The State Insurance Regulatory Authority’s (SIRA) ‘green slip refund’ campaign, and the TAFE semester one 2018 student recruitment campaign, complied with most requirements of the Government Advertising Act 2011 and the Government Advertising Guidelines, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford.

The Government Advertising Act 2011 (the Act) requires the Auditor-General to conduct a performance audit on the activities of one or more government agencies in relation to government advertising campaigns in each financial year. The performance audit assesses whether a government agency or agencies has carried out activities in relation to government advertising in an effective, economical and efficient manner and in compliance with the Act, the regulations, other laws and the Government Advertising Guidelines (the Guidelines).

This audit examined two campaigns conducted in 2017–18:

• the 'Green slip refund' campaign run by the State Insurance Regulatory Authority (SIRA)
• the semester one component of the 'TAFE NSW 2018 Student Recruitment Annual Campaign Program' run by the NSW TAFE Commission (TAFE).

Section 6 of the Act prohibits political advertising. Under this section, material that is part of a government advertising campaign must not contain the name, voice or image of a minister, member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament or the name, logo or any slogan of a political party. Further, a campaign must not be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party.

The State Insurance Regulatory Authority (SIRA) conducted the 'Green slip refund' campaign between March and June 2018. SIRA ran this campaign to raise awareness of the Compulsory Third Party (CTP) refunds and reforms after the Motor Accidents Injuries Act 2017 commenced in December 2017. SIRA's view is that the reforms include a reduced cost for CTP insurance, benefits for at-fault drivers, reduced opportunity for fraud and attempts to lower insurance company profits. Green slip holders are also able to claim partial refunds on their 2017 green slip insurance premium. The campaign aimed to make green slip holders aware of the refunds available, encourage them to claim online and to inform people about the changes to the green slip scheme. The campaign focused on the first two of these objectives. The total cost of the campaign was $1.9 million. See Appendix two for more details on this campaign.

Campaign materials we reviewed did not breach section 6 of the Act

Section 6 of the Act prohibits political advertising as part of a government advertising campaign. A government advertising campaign must not:

• be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party
• contain the name, voice or image of a minister, a member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament
• contain the name, logo, slogan or any other reference to a political party.

The audit team found no breaches of section 6 of the Act in the campaign material we reviewed.
 
Before the start of the campaign, SIRA conducted a survey which asked people whether they agreed ‘that the NSW Government is helping to reduce the cost of living by making positive reforms to:

• reduce the cost of green slips
• reduce the cost of health insurance
• increase the number of jobs
• increase investment in the state.'

SIRA's initial submission to peer review listed one of the campaign objectives as improving the perception of the government as a positive reformer. DPC advised SIRA that this should not be included. SIRA removed this objective.

Even though SIRA appropriately removed this objective, the post-campaign evaluation still measured agreement with the above statements, three of which did not relate to this campaign or SIRA's responsibilities. SIRA advised that these three additional statements were included to provide a broader context for any change in the green slip campaign survey results. For example, if all four measures reported an increase in positive responses of roughly the same size, then the increase may have been due to factors other than the advertising campaign.

This is not an appropriate use of the post-campaign evaluation, which should measure the success of the campaign against its stated objectives. The Guidelines list the purposes that government advertising may serve and none of these relate to improving the perception of the government. The inclusion of the above questions in SIRA's post-campaign evaluation creates a risk that the results may be used for party political purposes.

The campaign met most targets, however some were not challenging to achieve

The post-campaign evaluation demonstrated that the campaign met the targets for 12 of its 13 objectives including the targets relating to raising awareness of the refunds and the proportion of people claiming their refunds online. A fourteenth objective, the percentage of people aware that they should contact SIRA after a road accident injury, did not have a target set, meaning that it is not possible to say whether the campaign had the desired impact in this case.

In August 2017, before the campaign commenced, SIRA conducted a survey to determine the baselines for some of its objectives. This is a good practice to support an effective post campaign evaluation process. The survey found that 20 per cent of people were aware of the green slip reforms. SIRA's objective was to raise this to 25 per cent, which represents a small gain relative to the proposed campaign expenditure. The campaign aimed for 40 per cent of motorists to be aware of refunds, which is very low given that this was the primary focus of the campaign. SIRA followed the advice of its survey provider when setting these targets. 

In the survey carried out after the campaign, 66 per cent of people were aware of the availability of green slip refunds for most motorists. The campaign also aimed to get 83 per cent of motorists to claim their refunds via online channels. It met this target, with a total of 84 per cent. Finally, 62 per cent of people in the post-campaign survey were aware of the green slip reforms. This result is discussed further below.

The overall target for total number of refunds claimed is 85 per cent of eligible drivers, that is to say CTP holders. SIRA will evaluate the results of this objective after the conclusion of the refund period in June 2019.

The campaign did little to inform the public about the broader green slip reforms

One objective of the green slip refund campaign was to inform the public about the green slip reforms. The final campaign creative material focused almost entirely on the green slip refunds rather than the range of other reforms. This was because the peer review raised concerns that the creative material was attempting to deliver too many messages. 
 
The campaign submission stated that the advertising campaign would raise awareness of the broader reforms to the CTP scheme, citing several examples such as reduced opportunities for fraud and reduced insurer profits. SIRA also advised the Minister for Finance, Services and Property that secondary messaging in the campaign would benefit public understanding of the reforms.

Some of the television and radio advertisements referred to ‘more protection’ or ‘better protection’ for people injured on New South Wales roads, however advertisements did not refer to other elements of the reforms. Other campaign creative materials contained messages solely relating to the green slip refund and made no further reference to the broader reforms. SIRA used other communication channels, such as giving wallet cards to health service providers, to spread these messages to people, particularly those who had been injured.

Sixty two per cent of people in the post-campaign survey were aware of the green slip reforms. SIRA asked these people which benefits they associated with the reforms. The results of this survey are in Exhibit 4. Seventy-one per cent of this sample identified the reduced costs of green slips as one of the changes, but awareness of other elements of the reforms remains low. Though 29 per cent of people perceive the reforms to make the green slip scheme ‘fairer’, no more than 15 per cent of people could list a specific benefit which did not relate to insurance prices.

Another campaign target was to ensure that people understood that they should contact SIRA in case of an injury. None of the campaign creative materials contained this information. SIRA did some limited work to inform the public about this through its social media channels. One of the pieces of creative material directed the reader to SIRA's website for further information on the reforms, which contained this information. During the campaign period, there was an increase in the number of calls received by SIRA's CTP Assist phone line. However, in the post-campaign evaluation, only two per cent of surveyed people identified that they should contact SIRA in case of an injury.

The media plan allowed sufficient time for cost-efficient media placement

During the peer review process, DPC provides advice to agencies about the time they should allow to ensure cost-efficient media placement. For example, DPC advise that agencies book television advertising six to 12 weeks in advance and that agencies book radio advertising two to eight weeks in advance.

SIRA allowed sufficient time between the completion of the peer review process and the commencement of the first advertising. SIRA signed the agreement with the approved Media Agency Services provider eight weeks before the campaign started, meaning that it could achieve cost-efficient media placement for all types of media used in this campaign.

SIRA directly negotiated with a single supplier, making it difficult to demonstrate value for money

SIRA directly negotiated with a single supplier to procure the campaign's creative material. A direct negotiation occurs when an agency negotiates with a proponent without first undergoing a competitive process. It is difficult to demonstrate value for money using direct negotiation due to the lack of competition. 

ICAC's 'Guidelines for managing risks in direct negotiations' (ICAC Guidelines) provide guidance on how to undertake direct negotiations. SIRA has a direct negotiation checklist that aligns to the ICAC Guidelines. The SIRA checklist advises that staff should confirm that existing New South Wales prequalification schemes cannot provide the procurement before undertaking a direct negotiation. SIRA did not do this.

To procure creative materials, agencies can access the Advertising and Digital Communication Services prequalification scheme (the prequalification scheme). Using the prequalification scheme allows agencies to quickly seek quotes from suppliers who have a demonstrated track record and expertise. While agencies are not required to use the prequalification scheme, the NSW Procurement Board advises that agencies should use prequalification schemes where they are available to promote competition. 

By using direct negotiation when the prequalification scheme was available, and by not seeking quotes from other suppliers, SIRA was acting in a way that reduced competition. This increases the risk that SIRA did not achieve value for money in its procurement of creative materials.

SIRA advised that it sought to ensure value for money by comparing the quote from its selected supplier with the amount spent on creative materials in other campaigns of similar size. SIRA did not document this analysis at the time or include it as part of the briefing note staff used to seek approval for undertaking direct negotiation. As a result, decision-makers were not fully informed when approving this engagement. 

SIRA reported in a briefing note that it engaged in direct negotiations because:

• it believed that the original timeframe did not allow for a competitive tender process
• the supplier had done previous work on a related campaign for SIRA
• the supplier provided sample work which received positive feedback from focus groups.

In July 2017, when peer review commenced, SIRA planned to launch the campaign in November 2017 to coincide with the beginning of the green slip reforms. SIRA believed that this timeframe was narrow enough to warrant entering direct negotiations. The ICAC Guidelines advise that a narrow timeframe is not a valid reason to enter into a direct negotiation. In late October 2017, the campaign launch was delayed until March 2018 to stagger the demand on the resources of Service NSW, which is administering the refund. 

The ICAC Guidelines also advise against re-appointing a supplier because it has performed previous work. Instead, agencies could consider previous experience as one of several factors when deciding between quotes. In cases where an agency asks a supplier to provide sample work, the ICAC Guidelines advise that agencies should request sample work from multiple potential suppliers to promote competition.

The campaign's cost benefit analysis complied with the Act and Guidelines 

The Act requires a cost benefit analysis (CBA) for any government advertising campaign likely to exceed $1.0 million in value. Section six of the Guidelines set out the requirements for a government advertising CBA. The campaign's CBA complied with the requirements of the Act and the Guidelines.

The campaign CBA could have demonstrated further cost effectiveness if it considered alternative media mixes as outlined in NSW Treasury's 'Cost Benefit Analysis Framework for Government Advertising and Information Campaigns'. This would also have been consistent with the Handbook.

The cluster Secretary signed the compliance certificate instead of the head of SIRA

The Act requires the head of the agency running the campaign to sign a compliance certificate. 

The Secretary of the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation, the cluster to which SIRA belongs, signed the campaign's compliance certificate. However, section 17(2) of the State Insurance and Care Governance Act 2015 states that SIRA is ‘for the purposes of any Act, a NSW Government agency.’ Given this, the Chief Executive of SIRA was responsible for signing the compliance certificate for this campaign.

This is a minor non-compliance with the Act because the Chief Executive had reviewed the campaign and recommended that the Secretary sign the compliance certificate.  

The NSW TAFE Commission (TAFE) ran the 'TAFE NSW 2018 Student Recruitment Annual Campaign Program' from November 2017 to September 2018. The aim of the campaign was to assist TAFE in achieving its 2018 student enrolment target by improving the perception of TAFE's brand and generating student enquiries. This is the first state-wide campaign run by TAFE operating under the One TAFE model. Previously, each TAFE Institute ran its own campaigns. The total budget of the campaign was $19.5 million. This audit examined only the semester one 2018 component of the campaign, which ran from November 2017 to April 2018 at a total cost of $9.5 million. See Appendix two for more details on this campaign.

The campaign materials we reviewed did not breach section 6 of the Act

Section 6 of the Act prohibits political advertising as part of a government advertising campaign. A government advertising campaign must not:

• be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party
• contain the name, voice or image of a minister, a member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament
• contain the name, logo, slogan or any other reference to a political party.

The audit team found no breaches of section 6 of the Act in the campaign material we reviewed.

The campaign achieved 16 of 24 objectives, but did not reach its enrolment target

The campaign had 24 objectives which had a target for semester one. TAFE set these targets using a combination of previous experience, corporate objectives and brand surveys.

The overall objective of the combined semester one and two campaigns was to support TAFE achieving its 2018 total enrolment target of 549,636. TAFE's semester one target was 361,350, which it did not achieve. This indicates that the campaign was not fully effective.

The campaign achieved 11 of its 16 output objectives. The output targets related to TAFE's media placements and ability to reach an audience efficiently. TAFE tracked progress against many of the campaign's output objectives daily. TAFE altered its media channels throughout the campaign meaning that some of the output objectives were not met because TAFE decided to focus on alternative media channels. The campaign also achieved all seven of its outcome objectives. The outcome objectives related to changing the public perception of TAFE.

TAFE's initial media plan allowed for efficient media placement

During the peer review process, DPC provides advice to agencies about the time they should allow to ensure cost-efficient media placement. For example, DPC advise that agencies book television advertising six to 12 weeks in advance and that agencies book radio advertising two to eight weeks in advance. 

While TAFE's initial media plan allowed sufficient time between the approval of the campaign and its launch, a delay in receiving final approval for the campaign meant TAFE could not purchase media placements until two months later than planned. Most purchases still remained within DPC's recommended timeframes, but Indigenous television advertisements and metropolitan out of home advertisements both fell outside DPC's recommended time periods by one week. These delays did not impact on TAFE's efficiency.

TAFE re-used many creative materials, achieving some cost-savings

Rather than commissioning new creative materials, TAFE re-used many creative materials from the previous campaign and supplemented these with a selection of new creative materials. TAFE advised that this led to a cost saving of approximately $130,000.
TAFE sought quotes from suppliers on the government's Advertising and Digital Communication Services prequalification scheme for two creative material contracts. These contracts covered updates to existing materials and a selection of new materials.

The campaign's cost-benefit analysis did not comply with three requirements of the Guidelines

The Act requires an agency to conduct a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) if the cost of an advertising campaign is likely to exceed $1.0 million. The Guidelines set out the requirements of this CBA. TAFE did not comply with three of these requirements, outlined in Exhibit 5.

In this circumstance, section 6.2 of the Guidelines required the CBA to identify the number of enrolments TAFE would expect if it did not advertise. TAFE advised us that it is not possible to say what this scenario would look like because there had always been some degree of advertising, however, this argument is not reflected in the CBA. 

TAFE used 2017 as the baseline in the CBA. In 2017, TAFE spent $13.2 million on advertising. As such, the CBA was only able to isolate the impact of the increased expenditure rather than the impact of the campaign's entire $19.5 million expenditure. TAFE advised that 2017 had the most reliable state-wide data and this contributed to the decision to use it as the baseline.

During the audit, TAFE sought advice from NSW Treasury regarding whether a 2017 baseline was appropriate and NSW Treasury advised that it was. Regardless, TAFE did not receive this advice prior to writing the CBA and did not put commentary around this in the CBA. This would also not be sufficient for fulfilling the requirements of the Guidelines.

The CBA did not comply with sections 6.3 and 6.4 of the Guidelines. The CBA briefly considered the impact of spending the campaign budget directly on new training courses, however there was no sustained analysis of this option. TAFE staff advised that there are no realistic alternatives to advertising for achieving the campaign's objectives. However we did not see analysis to support this conclusion in documents provided to us. 

The campaign CBA could have better demonstrated cost effectiveness if it considered alternative media mixes as outlined in NSW Treasury's 'Cost Benefit Analysis Framework for Government Advertising and Information Campaigns'. This would also have been consistent with the Handbook.

TAFE made one inaccurate claim in its advertising and overstated a second

The Guidelines set out rules regarding the content of a government advertising campaign. Exhibit 6 sets out one of the principles with which agencies must comply.

TAFE made one inaccurate claim in its advertising and overstated a second.

In some campaign creative material, TAFE claimed that 78 per cent of its own graduates are employed after training (Exhibit 15 in Appendix 2). According to the National Centre for Vocational Education Research, 78 per cent of New South Wales Vocational Education and Training (VET) graduates (i.e. from all training providers) are employed after training. The result for TAFE graduates is 70.4 per cent.

One of the campaign's television advertisements refers to TAFE as ‘Australia's most reputable education provider’. This statement referred to a survey of current TAFE students who were asked where they would consider studying in future: TAFE, University or a private college. The current TAFE students selected TAFE by a large margin. The limited scope of TAFE's student survey and its results do not support the claim that it is ‘Australia's most reputable education provider’.

DPC did not consistently communicate the transitional arrangements for the Brand Guidelines and as such much of TAFE's creative material did not comply at campaign launch

On 7 August 2017, the government released the NSW Government Brand Guidelines (Brand Guidelines), setting out how agencies use the NSW Government logo. The Brand Guidelines replaced the Branding Style Guide which had been in place since September 2015. Some agencies were exempt from using the Branding Style Guide and the introduction of the new Brand Guidelines required these agencies to apply for a new exemption.

TAFE had recently commenced the peer review process for this campaign when the Brand Guidelines were released. TAFE was exempt from the requirements of the Branding Style Guide and as such the material which TAFE was planning to re-use in the new campaign did not contain the NSW Government logo.

Communication about how long agencies had to make themselves compliant with the Brand Guidelines was unclear. On 11 August 2017, the Chair of the Cabinet Standing Committee on Communication and Government Advertising (the Committee) sent a letter to the Secretary of the Department of Industry informing him that the Department must update all its material to be compliant with the Brand Guidelines ‘as soon as practicable within an 18-month transition period’. The Department of Industry advised TAFE that new advertising would need to be immediately compliant, however it was not clear if this included materials which agencies were re-using from previous campaigns. DPC advised the audit team that it expected re-used materials to be compliant when agencies launched new campaigns. DPC provided this advice to some agencies but did not communicate it more broadly. We could not source evidence that DPC provided this advice to TAFE.

DPC ran workshops to explain the transitional arrangements in September 2017 for the changes in the Brand Guidelines, however these did not specifically address the transitional timeframes for new advertising campaigns.

The Department of Industry, on behalf of TAFE, applied to the Committee for approval to co-brand the TAFE logo with the NSW Government logo. This was approved in October 2017. The requirements for co-branding are in Exhibit 7.

Appendix one - Responses from agencies 

Appendix two - About the campaigns

Appendix three - About the audit

Appendix four - Performance auditing

Parliamentary reference - Report number #311 - released 18 December 2018

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released her report today on the results of the financial audits of NSW Government central agencies. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet, and Finance, Services and Innovation clusters. While clear audit opinions were issued on all agency financial statements, the report notes that some complex accounting requirements caused significant errors in agency financial statements submitted for audit, which were corrected before the financial statements were approved. 

This report analyses the results of our audits of the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Finance, Services and Innovation cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report provides parliament and other users of the NSW Government's central agencies and their cluster agencies financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

• financial reporting
• audit observations
• liquidity risk management
• government financial services.

The central agencies and their key responsibilities are set out below.

A full list of agencies that this report covers by relevant cluster is included in Appendix three.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Finance, Services and Innovation clusters for 2018.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:

• our financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Finance, Services and Innovation cluster for 2018
• the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office work program.

The Audit Office work program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each of the NSW Government clusters.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations specific to NSW Government agencies providing financial services.

Appendix one - List of 2018 recommendations

Appendix two - Status of 2017 recommendations

Appendix three - Cluster agencies

Appendix four - Timeliness of financial reporting and audit reporting

Appendix five - Management letter findings by risk rating

Appendix six – Financial data

The Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford released her report today on NSW Justice cluster agencies. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial audits of law and order and emergency services agencies. We are pleased to report that unqualified audit opinions were issued for all Justice agencies’ financial statements.

This report analyses the results of the financial statement audits of the Justice cluster for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report provides parliament and other users of the Justice cluster agencies' financial statements with the results of our audits, including our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

• financial reporting
• audit observations
• service delivery.

The Justice cluster delivers legal, law enforcement and emergency services across the state and plays the lead role in commemorating the legacy of servicemen and women. 

The commentary in this report covers the following cluster agencies.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making is enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely. 

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Justice cluster for 2018.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:

• our financial statement audits of agencies in the Justice cluster for 2018
• the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office annual work program.

The Audit Office annual work program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each of the NSW Government clusters.

Government outcomes can be achieved through effective delivery of the right mix of services, whether from the public, private or not for profit sectors. Service delivery reform will be most successful if there is clear accountability for service delivery outcomes, decisions are aligned to strategic direction and performance is monitored and evaluated.

The Justice cluster is an integrated cluster with key service delivery inter-dependencies. Achieving state priorities and ensuring communities are safe requires both upstream and downstream agencies to be appropriately resourced. This is a delicate balance. Increases in frontline policing can subsequently impact the court system as more offences are identified. More convictions can in turn increase prison overcrowding and limit the opportunities for inmate rehabilitation.

Failure to successfully rehabilitate prisoners and prevent reoffending could impact future police resourcing. 

This chapter outlines certain service delivery outcomes for 2017–18. The data on activity levels and performance is provided by Cluster agencies. The Audit Office does not have a specific mandate to audit performance information. Accordingly, the information in this chapter is unaudited. 

We report this information on service delivery to provide additional context to understand the operations of the Justice cluster and to collate and present service information on law and order and emergency services agencies in one report. 

In our recent performance audit, Progress and measurement of the Premier's Priorities, we identified 12 limitations of performance measurement and performance data. We recommended the Department of Premier and Cabinet ensure that processes to check and verify data are in place for all agency data sources.

Appendix one - List of 2018 recommendations

Appendix two - Status of 2017 recommendations

Appendix three - Cluster agencies

Appendix four - Financial data

The Auditor-General for New South Wales Margaret Crawford found that as NSW state government agencies’ digital footprint increases they need to do more to address new and emerging information technology (IT) risks. This is one of the key findings to emerge from the second stand-alone report on internal controls and governance of the 40 largest NSW state government agencies.

This report analyses the internal controls and governance of the 40 largest agencies in the NSW public sector for the year ended 30 June 2018.

This report covers the findings and recommendations from our 2017–18 financial audits that relate to internal controls and governance at the 40 largest agencies (refer to Appendix three) in the NSW public sector.

This report offers insights into internal controls and governance in the NSW public sector

This is our second report dedicated to internal controls and governance at NSW State Government agencies. The report provides insights into the effectiveness of controls and governance processes in the NSW public sector by:

• highlighting the potential risks posed by weaknesses in controls and governance processes
• helping agencies benchmark the adequacy of their processes against their peers
• focusing on new and emerging risks, and the internal controls and governance processes that might address those risks.

Without strong governance systems and internal controls, agencies increase the risks associated with effectively managing their finances and delivering services to citizens. The way agencies deliver services increasingly relies on contracts and partnerships with the private sector. Many of these arrangements deliver front line services, but others provide less visible back office support. For example, an agency may rely on an IT service provider to manage a key system used to provide services to the community. The contract and service level agreements are only truly effective where they are actively managed to reduce risks to continuous quality service delivery, such as interruptions caused by system outages, cyber security attacks and data security breaches.

Our audits do not review all aspects of internal controls and governance every year. We select a range of measures, and report on those that present heightened risks for agencies to mitigate. This report divides these into the following five areas:

1. Internal control trends
2. Information technology (IT), including IT vendor management
3. Transparency and performance reporting
4. Management of purchasing cards and taxis
5. Fraud and corruption control.

The findings in this report should not be used to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of individual agency control environments and governance arrangements. Specific financial reporting, controls and service delivery comments are included in the individual 2018 cluster financial audit reports, which will be tabled in Parliament from November to December 2018.

The focus of the report has changed since last year

Last year's report topics included asset management, ethics and conduct, and risk management. We are reporting on new topics this year. We plan to introduce new topics and re-visit our previous topics in subsequent reports on a cyclical basis. This will provide a baseline against which to measure the NSW public sectors’ progress in implementing appropriate internal controls and governance processes to mitigate existing, new and emerging risks in the public sector.

Agencies selected for the volume account for 95 per cent of the state's expenditure

While we have covered only 40 agencies in this report, those selected are a large enough group to identify common issues and insights. They represent about 95 per cent of total expenditure for all NSW public sector agencies.

Internal controls are processes, policies and procedures that help agencies to:

• operate effectively and efficiently
• produce reliable financial reports
• comply with laws and regulations
• support ethical government.

This chapter outlines the overall trends for agency controls and governance issues, including the number of findings, level of risk and the most common deficiencies we found across agencies. The rest of this volume presents this year’s controls and governance findings in more detail.

Government agencies’ financial reporting is now heavily reliant on information technology (IT). IT is also increasingly important to the delivery of agency services. These systems often provide the data to help monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of agency processes and services they deliver. Our audits reviewed whether agencies have effective controls in place to manage both key financial systems and IT service contracts.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations from our review of how agencies reported their performance in their 2016–17 annual reports. The Annual Reports (Statutory Bodies) Regulation 2015 and Annual Reports (Departments) Regulation 2015 (annual reports regulation) currently prescribes the minimum requirements for agency annual reports.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency preventative and detective controls over purchasing card and taxi use for 2017–18.

Fraud and corruption control is one of the 17 key elements of our governance lighthouse. Recent reports from ICAC into state agencies and local government councils highlight the need for effective fraud control and ethical frameworks. Effective frameworks can help protect an agency from events that risk serious reputational damage and financial loss.

Our 2016 Fraud Survey found the NSW Government agencies we surveyed reported 1,077 frauds over the three year period to 30 June 2015. For those frauds where an estimate of losses was made, the reported value exceeded $10.0 million. The report also highlighted that the full extent of fraud in the NSW public sector could be higher than reported because:

• unreported frauds in organisations can be almost three times the number of reported frauds
• our 2015 survey did not include all NSW public sector agencies, nor did it include any NSW universities or local councils
• fraud committed by citizens such as fare evasion and fraudulent state tax self-assessments was not within the scope of our 2015 survey
• agencies did not estimate a value for 599 of the 1,077 (56 per cent) reported frauds.

Commissioning and outsourcing of services to the private sector and the advancement of digital technology are changing the fraud and corruption risks agencies face. Fraud risk assessments should be updated regularly and in particular where there are changes in agency business models. NSW Treasury Circular TC18-02 NSW Fraud and Corruption Control Policy now requires agencies develop, implement and maintain a fraud and corruption control framework, effective from 1 July 2018. 

Our Fraud Control Improvement Kit provides guidance and practical advice to help organisations implement an effective fraud control framework. The kit is divided into ten attributes. Three key attributes have been assessed below; prevention, detection and notification systems.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency fraud and corruption controls for 2017–18.

Appendix one - List of 2018 recommendations

Appendix two - Status of 2017 recommendations

Appendix three - Cluster agencies

Pursuant to the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983, I present my Report on State Finances 2018.

I am pleased to once again report that I issued a clear audit opinion on the State’s consolidated financial statements. This demonstrates the Government’s focus on preparing high quality information on the State’s financial position and performance for use by stakeholders.

However, there are two key areas I would like to see addressed to further support the preparation of the State’s financial statements.
Firstly, some complex accounting matters are not being resolved until late in the financial reporting cycle. This has contributed to an increase in the number of errors in the financial statements key agencies are submitting for audit, particularly around assessing the value of physical assets. Better planning and earlier resolution of these matters would lead to more efficient processes.

Secondly, the State needs to implement five new accounting standards over the next two years. Agencies will need to devote significant resources and effort to collect the necessary information and assess the impact at the whole of government level. I will work with Treasury and relevant agencies to help them improve quality assurance controls over their financial reporting.

Throughout 2017-18 my office worked with Treasury on reforms to improve financial governance, budgeting and reporting arrangements across the sector.

The Government Sector Finance Bill 2018 passed both houses of Parliament in June 2018. However, the Legislative Council returned other proposed changes to the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 to the Legislative Assembly for further consideration. Most of these changes relate to the Public Accounts Committee. At the time of writing, the cognate Bill had not been debated.

The budget result was a $4.2 billion surplus. The consolidated financial statements at 30 June 2018 do not reflect the sale of 51 per cent of the State’s investment in Sydney Motorway Corporation for which it received $9.3 billion. The sale was announced on 31 August 2018.

Finally, I would like to thank the staff of Treasury for the way they approached the audit. Our partnership is critical to ensuring the quality of financial management and reporting.

Margaret Crawford
Auditor-General
19 October 2018

The State's financial statements given a clear audit opinion

Timely and accurate financial reporting enables informed decision making, effective management of public funds and enhances public accountability.

Since the introduction of mandatory ‘early close procedures’ in 2011-12, the number of significant errors in financial statements of agencies had fallen largely due to identifying and resolving complex accounting issues early.

In 2016-17, Treasury narrowed the scope of mandatory procedures to focus on physical asset valuations and pro-forma financial statements. Despite being broadened for 2017-18, we have observed an increase in the number of errors in agency financial statements.

In 2017-18, twenty-three errors exceeding $20 million were found in agencies’ financial statements that make up the State’s consolidated financial statements. This compares to only five in 2015-16.

The errors identified this year were the result of:

• incorrectly applying Australian Accounting Standards
• deficiencies in assessing the value of physical assets
• using inappropriate and inaccurate assumptions when measuring liabilities
• inaccurately reflecting inter-agency payables and receivables.

Quality financial reporting would be enhanced by responding to key accounting issues as soon as they are identified, and preparing accounting position papers for consideration by Treasury, agency Audit and Risk Committees and the Audit Office.

Key accounting matters addressed by the State in 2017-18.

Restatement of some of the State’s previously reported asset and liability values.

The state corrected the previously reported values of some long-term liabilities ($2 billion).

Accounting standards require the State to measure its long-term liabilities at the best estimate of the expenditures required to settle the obligations. The affected liabilities include claims liabilities of the Lifetime Care and Support Authority of NSW and the NSW Self Insurance Corporation, and scheme liabilities of the Long Service Corporation. The liabilities are adjusted by what is referred to as the ‘discount rate’ to reflect the decreasing value of money over time.

In the past, agencies used a variety of rates to discount these liabilities. Some liabilities were discounted using the estimated long-term fair value of 10-year TCorp bond yields while others were discounted using the expected
return on investments. These discount rates did not comply with the requirements of Australian Accounting Standards and underestimated liabilities by $2.0 billion.

In 2017-18, the State assessed the discount rates previously used in the Sector. It determined the market yield on Commonwealth Bonds best met the Accounting Standard requirements and used this rate to discount similar liabilities in relevant agencies. This resulted in a $2.0 billion increase in the previously reported values of these liabilities and a similar decrease in retained earnings at 1 July 2016.

Risks to the quality and timeliness of financial reporting.

Challenges associated with valuing the State's physical assets.

When we audit financial statements we focus on areas we consider higher risk. These areas often require the use of estimates and judgements.

The valuation of the State’s physical assets is one such area. Fair value estimates are inherently complex and sensitive to assumptions and judgements. In the public sector, this may be exacerbated by the unique nature of its assets, such as land under roads, preserved plant specimens, cultural collections and other heritage assets.

In 2017-18, valuations of physical assets added $24.5 billion to the value of the State’s balance sheet. These assets are now valued at $339.2 billion. Our audits of these valuations identified:

Some important matters agencies should consider when planning/conducting asset valuations include:

STARTING OUT

• Planning is important
• Most effective revaluations include early engagement with all stakeholders, including auditors.
• Determine who needs to be involved and advised of progress with the revaluation – e.g. finance, internal audit, audit and risk committee.
• Ensure asset registers are complete and there is evidence to demonstrate the agency controls the assets.
• The effective date of the valuation can be any date after the financial year commences, but well before year end.

MANAGEMENT'S ROLE

• For large mass valuations consider using a suitable project management methodology to ensure the process remains ‘on track’ with sufficient oversight.
• Consider engaging an expert to perform the valuation, but maintain responsibility for the outcomes. Ensure the outcomes are reasonable and quality review the results, including the appropriateness of inputs and key assumptions.
• Compare pre and post valuation results on an individual asset basis. Where changes are significant and/or unexpected, document explanations from the valuer.
• Start revaluations early so they are completed by early close (around March). The timetable must allow time for a quality review of results and for the results to be recorded in the financial records.
• Revaluation workpapers must include the revaluation source data provided to the valuer and a reconciliation of the source data to the general ledger.

USING EXPERTS

• The terms of engagement should be documented in an engagement letter, which clearly details the proposed valuation methodology. It’s important the valuer knows what is required from a policy perspective and clearly understands the accounting framework used to prepare the financial statements.
• Valuation reports should detail the key assumptions used, explain why the valuation approach was adopted and how the use of relevant observable input was maximised.
• Valuation reports should clearly differentiate between assets revalued using a cost approach and those using an income or market approach. They should explain why the approach used was the most relevant for the asset type.
• Consider using representative/statistical sampling for mass valuations and determine the extent of physical inspections that may be required.
• If a sampling technique is used, it should provide sufficient confidence that the sample is representative of the population.
• Significant judgements should be supported by relevant benchmark data or other analysis and observations. A common example in the public sector is to discount asset values to reflect restrictions on use.
• Ensure the valuer has considered the age and condition of the assets, and heritage/cultural aspects and/or other special factors.

WHAT ABOUT INTERVENING YEARS?

• Perform revaluations with sufficient regularity to ensure asset carrying values in the financial statements reflect fair value.
• Indexation alone is not normally a substitute for a full revaluation. A full revaluation may be needed to accurately establish fair values if asset values move significantly when indices are applied to them.
• Where indexation is used between full revaluations, the indices should be appropriate for the type of asset being assessed.
• Indexing can be unreliable in assessing whether the fair value of assets has moved over time. For example, some assets are valued based on re- collection cost estimates, which may fall over time due to improved re-collection methods and technology.

COMMUNICATION

• For mass or complex valuations, key stakeholders, including auditors, should be involved at the scoping stage and invited to planning meetings with valuers.
• Management should meet with the auditors regularly to discuss progress and outcomes.
• When issues are identified, management should consult with and seek advice from Treasury.

The state will need to implement five new accounting standards over the next two years.

The State has started developing processes it considers necessary to effectively implement the requirements of five new accounting standards. The changes are significant and will impact the financial position and results of agencies and the State.

The new requirements increase the risk of errors in the financial statements. To minimise this risk, agencies will need to devote resources and effort to collect the necessary information and assess the impact of the accounting changes at the whole of government level.

Treasury is liaising with and obtaining information from agencies to assess the impact of the new standards at the whole of government level. Treasury is also liaising with other Treasuries throughout Australia on common implementation issues. To help agencies implement the new standards, Treasury is developing guidance, preparing position papers on proposed accounting treatments, and mandating options within the new standards that agencies need to adopt on transition.

A $4.2 billion surplus, $1.5 billion more than was budgeted

The Total State Sector comprises 304 entities controlled by NSW Government

The General Government Sector, which comprises 212 entities, generally provides goods and services funded centrally by the State.

The non-General Government Sector, which comprises 92 Government businesses, generally provides goods and services, such as water, electricity and financial services that consumers pay for directly.

A principal measure of a Government’s overall performance is its Net Operating Balance (Budget Result). This is the difference between the cost of General Government service delivery and the revenue earned to fund these sectors.

WHAT CHANGED FROM 2017 TO 2018?

Changes in revenues compared to 2016-17

Dividends and distributions			Due to:  Increases in dividends from Sydney Water ($255 million), Water NSW ($60 million) and the Port Authority of NSW ($195 million). An increase in the dividend from Landcom ($200 million) as profits retained in prior years to fund certain projects were not spent. Returns from investments in managed funds increased by $649 million as the State increased the value of its investment using proceeds from the lease of Ausgrid and Endeavour Energy assets
2016-2017	Change	2017-2018
2.4b	+1.3b	3.7b

Taxation			Due to:  Increases in land tax ($564 million) driven by land valuations used to calculate land tax assessments. Increases in payroll tax ($553 million) and other taxes ($419 million). Stamp duty receipts were $1.0 billion lower largely due to additional duty in the prior year of $718 million relating to the lease of Ausgrid and Endeavour Energy assets.
2016-2017	Change	2017-2018
30.8b	+537m	31.3b

Grants & Subsidies			Due to: Increase in the receipt of general purpose grants relating to GST collected by the Australian Government ($753 million). Decreases in national partnerships and specific purpose payments received from the Australian Government ($305 million), mainly due to the timing of major road projects. An increase in Commonwealth Health Reform funding ($338 million). An increase in grants associated with the National Education Reform Agreement for Education ($233 million).
2016-2017	Change	2017-2018
31.4b	+509m	31.9b

Sale of Goods and services			Includes:  Increases in education revenue ($133 million). Higher fees for services in transport to produce property plant and equipment ($89 million).
2016-2017	Change	2017-2018
8.2b	+349m	8.5b

Changes to expenses compared to 2016-17

Recurrent Grants & Subsidies			Due to:  A $613 million increase in grants for the delivery of aging, disability (including NDIS), homecare, community and public housing services. Increase in grants paid to local government sector ($342 million).
2016-2017	Change	2017-2018
12.6b	+1.3b	13.9b

Employee costs			Due to:  Wage inflation increases ($701 million). Increased workers' compensation and long service leave costs ($337 million).
2016-2017	Change	2017-2018
34.9b	+1.2b	36.1b

Other operating expenses			Includes:  Increased expenditure by Transport for NSW ($283 million) for major rail projects and the new rail timetable. Increased expenditure by the Department of Education ($165 million) to address the maintenance backlog, and higher school operating expenses.
2016-2017	Change	2017-2018
18.3b	+1.4b	19.7b
6.8b	+103m	6.9b	Other expenses

The State maintained its AAA credit rating.

The object of the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012 is to maintain the State’s AAA credit rating.

The Government manages NSW’s finances in alignment with the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012 (the Act).

The Act establishes the framework for fiscal responsibility and the strategy to protect the State’s AAA credit rating and service delivery
to the people of NSW.

The legislation sets out targets and principles for financial management to achieve this.

New South Wales has credit ratings of AAA/ Stable from Standard & Poor’s and Aaa/ Stable from Moody’s Investors Service.

THE FISCAL TARGETS FOR ACHIEVING THIS OBJECTIVE ARE:

General Government annual expenditure growth is lower than long term average revenue growth.

General Government expenditure grew by 5.4 per cent in 2017-18. This was lower than the long-term revenue growth rate of 5.6 per cent.

Eliminating unfunded superannuation liabilities by 2030.

The Act sets a target to eliminate unfunded superannuation liabilities by 2030.

The State’s funding plan is to contribute amounts escalated by five per cent each year so the schemes will be fully funded by 2030. In 2017-18, the State made employer contributions of $1.7 billion, which is largely consistent with contributions over the past five years. Treasury expects superannuation liabilities will be fully funded by 2030 based on the funding program at the last triennial review (December 2015).

For fiscal responsibility purposes, the State uses AASB 1056: Superannuation Entities. This standard discounts superannuation liabilities using the expected return on assets backing the liability.

Using this method, the State’s unfunded superannuation liability was $14.0 billion at 30 June 2018 ($15.0 billion at 30 June 2017). The unfunded liability is $3.4 billion less than it was when the Act was introduced.

Revenues increased by $3.2 billion to $86.7 billion in 2017-18.

Revenues were underpinned by growth in taxation and Australian Government grant revenues, but stamp duties fell.

Tax revenue for the Total State Sector increased by $746 million, or 2.5 per cent compared to 2016-17, primarily due to a:

• $582 million increase in land tax from growth in land values
• $562 million increase in payroll tax from NSW employment and wages growth
• $1 billion decrease in stamp duty due to lower than expected growth in property market transactions, volumes and prices. In 2016-17, stamp duty included $718 million from the leases of Ausgrid and Endeavour Energy assets.

The State expects total stamp duties will fall to $9.5 billion in 2018-19, a decrease of almost $2.0 billion from 2016-17.

The State received Australian Government grants and subsidies of $30.9 billion in 2017-18.
The State received $444 million more in grants and subsidies from the Australian Government than it did in 2016-17. This was due to increases in GST revenues ($753 million) and special purpose payments ($683 million).
There was a decrease in National Partnership payments ($992 million), mainly due to the timing of major road projects including the Pacific Highway (Woolgoolga to Ballina), WestConnex and Western Sydney Infrastructure Program.

In 2017-18, sales of goods and services were $1.1 billion higher than in 2016-17. This reflected increased transaction revenue at Sydney Water ($139 million), the Department of Education ($133 million), WestConnex ($145 million), Department of Finance, Services and Innovation ($111 million) and Sydney Trains ($83 million).

Other dividends and distributions were $803 million higher than in 2016-17 mainly reflecting higher investment returns on TCorp investments.

Key revenues include:

	2016-2017	Change%	2017-2018
	35.4b	+2.8	36.3b	Taxation, Fees, Fines, and other
	31.4b	+1.6	31.9b	Grants & Subsidies
	14.1b	+8.1	15.2b	Sale of Goods and Services

Expenses increased $4.9 billion to $84.2 billion in 2017-18

Overall expenses increased 6.1 per cent compared to 2016-17. Most of the increase was due to higher employee and operating costs.

Salaries and wages increased by 3.6 per cent compared to 2016-17.

Salaries and wages increased to $31.1 billion from $30 billion. This was due to inflation linked salary and wage increases and a reported increase in front line staff.

The Government wages policy aims to limit growth in employee remuneration and other employee related costs to no more than 2.5 per cent per annum.

Operating expenses increased by 7.8 per cent from 2016-17.

Within operating expenses, payments for supplies, services and other expenses increased, in part, due to:

• increased costs of major rail projects, WestConnex, B-Line bus program and a new rail timetable
• addressing the maintenance backlog and higher school operating expenses of the Department of Education.

Key expenses include:

	2016-2017	Change%	2017-2018
	32.8b	+3.8	34.1b	Employee Expenses
	21.6b	+7.8	23.3b	Operating Costs
	9.7b	+12.7	10.9b	Grants & Subsidies
	7.2b	+6.6	7.6b	Depreciation
	4.6b	+2.8	4.7b	Superannuation Expense

Health costs remain the highest expense of the State.

The Australian Bureau of Statistics introduced a revised Classification of the Function of Government Australia Framework (COFOG-A) effective 1 July 2017. This resulted in some re-classification of expenditure between purposes and now shows State expenses are highest in:

• Health (25.5 per cent)
• General Public Services (25.0 per cent)
• Education (19.6 per cent).

General Public Services includes the executive and legislative branches, financial affairs, public debt transactions and general public service transactions.

The graph highlights the annual expenditure by function and the value of assets to deliver those services.

Assets grew by $35.6 billion to $443 billion in 2017-18

Valuing the State’s physical assets.

The State had physical assets with a fair value of $339 billion at 30 June 2018. This includes land and buildings ($161.6b) and Infrastructure ($160.2b).

Our audits assess the reasonableness and appropriateness of assumptions used to value physical assets. This includes obtaining an understanding of the valuation methodologies used and judgements made. We also review the completeness of asset registers and the mathematical accuracy of valuation models.

Net movements between years include additions, disposals, depreciation and valuations. This year, revaluations of physical assets added $24.5 billion to the value of the State’s assets. This was mainly attributable to the following agencies:

• Department of Education - $8.5 billion
• Roads and Maritime Services - $7.4 billion.

The State’s financial assets increased by $308 million in 2017-18 ($27.5 billion in 2016-17).

In 2016-17, the significant increase in financial assets was primarily from the sale or lease of the following government assets and businesses:

• In June 2017, the Government leased 50.4 per cent of Endeavour Energy assets, which followed the long-term lease 50.4 per cent of Ausgrid’s assets in December 2016. The Government received proceeds of $24.0 billion from these transactions.
• A 35-year concession for providing titling and registry services, effective 30 June 2017, was granted to a private sector operator. The Government received $2.6 billion cash for the concession.

The Government implemented reforms relating to the use the State’s financial assets.

In 2017-18, the Asset and Liability Committee, which advises the Government on balance sheet management, recommended the following policy actions and frameworks to help manage the State’s financial risks and opportunities:

• expanding the scope of cash management reforms to give the State a whole-of-government view on the use of surplus funds. Treasury advises these reforms have centralised funds management of approximately $3.0 billion
• endorsing a new whole-of-government Foreign Exchange (FX) Risk Policy (effective 1 July 2018) to effectively manage the State’s FX risk
• expanding management of the State’s debt portfolio to minimise interest rate risks, reduce interest costs where possible, and extend the average weighted life of the General Government’s debt portfolio towards eight years
• endorsing establishment of a ‘sustainability bond’ program to further diversify and expand the State’s bond investor base and raise awareness of the Government’s social and environmental initiatives.

The State has established the NSW Generations Fund to maintain debt at sustainable levels.

The State established the NSW Generations Funds (NGF) in June 2018 to support debt retirement and to fund community-focused initiatives. The Government has indicated it will initially capitalise the NGF with $3.0 billion from its reserves.

The NSW Generations Funds Act 2018 requires an audit of each NSW Generations Fund by the Auditor- General (including a report by the Auditor-General on whether payments from the Funds have been made in accordance with the Act). The first audit of the fund will be for the period up to 30 June 2019.
 

Key assets include: 

	2016-2017	Change%	2017-2018
Physical Assets
	147.0b	+9.0	160.2b	Infrastructure
	143.4b	+12.7	161.6b	Land and Buildings
Financial Assets
	27.7b	- 4.6	26.4b	Equity investments
	20.6b	- 5.2	19.5b	Cash and Recievables
	40.5b	+6.5	41.3b	Investments and Placements

Liabilities increased $5.1 billion to $189 billion in 2017-18

Valuing the State’s liabilities relies on actuarial assessments.

Nearly half of the State’s liabilities relate to its employees. They include unfunded superannuation, and employee benefits, such as long service and recreation leave.

Valuing these obligations involves complex estimation techniques and significant judgements. Small changes in assumptions can materially impact the values and the financial statements.

The State’s superannuation obligations fell $2.2 billion in 2017-18.

The State’s $56.4 billion unfunded superannuation liability represents obligations to past and present employees less the value of assets set aside to meet those obligations. The unfunded superannuation liability fell from $58.6 billion to $56.4 billion in 2017-18.

The State’s borrowings at 30 June 2018 were $700 million higher than they were at 30 June 2017.

The State’s borrowings totalled $71.3 billion at 30 June 2018.

TCorp issues bonds to raise funds for NSW Government agencies. These are actively traded in financial markets, which provides price transparency and liquidity to public sector borrowers and institutional investors. All TCorp bonds are guaranteed by the NSW Government.

The Government manages its debt liabilities through its balance sheet management strategy. The strategy extends to TCorp, which applies an active risk management strategy to the Government’s debt portfolio.

General Government Sector debt has been restructured by replacing shorter-term debt with longer-term debt. This lengthens the portfolio to match liabilities with the funding requirements for infrastructure assets.

Key liabilities include: 

	2016-2017	Change%	2017-2018
	58.6b	- 3.7	56.4b	Unfunded Superannuation
	18.3b	+4.7	19.1b	Other Employee Benefits
	70.6b	+1.0	71.3b	Borrowings

Appendix one - Prescribed entities

Appendix two - Legal opinions

The Premier’s Implementation Unit uses a systematic approach to measuring and reporting progress towards the Premier’s Priorities performance targets, but public reporting needed to improve, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General of NSW, Margaret Crawford.

The Premier of New South Wales has established 12 Premier’s Priorities. These are key performance targets for government.

Source: Department of Premier and Cabinet, Premier’s Priorities website.

Each Premier’s Priority has a lead agency and minister responsible for achieving the performance target.

The Premier’s Implementation Unit (PIU) was established within the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) in 2015. The PIU is a delivery unit that supports agencies to measure and monitor performance, make progress toward the Premier’s Priorities targets, and report progress to the Premier, key ministers and the public.

This audit assessed how effectively the NSW Government is progressing and reporting on the Premier's Priorities.

The Premier’s Implementation Unit (PIU) is effective in assisting agencies to make progress against the Premier’s Priorities targets. Progress reporting is regular but transparency to the public is weakened by the lack of information about specific measurement limitations and lack of clarity about the relationship of the targets to broader government objectives.The PIU promotes a systematic approach to measuring performance and reporting progress towards the Premier’s Priorities’ performance targets. Public reporting would be improved with additional information about the rationale for choosing specific targets to report on broader government objectives.

The PIU provides a systematic approach to measuring performance and reporting progress towards the Premier's Priorities performance targets. Public reporting would be improved with additional information about the rationale for choosing specific targets to report on broader government objectives. The data used to measure the Premier’s Priorities comes from a variety of government and external datasets, some of which have known limitations. These limitations are not revealed in public reporting, and only some are revealed in progress reported to the Premier and ministers. This limits the transparency of reporting.

The PIU assists agencies to avoid unintended outcomes that can arise from prioritising particular performance measures over other areas of activity. The PIU has adopted a collaborative approach to assisting agencies to analyse performance using data, and helping them work across organisational silos to achieve the Premier’s Priorities targets.

Data used to measure progress for some of the Premier’s Priorities has limitations which are not made clear when progress is reported. This reduces transparency about the reported progress. Public reporting would also be improved with additional information about the relationship between specific performance measures and broader government objectives.

The PIU is responsible for reporting progress to the Premier, key ministers and the public. Agencies provide performance data and some play a role in preparing progress reports for the Premier and ministers. For 11 of the Premier's Priorities, progress is reported against measurable and time-related performance targets. For the infrastructure priority, progress is reported against project milestones.

Progress of some Priorities is measured using data that has known limitations, which should be noted wherever progress is reported. For example, the data used to report on housing completions does not take housing demolitions into account, and is therefore overstating the contribution of this performance measure to housing supply. This known limitation is not explained in progress reports or on the public website.

Data used to measure progress is sourced from a mix of government and external datasets. Updated progress data for most Premier’s Priorities is published on the Premier’s Priorities website annually, although reported to the Premier and key ministers more frequently. The PIU reviews the data and validates it through fieldwork with front line agencies. The PIU also assists agencies to avoid unintended outcomes that can arise from prioritising single performance measures. Most, but not all, agencies use additional indicators to check for misuse of data or perverse outcomes.

We examined the reporting processes and controls for five of the Premier’s Priorities. We found that there is insufficient assurance over the accuracy of the data on housing approvals.

The relationships between performance measures and broader government objectives is not always clearly explained on the Premier’s Priority website, which is the key source of public information about the Premier’s Priorities. For example, the Premier’s Priority to reduce litter volumes is communicated as “Keeping our Environment Clean.” While the website explains why reducing litter is important, it does not clearly explain why that particular target has been chosen to measure progress in keeping the environment clean.

By December 2018, the Department of Premier and Cabinet should:

1. improve transparency of public reporting by:
   • providing information about limitations of reported data and associated performance
   • clarifying the relationship between the Premier’s Priorities performance targets and broader government objectives.
2. ensure that processes to check and verify data are in place for all agency data sources
3. encourage agencies to develop and implement additional supporting indicators for all Premier’s Priority performance measures to prevent and detect unintended consequences or misuse of data.

The Premier's Implementation Unit is effective in supporting agencies to deliver progress towards the Premier’s Priority targets.

The PIU promotes a systematic approach to monitoring and reporting progress against a target, based on a methodology used in delivery units elsewhere in the world. The PIU undertakes internal self-evaluation, and commissions regular reviews of methodology implementation from the consultancy that owns the methodology and helped to establish the PIU. However, the unit lacks periodic independent reviews of their overall effectiveness. The PIU has adopted a collaborative approach and assists agencies to analyse performance using data, and work across organisational silos to achieve the Premier’s Priorities targets.

Agency representatives recognise the benefits of being responsible for a Premier's Priority and speak of the value of being held to account and having the attention of the Premier and senior ministers.

By June 2019, the Department of Premier and Cabinet should:

1. establish routine collection of feedback about PIU performance including:
   • independent assurance of PIU performance
   • opportunity for agencies to provide confidential feedback.

Appendix one: Response from agency

Appendix two: Data sources

Appendix three: About the audit

Appendix four: Performance auditing

Parliamentary reference - Report number #307 - released 13 September 2018

The Ministry of Health, NSW Fair Trading, NSW Police Force, and NSW Treasury Corporation are taking steps to strengthen their risk culture, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford. 'Senior management communicates the importance of managing risk to their staff, and there are many examples of risk management being integrated into daily activities', the Auditor-General said.

We did find that three of the agencies we examined could strengthen their culture so that all employees feel comfortable speaking openly about risks. To support innovation, senior management could also do better at communicating to their staff the levels of risk they are willing to accept.

Effective risk management is essential to good governance, and supports staff at all levels to make informed judgements and decisions. At a time when government is encouraging innovation and exploring new service delivery models, effective risk management is about seizing opportunities as well as managing threats.

Over the past decade, governments and regulators around the world have increasingly turned their attention to risk culture. It is now widely accepted that organisational culture is a key element of risk management because it influences how people recognise and engage with risk. Neglecting this ‘soft’ side of risk management can prevent institutions from managing risks that threaten their success and lead to missed opportunities for change, improvement or innovation.

This audit assessed how effectively NSW Government agencies are building risk management capabilities and embedding a sound risk culture throughout their organisations. To do this we examined whether:

• agencies can demonstrate that senior management is committed to risk management
• information about risk is communicated effectively throughout agencies
• agencies are building risk management capabilities.

The audit examined four agencies: the Ministry of Health, the NSW Fair Trading function within the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation, NSW Police Force and NSW Treasury Corporation (TCorp). NSW Treasury was also included as the agency responsible for the NSW Government's risk management framework.

Appendix one - Response from agencies

Appendix two - Survey results

Appendix three - About the audit

Appendix four - Performance auditing

Parliamentary reference - Report number #298 - released 23 April 2018

Agencies need to do more to address risks posed by information technology (IT).

Effective internal controls and governance systems help agencies to operate efficiently and effectively and comply with relevant laws, standards and policies. We assessed how well agencies are implementing these systems, and highlighted opportunities for improvement.
 

1. Overall trends

2. Information Technology

3. Asset Management

4. Governance

5. Ethics and Conduct

6. Risk Management 

This report covers the findings and recommendations from our 2016–17 financial audits related to the internal controls and governance of the 39 largest agencies (refer to Appendix three) in the NSW public sector. These agencies represent about 95 per cent of total expenditure for all NSW agencies and were considered to be a large enough group to identify common issues and insights.

The findings in this report should not be used to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of individual agency control environments and governance arrangements. Specific financial reporting, controls and service delivery comments are included in the individual 2017 cluster financial audit reports tabled in Parliament from October to December 2017.

This new report offers strategic insight on the public sector as a whole

In previous years, we have commented on internal control and governance issues in the volumes we published on each ‘cluster’ or agency sector, generally between October and December. To add further value, we then commented more broadly about the issues identified for the public sector as a whole at the start of the following year.

This year, we have created this report dedicated to internal controls and governance. This will help Parliament to understand broad issues affecting the public sector, and help agencies to compare their own performance against that of their peers.

Without strong control measures and governance systems, agencies face increased risks in their financial management and service delivery. If they do not, for example, properly authorise payments or manage conflicts of interest, they are at greater risk of fraud. If they do not have strong information technology (IT) systems, sensitive and trusted information may be at risk of unauthorised access and misuse.

These problems can in turn reduce the efficiency of agency operations, increase their costs and reduce the quality of the services they deliver.

Our audits do not review every control or governance measure every year. We select a range of measures, and report on those that present the most significant risks that agencies should mitigate. This report divides these into the following six areas:

1. Overall trends
2. Information technology
3. Asset management
4. Governance
5. Ethics and conduct
6. Risk management.

Internal controls are processes, policies and procedures that help agencies to:

• operate effectively and efficiently
• produce reliable financial reports
• comply with laws and regulations.

This chapter outlines the overall trends for agency controls and governance issues, including the number of findings, level of risk and the most common deficiencies we found across agencies. The rest of this volume then illustrates this year’s controls and governance findings in more detail.

Information technology (IT) has become increasingly important for government agencies’ financial reporting and to deliver their services efficiently and effectively. Our audits reviewed whether agencies have effective controls in place over their IT systems. We found that IT security remains the source of many control weakness in agencies.

Agency service delivery relies on developing and renewing infrastructure assets such as schools, hospitals, roads, or public housing. Agencies are currently investing significantly in new assets. Agencies need to manage the scale and volume of current capital projects in order to deliver new infrastructure on time, on budget and realise the intended benefits. We found agencies can improve how they:

• manage their major capital projects
• dispose of existing assets.

Governance refers to the high-level frameworks, processes and behaviours that help an organisation to achieve its objectives, comply with legal and other requirements, and meet a high standard of probity, accountability and transparency.

This chapter sets out the governance lighthouse model the Audit Office developed to help agencies reach best practice. It then focuses on two key areas: continuous disclosure and shared services arrangements. The following two chapters look at findings related to ethics and risk management.

All government sector employees must demonstrate the highest levels of ethical conduct, in line with standards set by The Code of Ethics and Conduct for NSW government sector employees.

This chapter looks at how well agencies are managing these requirements, and where they can improve their policies and processes.

We found that agencies mostly have the appropriate codes, frameworks and policies in place. But we have highlighted opportunities to improve the way they manage those systems to reduce the risks of unethical conduct.

Risk management is an integral part of effective corporate governance. It helps agencies to identify, assess and prioritise the risks they face and in turn minimise, monitor and control the impact of unforeseen events. It also means agencies can respond to opportunities that may emerge and improve their services and activities.

This year we looked at the overall maturity of the risk management frameworks that agencies use, along with two important risk management elements: risk culture and risk registers.

Effective risk management can improve agency decision-making, protect reputations and lead to significant efficiencies and cost savings. By embedding risk management directly into their operations, agencies can also derive extra value for their activities and services.

The following report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent audits of law and order and emergency services agencies in the Justice cluster.

No qualified audit opinions were issued on Justice agencies' financial statements. However, agencies that used the Department of Justice as their service provider experienced difficulties finalising their accounts. This was due to issues with the department’s implementation of a new financial accounting and reporting system and the continued establishment of its Business Support Centre. The Department is working to remediate the new finance system.

 2. Service Delivery

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence in public sector decision making and transparency is enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely. Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines audit observations, conclusions and recommendations for financial reporting and controls of Justice cluster agencies.

Achievement of government outcomes can be improved through effective delivery of the right mix of services, whether from the public, private or not for profit sectors. Service delivery reform will be most successful if there is clear accountability for service delivery outcomes, decisions are aligned to strategic direction and performance is monitored and evaluated.

The Justice cluster is an integrated cluster with key service delivery inter-dependencies. Achieving State priorities and ensuring communities are safe requires both upstream and downstream agencies to be adequately resourced. This is a delicate balance. Increases in frontline policing can subsequently impact the court system. Court backlogs can in turn increase prison overcrowding, and limit the opportunities for inmate rehabilitation. Failure to successfully rehabilitate prisoners and prevent reoffending could impact future police resourcing.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations related to service delivery by agencies in the Justice cluster for 2016–17.

Appendix one - List of 2017 recommendations

Appendix two - Status of 2016 recommendations

Appendix three - Agencies selected for this volume

Appendix four - Financial audit reporting