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Published

Actions for Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program

Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program

Transport
Planning
Compliance
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management

The urban renewal projects on former railway land in the Newcastle city centre are well targeted to support the objectives of the Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program), according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the government. However, the evidence that the cost of the light rail will be justified by its contribution to the Program is not convincing.

The Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program) is an urban renewal and transport program in the Newcastle city centre. The Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation (HCCDC) has led the Program since 2017. UrbanGrowth NSW led the Program from 2014 until 2017. Transport for NSW has been responsible for delivering the transport parts of the Program since the Program commenced. All references to HCCDC in this report relate to both HCCDC and its predecessor, the Hunter Development Corporation. All references to UrbanGrowth NSW in this report relate only to its Newcastle office from 2014 to 2017.

This audit had two objectives:

  1. To assess the economy of the approach chosen to achieve the objectives of the Program.
  2. To assess the effectiveness of the consultation and oversight of the Program.

We addressed the audit objectives by answering the following questions:

a) Was the decision to build light rail an economical option for achieving Program objectives?
b) Has the best value been obtained for the use of the former railway land?
c) Was good practice used in consultation on key Program decisions?
d) Did governance arrangements support delivery of the program?

Conclusion
1. The urban renewal projects on the former railway land are well targeted to support the objectives of the Program. However, there is insufficient evidence that the cost of the light rail will be justified by its contribution to Program objectives.

The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the Government. HCCDC, and previously UrbanGrowth NSW, identified and considered options for land use that would best meet Program objectives. Required probity processes were followed for developments that involved financial transactions. Our audit did not assess the achievement of these objectives because none of the projects have been completed yet.

Analysis presented in the Program business case and other planning documents showed that the light rail would have small transport benefits and was expected to make a modest contribution to broader Program objectives. Analysis in the Program business case argued that despite this, the light rail was justified because it would attract investment and promote economic development around the route. The Program business case referred to several international examples to support this argument, but did not make a convincing case that these examples were comparable to the proposed light rail in Newcastle.

The audited agencies argue that the contribution of light rail cannot be assessed separately because it is a part of a broader Program. The cost of the light rail makes up around 53 per cent of the total Program funding. Given the cost of the light rail, agencies need to be able to demonstrate that this investment provides value for money by making a measurable contribution to the Program objectives.

2. Consultation and oversight were mostly effective during the implementation stages of the Program. There were weaknesses in both areas in the planning stages.

Consultations about the urban renewal activities from around 2015 onward followed good practice standards. These consultations were based on an internationally accepted framework and met their stated objectives. Community consultations on the decision to close the train line were held in 2006 and 2009. However, the final decision in 2012 was made without a specific community consultation. There was no community consultation on the decision to build a light rail.

The governance arrangements that were in place during the planning stages of the Program did not provide effective oversight. This meant there was not a single agreed set of Program objectives until 2016 and roles and responsibilities for the Program were not clear. Leadership and oversight improved during the implementation phase of the Program. Roles and responsibilities were clarified and a multi-agency steering committee was established to resolve issues that needed multi-agency coordination.
The light rail is not justified by conventional cost-benefit analysis and there is insufficient evidence that the indirect contribution of light rail to achieving the economic development objectives of the Program will justify the cost.
Analysis presented in Program business cases and other planning documents showed that the light rail would have small transport benefits and was expected to make a modest contribution to broader Program objectives. Analysis in the Program business case argued that despite this, the light rail was justified because it would attract investment and promote economic development around the route. The Program business case referred to several international examples to support this argument, but did not make a convincing case that these examples were comparable to the proposed light rail in Newcastle.
The business case analysis of the benefits and costs of light rail was prepared after the decision to build light rail had been made and announced. Our previous reports, and recent reports by others, have emphasised the importance of completing thorough analysis before announcing infrastructure projects. Some advice provided after the initial light rail decision was announced was overly optimistic. It included benefits that cannot reasonably be attributed to light rail and underestimated the scope and cost of the project.
The audited agencies argue that the contribution of light rail cannot be assessed separately because it is part of a broader Program. The cost of the light rail makes up around 53 per cent of the total Program funding. Given the high cost of the light rail, we believe agencies need to be able to demonstrate that this investment provides value for money by making a measurable contribution to the Program objectives.

Recommendations
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should support economical decision-making on infrastructure projects by:
  • providing balanced advice to decision makers on the benefits and risks of large infrastructure investments at all stages of the decision-making process
  • providing scope and cost estimates that are as accurate and complete as possible when initial funding decisions are being made
  • making business cases available to the public.​​​​​​
The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the government.

The planned uses of the former railway land align with the objectives of encouraging people to visit and live in the city centre, creating attractive public spaces, and supporting growth in employment in the city. The transport benefits of the activities are less clear, because the light rail is the major transport project and this will not make significant improvements to transport in Newcastle.

The processes used for selling and leasing parts of the former railway land followed industry standards. Options for the former railway land were identified and assessed systematically. Competitive processes were used for most transactions and the required assessment and approval processes were followed. The sale of land to the University of Newcastle did not use a competitive process, but required processes for direct negotiations were followed.

Recommendation
By March 2019, the Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation should:
  • work with relevant stakeholders to explore options for increasing the focus on the heritage objective of the Program in projects on the former railway land. This could include projects that recognise the cultural and industrial heritage of Newcastle.
Consultations about the urban renewal activities followed good practice standards, but consultation on transport decisions for the Program did not.

Consultations focusing on urban renewal options for the Program included a range of stakeholders and provided opportunities for input into decisions about the use of the former railway land. These consultations received mostly positive feedback from participants. Changes and additions were made to the objectives of the Program and specific projects in response to feedback received. 

There had been several decades of debate about the potential closure of the train line, including community consultations in 2006 and 2009. However, the final decision to close the train line was made and announced in 2012 without a specific community consultation. HCCDC states that consultation with industry and business representatives constitutes community consultation because industry representatives are also members of the community. This does not meet good practice standards because it is not a representative sample of the community.

There was no community consultation on the decision to build a light rail. There were subsequent opportunities for members of the community to comment on the implementation options, but the decision to build it had already been made. A community and industry consultation was held on which route the light rail should use, but the results of this were not made public. 

Recommendation
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should consult with a wide range of stakeholders before major decisions are made and announced, and report publicly on the results and outcomes of consultations. 

The governance arrangements that were in place during the planning stages of the Program did not provide effective oversight. Project leadership and oversight improved during the implementation phase of the Program.

Multi-agency coordination and oversight were ineffective during the planning stages of the Program. Examples include: multiple versions of Program objectives being in circulation; unclear reporting lines for project management groups; and poor role definition for the initial advisory board. Program ownership was clarified in mid-2016 with the appointment of a new Program Director with clear accountability for the delivery of the Program. This was supported by the creation of a multi-agency steering committee that was more effective than previous oversight bodies.

The limitations that existed in multi-agency coordination and oversight had some negative consequences in important aspects of project management for the Program. This included whole-of-government benefits management and the coordination of work to mitigate impacts of the Program on small businesses.

Recommendations
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should: 

  • develop and implement a benefits management approach from the beginning of a program to ensure responsibility for defining benefits and measuring their achievement is clear
  • establish whole-of-government oversight early in the program to guide major decisions. This should include:
    • agreeing on objectives and ensuring all agencies understand these
    • clearly defining roles and responsibilities for all agencies
    • establishing whole-of-government coordination for the assessment and mitigation of the impact of major construction projects on businesses and the community.

By March 2019, the Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation should update and implement the Program Benefits Realisation Plan. This should include:

  • setting measurable targets for the desired benefits
  • clearly allocating ownership for achieving the desired benefits
  • monitoring progress toward achieving the desired benefits and reporting publicly on the results.

Appendix one - Response from agencies    

Appendix two - About the audit

Appendix three - Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #310 - released 12 December 2018

Published

Actions for Office of Strategic Lands

Office of Strategic Lands

Planning
Environment
Management and administration
Procurement

The Office of Strategic Lands effectively fulfils most aspects of its defined role, however, it could do more to support strategic land planning by identifying and acquiring land for future public use proactively rather than waiting for agencies or landholders to approach it. It may also have greater impact if it expanded its activities beyond greater Sydney.

The Office of Strategic Lands (OSL) was established under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EP&A Act) to identify, acquire, manage and divest land required for long-term planning by the NSW Government, particularly for open space and public purposes. 

OSL is a Corporation Sole acting on behalf of the Minister for Planning and is run within the Department of Planning and Environment (DPE). OSL is a self-funding entity, and is responsible for administering the Sydney Region Development Fund (SRDF), a statutory fund used for ongoing land acquisition and management. OSL currently only operates within greater Sydney and holds over a billion dollars in land assets in this region. 

This audit assessed whether OSL effectively fulfils its role to identify, acquire, manage and dispose of land, and whether OSL ensures it is sustainable over the long-term to meet its objectives. 

Conclusion:

OSL effectively fulfils most aspects of its defined role, but is not supporting strategic land planning through proactive identification and acquisition of land for future public use. OSL is diligent in its financial management over the short and medium terms. However, it has identified that relying on the sale of surplus land to continue funding its ongoing operations is not sustainable, and it is yet to finalise a strategy to address this.


OSL does not currently have a strategic or proactive focus to improve land planning outcomes. This is primarily due to the lack of a clear strategy and business plan to direct its work which defines OSL’s purpose, objectives, goals and performance targets.

OSL expects to finalise and implement a Strategic Business Plan to guide its future direction and long-term sustainability, in late 2017. 

OSL has three primary sources of funding. The largest source is Treasury loans which it needs to repay. The next most significant source of funding is from sales of land no longer required for government’s long-term needs. OSL has identified that it is likely to run out of surplus land within ten years. This is a significant financial risk for OSL, which should be addressed through a long-term financial strategy. 

Contributions by Sydney councils into the SRDF are OSL’s only regular and consistent income stream. The formula to calculate these contributions has not been reviewed for over 25 years, and recent council mergers and border changes have increased the need to review the formula. 

OSL is not used as extensively as it could be by other NSW Government agencies. It has the potential to play a much bigger role in assisting NSW Government agencies with longer term planning by partnering with them to identify, acquire, hold and manage land for future needs. For example, it could acquire land in future residential growth areas for needed public services such as schools, hospitals and transport corridors. There is also potential for OSL to expand its operations beyond the greater Sydney region into other parts of NSW to provide a statewide benefit from its unique role in government.

OSL has a unique role amongst government agencies, and could be used across NSW

NSW Government agencies we spoke with consider OSL fulfils an important role for the state that no other government agency performs. As a self-funding long-term land holder and manager, OSL can acquire and manage land beyond the four-year budget cycle that other government agencies face. Consideration should be given to expanding to other growth areas in NSW, where its unique role could assist in longer term land planning.

OSL has established good processes and procedures for most aspects of its role. This includes governance processes that we found to have been applied effectively. There was also adequate oversight and approvals for land transactions.

OSL has yet to finalise a business strategy to ensure long-term sustainability

OSL has shown that it is financially and operationally viable in the short to medium term. However, it does not have an overarching business strategy to guide its operations and ensure it is financially sustainable for the long-term. With a unique role in government, it is important for OSL to clarify its direction and implement a strategic business plan to drive its progress.

While there is no overarching long-term strategy, OSL has documented operating plans which guide its land acquisition and land divestment activities over the short to medium term. It has not developed a plan for its ongoing land management activities.
OSL advised that its Strategic Business Plan will be finalised and implemented in late 2017. This Plan should clarify OSL’s long-term direction, and guide its business to ensure it is financially sustainable.

OSL does not have adequate performance targets and measures

OSL has four key deliverables as part of DPE’s business plan. These deliverables cover land management, working with other agencies, and ensuring the SRDF is sustainable. There was no evidence that OSL or DPE monitor whether OSL achieves all key deliverables.

Currently, OSL’s performance targets are limited to meeting dollar values. OSL does not have any measures to demonstrate the achievement of outcomes that align with its core business, such as its success in land management or in working with other agencies. OSL staff also said that dollar targets were not always adequate or appropriate to measure its business performance.

With the development of its Strategic Business Plan, OSL has the opportunity to clarify its future business direction. This includes ensuring it has a range of relevant goals and performance measures that will support it becoming a strategic land planning partner with NSW Government agencies and local councils, and a land holder for the long-term.

OSL’s current financial management approach may impact long-term sustainability

OSL has valued the land that it needs to purchase on behalf of government to meet long-term strategic land needs in the Greater Sydney region, at $1.2 billion. However, OSLs annual budget for purchasing land is only between $40 million and $50 million until 2021. Also, in each of the last four years, OSL has not spent more than $30 million on land purchases because it relies on landowners to initiate contact when they are ready to sell their land.

Without a more proactive approach, it is not possible for OSL to make needed purchases in a timely manner. OSL acknowledges the substantial gap between these values, but has not established a budget or plan for how it will purchase all the identified land.

OSL has developed a Divestment Strategy which provides a five-year schedule of planned divestments. This is land OSL owns which has been identified as no longer required for government purposes. OSL has established an approach to generate the best and highest price for these sales. While funds are generated through the sale of surplus land, it also means that OSL holds fewer land assets to sell. OSL has identified it will run out of surplus land within ten years.

OSL needs to finalise and implement a business model to ensure it is financially and operationally capable to sustain and grow its business for the long-term.

OSL is working to improve transparency and engagement with key stakeholders

To deliver on its role, OSL needs to be able to effectively engage and work with its stakeholders, including NSW Government agencies, local councils, and people selling or buying land.

NSW Government agencies we spoke with are generally satisfied with OSL’s level of engagement and consultation. However, it would be beneficial for all parties to clarify and document their expectations of each other through a formal arrangement. OSL could also be more proactive in promoting its services, and working with additional NSW Government agencies to identify strategic lands.

The local councils in the Sydney region we spoke with are not as satisfied with OSL’s engagement and communication. The councils advised that they do not consider they are well-informed of OSL’s plans for their area, or how their contributions to the SRDF are spent.

More broadly, the activities of OSL are not reported transparently to stakeholders or the general public. OSL is developing a communication package for local councils and the community. This is an opportunity for OSL to improve the transparency of its role, operations, projects, and the SRDF, as well as promote its services and achievements.

The Office of Strategic Lands (OSL) was established in 1951 to identify, acquire, manage and divest land required for the NSW Government's long term planning purposes. OSL acts on behalf of the Minister for Planning, as a Corporation Sole, under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EP&A Act).

OSL acquires and manages land identified for long-term strategic needs, and then transfers or sells it to other government agencies for ultimate use. It also sells land identified as surplus to government’s long term strategic requirements. Surplus land can also be transferred to local councils. OSL operates only in the greater Sydney region (from Wyong in the north, to the base of the Blue Mountains in the west, and south to Wollondilly). OSL has 20 staff who manage over 6,000 parcels of land.
 

The Department of Planning and Environment (Office of Strategic Lands) should:

By December 2017:  

  1. clarify and document its long-term purpose, role and goals in line with its mandate. This includes:
    • finalising and implementing a business plan with outcome-based performance measures that support the achievement of its goals
    • establishing and implementing a business and financial model, including resourcing, that supports its long-term strategy
    • exploring options for expanding the operation of OSL to other areas of NSW.

By July 2018:

2. develop and implement an approach for working with NSW Government agencies to improve its efficacy in strategic land identification, acquisition and management.

On an ongoing basis:

3. improve the transparency of its operations, and its communication and engagement with all stakeholders. This includes developing engagement strategies appropriate for different stakeholder groups.

Published

Actions for Sydney Road Maintenance Contracts

Sydney Road Maintenance Contracts

Transport
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management

In November 2013, Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) outsourced the maintenance of State roads in the Sydney region south and west zones using an innovative contracting approach called the Stewardship Maintenance Contract (SMC). The SMC links risk to reward, and uses a performance framework where outcomes should drive improved performance over time.

RMS’ SMC contract management includes most elements of good practice, including governance and dispute resolution mechanisms. However, key elements are missing which reduces its effectiveness.

Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) is responsible for the Sydney region State roads network This includes over 2,800 kilometres of roads and associated road corridor infrastructure such as bridges, tunnels and drainage structures. RMS divides the network into three geographical areas: south, west and north zones.

In 1995, RMS first outsourced road corridor infrastructure maintenance for the north zone through a Performance Specified Maintenance Contract (PSMC). The current 10-year PSMC for the north zone will expire in October 2018. Prior to November 2013, RMS maintained roads in the south and west zones through its Road and Fleet Services unit. 

In November 2013, RMS outsourced road maintenance services for the south and west zones using Stewardship Maintenance Contracts (SMC). The contracts run for seven years with an option for a further three years at RMS’ discretion. RMS estimated that the annual cost of these contracts was around $240 million in total. In March 2018, the contract prices are due to be reset by negotiation to reflect the contractors’ experience with, and better information about, the road networks and routine maintenance requirements. 

The SMC model adopted stewardship principles to improve value for money. RMS defined stewardship principles as a broad set of values, attitudes and behaviours, required of the contractor to effectively manage the assets on behalf of RMS. The SMC also includes commercial principles, such as linking risk to reward, and a performance framework where outcomes drive performance.

This audit assessed whether RMS had effectively managed the outsourcing of road maintenance in the Sydney region south and west zones. In making this assessment, we answered the following questions:

  1. Did RMS justify the decision to adopt the SMC model?
  2. Do SMCs include key performance indicators (KPIs) and incentives which promote efficiency and effectiveness? 
  3. Does RMS collect high quality information on contractor performance and take action to correct performance deficiencies?
  4. Are the expected benefits being achieved?

Conclusion

RMS developed an innovative contracting approach with the SMC. RMS has realised some benefits in the first year, including savings, from outsourcing road maintenance in the Sydney region south and west zones using the SMC. However, RMS’ management of the SMC has key elements missing which reduces its effectiveness.

The SMC includes performance measures and incentives to drive efficiency and effectiveness improvements over time.  

RMS has established a contract management framework which includes most elements of good practice, including governance and dispute resolution mechanisms. However, it does not have procedures to guide its contract managers in managing specific provisions of the SMC. Consequently, RMS has not exercised several significant SMC requirements, such as having the contractor account for an efficiency dividend in its pricing at the start of each three-year works period. It also has not done enough to assure itself that the contractor provided performance and financial data are correct. This is important because the data is used to measure performance and calculate contractor payments.  

RMS assessed that it had achieved around 80 per cent of the expected cost benefit in the initial year of the SMC. However, it has not tracked its achievement of benefits since then.

The Stewardship Maintenance Contract

RMS justified adopting the SMC model and included KPIs to drive efficiency and effectiveness

The SMC model includes features that RMS had not previously used for road maintenance contracts. These included adopting stewardship principles and transferring price risk to the contractor over time as the contractor becomes familiar with the assets being maintained.

The SMC model meets RMS’ requirements for flexibility in pricing models, the need for collaboration in asset maintenance planning, promoting innovation and effective performance management.

RMS used many good practices to develop the SMC model, including:

  • preparing a robust business case comparing the SMC model to RMS maintaining the road network itself, as well as assessing whether two other contracting models
    (traditional and alliance) would meet its requirements
  • assessing experiences with similar arrangements in other jurisdictions and identifying elements that worked to get the best outcomes
  • developing a robust performance framework, which included a mix of efficiency and effectiveness KPIs that reflected NSW Government policy and RMS priorities
  • incorporating risk and reward incentives delivered through cost sharing arrangements which change as the contract matures
  • using a contract duration that supports RMS priorities and provides an incentive for better quality outcomes.

RMS uses data provided by the contractor to measure performance and calculate payments to the contractor. The SMC includes a specific sanction if RMS finds that the contractor provided incorrect performance data, but no specific sanction if the contractor provides incorrect financial data. If RMS finds that the contactor provided incorrect performance or financial data, RMS can only recover over-payments which may have been made using the incorrect data.  

To provide a stronger incentive for the contractor to ensure data it provides is accurate, RMS should consider whether to incorporate stronger sanctions when negotiating the commercial reset due in mid-2018 for south and west zones. RMS should also consider this for the new contract for the north zone when the current PSMC contract expires in October 2018.

RMS' contract management approach and benefits realization

RMS can improve the effectiveness of its oversight and management of the SMC

RMS does not have SMC specific contract procedures to guide its contract managers. Consequently, RMS has not exercised several significant SMC requirements, such as having the contractors account for an efficiency dividend in their pricing at the start of each three-year works period. Effective contract management should be supported by contract specific procedures, with explanations of, and allocation of responsibility for, the various interventions that RMS may be required to exercise in the SMC.

Performance and financial reporting under the SMC is based on a mix of RMS and contractor provided data. While there are a range of audits of contractor provided performance and financial data that RMS can conduct each year under the SMC, it does not have a schedule of audits it will conduct and when.  
During the first year of the SMC, RMS commissioned some limited audits of financial data. In the first three years of the SMC, RMS did not conduct any audits of performance data. Had there been SMC specific procedures in place, this would have reduced the risk of RMS not implementing a systematic audit program to give it reasonable assurance on the quality of the data that the contractor has provided. This is important because the data is used to measure performance and calculate contractor payments.

RMS has been aware of data quality issues since 2015. While RMS advised that it commenced addressing some data quality issues in response to a series of reviews conducted in 2015, a recent internal audit report indicates that RMS has not resolved the data quality issues.  

RMS achieved benefits in the first year, but has not tracked benefits since

As part of the business case, RMS agreed to implement a benefits realisation strategy, including a benefits tracking tool. RMS commenced tracking benefits, but did not establish a comparative baseline pre-SMC on non-financial benefits, and has not tracked benefits past year one.

In 2015, a benchmarking study commissioned by RMS found that it had achieved 80 per cent of the expected recurrent cost savings and other benefits, such as improved workplace safety, in the first full year of the SMC. However, there was no clear baseline to measure
non-financial performance. The study was qualified due to gaps in available data. The study also did not reconcile the actual one-off transition costs to the business case estimate.

During the course of the audit, RMS advised that it intends to repeat this type of study to determine whether it has achieved all expected benefits (and their value), and that it would use the results to inform its negotiation with the SMC contractors as part of the commercial reset due in mid-2018.

Roads and Maritime Services is responsible for the State Roads network in the Sydney region

Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) is responsible for the Sydney region State roads network. This includes over 2,800 kilometres of roads and associated road corridor infrastructure such as bridges, tunnels and drainage structures. The network is divided into three geographical areas: south, west and north zones. Prior to November 2013, RMS maintained roads in the Sydney region south and west zones through its Road and Fleet Services unit.  

In 1995, RMS first outsourced road corridor infrastructure maintenance for the north zone through a Performance Specified Maintenance Contract (PSMC). The current 10-year PSMC for the north zone will expire in October 2018. This contract is worth around $35 million per annum.  

NSW Government priorities and road maintenance

Efficient and effective road maintenance contributes to the following NSW Government priorities:

  • improving road travel reliability
  • ensuring on-time running of public transport
  • reducing road fatalities
  • improving government services
  • keeping our environment clean.

The NSW Commission of Audit recommended outsourcing the maintenance of State roads

The NSW Commission of Audit in its Final Report on Government Expenditure (May 2012) recommended contestability as an appropriate strategy to consider for improving road maintenance service delivery for State roads.  

The Commission benchmarked RMS’ road surface quality and cost per lane kilometre against those of Western Australia, Victoria, and Queensland. This showed that New South Wales lagged the other states on both these measures.  

Exhibit 1: Interjurisdictional comparison of road maintenance outcomes 2009–10
  WA VIC QLD NSW
Roads managed (lane kms) 52,659 50,510 71,353 80,348
Estimated spend ($/lane km) 5,000 4,500 6,000 7,000
Road quality measure (%) 99 99 94 91

Source: NSW Commission of Audit Final Report May 2012.

The Commission noted that RMS had conducted two independent reviews to examine the potential for extending road maintenance contestability. The Commission found that there was inadequate and inconclusive benchmarking to establish the efficiency of RMS’ Road and Fleet Services unit when compared to outsourcing. It recommended that RMS bring forward a proposal to conduct a competitive tender for the road maintenance of the Sydney region south zone road network to inform the feasibility of a progressive rollout of road maintenance contestability across other areas of the State. In August 2012, the NSW Government adopted the Commission’s recommendation.

The NSW Government introduced road maintenance contestability through Stewardship Maintenance Contracts

In April 2013, the NSW Government announced that it would introduce road maintenance contestability across the Sydney region, using a Stewardship Maintenance Contract (SMC) model to improve value for money. In doing so, it excluded RMS’ Road and Fleet Services unit from tendering.  

The SMC model is based on the following key commercial and performance principles set by RMS:

  • performance driven by outcomes
  • flexible and adaptable
  • transparent and measurable
  • linking risk to reward
  • continuous improvement
  • criteria for selection of, and transition to, different payment models.

The following key stewardship principles underpin the SMC’s broad set of values, attitudes and behaviours, which are required of the contractor to effectively manage the assets on behalf of RMS:

  • putting RMS’ customers (road users and the general public) first and being responsive to them
  • being responsible and accountable for the outcomes resulting from the management of the assets
  • managing the assets diligently, efficiently and effectively with limited direction from RMS
  • working collaboratively with RMS to deliver services that are tailored to meet RMS’ evolving needs
  • acting with integrity and transparency in performing the services
  • performing the services in the best interests of RMS and asset users.

Other key features of the SMC include:

  • service requirements which describe the scope of the services, and the standards the contractor must meet
  • a commercial framework which defines how payments are structured, how performance assessment will impact on payments and outlines the key commercial principles. SMCs primarily divide payments into two main mechanisms, these being the priced component (or fixed price) and the target cost calculated as follows:
    • fixed price – the contractor is paid a pre-agreed amount for specific services being provided, regardless of the actual costs incurred
    • target cost – RMS and the contractor agree on a target cost for a project, and any cost overruns or underruns are shared between them
  • a performance framework which provides mechanisms for assessing contractor performance. This includes a comprehensive listing of the key result areas (KRAs) and key performance indicators (KPIs) against which RMS measures the contractor’s performance. The framework also outlines the scoring methodology that RMS uses to determine whether the contractor’s bid margin (profit and overheads) is reduced due to less than satisfactory performance or whether a bonus is paid if a threshold performance score is exceeded.

Road maintenance under SMCs for Sydney region south and west zones commenced in November 2013

In November 2013, RMS awarded SMCs to the Leighton Boral Amey consortium, now named Ventia Boral Amey (VBA), for the south zone and the DownerMouchel (DM) consortium for the west zone. The contracts run for seven years with an option for a further three years at RMS’ discretion. In April 2014, full services commenced following a four-month transition period. RMS estimated that the annual cost of these contracts was around $240 million in total. In March 2018, the contract prices are due to be reset by negotiation to reflect the contractors’ experience with, and better information about, the road networks and routine maintenance requirements. 

  1. Roads and Maritime Services should consider whether to incorporate stronger sanctions in the Stewardship Maintenance Contract if the contractor provides incorrect performance or financial data to RMS, when:
     
    1. negotiating the commercial reset for the next works period with the Sydney region south and west zone contractors due in July 2018.
    2. finalising a new SMC contract for the Sydney region north zone, due to commence in October 2018.

Roads and Maritime Services should, by September 2017:

2.  Review its contract management framework for SMCs to ensure that all authorities and accountabilities of
     contract managers are clearly defined, including:

a) accountability and procedures for exercising all operational clauses in the SMC where RMS may opt to, or be required to intervene, or make a decision

b) authority to approve or initiate the interventions RMS is required to, or may, exercise under the SMC

c) the audits that RMS will conduct to systematically validate the performance and financial data that the SMC contractors provide

d) the accountabilities of RMS contract managers to systematically review audits and quality reviews that the SMC contractors must conduct to demonstrate compliance with their service plans

e) the accountabilities of RMS contract managers to check that the monthly and annual reports provided by SMC contractors do not contain errors, omissions or inaccuracies.

3.  Improve its management of benefits realisation by:

a) initiating a further benefits realisation review and record the benefits delivered against those
    estimated following the tender process, including the one-off transition costs

b) identify any benefits, including savings, not yet attained and develop strategies to address any short-falls

c) establish a tool to track the ongoing realisation of benefits.

Published

Actions for NorthConnex

NorthConnex

Premier and Cabinet
Treasury
Transport
Compliance
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement

The processes used to assess NorthConnex adequately considered value for money for taxpayers.This report also found that the impact of tolling concessions on road users and the motorway network was consistent with policy objectives described in the 2012 NSW Long Term Transport Master Plan.

NorthConnex is a nine-kilometre tolled motorway tunnel between the M1 Pacific motorway at Wahroonga and the M2 Hills motorway at West Pennant Hills. The total cost for the project is $3.1 billion. NorthConnex will be funded through toll charges, and contributions from the NSW and Australian Governments of up to $405 million each. In January 2015, the NSW Roads Minister signed the final contracts for NorthConnex.

By December 2017, the Department of Premier and Cabinet should:

1. publish an updated ‘Unsolicited Proposals – Guide for Submission and Assessment’ which clarifies obligations with requirements in other NSW Government policies such as the NSW PPP guideline and Infrastructure Investor Assurance Framework. The update should require:

a) a business case to be prepared, and a business case gateway review completed, as part of the assessment of the detailed proposal (currently stage 2)

b) probity reports must be completed and considered before the decision to proceed to the next stage.
 

The Department of Premier and Cabinet and NSW Treasury should immediately:

2. improve record keeping to ensure compliance with the State Records Act 1998 and the NSW Government Standard on Records Management.

 

Published

Actions for Contingent workforce - management and procurement

Contingent workforce - management and procurement

Industry
Management and administration
Procurement
Workforce and capability

The Department of Industry, Transport for NSW and the Department of Education were not able to demonstrate that the use of contingent labour is the best resourcing strategy to meet their business needs or deliver value for money.

NSW Government agencies use contingent labour to help deliver services to the community. The NSW Public Service Commission (PSC) defines contingent labour as people employed by a recruitment agency and hired by government agencies to provide labour or services. Agencies use contingent labour to fill a gap in skills or capability, for example, to fill a position while a staff member is on leave or where specialist knowledge may be needed on a short-term basis. The PSC estimated that in 2016 the contingent workforce represented 2.3 per cent of the public sector workforce, equivalent to 7,571 full-time employees.

The PSC recommends that contingent labour only be used when it is the most efficient and effective option available to respond to an agency’s business needs. It also recommends that agencies’ use of contingent labour be informed by workforce planning. 

Government spending on contingent labour has increased significantly over the last five years, from $503 million in 2011–12 to $1.1 billion in 2015–16. To reduce spend in this area, the NSW Government has introduced the Contingent Workforce Renewal Strategy, overseen by NSW Procurement. The Strategy aims to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in the use of contingent labour. It has four pillars:

  • prequalification scheme – a list of approved contingent labour suppliers
  • vendor management system – an information system to manage contingent workers
  • managed service provider – a recruitment agency broker
  • contractor management organisations – organisations that manage a contingent labour database, which agencies can source labour from.

The prequalification scheme is mandatory for public sector agencies. Agencies are progressively rolling out the other pillars. The vendor management system and managed service provider are together called ‘Contractor Central’.

Within the context of sector reform aimed at promoting efficiency and effectiveness, the objective of this audit is to assess whether agencies’ approach to purchasing and managing their contingent workforce meets business needs and delivers value for money. In making this assessment, we reviewed three agencies each at a different stage of the reform:

  • Department of Education (Education) – Contractor Central introduced in August 2015
  • Department of Industry (Industry) – Contractor Central introduced in November 2016, after our review
  • Transport for NSW (Transport) – Contractor Central not in place.
Conclusion

None of the three agencies we reviewed were able to demonstrate that contingent labour is the best resourcing strategy to meet their agencies’ business needs or delivers value for money. There are three reasons for this. First, agencies’ use of contingent labour was not informed by workforce planning at an agency level, with limited work undertaken in this area. Second, two of the three agencies have limited oversight of their contingent workforce. Information is not reliable or accurate, reports are onerous to produce, and there is limited reporting to the agency’s executive. Finally, none of the agencies routinely monitor and centrally document the performance of contingent workers to ensure services are delivered as planned. Together, these factors make it difficult for agencies to ensure contingent labour is engaged only when needed, at reasonable rates, and delivers quality services.

Some of these issues will be addressed by Contractor Central, which had only been introduced at Education at the time of our review. The new software program enables staff to easily obtain real-time reports on its contingent workforce. The recruitment broker also has the potential to improve value through better negotiation and benchmarking of pay rates. However, Contractor Central will only address some of the issues highlighted above. Better workforce planning and performance monitoring are needed to ensure an agencies’ workforce, including contingent workers, meets its business needs and represents value for money.


The use of contingent labour neither informs nor is informed by agency level workforce plans

None of the three agencies we reviewed had an agency level workforce plan in place. Agencies could not demonstrate that they had analysed their use of contingent labour at an agency level, including how it is being used to address any skills gaps. An agency’s executive is responsible for ensuring that an agency level workforce plan is in place. An agency level workforce plan helps hiring managers to make decisions on the best resource strategy to meet their business needs. This is important because contingent labour should only be engaged after considering all other recruitment options and the agency’s workforce plan.

Contingent workforce data is not always reliable or accurate

The accuracy and reliability of contingent workforce data varied significantly across the three agencies we reviewed. In Industry and Transport, information on contingent labour is difficult to obtain because it must be drawn from different data sources, affecting its accuracy, reliability and timeliness. This information is also incomplete, with these agencies not having a full picture of their contingent workforce. Quality data is important because it improves an agency’s capacity to plan and monitor its use of contingent labour to ensure it meets business needs.

At the time of our review, only Education, through Contractor Central, was able to obtain timely and accurate data on its use of contingent labour. Contractor Central has also improved its reporting capability, with the agency’s executive now receiving quarterly reports on its contingent workforce. In contrast, executives in Industry and Transport received ad-hoc reports on the use of contingent labour that only gave them limited oversight of their contingent workforce.

Long tenure of contingent workers is an issue in agencies

We found that the maximum tenure of contingent labour varied across agencies from nine to more than 20 years. In Education and Transport, staff reported that hiring managers assume contingent workers are automatically renewed at the end of their contract, with no formal consideration about whether contingent labour is still needed. Also, contingent labour is used for significant capital projects in the information technology and infrastructure areas where a project may run for several years.

None of the agencies reviewed undertook an analysis to determine how to reduce tenure while ensuring business needs are met. This is particularly important for long-term use of contingent labour for large capital projects. Understanding whether contingent labour represents best value compared to other recruitment options, such as secondments or temporary employment, is essential. Contingent workers are engaged under different working conditions to employees. Long tenure can pose an industrial relations risk to agencies because contingent workers may believe they are entitled to the same working conditions as employees.

On and off-boarding processes could be strengthened

Agencies have processes to engage and release contingent labour, also called on boarding and off-boarding. This includes access to IT systems, building access, and the return of property. However, not all agencies had on boarding or off-boarding checklists with specific requirements for engaging or releasing contingent labour. In addition, agencies’ off boarding guidelines did not always provide for knowledge transfer. This was identified as a key risk by staff because it is important to ensure that critical skills and knowledge are retained.

Risk that agencies are being overcharged when engaging contingent labour

We found that in agencies without Contractor Central, there is limited assurance that recruitment agencies charge in line with the prequalification scheme fees. NSW Procurement estimates that the government was overcharged $1.3 million in 2015–16. In addition, there is a risk that hiring managers do not have sufficient information to benchmark pay rates when negotiating contingent labour engagements. Agencies with Contractor Central may be more likely to get reasonable rates by using a recruitment broker who has specialised market knowledge.

No system in place to monitor the performance of contingent workers

None of the agencies we reviewed had a system in place to monitor the performance of their contingent workforce at an agency level to ensure it delivers value for money. Hiring managers are not required to evaluate whether contingent labour delivers the services for which they are hired. For example, hiring managers do not routinely assess and centrally document the quality of services provided, including whether services are delivered on time and within budget. This means contingent workers who are not performing may be re-hired by other managers or agencies. With the implementation of Contractor Central, there is the means to capture agency-wide information on the performance of contingent workers.

Contractor Central has the potential to improve value for money

Contractor Central has the potential to improve value for money. This is because the recruitment broker has specialised market knowledge and is able to promote competition, and benchmark and negotiate pay rates. In addition, the new software can streamline invoice processing and ensure correct supplier rates are charged. Education reports that it achieved a net saving of $944,600 from August 2015 to May 2016 due to the introduction of Contractor Central. Industry also expects to achieve similar results with Contractor Central, which it advised was implemented in November 2016.

The Department of Industry and Transport for NSW should, by December 2017:

1. improve the accuracy and reliability of their data on contingent labour

2. routinely report the use of contingent labour to agency executive.

The Department of Industry, Department of Education, and Transport for NSW should:

by December 2017:

3. ensure agency-wide on-boarding and off-boarding guidelines or checklists detail the specific requirements for engaging or releasing contingent labour, including provisions for knowledge transfer.

by March 2018

4. ensure that contingent labour informs and is informed by workforce planning, by:

  • analysing agency-wide business needs, staff capability, and skills gaps
  • understanding how gaps are filled by contingent workers or other recruitment options
  • assessing whether long-term contingent worker engagements are the most economical and effective labour option
  • evaluating whether contingent workers meet agency business needs and deliver value for money.

5. assess and centrally document the performance of their contingent workforce to ensure that services are delivered as contracted

6. implement processes to ensure that hiring managers consider other recruitment options prior to engaging or re-engaging contingent workers.
    

Sector-wide learnings

This audit identified learnings that government agencies across the sector should consider when procuring and managing contingent labour:

1. Contingent workforce planning should be part of an agency’s broader workforce planning.

2. Using information systems to manage and procure contingent labour improves the accuracy, reliability and timeliness of contingent labour data. This information enables agencies to consistently assess contingent labour rates and to identify persistent skills gaps in their workforce.

3. Routine reporting of contingent labour to agency executives provides oversight of an agency’s use of contingent labour.

4. Hiring managers should consider all recruitment options, with advice from human resources staff, before engaging contingent labour to ensure that it is the most appropriate solution for a specific need.

5. Regularly assessing long tenure contingent labour engagements helps to ensure that such engagements are still the most economical and effective labour option.

6. Planning the engagement of contingent workers, including provisions for knowledge transfer, maximises the potential to obtain value for money from the use of contingent labour.

7. Assessing and centrally documenting the performance of contingent labour against agreed deliverables helps to ensure services are delivered as planned, including in terms of quality, and timeliness.

Download appendices for report on Contingent workforce

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #282 - released 27 April 2017

Published

Actions for Improving efficiency of irrigation water use on farms

Improving efficiency of irrigation water use on farms

Industry
Management and administration
Procurement
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration

The Department of Primary Industries (DPI) has a crucial role in assisting the irrigation industry to respond to the conflicting demands placed upon the state’s water resources. The State Plan emphasises the importance of water to agriculture, and gives DPI responsibility to use its training programs to help farmers continue to increase water use efficiency. DPI needs to work closely with agencies with which it shares responsibilities in the State Plan to ensure that its water use efficiency activities contribute to the State Plan goals. It needs to work closely with Treasury to document the services it will require to do this, the resources which will be needed, and how its success will be measured. This will ensure that DPI is well placed to continue to assist the NSW farming industry to adapt and survive periods of reduced water availability. 

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #172 - released 21 November 2007