Reports
Actions for Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program
Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program
The urban renewal projects on former railway land in the Newcastle city centre are well targeted to support the objectives of the Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program), according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the government. However, the evidence that the cost of the light rail will be justified by its contribution to the Program is not convincing.
The Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program) is an urban renewal and transport program in the Newcastle city centre. The Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation (HCCDC) has led the Program since 2017. UrbanGrowth NSW led the Program from 2014 until 2017. Transport for NSW has been responsible for delivering the transport parts of the Program since the Program commenced. All references to HCCDC in this report relate to both HCCDC and its predecessor, the Hunter Development Corporation. All references to UrbanGrowth NSW in this report relate only to its Newcastle office from 2014 to 2017.
This audit had two objectives:
- To assess the economy of the approach chosen to achieve the objectives of the Program.
- To assess the effectiveness of the consultation and oversight of the Program.
We addressed the audit objectives by answering the following questions:
a) Was the decision to build light rail an economical option for achieving Program objectives?
b) Has the best value been obtained for the use of the former railway land?
c) Was good practice used in consultation on key Program decisions?
d) Did governance arrangements support delivery of the program?
1. The urban renewal projects on the former railway land are well targeted to support the objectives of the Program. However, there is insufficient evidence that the cost of the light rail will be justified by its contribution to Program objectives.
The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the Government. HCCDC, and previously UrbanGrowth NSW, identified and considered options for land use that would best meet Program objectives. Required probity processes were followed for developments that involved financial transactions. Our audit did not assess the achievement of these objectives because none of the projects have been completed yet.
Analysis presented in the Program business case and other planning documents showed that the light rail would have small transport benefits and was expected to make a modest contribution to broader Program objectives. Analysis in the Program business case argued that despite this, the light rail was justified because it would attract investment and promote economic development around the route. The Program business case referred to several international examples to support this argument, but did not make a convincing case that these examples were comparable to the proposed light rail in Newcastle.
The audited agencies argue that the contribution of light rail cannot be assessed separately because it is a part of a broader Program. The cost of the light rail makes up around 53 per cent of the total Program funding. Given the cost of the light rail, agencies need to be able to demonstrate that this investment provides value for money by making a measurable contribution to the Program objectives.
2. Consultation and oversight were mostly effective during the implementation stages of the Program. There were weaknesses in both areas in the planning stages.
Consultations about the urban renewal activities from around 2015 onward followed good practice standards. These consultations were based on an internationally accepted framework and met their stated objectives. Community consultations on the decision to close the train line were held in 2006 and 2009. However, the final decision in 2012 was made without a specific community consultation. There was no community consultation on the decision to build a light rail.
The governance arrangements that were in place during the planning stages of the Program did not provide effective oversight. This meant there was not a single agreed set of Program objectives until 2016 and roles and responsibilities for the Program were not clear. Leadership and oversight improved during the implementation phase of the Program. Roles and responsibilities were clarified and a multi-agency steering committee was established to resolve issues that needed multi-agency coordination.
Recommendations
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should support economical decision-making on infrastructure projects by:
- providing balanced advice to decision makers on the benefits and risks of large infrastructure investments at all stages of the decision-making process
- providing scope and cost estimates that are as accurate and complete as possible when initial funding decisions are being made
- making business cases available to the public.
The planned uses of the former railway land align with the objectives of encouraging people to visit and live in the city centre, creating attractive public spaces, and supporting growth in employment in the city. The transport benefits of the activities are less clear, because the light rail is the major transport project and this will not make significant improvements to transport in Newcastle.
The processes used for selling and leasing parts of the former railway land followed industry standards. Options for the former railway land were identified and assessed systematically. Competitive processes were used for most transactions and the required assessment and approval processes were followed. The sale of land to the University of Newcastle did not use a competitive process, but required processes for direct negotiations were followed.
Recommendation
By March 2019, the Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation should:
- work with relevant stakeholders to explore options for increasing the focus on the heritage objective of the Program in projects on the former railway land. This could include projects that recognise the cultural and industrial heritage of Newcastle.
Consultations focusing on urban renewal options for the Program included a range of stakeholders and provided opportunities for input into decisions about the use of the former railway land. These consultations received mostly positive feedback from participants. Changes and additions were made to the objectives of the Program and specific projects in response to feedback received.
There had been several decades of debate about the potential closure of the train line, including community consultations in 2006 and 2009. However, the final decision to close the train line was made and announced in 2012 without a specific community consultation. HCCDC states that consultation with industry and business representatives constitutes community consultation because industry representatives are also members of the community. This does not meet good practice standards because it is not a representative sample of the community.
There was no community consultation on the decision to build a light rail. There were subsequent opportunities for members of the community to comment on the implementation options, but the decision to build it had already been made. A community and industry consultation was held on which route the light rail should use, but the results of this were not made public.
Recommendation
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should consult with a wide range of stakeholders before major decisions are made and announced, and report publicly on the results and outcomes of consultations.
The governance arrangements that were in place during the planning stages of the Program did not provide effective oversight. Project leadership and oversight improved during the implementation phase of the Program.
Multi-agency coordination and oversight were ineffective during the planning stages of the Program. Examples include: multiple versions of Program objectives being in circulation; unclear reporting lines for project management groups; and poor role definition for the initial advisory board. Program ownership was clarified in mid-2016 with the appointment of a new Program Director with clear accountability for the delivery of the Program. This was supported by the creation of a multi-agency steering committee that was more effective than previous oversight bodies.
The limitations that existed in multi-agency coordination and oversight had some negative consequences in important aspects of project management for the Program. This included whole-of-government benefits management and the coordination of work to mitigate impacts of the Program on small businesses.
Recommendations
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should:
- develop and implement a benefits management approach from the beginning of a program to ensure responsibility for defining benefits and measuring their achievement is clear
- establish whole-of-government oversight early in the program to guide major decisions. This should include:
- agreeing on objectives and ensuring all agencies understand these
- clearly defining roles and responsibilities for all agencies
- establishing whole-of-government coordination for the assessment and mitigation of the impact of major construction projects on businesses and the community.
By March 2019, the Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation should update and implement the Program Benefits Realisation Plan. This should include:
- setting measurable targets for the desired benefits
- clearly allocating ownership for achieving the desired benefits
- monitoring progress toward achieving the desired benefits and reporting publicly on the results.
Appendix one - Response from agencies
Appendix two - About the audit
Appendix three - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #310 - released 12 December 2018
Actions for Office of Strategic Lands
Office of Strategic Lands
The Office of Strategic Lands effectively fulfils most aspects of its defined role, however, it could do more to support strategic land planning by identifying and acquiring land for future public use proactively rather than waiting for agencies or landholders to approach it. It may also have greater impact if it expanded its activities beyond greater Sydney.
The Office of Strategic Lands (OSL) was established under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EP&A Act) to identify, acquire, manage and divest land required for long-term planning by the NSW Government, particularly for open space and public purposes.
OSL is a Corporation Sole acting on behalf of the Minister for Planning and is run within the Department of Planning and Environment (DPE). OSL is a self-funding entity, and is responsible for administering the Sydney Region Development Fund (SRDF), a statutory fund used for ongoing land acquisition and management. OSL currently only operates within greater Sydney and holds over a billion dollars in land assets in this region.
This audit assessed whether OSL effectively fulfils its role to identify, acquire, manage and dispose of land, and whether OSL ensures it is sustainable over the long-term to meet its objectives.
Conclusion:
OSL effectively fulfils most aspects of its defined role, but is not supporting strategic land planning through proactive identification and acquisition of land for future public use. OSL is diligent in its financial management over the short and medium terms. However, it has identified that relying on the sale of surplus land to continue funding its ongoing operations is not sustainable, and it is yet to finalise a strategy to address this.
OSL does not currently have a strategic or proactive focus to improve land planning outcomes. This is primarily due to the lack of a clear strategy and business plan to direct its work which defines OSL’s purpose, objectives, goals and performance targets.
OSL expects to finalise and implement a Strategic Business Plan to guide its future direction and long-term sustainability, in late 2017.
OSL has three primary sources of funding. The largest source is Treasury loans which it needs to repay. The next most significant source of funding is from sales of land no longer required for government’s long-term needs. OSL has identified that it is likely to run out of surplus land within ten years. This is a significant financial risk for OSL, which should be addressed through a long-term financial strategy.
Contributions by Sydney councils into the SRDF are OSL’s only regular and consistent income stream. The formula to calculate these contributions has not been reviewed for over 25 years, and recent council mergers and border changes have increased the need to review the formula.
OSL is not used as extensively as it could be by other NSW Government agencies. It has the potential to play a much bigger role in assisting NSW Government agencies with longer term planning by partnering with them to identify, acquire, hold and manage land for future needs. For example, it could acquire land in future residential growth areas for needed public services such as schools, hospitals and transport corridors. There is also potential for OSL to expand its operations beyond the greater Sydney region into other parts of NSW to provide a statewide benefit from its unique role in government.
OSL has a unique role amongst government agencies, and could be used across NSW
NSW Government agencies we spoke with consider OSL fulfils an important role for the state that no other government agency performs. As a self-funding long-term land holder and manager, OSL can acquire and manage land beyond the four-year budget cycle that other government agencies face. Consideration should be given to expanding to other growth areas in NSW, where its unique role could assist in longer term land planning.
OSL has established good processes and procedures for most aspects of its role. This includes governance processes that we found to have been applied effectively. There was also adequate oversight and approvals for land transactions.
OSL has yet to finalise a business strategy to ensure long-term sustainability
OSL has shown that it is financially and operationally viable in the short to medium term. However, it does not have an overarching business strategy to guide its operations and ensure it is financially sustainable for the long-term. With a unique role in government, it is important for OSL to clarify its direction and implement a strategic business plan to drive its progress.
While there is no overarching long-term strategy, OSL has documented operating plans which guide its land acquisition and land divestment activities over the short to medium term. It has not developed a plan for its ongoing land management activities.
OSL advised that its Strategic Business Plan will be finalised and implemented in late 2017. This Plan should clarify OSL’s long-term direction, and guide its business to ensure it is financially sustainable.
OSL does not have adequate performance targets and measures
OSL has four key deliverables as part of DPE’s business plan. These deliverables cover land management, working with other agencies, and ensuring the SRDF is sustainable. There was no evidence that OSL or DPE monitor whether OSL achieves all key deliverables.
Currently, OSL’s performance targets are limited to meeting dollar values. OSL does not have any measures to demonstrate the achievement of outcomes that align with its core business, such as its success in land management or in working with other agencies. OSL staff also said that dollar targets were not always adequate or appropriate to measure its business performance.
With the development of its Strategic Business Plan, OSL has the opportunity to clarify its future business direction. This includes ensuring it has a range of relevant goals and performance measures that will support it becoming a strategic land planning partner with NSW Government agencies and local councils, and a land holder for the long-term.
OSL’s current financial management approach may impact long-term sustainability
OSL has valued the land that it needs to purchase on behalf of government to meet long-term strategic land needs in the Greater Sydney region, at $1.2 billion. However, OSLs annual budget for purchasing land is only between $40 million and $50 million until 2021. Also, in each of the last four years, OSL has not spent more than $30 million on land purchases because it relies on landowners to initiate contact when they are ready to sell their land.
Without a more proactive approach, it is not possible for OSL to make needed purchases in a timely manner. OSL acknowledges the substantial gap between these values, but has not established a budget or plan for how it will purchase all the identified land.
OSL has developed a Divestment Strategy which provides a five-year schedule of planned divestments. This is land OSL owns which has been identified as no longer required for government purposes. OSL has established an approach to generate the best and highest price for these sales. While funds are generated through the sale of surplus land, it also means that OSL holds fewer land assets to sell. OSL has identified it will run out of surplus land within ten years.
OSL needs to finalise and implement a business model to ensure it is financially and operationally capable to sustain and grow its business for the long-term.
OSL is working to improve transparency and engagement with key stakeholders
To deliver on its role, OSL needs to be able to effectively engage and work with its stakeholders, including NSW Government agencies, local councils, and people selling or buying land.
NSW Government agencies we spoke with are generally satisfied with OSL’s level of engagement and consultation. However, it would be beneficial for all parties to clarify and document their expectations of each other through a formal arrangement. OSL could also be more proactive in promoting its services, and working with additional NSW Government agencies to identify strategic lands.
The local councils in the Sydney region we spoke with are not as satisfied with OSL’s engagement and communication. The councils advised that they do not consider they are well-informed of OSL’s plans for their area, or how their contributions to the SRDF are spent.
More broadly, the activities of OSL are not reported transparently to stakeholders or the general public. OSL is developing a communication package for local councils and the community. This is an opportunity for OSL to improve the transparency of its role, operations, projects, and the SRDF, as well as promote its services and achievements.
The Office of Strategic Lands (OSL) was established in 1951 to identify, acquire, manage and divest land required for the NSW Government's long term planning purposes. OSL acts on behalf of the Minister for Planning, as a Corporation Sole, under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EP&A Act).
OSL acquires and manages land identified for long-term strategic needs, and then transfers or sells it to other government agencies for ultimate use. It also sells land identified as surplus to government’s long term strategic requirements. Surplus land can also be transferred to local councils. OSL operates only in the greater Sydney region (from Wyong in the north, to the base of the Blue Mountains in the west, and south to Wollondilly). OSL has 20 staff who manage over 6,000 parcels of land.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #290 - released 10 August 2017
Actions for Sydney Road Maintenance Contracts
Sydney Road Maintenance Contracts
In November 2013, Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) outsourced the maintenance of State roads in the Sydney region south and west zones using an innovative contracting approach called the Stewardship Maintenance Contract (SMC). The SMC links risk to reward, and uses a performance framework where outcomes should drive improved performance over time.
WA | VIC | QLD | NSW | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Roads managed (lane kms) | 52,659 | 50,510 | 71,353 | 80,348 |
Estimated spend ($/lane km) | 5,000 | 4,500 | 6,000 | 7,000 |
Road quality measure (%) | 99 | 99 | 94 | 91 |
Parliamentary reference - Report number #288 - released 15 June 2017
Actions for NorthConnex
NorthConnex
The processes used to assess NorthConnex adequately considered value for money for taxpayers.This report also found that the impact of tolling concessions on road users and the motorway network was consistent with policy objectives described in the 2012 NSW Long Term Transport Master Plan.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #287 - released 8 June 2017
Actions for Contingent workforce - management and procurement
Contingent workforce - management and procurement
The Department of Industry, Transport for NSW and the Department of Education were not able to demonstrate that the use of contingent labour is the best resourcing strategy to meet their business needs or deliver value for money.
None of the three agencies we reviewed were able to demonstrate that contingent labour is the best resourcing strategy to meet their agencies’ business needs or delivers value for money. There are three reasons for this. First, agencies’ use of contingent labour was not informed by workforce planning at an agency level, with limited work undertaken in this area. Second, two of the three agencies have limited oversight of their contingent workforce. Information is not reliable or accurate, reports are onerous to produce, and there is limited reporting to the agency’s executive. Finally, none of the agencies routinely monitor and centrally document the performance of contingent workers to ensure services are delivered as planned. Together, these factors make it difficult for agencies to ensure contingent labour is engaged only when needed, at reasonable rates, and delivers quality services.
Some of these issues will be addressed by Contractor Central, which had only been introduced at Education at the time of our review. The new software program enables staff to easily obtain real-time reports on its contingent workforce. The recruitment broker also has the potential to improve value through better negotiation and benchmarking of pay rates. However, Contractor Central will only address some of the issues highlighted above. Better workforce planning and performance monitoring are needed to ensure an agencies’ workforce, including contingent workers, meets its business needs and represents value for money.
Download appendices for report on Contingent workforce
Parliamentary reference - Report number #282 - released 27 April 2017
Actions for Improving efficiency of irrigation water use on farms
Improving efficiency of irrigation water use on farms
The Department of Primary Industries (DPI) has a crucial role in assisting the irrigation industry to respond to the conflicting demands placed upon the state’s water resources. The State Plan emphasises the importance of water to agriculture, and gives DPI responsibility to use its training programs to help farmers continue to increase water use efficiency. DPI needs to work closely with agencies with which it shares responsibilities in the State Plan to ensure that its water use efficiency activities contribute to the State Plan goals. It needs to work closely with Treasury to document the services it will require to do this, the resources which will be needed, and how its success will be measured. This will ensure that DPI is well placed to continue to assist the NSW farming industry to adapt and survive periods of reduced water availability.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #172 - released 21 November 2007