiries for this audit relate to:

  • the 2013–14, the 2016–17 and the 2017–18 bushfire seasons
  • severe storms and floods in 2015, 2016 and 2017
  • workforce issues affecting the ability of agencies to respond to natural disasters.

The public inquiries we reviewed included coronial inquiries and inquests, parliamentary inquiries, independent reports and reviews, performance audits and recovery coordinator reports. In total, we looked at the processes that agencies used to implement 191 recommendations from these 17 public inquiries.

The objective of this audit was to determine how effective emergency response agencies are in addressing accepted recommendations from public inquiries. To answer our audit objective, we asked two questions:

  • Do agencies have effective governance arrangements in place to respond to, monitor and implement accepted recommendations from public reviews and inquiries?
  • Do agencies provide timely and accurate information on the implementation of accepted inquiry recommendations to senior decision makers and the public?

The agencies reviewed were:

  • Fire and Rescue NSW
  • NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service (now a division of the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment)
  • NSW Rural Fire Service
  • NSW State Emergency Service
  • Resilience NSW (formerly the Ministry for Police and Emergency Services; and the Office of Emergency Management).

While the focus of this audit was agencies that respond to natural disasters (flood, bushfire and storms), the findings and recommendations from this report have the potential to be applied across the NSW public sector in response to public inquiries related to other areas of government activity.

Conclusion

The arrangements used by NSW emergency response agencies to address public inquiry recommendations have important and consistent gaps.

For two-thirds of the recommendations reviewed as part of this audit, the agencies did not sufficiently verify that they had been implemented as intended, and in line with the outcomes sought. This exposes risks that gaps in disaster responses are not addressed in a complete or timely way and persist or recur in the future.

Two-thirds of the recommendations reviewed as part of this audit had also not been allocated milestone dates or priority rankings, and as such the audited agencies are less accountable and could not demonstrate they were managing or monitoring them effectively.

None of the agencies publicly report the status of actions taken to address public inquiry recommendations, limiting accountability and transparency.

The agencies subject to this audit all address accepted recommendations from public inquiries with varying degrees of formality and transparency. No agency maintained a central and comprehensive approach – such as a register – to track recommendations for all public inquiries.

The agencies do not consistently review evidence that recommendations have been implemented effectively, and in line with the intention of the inquiry. The agencies also often failed to set milestone dates or test that recommendations had been actioned as committed. This increases the risk that recommendations are overlooked or not addressed in line with the intent, priority and risk of the recommendation. In turn, this raises the possibility that gaps and issues identified by public inquiries are not adequately resolved and could persist or recur in future disasters.

None of the audited agencies published a summary of progress made in implementing accepted recommendations to update the public. There are transparency and accountability benefits in doing so. This echoes the findings of the NSW Bushfire Inquiry and the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements. Both inquiries noted that it is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to determine the implementation status for many recommendations by publicly available information.

One factor hindering agencies from publishing this information is the lack of a consistent means of tracking public inquiry recommendation implementation. Adopting a consistent approach, within and across agencies, should help to overcome this barrier in the future. 

This chapter reviews the way agencies have responded to, monitored and ensured they have implemented accepted recommendations from public inquiries.

This chapter reviews how agencies provided information to senior decision makers, agency Audit and Risk Committees and the public on the implementation of accepted recommendations from public inquiries.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – Identifying in scope inquiries

Appendix three – In scope inquiries

Appendix four – Recommendations reported by agencies as still in progress (detail)

Appendix five – Agency reported recommendation implementation status (unaudited) 

Appendix six – About the audit 

Appendix seven – Performance auditing

 

Copyright Notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #348 - released (22 April 2021).

Published

Actions for Service NSW's handling of personal information

Service NSW's handling of personal information

Premier and Cabinet
Finance
Cyber security
Fraud
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining the effectiveness of Service NSW’s handling of customers’ personal information to ensure its privacy.

The audit found that Service NSW is not effectively handling personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy. Service NSW continues to use business processes that pose a risk to the privacy of personal information. This includes the routine emailing of personal information between Service NSW service centres and other agencies, which is one of the processes that contributed to the data breach earlier this year. The audit found that previously identified risks and recommended solutions had not been implemented on a timely basis.

The Auditor-General made eight recommendations aimed at ensuring improved processes, technologies, and governance arrangements for how Service NSW handles customers’ personal information.

The Hon. Victor Dominello, MP, Minister for Customer Service, requested this audit under section 27(B)(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 following public reports in May 2020 of a cyber security attack which had led to a breach of Service NSW customer information. This audit also included the Department of Customer Service which supports Service NSW with privacy, risk and governance functions.

Service NSW was established in 2013 with the intention that it would, over time, 'become the primary interaction point for customers accessing New South Wales Government transaction services'.

Service NSW's functions are set out in the Service NSW (One stop Access to Government Services) Act 2013. This legislation allows for other NSW Government agencies to delegate to and enter into agreements with the Chief Executive Officer of Service NSW in order for Service NSW to undertake service functions for the agency.

Service NSW now has agreements with 36 NSW Government client agencies to facilitate over 1,200 types of interactions and transactions for the community.

The nature of each agreement between Service NSW and its client agencies varies. Some client agencies have delegated authority to allow Service NSW staff to conduct transactions on their behalf in the agencies' systems. Other arrangements do not include the same degree of delegation. In these cases, Service NSW provides services such as responding to enquiries and validating documents.

In addition, Service NSW conducts transactions for its own programs, such as the Seniors Card. Personal information for these programs, as well as information for customers' MyServiceNSW accounts, are stored by Service NSW on its Salesforce Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system.

In March 2020, Service NSW suffered two cyber security attacks in short succession. Technical analysis undertaken by the Department of Customer Service (DCS) concluded that these attacks resulted from a phishing exercise through which external threat actors gained access to the email accounts of 47 staff members. These attacks resulted in the breach of a large amount of personal customer information that was contained in these email accounts. See Section 1.1 for further details.

This audit is being conducted in response to a request from the Hon. Victor Dominello, Minister for Customer Service, under section 27B(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983. Minister Dominello requested that the Auditor General conduct a performance audit in relation to Service NSW's handling of sensitive customer and business information.

This audit assessed how effectively Service NSW handles personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy.

It addressed the following:

  • Does Service NSW have processes and governance in place to identify and manage risks to the privacy of personal customer and business information?
  • Does Service NSW have policies, processes and systems in place that support the effective handling of personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy?
  • Has Service NSW effectively implemented its policies, processes and systems for managing personal customer and business information?

Conclusion

Service NSW is not effectively handling personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy. It continues to use business processes that pose a risk to the privacy of personal information. These include routinely emailing personal customer information to client agencies, which is one of the processes that contributed to the March 2020 data breach. Previously identified risks and recommended solutions had not been implemented on a timely basis.

Service NSW identifies privacy as a strategic risk in both its Risk Management Guideline and enterprise risk register and sets out a zero level appetite for privacy risk in its risk appetite statement. That said, the governance, policies, and processes established by Service NSW to mitigate privacy risk are not effective in ensuring the privacy of personal customer and business information. While Service NSW had risk identification and management processes in place at the time of the March 2020 data breach, these did not prevent the breach occurring.

Some of the practices that contributed to the data breach are still being followed by Service NSW staff. For example, business processes still require Service NSW staff to scan and email personal information to some client agencies.

The lack of multi factor authentication has been identified as another key contributing factor to the March 2020 data breach as this enabled the external threat actors to gain access to staff email accounts once they had obtained the user account details through a phishing exercise. Service NSW had identified the lack of multi factor authentication on its webmail platform as a risk more than a year prior to the breach and had committed to addressing this by June 2019. It was not implemented until after the breach occurred.

There are weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system, which holds the personal information of over four million NSW residents.

Internal audits carried out by Service NSW, including one completed in August 2020, have identified significant weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce CRM system. These include deficiencies in the management of role based access, monitoring and audit of user access, and partitioning of program specific transaction information. These deficiencies create an increased risk of unauthorised access to the personal information of over four million customers held in the system.

Lines of responsibility for meeting privacy obligations are not clearly drawn between Service NSW and its client agencies.

Service NSW has agreements in place with client agencies. However, the agreements lack detail and clarity about the roles and responsibilities of the agencies in relation to the collection, storage and security of customer's personal information. This lack of clarity raises the risk that privacy obligations will become confused and missed between the agencies.

Service NSW carries out privacy impact assessments for major new projects but does not routinely review existing processes and systems.

Service NSW carries out privacy impact assessments as part of its routine processes for implementing major new projects, ensuring that privacy management is considered as part of project design. Service NSW does not regularly undertake privacy impact assessments or reviews of existing or legacy processes and systems, which has resulted in some processes continuing despite posing significant risks to the privacy of personal information, such as the scanning, emailing, and storing of identification documents.

1. Key findings

Service NSW identifies privacy risks, but the controls and processes it put in place to mitigate these privacy risks were not adequate to prevent or limit the extent of the data breach that occurred in March 2020

Service NSW’s approach to risk management is framed by its Risk Management Guideline, which defines 'privacy and compliance' as one of the key types of risk for the agency. Service NSW's enterprise risk register identifies four strategic privacy related risks. Service NSW has set out a zero level appetite for privacy risk in its risk appetite statement.

Service NSW has assessed the adequacy of its controls for privacy risks as needing improvement. To be fully effective, the Risk Management Guideline says that these controls should have a focus that is ‘largely preventative and address the root causes’.

One of the business processes that was a key contributing factor to the data breach was the emailing of personal information by Service NSW staff to client agencies.

This process had been identified as a risk prior to the breach and some steps had been put in place to mitigate the risk. In particular, staff were required to manually delete emails that contained personal information. However, these measures were ineffective in preventing the breach, as the external threat actors still gained access to 47 staff email accounts that contained a large amount of personal information.

It is unclear why Service NSW did not effectively mitigate this risk prior to the breaches. However, Service NSW has advised that it implemented measures in June and October 2020 to automatically archive emails likely to contain personal information. This is expected to limit the quantity of information retained in email accounts for extended periods.

Service NSW has not put in place any technical or other solutions to avoid Service NSW staff having to scan and email personal information to some client agencies. Urgent action is needed to remove the requirement for staff to email personal information to client agencies, thereby mitigating the risk inherent in sending and storing this information using email.

There are weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce CRM system, which holds the personal information of over four million customers

There are weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce CRM system. These weaknesses include deficiencies in governance of role based access, monitoring and audit of staff access, and partitioning of program specific transaction information. These deficiencies create an increased risk of unauthorised access to the personal information of over four million customers which is stored in this system.

In addition, there is an absence of important controls to safeguard customers' privacy, such as multi factor authentication and reviewable logs of access history to their information. Such controls, when properly implemented, would enhance the control that customers are able to exercise over their personal information.

A privacy impact assessment conducted on Service NSW’s Salesforce CRM system in 2015 recommended that the system include the ability for customers to review access history to their personal information, as well as the option for customers to apply multi factor authentication to their accounts. While both these recommendations appeared positively received by Service NSW, neither have been implemented.

Since its inception, Service NSW’s use of Salesforce has extended to storing transaction data, particularly for transactions for which Service NSW is responsible, such as the Seniors Card. It also holds details of over four million MyServiceNSW account holders, including name, email address and phone number, and optional address details. It was not originally intended for the system to hold this volume and nature of customer information.

Lines of responsibility for meeting privacy obligations are unclear between Service NSW and its client agencies

Service NSW's privacy management plan does not clearly set out the privacy obligations of Service NSW and its client agencies. It sets out that 'compliance with the privacy principles will primarily be the responsibility of that [client] agency'. However, Service NSW has its own obligations under the security principles of the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (PPIP Act) to take reasonable steps to prevent unauthorised access to personal information, which is not made clear in the privacy management plan.

The agreements between Service NSW and client agencies reviewed for this audit only include general and high level references to privacy. Most do not include details of each parties' privacy responsibilities such as: which agency will provide the customer with a privacy notice explaining how their personal information will be handled, how personal information will be kept secure, how long Service NSW will retain information, what processes will be followed for internal reviews, and what specific planning is in place to respond to data breaches.

Service NSW's privacy management plan has not been updated to include new programs and governance changes

Service NSW's privacy management plan includes most of the matters required by law or good practice, with some exceptions. It does not explain any exemptions that the agency commonly relies on under the PPIP Act and does not address any health information that Service NSW may handle. It had also not been updated to reflect governance changes and the fact that, at the time this audit commenced, Service NSW was disclosing the content of internal review applications (the formal expression for 'complaints') to the Department of Customer Service (DCS). These governance changes were part of the centralisation of Service NSW's corporate support functions into DCS in late 2019, though internal review staff were seconded back into Service NSW during the course of this audit.

The current July 2019 privacy management plan has also not been updated since the rollout of a number of major new initiatives in 2020. These include 2019–20 bushfire emergency recovery initiatives (such as small business grants) and COVID 19 pandemic response initiatives (such as small business grants, border permits and the COVID safe check in app).

Service NSW routinely conducts privacy impact assessments for new initiatives, though privacy risks remain in legacy systems and processes

Service NSW routinely conducts privacy impact assessments for major new initiatives and the assessments reviewed for this audit largely accorded with good practice guidance.

Service NSW does not routinely review existing processes and systems to ensure that they are effective in ensuring the privacy of customer personal information. Business processes that create the highest risk to privacy, such as emailing of personal information, are more common in these longstanding legacy systems.

Service NSW's significant and rapid growth has outpaced the establishment of a robust control environment which has exacerbated privacy risks

Since it was established in 2013, Service NSW has experienced significant growth in the number and diversity of the types of transactions it provides, as well as the number of client agencies with which it works. The pace and extent of this growth has contributed to important controls not being properly implemented on a timely basis, which has heightened privacy risks, particularly in regard to existing, legacy systems and processes.

The pace of change and increasing demand for new program implementation has limited the opportunity for Service NSW, in collaboration with its client agencies, to revisit and redesign legacy business practices which pose a greater privacy risk. This includes the scanning and emailing of personal information.

While 2019–20 has seen additional demands placed on Service NSW in responding to the 2019–20 bushfire emergency and COVID 19 pandemic, it is the nature of the agency’s work that it operates in a fast paced and complex environment, where it is required to respond to multiple client agencies and stakeholders. Ensuring customer privacy should be integral to Service NSW’s business as usual operations.

2. Recommendations

Service NSW commissioned a number of external reviews and investigations stemming from the data breaches. The Auditor General's recommendations below have taken these other reviews into account. In order to offer assurance that it is appropriately protecting the privacy of its customers, Service NSW should address the full breadth of findings and recommendations made across all relevant reviews.

As a matter of urgency, Service NSW should:

1. in consultation with relevant client agencies and the Department of Customer Service, implement a solution for a secure method of transferring personal information between Service NSW and client agencies

2. review the need to store scanned copies of personal information and, if still required, implement a more secure method of storing this information and regular deletion of material.

By March 2021, Service NSW should:

3. ensure that all new agreements entered into with client agencies from 1 April 2021 address the deficiencies identified in this audit, including that they provide clarity on:

  • the content and provision of privacy collection notices
  • the terms by which personal information will be retained, stored, archived, and disposed of when no longer required
  • steps that will be taken by each agency to ensure that personal information is kept secure
  • the circumstances in which, and processes by which, applications for internal review will be referred by one agency to the other
  • how identified breaches of privacy will be handled between agencies

4. in collaboration with the Department of Customer Service, review its privacy management plan to address the deficiencies raised in this audit, including:

  • to clarify Service NSW's understanding of how responsibility for meeting privacy obligations are delineated between Service NSW and client agencies
  • to better reflect the full scope and complexity of personal information handled by Service NSW
  • to better explain how applications for internal review are handled between Service NSW and the Department of Customer Service
  • to ensure regular ongoing review, either according to a schedule or when Service NSW experiences substantial change to its programs and handling of personal information

5. in consultation with the Department of Customer Service, review its policies and processes for the management of privacy risks, including to:

  • ensure that there are appropriate mechanisms to escalate identified privacy risks from business units to the Executive Leadership Team
  • ensure that there are action plans to address strategic privacy risks that are assessed as having ineffective controls.
By June 2021, Service NSW should:

6. address deficiencies in the controls over, and security for, its Salesforce customer relationship management and related systems that hold customer personal information, including:

  • establish policies and processes for regular access reviews and monitoring of user activity in these systems, including for privileged users
  • enable partitioning and role based access restrictions to personal information collected for different programs
  • provide customers the choice to use multi factor authentication to further secure their MyServiceNSW accounts
  • enable customers to view the transaction history of their personal information to detect possible mishandling.
By December 2021, Service NSW should:

7. ensure that all existing agreements with client agencies address the deficiencies identified in this audit, including that they provide clarity on:

  • the content and provision of privacy collection notices
  • the terms by which personal information will be retained, stored, archived, and disposed of when no longer required
  • steps that will be taken by each agency to ensure that personal information is kept secure
  • the circumstances in which, and processes by which, applications for internal review will be referred by one agency to the other
  • how identified breaches of privacy will be handled between agencies

8. carry out a risk assessment of all processes, systems and transactions that involve the handling of personal information and undertake a privacy impact assessment for those that:

  • are identified as high risk and have not previously had a privacy impact assessment
  • have had major changes or updates since the privacy impact assessment was completed.

Appendix one – Responses from agencies

Appendix two – About the audit

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Procurement management in Local Government

Procurement management in Local Government

Local Government
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Regulation
Service delivery

The Auditor‑General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining procurement management in Local Government.

The audit assessed the effectiveness of procurement management practices in six councils. All six councils had procurement management policies that were consistent with legislative requirements, but the audit found compliance gaps in some councils. The audit also identified opportunities for councils to address risks to transparency and accountability, and to ensure value for money is achieved when undertaking procurement.

The Auditor‑General recommended that the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment review the Local Government (General) Regulation 2005 and publish updated and more comprehensive guidance on procurement management for the Local Government sector. The report also generated insights for the Local Government sector on opportunities to strengthen procurement practices.

Effective procurement is important in ensuring councils achieve their objectives, demonstrate value for money and deliver benefits to the community when purchasing goods and services. Procurement also comes with risks and challenges in ensuring the purchased goods and services deliver to expectations. The risks of fraud and conflicts of interest also need to be mitigated.

The legislative requirements related to procurement in the Local Government sector are focused on sourcing and assessing tender offers. These requirements are included in the Local Government Act 1993 (the Act), the Local Government Amendment Act 2019 (the Amendment), the Local Government (General) Regulation 2005 (the Regulation), the Tendering Guidelines for NSW Local Government 2009 (the Tendering Guidelines), the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (the GIPA Act) and the State Records Act 1998.

General requirements and guidance relevant to councils are also available in the Model Code of Conduct for Local Councils in NSW 2018 (the Model Code), the NSW Government Procurement Policy Framework 2019 and in publications by the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC).1

Individual councils have developed their own procurement policies and procedures to expand on the legislative requirements. Understandably, these vary to reflect each council’s location, size and procurement needs. Nevertheless, the general principles of effective procurement management (such as transparency and accountability) and risk-mitigating practices (such as segregation of duties and the provision of training) are relevant to all councils.

The Audit Office of New South Wales Report on Local Government 2018 provided a sector-wide summary of aspects of procurement management in Local Government (see Section 2.1 of this report). This audit builds on this state-wide view by examining in detail the effectiveness of procurement management practices in six councils. This report also provides insights on opportunities to strengthen procurement management in the sector.

The selected councils for this audit were Cumberland City Council, Georges River Council, Lockhart Shire Council, Tweed Shire Council, Waverley Council and Wollongong City Council. They were selected to provide a mix of councils of different geographical classifications, sizes, priorities and levels of resourcing.

Conclusion

All six councils had procurement management policies and procedures that were consistent with the legislative requirements for sourcing and assessing tender offers. Their policies and procedures also extended beyond the legislative requirements to cover key aspects of procurement, from planning to completion. In terms of how these policies were applied in practice, the six councils were mostly compliant with legislative requirements and their own policies and procedures, but we found some gaps in compliance in some councils and made specific recommendations on closing these gaps.

There were also opportunities for councils to improve procurement management to mitigate risks to transparency, accountability and value for money. Common gaps in the councils’ procurement management approaches included not requiring procurement needs to be documented at the planning stage, not providing adequate staff training on procurement, not requiring procurement outcomes to be evaluated, and having discrepancies in contract values between contract registers and annual reports. These gaps expose risks to councils’ ability to demonstrate their procurements are justified, well managed, delivering to expectations, and achieving value for money. Chapter three of this report provides insights for the audited councils and the Local Government sector on ways to address these risks

Recommendations

  1. By June 2022, the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment should:
    1. publish comprehensive and updated guidance on effective procurement practices – including electronic tender submissions and procurements below the tender threshold
    2. review and update the Local Government (General) Regulation 2005 to reflect the increasing use of electronic tender submissions rather than paper copies.
  2. By December 2021, the six audited councils should consider the opportunities to improve procurement management in line with the improvement areas outlined in chapter three of this report.
  3. Cumberland City Council should immediately:
    1. ensure contract values are consistent between the contract register and the annual report
    2. introduce procedures to ensure supplier performance reviews are conducted as per the council’s policy
  4. Georges River Council should immediately:
    1. ensure contract values are consistent between the contract register and the annual report
    2. introduce procedures to ensure all the steps up to the awarding of a contract are documented as per the council’s policy
    3. introduce procedures to ensure outcome evaluations are conducted as per the council’s policy.
  5. Lockhart Shire Council should immediately:
    1. include additional information in the council’s contract register to ensure compliance with Section 29(b), (f), (g), (h) and (i) of the GIPA Act
    2. ensure contract values are consistent between the contract register and the annual report.
  6. Waverley Council should immediately ensure contracts are disclosed in the annual report as per Section 217(1)(a2) of the Regulation.

(1) The relevant ICAC publications include: Corruption Risks in NSW Government Procurement – The Management Challenge (2011), Corruption Risks in NSW Government Procurement – Suppliers’ Perception of Corruption (2011) and Corruption Risks in NSW Government Procurement – Recommendations to Government (2011).

While all six councils had procurement policies in place and were generally compliant with legislative requirements, this report has identified common gaps in processes and practices that expose risks to transparency, accountability and value for money.

This section discusses how councils can mitigate risks and ensure the best outcomes are achieved from their procurements.

Documented justification of procurement needs

The ICAC notes that determining what goods and services an agency requires is the first step of procurement, and the scope for corruption in how need is determined is significant. Without documenting how procurement needs have been justified, councils cannot demonstrate that they fulfill business needs, nor how the procurements may link to the councils’ strategic plans to deliver to the community.

This audit found that none of the six councils’ policies required them to document justification of procurement needs, and none did so consistently in practice. Councils can address this gap by building into their procurement planning process a requirement for staff to document the justification of procurement needs. For higher value procurements, this could be extended to include analysis of options, an assessment of risks and defining intended outcomes. Similarly, clearly establishing and documenting how relevant procurements relate to a council’s community strategic plans or operational plans helps ensure transparency.

Although a formal business case may not be required for many procurements (for example, low-value procurements or routine replacements), some form of documented justification for the expenditure should still be kept on record to demonstrate that the procurement relates to business purposes and is needed.

Segregation of duties

Segregation of duties is an effective control for reducing risks of error, fraud and corruption in procurement. It works on the principle that one person should not have end-to-end control of a procurement. Effective segregation of duties also often involves managerial or independent oversight that is built into the process. Four of the audited councils (Cumberland City Council, Georges River Council, Lockhart Shire Council and Wollongong City Council) appropriately addressed segregation of duties in their procurement frameworks. For example:

  • All procurements in Cumberland City Council required a delegated officer’s approval before commencing, and the requisitioning department is responsible for ensuring the completion of the goods, works or services associated with each contract. For contracts over $50,000, a specific ‘Authority to Procure’ form had to be completed by the requesting staff, signed by an approver and then forwarded to the procurement team.

  • Reflecting its small size, all procurements in Lockhart Shire Council were managed by one senior staff member. Nevertheless, this staff member had to bring contract management plans to the rest of the Executive Leadership Team for review and discussion, with large contracts such as those above the tender threshold referred to Council for approval.

The ICAC notes that segregation of duties helps to control discretion, which has particular risk implications for some types of procurement.This includes those involving low-value and high-volume transactions, restricted tenders, long-standing procurements and ‘pet projects’ (projects advocated by individual staff members). In cases where corruption risks are low, ICAC notes that monitoring staff’s involvement in procurement may be a cost-effective alternative to total segregation of duties.

Assessment of supplier performance

Councils need to monitor and assess supplier performance to ensure suppliers deliver the goods and services as agreed. The audit found that all six councils consistently monitored progress in capital works and for externally funded projects. Contract monitoring in these cases included ensuring timelines, funding, and legislative requirements were met. This is positive, as capital works made up the bulk of procurements (in terms of volume) in all of the audited councils.

That said, in all six councils, the level of scrutiny was lower for other types of procurements, and there is scope for improvement. For instance, the approach to monitoring capital works or externally funded projects could be replicated across other procurements of a similar nature and value. Conducting assessments and keeping records of supplier performance on all procurements does not need to be onerous, but instead provides useful information to inform future decision-making—including by helping ensure supplier pricing remains competitive, and avoiding re-engaging underperforming suppliers.

The NSW Government Procurement Policy Framework requires that NSW Government agencies establish systems and processes jointly with the suppliers to ensure compliance with contract terms and performance requirements. It also advises that agencies should drive continuous improvement and encourage innovation in coordination with suppliers and key stakeholders.

Centralised contract register

Centrally registering a contract provides improved transparency of procurement activities and facilitates monitoring and compliance checks. While councils are already required to maintain a contract register for all contracts above the reporting threshold (as per the GIPA Act), given the threshold is set at a relatively high benchmark ($150,000), there is merit in councils extending the practice to procurements below the reporting threshold. A central and comprehensive register of contracts helps avoid duplication of procurements and re-contracting of underperforming suppliers.

Three of the audited councils (Georges River Council, Tweed Shire Council and Wollongong City Council) had contract register policies that applied to procurements below the reporting threshold during the audited period. For example, Georges River Council required contracts valued at $10,000 or above to be registered with the procurement team, and Tweed Shire Council had a threshold of $50,000.

Evaluation of community outcomes and value for money

Councils may be progressing procurements to fulfill their strategic and business plans, or using them to fulfill commitments to the community. In these instances, outcomes evaluation is an important way to demonstrate to the community that the intended benefits and value for money have been delivered.

Five of the six audited councils did not require evaluations of community outcomes and value for money. While Georges River Council required contracts valued at $50,000 or more to be monitored, evaluated and reported on at least annually throughout the contract and also at its conclusion, in the procurements we examined the only ‘outcome evaluations’ that the council had conducted were community surveys that did not refer to individual procurements. Councils can miss opportunities to understand the impact of their work on the local community if evaluations of procurement outcomes are not completed. Evaluation findings are also valuable in guiding future resource allocation decisions.

Value for money in the procurement of goods and services is more than just having the specified goods delivered or services carried out. The NSW Government Procurement Policy Framework requires that state government agencies track and report benefits to demonstrate how value for money is being delivered. The framework notes that value for money is not necessarily the lowest price, nor the highest quality good or service, but requires a balanced assessment of a range of financial and non-financial factors, such as: quality, cost, fitness for purpose, capability, capacity, risk, total cost of ownership or other relevant factors.

Procurement training

Effective procurement management relies on the capability of staff involved in various stages of the process. Guidance can be provided through training, which is an important element of any procurement management framework. It ensures that staff members are aware of the councils' policies and procedures. If structured appropriately and provided in a timely manner, training can help to standardise practices, ensure compliance, reduce chances of error, and mitigate risks of fraud or corruption.

The ICAC notes that effective procurement management depends on the competence of staff undertaking procurements and the competence of those who oversee procurement activities. As the public sector is characterised by varying levels of procurement expertise, the ICAC notes that the sector would benefit from a structured approach to training and the application of minimum standards.3

At the time of this audit, only Wollongong City Council addressed staff training requirements in its procurement management framework. Exhibit 8 details its approach.

Exhibit 8: Wollongong City Council's approach to training
  • Wollongong City Council has a suite of procurement training available for staff, administered by a dedicated staff member who also monitors attendance and training needs
  • Staff must complete training before they can take part in a procurement or be a member of a tender assessment panel, and the council keeps a list of all accredited staff members.
  • Staff cannot access procurement files on the council's electronic records management system until they have received training and have been approved for access by the trainer.
  • Staff must be trained before they can receive a financial delegation.

Source: Audit Office of New South Wales analysis of Wollongong City Council's procurement policies and procedures 2020.
 

Two of the audited councils have now also introduced procurement training:

  • Georges River Council implemented online training, which is mandatory for new staff and serves as refresher training for existing staff. The council also provides in-person training for selected staff (covering contract management, contract specification writing and contractor relationship management) and has developed quick reference cards for all staff to increase awareness of the council's procurement processes.
  • Tweed Shire Council implemented mandatory online training for all staff members. The training covers the council's procurement policy and protocol as well as relevant legislation. It is linked to relevant council documents such as the Procurement Toolkit on the council's intranet, and includes a quiz for which training participants must score at least 80 per cent to have the training marked as completed.
(2) ICAC (2011) Corruption Risks in NSW Government Procurement – The Management Challenge.
(3) ICAC (2011) Corruption Risks in NSW Government Procurement – Recommendations to Government.

Appendix one – Responses from councils and the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment

Appendix two – Councils’ procurement contracts

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #345 - released 17 December 2020

Published

Actions for Central Agencies 2020

Central Agencies 2020

Premier and Cabinet
Treasury
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk

This report analyses the results of our audits of the financial statements of the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet, Customer Service cluster agencies (central agencies), and the Legislature for the year ended 30 June 2020. The table below summarises our key observations.

1. Financial reporting

Audit opinions and timeliness of reporting

Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the 2019–20 financial statements of central agencies and the Legislature.

The audit opinion on the Social and Affordable Housing NSW Fund's compliance with the payment requirements of the Social and Affordable Housing NSW Fund Act 2016 was qualified.

All agencies met statutory deadlines for submitting
financial statements. 

Agencies were financially impacted by recent emergency events The NSW Government allocated $1.4 billion to provide small business support and bushfire recovery relief, support COVID-19 quarantine compliance management, recruit more staff to respond to increased customer demand, and meet additional COVID-19 cleaning requirements. Agencies spent $901 million (64 per cent of the allocated funding) for the financial year ended 30 June 2020. NSW Self Insurance Corporation reported an increase of $850 million in its liability for claims related to emergency events.
AASB 16 'Leases' resulted in significant changes to agencies' financial position The implementation of new accounting standards was challenging for many agencies. The New South Wales Government Telecommunications Authority was not well-prepared to implement AASB 16 'Leases' and had not completely assessed contracts that contained leases. This resulted in understatements of leased assets and liabilities by $56 million which were subsequently corrected.
Implementation of new revenue standards NSW Treasury did not adequately implement the new revenue standard AASB 1058 ‘Income of Not-for-Profit Entities’ for the Crown Entity. This resulted in understatements of $274 million in opening equity and $254 million to current year revenue, which have been corrected in the final financial statements.

2. Audit observations

Management letter findings and repeat issues Our 2019–20 audits identified nine high risk and 122 moderate risk issues across central agencies and the Legislature. The high risk issues were identified in the audits of:
  • Insurance and Care NSW
  • New South Wales Government Telecommunications Authority
  • Rental Bond Board
  • Independent Commission Against Corruption
  • NSW Treasury
  • Crown Entity
  • Department of Premier and Cabinet.

High risk findings include:

  • Insurance and Care NSW (icare) allocates service costs to the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer, and the other schemes it supports. The documentation supporting cost allocations does not demonstrate how these allocations reflect actual costs. There is a risk of the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer being overcharged.
  • New South Wales Government Telecommunications Authority's delay in capitalisation and valuation of material capital projects; and insufficient work performed to implement the new accounting standard AASB 16 ‘Leases’.
  • NSW Treasury's four-year plan to transition RailCorp to a for-profit State Owned Corporation called Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (TAHE) by 1 July 2019, remains to be implemented. On 1 July 2020, RailCorp converted to TAHE. A large portion of the planned arrangements are still to be implemented. As at the time of the audit, the TAHE operating model, Statement of Corporate Intent (SCI) and other key plans and commercial agreements were not finalised. In the absence of commercial arrangements with the public rail operators, there is a lack of evidence to demonstrate TAHE’s ability to create a commercial return in the long term. This matter has been included as a high risk finding in our management letter as there may be financial reporting implications to the State if TAHE does not generate a commercial return for its shareholders in line with the original intent. NSW Treasury and TAHE should ensure the commercial arrangements, operating model and SCI are finalised in 2020–21.

Of the 122 moderate risk issues, 36 per cent were repeat issues. The most common repeat issue related to weaknesses in controls over information technology user access administration, which increases the risk of inappropriate access to systems and records.

Grants administration for disaster relief Service NSW delivers grants responding to emergency events on behalf of other NSW Public Sector agencies. Since the first grant program commenced in January 2020, Service NSW processed approximately $791 million to NSW citizens and businesses impacted by emergency events for the financial year ended 30 June 2020. A performance audit of grants administration for disaster relief is planned for 2020–21. It will assess whether grants programs administered under the Small Business Support Fund were effectively designed and implemented to provide disaster relief.
Internal controls at GovConnect NSW service providers require enhancement

GovConnect NSW provides transactional and information technology services to central agencies. It engages an independent service auditor (service auditor) from the private sector to perform annual assurance reviews of controls at service providers, namely Infosys, Unisys and the Department of Customer Service (DCS). The service auditor issued:

  • unqualified opinions on information technology and business process controls at Infosys and Unisys, but there was an increase in control deficiencies identified in the user access controls at these service providers
  • a qualified opinion on DCS's information technology (IT) security monitoring controls because security tools were not implemented and monitored for the entire financial year. Responsibility for IT security monitoring transitioned from Unisys to DCS in 2019–20. These control deficiencies can increase the risk of fraud and inappropriate use of sensitive data.

These may impact on the ability of agencies to detect and respond to a cyber incident.

Recommendation:

We recommend DCS work with GovConnect service providers to resolve the identified control deficiencies as a matter of priority.

The NSW Public Sector's cyber security resilience needs to improve

The NSW Cyber Security Policy requires agencies to provide a maturity self-assessment against the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) Essential 8 to the head of the agency and Cyber Security NSW annually. Completed self-assessment returns highlighted limited progress in implementing the Essential 8.

Repeat recommendation:

Cyber Security NSW and NSW government agencies need to prioritise improvements to their cyber security resilience as a matter of urgency

Three Insurance and Care NSW (icare) entities had net asset deficiencies at 30 June 2020 The Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer, NSW Self Insurance Corporation and the Lifetime Care and Support Authority of NSW all had negative net assets at 30 June 2020. These icare entities did not hold sufficient assets to meet the estimated present value of all of their future payment obligations at 30 June 2020. The deterioration in net assets was largely due to increases in outstanding claims liabilities. Notwithstanding the overall net asset deficiencies, the financial statements for these entities were prepared on a going concern basis. This is because future payment obligations are not all due within the next 12 months. Settlement is instead expected to occur over years into the future, depending on the nature of the benefits provided by each scheme.
icare has not been able to demonstrate that its allocation of costs reflects the actual costs incurred by the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer and other schemes

Costs are incurred by icare as the 'service entity' of the statutory scheme it administers, and then subsequently recovered from the schemes through 'service fees'. In the absence of documentation supported by robust supporting analysis, there is a risk of the schemes being overcharged, and the allocation of costs being in breach of legislative requirements.

Recommendation:

icare should ensure its approach to allocating service fees to the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer and the other schemes it manages, is transparent and reflects actual costs.

icare did not comply with GIPA requirements icare did not comply with the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (GIPA) contract disclosure requirements in 2019–20 and has not complied for several years. A total of 417 contracts were identified by management as not having been published on the NSW Government’s eTendering website. The final upload of these past contracts occurred on 20 August 2020.
Implementation of Machinery of Government (MoG) changes MoG changes impacted the governance and business processes of some agencies. Our audits identified and reported areas for improvement in the consolidation of corporate functions following MoG implementation processes at Infrastructure NSW and in the Customer Service cluster.

This report provides Parliament and other users of NSW Government central agencies' financial statements and the Legislature's financial statements with the results of our financial audits, observations, analyses, conclusions and recommendations.

Emergency events, such as bushfires, floods and the COVID-19 pandemic significantly impacted agencies in 2019–20. Our findings on nine agencies that were most impacted by recent emergency events are included throughout this report.

Refer to Appendix one for the names of all central agencies and Appendix four for the nine agencies most impacted by emergency events.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely. This chapter outlines our audit observations on the financial reporting of central agencies and the Legislature for 2020, including the financial implications from recent emergency events.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the 2019–20 financial statements of central agencies and the Legislature. All agencies met the statutory deadlines for submitting their financial statements.
  • The audit opinion on the Social and Affordable Housing NSW Fund's compliance with the payment requirements of the Social and Affordable Housing NSW Fund Act 2016 was qualified as a result of a payment made without a Treasurer's delegation.
  • Agencies were impacted by emergency events during 2019–20. This included additional grants to fund specific deliverables.
  • The implementation of new accounting standards was challenging for many agencies. The New South Wales Government Telecommunications Authority was not well-prepared to implement AASB 16 'Leases' and had not completely assessed contracts that contained leases. This resulted in understatements of leased assets and liabilities by $56 million which were subsequently corrected.
  • NSW Treasury did not adequately implement the new revenue standard AASB 1058 ‘Income of Not-for-Profit Entities’ for the Crown Entity. This resulted in understatements of $274 million in opening equity and $254 million to current year revenue in the financial statements. These misstatements were due to incorrect revenue calculations performed by the Transport agencies. The Crown Entity relies on information from Transport agencies as they are responsible for carrying out the State’s contractual obligations for Commonwealth funded transport projects. The extent of misstatements could have been reduced with more robust quality review processes in place by Treasury and Transport.

 

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines:

  • our observations and insights from the financial statement audits of agencies in the central agencies and the Legislature
  • our assessment of how well agencies adapted their systems, policies, procedures and governance arrangements in response to recent emergencies.

Section highlights

  • The 2019–20 audits identified nine high risk and 122 moderate risk issues across the agencies. Of the 122 moderate risk issues, 44 (36 per cent) were repeat issues. The most common repeat issue relates to weaknesses in controls over information technology user access administration.
  • Service NSW delivers grants responding to emergency events on behalf of other NSW Public Sector agencies. Since the first grant program commenced in January 2020, Service NSW processed approximately $791 million to NSW citizens and businesses impacted by these emergency events for the financial year ended 30 June 2020.
  • GovConnect NSW engaged an independent auditor (the service auditor) from the private sector to evaluate the internal controls of its service providers. DCS's information technology security monitoring controls were qualified by the service auditor because security tools were not implemented and monitored for the entire financial year. These may impact on the ability of agencies to detect and respond to a cyber incident.
  • NSW Government agency self-assessment results show that the NSW Public Sector's cyber security resilience needs urgent attention.
  • The Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer, NSW Self Insurance Corporation and the Lifetime Care and Support Authority of NSW all had negative net assets at 30 June 2020. The financial statements for these entities continued to be prepared on a going concern basis as their liabilities are not all due for settlement within the next 12 months.
  • icare did not comply with the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (GIPA) contract disclosure requirements in 2019–20, and has not complied for several years. A total of 417 contracts were identified by management as not having been published on the NSW Government’s eTendering website. The final upload of these past contracts occurred on 20 August 2020.
  • Machinery of Government (MoG) changes impacted the governance and business processes of affected agencies. Our audits identified and reported areas for improvement in the consolidation of corporate functions following MoG changes at Infrastructure NSW and in the Customer Service cluster.

 

Published

Actions for Health 2020

Health 2020

Health
Compliance
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Service delivery

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Health cluster for the year ended 30 June 2020. The table below summarises our key observations.

1. Financial reporting

Financial reporting

Unqualified financial audit opinions

The financial statements of NSW Health and its 25 controlled entities received unqualified opinions.

The number of corrected and uncorrected misstatements increased from the prior year. Misstatements related predominantly to the implementation of new accounting standards, asset revaluations and accounting for new revenue streams to cover the cost of HSW Health’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Qualified compliance audit opinion

We issued a qualified audit opinion for the Ministry of Health’s Annual Prudential Compliance Statement for aged care facilities operated by NSW Health. We identified 18 instances of material non-compliance with the Fees and Payments Principles 2014 (No. 2) (the Principles) in 2019–20 (30 in 2018–19).

Financial performance

NSW Health received an additional $3.3 billion in funding to cover costs associated with its response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the cluster were significant for health entities and included changes to operations, increased revenues, expenditure, assets and liabilities. Cancellation of elective surgery and decreased emergency department presentations meant that despite the pandemic, activity levels at many health entities decreased. Health Pathology and HealthShare were notable exceptions.

In the period to the 30 June 2020, NSW Health reported that over 900,000 COVID-19 tests were conducted. Health Pathology conducted over 500,000 of these tests. Health Pathology's surge requirements were enhanced through arrangements with 13 private sector providers. HealthShare purchased $864.2 million of personal protective equipment.

Overall, NSW Health recorded an operating surplus of $3.1 billion in 2019–20, an increase of $2.0 billion from 2018–19. As in previous years, the surplus largely resulted from additional revenue received to fund capital projects including the construction of new facilities, upgrades and redevelopments. In 2019–20 additional Commonwealth and State funding for the purchase and stockpiling of personal protective equipment also contributed to the operating surplus.

Overtime payments The Ambulance Service of NSW’s (NSW Ambulance) reduced their overtime payments to $79.7 million in 2019–20 ($83.1 million in 2018–19). Overtime payments in 2019–20 included $6.8 million related to the response to the 2019–20 bushfire season. NSW Ambulance overtime payments represent 16.8 per cent of total overtime payments in the cluster.

2. Audit observations

Internal control deficiencies

We identified more internal control deficiencies in 2019–20. The number of repeat issues from prior years also remains high.

NSW Health addressed 18 out of the 25 information system control deficiencies during the year.

Several key agreements lacked formal documentation. This included agreements between the Ministry and health entities, between health entities and agencies in other clusters and between the Ministry and health departments in other jurisdictions.

Infrastructure delivery NSW Health had 44 ongoing major capital projects at 30 June 2020 with a total revised budget of $12.3 billion. The revised total budget of $12.3 billion is $2.0 billion more than the original budget. NSW Health revises budgets when it combines project stages.

This report provides parliament and other users of the Health cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

The impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the cluster were significant and included changes to the operations of the health entities and increased revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities.

As a part of this year's audits of health entities, we have considered:

  • financial implications of the COVID-19 emergency at both health entity and cluster levels
  • changes to agencies' operating models
  • agencies' access to technology and the maturity of systems and controls to prevent unauthorised and fraudulent access to data.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

The response to the COVID-19 pandemic primarily impacted the financial reporting of NSW Health through:

  • additional revenue from the State government in the form of grants and stimulus payments
  • additional revenue from the Commonwealth government under the National Partnership Agreement for COVID-19 to cover part of the cost of responding to the COVID-19 pandemic
  • increased expenses, largely due to increased payments to private health operators to maintain their viability during the COVID-19 pandemic and later to assist with public patient elective surgery waitlists and increased cleaning costs
  • increased purchases of personal protective equipment.

Chapter one outlines the impacts of NSW Health’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This chapter outlines our other audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Health cluster for 2020.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all health entities’ financial statements, although more misstatements were identified than last year.
  • NSW Health recorded an operating surplus of $3.1 billion, an increase of $2.0 billion from 2018–19. This is largely due to additional capital grants for new facilities, upgrades and redevelopments and additional Commonwealth and State funding for the purchase of personal protective equipment.
  • NSW Health’s expenses increased by 5.5 per cent in 2019–20 (7.0 per cent in 2018–19) despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The primary causes for the growth in expenses are increases in:
    • employee related expenses due to higher employee numbers, increased overtime and a 2.5 per cent award increase
    • payments to private health operators to maintain their viability during the COVID-19 pandemic and later to assist with public patient elective surgery waitlists
    • payments to private health operators due to the first full year of operation of the Northern Beaches hospital.
  • The Ambulance Service of NSW (NSW Ambulance) continued to report higher overtime payments than other health entities. However, despite the response to the 2019–20 bushfire season, their overtime payments were lower than last year. NSW Ambulance paid $79.7 million in overtime payments in 2019–20 ($83.1 million in 2018–19).
  • A qualified audit opinion was issued for the Ministry of Health’s Annual Prudential Compliance Statement for aged care facilities operated by NSW Health. There were 18 instances of material non-compliance with the Fees and Payments Principles 2014 (No. 2) (the Principles) in 2019–20 (30 in 2018–19)

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

The primary impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the effectiveness of the internal controls of NSW Health and health entities relates to the effectiveness of controls implemented by HealthShare relating to the stocktake of personal protective equipment inventories. Inventory managed by HealthShare increased by 2,746 per cent during 2019–20. HealthShare’s inventory controls did not maintain pace with the sudden, significant increase.

The impacts of NSW Health’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic are outlined in chapter one. This chapter outlines other observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Health cluster.

Section highlights

  • The number of internal control deficiencies has increased since 2018–19. More than a third of control deficiencies are repeat issues.
  • Control deficiencies that relate to managing employees’ leave and employee’s time recording continue to be difficult for entities to resolve, particularly during the ongoing response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
  • Several key agreements were undocumented. These included agreements between the Ministry and the health entities, between health entities, and between the Ministry and entities in other clusters and jurisdictions. These related to:
    • a loan arrangement between the Ministry and HealthShare for $319 million.
    • Northern Sydney Local Health District's use of land and buildings owned by the Graythwaite Charitable Trust
    • agreements for the treatment of New South Wales residents while they are interstate, and interstate residents receiving treatment while they are in New South Wales from Queensland, Victoria, South Australia and the ACT for both 2019–20 and 2018–19.
  • NSW Health reported that they completed nine major capital projects during 2019–20. As at 30 June 2020 there were 44 ongoing major capital health projects in NSW. The revised capital budget for these projects in total was $2.0 billion more than the original budget of $10.3 billion. NSW Health reported the budget revisions are largely the result of combining project stages.

Appendix one – List of 2020 recommendations 

Appendix two – Status of 2019 recommendations 

Appendix three – Financial data

Appendix four – Analysis of financial indicators 

Appendix five – Analysis of performance against budget

 

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Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament

Health 2020

11 December 2020

This corrigendum has been prepared to amend the following text within the Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament on Health 2020, dated 10 December 2020.

NSW Health emergency department treatment times

On page five the original text was as follows:

NSW Health also measures the percentage of patients whose clinical care in emergency departments is completed within four hours. The measure is used as an indicator of accessibility to public hospital services.

NSW Health aims to complete clinical care in the emergency department for 81 per cent of patients within four hours. In 2019–20 NSW Health reports it completed clinical care within four hours for 72.1 per cent of patients (a 7.3 per cent decrease from 2018–19).

At Western Sydney Local Health District, 59 per cent of patients were treated within the targeted timeframe. NSW Health attribute this to the profile of patients presenting in emergency departments and additional time taken processing COVID-19 patients to ensure staff safety.

The original text has now been changed to:

NSW Health also measures the percentage of patients with total time in the emergency department of four hours or less for each local health district. The measure is used as an indicator of accessibility to public hospital services.

Local Health Districts Target % (2019–20) Actual % (2019–20)
Central Coast 77.0 59.9
Far West 90.2 86.6
Hunter New England 81.0 72.5
Illawarra Shoalhaven 79.0 60.2
Mid North Coast 82.0 76.7
Murrumbidgee 85.3 81.9
Nepean Blue Mountains 79.0 65.5
Northern NSW 81.0 78.2
Northern Sydney 79.0 73.9
South Eastern Sydney 78.0 70.3
South Western Sydney 78.0 61.2
Southern NSW 85.0 83.0
Sydney 76.0 70.9
Sydney Children’s Hospitals Network 80.0 72.1
Western NSW 85.9 81.0
Western Sydney 78.0 59.0
St Vincent's Health Network* 75.0 65.4
* St Vincent’s Health Network Sydney (SVHNS) comprises of St Vincent’s Hospital Sydney Limited as the affiliated health organisation in respect of four recognised establishments under the Health Services Act 1997 (NSW) (Health Services Act). Under the Health Services Act, St Vincent’s Hospital Sydney Limited, is treated as a Network for the purposes of the National Health Reform Agreement in respect of the three recognised establishments: St Vincent’s Hospital, Darlinghurst; Sacred Heart Health Service, Darlinghurst; St Joseph’s Hospital, Auburn; and St Vincent's Correctional Health, Parklea.
Source: NSW Health (unaudited)

The above changes will be reflected in the version of the report published on the Audit Office website and should be considered the true and accurate version.