Reports
Machinery of government changes
What the report is about
The term ‘machinery of government’ refers to the way government functions and responsibilities are organised.
The decision to make machinery of government changes is made by the Premier. Changes may be made for a range of reasons, including to support the policy and/or political objectives of the government of the day.
Larger machinery of government changes typically occur after an election or a change of Premier.
This report assessed how effectively the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (DPIE) and the Department of Regional NSW (DRNSW) managed their 2019 and 2020 machinery of government changes, respectively. It also considered the role of the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) and NSW Treasury in overseeing machinery of government changes.
What we found
The anticipated benefits of the changes were not articulated in sufficient detail and the achievement of benefits has not been monitored. The costs of the changes were not tracked or reported.
DPC and NSW Treasury provided principles to guide implementation but did not require departments to collect or report information about the benefits or costs of the changes.
The implementation of the machinery of government changes was completed within the set timeframes, and operations for the new departments commenced as scheduled.
Major implementation challenges included negotiation about the allocation of corporate support staff and the integration of complex corporate and ICT systems.
What we recommended
DPC and NSW Treasury should:
- consolidate existing guidance on machinery of government changes into a single document that is available to all departments and agencies
- provide guidance for departments and agencies to use when negotiating corporate services staff transfers as a part of machinery of government changes, including a standard rate for calculating corporate services requirements
- progress work to develop and implement common processes and systems for corporate services in order to support more efficient movement of staff between departments and agencies.
Fast facts
- $23.7m is the estimated minimum direct cost of the 2019 DPIE changes to date, noting additional ICT costs will be incurred
- $4.0m is the estimated minimum direct cost of the 2020 DRNSW changes, with an estimated $2.7 million ongoing annual cost
- 40+ NSW Government entities affected by the 2019 machinery of government changes
The term ‘machinery of government’ refers to the way government functions and responsibilities are allocated and structured across government departments and agencies. A machinery of government change is the reorganisation of these structures. This can involve establishing, merging or abolishing departments and agencies and transferring functions and responsibilities from one department or agency to another.
The decision to make machinery of government changes is made by the Premier. These changes may be made for a range of reasons, including to support the policy and/or political objectives of the government of the day. Machinery of government changes are formally set out in Administrative Arrangements Orders, which are prepared by the Department of Premier and Cabinet, as instructed by the Premier, and issued as legislative instruments under the Constitution Act 1902.
The heads of agencies subject to machinery of government changes are responsible for implementing them. For more complex changes, central agencies are also involved in providing guidance and monitoring progress.
The NSW Government announced major machinery of government changes after the 2019 state government election. These changes took place between April and June 2019 and involved abolishing five departments (Industry; Planning and Environment; Family and Community Services; Justice; and Finance, Services and Innovation) and creating three new departments (Planning, Industry and Environment; Communities and Justice; and Customer Service). This also resulted in changes to the 'clusters' associated with departments. The NSW Government uses clusters to group certain agencies and entities with related departments for administrative and financial management. Clusters do not have legal status. Most other departments that were not abolished had some functions added or removed as a part of these machinery of government changes. For example, the functions relating to regional policy and service delivery in the Department of Premier and Cabinet were moved to the new Department of Planning, Industry and Environment.
Our Report on State Finances 2019, tabled in October 2019, outlined these changes and identified several issues that can arise from machinery of government changes if risks are not identified early and properly managed. These include: challenges measuring the costs and benefits of machinery of government changes; disruption to services due to unclear roles and responsibilities; and disruption to control environments due to staff, system and process changes.
In April 2020, the Department of Regional NSW was created in a separate machinery of government change. This involved moving functions and agencies related to regional policy and service delivery from the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment into a standalone department.
This audit assessed how effectively the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (DPIE) and the Department of Regional NSW (DRNSW) managed their 2019 and 2020 machinery of government changes, respectively. It also considered the role of the Department of Premier and Cabinet and NSW Treasury in overseeing machinery of government changes. The audit investigated whether:
- DPIE and DRNSW have integrated new responsibilities and functions in an effective and timely manner
- DPIE and DRNSW can demonstrate the costs of the machinery of government changes
- The machinery of government changes have achieved or are achieving intended outcomes and benefits.
It is unclear whether the benefits of the machinery of government changes that created the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (DPIE) and the Department of Regional NSW (DRNSW) outweigh the costs. The anticipated benefits of the changes were not articulated in sufficient detail and the achievement of directly attributable benefits has not been monitored. The costs of the changes were not tracked or reported. The benefits and costs of the machinery of government changes were not tracked because the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) and NSW Treasury did not require departments to collect or report this information. The implementation of the machinery of government changes was completed within the set timeframes, and operations for the new departments commenced as scheduled. This was achieved despite short timelines and no additional budget allocation for the implementation of the changes.
The rationale for establishing DPIE was not documented at the time of the 2019 machinery of government changes and the anticipated benefits of the change were not defined by the government or the department. For DRNSW, the government’s stated purpose was to provide better representation and support for regional areas, but no prior analysis was conducted to quantify any problems or set targets for improvement. Both departments reported some anecdotal benefits linked to the machinery of government changes. However, improvements in these areas are difficult to attribute because neither department set specific measures or targets to align with these intended benefits. Since the machinery of government changes were completed, limited data has been gathered to allow comparisons of performance before and after the changes.
DPC and NSW Treasury advised that they did not define the purpose and benefits of the machinery of government changes, or request affected departments to do so, because these were decisions of the government and the role of the public service was to implement the decisions.
We have attempted to quantify some of the costs of the DPIE and DRNSW changes based on the information the audited agencies could provide. This information does not capture the full costs of the changes because some costs, such as the impact of disruption on staff, are very difficult to quantify, and the costs of ICT separation and integration work may continue for several more years. Noting these limitations, we estimate the initial costs of these machinery of government changes are at least $23.7 million for DPIE and $4.0 million for DRNSW. For DPIE, this is predominantly made up of ICT costs and redundancy payments made around the time of the machinery of government change. For DRNSW it includes ICT costs and an increase in senior executive costs for a standalone department, which we estimate is an ongoing cost of at least $1.9 million per year.
For the DPIE machinery of government change, there were risks associated with placing functions and agencies that represent potentially competing policy interests within the same 'cluster', such as environment protection and industry. We did not see evidence of plans to manage these issues being considered by DPIE as a part of the machinery of government change process.
The efficiency of machinery of government changes could be improved in several ways. This includes providing additional standardised guidance on the allocation of corporate functions and resources when agencies are being merged or separated, and consolidating guidance on defining, measuring and monitoring the benefits and costs of machinery of government changes.
Appendix one – Response from agencies
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #359 - released (17 December 2021).
Responses to homelessness
What the report is about
The report assessed how effectively the Department of Communities and Justice is responding to homelessness through the NSW Government’s Homelessness Strategy.
It also assessed the effectiveness of the department’s efforts to address street homelessness in its COVID-19 response.
What we found
The strategy was designed to build evidence to inform future state-wide action rather than to end homelessness.
The department received significantly less funding than it sought for the strategy.
Actions delivered under the strategy have a narrow reach in terms of locations and number of people targeted for assistance.
The strategy will have limited short-term impact on homelessness across NSW, but it is building evidence on what works to prevent and reduce homelessness.
The department effectively implemented a crisis response to assist over 4,350 people sleeping rough into temporary accommodation during the pandemic.
While there was an effective crisis response to assist people sleeping rough during the pandemic, more will need to be done to ensure a sustainable response which prevents people returning to homelessness.
What we recommend
The department should:
- provide advice to the NSW Government on sustainably addressing demand and unmet need for homelessness supports
- commence development of a comprehensive strategy to address homelessness, linked to the government’s 10-year plan for social housing and 20-year housing strategy
- enable input to key decisions on homelessness policy from partner agencies, the specialist homelessness services sector, the community housing sector, Aboriginal people, and people with lived experience of homelessness
- partner with Aboriginal stakeholders and communities to design and implement a strategy for early identification and responses to the needs of Aboriginal people vulnerable to homelessness; and build the capacity and resourcing of the Aboriginal Community Controlled Sector to deliver homelessness services
- evaluate the homelessness response to COVID-19, integrate the lessons learned into future practice, and develop protocols to inform actions in future emergencies or disasters
- regularly collect client outcomes data and feedback and use this to drive improvements to responses to homelessness.
Fast factsHomelessness Strategy
COVID-19 response 1 April 2020 to 31 January 2021
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Further information
Please contact Ian Goodwin, Deputy Auditor-General on 9275 7347 or by email.
Homelessness exists when a person does not have suitable accommodation alternatives. A person is considered to be experiencing homelessness if their current living arrangement:
- is in a dwelling that is inadequate; or
- has no tenure, or if their initial tenure is short and not extendable; or
- does not allow them to have control of, and access to space for social relations.
The number of people experiencing homelessness in New South Wales increased by 37 per cent between the last two censuses, from 27,479 in 2011, to 37,715 in 2016. New South Wales recorded the largest increase of all the states and territories in both the number of people experiencing homelessness and in the homeless rate (from 40.8 to 50.4 persons per 10,000).
The NSW Government's primary service response to homelessness is crisis, temporary and transitional accommodation, and support services, funded at more than $1.0 billion over four years from 2018–19. These are ‘commissioned services’ delivered by non‑government organisations under contracts with the Department of Communities and Justice (the Department) and out of scope for this audit. We assessed how the Department manages contracts for specialist homelessness services in our 2019 audit 'Contracting non‑government organisations'.
The policy framework for the NSW Government's response to homelessness is the NSW Homelessness Strategy 2018–23 (the Strategy), which is examined in this audit. The Department is responsible for the development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the Strategy. The Strategy comprises 21 actions, ten of which directly target people at risk of, or already experiencing, homelessness through measures such as:
- screening high school students for the risk of homelessness and providing supports
- assisting vulnerable people to maintain their tenancies in social housing or the private rental market
- providing purpose‑built social housing.
These ten actions comprise $160 million of the Strategy's $169 million funding.
In December 2019, the first evidence of the COVID‑19 virus emerged. People sleeping without shelter or in public places (sleeping rough) typically live in communal arrangements, with some having limited access to basic hygiene supplies or showering facilities. These factors may increase the risk of transmission of COVID‑19 amongst this population.
In response to the pandemic, the NSW Government provided additional funding for the Department to institute a range of actions aimed at preventing vulnerable people from becoming homeless, and people sleeping rough from contracting or transmitting the virus. These were informed by, but separate to, actions under the Homelessness Strategy.
This audit focused on the temporary accommodation provided to individuals experiencing street homelessness during the pandemic, and the new 'Together Home' program established in 2020 to transition people with experience or history sleeping rough from temporary accommodation into more sustainable longer‑term housing.
This audit assessed how effectively the Department is implementing the Homelessness Strategy and addressing street homelessness in its COVID‑19 response. In making this assessment, the audit examined whether the Department:
- has effectively developed an evidence‑based Strategy and established supporting arrangements to implement it
- is ensuring the Strategy is achieving its objectives and outcomes
- is effectively supporting people sleeping rough into temporary accommodation during COVID‑19 and to transition into more sustainable longer‑term housing.
ConclusionThe $169 million Homelessness Strategy will have a limited short‑term impact on homelessness across New South Wales.The Department designed the Strategy to build evidence to inform future state‑wide action rather than to end homelessness. The Department also received significantly less funding than it sought, and as a result, the Strategy's actions have a narrow reach in terms of the locations and the number of people targeted for assistance. The Department has clearly communicated its aims to intervene early to prevent people from experiencing homelessness; to provide effective supports to people experiencing homelessness; and to create an integrated person‑centred system. While these objectives are clear, they are not being pursued state‑wide. The Department recognised in its advice to government on Strategy resourcing that growing demand could not be met within current funding and housing supply, and that there was limited proof on effective preventative and early interventions in the available evidence base. Given the evidence threshold for new funding, the Department designed the Strategy to pilot approaches which help to identify the best prevention and early intervention measures for state‑wide roll out after the Strategy's five‑year term, subject to budget approval. The Department received significantly less funding than it sought for the Strategy. It repurposed existing resources, dropped some proposed actions and scaled others down to fit within the final funding envelope. While seeking to demonstrate what works to prevent homelessness or intervene earlier, the Department directed 95 per cent of the final Strategy funding to concrete actions supporting people at risk of, or experiencing, homelessness. The Department has put in place governance and operational arrangements which are supporting the implementation and evaluation of the Strategy, and it is broadly on track with reaching the target number of clients expected. The Department’s data shows that more than 4,100 people have received direct supports under Strategy actions. However, the reach of the Strategy remains constrained. Once fully implemented, most Strategy actions will be available in only a quarter of the state's local government areas, supporting around 8,200 people ‑ what equates to around 22 per cent of the number of people experiencing homelessness in New South Wales at the last census in 2016. There is a risk that future funding will not be secured – and Strategy actions not continued or scaled up – if the evidence on effectiveness is incomplete, mixed or unclear when the Strategy concludes. This sits against a backdrop of increasing need for housing and homelessness supports in the state that may become more acute once the full economic impacts of the COVID‑19 pandemic are felt. The Department effectively planned and implemented a crisis response to assist people sleeping on the streets during the COVID‑19 pandemic. The Department will need to do more to ensure a sustainable longer‑term response which prevents people returning to street homelessness.The Department's crisis response focused on people sleeping rough due to the public health risk of COVID‑19 transmission amongst this group. Of the approximately 32,500 people provided with temporary accommodation between 1 April 2020 and 31 January 2021, 4,355 were sleeping rough. As at 13 May 2021, only one case of COVID‑19 had been detected to date among the individuals who received assistance. The Department advises that around one‑quarter of all those placed in temporary accommodation were assisted into social housing or private rental accommodation. Within metropolitan Sydney, the Department established a dedicated team and contracted provider to connect people sleeping rough placed in hotels with support services, and to assist and monitor their transition to longer‑term housing. The Department’s data suggests that almost 38 per cent of the approximately 1,800 people who received this support were able to move to social housing or private rental accommodation. However, the Department did not track the housing outcomes for clients who were not provided with this support, or who were not engaged with housing or funded support services. The Department offers supports to people in temporary accommodation to assist them in finding longer term housing, and it has a policy to not knowingly exit someone from temporary accommodation into homelessness. However, it does not track housing outcomes for every client if they do not engage with the Department's housing or funded support services. The Department cannot precisely identify how many people sleeping rough assisted during COVID‑19 have returned to rough sleeping or other forms of homelessness. The Department’s data suggests that 72 per cent of the approximately 4,000 people sleeping rough assisted with temporary accommodation between April 2020 and April 2021 who exited left with an unknown housing outcome. The Department intends to conduct research in the future to better understand what happens to people who leave temporary accommodation without seeking further assistance. The Department also has limited data to understand whether the enhanced temporary accommodation program was more effective in helping to connect participants with services and support them into stable accommodation, than previous approaches. The Department extended an existing initiative for community housing providers to head lease properties in the private rental market and ensure support services for people who were sleeping rough before being assisted into enhanced temporary accommodation. As at April 2021, the Together Home program has assisted 400 people to obtain accommodation and supports for two years. However, the number of Together Home places is significantly less than what is required to provide housing for the more than 4,350 individuals who were sleeping rough prior to entering enhanced temporary accommodation. The Department advises it is using a combination of ‘business‑as‑usual’ options to assist other people sleeping rough into stable accommodation where Together Home places are not available, including social and affordable housing and supported transitional accommodation. It also intends to secure longer‑term housing options for Together Home clients after the two‑year support ends. But it is not clear how it will overcome longstanding housing challenges to do so, given the complexity of needs amongst this client group, the limited availability of affordable rental properties and the existing scale of unmet need for social housing in New South Wales. |
1. Key findings: the Homelessness Strategy
The Strategy's geographical and client reach is limited because it is building the evidence base on what works
The Department's objectives to intervene early, provide effective supports and create an integrated person‑centred system to address homelessness are clear, but are not being pursued state‑wide.
There were existing gaps in the available evidence which made it difficult for the Department to develop a holistic, state‑wide, long‑term solution to homelessness. Some of the actions under the Strategy have a degree of supporting evidence. Other actions are intended to generate evidence through pilots and by evaluating existing programs more robustly.
At least one Strategy action is available in each of the Department's 16 districts, and there are examples of the Department rolling out practice changes from Strategy pilots across the state. However, progress towards the Strategy aims is confined to pockets where actions are being trialled.
Once fully implemented, Strategy actions will be available in only a quarter of the state's 128 local government areas and will support approximately 8,200 people ‑ which equates to around 22 per cent of the number of people who were experiencing homelessness at the time of the last census in New South Wales in 2016 more than 37,000 people. This does not include the number of people at risk of homelessness.
A key gap in Strategy actions is addressing Aboriginal homelessness.
The Department received significantly less funding than sought and designed the Strategy to build the evidence base rather than eliminate homelessness
The Department could not meet the evidence threshold for a cost benefit analysis required by a Treasury business case, given the limited evidence available locally and internationally on what works to prevent homelessness or intervene earlier. The Department sought new, targeted investment to extend a small number of initiatives with proven effect, and to build the evidence base about other measures that work, rather than the quantum of funding required to end homelessness in New South Wales.
Even so, approved funding was significantly less than that sought by the Department. It repurposed existing resources, dropped some proposed actions and scaled others down to fit within the final funding envelope. It directed 95 per cent of the total Strategy funding to supports and accommodation for people at risk of or experiencing homelessness.
The Department intends to use the gathered data from implementation of the Strategy to expand effective prevention and early intervention measures after it concludes, subject to budget approval. It expects that, over time, these initiatives will reduce the demand for crisis services.
Actions may not be scaled up at the end of the Strategy's term, perpetuating the Strategy's limited reach and narrow impact on homelessness
The Department's approach of testing interventions and building the evidence base through the Strategy was well described and provided a clear rationale in its original advice to government. An evaluation framework has been designed to generate sufficient evidence on the overall Strategy and its individual actions for a cost benefit analysis to support a future budget bid.
The Department intends to use the findings from interim evaluation reports, due by September 2021, to determine the programs and pilots with promising evidence that should continue to the end of the Strategy term. It expects this to enable more qualitative and quantitative data to be available to the evaluations, as well as to support service continuity.
However, delays in delivery of some actions under the Strategy, and the time taken for outcomes to be achieved and show up in the data, will impact on the strength of the evidence available at the mid‑term and final Strategy evaluation points. This raises a risk that future funding for a comprehensive Strategy will not be secured ‑ and prevention and early intervention activities not continued or scaled up beyond pilot sites ‑ if the evidence on effectiveness is incomplete, mixed or unclear when the Strategy concludes.
Given its limited reach, even if the existing Strategy actions were retained, and no expansion occurred, it would continue to have a narrow impact on homelessness in New South Wales. This sits against a backdrop of increasing need for housing and homelessness supports in the state that may become more acute once the full economic impacts of the COVID‑19 pandemic are felt.
2. Key findings: the COVID‑19 response to homelessness
The Department effectively planned and implemented its homelessness response to the pandemic and reduced the risk of transmission of COVID‑19 for people sleeping rough
The Department's crisis response focused on people sleeping rough due to the public health risk of COVID‑19 transmission amongst this group.
The Department engaged with the specialist homelessness services sector from mid‑March 2020 to modify service delivery, advise on infection control and plan extra supports. It explored options with temporary accommodation providers to support self‑isolation for clients, and scaled up its assertive outreach patrols by staff, specialist caseworkers and health professionals to support people sleeping rough into crisis or temporary accommodation for safety.
The Minister directed the Department to address street homelessness in the COVID‑19 response using the Government’s second stage of stimulus funding. The Department procured hotel, motel or serviced apartment accommodation for 400 people who were sleeping rough, or unable to physically distance in large crisis accommodation centres, within a week of the ministerial direction, building on existing programs. The Department provided advice to the Minister on the need to adjust existing policy settings to meet the forecast demand for temporary accommodation services.
The Department secured additional temporary accommodation when and where it was required, to accommodate the number of people sleeping rough who wanted support. Between 1 April 2020 and 31 January 2021, the Department provided temporary accommodation to 32,158 individuals, of which 4,355 people were sleeping rough, totalling more than 70,000 nights of temporary accommodation and services.
The Department met regularly with NSW homelessness peak organisations and established a Taskforce involving other government agencies, peak organisations, and service providers, to assist in quickly executing the measure and resolving issues arising. The Taskforce built on existing collaborative arrangements in place to support cross‑sectoral coordination, enabling it to respond quickly to COVID‑19.
The Department worked with NSW Health and health providers to ensure its COVID‑19 response to homelessness was in line with health guidelines. As of May 2021, just one participant in the Department's enhanced temporary accommodation program had contracted COVID‑19.
The Department does not know how many people sleeping rough who were assisted with enhanced temporary accommodation have returned to homelessness
Within metropolitan Sydney, the Department established a specialist housing team, and contracted a non‑government provider, to connect people placed in hotels with support services, provide tailored support, and to assist and monitor their transition to longer‑term housing.
The Department’s data indicates that between May 2020 and 31 January 2021, over 1,800 people who had previously been sleeping rough had been engaged in this program, more than four times the expected client numbers. Almost half moved into further accommodation when they left the program, including people supported with longer‑term housing such as social housing, community leasing under the Together Home program, and private rental arrangements.
However, the Department did not track the housing outcomes for clients who were not provided with this support, or who disengaged from services. The Department advises that this would have required additional resourcing to do so.
The Department offers assistance to people in temporary accommodation to find longer term options, and has a policy to not knowingly exit someone from temporary accommodation into homelessness. However, it does not track housing outcomes for every client if they do not engage with the Department's housing or funded support services. It intends to conduct research in the future to better understand what happens to people who leave temporary accommodation without seeking further assistance from the Department.
The Department cannot identify precisely how many people sleeping rough who were assisted during COVID‑19 have returned to rough sleeping or other forms of homelessness. The Department’s data suggests that 72 per cent of the approximately 4,000 people formerly sleeping rough who left temporary accommodation between April 2020 and April 2021 left with an unknown housing outcome. This includes people who were not eligible for social housing, were stranded due to border closures, or who disengaged from the Department or funded support services.
The Department also has limited data to understand whether the enhanced temporary accommodation program was more effective in helping to connect participants with services and support them into stable accommodation, than previous approaches.
The Together Home program was established quickly to assist people into more permanent accommodation but will not meet demand as a standalone response
The Department established the Together Home program in September 2020 to provide longer‑term accommodation to people who were sleeping rough during the pandemic. Community housing providers head‑lease properties in the private rental market for two years and sub‑lease these to clients, while ensuring they receive additional support, such as health services, to help them maintain the lease.
Under the initial tranche of funding, the Together Home program aimed to support 400 people sleeping rough. This target was met by April 2021. Due to increased rental demand in many areas of the state, there were some delays in securing properties in certain areas. In addition, people on temporary visas, or with existing public housing debt, are ineligible for this program.
A further $29.0 million was provided to this program through the 2020–21 NSW Budget, creating 400 additional program places. However, the total number of 800 Together Home places will not be sufficient to provide housing for the more than 4,000 individuals who were sleeping rough prior to entering enhanced temporary accommodation.
The Department advises it is using a range of ‘business‑as‑usual’ options to assist other people sleeping rough into stable accommodation outside of the Together Home program. These options include social housing, supported transitional accommodation, subsidised private rental, boarding houses, and referral to mental health and substance addiction rehabilitation facilities.
The Department’s latest annual state‑wide street count suggested that the number of people sleeping rough across New South Wales decreased by 13 per cent between February 2020 and February 2021. The Department has acknowledged that it could do more to monitor and support the housing outcomes for people in temporary accommodation after they exit.
The Department has plans to secure longer‑term housing options for Together Home clients after the two‑year program, through commissioned community housing and private rental assistance. However, it is not clear how this will overcome existing housing challenges given the complexity of needs amongst this client group, the limited availability of affordable rental properties and the existing scale of unmet need for social housing.
3. Recommendations
By July 2022, the Department of Communities and Justice should:
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use data and analysis identified through the Homelessness Strategy 2018–2023 and provide advice to the NSW Government on sustainably addressing demand and unmet need for homelessness supports
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use the evidence obtained through the Homelessness Strategy 2018–2023 to commence development of a comprehensive strategy to address homelessness, linked to the government’s ten‑year plan for social housing and 20‑year housing strategy
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establish and sustain governance arrangements that enable input to key decisions on homelessness policy from partner agencies, the specialist homelessness services sector, the community housing sector, Aboriginal people and people with lived experience of homelessness
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in partnership with Aboriginal stakeholders and communities, design and implement a strategy for early identification and responses to the needs of Aboriginal people vulnerable to homelessness; and build the capacity and resourcing of the Aboriginal Community Controlled Sector to deliver homelessness services
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evaluate the homelessness response to COVID‑19 and integrate the lessons learned into future practice; and develop protocols to inform actions in future emergencies/disasters
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establish and sustain a means to regularly collect client outcomes data and feedback; and use this to drive improvements to responses to homelessness.
This chapter considers how effectively the NSW Homelessness Strategy was developed and is currently being implemented by the Department of Communities and Justice.
This chapter examines how effectively the Department of Communities and Justice addressed homelessness in its response to the COVID‑19 pandemic, and how well it is applying lessons learned from the pandemic to future policy and service development.
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – Actions within the NSW Homelessness Strategy 2018–23
Appendix three – Reported progress on Homelessness Strategy actions to date (unaudited)
Appendix four – Key homelessness data collections
Appendix six – Key measures in the COVID 19 response to homelessness
Appendix seven – About the audit
Appendix eight – Performance auditing
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #350 - released (4 June 2021).
Internal Controls and Governance 2017
Agencies need to do more to address risks posed by information technology (IT).
Effective internal controls and governance systems help agencies to operate efficiently and effectively and comply with relevant laws, standards and policies. We assessed how well agencies are implementing these systems, and highlighted opportunities for improvement.
1. Overall trends
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New and repeat findings |
The number of reported financial and IT control deficiencies has fallen, but many previously reported findings remain unresolved. |
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High risk findings |
Poor systems implementations contributed to the seven high risk internal control deficiencies that could affect agencies. |
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Common findings |
Poor IT controls are the most commonly reported deficiency across agencies, followed by governance issues relating to cyber security, capital projects, continuous disclosure, shared services, ethics and risk management maturity. |
2. Information Technology
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IT security |
Only two-thirds of agencies are complying with their own policies on IT security. Agencies need to tighten user access and password controls. |
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Cyber security |
Agencies do not have a common view on what constitutes a cyber attack, which limits understanding the extent of the cyber security threat. |
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Other IT systems |
Agencies can improve their disaster recovery plans and the change control processes they use when updating IT systems. |
3. Asset Management
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Capital investment |
Agencies report delays delivering against the significant increase in their budgets for capital projects. |
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Capital projects |
Agencies are underspending their capital budgets and some can improve capital project governance. |
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Asset disposals |
Eleven per cent of agencies were required to sell their real property through Property NSW but didn’t. And eight per cent of agencies can improve their asset disposal processes. |
4. Governance
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Governance arrangements |
Sixty-four per cent of agencies’ disclosure policies support communication of key performance information and prompt public reporting of significant issues. |
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Shared services |
Fifty-nine per cent of agencies use shared services, yet 14 per cent do not have service level agreements in place and 20 per cent can strengthen the performance standards they set. |
5. Ethics and Conduct
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Ethical framework |
Agencies can reinforce their ethical frameworks by updating code‑of‑conduct policies and publishing a Statement of Business Ethics. |
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Conflicts of interest |
All agencies we reviewed have a code of conduct, but they can still improve the way they update and manage their codes to reduce the risk of fraud and unethical behaviour. |
6. Risk Management
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Risk management maturity |
All agencies have implemented risk management frameworks, but with varying levels of maturity. |
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Risk management elements |
Many agencies can improve risk registers and strengthen their risk culture, particularly in the way that they report risks to their lead agency. |
This report covers the findings and recommendations from our 2016–17 financial audits related to the internal controls and governance of the 39 largest agencies (refer to Appendix three) in the NSW public sector. These agencies represent about 95 per cent of total expenditure for all NSW agencies and were considered to be a large enough group to identify common issues and insights.
The findings in this report should not be used to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of individual agency control environments and governance arrangements. Specific financial reporting, controls and service delivery comments are included in the individual 2017 cluster financial audit reports tabled in Parliament from October to December 2017.
This new report offers strategic insight on the public sector as a whole
In previous years, we have commented on internal control and governance issues in the volumes we published on each ‘cluster’ or agency sector, generally between October and December. To add further value, we then commented more broadly about the issues identified for the public sector as a whole at the start of the following year.
This year, we have created this report dedicated to internal controls and governance. This will help Parliament to understand broad issues affecting the public sector, and help agencies to compare their own performance against that of their peers.
Without strong control measures and governance systems, agencies face increased risks in their financial management and service delivery. If they do not, for example, properly authorise payments or manage conflicts of interest, they are at greater risk of fraud. If they do not have strong information technology (IT) systems, sensitive and trusted information may be at risk of unauthorised access and misuse.
These problems can in turn reduce the efficiency of agency operations, increase their costs and reduce the quality of the services they deliver.
Our audits do not review every control or governance measure every year. We select a range of measures, and report on those that present the most significant risks that agencies should mitigate. This report divides these into the following six areas:
- Overall trends
- Information technology
- Asset management
- Governance
- Ethics and conduct
- Risk management.
Internal controls are processes, policies and procedures that help agencies to:
- operate effectively and efficiently
- produce reliable financial reports
- comply with laws and regulations.
This chapter outlines the overall trends for agency controls and governance issues, including the number of findings, level of risk and the most common deficiencies we found across agencies. The rest of this volume then illustrates this year’s controls and governance findings in more detail.
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Issues |
Recommendations |
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1.1 New and repeat findings |
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The number of internal control deficiencies reduced over the past three years, but new higher-risk information technology (IT) control deficiencies were reported in 2016–17. Deficiencies repeated from previous years still make up a sizeable proportion of all internal control deficiencies. |
Recommendation Agencies should focus on emerging IT risks, but also manage new IT risks, reduce existing IT control deficiencies, and address repeat internal control deficiencies on a more timely basis. |
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1.2 High risk findings |
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We found seven high risk internal control deficiencies, which might significantly affect agencies. |
Recommendation Agencies should rectify high risk internal control deficiencies as a priority |
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1.3 Common findings |
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The most common internal control deficiencies related to poor or absent IT controls. We found some common governance deficiencies across multiple agencies. |
Recommendation Agencies should coordinate actions and resources to help rectify common IT control and governance deficiencies. |
Information technology (IT) has become increasingly important for government agencies’ financial reporting and to deliver their services efficiently and effectively. Our audits reviewed whether agencies have effective controls in place over their IT systems. We found that IT security remains the source of many control weakness in agencies.
| Issues | Recommendations |
2.1 IT security |
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User access administration While 95 per cent of agencies have policies about user access, about two-thirds were compliant with these policies. Agencies can improve how they grant, change and end user access to their systems. |
Recommendation Agencies should strengthen user access administration to prevent inappropriate access to sensitive systems. Agencies should:
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Privileged access Sixty-eight per cent of agencies do not adequately manage who can access their information systems, and many do not sufficiently monitor or restrict privileged access. |
Recommendation Agencies should tighten privileged user access to protect their information systems and reduce the risks of data misuse and fraud. Agencies should ensure they:
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Password controls Forty-one per cent of agencies did not meet either their own standards or minimum standards for password controls. |
Recommendation Agencies should review and enforce password controls to strengthen security over sensitive systems. As a minimum, password parameters should include:
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2.2 Cyber Security |
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Cyber security framework Agencies do not have a common view on what constitutes a cyber attack, which limits understanding the extent of the cyber security threat. |
Recommendation The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should revisit its existing framework to develop a shared cyber security terminology and strengthen the current reporting requirements for cyber incidents. |
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Cyber security strategies While 82 per cent of agencies have dedicated resources to address cyber security, they can strengthen their strategies, expertise and staff awareness. |
Recommendations The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should:
Agencies should ensure they adequately resource staff dedicated to cyber security. |
2.3 Other IT systems |
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Change control processes Some agencies need to improve change control processes to avoid unauthorised or inaccurate system changes. |
Recommendation Agencies should consistently perform user acceptance testing before system upgrades and changes. They should also properly approve and document changes to IT systems. |
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Disaster recovery planning Agencies can do more to adequately assess critical business systems to enforce effective disaster recovery plans. This includes reviewing and testing their plans on a timely basis. |
Recommendation Agencies should complete business impact analyses to strengthen disaster recovery plans, then regularly test and update their plans. |
Agency service delivery relies on developing and renewing infrastructure assets such as schools, hospitals, roads, or public housing. Agencies are currently investing significantly in new assets. Agencies need to manage the scale and volume of current capital projects in order to deliver new infrastructure on time, on budget and realise the intended benefits. We found agencies can improve how they:
- manage their major capital projects
- dispose of existing assets.
| Issues | Recommendations or conclusions |
3.1 Capital investment |
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Capital asset investment ratios Most agencies report high capital investment ratios, but one-third of agencies’ capital investment ratios are less than one. |
Recommendation Agencies with high capital asset investment ratios should ensure their project management and delivery functions have the capacity to deliver their current and forward work programs. |
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Volume of capital spending Most agencies have significant forward spending commitments for capital projects. However, agencies’ actual capital expenditure has been below budget for the last three years. |
Conclusion The significant increase in capital budget underspends warrant investigation, particularly where this has resulted from slower than expected delivery of projects from previous years. |
3.2 Capital projects |
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Major capital projects Agencies’ major capital projects were underspent by 13 percent against their budgets. |
Conclusion The causes of agency budget underspends warrant investigation to ensure the NSW Government’s infrastructure commitment is delivered on time. |
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Capital project governance Agencies do not consistently prepare business cases or use project steering committees to oversee major capital projects. |
Conclusion Agencies that have project management processes that include robust business cases and regular updates to their steering committees (or equivalent) are better able to provide those projects with strategic direction and oversight. |
3.3. Asset disposals |
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Asset disposal procedures Agencies need to strengthen their asset disposal procedures. |
Recommendations Agencies should have formal processes for disposing of surplus properties. Agencies should use Property NSW to manage real property sales unless, as in the case for State owned corporations, they have been granted an exemption. |
Governance refers to the high-level frameworks, processes and behaviours that help an organisation to achieve its objectives, comply with legal and other requirements, and meet a high standard of probity, accountability and transparency.
This chapter sets out the governance lighthouse model the Audit Office developed to help agencies reach best practice. It then focuses on two key areas: continuous disclosure and shared services arrangements. The following two chapters look at findings related to ethics and risk management.
| Issues | Recommendations or conclusions |
4.1 Governance arrangements |
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Continuous disclosure Continuous disclosure promotes improved performance and public trust and aides better decision-making. Continuous disclosure is only mandatory for NSW Government Businesses such as State owned corporations. |
Conclusion Some agencies promote transparency and accountability by publishing on their websites a continuous disclosure policy that provides for, and encourages:
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4.2 Shared services |
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Service level agreements Some agencies do not have service level agreements for their shared service arrangements. Many of the agreements that do exist do not adequately specify controls, performance or reporting requirements. This reduces the effectiveness of shared services arrangements. |
Conclusion Agencies are better able to manage the quality and timeliness of shared service arrangements where they have a service level agreement in place. Ideally, the terms of service should be agreed before services are transferred to the service provider and:
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Shared service performance Some agencies do not set performance standards for their shared service providers or regularly review performance results. |
Conclusion Agencies can achieve better results from shared service arrangements when they regularly monitor the performance of shared service providers using key measures for the benefits realised, costs saved and quality of services received. Before agencies extend or renegotiate a contract, they should comprehensively assess the services received and test the market to maximise value for money. |
All government sector employees must demonstrate the highest levels of ethical conduct, in line with standards set by The Code of Ethics and Conduct for NSW government sector employees.
This chapter looks at how well agencies are managing these requirements, and where they can improve their policies and processes.
We found that agencies mostly have the appropriate codes, frameworks and policies in place. But we have highlighted opportunities to improve the way they manage those systems to reduce the risks of unethical conduct.
| Issues | Recommendations or conclusions |
5.1 Ethical framework |
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Code of conduct All agencies we reviewed have a code of conduct, but they can still improve the way they update and manage their codes to reduce the risk of fraud and unethical behaviour. |
Recommendation Agencies should regularly review their code-of-conduct policies and ensure they keep their codes of conduct up-to-date. |
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Statement of business ethics Most agencies maintain an ethical framework, but some can enhance their related processes, particularly when dealing with external clients, customers, suppliers and contractors. |
Conclusion Agencies can enhance their ethical frameworks by publishing a Statement of Business Ethics, which communicates their values and culture. |
5.2 Potential conflicts of interest |
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Conflicts of interest All agencies have a conflicts-of-interest policy, but most can improve how they identify, manage and avoid conflicts of interest. |
Recommendation Agencies should improve the way they manage conflicts of interest, particularly by:
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Gifts and benefits While all agencies already have a formal gifts-and-benefits policy, we found gaps in the management of gifts and benefits by some that increase the risk of unethical conduct. |
Recommendation Agencies should improve the way they manage gifts and benefits by promptly updating registers and providing annual training to staff. |
Risk management is an integral part of effective corporate governance. It helps agencies to identify, assess and prioritise the risks they face and in turn minimise, monitor and control the impact of unforeseen events. It also means agencies can respond to opportunities that may emerge and improve their services and activities.
This year we looked at the overall maturity of the risk management frameworks that agencies use, along with two important risk management elements: risk culture and risk registers.
| Issues | Recommendations or conclusions |
6.1 Risk management maturity |
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All agencies have implemented risk management frameworks, but with varying levels of maturity in their application. Agencies’ averaged a score of 3.1 out of five across five critical assessment criteria for risk management. While strategy and governance fared best, the areas that most need to improve are risk culture, and systems and intelligence. |
Conclusion Agencies have introduced risk management frameworks and practices as required by the Treasury’s:
However, more can be done to progress risk management maturity and embed risk management in agency culture. |
6.2 Risk management elements |
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Risk culture Most agencies have started to embed risk management into the culture of their organisation. But only some have successfully done so, and most agencies can improve their risk culture.
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Conclusion Agencies can improve their risk culture by:
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Risk registers and reporting Some agencies do not report their significant risks to their lead agency, which may impair the way resources are allocated in their cluster. Some agencies do not integrate risk registers at a divisional and whole-of-enterprise level. |
Conclusion Agencies not reporting significant risks at the cluster level increases the likelihood that significant risks are not being mitigated appropriately. |
Effective risk management can improve agency decision-making, protect reputations and lead to significant efficiencies and cost savings. By embedding risk management directly into their operations, agencies can also derive extra value for their activities and services.
Central Agencies 2017
This report highlights the results of the financial audits of NSW Government central agencies. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet, and Finance, Services and Innovation clusters.
The report includes a range of findings in respect to service delivery. One repeat finding is that while the Government regularly reports on the 12 Premier's priorities, there is no comprehensive reporting on the 18 State priorities.
1. Financial reporting and controls
| Audit Opinions | Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' 30 June 2017 financial statements. |
| Early close | Early close procedures continue to facilitate the timely preparation of financial statements and completion of audits, but agencies can make further improvement. |
| Deficient user administration access | User access administration over financial systems remains an area of weakness. Agencies need to strengthen user access administration to critical systems. |
| Transitioning to outsourced service providers | Transitioning of services to outsourced service providers can be improved. Outsourcing services can lead to better outcomes, which may include lower transaction costs and improved services, but it also introduces new risks. |
2. Service delivery
| Premier and State Priorities | A comprehensive report of performance against the 18 State Priorities is yet to be published. While some measures are publicly reported through agency annual reports or other sources, a comprehensive report of performance against the 18 State Priorities would ensure all State Priorities are publicly reported, provide a single and easily accessible source of reference and improve transparency. |
| ICT and digital government | The Digital Government Strategy was released in May 2017. Targets will need to be set to assess and monitor progress against the Strategy. |
| Digital information security | Not all agencies are complying with the NSW Government's information security policy. This increases the risk of noncompliance with legislation, information security breaches and difficulty restoring data or maintaining business continuity in the event of a disaster or disruption. |
| Property and asset utilisation | Property NSW's performance reporting would be enhanced by developing and reporting on customer satisfaction, reporting against set targets and benchmarking cost of service to the private sector. |
3. Government financial services
| Prudential oversight of NSW Government superannuation funds |
Prudential oversight of SAS Trustee Corporation Pooled Fund and Parliamentary Contributory Superannuation Fund has not been prescribed. Structured and comprehensive prudential oversight of these funds remains important as they operate in a specialised, complex and continuously changing investment market sector, have over 106,000 members and manage investments in excess of $42.4 billion. |
| Green slip scheme affordability | Currently, Green Slips in NSW are the most expensive in Australia. However, CTP reforms are expected to reduce the cost of Green Slips. |
This report sets out the results of the 30 June 2017 financial statement audits of NSW Government's central agencies and their cluster agencies.
Central agencies play a key role in ensuring policy coordination, good administrative and people management practices and prudent fiscal management. The central agencies and their key responsibilities are set out below.
Confidence in public sector decision‑making and transparency is enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely. Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions or recommendations related to financial reporting and controls of agencies for 2016–17.
| Observation | Conclusion or recommendation |
| 2.1 Quality of financial reporting | |
| Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agency financial statements. | The quality of financial reporting continues to remain strong across the clusters. |
| 2.2 Timeliness of financial reporting | |
| Most agencies complied with the statutory timeframes for completion of early close procedures and preparation and audit of financial statements. | Early close procedures continue to facilitate the timely preparation of financial statements and completion of audits, but agencies can make further improvement. |
| 2.3 Financial performance and sustainability | |
| We assessed the performance of agencies listed in Appendix six against some key financial sustainability indicators. This highlighted two agencies with negative operating margins of more than ten per cent and one agency with a liquidity ratio of less than 0.5. | These agencies have strategies in place to remain financially sustainability and manage their liquidity. Our analysis found that, overall, the agencies are not at high risk of sustainability concerns. |
| 2.4 Internal Controls | |
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User access administration over financial systems remains an area of weakness. Sixteen moderate risk and ten low risk issues related to user access administration across eight agencies were identified. |
Recommendation: Agencies should review user access administration to critical systems to ensure:
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Transitioning of services to outsourced service providers can be improved. Our 2016–17 audits identified one high risk issue relating to Property NSW's outsourcing of property and facility management services to the private sector. While a high risk issue was identified in 2015–16 from the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation's outsourcing of transactional and information technology services to GovConnect there has been an improvement in GovConnect's internal control environment throughout |
Outsourcing services can lead to better outcomes, which may include lower transaction costs and improved services, but it also introduces new risks. The transition needs to be carefully managed and requires thorough planning and effective project governance. This should be supported by oversight and direction from senior management and independent project assurance. |
| 2.5 Human Resources | |
| The percentage of full‑time equivalent staff with annual leave greater than 30 days in the Finance, Services and Innovation, Premier and Cabinet and the Treasury clusters is 7.9 per cent, 17.1 per cent and 18.4 per cent respectively. | Agencies have strategies in place to reduce annual leave balances that are greater than 30 days. The effectiveness of these strategies will need to be monitored to ensure they are helping to achieve the desired outcome. |
This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations relating to service delivery for 2016–17.
| Observation | Conclusion or recommendation |
| 3.1 Premier and State priorities | |
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The Department of Premier and Cabinet monitors the achievement of targets and the implementation of initiatives to deliver the 12 Premier’s Priorities. Responsible ministers and agencies manage the 18 State Priorities. A comprehensive report of performance against the 18 State Priorities is yet to be published. |
While some measures are publicly reported through agency annual reports or other sources, a comprehensive report of performance against the 18 State Priorities would ensure all State Priorities are publicly reported, provide a single and easily accessible source of reference and improve transparency. Where possible, independent sources are used to measure performance, however without independent assurance there is an increased risk that the target measures are inaccurate, not relevant or do not fairly represent actual performance. |
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Performance against the State Priority to make NSW the easiest state to start a business is not currently published. |
Initiatives, such as easy to do business and red tape reduction are in place to help achieve this priority. The regulatory policy framework is under review following an October 2016 performance audit on ‘Red tape reduction’ that found the regulatory burden of legislation had increased. |
| 3.2 Financial management | |
| Revenue NSW earned record crown revenue of $30.0 billion in 2016–17 to support the state's finances. | Record crown revenue has been driven by the sustained increase in duties revenue, which has increased by 93.7 per cent over the last five years. This is a consequence of the continued strength in the property market over this time and large one off NSW Government business asset sales and leases. |
| 3.3 ICT and digital government | |
| The Digital Government Strategy (the Strategy) was released in May 2017 to build on reforms set out in previous ICT strategies. | The Strategy’s priorities and enablers aim to support digital innovation. Targets and measures will need to be set to assess and monitor progress against the Strategy. |
| The Digital Information Security Policy (DISP) is a key tool that helps ensure a minimum set of information security controls are implemented across NSW Government agencies. A review of 2016 annual reports found 15 agencies (13 in 2015) did not attest to compliance with the DISP and of the agencies that attested to compliance, 34 reported issues associated with their compliance. |
The Strategy’s priorities and enablers aim to support digital innovation. Targets and measures will need to be set to assess and monitor progress against the Strategy. |
| 3.4 Property and asset utilisation | |
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Property NSW's performance reporting could be |
Property NSW's performance reporting would be enhanced by developing and reporting on customer satisfaction, reporting against set targets and benchmarking cost of service to the private sector. |
This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations specific to NSW Government agencies providing financial services.
| Observation | Conclusion or recommendation |
| 4.1 Key issues | |
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The SAS Trustee Corporation (STC) Pooled Fund and the Parliamentary Contributory Superannuation (PCS) Fund are not required to comply with the prudential and reporting standards issued by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA). Amendments to relevant legislation allows the Minister for Finance, Services and Property to prescribe applicable prudential standards and audit requirements. |
Structured and comprehensive prudential oversight of these funds remains important as they operate in a specialised, complex and continuously changing investment market sector, have over 106,000 members and manage investments of more than $42.4 billion. Recommendation: The Treasury should liaise with the respective Trustees to implement appropriate prudential standards and oversight arrangements for the exempt public sector superannuation funds. |
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Currently, Green Slips in NSW are the most expensive in Australia. Average premiums for Sydney Metropolitan vehicles increased by 10.4 per cent between 1 January 2016 and 31 December 2016. |
CTP reforms are expected to reduce the cost of Green Slips. The State Insurance Regulatory Authority will need to ensure it has appropriate processes in place to track and report against the expected benefits. |
| 4.2 Financial performance and sustainability | |
| Net unfunded superannuation liabilities were $15.0 billion at 30 June 2017. Under the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012, the NSW Government’s target is to eliminate unfunded superannuation liabilities by 2030. |
The superannuation funds’ strategic asset allocation and investment strategies are monitored and adjusted to help achieve a fully funded position by 2030. |
| The Home Warranty Scheme commenced in 2011. Over this time total premiums collected have not been sufficient to cover expected claim costs. | Funding arrangements introduced during 2016–17 allow the Home Building Compensation Fund to apply to the Crown for reimbursement of unfunded realised losses from under-pricing of premiums. Other reforms are planned to address the long term sustainability of the home building compensation scheme. |
| 4.3 Investment performance | |
| The NSW Government’s main superannuation funds have maintained the management expense ratio (MER) at consistent levels over the past two years. The Parliamentary Contributory Superannuation (PCS) Fund does not set an MER target. | MER is an industry recognised ratio to measure the performance of funds and investment managers. Recommendation: The Fund Secretary for the PCS Fund, in conjunction with the Trustee, should consider establishing an appropriate management expense ratio target to measure performance. |
2016 - An overview
This report focuses on key observations and findings from 2016 audits and highlights key areas of focus for financial and performance audits in 2017.
| Financial reporting | |
| Observation | Conclusion |
| Only one qualified audit opinion was issued on the 2015–16 financial statements of NSW public sector agencies, compared to two in 2014–15. | The quality of financial reporting continued to improve across the NSW public sector. |
| More 2015–16 financial statements and audit opinions were signed within three months of the year end. | Timely financial reporting was facilitated by more agencies resolving significant accounting issues early, completing asset valuations on time and compiling sufficient evidence to support financial statement balances. |
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NSW Treasury’s early close procedures in 2015–16 were again successful in improving the quality and timeliness of financial reporting, largely facilitated by the early resolution of accounting issues. For 2016–17, NSW Treasury has narrowed the scope of mandatory early close procedures. |
The narrowed scope of mandatory early close procedures may diminish the good performance in ensuring the quality and timeliness of financial reporting achieved in recent years. To mitigate this risk, NSW Treasury has mandated that agencies perform non-financial asset valuations and prepare proforma financial statements in their early close procedures. It also encourages them to continue with the good practices embedded in recent years. |
| Although most agencies complied with NSW Treasury’s early close asset revaluation procedures we identified areas where they can improve. | Asset revaluations need to commence early enough to ensure all assets are identified and the results are analysed, recorded and reflected accurately in the early close financial statements. |
| Number of misstatements | |||||
| Year ended 30 June | 2015-16 | 2014-15 | 2013-14 | 2012-13 | 2011-12 |
| Total reported misstatements | 298 | 396 | 459 | 661 | 1,077 |
All material misstatements identified by agencies and audit teams were corrected before the financial statements and audit opinions were signed. A material misstatement relates to an incorrect amount, classification, presentation or disclosure in the financial statements that could reasonably be expected to influence the economic decisions of users.
Significant matters reported to the portfolio Minister, Treasurer and Agency Head
In 2015–16, we reported the following significant matters to the portfolio Minister, Treasurer and agency head in our Statutory Audit Reports:
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and the implementation and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.
In 2015–16, our audit teams made the following key observations on the financial controls of NSW public sector agencies.
| Financial controls | |
| Observation | Conclusion |
| More needs to be done to implement audit recommendations on a timely basis. We found 212 internal control issues identified in previous audits had not been adequately addressed by 30 June 2016. |
Delays in implementing audit recommendations can impact the quality of financial information and the effectiveness of decision making. Agencies need to ensure they have action plans, timeframes and assigned responsibilities to address recommendations in a timely manner. |
| Agencies continue to face challenges managing information security. Most information technology issues we identified related to poor IT user administration in areas like password controls and inappropriate access. | Agencies should review the design and effectiveness of information security controls to ensure data is adequately protected. |
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We found shared service provider agreements did not always adequately address information security requirements. |
Where agencies use shared service providers they should consider whether the service level arrangements adequately address information security. |
| Thirteen of 108 agencies required to attest to having a minimum set of information security controls did not do so in their 2015 annual reports. | The 'NSW Government Digital Information Security Policy' recognises the growing need for effective information security. With cyber security threats continuing to increase as digital services expand we plan to look at cyber security as part of our 2017–18 performance audit program. |
| We identified instances where service level agreements with shared service providers were outdated, signed too late or did not exist. | Corporate and shared service arrangements are more effective when service level arrangements are negotiated and signed in time, clearly detail rights and responsibilities and include meaningful KPIs, fee arrangements and dispute resolution processes. |
| Internal controls at GovConnect, the private sector provider of transactional and information technology services to many NSW public sector agencies were ineffective in 2015–16. We found mitigating actions taken to manage transition risks from ServiceFirst to GovConnect were ineffective in ensuring effective control over client transactions and data. | The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should ensure GovConnect addresses the control deficiencies. It should also examine the breakdowns in the transition of the shared service arrangements and apply the learnings to other services being transitioned to the private sector. |
| Maintenance backlogs exist in several NSW public sector agencies, including Roads and Maritime Services, Sydney Trains, NSW Health, the Department of Education and the Department of Justice. | To address backlog maintenance it is important for agencies to have asset lifecycle planning strategies that ensure newly built and existing assets are funded and maintained to a desired service level. |
Volume Six 2013 focusing on Law, Order and Emergency Services
We issued unqualified audit opinions on the above agencies’ 30 June 2013 financial statements. During the year, The Treasury issued TC 13/01 ‘Mandatory early close procedures for 2013’. As a result, the law and order services agencies were required to perform early close procedures. All law and order service agencies were broadly successful in performing the procedures, which helped them submit financial statements by an earlier due date. This in turn enabled the financial statement audits to be finalised within an earlier timeframe of eight weeks (nine weeks in 2011-12).
As previously recommended, the Department of Attorney General and Justice should continue integrating policies, operations and systems between its divisions and, once complete, analyse the costs and benefits. The Department of Attorney-General and Justice should also ensure it has the necessary processes in place to enable it to regularly monitor and measure the performance and success of the Victims Support Scheme in providing a more accessible, streamlined and targeted service to victims of violent crime in New South Wales.
Cost of Alcohol Abuse to the NSW Government
The NSW Government does not estimate or report the total cost of alcohol abuse. The Audit Office of New South Wales’ sponsored research estimates it costs the government over $1 billion a year, or around $416 from each NSW household.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #235 - released 6 August 2013
NSW Senior Executive Service: Professionalism and Integrity Volume 1 Part 1 Summary and Research Report
The Audit Office is of the opinion that there are several features of the current Senior Executive Service (SES) model, or its application, which hinder the capacity of the SES to operate effectively in line with the Government’s stated objectives. The ultimate effect of these features is to reduce the capacity or perceived capacity of the SES to meet the Government’s objectives for the operation of the SES.
Taken overall, difficulties in the SES identified by the audit included: uncertainty caused by the way some contracts have been applied in practice, removal for reasons other than poor performance, informal strategies such as using restructuring to “terminate contracts and to move people in and out of positions regardless of their formal reported performance” (Section 5.4), inconsistently applied rules about selection/recruitment, appointment and removal of the SES, an imbalance between CES responsibility to the Minister as the employer/reviewer with their responsibility not to act in a political or partial manner, apparent lack of rigour in, value of and Ministerial accountability for CES performance review processes and failure to implement an adequate system of rewards and sanctions related to performance.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #59.1 - released 17 December 1998
NSW Senior Executive Service: Professionalism and Integrity Volume 1 Part 2 SES Research
This Performance Audit Report, prepared by the University of Technology, Sydney (UTS) on behalf of The Audit Office of New South Wales (NSW), is a study of the NSW Senior Executive Service (SES).
It found the dissonance between where optimal executive performance might take place on a performance spectrum, encompassing the formal SES and less formal political arenas, is canvassed. The critical point here is that this arena, between the informal political actions and the application of formal SES structures, where much of the important decision making takes place, will always be difficult to manage. Transparency in decision making processes where non partisan and partisan actions are clearly defined seems a primary essential element of performance if the integrity of the NSW SES is to be maintained.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #59.2 - released 17 December 1998
The coordination of bushfire fighting activities
The NSW model of rural fire fighting is complex, and requires an extensive amount of coordination and cooperation to function properly. This has inherent risks. In general, the model has been made to work quite well and much improvement in rural fire fighting has been achieved over the past decade. The efforts of all concerned should be recognised and applauded especially since any change must be developed cooperatively between a number of agencies and groups.
Nevertheless, past tensions and difficulties have left pockets of disagreement and resistance. The rural fire fighting culture which was developed over the course of a century has always been highly dedicated, as it is today. However, changed organisational, technical, legal, financial and environmental factors have necessitated major and continuing changes.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #57 - released 2 December 1998
