The Audit Office is of the opinion that there are several features of the current Senior Executive Service (SES) model, or its application, which hinder the capacity of the SES to operate effectively in line with the Government’s stated objectives. The ultimate effect of these features is to reduce the capacity or perceived capacity of the SES to meet the Government’s objectives for the operation of the SES.

Taken overall, difficulties in the SES identified by the audit included: uncertainty caused by the way some contracts have been applied in practice, removal for reasons other than poor performance, informal strategies such as using restructuring to “terminate contracts and to move people in and out of positions regardless of their formal reported performance” (Section 5.4), inconsistently applied rules about selection/recruitment, appointment and removal of the SES, an imbalance between CES responsibility to the Minister as the employer/reviewer with their responsibility not to act in a political or partial manner, apparent lack of rigour in, value of and Ministerial accountability for CES performance review processes and failure to implement an adequate system of rewards and sanctions related to performance.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #59.1 - released 17 December 1998

This Performance Audit Report, prepared by the University of Technology, Sydney (UTS) on behalf of The Audit Office of New South Wales (NSW), is a study of the NSW Senior Executive Service (SES).

It found the dissonance between where optimal executive performance might take place on a performance spectrum, encompassing the formal SES and less formal political arenas, is canvassed. The critical point here is that this arena, between the informal political actions and the application of formal SES structures, where much of the important decision making takes place, will always be difficult to manage. Transparency in decision making processes where non partisan and partisan actions are clearly defined seems a primary essential element of performance if the integrity of the NSW SES is to be maintained.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #59.2 - released 17 December 1998

Information relating to the NSW public sector wide sickness absence levels, unlike in some other states, are presently not maintained or monitored centrally. The salaries and wages paid to individuals whilst on sickness absence on a public sector wide basis in 1996-97 was estimated to be $368.3m. This estimate does not take into account any flow -on effect resulting from sickness absence, eg overtime or other replacement cost.

Improved management of sickness absence provides an opportunity for the NSW public sector to gain benefits, including the reduction of salary costs associated with people on sickness absence. The salary differential between the sickness absence level currently existing and the sickness absence level reported for the private sector, is around $123m per annum. To assist with the management of sickness absence within the NSW public sector, The Audit Office of NSW developed a Better Practice Guide. This Guide has been referred to the Premier’s Department for consultation as a prelude to its completion and release.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #52 - released 27 August 1998

This Volume, Volume Two: The Survey - Detailed Findings, is the second of a two part Performance Audit Report on Management of Sickness Absence New South Wales Public Sector. The first volume, Volume One: Executive Briefing, identifies the main issues of sickness absenteeism identified during the audit.

This Report Volume, Volume Two: The Survey - Detailed Findings, presents the more detailed findings of the audit which were gathered from:

• the review and analysis of responses received from agencies to The Audit Office’s management of sickness absence survey

• fieldwork visits to selected public and private sector organisations, during the course of the audit, which supplemented the survey. 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #52 - released 27 August 1998

At the request of the Department of Gaming and Racing, the audit reviewed the efficiency and effectiveness of the organisation and management of casino surveillance undertaken pursuant to the Casino Control Act, 1992 (the Act).

Implicitly the Act requires an effective level of cooperation and coordination between the agencies to achieve their statutory roles and responsibilities. However, The Audit Office is of the opinion that this has not been achieved. As a consequence, the efficiency and effectiveness of the surveillance roles and processes carried out under the Act can be improved.

Revision is required to the surveillance methodology and its implementation, to the skills base within Director of Casino Surveillance (DCS) and the underlying working and to organisational arrangements between and within DCS and the New South Wales Casino Control Authority. Until such revision has been finalised, it is not possible to determine the level of resources or type of surveillance that needs to be undertaken and funded.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #50 - released 10 June 1998