Reports
Government Advertising 2017-18
The State Insurance Regulatory Authority’s (SIRA) ‘green slip refund’ campaign, and the TAFE semester one 2018 student recruitment campaign, complied with most requirements of the Government Advertising Act 2011 and the Government Advertising Guidelines, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford.
The Government Advertising Act 2011 (the Act) requires the Auditor-General to conduct a performance audit on the activities of one or more government agencies in relation to government advertising campaigns in each financial year. The performance audit assesses whether a government agency or agencies has carried out activities in relation to government advertising in an effective, economical and efficient manner and in compliance with the Act, the regulations, other laws and the Government Advertising Guidelines (the Guidelines).
This audit examined two campaigns conducted in 2017–18:
- the 'Green slip refund' campaign run by the State Insurance Regulatory Authority (SIRA)
- the semester one component of the 'TAFE NSW 2018 Student Recruitment Annual Campaign Program' run by the NSW TAFE Commission (TAFE).
Section 6 of the Act prohibits political advertising. Under this section, material that is part of a government advertising campaign must not contain the name, voice or image of a minister, member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament or the name, logo or any slogan of a political party. Further, a campaign must not be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party.
The State Insurance Regulatory Authority (SIRA) conducted the 'Green slip refund' campaign between March and June 2018. SIRA ran this campaign to raise awareness of the Compulsory Third Party (CTP) refunds and reforms after the Motor Accidents Injuries Act 2017 commenced in December 2017. SIRA's view is that the reforms include a reduced cost for CTP insurance, benefits for at-fault drivers, reduced opportunity for fraud and attempts to lower insurance company profits. Green slip holders are also able to claim partial refunds on their 2017 green slip insurance premium. The campaign aimed to make green slip holders aware of the refunds available, encourage them to claim online and to inform people about the changes to the green slip scheme. The campaign focused on the first two of these objectives. The total cost of the campaign was $1.9 million. See Appendix two for more details on this campaign.
Campaign materials we reviewed did not breach section 6 of the Act
Section 6 of the Act prohibits political advertising as part of a government advertising campaign. A government advertising campaign must not:
- be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party
- contain the name, voice or image of a minister, a member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament
- contain the name, logo, slogan or any other reference to a political party.
The audit team found no breaches of section 6 of the Act in the campaign material we reviewed.
Before the start of the campaign, SIRA conducted a survey which asked people whether they agreed ‘that the NSW Government is helping to reduce the cost of living by making positive reforms to:
- reduce the cost of green slips
- reduce the cost of health insurance
- increase the number of jobs
- increase investment in the state.'
SIRA's initial submission to peer review listed one of the campaign objectives as improving the perception of the government as a positive reformer. DPC advised SIRA that this should not be included. SIRA removed this objective.
Even though SIRA appropriately removed this objective, the post-campaign evaluation still measured agreement with the above statements, three of which did not relate to this campaign or SIRA's responsibilities. SIRA advised that these three additional statements were included to provide a broader context for any change in the green slip campaign survey results. For example, if all four measures reported an increase in positive responses of roughly the same size, then the increase may have been due to factors other than the advertising campaign.
This is not an appropriate use of the post-campaign evaluation, which should measure the success of the campaign against its stated objectives. The Guidelines list the purposes that government advertising may serve and none of these relate to improving the perception of the government. The inclusion of the above questions in SIRA's post-campaign evaluation creates a risk that the results may be used for party political purposes.
The campaign met most targets, however some were not challenging to achieve
The post-campaign evaluation demonstrated that the campaign met the targets for 12 of its 13 objectives including the targets relating to raising awareness of the refunds and the proportion of people claiming their refunds online. A fourteenth objective, the percentage of people aware that they should contact SIRA after a road accident injury, did not have a target set, meaning that it is not possible to say whether the campaign had the desired impact in this case.
In August 2017, before the campaign commenced, SIRA conducted a survey to determine the baselines for some of its objectives. This is a good practice to support an effective post campaign evaluation process. The survey found that 20 per cent of people were aware of the green slip reforms. SIRA's objective was to raise this to 25 per cent, which represents a small gain relative to the proposed campaign expenditure. The campaign aimed for 40 per cent of motorists to be aware of refunds, which is very low given that this was the primary focus of the campaign. SIRA followed the advice of its survey provider when setting these targets.
In the survey carried out after the campaign, 66 per cent of people were aware of the availability of green slip refunds for most motorists. The campaign also aimed to get 83 per cent of motorists to claim their refunds via online channels. It met this target, with a total of 84 per cent. Finally, 62 per cent of people in the post-campaign survey were aware of the green slip reforms. This result is discussed further below.
The overall target for total number of refunds claimed is 85 per cent of eligible drivers, that is to say CTP holders. SIRA will evaluate the results of this objective after the conclusion of the refund period in June 2019.
The campaign did little to inform the public about the broader green slip reforms
One objective of the green slip refund campaign was to inform the public about the green slip reforms. The final campaign creative material focused almost entirely on the green slip refunds rather than the range of other reforms. This was because the peer review raised concerns that the creative material was attempting to deliver too many messages.
The campaign submission stated that the advertising campaign would raise awareness of the broader reforms to the CTP scheme, citing several examples such as reduced opportunities for fraud and reduced insurer profits. SIRA also advised the Minister for Finance, Services and Property that secondary messaging in the campaign would benefit public understanding of the reforms.
Some of the television and radio advertisements referred to ‘more protection’ or ‘better protection’ for people injured on New South Wales roads, however advertisements did not refer to other elements of the reforms. Other campaign creative materials contained messages solely relating to the green slip refund and made no further reference to the broader reforms. SIRA used other communication channels, such as giving wallet cards to health service providers, to spread these messages to people, particularly those who had been injured.
Sixty two per cent of people in the post-campaign survey were aware of the green slip reforms. SIRA asked these people which benefits they associated with the reforms. The results of this survey are in Exhibit 4. Seventy-one per cent of this sample identified the reduced costs of green slips as one of the changes, but awareness of other elements of the reforms remains low. Though 29 per cent of people perceive the reforms to make the green slip scheme ‘fairer’, no more than 15 per cent of people could list a specific benefit which did not relate to insurance prices.
| Perceived benefit | Percentage aware of this benefit |
|---|---|
| Reduced costs of green slips for vehicle owners | 71% |
| A fairer scheme for all people | 29% |
| Reduced costs of comprehensive vehicle insurance | 20% |
| Better support for people injured on our roads | 15% |
| Less chances of fraudulent claims | 15% |
| Lowering insurance company profits | 13% |
| Quicker payment of claims to injured people | 10% |
Another campaign target was to ensure that people understood that they should contact SIRA in case of an injury. None of the campaign creative materials contained this information. SIRA did some limited work to inform the public about this through its social media channels. One of the pieces of creative material directed the reader to SIRA's website for further information on the reforms, which contained this information. During the campaign period, there was an increase in the number of calls received by SIRA's CTP Assist phone line. However, in the post-campaign evaluation, only two per cent of surveyed people identified that they should contact SIRA in case of an injury.
The media plan allowed sufficient time for cost-efficient media placement
During the peer review process, DPC provides advice to agencies about the time they should allow to ensure cost-efficient media placement. For example, DPC advise that agencies book television advertising six to 12 weeks in advance and that agencies book radio advertising two to eight weeks in advance.
SIRA allowed sufficient time between the completion of the peer review process and the commencement of the first advertising. SIRA signed the agreement with the approved Media Agency Services provider eight weeks before the campaign started, meaning that it could achieve cost-efficient media placement for all types of media used in this campaign.
SIRA directly negotiated with a single supplier, making it difficult to demonstrate value for money
SIRA directly negotiated with a single supplier to procure the campaign's creative material. A direct negotiation occurs when an agency negotiates with a proponent without first undergoing a competitive process. It is difficult to demonstrate value for money using direct negotiation due to the lack of competition.
ICAC's 'Guidelines for managing risks in direct negotiations' (ICAC Guidelines) provide guidance on how to undertake direct negotiations. SIRA has a direct negotiation checklist that aligns to the ICAC Guidelines. The SIRA checklist advises that staff should confirm that existing New South Wales prequalification schemes cannot provide the procurement before undertaking a direct negotiation. SIRA did not do this.
To procure creative materials, agencies can access the Advertising and Digital Communication Services prequalification scheme (the prequalification scheme). Using the prequalification scheme allows agencies to quickly seek quotes from suppliers who have a demonstrated track record and expertise. While agencies are not required to use the prequalification scheme, the NSW Procurement Board advises that agencies should use prequalification schemes where they are available to promote competition.
By using direct negotiation when the prequalification scheme was available, and by not seeking quotes from other suppliers, SIRA was acting in a way that reduced competition. This increases the risk that SIRA did not achieve value for money in its procurement of creative materials.
SIRA advised that it sought to ensure value for money by comparing the quote from its selected supplier with the amount spent on creative materials in other campaigns of similar size. SIRA did not document this analysis at the time or include it as part of the briefing note staff used to seek approval for undertaking direct negotiation. As a result, decision-makers were not fully informed when approving this engagement.
SIRA reported in a briefing note that it engaged in direct negotiations because:
- it believed that the original timeframe did not allow for a competitive tender process
- the supplier had done previous work on a related campaign for SIRA
- the supplier provided sample work which received positive feedback from focus groups.
In July 2017, when peer review commenced, SIRA planned to launch the campaign in November 2017 to coincide with the beginning of the green slip reforms. SIRA believed that this timeframe was narrow enough to warrant entering direct negotiations. The ICAC Guidelines advise that a narrow timeframe is not a valid reason to enter into a direct negotiation. In late October 2017, the campaign launch was delayed until March 2018 to stagger the demand on the resources of Service NSW, which is administering the refund.
The ICAC Guidelines also advise against re-appointing a supplier because it has performed previous work. Instead, agencies could consider previous experience as one of several factors when deciding between quotes. In cases where an agency asks a supplier to provide sample work, the ICAC Guidelines advise that agencies should request sample work from multiple potential suppliers to promote competition.
The campaign's cost benefit analysis complied with the Act and Guidelines
The Act requires a cost benefit analysis (CBA) for any government advertising campaign likely to exceed $1.0 million in value. Section six of the Guidelines set out the requirements for a government advertising CBA. The campaign's CBA complied with the requirements of the Act and the Guidelines.
The campaign CBA could have demonstrated further cost effectiveness if it considered alternative media mixes as outlined in NSW Treasury's 'Cost Benefit Analysis Framework for Government Advertising and Information Campaigns'. This would also have been consistent with the Handbook.
The cluster Secretary signed the compliance certificate instead of the head of SIRA
The Act requires the head of the agency running the campaign to sign a compliance certificate.
The Secretary of the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation, the cluster to which SIRA belongs, signed the campaign's compliance certificate. However, section 17(2) of the State Insurance and Care Governance Act 2015 states that SIRA is ‘for the purposes of any Act, a NSW Government agency.’ Given this, the Chief Executive of SIRA was responsible for signing the compliance certificate for this campaign.
This is a minor non-compliance with the Act because the Chief Executive had reviewed the campaign and recommended that the Secretary sign the compliance certificate.
The NSW TAFE Commission (TAFE) ran the 'TAFE NSW 2018 Student Recruitment Annual Campaign Program' from November 2017 to September 2018. The aim of the campaign was to assist TAFE in achieving its 2018 student enrolment target by improving the perception of TAFE's brand and generating student enquiries. This is the first state-wide campaign run by TAFE operating under the One TAFE model. Previously, each TAFE Institute ran its own campaigns. The total budget of the campaign was $19.5 million. This audit examined only the semester one 2018 component of the campaign, which ran from November 2017 to April 2018 at a total cost of $9.5 million. See Appendix two for more details on this campaign.
TAFE was able to place most of its campaign media within cost-efficient timeframes. TAFE also achieved efficiencies by re-using many creative materials from a previous campaign.
The campaign materials we reviewed did not breach section 6 of the Act
Section 6 of the Act prohibits political advertising as part of a government advertising campaign. A government advertising campaign must not:
- be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party
- contain the name, voice or image of a minister, a member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament
- contain the name, logo, slogan or any other reference to a political party.
The audit team found no breaches of section 6 of the Act in the campaign material we reviewed.
The campaign achieved 16 of 24 objectives, but did not reach its enrolment target
The campaign had 24 objectives which had a target for semester one. TAFE set these targets using a combination of previous experience, corporate objectives and brand surveys.
The overall objective of the combined semester one and two campaigns was to support TAFE achieving its 2018 total enrolment target of 549,636. TAFE's semester one target was 361,350, which it did not achieve. This indicates that the campaign was not fully effective.
The campaign achieved 11 of its 16 output objectives. The output targets related to TAFE's media placements and ability to reach an audience efficiently. TAFE tracked progress against many of the campaign's output objectives daily. TAFE altered its media channels throughout the campaign meaning that some of the output objectives were not met because TAFE decided to focus on alternative media channels. The campaign also achieved all seven of its outcome objectives. The outcome objectives related to changing the public perception of TAFE.
TAFE's initial media plan allowed for efficient media placement
During the peer review process, DPC provides advice to agencies about the time they should allow to ensure cost-efficient media placement. For example, DPC advise that agencies book television advertising six to 12 weeks in advance and that agencies book radio advertising two to eight weeks in advance.
While TAFE's initial media plan allowed sufficient time between the approval of the campaign and its launch, a delay in receiving final approval for the campaign meant TAFE could not purchase media placements until two months later than planned. Most purchases still remained within DPC's recommended timeframes, but Indigenous television advertisements and metropolitan out of home advertisements both fell outside DPC's recommended time periods by one week. These delays did not impact on TAFE's efficiency.
TAFE re-used many creative materials, achieving some cost-savings
Rather than commissioning new creative materials, TAFE re-used many creative materials from the previous campaign and supplemented these with a selection of new creative materials. TAFE advised that this led to a cost saving of approximately $130,000.
TAFE sought quotes from suppliers on the government's Advertising and Digital Communication Services prequalification scheme for two creative material contracts. These contracts covered updates to existing materials and a selection of new materials.
The campaign's cost-benefit analysis did not comply with three requirements of the Guidelines
The Act requires an agency to conduct a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) if the cost of an advertising campaign is likely to exceed $1.0 million. The Guidelines set out the requirements of this CBA. TAFE did not comply with three of these requirements, outlined in Exhibit 5.
| 6.2 The cost benefit analysis must isolate the additional costs and benefits attributable to the advertising campaign itself compared to the base-case of not-advertising. 6.3 The cost benefit analysis must specify the extent to which the expected benefits could be achieved without advertising. 6.4 The cost benefit analysis must outline what options other than advertising could be used to successfully implement the program and achieve the program benefits and a comparison of their costs. |
In this circumstance, section 6.2 of the Guidelines required the CBA to identify the number of enrolments TAFE would expect if it did not advertise. TAFE advised us that it is not possible to say what this scenario would look like because there had always been some degree of advertising, however, this argument is not reflected in the CBA.
TAFE used 2017 as the baseline in the CBA. In 2017, TAFE spent $13.2 million on advertising. As such, the CBA was only able to isolate the impact of the increased expenditure rather than the impact of the campaign's entire $19.5 million expenditure. TAFE advised that 2017 had the most reliable state-wide data and this contributed to the decision to use it as the baseline.
During the audit, TAFE sought advice from NSW Treasury regarding whether a 2017 baseline was appropriate and NSW Treasury advised that it was. Regardless, TAFE did not receive this advice prior to writing the CBA and did not put commentary around this in the CBA. This would also not be sufficient for fulfilling the requirements of the Guidelines.
The CBA did not comply with sections 6.3 and 6.4 of the Guidelines. The CBA briefly considered the impact of spending the campaign budget directly on new training courses, however there was no sustained analysis of this option. TAFE staff advised that there are no realistic alternatives to advertising for achieving the campaign's objectives. However we did not see analysis to support this conclusion in documents provided to us.
The campaign CBA could have better demonstrated cost effectiveness if it considered alternative media mixes as outlined in NSW Treasury's 'Cost Benefit Analysis Framework for Government Advertising and Information Campaigns'. This would also have been consistent with the Handbook.
TAFE made one inaccurate claim in its advertising and overstated a second
The Guidelines set out rules regarding the content of a government advertising campaign. Exhibit 6 sets out one of the principles with which agencies must comply.
The following principles apply to the style and content of government advertising campaigns:
|
TAFE made one inaccurate claim in its advertising and overstated a second.
In some campaign creative material, TAFE claimed that 78 per cent of its own graduates are employed after training (Exhibit 15 in Appendix 2). According to the National Centre for Vocational Education Research, 78 per cent of New South Wales Vocational Education and Training (VET) graduates (i.e. from all training providers) are employed after training. The result for TAFE graduates is 70.4 per cent.
One of the campaign's television advertisements refers to TAFE as ‘Australia's most reputable education provider’. This statement referred to a survey of current TAFE students who were asked where they would consider studying in future: TAFE, University or a private college. The current TAFE students selected TAFE by a large margin. The limited scope of TAFE's student survey and its results do not support the claim that it is ‘Australia's most reputable education provider’.
DPC did not consistently communicate the transitional arrangements for the Brand Guidelines and as such much of TAFE's creative material did not comply at campaign launch
On 7 August 2017, the government released the NSW Government Brand Guidelines (Brand Guidelines), setting out how agencies use the NSW Government logo. The Brand Guidelines replaced the Branding Style Guide which had been in place since September 2015. Some agencies were exempt from using the Branding Style Guide and the introduction of the new Brand Guidelines required these agencies to apply for a new exemption.
TAFE had recently commenced the peer review process for this campaign when the Brand Guidelines were released. TAFE was exempt from the requirements of the Branding Style Guide and as such the material which TAFE was planning to re-use in the new campaign did not contain the NSW Government logo.
Communication about how long agencies had to make themselves compliant with the Brand Guidelines was unclear. On 11 August 2017, the Chair of the Cabinet Standing Committee on Communication and Government Advertising (the Committee) sent a letter to the Secretary of the Department of Industry informing him that the Department must update all its material to be compliant with the Brand Guidelines ‘as soon as practicable within an 18-month transition period’. The Department of Industry advised TAFE that new advertising would need to be immediately compliant, however it was not clear if this included materials which agencies were re-using from previous campaigns. DPC advised the audit team that it expected re-used materials to be compliant when agencies launched new campaigns. DPC provided this advice to some agencies but did not communicate it more broadly. We could not source evidence that DPC provided this advice to TAFE.
DPC ran workshops to explain the transitional arrangements in September 2017 for the changes in the Brand Guidelines, however these did not specifically address the transitional timeframes for new advertising campaigns.
The Department of Industry, on behalf of TAFE, applied to the Committee for approval to co-brand the TAFE logo with the NSW Government logo. This was approved in October 2017. The requirements for co-branding are in Exhibit 7.
|
Co-branding partners the agency logo with the NSW Government logo. The NSW Government logo must always be presented as the dominant or lead brand. The Brand Guidelines provide the following template shown below the exhibit box. The NSW Government logo is on the left and the agency logo is placed on the right, with a dividing line between them. |
Appendix one - Responses from agencies
Appendix two - About the campaigns
Appendix three - About the audit
Appendix four - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #311 - released 18 December 2018
Unsolicited proposal process for the lease of Ausgrid
In October 2016, the NSW Government accepted an unsolicited proposal from IFM Investors and AustralianSuper to lease 50.4 per cent of Ausgrid for 99 years. The deal followed the Federal Government’s rejection of two bids from foreign investors, for national security reasons.
A performance audit of the lease of Ausgrid has found shortcomings in the unsolicited proposal process. Releasing the audit findings today, the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford said ‘this transaction involved a $20 billion asset owned by the people of New South Wales. As such, it warranted strict adherence to established guidelines’.
Ausgrid is a distributor of electricity to eastern parts of Sydney, the Central Coast, Newcastle and the Hunter Region.
In June 2014, the then government announced its commitment to lease components of the state's electricity network as part of the Rebuilding NSW plan. Implementation of the policy began after the government was re-elected in 2015. Between November 2015 and August 2016, the NSW Government held a competitive tender process to lease 50.4 per cent of Ausgrid for 99 years. The NSW Government abandoned the process on 19 August 2016 after the Australian Treasurer rejected two bids from foreign investors, for national security reasons. That day, the Premier and Treasurer released a media statement clarifying the government's objective to complete the transaction via a competitive process in time to include the proceeds in the 2017–18 budget.
On 31 August 2016, the state received an unsolicited proposal from IFM Investors and AustralianSuper to acquire an interest in Ausgrid under the same terms proposed by the state during the tender process. In October 2016, the government accepted the unsolicited proposal.
This audit examined whether the unsolicited proposal process for the partial long-term lease of Ausgrid was effectively conducted and in compliance with the government’s 2014 Unsolicited Proposals: Guide for Submission and Assessment (Unsolicited Proposals Guide or the Guide).
The audit focused on how the government-appointed Assessment Panel and Proposal Specific Steering Committee assessed key requirements in the Guide that unsolicited proposals must be demonstrably unique and represent value for money.
The evidence available does not conclusively demonstrate the unsolicited proposal was unique, and there were some shortcomings in the negotiation process, documentation and segregation of duties. That said, before the final commitment to proceed with the lease, the state obtained assurance that the proposal delivered value for money.
It is particularly important to demonstrate unsolicited proposals are unique, in order to justify the departure from other transaction processes that offer greater competition, transparency and certainty about value for money.
The Assessment Panel and the Proposal Specific Steering Committee determined the Ausgrid unsolicited proposal was unique, primarily on the basis that the proponent did not require foreign investment approval from the Australian Treasurer, and the lease transaction could be concluded earlier than through a second tender process. However, the evidence that persuaded the Panel and Committee did not demonstrate that no other proponent could conclude the transaction in time to meet the government’s deadline.
It is not appropriate to determine an unsolicited proposal is unique because it delivers an earlier outcome than possible through a tender process. The Panel and Committee did not contend, and it is not evident, that the unsolicited proposal was the only way to meet the government’s transaction deadline.
The evidence does not demonstrate that the proponent was the only party that would not have needed foreign investment approval to participate in the transaction. It also does not demonstrate that the requirement for foreign investment approval would have reduced the pool of foreign buyers to the degree that it would be reasonable to assume none would emerge.
The Panel, Committee and financial advisers determined that the final price represented value for money, and that retendering offered a material risk of a worse financial outcome. However, an acceptable price was revealed early in the negotiation process, and doing so made it highly unlikely that the proponent would offer a higher price than that disclosed. The Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) and NSW Treasury were not able to provide a documented reserve price, bargaining strategy or similar which put the negotiations in context. It is not evident that the Panel or Committee authorised, justified or endorsed negotiations in advance.
Key aspects of governance recommended by the Guide were in place. Some shortcomings relating to role segregation, record keeping and probity assurance weakened the effectiveness of the unsolicited proposal process adopted for Ausgrid.
The reasons for accepting that the proposal and proponent were unique are not compelling.
The Unsolicited Proposals Guide says the 'unique benefits of the proposal and the unique ability of the proponent to deliver the proposal' must be demonstrated.
The conclusion reached by the Panel and Committee that the proposal offered a ‘unique ability to deliver (a) strategic outcome’ was primarily based on the proponent not requiring foreign investment approval from the Australian Treasurer, and allowing the government to complete the lease transaction earlier than by going through a second tender process.
It is not appropriate to determine an unsolicited proposal is unique because it delivers an earlier outcome than possible through a tender process. The Panel and Committee did not contend, and it is not evident, that the unsolicited proposal was the only way to meet the government’s transaction deadline.
The evidence does not demonstrate that the proponent was the only party that would not have needed foreign investment approval to participate in the transaction. Nor does it demonstrate that the requirement for foreign investment approval would have reduced the pool of foreign buyers to the degree that it would be reasonable to assume none would emerge.
That said, the Australian Treasurer’s decision to reject the two bids from the previous tender process created uncertainty about the conditions under which he would approve international bids. The financial advisers engaged for the Ausgrid transaction informed the Panel and Committee that:
- it was not likely another viable proponent would emerge soon enough to meet the government’s transaction deadline
- the market would be unlikely to deliver a better result than offered by the proponent
- going to tender presented a material risk of a worse financial result.
The Unsolicited Proposals Guide says that a proposal to directly purchase or acquire a government-owned entity or property will generally not be unique. The Ausgrid unsolicited proposal fell into this category.
Recommendations:
DPC should ensure future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government business or asset:
- recognise that when considering uniqueness they should:
- require very strong evidence to decide that both the proponent and proposal are the only ones of their kind that could meet the government’s objectives
- give thorough consideration to any reasonable counter-arguments against uniqueness.
- rigorously consider all elements of the Unsolicited Proposals Guide when determining whether a proposal should be dealt with as an unsolicited proposal, and document these deliberations and all relevant evidence
- do not use speed of transaction compared to a market process as justification for uniqueness.
The Panel and Committee concluded the price represented value for money, based on peer-reviewed advice from their financial advisers and knowledge acquired from previous tenders. The financial advisers also told the Panel and Committee that there was a material risk the state would receive a lower price than offered by the unsolicited proposal if it immediately proceeded with a second market transaction.
The state commenced negotiations on price earlier than the Guide says they should have. Early disclosure of a price that the state would accept reduced the likelihood of achieving a price greater than this. DPC says the intent of this meeting was to quickly establish whether the proponents could meet the state’s benchmark rather than spending more time and resources on a proposal which had no prospect of proceeding.
DPC and NSW Treasury were not able to provide a documented reserve price, negotiation strategy or similar which put the negotiations and price achieved in context. It was not evident that the Panel or Committee authorised, justified or endorsed negotiations in advance. However, the Panel and Committee endorsed the outcomes of the negotiations.
The negotiations were informed by the range of prices achieved for similar assets and the specific bids for Ausgrid from the earlier market process.
Recommendations:
DPC should ensure any future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government business or asset:
- document a minimum acceptable price, and a negotiating strategy designed to maximise price, before commencing negotiations
- do not communicate an acceptable price to the proponent, before the negotiation stage of the process, and then only as part of a documented bargaining strategy.
The state established a governance structure in accordance with the Unsolicited Proposals Guide, including an Assessment Panel and Proposal Specific Steering Committee. The members of the Panel and Steering Committee were senior and experienced officers, as befitted the size and nature of the unsolicited proposal.
The separation of negotiation, assessment and review envisaged by the Guide was not maintained fully. The Chair of the Assessment Panel and a member of the Steering Committee were involved in negotiations with the proponent.
DPC could not provide comprehensive records of some key interactions with the proponent or a documented negotiation strategy. The absence of such records means the Department cannot demonstrate engagement and negotiation processes were authorised and rigorous.
The probity adviser reported there were no material probity issues with the transaction. The probity adviser also provided audit services. This is not good practice. The same party should not provide both advisory and audit services on the same transaction.
Recommendations:
DPC should ensure any future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government entity or asset:
• maintain separation between negotiation, assessment and review in line with the Unsolicited Proposals Guide
• keep an auditable trail of documentation relating to the negotiation process
• maintain separation between any probity audit services engaged and the probity advisory and reporting services recommended in the current Guide.
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - NSW Government’s summary of assessment of the Ausgrid unsolicited proposal
Appendix three - The definition and nature of unsolicited proposals
Appendix four - Ausgrid unsolicited proposal process
Appendix five - About the audit
Appendix six - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #309 - released 11 December 2018
Internal Controls and Governance 2018
The Auditor-General for New South Wales Margaret Crawford found that as NSW state government agencies’ digital footprint increases they need to do more to address new and emerging information technology (IT) risks. This is one of the key findings to emerge from the second stand-alone report on internal controls and governance of the 40 largest NSW state government agencies.
This report analyses the internal controls and governance of the 40 largest agencies in the NSW public sector for the year ended 30 June 2018.
This report covers the findings and recommendations from our 2017–18 financial audits that relate to internal controls and governance at the 40 largest agencies (refer to Appendix three) in the NSW public sector.
This report offers insights into internal controls and governance in the NSW public sector
This is our second report dedicated to internal controls and governance at NSW State Government agencies. The report provides insights into the effectiveness of controls and governance processes in the NSW public sector by:
- highlighting the potential risks posed by weaknesses in controls and governance processes
- helping agencies benchmark the adequacy of their processes against their peers
- focusing on new and emerging risks, and the internal controls and governance processes that might address those risks.
Without strong governance systems and internal controls, agencies increase the risks associated with effectively managing their finances and delivering services to citizens. The way agencies deliver services increasingly relies on contracts and partnerships with the private sector. Many of these arrangements deliver front line services, but others provide less visible back office support. For example, an agency may rely on an IT service provider to manage a key system used to provide services to the community. The contract and service level agreements are only truly effective where they are actively managed to reduce risks to continuous quality service delivery, such as interruptions caused by system outages, cyber security attacks and data security breaches.
Our audits do not review all aspects of internal controls and governance every year. We select a range of measures, and report on those that present heightened risks for agencies to mitigate. This report divides these into the following five areas:
- Internal control trends
- Information technology (IT), including IT vendor management
- Transparency and performance reporting
- Management of purchasing cards and taxis
- Fraud and corruption control.
The findings in this report should not be used to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of individual agency control environments and governance arrangements. Specific financial reporting, controls and service delivery comments are included in the individual 2018 cluster financial audit reports, which will be tabled in Parliament from November to December 2018.
The focus of the report has changed since last year
Last year's report topics included asset management, ethics and conduct, and risk management. We are reporting on new topics this year. We plan to introduce new topics and re-visit our previous topics in subsequent reports on a cyclical basis. This will provide a baseline against which to measure the NSW public sectors’ progress in implementing appropriate internal controls and governance processes to mitigate existing, new and emerging risks in the public sector.
Agencies selected for the volume account for 95 per cent of the state's expenditure
While we have covered only 40 agencies in this report, those selected are a large enough group to identify common issues and insights. They represent about 95 per cent of total expenditure for all NSW public sector agencies.
Internal controls are processes, policies and procedures that help agencies to:
- operate effectively and efficiently
- produce reliable financial reports
- comply with laws and regulations
- support ethical government.
This chapter outlines the overall trends for agency controls and governance issues, including the number of findings, level of risk and the most common deficiencies we found across agencies. The rest of this volume presents this year’s controls and governance findings in more detail.
| Observation | Conclusions and recommendations |
|---|---|
| 2.1 High risk findings | |
| We found six high risk findings (seven in 2016–17), one of which was repeated from both last year and 2015–16. | Recommendation: Agencies should reduce risk by addressing high risk internal control deficiencies as a priority. |
| 2.2 Common findings | |
| We found several internal controls and governance findings common to multiple agencies. | Conclusion: Central agencies or the lead agency in a cluster can play a lead role in helping ensure agency responses to common findings are consistent, timely, efficient and effective. |
| 2.3 New and repeat findings | |
| Although internal control deficiencies decreased over the last four years, this year has seen a 42 per cent increase in internal control deficiencies. | The increase in new IT control deficiencies and repeat IT control deficiencies signifies an emerging risk for agencies. |
| IT control deficiencies feature in this increase, having risen by 63 per cent since last year. The number of repeat IT control deficiencies has doubled and is driven by the increasing digital footprint left by agencies as government prioritises on-line interfaces with citizens, and the number of transactions conducted through digital channels increases |
Recommendation: Agencies should reduce IT risks by:
|
Government agencies’ financial reporting is now heavily reliant on information technology (IT). IT is also increasingly important to the delivery of agency services. These systems often provide the data to help monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of agency processes and services they deliver. Our audits reviewed whether agencies have effective controls in place to manage both key financial systems and IT service contracts.
| Observation | Conclusions and recommendations |
|---|---|
| 3.1 Management of IT vendors | |
| Contract management framework Although 87 per cent of agencies have a contract management policy to manage IT vendors, one fifth require review. |
Conclusion: Agencies can more effectively manage IT vendor contracts by developing policies and procedures to ensure vendor management frameworks are kept up to date, plans are in place to manage vendor performance and risk, and compliance with the framework is monitored by:
|
| Contract risk management Forty-one per cent of agencies are not using contract management plans and do not assess contract risks. Half of the agencies that did assess contract risks, had not updated the risk assessments since the commencement of the contract. |
Conclusion: Instead of applying a 'set and forget' approach in relation to management of contract risks, agencies should assess risk regularly and develop a plan to actively manage identified risks throughout the contract lifecycle - from negotiation and commencement, to termination. |
|
Performance management Only 24 per cent of agencies sought assurance about the accuracy of vendor reporting against KPIs, yet sixty-seven per cent of the IT contracts allow agencies to determine performance based payments and/or penalise underperformance. |
Conclusion: Agencies are monitoring IT vendor performance, but could improve outcomes and more effectively manage under-performance by:
|
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Transitioning services Where IT vendor contracts do make provision for transitioning-out, only 28 per cent of agencies have developed a transitioning-out plan with their IT vendor. |
Conclusion: Contract transition/phase out clauses and plans can mitigate risks to service disruption, ensure internal controls remain in place, avoid unnecessary costs and reduce the risk of 'vendor lock-in'. |
| Contract Registers Eleven out of forty agencies did not have a contract register, or have registers that are not accurate and/or complete. |
Conclusion: A contract register helps to manage an agency’s compliance obligations under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (the GIPA Act). However, it also helps agencies more effectively manage IT vendors by:
Recommendation: Agencies should ensure their contract registers are complete and accurate so they can more effectively govern contracts and manage compliance obligations. |
| 3.2 IT general controls | |
| Governance Ninety-five per cent of agencies have established policies to manage key IT processes and functions within the agency, with ten per cent of those due for review. |
Conclusion: Regular review of IT policies ensures risks are considered and appropriate strategies and procedures are implemented to manage these risks on a consistent basis. An absence of policies can lead to ad-hoc responses to risks, and failure to consider emerging IT risks and changes to agency IT environments. |
|
User access administration
|
Recommendation: Agencies should strengthen the administration of user access to prevent inappropriate access to key systems. |
| Privileged access Forty per cent of agencies do not periodically review logs of the activities of privileged users to identify suspicious or unauthorised activities. |
Recommendation: Agencies should:
|
| Password controls Twenty-three per cent of agencies did not comply with their own policy on password parameters. |
Recommendation: Agencies should ensure IT password settings comply with their password policies. |
| Program changes Fifteen per cent of agencies had deficient IT program change controls mainly related to segregation of duties and authorisation and testing of IT program changes prior to deployment. |
Recommendation: Agencies should maintain appropriate segregation of duties in their IT functions and test system changes before they are deployed. |
This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations from our review of how agencies reported their performance in their 2016–17 annual reports. The Annual Reports (Statutory Bodies) Regulation 2015 and Annual Reports (Departments) Regulation 2015 (annual reports regulation) currently prescribes the minimum requirements for agency annual reports.
| Observation | Conclusion or recommendation |
| 4.1 Reporting on performance | |
|
Only 57 per cent of agencies linked reporting on performance to their strategic objectives. The use of targets and reporting performance over time was limited and applied inconsistently. |
Conclusion: There is significant disparity in the quality and consistency of how agencies report on their performance in their annual reports. This limits the reliability and transparency of reported performance information. Agencies could improve performance reporting by clearly linking strategic objectives to reported outcomes, and reporting on performance against targets over time. NSW Treasury may need to provide more guidance to agencies to support consistent and high-quality performance reporting in annual reports. |
|
There is no independent assurance that the performance metrics agencies report in their annual reports are accurate. Prior performance audits have noted issues related to the collection of performance information. For example, our 2016 Report on Red Tape Reduction highlighted inaccuracies in how the dollar-value of red tape reduction had been reported. |
Conclusion: The ability of Parliament and the public to rely on reported information as a relevant and accurate reflection of an agency's performance is limited. The relevance and accuracy of performance information is enhanced when:
|
| 4.2 Reporting on reports | |
|
Agency reporting on major projects does not meet the requirements of the annual reports regulation. Forty-seven per cent of agencies did not report on costs to date and estimated completion dates for major works in progress. Of the 47 per cent of agencies that reported on major works, only one agency reported detail about significant cost overruns, delays, amendments, deferments or cancellations. |
NSW Treasury produce an annual report checklist to help agencies comply with their annual report obligations. Recommendation: Agencies should comply with the annual reports regulation and report on all mandatory fields, including significant cost overruns and delays, for their major works in progress. |
|
The information the annual reports regulation requires agencies to report deals only with major works in progress. There is no requirement to report on completed works. Sixteen of 30 agencies reported some information on completed major works. |
Conclusion: Agencies could improve their transparency if they reported, or were required to report:
|
This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency preventative and detective controls over purchasing card and taxi use for 2017–18.
| Observation | Conclusion or recommendation |
| 5.1 Management of purchasing cards | |
| Volume of credit card spend Purchasing card expenditure has increased by 76 per cent over the last four years in response to a government review into the cost savings possible from using purchasing cards for low value, high volume procurement. |
Conclusion: The increasing use of purchasing cards highlights the importance of an effective framework for the use and management of purchasing cards. |
| Policy framework We found all agencies that held purchasing cards had a policy in place, but 26 per cent of agencies have not reviewed their purchasing card policy by the scheduled date, or do not have a scheduled revision date stated within their policy. |
Recommendation: Agencies should mitigate the risks associated with increased purchasing card use by ensuring policies and purchasing card frameworks remain current and compliant with the core requirements of TPP 17–09 'Use and Management of NSW Government Purchasing Cards'. |
| Preventative controls We found that:
|
Agencies have designed and implemented preventative controls aimed at deterring the potential misuse of purchasing cards. Conclusion: Further opportunities exist for agencies to better control the use of purchasing cards, such as:
|
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Detective controls Major reviews, such as data analytics (29 per cent of agencies) and independent spot checks (49 per cent of agencies) are not widely used. |
Agencies have designed and implemented detective controls aimed at identifying potential misuse of purchasing cards. Conclusion: More effective monitoring using purchasing card data can provide better visibility over spending activity and can be used to:
|
| 5.2 Management of taxis | |
| Policy framework Thirteen per cent of agencies have not developed and implemented a policy to manage taxi use. In addition:
|
Conclusion: Agencies can promote savings and provide more options to staff where their taxi use policies:
|
| Detective controls All agencies approve taxi expenditure by expense reimbursement, purchasing card and Cabcharge, and have implemented controls around this approval process. However, beyond this there is minimal monitoring and review activity, such as data monitoring, independent spot checks or internal audit reviews. |
Conclusion: Taxi spend at agencies is not significant in terms of its dollar value, but it is significant from a probity perspective. Agencies can better address the probity risk by incorporating taxi use into a broader purchasing card or fraud monitoring program. |
Fraud and corruption control is one of the 17 key elements of our governance lighthouse. Recent reports from ICAC into state agencies and local government councils highlight the need for effective fraud control and ethical frameworks. Effective frameworks can help protect an agency from events that risk serious reputational damage and financial loss.
Our 2016 Fraud Survey found the NSW Government agencies we surveyed reported 1,077 frauds over the three year period to 30 June 2015. For those frauds where an estimate of losses was made, the reported value exceeded $10.0 million. The report also highlighted that the full extent of fraud in the NSW public sector could be higher than reported because:
- unreported frauds in organisations can be almost three times the number of reported frauds
- our 2015 survey did not include all NSW public sector agencies, nor did it include any NSW universities or local councils
- fraud committed by citizens such as fare evasion and fraudulent state tax self-assessments was not within the scope of our 2015 survey
- agencies did not estimate a value for 599 of the 1,077 (56 per cent) reported frauds.
Commissioning and outsourcing of services to the private sector and the advancement of digital technology are changing the fraud and corruption risks agencies face. Fraud risk assessments should be updated regularly and in particular where there are changes in agency business models. NSW Treasury Circular TC18-02 NSW Fraud and Corruption Control Policy now requires agencies develop, implement and maintain a fraud and corruption control framework, effective from 1 July 2018.
Our Fraud Control Improvement Kit provides guidance and practical advice to help organisations implement an effective fraud control framework. The kit is divided into ten attributes. Three key attributes have been assessed below; prevention, detection and notification systems.
This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency fraud and corruption controls for 2017–18.
| Observation | Conclusion or recommendation |
| 6.1 Prevention systems | |
|
Prevention systems Only 54 per cent of agencies have an employment screening policy and all agencies have IT security policies, but gaps in IT security controls could undermine their policies. |
Conclusion: Most agencies have implemented fraud prevention systems to reduce the risk of fraud. However poor IT security along with other gaps in agency prevention systems, such as employment screening practices heightens the risk of fraud and inappropriate use of data. Agencies can improve their fraud prevention systems by:
|
| Twenty-three per cent of agencies were not performing fraud risk assessments and some agency fraud risk assessments may not be as robust as they could be. | Conclusion: Agencies' systems of internal controls may be less effective where new and emerging fraud risks have been overlooked, or known weaknesses have not been rectified. |
| 6.2 Detection systems | |
| Detection systems Several agencies reported they were developing a data monitoring program, but only 38 per cent of agencies had already implemented a program. |
Studies have shown data monitoring, whereby entire populations of transactional data are analysed for indicators of fraudulent activity, is one of the most effective methods of early detection. Early detection decreases the duration a fraud remains undetected thereby limiting the extent of losses. Conclusion: Data monitoring is an effective tool for early detection of fraud and is more effective when informed by a comprehensive fraud risk assessment. |
| 6.3 Notification systems | |
| Notification system All agencies have notification systems for reporting actual or suspected fraud and corruption. Most agencies provide multiple reporting lines, provide training and publicise options for staff to report actual or suspected fraud and corruption. |
Conclusion: Training staff about their obligations and the use of fraud notification systems promotes a fraud-aware culture |
Members' Additional Entitlements 2017
Progress and measurement of the Premier's Priorities
The Premier’s Implementation Unit uses a systematic approach to measuring and reporting progress towards the Premier’s Priorities performance targets, but public reporting needed to improve, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General of NSW, Margaret Crawford.
The Premier of New South Wales has established 12 Premier’s Priorities. These are key performance targets for government.
| The 12 Premier's Priorities | |
|---|---|
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Source: Department of Premier and Cabinet, Premier’s Priorities website.
Each Premier’s Priority has a lead agency and minister responsible for achieving the performance target.
The Premier’s Implementation Unit (PIU) was established within the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) in 2015. The PIU is a delivery unit that supports agencies to measure and monitor performance, make progress toward the Premier’s Priorities targets, and report progress to the Premier, key ministers and the public.
This audit assessed how effectively the NSW Government is progressing and reporting on the Premier's Priorities.
The Premier’s Implementation Unit (PIU) is effective in assisting agencies to make progress against the Premier’s Priorities targets. Progress reporting is regular but transparency to the public is weakened by the lack of information about specific measurement limitations and lack of clarity about the relationship of the targets to broader government objectives.The PIU promotes a systematic approach to measuring performance and reporting progress towards the Premier’s Priorities’ performance targets. Public reporting would be improved with additional information about the rationale for choosing specific targets to report on broader government objectives.
The PIU provides a systematic approach to measuring performance and reporting progress towards the Premier's Priorities performance targets. Public reporting would be improved with additional information about the rationale for choosing specific targets to report on broader government objectives. The data used to measure the Premier’s Priorities comes from a variety of government and external datasets, some of which have known limitations. These limitations are not revealed in public reporting, and only some are revealed in progress reported to the Premier and ministers. This limits the transparency of reporting.
The PIU assists agencies to avoid unintended outcomes that can arise from prioritising particular performance measures over other areas of activity. The PIU has adopted a collaborative approach to assisting agencies to analyse performance using data, and helping them work across organisational silos to achieve the Premier’s Priorities targets.
Data used to measure progress for some of the Premier’s Priorities has limitations which are not made clear when progress is reported. This reduces transparency about the reported progress. Public reporting would also be improved with additional information about the relationship between specific performance measures and broader government objectives.
The PIU is responsible for reporting progress to the Premier, key ministers and the public. Agencies provide performance data and some play a role in preparing progress reports for the Premier and ministers. For 11 of the Premier's Priorities, progress is reported against measurable and time-related performance targets. For the infrastructure priority, progress is reported against project milestones.
Progress of some Priorities is measured using data that has known limitations, which should be noted wherever progress is reported. For example, the data used to report on housing completions does not take housing demolitions into account, and is therefore overstating the contribution of this performance measure to housing supply. This known limitation is not explained in progress reports or on the public website.
Data used to measure progress is sourced from a mix of government and external datasets. Updated progress data for most Premier’s Priorities is published on the Premier’s Priorities website annually, although reported to the Premier and key ministers more frequently. The PIU reviews the data and validates it through fieldwork with front line agencies. The PIU also assists agencies to avoid unintended outcomes that can arise from prioritising single performance measures. Most, but not all, agencies use additional indicators to check for misuse of data or perverse outcomes.
We examined the reporting processes and controls for five of the Premier’s Priorities. We found that there is insufficient assurance over the accuracy of the data on housing approvals.
The relationships between performance measures and broader government objectives is not always clearly explained on the Premier’s Priority website, which is the key source of public information about the Premier’s Priorities. For example, the Premier’s Priority to reduce litter volumes is communicated as “Keeping our Environment Clean.” While the website explains why reducing litter is important, it does not clearly explain why that particular target has been chosen to measure progress in keeping the environment clean.
By December 2018, the Department of Premier and Cabinet should:
- improve transparency of public reporting by:
- providing information about limitations of reported data and associated performance
- clarifying the relationship between the Premier’s Priorities performance targets and broader government objectives.
- ensure that processes to check and verify data are in place for all agency data sources
- encourage agencies to develop and implement additional supporting indicators for all Premier’s Priority performance measures to prevent and detect unintended consequences or misuse of data.
The Premier's Implementation Unit is effective in supporting agencies to deliver progress towards the Premier’s Priority targets.
The PIU promotes a systematic approach to monitoring and reporting progress against a target, based on a methodology used in delivery units elsewhere in the world. The PIU undertakes internal self-evaluation, and commissions regular reviews of methodology implementation from the consultancy that owns the methodology and helped to establish the PIU. However, the unit lacks periodic independent reviews of their overall effectiveness. The PIU has adopted a collaborative approach and assists agencies to analyse performance using data, and work across organisational silos to achieve the Premier’s Priorities targets.
Agency representatives recognise the benefits of being responsible for a Premier's Priority and speak of the value of being held to account and having the attention of the Premier and senior ministers.
By June 2019, the Department of Premier and Cabinet should:
- establish routine collection of feedback about PIU performance including:
- independent assurance of PIU performance
- opportunity for agencies to provide confidential feedback.
Appendix one: Response from agency
Appendix three: About the audit
Appendix four: Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #307 - released 13 September 2018
HealthRoster benefits realisation
The HealthRoster system is delivering some business benefits but Local Health Districts are yet to use all of its features, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. HealthRoster is an IT system designed to more effectively roster staff to meet the needs of Local Health Districts and other NSW health agencies.
The NSW public health system employs over 100,000 people in clinical and non-clinical roles across the state. With increasing demand for services, it is vital that NSW Health effectively rosters staff to ensure high quality and efficient patient care, while maintaining good workplace practices to support staff in demanding roles.
NSW Health is implementing HealthRoster as its single state-wide rostering system to more effectively roster staff according to the demands of each location. Between 2013–14 and 2016–17, our financial audits of individual LHDs had reported issues with rostering and payroll processes and systems.
NSW Health grouped all Local Health Districts (LHDs), and other NSW Health organisations, into four clusters to manage the implementation of HealthRoster over four years. Refer to Exhibit 4 for a list of the NSW Health entities in each cluster.
- Cluster 1 implementation commenced in 2014–15 and was completed in 2015–16.
- Cluster 2 implementation commenced in 2015–16 and was completed in 2016–17.
- Cluster 3 began implementation in 2016–17 and was underway during the conduct of the audit.
- Cluster 4 began planning for implementation in 2017–18.
Full implementation, including capability for centralised data and reporting, is planned for completion in 2019.
This audit assessed the effectiveness of the HealthRoster system in delivering business benefits. In making this assessment, we examined whether:
- expected business benefits of HealthRoster were well-defined
- HealthRoster is achieving business benefits where implemented.
The HealthRoster project has a timespan from 2009 to 2019. We examined the HealthRoster implementation in LHDs, and other NSW Health organisations, focusing on the period from 2014, when eHealth assumed responsibility for project implementation, to early 2018.
Business benefits identified for HealthRoster accurately reflect business needs.
NSW Health has a good understanding of the issues in previous rostering systems and has designed HealthRoster to adequately address these issues. Interviews with frontline staff indicate that HealthRoster facilitates rostering which complies with industrial awards. This is a key business benefit that supports the provision of quality patient care. We saw no evidence that any major business needs or issues with the previous rostering systems are not being addressed by HealthRoster.
In the period examined in this audit since 2015, NSW Health has applied appropriate project management and governance structures to ensure that risks and issues are well managed during HealthRoster implementation.
HealthRoster has had two changes to its budget and timeline. Overall, the capital cost for the project has increased from $88.6 million to $125.6 million (42 per cent) and has delayed expected project completion by four years from 2015 to 2019. NSW Health attributes the increased cost and extended time frame to the large scale and complexity of the full implementation of HealthRoster.
NSW Health has established appropriate governance arrangements to ensure that HealthRoster is successfully implemented and that it will achieve business benefits in the long term. During implementation, local steering committees monitor risks and resolve implementation issues. Risks or issues that cannot be resolved locally are escalated to the state-wide steering committee.
NSW Health has grouped local health districts, and other NSW Health organisations, into four clusters for implementation. This has enabled NSW Health to apply lessons learnt from each implementation to improve future implementations.
NSW Health has a benefits realisation framework, but it is not fully applied to HealthRoster.
NSW Health can demonstrate that HealthRoster has delivered some functional business benefits, including rosters that comply with a wide variety of employment awards.
NSW Health is not yet measuring and tracking the value of business benefits achieved. NSW Health did not have benefits realisation plans with baseline measures defined for LHDs in cluster 1 and 2 before implementation. Without baseline measures NSW Health is unable to quantify business benefits achieved. However, analysis of post-implementation reviews and interviews with frontline staff indicate that benefits are being achieved. As a result, NSW Health now includes defining baseline measures and setting targets as part of LHD implementation planning. It has created a benefits realisation toolkit to assist this process from cluster 3 implementations onwards.
NSW Health conducted post-implementation reviews for clusters 1 and 2 and found that LHDs in these clusters were not using HealthRoster to realise all the benefits that HealthRoster could deliver.
By September 2018, NSW Health should:
- Ensure that Local Health Districts undertake benefits realisation planning according to the NSW Health benefits realisation framework
- Regularly measure benefits realised, at state and local health district levels, from the statewide implementation of HealthRoster
- Review the use of HealthRoster in Local Health Districts in clusters 1 and 2 and assist them to improve their HealthRoster related processes and practices.
By June 2019, NSW Health should:
- Ensure that all Local Health Districts are effectively using demand based rostering.
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - About the audit
Appendix three - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #301 - released 7 June 2018
Regional Assistance Programs
Infrastructure NSW effectively manages how grant applications for regional assistance programs are assessed and recommended for funding. Its contract management processes are also effective. However, we are unable to conclude whether the objectives of these programs have been achieved as the relevant agencies have not yet measured their benefits, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford.
In 2011, the NSW Government established Restart NSW to fund new infrastructure with the proceeds from the sale and lease of government assets. From 2011 to 2017, the NSW Government allocated $1.7 billion from the fund for infrastructure in regional areas, with an additional commitment of $1.3 billion to be allocated by 2021. The NSW Government allocates these funds through regional assistance programs such as Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads. NSW councils are the primary recipients of funding provided under these programs.
The NSW Government announced the Resources for Regions program in 2012 with the aim of addressing infrastructure constraints in mining affected communities. Infrastructure NSW administers the program, with support from the Department of Premier and Cabinet.
The NSW Government announced the Fixing Country Roads program in 2014 with the aim of building more efficient road freight networks. Transport for NSW and Infrastructure NSW jointly administer this program, which funds local councils to deliver projects that help connect local and regional roads to state highways and freight hubs.
This audit assessed whether these two programs (Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads) were being effectively managed and achieved their objectives. In making this assessment, we answered the following questions:
- How well are the relevant agencies managing the assessment and recommendation process?
- How do the relevant agencies ensure that funded projects are being delivered?
- Do the funded projects meet program and project objectives?
The audit focussed on four rounds of Resources for Regions funding between 2013–14 to 2015–16, as well as the first two rounds of Fixing Country Roads funding in 2014–15 and 2015–16.
The project selection criteria are consistent with the program objectives set by the NSW Government, and the RIAP applied the criteria consistently. Probity and record keeping practices did not fully comply with the probity plans.
The assessment methodology designed by Infrastructure NSW is consistent with2 the program objectives and criteria. In the rounds that we reviewed, all funded projects met the assessment criteria.
Infrastructure NSW developed probity plans for both programs which provided guidance on the record keeping required to maintain an audit trail, including the use of conflict of interest registers. Infrastructure NSW and Transport for NSW did not fully comply with these requirements. The relevant agencies have taken steps to address this in the current funding rounds for both programs.
NSW Procurement Board Directions require agencies to ensure that they do not engage a probity advisor that is engaged elsewhere in the agency. Infrastructure NSW has not fully complied with this requirement. A conflict of interest arose when Infrastructure NSW engaged the same consultancy to act as its internal auditor and probity advisor.
While these infringements of probity arrangements are unlikely to have had a major impact on the assessment process, they weaken the transparency and accountability of the process.
Some councils have identified resourcing and capability issues which impact on their ability to participate in the application process. For both programs, the relevant agencies conducted briefings and webinars with applicants to provide advice on the objectives of the programs and how to improve the quality of their applications. Additionally, Transport for NSW and the Department of Premier and Cabinet have developed tools to assist councils to demonstrate the economic impact of their applications.
The relevant agencies provided feedback on unsuccessful applications to councils. Councils reported that the quality of this feedback has improved over time.
Recommendations
- By June 2018, Infrastructure NSW should:
- ensure probity reports address whether all elements of the probity plan have been effectively implemented.
- By June 2018, Infrastructure NSW and Transport for NSW should:
- maintain and store all documentation regarding assessment and probity matters according to the State Records Act 1998, the NSW Standard on Records Management and the relevant probity plans
Infrastructure NSW is responsible for overseeing and monitoring projects funded under Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads. Infrastructure NSW effectively manages projects to keep them on track, however it could do more to assure itself that all recipients have complied with funding deeds. Benefits and outcomes should also start to be measured and reported as soon as practicable after projects are completed to inform assessment of future projects.
Infrastructure NSW identifies projects experiencing unreasonable delays or higher than expected expenses as 'at‑risk'. After Infrastructure NSW identifies a project as 'at‑risk', it puts in place processes to resolve issues to bring them back on track. Infrastructure NSW, working with Public Works Advisory regional offices, employs a risk‑based approach to validate payment claims, however this process should be strengthened. Infrastructure NSW would get better assurance by also conducting annual audits of compliance with the funding deed for a random sample of projects.
Infrastructure NSW collects project completion reports for all Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads funded projects. It applies the Infrastructure Investor Assurance Framework to Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads at a program level. This means that each round of funding (under both programs) is treated as a distinct program for the purposes of benefits realisation. It plans to assess whether benefits have been realised once each project in a funding round is completed. As a result, no benefits realisation assessment has been done for any project funded under either Resources for Regions or Fixing Country Roads. Without project‑level benefits realisation, future decisions are not informed by the lessons from previous investments.
Recommendations
- By December 2018, Infrastructure NSW should:
- conduct annual audits of compliance with the funding deed for a random sample of projects funded under Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads
- publish the circumstances under which unspent funds can be allocated to changes in project scope
- measure benefits delivered by projects that were completed before December 2017
- implement an annual process to measure benefits for projects completed after December 2017
- By December 2018, Transport for NSW and Infrastructure NSW should:
- incorporate a benefits realisation framework as part of the detailed application.
Appendix one - Response from agencies
Appendix two - Maps of funded projects
Appendix three - About the audit
Appendix four - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #300 - released 17 May 2018
Managing risks in the NSW public sector: risk culture and capability
The Ministry of Health, NSW Fair Trading, NSW Police Force, and NSW Treasury Corporation are taking steps to strengthen their risk culture, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford. 'Senior management communicates the importance of managing risk to their staff, and there are many examples of risk management being integrated into daily activities', the Auditor-General said.
We did find that three of the agencies we examined could strengthen their culture so that all employees feel comfortable speaking openly about risks. To support innovation, senior management could also do better at communicating to their staff the levels of risk they are willing to accept.
Effective risk management is essential to good governance, and supports staff at all levels to make informed judgements and decisions. At a time when government is encouraging innovation and exploring new service delivery models, effective risk management is about seizing opportunities as well as managing threats.
Over the past decade, governments and regulators around the world have increasingly turned their attention to risk culture. It is now widely accepted that organisational culture is a key element of risk management because it influences how people recognise and engage with risk. Neglecting this ‘soft’ side of risk management can prevent institutions from managing risks that threaten their success and lead to missed opportunities for change, improvement or innovation.
This audit assessed how effectively NSW Government agencies are building risk management capabilities and embedding a sound risk culture throughout their organisations. To do this we examined whether:
- agencies can demonstrate that senior management is committed to risk management
- information about risk is communicated effectively throughout agencies
- agencies are building risk management capabilities.
The audit examined four agencies: the Ministry of Health, the NSW Fair Trading function within the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation, NSW Police Force and NSW Treasury Corporation (TCorp). NSW Treasury was also included as the agency responsible for the NSW Government's risk management framework.
In assessing an agency’s risk culture, we focused on four key areas:
Executive sponsorship (tone at the top)
In the four agencies we reviewed, senior management is communicating the importance of managing risk. They have endorsed risk management frameworks and funded central functions tasked with overseeing risk management within their agencies.
That said, we found that three case study agencies do not measure their existing risk culture. Without clear measures of how employees identify and engage with risk, it is difficult for agencies to tell whether employee's behaviours are aligned with the 'tone' set by the executive and management.
For example, in some agencies we examined we found a disconnect between risk tolerances espoused by senior management and how these concepts were understood by staff.
Employee perceptions of risk management
Our survey of staff indicated that while senior leaders have communicated the importance of managing risk, more could be done to strengthen a culture of open communication so that all employees feel comfortable speaking openly about risks. We found that senior management could better communicate to their staff the levels of risk they should be willing to accept.
Integration of risk management into daily activities and links to decision-making
We found examples of risk management being integrated into daily activities. On the other hand, we also identified areas where risk management deviated from good practice. For example, we found that corporate risk registers are not consistently used as a tool to support decision-making.
Support and guidance to help staff manage risks
Most case study agencies are monitoring risk-related skills and knowledge of their workforce, but only one agency has addressed the gaps it identified. While agencies are providing risk management training, surveyed staff in three case study agencies reported that risk management training is not adequate.
NSW Treasury provides agencies with direction and guidance on risk management through policy and guidelines. In line with better practice, NSW Treasury's principles-based policy acknowledges that individual agencies are in a better position to understand their own risks and design risk management frameworks that address those risks. Nevertheless, there is scope for NSW Treasury to refine its guidance material to support a better risk culture in the NSW public sector.
Recommendation
By May 2019, NSW Treasury should:
- Review the scope of its risk management guidance, and identify additional guidance, training or activities to improve risk culture across the NSW public sector. This should focus on encouraging agency heads to form a view on the current risk culture in their agencies, identify desirable changes to that risk culture, and take steps to address those changes.
Appendix one - Response from agencies
Appendix three - About the audit
Appendix four - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #298 - released 23 April 2018
Internal Controls and Governance 2017
Agencies need to do more to address risks posed by information technology (IT).
Effective internal controls and governance systems help agencies to operate efficiently and effectively and comply with relevant laws, standards and policies. We assessed how well agencies are implementing these systems, and highlighted opportunities for improvement.
1. Overall trends
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New and repeat findings |
The number of reported financial and IT control deficiencies has fallen, but many previously reported findings remain unresolved. |
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High risk findings |
Poor systems implementations contributed to the seven high risk internal control deficiencies that could affect agencies. |
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Common findings |
Poor IT controls are the most commonly reported deficiency across agencies, followed by governance issues relating to cyber security, capital projects, continuous disclosure, shared services, ethics and risk management maturity. |
2. Information Technology
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IT security |
Only two-thirds of agencies are complying with their own policies on IT security. Agencies need to tighten user access and password controls. |
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Cyber security |
Agencies do not have a common view on what constitutes a cyber attack, which limits understanding the extent of the cyber security threat. |
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Other IT systems |
Agencies can improve their disaster recovery plans and the change control processes they use when updating IT systems. |
3. Asset Management
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Capital investment |
Agencies report delays delivering against the significant increase in their budgets for capital projects. |
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Capital projects |
Agencies are underspending their capital budgets and some can improve capital project governance. |
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Asset disposals |
Eleven per cent of agencies were required to sell their real property through Property NSW but didn’t. And eight per cent of agencies can improve their asset disposal processes. |
4. Governance
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Governance arrangements |
Sixty-four per cent of agencies’ disclosure policies support communication of key performance information and prompt public reporting of significant issues. |
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Shared services |
Fifty-nine per cent of agencies use shared services, yet 14 per cent do not have service level agreements in place and 20 per cent can strengthen the performance standards they set. |
5. Ethics and Conduct
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Ethical framework |
Agencies can reinforce their ethical frameworks by updating code‑of‑conduct policies and publishing a Statement of Business Ethics. |
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Conflicts of interest |
All agencies we reviewed have a code of conduct, but they can still improve the way they update and manage their codes to reduce the risk of fraud and unethical behaviour. |
6. Risk Management
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Risk management maturity |
All agencies have implemented risk management frameworks, but with varying levels of maturity. |
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Risk management elements |
Many agencies can improve risk registers and strengthen their risk culture, particularly in the way that they report risks to their lead agency. |
This report covers the findings and recommendations from our 2016–17 financial audits related to the internal controls and governance of the 39 largest agencies (refer to Appendix three) in the NSW public sector. These agencies represent about 95 per cent of total expenditure for all NSW agencies and were considered to be a large enough group to identify common issues and insights.
The findings in this report should not be used to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of individual agency control environments and governance arrangements. Specific financial reporting, controls and service delivery comments are included in the individual 2017 cluster financial audit reports tabled in Parliament from October to December 2017.
This new report offers strategic insight on the public sector as a whole
In previous years, we have commented on internal control and governance issues in the volumes we published on each ‘cluster’ or agency sector, generally between October and December. To add further value, we then commented more broadly about the issues identified for the public sector as a whole at the start of the following year.
This year, we have created this report dedicated to internal controls and governance. This will help Parliament to understand broad issues affecting the public sector, and help agencies to compare their own performance against that of their peers.
Without strong control measures and governance systems, agencies face increased risks in their financial management and service delivery. If they do not, for example, properly authorise payments or manage conflicts of interest, they are at greater risk of fraud. If they do not have strong information technology (IT) systems, sensitive and trusted information may be at risk of unauthorised access and misuse.
These problems can in turn reduce the efficiency of agency operations, increase their costs and reduce the quality of the services they deliver.
Our audits do not review every control or governance measure every year. We select a range of measures, and report on those that present the most significant risks that agencies should mitigate. This report divides these into the following six areas:
- Overall trends
- Information technology
- Asset management
- Governance
- Ethics and conduct
- Risk management.
Internal controls are processes, policies and procedures that help agencies to:
- operate effectively and efficiently
- produce reliable financial reports
- comply with laws and regulations.
This chapter outlines the overall trends for agency controls and governance issues, including the number of findings, level of risk and the most common deficiencies we found across agencies. The rest of this volume then illustrates this year’s controls and governance findings in more detail.
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Issues |
Recommendations |
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1.1 New and repeat findings |
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The number of internal control deficiencies reduced over the past three years, but new higher-risk information technology (IT) control deficiencies were reported in 2016–17. Deficiencies repeated from previous years still make up a sizeable proportion of all internal control deficiencies. |
Recommendation Agencies should focus on emerging IT risks, but also manage new IT risks, reduce existing IT control deficiencies, and address repeat internal control deficiencies on a more timely basis. |
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1.2 High risk findings |
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We found seven high risk internal control deficiencies, which might significantly affect agencies. |
Recommendation Agencies should rectify high risk internal control deficiencies as a priority |
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1.3 Common findings |
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The most common internal control deficiencies related to poor or absent IT controls. We found some common governance deficiencies across multiple agencies. |
Recommendation Agencies should coordinate actions and resources to help rectify common IT control and governance deficiencies. |
Information technology (IT) has become increasingly important for government agencies’ financial reporting and to deliver their services efficiently and effectively. Our audits reviewed whether agencies have effective controls in place over their IT systems. We found that IT security remains the source of many control weakness in agencies.
| Issues | Recommendations |
2.1 IT security |
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User access administration While 95 per cent of agencies have policies about user access, about two-thirds were compliant with these policies. Agencies can improve how they grant, change and end user access to their systems. |
Recommendation Agencies should strengthen user access administration to prevent inappropriate access to sensitive systems. Agencies should:
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Privileged access Sixty-eight per cent of agencies do not adequately manage who can access their information systems, and many do not sufficiently monitor or restrict privileged access. |
Recommendation Agencies should tighten privileged user access to protect their information systems and reduce the risks of data misuse and fraud. Agencies should ensure they:
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Password controls Forty-one per cent of agencies did not meet either their own standards or minimum standards for password controls. |
Recommendation Agencies should review and enforce password controls to strengthen security over sensitive systems. As a minimum, password parameters should include:
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2.2 Cyber Security |
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Cyber security framework Agencies do not have a common view on what constitutes a cyber attack, which limits understanding the extent of the cyber security threat. |
Recommendation The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should revisit its existing framework to develop a shared cyber security terminology and strengthen the current reporting requirements for cyber incidents. |
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Cyber security strategies While 82 per cent of agencies have dedicated resources to address cyber security, they can strengthen their strategies, expertise and staff awareness. |
Recommendations The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should:
Agencies should ensure they adequately resource staff dedicated to cyber security. |
2.3 Other IT systems |
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Change control processes Some agencies need to improve change control processes to avoid unauthorised or inaccurate system changes. |
Recommendation Agencies should consistently perform user acceptance testing before system upgrades and changes. They should also properly approve and document changes to IT systems. |
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Disaster recovery planning Agencies can do more to adequately assess critical business systems to enforce effective disaster recovery plans. This includes reviewing and testing their plans on a timely basis. |
Recommendation Agencies should complete business impact analyses to strengthen disaster recovery plans, then regularly test and update their plans. |
Agency service delivery relies on developing and renewing infrastructure assets such as schools, hospitals, roads, or public housing. Agencies are currently investing significantly in new assets. Agencies need to manage the scale and volume of current capital projects in order to deliver new infrastructure on time, on budget and realise the intended benefits. We found agencies can improve how they:
- manage their major capital projects
- dispose of existing assets.
| Issues | Recommendations or conclusions |
3.1 Capital investment |
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Capital asset investment ratios Most agencies report high capital investment ratios, but one-third of agencies’ capital investment ratios are less than one. |
Recommendation Agencies with high capital asset investment ratios should ensure their project management and delivery functions have the capacity to deliver their current and forward work programs. |
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Volume of capital spending Most agencies have significant forward spending commitments for capital projects. However, agencies’ actual capital expenditure has been below budget for the last three years. |
Conclusion The significant increase in capital budget underspends warrant investigation, particularly where this has resulted from slower than expected delivery of projects from previous years. |
3.2 Capital projects |
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Major capital projects Agencies’ major capital projects were underspent by 13 percent against their budgets. |
Conclusion The causes of agency budget underspends warrant investigation to ensure the NSW Government’s infrastructure commitment is delivered on time. |
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Capital project governance Agencies do not consistently prepare business cases or use project steering committees to oversee major capital projects. |
Conclusion Agencies that have project management processes that include robust business cases and regular updates to their steering committees (or equivalent) are better able to provide those projects with strategic direction and oversight. |
3.3. Asset disposals |
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Asset disposal procedures Agencies need to strengthen their asset disposal procedures. |
Recommendations Agencies should have formal processes for disposing of surplus properties. Agencies should use Property NSW to manage real property sales unless, as in the case for State owned corporations, they have been granted an exemption. |
Governance refers to the high-level frameworks, processes and behaviours that help an organisation to achieve its objectives, comply with legal and other requirements, and meet a high standard of probity, accountability and transparency.
This chapter sets out the governance lighthouse model the Audit Office developed to help agencies reach best practice. It then focuses on two key areas: continuous disclosure and shared services arrangements. The following two chapters look at findings related to ethics and risk management.
| Issues | Recommendations or conclusions |
4.1 Governance arrangements |
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Continuous disclosure Continuous disclosure promotes improved performance and public trust and aides better decision-making. Continuous disclosure is only mandatory for NSW Government Businesses such as State owned corporations. |
Conclusion Some agencies promote transparency and accountability by publishing on their websites a continuous disclosure policy that provides for, and encourages:
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4.2 Shared services |
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Service level agreements Some agencies do not have service level agreements for their shared service arrangements. Many of the agreements that do exist do not adequately specify controls, performance or reporting requirements. This reduces the effectiveness of shared services arrangements. |
Conclusion Agencies are better able to manage the quality and timeliness of shared service arrangements where they have a service level agreement in place. Ideally, the terms of service should be agreed before services are transferred to the service provider and:
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Shared service performance Some agencies do not set performance standards for their shared service providers or regularly review performance results. |
Conclusion Agencies can achieve better results from shared service arrangements when they regularly monitor the performance of shared service providers using key measures for the benefits realised, costs saved and quality of services received. Before agencies extend or renegotiate a contract, they should comprehensively assess the services received and test the market to maximise value for money. |
All government sector employees must demonstrate the highest levels of ethical conduct, in line with standards set by The Code of Ethics and Conduct for NSW government sector employees.
This chapter looks at how well agencies are managing these requirements, and where they can improve their policies and processes.
We found that agencies mostly have the appropriate codes, frameworks and policies in place. But we have highlighted opportunities to improve the way they manage those systems to reduce the risks of unethical conduct.
| Issues | Recommendations or conclusions |
5.1 Ethical framework |
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Code of conduct All agencies we reviewed have a code of conduct, but they can still improve the way they update and manage their codes to reduce the risk of fraud and unethical behaviour. |
Recommendation Agencies should regularly review their code-of-conduct policies and ensure they keep their codes of conduct up-to-date. |
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Statement of business ethics Most agencies maintain an ethical framework, but some can enhance their related processes, particularly when dealing with external clients, customers, suppliers and contractors. |
Conclusion Agencies can enhance their ethical frameworks by publishing a Statement of Business Ethics, which communicates their values and culture. |
5.2 Potential conflicts of interest |
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Conflicts of interest All agencies have a conflicts-of-interest policy, but most can improve how they identify, manage and avoid conflicts of interest. |
Recommendation Agencies should improve the way they manage conflicts of interest, particularly by:
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Gifts and benefits While all agencies already have a formal gifts-and-benefits policy, we found gaps in the management of gifts and benefits by some that increase the risk of unethical conduct. |
Recommendation Agencies should improve the way they manage gifts and benefits by promptly updating registers and providing annual training to staff. |
Risk management is an integral part of effective corporate governance. It helps agencies to identify, assess and prioritise the risks they face and in turn minimise, monitor and control the impact of unforeseen events. It also means agencies can respond to opportunities that may emerge and improve their services and activities.
This year we looked at the overall maturity of the risk management frameworks that agencies use, along with two important risk management elements: risk culture and risk registers.
| Issues | Recommendations or conclusions |
6.1 Risk management maturity |
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All agencies have implemented risk management frameworks, but with varying levels of maturity in their application. Agencies’ averaged a score of 3.1 out of five across five critical assessment criteria for risk management. While strategy and governance fared best, the areas that most need to improve are risk culture, and systems and intelligence. |
Conclusion Agencies have introduced risk management frameworks and practices as required by the Treasury’s:
However, more can be done to progress risk management maturity and embed risk management in agency culture. |
6.2 Risk management elements |
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Risk culture Most agencies have started to embed risk management into the culture of their organisation. But only some have successfully done so, and most agencies can improve their risk culture.
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Conclusion Agencies can improve their risk culture by:
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Risk registers and reporting Some agencies do not report their significant risks to their lead agency, which may impair the way resources are allocated in their cluster. Some agencies do not integrate risk registers at a divisional and whole-of-enterprise level. |
Conclusion Agencies not reporting significant risks at the cluster level increases the likelihood that significant risks are not being mitigated appropriately. |
Effective risk management can improve agency decision-making, protect reputations and lead to significant efficiencies and cost savings. By embedding risk management directly into their operations, agencies can also derive extra value for their activities and services.
Managing demand for ambulance services 2017
NSW Ambulance has introduced several initiatives over the past decade to better manage the number of unnecessary ambulance responses and transports to hospital emergency departments. However, there is no overall strategy to guide the development of these initiatives nor do NSW Ambulance's data systems properly monitor their impact. As a result, the Audit Office was unable to assess whether NSW Ambulance's approach to managing demand is improving the efficiency of ambulance services.
NSW Ambulance uses a telephone referral system to manage triple zero calls from people with medical issues that do not require an ambulance. This has the potential to achieve efficiency improvements but there are weaknesses in NSW Ambulance's use and monitoring of this system. Paramedics are now able to make decisions about whether patients need transport to a hospital emergency department. NSW Ambulance does not routinely measure or monitor the decisions paramedics make, so it does not know whether these decisions are improving efficiency. Extended Care Paramedics who have additional skills in diagnosing and treating patients with less urgent medical issues were introduced in 2007. NSW Ambulance analysis indicates that these paramedics have the potential to improve efficiency, but have not been used as effectively as possible.
Our 2013 audit of NSW Ambulance found that accurate monitoring of activity and performance was not being conducted. More than four years later, this remains the case.
NSW Ambulance has recognised the need to change the way it manages demand and has developed initiatives that have the potential to improve efficiency. However, there are significant weaknesses in the strategy for and implementation of its demand management initiatives.
NSW Ambulance has identified the goal of moving from an emergency transport provider to a mobile health service and developed several initiatives to support this. Its demand management initiatives have the potential to contribute to the broader policy directions for the health system in New South Wales. However, there is no clear overall strategy guiding these initiatives and their implementation has been poor.
NSW Ambulance's reasons for changing its approach to demand management have not been communicated proactively to the community. Demand management initiatives that have been operating for over a decade still do not have clear performance measures or targets. Project management of new initiatives has been inadequate, with insufficient organisational resources to oversee them and inadequate engagement with other healthcare providers.
NSW Ambulance uses an in-house Vocational Education and Training course to recruit some paramedics, as well as recruiting paramedics who have completed a university degree. No other Australian ambulance services continue to provide their own Vocational Education and Training qualifications. Paramedics will need more support in several key areas to be able to fulfil their expanded roles in providing a mobile health service. Performance and development systems for paramedics are not used effectively. Up to date technology would help paramedics make better decisions and improve NSW Ambulance's ability to monitor demand management activity.
There are gaps in NSW Ambulance's oversight of the risks of some of the initiatives it has introduced, particularly its lack of information on the outcomes for patients who are not transported to hospital. Weaknesses in the way NSW Ambulance uses its data limit its ability to properly assess the risks of the demand management initiatives it has introduced.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #295 - released 13 December 2017
