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Actions for Supporting the District Criminal Court

Supporting the District Criminal Court

Justice
Community Services
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Project management

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today on whether the Department of Communities and Justice (the department) effectively supports the efficient operation of the District Criminal Court system.

The audit found that in the provision of data and technology services, the department is not effectively supporting the efficient operation of the District Criminal Court system. The department has insufficient controls in place to ensure that data in the system is always accurate.

The department is also using outdated technology and could improve its delivery of technical support to courts.

The audit also assessed the implementation of the Early Appropriate Guilty Pleas reform. This reform aims to improve court efficiency by having more cases resolved earlier with a guilty plea in the Local Court. The audit found that the department effectively governed the implementation of the reform but is not measuring achievement of expected benefits, placing the objectives of the reform at risk.

The Auditor-General made seven recommendations to the department, aimed at improving the controls around courts data, reporting on key performance indicators, improving regional technical support and measuring the success of the Early Appropriate Guilty Pleas reform. 

The District Court is the intermediate court in the New South Wales court system. It hears most serious criminal matters, except murder, treason and piracy. The Department of Communities and Justice (the Department) provides support to the District Court in a variety of ways. For example, it provides security services, library services and front-desk services. This audit examined three forms of support that the Department provides to the District Court:

  • data collection, reporting and analysis - the Department collects data from cases in its case management system, JusticeLink, based on the orders Judges make in court and court papers
  • technology - the Department provides technology to courts across New South Wales, as well as technical support for this technology
  • policy - the Department is responsible for proposing and implementing policy reforms.

Recent years have seen a worsening of District Court efficiency, as measured in the Productivity Commission's Report on Government Services (RoGS). Efficiency in the court system is typically measured through timeliness of case completion. There is evidence that timeliness has worsened. For example, the median time from arrest to finalisation of a case in the District Court increased from 420 days in 2012–13 to 541 days in 2017–18.

As a result, the government has announced a range of measures to improve court performance, particularly in the District Court. These measures included the Early Appropriate Guilty Pleas (EAGP) reform. One of the objectives of EAGP is to improve court efficiency, which would be achieved by having more cases resolve with a guilty plea in the Local Court.

This audit assessed whether the Department of Communities and Justice effectively supports the efficient operation of the District Criminal Court system. We assessed this with the following lines of inquiry:

  • Does the Department effectively collect, analyse and report performance information relevant to court efficiency?
  • Does the Department effectively provide technology to support the efficient working of the courts?
  • Does the Department have effective plans, governance and monitoring for the Early Appropriate Guilty Pleas reform?

The audit did not consider other support functions provided by the Department. Further information on the audit, including detailed audit criteria, may be found in Appendix two.

Conclusion
In the provision of data and technology services, the Department is not effectively supporting the efficient operation of the District Criminal Court system. The Department has insufficient controls in place to ensure accurate data in the District Criminal Court system. The Department is also using outdated technology in significant numbers and could improve its delivery of technical support to meet agreed targets.
The Department effectively governed the implementation of the Early Appropriate Guilty Pleas reform. However, it is not ensuring that the benefits stated in the business case are being achieved, placing its objectives at risk.
The impact of inaccurate court data can be severe, and the Department does not have sufficient controls in place to ensure that its court data is accurate. Recent Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research reviews have identified data inaccuracies, and this demonstrates the Department needs strong controls in place to ensure that its court data is accurate.
The Department does not have a policy for data quality and has not formally assigned responsibility for data quality to any individual or branch. The Department also does not have a data dictionary outlining all the fields in its case management system. While the Department validates the highest risk items, such as warrants, to ensure that they are accurate, most data is not validated. The Department has recently commenced setting up a data unit for the Courts, Tribunals and Service Delivery branch. It is proposed that this unit will address most of the identified shortcomings.
The Department did not provide timely technical support to the court system in 2017 and is using outdated technology in significant numbers. The Digital and Technology Services branch of the Department had agreed a Service Level Agreement with the rest of the Department, outlining the expected speed of technical support responses. The branch did not meet response times in 2017. Performance improved in 2018, though DTS fell short of its targets for critical and moderate priority incidents. Critical incidents are particularly important to deal with in a timely manner as they include incidents which may delay a court sitting.
Requests for technical support rose significantly in 2018 compared to 2017, which may be related to the number of outdated pieces of technology. As at April 2019, the whole court system had 2,389 laptops or desktop computers outside their warranty period. The Department was also using other outdated technology. Outdated technology is more prone to failure and continuing to use it poses a risk of court delays.
The Department is not measuring all the expected benefits from the Early Appropriate Guilty Pleas reform, placing the objectives of the program at risk. The Early Appropriate Guilty Pleas business case outlined nine expected benefits from the reform. The Department is not measuring one of these benefits and is not measuring the economic benefits of a further five business case benefits. Not measuring the impact of the reform means that the Department does not know if it is achieving its objectives and if the reform had the desired impact.

The Department is responsible for providing technology to the courts, which can improve the efficiency of court operations by making them faster and cheaper. The Department is also responsible for providing technical support to courtrooms and registries. It is important that technical support is provided in a timely manner because some technical incidents can delay court sittings and thus impact on court efficiency. A 2013 Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development report emphasised the importance of technology and digitisation for reducing trial length.

While the Department may provide technology to the courts, they are not responsible for deciding when, how or if the technology is used in the courtroom.

The Department is using a significant amount of outdated technology, risking court delays

As of April 2019, the whole court system had 2,389 laptops or desktop computers out of warranty, 56.0 per cent of the court system's fleet. The court system also had 786 printing devices out of their normal warranty period, 75.1 per cent of all printers in use. The Department also advised that many of its court audio transcription machines are out of date. These machines must be running for the court to sit and thus it is critical that they are maintained to a high degree. The then Department of Justice estimated the cost of aligning its hardware across the whole Department with desired levels at $14.0 million per year for three years. Figures for the court system were not calculated but they are likely to be a significant portion of this figure.

Using outdated technology poses a risk to the court system as older equipment may be more likely to break down, potentially delaying courts or slowing down court services. In the court system throughout 2018, hardware made up 30.8 per cent of all critical incidents reported to technical support and 41.9 per cent of all high priority incidents. In addition, 16.2 per cent of all reported issues related to printing devices or printing.

From 2017 to 2018, technical support incidents from courts or court services increased. There were 4,379 technical support incidents in 2017, which increased significantly to 9,186 in 2018. The Department advised that some outside factors may have contributed to this increase. The Department was rolling out its new incident recording system throughout 2017, meaning that there would be an under‑reporting of incidents in that year. The Department also advised that throughout 2018 there was a greater focus on ensuring that every issue was logged, which had not previously been the case. Despite these factors, the use of outdated technology has likely increased the risk of technology breakages and may have contributed to the increase in requests for technical support.

Refreshing technology on a regular basis would reduce the risk of hardware failures and ensure that equipment is covered by warranty.

The Department did not meet all court technical support targets in 2017 and 2018

The Digital and Technology Services branch (DTS) was responsible for providing technical support to the courts and the Courts and Tribunal Services branch prior to July 2019. DTS provided technical support in line with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) with the Department. In 2017, DTS did not provide this support in a timely manner. Performance improved in 2018, though DTS fell short of its targets for critical and moderate priority incidents. Exhibit 7 outlines DTS' targets under the SLA.

Exhibit 7: Digital and Technology Services' Service Level Agreement
Priority Target resolution time Target percentage in time (%)
1. Critical 4 hours 80
2. High 1 day 80
3. Moderate 3 days 85
4. Low 5 days 85
Source: Department of Communities and Justice, 2019.

Critical incidents are particularly important for the Department to deal with in a timely manner because these include incidents which may delay a court sitting until resolved or incidents which impact on large numbers of staff. Some of the critical incidents raised with DTS specifically stated that they were delaying a court sitting, often due to transcription machines not working. High priority incidents include those where there is some impact on the functions of the business, which may in turn affect the efficiency of the court system. High priority incidents also include those directly impacting on members of the Judiciary. 

This audit examined DTS' performance against its SLA in the 2017 and 2018 calendar years across the whole court system, not just the District Court. The total number of incidents, as well as critical and high priority incidents, can be seen in Exhibit 8.

Exhibit 8: Number of incidents in 2017 and 2018
Priority 2017 2018
All 4,379 9,186
1. Critical 48 91
2. High 128 315
Source: Audit Office of NSW analysis of Department of Communities and Justice data, 2019.

The Department's results against its SLA in 2017 and 2018 are shown in Exhibit 9.

The Early Appropriate Guilty Pleas (EAGP) reform consists of five main elements:

  • early disclosure of evidence from NSW Police Force to the prosecution and defence
  • early certification of what the accused is going to be charged with to minimise changes
  • mandatory criminal case conferencing between the prosecutor and accused's representation
  • changes to Local Court case management
  • more structured sentence discounts.

More detailed descriptions of each of these changes can be found in the Introduction. These reform elements are anticipated to have three key effects:

  • accelerate the timing of guilty pleas
  • increase the overall proportion of guilty pleas
  • decrease the average length of contested trials.

Improving District Court efficiency is one of the stated aims of EAGP, which would be achieved by having more cases resolve in the Local Court and having fewer defendants plead guilty on the day of their trial in the District Court. The reform commenced in April 2018 and it is too early to state the impact of this reform on District Court efficiency.

The Department is responsible for delivering EAGP in conjunction with other justice sector agencies. They participated in the Steering Committee and the Working Groups, as well as providing the Project Management Office (PMO).

The Department is not measuring the economic benefits stated in the EAGP business case

The business case for EAGP listed nine quantifiable benefits which were expected to be derived from the achievement of the three key effects listed above. The Department is not measuring one of these benefits and is not measuring the economic benefits for five more, as shown in Exhibit 12.

Benefit Economic benefit (over ten years) Being measured?
Accelerated timing of guilty pleas $54.6m yellow circle with minus in the center
Increased guilty plea rate $90.7m yellow circle with minus in the center
Decreased average trial length $27.5m yellow circle with minus in the center
A reduction in the delay of indictable matters proceeding to trial N/A check circle mauve
Increase the number of finalised matters per annum N/A check circle mauve
Reduction of the current backlog of criminal trials in the District Court N/A check circle mauve
Reduction in bed pressure on the correction system due to reduced
average time in custody
$13.7m Exclamation circle red
Productivity improvements due to reduction in wasted effort $53.3m yellow circle with minus in the center
Bankable cost savings due to jury empanelment avoided $2.5m yellow circle with minus in the center

 

Exhibit 12: The Department's measurement of quantifiable benefits
Key check circle mauve Measuring yellow circle with minus in the center Not measuring economic benefit Exclamation circle red Not measuring
Source: Audit Office of NSW analysis.

While it is too early to comment on the overall impact of EAGP, better practice in benefits realisation involves an ongoing effort to monitor benefits to ensure that the reform is on target and determine whether any corrective action is needed.

The Department is measuring the number of finalised matters per annum and while the Department is not measuring the reduction in the backlog as part of this program, this measure is reported as part of the Department's internal reporting framework. The Department is not monitoring the reduction in delay of indictable matters proceeding to trial directly as part of this reform, but this does form part of the monthly Operational Performance Report which the Department sends to the EAGP Steering Committee.

The Department is not monitoring any of the economic benefits stated in the business case. These economic benefits are a mixture of bankable savings and productivity improvements. This amounts to a total of $242.3 million over ten years which was listed in the business case as potential economic benefits from the implementation of this reform against the total cost of $206.9 million over ten years. The Department is collecting proxy indicators which would assist in these calculations for several indicators, but it is not actively monitoring these savings. For example, the Department is monitoring average trial length, but is not using this information to calculate economic benefits derived from changes in trial length.

The Department is also not collecting information related to the average length of custody as part of this program. This means that it is unable to determine if EAGP is putting less pressure on the correctives system and it is not possible for the Department to calculate the savings from this particular benefit.

While stakeholders are optimistic about the impact of EAGP, not measuring the expected benefits stated in the business case means that the Department does not know if the reform is achieving what it was designed to achieve. Further, the Department does not know if it must take corrective action to ensure that the program achieves the stated benefits. These two things put the overall program benefits at risk.

The Department has not assigned responsibility for the realisation of each benefit, potentially risking the success of the program

The Department has not assigned responsibility for the realisation of each benefit stated in the business case. The Department holds the Steering Committee responsible for the realisation of all benefits. Benefits realisation is the process which ensures that the agency reaches benefits as stated in the business case. Assigning responsibility for benefits realisation to the Steering Committee rather than individuals is not in line with good practice.

Good practice benefits realisation involves assigning responsibility for the realisation of each benefit to an individual at the business unit level. This ensures there is a single point of accountability for each part of the program with knowledge of the benefit and the ability to take corrective action if it looks like that benefit will not be realised. This responsibility should sit at the operational level where detailed action can most easily be undertaken. The role of a Steering Committee in benefits realisation is to ensure that responsible parties are monitoring their benefits and taking appropriate corrective action.

The Department advised that it believes the Steering Committee should have responsibility for the realisation of benefits due to the difficulty of attributing the achievement of each benefit to one part of the reform alone. Given the Steering Committee meets only quarterly, it is not well placed to take action in response to variances in performance.

A BOCSAR evaluation is planned, however data errors make some of the information unreliable

BOCSAR are planning to undertake an overall evaluation of EAGP which is planned for release in 2021. Undertaking this evaluation will require high quality data to gain an understanding of the drivers of the reform. However, data captured throughout the first year of EAGP has proven unreliable, which may reduce the usefulness of BOCSAR's evaluation. These data issues were discussed in Exhibit 5 in Chapter 2, above. Access to accurate data is vital for conducting any program evaluation and inaccurate data raises the risk that the BOCSAR evaluation will not be able to provide an accurate evaluation of the impact of EAGP.

In addition to the BOCSAR evaluation, the Department had plans for a series of 'snapshot' evaluations for some of the key elements of the reform to ensure that they were operating effectively. These were initially delayed due to an efficiency dividend which affected EAGP. In August 2019, the Department commissioned a review of the implementation of several key success factors for EAGP.

There was clear governance throughout the implementation of EAGP

The implementation stage of EAGP had clear governance, lines of authority and communication. The Steering Committee, each Working Group and each agency had clear roles and responsibilities, and these were organised through a Project Management Office (PMO) provided by the former Department of Justice. The governance structure throughout the implementation phase can be seen at Exhibit 13.

The Steering Committee was established in December 2016 and met regularly from March 2017. It comprised senior members of key government agencies, as well as the Chief Judge and the Chief Magistrate for most of the duration of the implementation period. The Steering Committee met at least monthly throughout the life of the program. The Steering Committee was responsible for overseeing the delivery of EAGP and making key decisions relating to implementation, including spending decisions. The Chief Judge and the Chief Magistrate abstained from financial decisions. The Steering Committee updated the governance and membership of the Steering Committee as appropriate throughout the life of the reform.

Appendix one – Response from agency
 
Appendix two – About the audit 

Appendix three – Performance auditing 

 

Copyright Notice

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Parliamentary Reference: Report number #329 - released 18 December 2019

Published

Actions for Governance of Local Health Districts

Governance of Local Health Districts

Health
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration

The main roles, responsibilities and relationships between Local Health Districts (LHDs), their Boards and the Ministry of Health are clear and understood, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. However, there are opportunities to achieve further maturity in the system of governance and the audit report recommended a series of actions to further strengthen governance arrangements.

Fifteen Local Health Districts (LHDs) are responsible for providing public hospital and related health services in NSW. LHDs are:

  • established as statutory corporations under the Health Services Act 1997 to manage public hospitals and provide health services within defined geographical areas
  • governed by boards of between six and 13 people appointed by the Minister for Health
  • managed by a chief executive who is appointed by the board with the concurrence of the Secretary of NSW Health
  • accountable for meeting commitments made in annual service agreements with the NSW Ministry of Health.

The NSW Ministry of Health (the Ministry) is the policy agency for the NSW public health system, providing regulatory functions, public health policy, as well as managing the health system, including monitoring the performance of hospitals and health services.

The current roles and responsibilities of LHDs and the Ministry, along with other agencies in NSW Health, were established in 2011 following a series of reforms to the structure and governance of the system. These reforms began with the report of the 'Special Commission of Inquiry into Acute Care Services in NSW Public Hospitals' ('the Garling Inquiry'), which was released in 2008, and were followed by reforms announced by the incoming coalition government in 2011.

These reforms were intended to deliver greater local decision making, including better engagement with clinicians, consumers, local communities, and other stakeholders in the primary care (such as general practitioners) and non-government sectors.

The reforms empowered LHDs by devolving some management and accountability from the Ministry for the delivery of health services in their area. LHDs were made accountable for meeting annual obligations under service agreements.

This audit assessed the efficiency and effectiveness of the governance arrangements for LHDs. We answered two questions:

  • Are there clear roles, responsibilities and relationships between the Ministry of Health and LHDs and within LHDs?
  • Does the NSW Health Performance Framework establish and maintain accountability, oversight and strategic guidance for LHDs?
Conclusion
Main roles, responsibilities and relationships between LHDs, their boards, and the Ministry of Health are clear and understood, though there is opportunity to achieve further maturity in the system of governance for LHDs.
Main roles and responsibilities are clear and understood by local health district (LHD) board members and staff, Ministry of Health executive staff, and key stakeholders. However, there is some ambiguity for more complex and nuanced functions. A statement of principles to support decision making in a devolved system would help to ensuring that neither LHDs or the Ministry 'over-reach' into areas that are more appropriately the other's responsibility.
Better clinician engagement in LHD decision making was a key driver for devolution. This engagement has not met the expectations of devolution and requires attention as a priority.
Relationships between system participants are collaborative, though the opportunity should be taken to further embed this in the system structures and processes and complement existing interpersonal relationships and leadership styles.
Accountability and oversight mechanisms, including the Health Performance Framework and Service Agreements, have been effective in establishing accountability, oversight and strategic guidance for LHDs.
The Health Performance Framework and Service Agreements have underpinned a cultural shift toward greater accountability and oversight. However, as NSW Health is a large, complex and dynamic system, it is important that these accountability and oversight mechanisms continue to evolve to ensure that they are sufficiently robust to support good governance.
There are areas where accountability and oversight can be improved including:
  • continued progress in moving toward patient experience, outcome, and quality and safety measures
  • improving the Health Performance Framework document to ensure it is comprehensive, clear and specifies decision makers
  • greater clarity in the nexus between underperformance and escalation decisions
  • including governance-related performance measures
  • more rigour in accountability for non-service activity functions, including consumer and community engagement
  • ensuring that performance monitoring and intervention is consistent with the intent of devolution. 
There is clear understanding of the main roles and responsibilities of LHDs and the Ministry of Health under the structural and governance reforms introduced in 2011. Strongly collaborative relationships provide a good foundation on which governance arrangements can continue to mature, though there is a need to better ensure that clinicians are involved in LHD decision making.

NSW Health is large and complex system, operating in a dynamic environment. The governance reforms introduced in 2011 were significant and it is reasonable that they take time to mature.

The main roles of LHDs and the Ministry are clear and well-understood, and there is good collaboration between different parts of the system. This provides a sound foundation on which to further mature the governance arrangements of LHDs.

While the broad roles of LHDs, their boards, and the Ministry are well understood by stakeholders in the system, there are matters of detail and complexity that create ambiguity and uncertainty, including:

  • the roles and relationships between the LHDs and the Pillars
  • to what extent LHDs have discretion to pursue innovation
  • individual responsibility and obligations between chairs, boards, executive staff, and the Ministry.

These should be addressed collaboratively between boards, their executives, and the Ministry, and should be informed by a statement of principles that guides how devolved decision making should be implemented.

Better clinician engagement in health service decision making was a key policy driver for devolution. Priority should be given by LHDs and the Ministry to ensuring that clinicians are adequately engaged in LHD decision making. It appears that in many cases they are not, and this needs to be addressed.

The quality of board decision making depends on the information they are provided and their capacity to absorb and analyse that information. More can be done to promote good decision making by improving the papers that go to boards, and by ensuring that board members are well positioned to absorb the information provided. This includes ensuring that the right type and volume of information are provided to boards, and that members and executive managers have adequate data literacy skills to understand the information.

Recommendations

  1. By December 2019, the Ministry of Health should:
     
    1. work with LHDs to identify and overcome barriers that are limiting the appropriate engagement of clinicians in decision making in LHDs
    2. develop a statement of principles to guide decision making in a devolved system
    3. provide clarity on the relationship of the Agency for Clinical Innovation and the Clinical Excellence Commission to the roles and responsibilities of LHDs.
       
  2. By June 2020, LHDs boards, supported where appropriate by the Ministry of Health, should address the findings of this performance audit to ensure that local practices and processes support good governance, including:
     
    1. providing timely and consistent induction; training; and reviews of boards, members and charters
    2. ensuring that each board's governance and oversight of service agreements is consistent with their legislative functions
    3. improving the use of performance information to support decision making by boards and executive managers.
Accountability and oversight mechanisms, including the Health Performance Framework and service agreements, have been effective in establishing accountability, oversight and strategic guidance for LHDs. They have done this by driving a cultural shift that supports LHDs being accountable for meeting their obligations. These accountablity and oversight mechanisms must continue to evolve and be improved.

This cultural shift has achieved greater recognition of the importance of transparency in how well LHDs perform. However, as NSW Health is a large, complex and dynamic system, it is important that these accountability and oversight mechanisms continue to evolve to ensure that they are sufficiently robust to support good governance.

There are areas where accountability and oversight can be improved including:

  • continued progress in moving toward patient experience, outcome and value-based measures
  • improving the Health Performance Framework document to ensure it is comprehensive, clear and specifies decision makers
  • greater clarity in the nexus between underperformance and escalation decisions
  • by adding governance-related performance measures to service agreements
  • more rigour in accountability for non-service activity functions, such as consumer and community engagement
  • ensuring that performance monitoring and intervention is consistent with the intent of devolution.

Recommendations

3.    By June 2020, the Ministry of Health should improve accountability and oversight mechanisms by:

a)    revising the Health Performance Framework so that it is a cohesive and comprehensive document
b)    clarifying processes and decision making for managing performance concerns
c)    developing a mechanism to adequately hold LHDs accountable for non-service activity functions
d)    reconciling performance monitoring and intervention with the policy intent of devolution.