Reports
Property Asset Utilisation
Property NSW’s effectiveness in managing NSW Government owned and leased commercial office property is limited in three areas according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford.
At 30 June 2018, the NSW Government owned $160 billion worth of land and buildings. The NSW Treasury predicts this figure will rise over the coming years. Property NSW manages more than 900 leased office properties across the state. Approximately 250 of these are owned by Property NSW. Other NSW Government agencies maintain ownership and control of properties considered essential for service provision, such as schools, prisons and hospitals. Between 2012–13 and 2017–18 sales of property assets across the whole of the NSW Government have raised $10 billion, of which Property NSW has sold property assets of approximately $2 billion.
In September 2012, the Property Asset Utilisation Taskforce (the Taskforce) released its report on ‘real property asset management across government’ and concluded that the government has accumulated, over time, ‘a real property asset portfolio it cannot afford to maintain or protect’. The Taskforce noted that ‘a lack of centralised information seriously inhibits any whole-of-government strategic asset planning’ and that maintaining under-utilised or unnecessary properties diverted funds from areas where they might be better used. The Taskforce’s key findings included:
- the NSW Government should own property only as a means to deliver or enhance services
- many government properties were under-utilised, poorly maintained and inappropriate to support service delivery.
The Taskforce recommended the creation of Property NSW, as a replacement for the State Property Authority, to improve property asset utilisation and to drive efficiencies in the government’s owned and leased property portfolio. Property NSW was to achieve these goals by:
- collating property information across the whole-of-government
- working with agencies on longer-term strategic real property asset planning to:
- provide services to agencies as customers
- bring a whole-of-government perspective to real property asset planning.
In response to the Taskforce report, in December 2012, the Premier's Memorandum M2012-20 (the Memorandum) established Property NSW to improve the management of the NSW Government's owned and leased real property portfolio.
Under the Memorandum, Property NSW is responsible for:
- management of all leased and owned commercial office accommodation
- acting as the central acquisition and disposal agency
- providing advice to the government on property matters and developing property policy
- conducting regular and ongoing reviews of agencies portfolios, working with agencies to identify efficiencies to improve service delivery, in relation to the review of capital planning1
- maintaining the register of all government owned property.
The Memorandum states that ownership of all commercial office property should be vested in Property NSW.
This audit assessed whether Property NSW is effective in the management of NSW Government owned and leased commercial office property. To do this we assessed whether NSW Government leased commercial office space is being effectively utilised and whether the Government Property Register, a register of all government owned property, is accurate and up-to-date.
In December 2017, Property NSW started working across the NSW Government to help agencies identify real property assets, including commercial office properties, that are under-utilised or surplus and that could be recycled, repurposed, or vested to Property NSW.
1 Capital Planning was previously referred to as Total Asset Management (TAM).
By December 2019, Property NSW should:
- combine the results of property portfolio reviews to produce a whole-of-government picture of the NSW Government property portfolio
- devise a strategy and plan to recycle or repurpose under-utilised properties using a whole-of-government picture of the NSW Government property portfolio
- develop and report on indicators for progress in reducing the number and value of under-utilised properties at the whole-of-government level, referencing progress against an accurate baseline stocktake.
By December 2019, Property NSW should:
4. improve the data held on government owned and leased properties by combining and automating data feeds to construct a single, consolidated and accurate whole-of-government property data set.
By December 2019, Property NSW should:
5. document and communicate to stakeholders how its assessment criteria inform key decisions including agency relocations, lease renewals and rectifying under-utilisation
6. include customer satisfaction measures in its annual reports and reviews, in accordance with the requirements set out in the Premier's Memorandum M2012-20
7. improve record-keeping and compliance with the State Records Act 1998 and the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation Records Management Policy.
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - Audit Office response
Appendix three - About the audit
Appendix four - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #312 - released 18 December 2018
Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program
The urban renewal projects on former railway land in the Newcastle city centre are well targeted to support the objectives of the Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program), according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the government. However, the evidence that the cost of the light rail will be justified by its contribution to the Program is not convincing.
The Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program) is an urban renewal and transport program in the Newcastle city centre. The Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation (HCCDC) has led the Program since 2017. UrbanGrowth NSW led the Program from 2014 until 2017. Transport for NSW has been responsible for delivering the transport parts of the Program since the Program commenced. All references to HCCDC in this report relate to both HCCDC and its predecessor, the Hunter Development Corporation. All references to UrbanGrowth NSW in this report relate only to its Newcastle office from 2014 to 2017.
This audit had two objectives:
- To assess the economy of the approach chosen to achieve the objectives of the Program.
- To assess the effectiveness of the consultation and oversight of the Program.
We addressed the audit objectives by answering the following questions:
a) Was the decision to build light rail an economical option for achieving Program objectives?
b) Has the best value been obtained for the use of the former railway land?
c) Was good practice used in consultation on key Program decisions?
d) Did governance arrangements support delivery of the program?
1. The urban renewal projects on the former railway land are well targeted to support the objectives of the Program. However, there is insufficient evidence that the cost of the light rail will be justified by its contribution to Program objectives.
The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the Government. HCCDC, and previously UrbanGrowth NSW, identified and considered options for land use that would best meet Program objectives. Required probity processes were followed for developments that involved financial transactions. Our audit did not assess the achievement of these objectives because none of the projects have been completed yet.
Analysis presented in the Program business case and other planning documents showed that the light rail would have small transport benefits and was expected to make a modest contribution to broader Program objectives. Analysis in the Program business case argued that despite this, the light rail was justified because it would attract investment and promote economic development around the route. The Program business case referred to several international examples to support this argument, but did not make a convincing case that these examples were comparable to the proposed light rail in Newcastle.
The audited agencies argue that the contribution of light rail cannot be assessed separately because it is a part of a broader Program. The cost of the light rail makes up around 53 per cent of the total Program funding. Given the cost of the light rail, agencies need to be able to demonstrate that this investment provides value for money by making a measurable contribution to the Program objectives.
2. Consultation and oversight were mostly effective during the implementation stages of the Program. There were weaknesses in both areas in the planning stages.
Consultations about the urban renewal activities from around 2015 onward followed good practice standards. These consultations were based on an internationally accepted framework and met their stated objectives. Community consultations on the decision to close the train line were held in 2006 and 2009. However, the final decision in 2012 was made without a specific community consultation. There was no community consultation on the decision to build a light rail.
The governance arrangements that were in place during the planning stages of the Program did not provide effective oversight. This meant there was not a single agreed set of Program objectives until 2016 and roles and responsibilities for the Program were not clear. Leadership and oversight improved during the implementation phase of the Program. Roles and responsibilities were clarified and a multi-agency steering committee was established to resolve issues that needed multi-agency coordination.
Recommendations
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should support economical decision-making on infrastructure projects by:
- providing balanced advice to decision makers on the benefits and risks of large infrastructure investments at all stages of the decision-making process
- providing scope and cost estimates that are as accurate and complete as possible when initial funding decisions are being made
- making business cases available to the public.
The planned uses of the former railway land align with the objectives of encouraging people to visit and live in the city centre, creating attractive public spaces, and supporting growth in employment in the city. The transport benefits of the activities are less clear, because the light rail is the major transport project and this will not make significant improvements to transport in Newcastle.
The processes used for selling and leasing parts of the former railway land followed industry standards. Options for the former railway land were identified and assessed systematically. Competitive processes were used for most transactions and the required assessment and approval processes were followed. The sale of land to the University of Newcastle did not use a competitive process, but required processes for direct negotiations were followed.
Recommendation
By March 2019, the Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation should:
- work with relevant stakeholders to explore options for increasing the focus on the heritage objective of the Program in projects on the former railway land. This could include projects that recognise the cultural and industrial heritage of Newcastle.
Consultations focusing on urban renewal options for the Program included a range of stakeholders and provided opportunities for input into decisions about the use of the former railway land. These consultations received mostly positive feedback from participants. Changes and additions were made to the objectives of the Program and specific projects in response to feedback received.
There had been several decades of debate about the potential closure of the train line, including community consultations in 2006 and 2009. However, the final decision to close the train line was made and announced in 2012 without a specific community consultation. HCCDC states that consultation with industry and business representatives constitutes community consultation because industry representatives are also members of the community. This does not meet good practice standards because it is not a representative sample of the community.
There was no community consultation on the decision to build a light rail. There were subsequent opportunities for members of the community to comment on the implementation options, but the decision to build it had already been made. A community and industry consultation was held on which route the light rail should use, but the results of this were not made public.
Recommendation
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should consult with a wide range of stakeholders before major decisions are made and announced, and report publicly on the results and outcomes of consultations.
The governance arrangements that were in place during the planning stages of the Program did not provide effective oversight. Project leadership and oversight improved during the implementation phase of the Program.
Multi-agency coordination and oversight were ineffective during the planning stages of the Program. Examples include: multiple versions of Program objectives being in circulation; unclear reporting lines for project management groups; and poor role definition for the initial advisory board. Program ownership was clarified in mid-2016 with the appointment of a new Program Director with clear accountability for the delivery of the Program. This was supported by the creation of a multi-agency steering committee that was more effective than previous oversight bodies.
The limitations that existed in multi-agency coordination and oversight had some negative consequences in important aspects of project management for the Program. This included whole-of-government benefits management and the coordination of work to mitigate impacts of the Program on small businesses.
Recommendations
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should:
- develop and implement a benefits management approach from the beginning of a program to ensure responsibility for defining benefits and measuring their achievement is clear
- establish whole-of-government oversight early in the program to guide major decisions. This should include:
- agreeing on objectives and ensuring all agencies understand these
- clearly defining roles and responsibilities for all agencies
- establishing whole-of-government coordination for the assessment and mitigation of the impact of major construction projects on businesses and the community.
By March 2019, the Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation should update and implement the Program Benefits Realisation Plan. This should include:
- setting measurable targets for the desired benefits
- clearly allocating ownership for achieving the desired benefits
- monitoring progress toward achieving the desired benefits and reporting publicly on the results.
Appendix one - Response from agencies
Appendix two - About the audit
Appendix three - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #310 - released 12 December 2018
Unsolicited proposal process for the lease of Ausgrid
In October 2016, the NSW Government accepted an unsolicited proposal from IFM Investors and AustralianSuper to lease 50.4 per cent of Ausgrid for 99 years. The deal followed the Federal Government’s rejection of two bids from foreign investors, for national security reasons.
A performance audit of the lease of Ausgrid has found shortcomings in the unsolicited proposal process. Releasing the audit findings today, the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford said ‘this transaction involved a $20 billion asset owned by the people of New South Wales. As such, it warranted strict adherence to established guidelines’.
Ausgrid is a distributor of electricity to eastern parts of Sydney, the Central Coast, Newcastle and the Hunter Region.
In June 2014, the then government announced its commitment to lease components of the state's electricity network as part of the Rebuilding NSW plan. Implementation of the policy began after the government was re-elected in 2015. Between November 2015 and August 2016, the NSW Government held a competitive tender process to lease 50.4 per cent of Ausgrid for 99 years. The NSW Government abandoned the process on 19 August 2016 after the Australian Treasurer rejected two bids from foreign investors, for national security reasons. That day, the Premier and Treasurer released a media statement clarifying the government's objective to complete the transaction via a competitive process in time to include the proceeds in the 2017–18 budget.
On 31 August 2016, the state received an unsolicited proposal from IFM Investors and AustralianSuper to acquire an interest in Ausgrid under the same terms proposed by the state during the tender process. In October 2016, the government accepted the unsolicited proposal.
This audit examined whether the unsolicited proposal process for the partial long-term lease of Ausgrid was effectively conducted and in compliance with the government’s 2014 Unsolicited Proposals: Guide for Submission and Assessment (Unsolicited Proposals Guide or the Guide).
The audit focused on how the government-appointed Assessment Panel and Proposal Specific Steering Committee assessed key requirements in the Guide that unsolicited proposals must be demonstrably unique and represent value for money.
The evidence available does not conclusively demonstrate the unsolicited proposal was unique, and there were some shortcomings in the negotiation process, documentation and segregation of duties. That said, before the final commitment to proceed with the lease, the state obtained assurance that the proposal delivered value for money.
It is particularly important to demonstrate unsolicited proposals are unique, in order to justify the departure from other transaction processes that offer greater competition, transparency and certainty about value for money.
The Assessment Panel and the Proposal Specific Steering Committee determined the Ausgrid unsolicited proposal was unique, primarily on the basis that the proponent did not require foreign investment approval from the Australian Treasurer, and the lease transaction could be concluded earlier than through a second tender process. However, the evidence that persuaded the Panel and Committee did not demonstrate that no other proponent could conclude the transaction in time to meet the government’s deadline.
It is not appropriate to determine an unsolicited proposal is unique because it delivers an earlier outcome than possible through a tender process. The Panel and Committee did not contend, and it is not evident, that the unsolicited proposal was the only way to meet the government’s transaction deadline.
The evidence does not demonstrate that the proponent was the only party that would not have needed foreign investment approval to participate in the transaction. It also does not demonstrate that the requirement for foreign investment approval would have reduced the pool of foreign buyers to the degree that it would be reasonable to assume none would emerge.
The Panel, Committee and financial advisers determined that the final price represented value for money, and that retendering offered a material risk of a worse financial outcome. However, an acceptable price was revealed early in the negotiation process, and doing so made it highly unlikely that the proponent would offer a higher price than that disclosed. The Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) and NSW Treasury were not able to provide a documented reserve price, bargaining strategy or similar which put the negotiations in context. It is not evident that the Panel or Committee authorised, justified or endorsed negotiations in advance.
Key aspects of governance recommended by the Guide were in place. Some shortcomings relating to role segregation, record keeping and probity assurance weakened the effectiveness of the unsolicited proposal process adopted for Ausgrid.
The reasons for accepting that the proposal and proponent were unique are not compelling.
The Unsolicited Proposals Guide says the 'unique benefits of the proposal and the unique ability of the proponent to deliver the proposal' must be demonstrated.
The conclusion reached by the Panel and Committee that the proposal offered a ‘unique ability to deliver (a) strategic outcome’ was primarily based on the proponent not requiring foreign investment approval from the Australian Treasurer, and allowing the government to complete the lease transaction earlier than by going through a second tender process.
It is not appropriate to determine an unsolicited proposal is unique because it delivers an earlier outcome than possible through a tender process. The Panel and Committee did not contend, and it is not evident, that the unsolicited proposal was the only way to meet the government’s transaction deadline.
The evidence does not demonstrate that the proponent was the only party that would not have needed foreign investment approval to participate in the transaction. Nor does it demonstrate that the requirement for foreign investment approval would have reduced the pool of foreign buyers to the degree that it would be reasonable to assume none would emerge.
That said, the Australian Treasurer’s decision to reject the two bids from the previous tender process created uncertainty about the conditions under which he would approve international bids. The financial advisers engaged for the Ausgrid transaction informed the Panel and Committee that:
- it was not likely another viable proponent would emerge soon enough to meet the government’s transaction deadline
- the market would be unlikely to deliver a better result than offered by the proponent
- going to tender presented a material risk of a worse financial result.
The Unsolicited Proposals Guide says that a proposal to directly purchase or acquire a government-owned entity or property will generally not be unique. The Ausgrid unsolicited proposal fell into this category.
Recommendations:
DPC should ensure future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government business or asset:
- recognise that when considering uniqueness they should:
- require very strong evidence to decide that both the proponent and proposal are the only ones of their kind that could meet the government’s objectives
- give thorough consideration to any reasonable counter-arguments against uniqueness.
- rigorously consider all elements of the Unsolicited Proposals Guide when determining whether a proposal should be dealt with as an unsolicited proposal, and document these deliberations and all relevant evidence
- do not use speed of transaction compared to a market process as justification for uniqueness.
The Panel and Committee concluded the price represented value for money, based on peer-reviewed advice from their financial advisers and knowledge acquired from previous tenders. The financial advisers also told the Panel and Committee that there was a material risk the state would receive a lower price than offered by the unsolicited proposal if it immediately proceeded with a second market transaction.
The state commenced negotiations on price earlier than the Guide says they should have. Early disclosure of a price that the state would accept reduced the likelihood of achieving a price greater than this. DPC says the intent of this meeting was to quickly establish whether the proponents could meet the state’s benchmark rather than spending more time and resources on a proposal which had no prospect of proceeding.
DPC and NSW Treasury were not able to provide a documented reserve price, negotiation strategy or similar which put the negotiations and price achieved in context. It was not evident that the Panel or Committee authorised, justified or endorsed negotiations in advance. However, the Panel and Committee endorsed the outcomes of the negotiations.
The negotiations were informed by the range of prices achieved for similar assets and the specific bids for Ausgrid from the earlier market process.
Recommendations:
DPC should ensure any future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government business or asset:
- document a minimum acceptable price, and a negotiating strategy designed to maximise price, before commencing negotiations
- do not communicate an acceptable price to the proponent, before the negotiation stage of the process, and then only as part of a documented bargaining strategy.
The state established a governance structure in accordance with the Unsolicited Proposals Guide, including an Assessment Panel and Proposal Specific Steering Committee. The members of the Panel and Steering Committee were senior and experienced officers, as befitted the size and nature of the unsolicited proposal.
The separation of negotiation, assessment and review envisaged by the Guide was not maintained fully. The Chair of the Assessment Panel and a member of the Steering Committee were involved in negotiations with the proponent.
DPC could not provide comprehensive records of some key interactions with the proponent or a documented negotiation strategy. The absence of such records means the Department cannot demonstrate engagement and negotiation processes were authorised and rigorous.
The probity adviser reported there were no material probity issues with the transaction. The probity adviser also provided audit services. This is not good practice. The same party should not provide both advisory and audit services on the same transaction.
Recommendations:
DPC should ensure any future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government entity or asset:
• maintain separation between negotiation, assessment and review in line with the Unsolicited Proposals Guide
• keep an auditable trail of documentation relating to the negotiation process
• maintain separation between any probity audit services engaged and the probity advisory and reporting services recommended in the current Guide.
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - NSW Government’s summary of assessment of the Ausgrid unsolicited proposal
Appendix three - The definition and nature of unsolicited proposals
Appendix four - Ausgrid unsolicited proposal process
Appendix five - About the audit
Appendix six - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #309 - released 11 December 2018
Mobile speed cameras
The primary goal of speed cameras is to reduce speeding and make the roads safer. Our 2011 performance audit on speed cameras found that, in general, speed cameras change driver behaviour and have a positive impact on road safety.
Transport for NSW published the NSW Speed Camera Strategy in June 2012 in response to our audit. According to the Strategy, the main purpose of mobile speed cameras is to reduce speeding across the road network by providing a general deterrence through anywhere, anytime enforcement and by creating a perceived risk of detection across the road network. Fixed and red-light speed cameras aim to reduce speeding at specific locations.
Roads and Maritime Services and Transport for NSW deploy mobile speed cameras (MSCs) in consultation with NSW Police. The cameras are operated by contractors authorised by Roads and Maritime Services. MSC locations are stretches of road that can be more than 20 kilometres long. MSC sites are specific places within these locations that meet the requirements for a MSC vehicle to be able to operate there.
This audit assessed whether the mobile speed camera program is effectively managed to maximise road safety benefits across the NSW road network.
The mobile speed camera program requires improvements to key aspects of its management to maximise road safety benefits. While camera locations have been selected based on crash history, the limited number of locations restricts network coverage. It also makes enforcement more predictable, reducing the ability to provide a general deterrence. Implementation of the program has been consistent with government decisions to limit its hours of operation and use multiple warning signs. These factors limit the ability of the mobile speed camera program to effectively deliver a broad general network deterrence from speeding.
Many locations are needed to enable network-wide coverage and ensure MSC sessions are randomised and not predictable. However, there are insufficient locations available to operate MSCs that meet strict criteria for crash history, operator safety, signage and technical requirements. MSC performance would be improved if there were more locations.
A scheduling system is meant to randomise MSC location visits to ensure they are not predictable. However, a relatively small number of locations have been visited many times making their deployment more predictable in these places. The allocation of MSCs across the time of day, day of week and across regions is prioritised based on crash history but the frequency of location visits does not correspond with the crash risk for each location.
There is evidence of a reduction in fatal and serious crashes at the 30 best-performing MSC locations. However, there is limited evidence that the current MSC program in NSW has led to a behavioural change in drivers by creating a general network deterrence. While the overall reduction in serious injuries on roads has continued, fatalities have started to climb again. Compliance with speed limits has improved at the sites and locations that MSCs operate, but the results of overall network speed surveys vary, with recent improvements in some speed zones but not others.
There is no supporting justification for the number of hours of operation for the program. The rate of MSC enforcement (hours per capita) in NSW is less than Queensland and Victoria. The government decision to use multiple warning signs has made it harder to identify and maintain suitable MSC locations, and impeded their use for enforcement in both traffic directions and in school zones.
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - About the audit
Appendix three - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #308 - released 18 October 2018
Progress and measurement of the Premier's Priorities
The Premier’s Implementation Unit uses a systematic approach to measuring and reporting progress towards the Premier’s Priorities performance targets, but public reporting needed to improve, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General of NSW, Margaret Crawford.
The Premier of New South Wales has established 12 Premier’s Priorities. These are key performance targets for government.
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Source: Department of Premier and Cabinet, Premier’s Priorities website.
Each Premier’s Priority has a lead agency and minister responsible for achieving the performance target.
The Premier’s Implementation Unit (PIU) was established within the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) in 2015. The PIU is a delivery unit that supports agencies to measure and monitor performance, make progress toward the Premier’s Priorities targets, and report progress to the Premier, key ministers and the public.
This audit assessed how effectively the NSW Government is progressing and reporting on the Premier's Priorities.
The Premier’s Implementation Unit (PIU) is effective in assisting agencies to make progress against the Premier’s Priorities targets. Progress reporting is regular but transparency to the public is weakened by the lack of information about specific measurement limitations and lack of clarity about the relationship of the targets to broader government objectives.The PIU promotes a systematic approach to measuring performance and reporting progress towards the Premier’s Priorities’ performance targets. Public reporting would be improved with additional information about the rationale for choosing specific targets to report on broader government objectives.
The PIU provides a systematic approach to measuring performance and reporting progress towards the Premier's Priorities performance targets. Public reporting would be improved with additional information about the rationale for choosing specific targets to report on broader government objectives. The data used to measure the Premier’s Priorities comes from a variety of government and external datasets, some of which have known limitations. These limitations are not revealed in public reporting, and only some are revealed in progress reported to the Premier and ministers. This limits the transparency of reporting.
The PIU assists agencies to avoid unintended outcomes that can arise from prioritising particular performance measures over other areas of activity. The PIU has adopted a collaborative approach to assisting agencies to analyse performance using data, and helping them work across organisational silos to achieve the Premier’s Priorities targets.
Data used to measure progress for some of the Premier’s Priorities has limitations which are not made clear when progress is reported. This reduces transparency about the reported progress. Public reporting would also be improved with additional information about the relationship between specific performance measures and broader government objectives.
The PIU is responsible for reporting progress to the Premier, key ministers and the public. Agencies provide performance data and some play a role in preparing progress reports for the Premier and ministers. For 11 of the Premier's Priorities, progress is reported against measurable and time-related performance targets. For the infrastructure priority, progress is reported against project milestones.
Progress of some Priorities is measured using data that has known limitations, which should be noted wherever progress is reported. For example, the data used to report on housing completions does not take housing demolitions into account, and is therefore overstating the contribution of this performance measure to housing supply. This known limitation is not explained in progress reports or on the public website.
Data used to measure progress is sourced from a mix of government and external datasets. Updated progress data for most Premier’s Priorities is published on the Premier’s Priorities website annually, although reported to the Premier and key ministers more frequently. The PIU reviews the data and validates it through fieldwork with front line agencies. The PIU also assists agencies to avoid unintended outcomes that can arise from prioritising single performance measures. Most, but not all, agencies use additional indicators to check for misuse of data or perverse outcomes.
We examined the reporting processes and controls for five of the Premier’s Priorities. We found that there is insufficient assurance over the accuracy of the data on housing approvals.
The relationships between performance measures and broader government objectives is not always clearly explained on the Premier’s Priority website, which is the key source of public information about the Premier’s Priorities. For example, the Premier’s Priority to reduce litter volumes is communicated as “Keeping our Environment Clean.” While the website explains why reducing litter is important, it does not clearly explain why that particular target has been chosen to measure progress in keeping the environment clean.
By December 2018, the Department of Premier and Cabinet should:
- improve transparency of public reporting by:
- providing information about limitations of reported data and associated performance
- clarifying the relationship between the Premier’s Priorities performance targets and broader government objectives.
- ensure that processes to check and verify data are in place for all agency data sources
- encourage agencies to develop and implement additional supporting indicators for all Premier’s Priority performance measures to prevent and detect unintended consequences or misuse of data.
The Premier's Implementation Unit is effective in supporting agencies to deliver progress towards the Premier’s Priority targets.
The PIU promotes a systematic approach to monitoring and reporting progress against a target, based on a methodology used in delivery units elsewhere in the world. The PIU undertakes internal self-evaluation, and commissions regular reviews of methodology implementation from the consultancy that owns the methodology and helped to establish the PIU. However, the unit lacks periodic independent reviews of their overall effectiveness. The PIU has adopted a collaborative approach and assists agencies to analyse performance using data, and work across organisational silos to achieve the Premier’s Priorities targets.
Agency representatives recognise the benefits of being responsible for a Premier's Priority and speak of the value of being held to account and having the attention of the Premier and senior ministers.
By June 2019, the Department of Premier and Cabinet should:
- establish routine collection of feedback about PIU performance including:
- independent assurance of PIU performance
- opportunity for agencies to provide confidential feedback.
Appendix one: Response from agency
Appendix three: About the audit
Appendix four: Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #307 - released 13 September 2018
Matching skills training with market needs
In 2012, governments across Australia entered into the National Partnership Agreement on Skills Reform. Under the National Partnership Agreement, the Australian Government provided incentive payments to States and Territories to move towards a more contestable Vocational Education and Training (VET) market. The aim of the National Partnership Agreement was to foster a more accessible, transparent, efficient and high quality training sector that is responsive to the needs of students and industry.
The New South Wales Government introduced the Smart and Skilled program in response to the National Partnership Agreement. Through Smart and Skilled, students can choose a vocational course from a list of approved qualifications and training providers. Students pay the same fee for their chosen qualification regardless of the selected training provider and the government covers the gap between the student fee and the fixed price of the qualification through a subsidy paid to their training provider.
Smart and Skilled commenced in January 2015, with the then Department of Education and Communities having primary responsibility for its implementation. Since July 2015, the NSW Department of Industry (the Department) has been responsible for VET in New South Wales and the implementation of Smart and Skilled.
The NSW Skills Board, comprising nine part-time members appointed by the Minister for Skills, provides independent strategic advice on VET reform and funding. In line with most other States and Territories, the Department maintains a 'Skills List' which contains government subsidised qualifications to address identified priority skill needs in New South Wales.
This audit assessed the effectiveness of the Department in identifying, prioritising, and aligning course subsidies to the skill needs of NSW. To do this we examined whether:
- the Department effectively identifies and prioritises present and future skill needs
- Smart and Skilled funding is aligned with the priority skill areas
- skill needs and available VET courses are effectively communicated to potential participants and training providers.
Smart and Skilled is a relatively new and complex program, and is being delivered in the context of significant reform to VET nationally and in New South Wales. A large scale government funded contestable market was not present in the VET sector in New South Wales before the introduction of Smart and Skilled. This audit's findings should be considered in that context.
The Department needs to better use the data it has, and collect additional data, to support its analysis of priority skill needs in New South Wales, and direct funding accordingly.
- funding scholarships and support for disadvantaged students
- funding training in regional and remote areas
- providing additional support to deliver some qualifications that the market is not providing.
The Department needs to evaluate these funding strategies to ensure they are achieving their goals. It should also explore why training providers are not delivering some priority qualifications through Smart and Skilled.
Training providers compete for funding allocations based on their capacity to deliver. The Department successfully manages the budget by capping funding allocated to each Smart and Skilled training provider. However, training providers have only one year of funding certainty at present. Training providers that are performing well are not rewarded with greater certainty.
The Department needs to improve its communication with prospective students to ensure they can make informed decisions in the VET market.
The Department also needs to communicate more transparently to training providers about its funding allocations and decisions about changes to the NSW Skills List.
The Department relies on stakeholder proposals to update the NSW Skills List. Stakeholders include industry, training providers and government departments. These stakeholders, particularly industry, are likely to be aware of skill needs, and have a strong incentive to propose qualifications that address these needs. The Department’s process of collecting stakeholder proposals helps to ensure that it can identify qualifications needed to address material skill needs.
It is also important that the Department ensures the NSW Skills List only includes priority qualifications that need to be subsidised by government. The Department does not have robust processes in place to remove qualifications from the NSW Skills List. As a result, there is a risk that the list may include lower priority skill areas. Since the NSW Skills List was first created, new additions to the list have outnumbered those removed by five to one.
The Department does not always validate information gathered from stakeholder proposals, even when it has data to do so. Further, its decision making about what to include on, or delete from, the NSW Skills List is not transparent because the rationale for decisions is not adequately documented.
The Department is undertaking projects to better use data to support its decisions about what should be on the NSW Skills List. Some of these projects should deliver useful data soon, but some can only provide useful information when sufficient trend data is available.
Recommendation
The Department should:
- by June 2019, increase transparency of decisions about proposed changes to the NSW Skills List and improve record-keeping of deliberations regarding these changes
- by December 2019, use data more effectively and consistently to ensure that the NSW Skills List only includes high priority qualifications
Only qualifications on the NSW Skills List are eligible for subsidies under Smart and Skilled. As the Department does not have a robust process for removing low priority qualifications from the NSW Skills list, some low priority qualifications may be subsidised.
The Department allocates the Smart and Skilled budget through contracts with Smart and Skilled training providers. Training providers that meet contractual obligations and perform well in terms of enrolments and completion rates are rewarded with renewed contracts and more funding for increased enrolments, but these decisions are not based on student outcomes. The Department reduces or removes funding from training providers that do not meet quality standards, breach contract conditions or that are unable to spend their allocated funding effectively. Contracts are for only one year, offering training providers little funding certainty.
Smart and Skilled provides additional funding for scholarships and for training providers in locations where the cost of delivery is high or to those that cater to students with disabilities. The Department has not yet evaluated whether this additional funding is achieving its intended outcomes.
Eight per cent of the qualifications that have been on the NSW Skills List since 2015 are not delivered under Smart and Skilled anywhere in New South Wales. A further 14 per cent of the qualifications that are offered by training providers have had no student commencements. The Department is yet to identify the reasons that these high priority qualifications are either not offered or not taken up by students.
Recommendation
The Department should:
- by June 2019, investigate why training providers do not offer, and prospective students do not enrol in, some Smart and Skilled subsidised qualifications
- by December 2019, evaluate the effectiveness of Smart and Skilled funding which supplements standard subsidies for qualifications on the NSW Skills List, to determine whether it is achieving its objectives
- by December 2019, provide longer term funding certainty to high performing training providers, while retaining incentives for them to continue to perform well.
In a contestable market, it is important for consumers to have sufficient information to make informed decisions. The Department does not provide some key information to prospective VET students to support their decisions, such as measures of provider quality and examples of employment and further education outcomes of students completing particular courses. Existing information is spread across numerous channels and is not presented in a user friendly manner. This is a potential barrier to participation in VET for those less engaged with the system or less ICT literate.
The Department conveys relevant information about the program to training providers through its websites and its regional offices. However, it could better communicate some specific information directly to individual Smart and Skilled training providers, such as reasons their proposals to include new qualifications on the NSW Skills List are accepted or rejected.
While the Department is implementing a communication strategy for VET in New South Wales, it does not have a specific communications strategy for Smart and Skilled which comprehensively identifies the needs of different stakeholders and how these can be addressed.
Recommendation
By December 2019, the Department should develop and implement a specific communications strategy for Smart and Skilled to:
- support prospective student engagement and informed decision making
- meet the information needs of training providers
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - About the audit
Appendix three - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #305 - released 26 July 2018
Regulation of water pollution in drinking water catchments and illegal disposal of solid waste
There are important gaps in how the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) implements its regulatory framework for water pollution in drinking water catchments and illegal solid waste disposal. This limits the effectiveness of its regulatory responses, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford.
| By 31 December 2018, to improve governance and oversight, the EPA should: | |
| 1. | implement a more effective performance framework with regular reports to the Chief Executive Officer and to the EPA Board on outcomes-based key result areas that assess its environmental and regulatory performance and trends over time |
| By 30 June 2019, to improve consistency in its practices, the EPA should: | |
| 2. | progressively update and make accessible its policies and procedures for regulatory operations, and mandate procedures where necessary to ensure consistent application |
| 3. | implement internal controls to monitor the consistency and quality of its regulatory operations. |
| By 30 June 2019, to address worsening water quality in Lake Burragorang, the EPA should: | |
| 4. | (a) review the impact of its licensed activities on water quality in Lake Burragorang, and |
| (b) develop strategies relating to its licensed activities (in consultation with other relevant NSW Government agencies) to improve and maintain the lake's water quality. | |
| To improve compliance monitoring, the EPA should implement procedures to: | |
| 5. | by 30 June 2019, validate self-reported information, eliminate hardcopy submissions and require licensees to report on their breaches of the Act and associated regulations in their annual returns |
| 6. | by 31 December 2018, conduct mandatory site inspections under the risk-based licensing scheme to assess compliance with all regulatory requirements and licence conditions. |
| By 31 December 2018 to improve enforcement, the EPA should: | |
| 7. | Implement procedures to systematically assess non-compliances with licence conditions and breaches of the Act and to implement appropriate and consistent regulatory actions. |
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – List of enforcement tools
Appendix three – The EPA's organisational structure
Appendix four – The EPA's regions and branches
Appendix five – About the audit
Appendix six – Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #304 - released 28 June 2018
Fraud controls in local councils
Many local councils need to improve their fraud control systems, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. The report highlights that councils often have fraud control procedures and systems in place, but are not ensuring people understand them and how they work. There is also significant variation between councils in the quality of their fraud controls.
Fraud can directly influence councils’ ability to deliver services, and undermine community confidence and trust. ICAC investigations, such as the recent Operation Ricco into the former City of Botany Bay Council, show the financial and reputational damage that major fraud can cause. Good fraud control practices are critical for councils and the community.
The Audit Office of New South Wales 2015 Fraud Control Improvement Kit (the Kit) aligns with the Fraud and Corruption Control Standard AS8001-2008 and identifies ten attributes of an effective fraud control system. This audit used the Kit to assess how councils manage the risk of fraud. It identifies areas where fraud control can improve.
Fraud can disrupt the delivery and quality of services and threaten the financial stability of councils.
Recent reviews of local government in Queensland and Victoria identify that councils are at risk of fraud because they purchase large quantities of goods and services using devolved decision making arrangements. The Queensland Audit Office in its 2014–15 report 'Fraud Management in Local Government' found that ‘Councils are exposed to high-risks of fraud and corruption because of the high volume of goods and services they procure, often from local suppliers; and because of the high degree of decision making vested in councils'. They also highlight some common problems faced by councils including the absence of fraud control plans and failure to conduct regular reviews of their internal controls. Also, in 2008 and 2012 the Victorian Auditor-General identified the importance of up-to-date fraud control planning, clearly documented related policies, training staff to identify fraud risks and the importance of controls such as third party management.
Investigations into councils by the NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), such as the recent Operation Ricco, show the impact that fraud can have on councils. These impacts include significant financial loss, and negative public perceptions about how well councils manage fraud. The findings of these investigations also show the importance of good fraud controls for councils.
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Operation Ricco In its report on Operation Ricco, the ICAC found that the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of the City of Botany Bay Council and others dishonestly exercised official functions to obtain financial benefits for themselves and others by causing fraudulent payments from the Council for their benefit. It also identified the CFO received inducements for favourable treatment of contractors. The report noted that there were overwhelming failures in the council’s procedures and governance framework that created significant opportunities for corruption, of which the CFO and others took advantage. It found weaknesses across a wide variety of governance processes and functions, including those involving the general manager, the internal audit function, external audit, and the operation of the audit committee. |
The strength of fraud control systems varies significantly across New South Wales local councils, and many councils we surveyed need to improve significantly.
Most surveyed councils do not have fraud control plans that direct resources to mitigating the specific fraud risks they face. Few councils reported that they conduct regular risk assessments or health checks to ensure they respond effectively to the risks they identify.
There are sector wide weaknesses that impact on the strength of councils' fraud control practice. Less than one-third of councils that responded to the survey:
- communicate their expectations about ethical conduct and responsibility for fraud control to staff
- regularly train staff to identify and respond to suspected fraud
- inform staff or the wider community how to report suspected fraud and how reports made will be investigated.
The audit also identified a pattern of councils developing policies, procedures or systems without ensuring people understand them, or assessing that they work. This reduces the likelihood that staff will actually use them.
In general, metropolitan and regional councils surveyed have stronger fraud control systems than rural councils.
Newly amalgamated councils are operating with systems inherited from two or more pre-amalgamated councils. These councils are developing new systems for their changed circumstances.
Five councils surveyed reported that they did not comply with the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1994.
Observations for the sector:
Councils should improve their fraud controls by:
- tailoring fraud control plans to their circumstances and specific risks
- systematically and regularly reviewing their fraud risks and fraud control systems to keep their plans up to-date
- effectively communicating fraud risks, and how staff and the community can report suspected fraud
- ensuring that they comply with the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1994.
Recommendation:
That the Office of Local Government:
- work with councils to ensure they comply with the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1994.
That the Office of Local Government:
- work with state entities and councils to develop a common approach to how fraud complaints and incidences are defined and categorised so that they can:
- better use data to provide a clearer picture of the level of fraud within councils
- measure the effectiveness of, and drive improvement in councils' fraud controls systems
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix three – About the audit
Appendix four – Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #303 - released 22 June 2018
Shared services in local government
Local councils need to properly assess the performance of their current services before considering whether to enter into arrangements with other councils to jointly manage back-office functions or services for their communities. This is one of the recommended practices for councils in a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. ‘When councils have decided to jointly provide services, they do not always have a strong business case, which clearly identifies the expected costs, benefits and risks of shared service arrangements’, said the Auditor-General.
Councils provide a range of services to meet the needs of their communities. It is important that they consider the most effective and efficient way to deliver them. Many councils work together to share knowledge, resources and services. When done well, councils can save money and improve access to services. This audit assessed how efficiently and effectively councils engage in shared service arrangements. We define ‘shared services’ as two or more councils jointly managing activities to deliver services to communities or perform back-office functions.
The information we gathered for this audit included a survey of all general-purpose councils in NSW. In total 67 councils (52 per cent) responded to the survey from 128 invited to participate. Appendix two outlines in more detail some of the results from our survey.
First, not all surveyed councils are assessing the performance of their current services before deciding on the best service delivery model. Where they have decided that sharing services is the best way to deliver services, they do not always build a business case which outlines the costs, benefits and risks of the proposed shared service arrangement before entering into it.
The Office of Local Government should, by April 2019:
Develop guidance which outlines the risks and opportunities of governance models that councils can use to share services. This should include advice on legal requirements, transparency in decisions, and accountability for effective use of public resources.
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – Survey findings
Appendix three – About the audit
Appendix four – Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #302 - released 21 June 2018
HealthRoster benefits realisation
The HealthRoster system is delivering some business benefits but Local Health Districts are yet to use all of its features, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. HealthRoster is an IT system designed to more effectively roster staff to meet the needs of Local Health Districts and other NSW health agencies.
The NSW public health system employs over 100,000 people in clinical and non-clinical roles across the state. With increasing demand for services, it is vital that NSW Health effectively rosters staff to ensure high quality and efficient patient care, while maintaining good workplace practices to support staff in demanding roles.
NSW Health is implementing HealthRoster as its single state-wide rostering system to more effectively roster staff according to the demands of each location. Between 2013–14 and 2016–17, our financial audits of individual LHDs had reported issues with rostering and payroll processes and systems.
NSW Health grouped all Local Health Districts (LHDs), and other NSW Health organisations, into four clusters to manage the implementation of HealthRoster over four years. Refer to Exhibit 4 for a list of the NSW Health entities in each cluster.
- Cluster 1 implementation commenced in 2014–15 and was completed in 2015–16.
- Cluster 2 implementation commenced in 2015–16 and was completed in 2016–17.
- Cluster 3 began implementation in 2016–17 and was underway during the conduct of the audit.
- Cluster 4 began planning for implementation in 2017–18.
Full implementation, including capability for centralised data and reporting, is planned for completion in 2019.
This audit assessed the effectiveness of the HealthRoster system in delivering business benefits. In making this assessment, we examined whether:
- expected business benefits of HealthRoster were well-defined
- HealthRoster is achieving business benefits where implemented.
The HealthRoster project has a timespan from 2009 to 2019. We examined the HealthRoster implementation in LHDs, and other NSW Health organisations, focusing on the period from 2014, when eHealth assumed responsibility for project implementation, to early 2018.
Business benefits identified for HealthRoster accurately reflect business needs.
NSW Health has a good understanding of the issues in previous rostering systems and has designed HealthRoster to adequately address these issues. Interviews with frontline staff indicate that HealthRoster facilitates rostering which complies with industrial awards. This is a key business benefit that supports the provision of quality patient care. We saw no evidence that any major business needs or issues with the previous rostering systems are not being addressed by HealthRoster.
In the period examined in this audit since 2015, NSW Health has applied appropriate project management and governance structures to ensure that risks and issues are well managed during HealthRoster implementation.
HealthRoster has had two changes to its budget and timeline. Overall, the capital cost for the project has increased from $88.6 million to $125.6 million (42 per cent) and has delayed expected project completion by four years from 2015 to 2019. NSW Health attributes the increased cost and extended time frame to the large scale and complexity of the full implementation of HealthRoster.
NSW Health has established appropriate governance arrangements to ensure that HealthRoster is successfully implemented and that it will achieve business benefits in the long term. During implementation, local steering committees monitor risks and resolve implementation issues. Risks or issues that cannot be resolved locally are escalated to the state-wide steering committee.
NSW Health has grouped local health districts, and other NSW Health organisations, into four clusters for implementation. This has enabled NSW Health to apply lessons learnt from each implementation to improve future implementations.
NSW Health has a benefits realisation framework, but it is not fully applied to HealthRoster.
NSW Health can demonstrate that HealthRoster has delivered some functional business benefits, including rosters that comply with a wide variety of employment awards.
NSW Health is not yet measuring and tracking the value of business benefits achieved. NSW Health did not have benefits realisation plans with baseline measures defined for LHDs in cluster 1 and 2 before implementation. Without baseline measures NSW Health is unable to quantify business benefits achieved. However, analysis of post-implementation reviews and interviews with frontline staff indicate that benefits are being achieved. As a result, NSW Health now includes defining baseline measures and setting targets as part of LHD implementation planning. It has created a benefits realisation toolkit to assist this process from cluster 3 implementations onwards.
NSW Health conducted post-implementation reviews for clusters 1 and 2 and found that LHDs in these clusters were not using HealthRoster to realise all the benefits that HealthRoster could deliver.
By September 2018, NSW Health should:
- Ensure that Local Health Districts undertake benefits realisation planning according to the NSW Health benefits realisation framework
- Regularly measure benefits realised, at state and local health district levels, from the statewide implementation of HealthRoster
- Review the use of HealthRoster in Local Health Districts in clusters 1 and 2 and assist them to improve their HealthRoster related processes and practices.
By June 2019, NSW Health should:
- Ensure that all Local Health Districts are effectively using demand based rostering.
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - About the audit
Appendix three - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #301 - released 7 June 2018
