This audit focuses on the M4 handback. It looks at whether the road will be in good condition when the State gets it back, and whether it will cope with the extra traffic after the toll is removed. These are critical issues for taxpayers and motorists. Taxpayers don’t want to be responsible for a large repair bill and motorists don’t want to be stuck in traffic jams.

To ensure that future private sector partnerships (PPP) deal adequately with handback, we recommend that the Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA):

• ensure deeds spell out an appropriate inspection and testing program to determine repairs required to bring roads up to a satisfactory condition at handback (p.11)
• ensure deeds link condition standards and maintenance approaches to changing industry standards and approaches over the life of the PPP (p.11)
• consider including in deeds a requirement that operators provide a performance bond or similar security over the cost of handback repairs (p.11)
• review the lessons learnt from the M4 tollway handback and determine whether it should seek to negotiate changes to existing tollway deeds to better deal with handback, by June 2010 (p.11)

Parliamentary reference - Report number #193 - released 27 October 2009

The RTA (Roads and Traffic Authority) approach to detecting and enforcing heavy vehicle safety has produced mixed results. There have been overall decreases in the number of crashes and people killed and injured in crashes involving heavy vehicles between 2002 and 2007. However, the number of crashes and the number of people injured have increased between 2006 and 2007.

We recognise that the RTA is unable to prevent all crashes. However, we consider that the RTA could do more to improve its ability to detect and respond to high risk heavy vehicles travelling on our roads.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #187 - released 13 May 2009

Overall, the NSW Police Force (the Force) is not meeting its target for responding to urgent calls for assistance. Today, one in four complaints is about customer service. Victims of crime report issues including difficulties in contacting an officer and frustration at having to wait for an officer to return to duty to find out about their case. The timeliness of investigations is also at risk when follow-up is delayed. Seventy per cent of commanders surveyed indicated that rosters did not support continuity of investigations or victims’ needs.

We are also concerned that the current roster pattern may not be in the best interest of the health and safety of officers. Sick and injury leave is higher in NSW than other states and the Force is yet to assess the extent to which rosters may contribute to this. The Force also needs to do more to protect its general duties officers from fatigue in line with contemporary practice for managing shiftwork.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #173 - released 5 December 2007

Between 2004 and 2006, the number of signalling failures, signalling downtime and the number of trains delayed as a result of signal failures all fell. RailCorp’s on-time running performance improved over the same period. The fall in failures is a clear indication of improved performance. Changes in the definition of on-time and to the timetable during 2005 and 2006 however make it difficult to determine whether improvements in response downtime and signalling delays are due to a true performance improvement. To build upon this strong base, RailCorp needs to determine with more confidence the number and duration of signalling failures the network can tolerate without impacting on service levels.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #170 - released 15 August 2007

We see considerable potential for the Ministry of Transport to plan and manage interchanges more effectively, so as to make better use of our public transport network. We believe that the Ministry now needs to focus more on multi-modal transport planning and interchange performance. It needs to assign responsibility for the coordination and oversight of inter-modal operations to an entity resourced for the purpose. Without this it will continue to be very difficult to identify and address unmet needs, seek and secure stakeholder funding, and monitor and evaluate system performance.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #168 - released 6 June 2007

While central communications units are responsible for broadcasting calls from the public for assistance to police cars; these units have no authority over those police cars. And while local police commands are responsible for police deployment, they have no ready capability to communicate with their police cars. The report also found that Local police management have limited contemporaneous knowledge of what their response resources are doing, and little useful management information that can tell them what they have done over prior periods. Current systems of response fail to distinguish adequately between calls of various types. All tend to be allocated for response by a police car, even where the caller’s needs may be equally well met by alternatives which are less resource intensive.

The NSW Police Service has begun to address these limitations. But it understands that more needs to be done before the service can realise improvements in response performance, and evidence levels of efficiency and effectiveness. In particular, the NSW Police Service should: formulate a strategy for improving response overall, before it commits itself to major new investments in this area and, as part of this strategy it should clarify accountabilities throughout the response “system” and develop a framework of indicators and standards to help it (and the public) monitor response performance.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #47 - released 10 March 1998