The annual Budget is one of the most important and visible statements about a government’s financial intentions.

Once a Budget is released, it is important to monitor variations from the projections it contains. This is done for two reasons -

• first, to ensure that individual agencies are properly managing their budget allocations and that any genuine emerging need for additional funding is met.
• second, to ensure that any changes to the State’s overall financial position are understood and corrective action is undertaken.

This audit dealt primarily with the second of these objectives.

Budget monitoring involves both agencies and Treasury working together to quickly identify factors that might impact the budget, to clearly understand the implications for their budget position and to take any remedial action needed.

Poor monitoring may reduce the confidence that stakeholders have in the government’s financial management. It may mean that government decisions made in- year or for the following budget (for example on tax measures or spending increases/savings) are based on an incorrect understanding of the State’s true financial position.

I hope that this Report provides some useful insights that will assist in better monitoring.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #141 - released 28 July 2005

The Audit Office is of the opinion that there are several features of the current Senior Executive Service (SES) model, or its application, which hinder the capacity of the SES to operate effectively in line with the Government’s stated objectives. The ultimate effect of these features is to reduce the capacity or perceived capacity of the SES to meet the Government’s objectives for the operation of the SES.

Taken overall, difficulties in the SES identified by the audit included: uncertainty caused by the way some contracts have been applied in practice, removal for reasons other than poor performance, informal strategies such as using restructuring to “terminate contracts and to move people in and out of positions regardless of their formal reported performance” (Section 5.4), inconsistently applied rules about selection/recruitment, appointment and removal of the SES, an imbalance between CES responsibility to the Minister as the employer/reviewer with their responsibility not to act in a political or partial manner, apparent lack of rigour in, value of and Ministerial accountability for CES performance review processes and failure to implement an adequate system of rewards and sanctions related to performance.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #59.1 - released 17 December 1998

This Performance Audit Report, prepared by the University of Technology, Sydney (UTS) on behalf of The Audit Office of New South Wales (NSW), is a study of the NSW Senior Executive Service (SES).

It found the dissonance between where optimal executive performance might take place on a performance spectrum, encompassing the formal SES and less formal political arenas, is canvassed. The critical point here is that this arena, between the informal political actions and the application of formal SES structures, where much of the important decision making takes place, will always be difficult to manage. Transparency in decision making processes where non partisan and partisan actions are clearly defined seems a primary essential element of performance if the integrity of the NSW SES is to be maintained.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #59.2 - released 17 December 1998