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Published

Actions for Internal controls and governance 2022

Internal controls and governance 2022

Whole of Government
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Fraud
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Procurement
Risk

What the report is about

This report analyses the internal controls and governance of the 25 largest agencies in the NSW public sector, excluding state-owned corporations and public financial corporations, for the year ended 30 June 2022.

What we found

Internal control trends

The proportion of control deficiencies identified as high-risk this year increased to 8.2% (5.9% in 2020–21). Sixteen of the 23 high-risk findings related to financial controls while seven related to IT controls.

Repeat findings of control deficiencies now represent 48% of all findings (47% in 2020–21).

Information technology

There continues to be a high number of deficiencies relating to IT general controls, particularly around user access reviews, which affected 56% of agencies.

Cyber security

Agencies' self-assessed maturity levels against the NSW Cyber Security Policy mandatory requirements are lower than target levels. Overall, maturity levels against the Australian Cyber Security Centre's Essential Eight controls have not improved since last year.

Management of cyber risks relating to third party IT service providers should be improved. IT service providers may pose risks to the agency if the provider's cyber security controls have weaknesses.

Consultants and contractors

Agencies risk over-reliance on the same consultants and contractors. A quarter of agencies have re-engaged the same contractor over the past five years.

Employment screening Twenty-four per cent of agencies have not complied with the employment screening requirements of the Government Sector Employment Act 2013 with regard to citizenship or residency. Screening and induction practices for non-permanent workers are often less stringent than for permanent employees. This can pose increased risks to an entity of not detecting applicants with false credentials or a history of corrupt conduct.

Contract management

Half of all agencies' procurement contract registers are incomplete, which is non-compliant with the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009.

What we recommended

Agencies should:

  • prioritise actions to address repeat control deficiencies
  • prioritise improvements to their cyber security and resilience
  • reinforce mandatory cyber training to all staff and improve completion rates
  • ensure that contractor engagements that have been renewed over multiple years are periodically reassessed against the market.

Internal controls are processes, policies and procedures that help agencies to:

  • operate effectively and efficiently
  • produce reliable financial reports
  • comply with laws and regulations
  • support ethical government.

This chapter outlines the overall trends for agency controls and governance issues, including the number of audit findings, the degree of risk those deficiencies pose to the agency, and a summary of the most common deficiencies we found across agencies. The rest of this report presents this year's controls and governance findings in more detail.

For consistency and comparability, we have adjusted the 2021 results to incorporate additional audit findings that were reported after the date of the 'Internal controls and governance 2021' report. Therefore, the 2021 figures will not necessarily align with those reported in our 2021 report.

This section also covers how agencies have complied with TD 21-04 during 2021–22.

Section highlights

We identified 23 high-risk findings, compared to 20 last year, with ten repeated from last year. Sixteen of the 23 findings related to financial controls and seven related to IT controls.

  • The proportion of repeat deficiencies has increased from 47% in 2020–21 to 48% in 2021–22.
  • We identified a low level of compliance with TD 21-04 during 2021–22. Most agencies do not have a policy on gifts of government property, and did not annually certify their register of gifts of government property or attest that the agency has not made any gifts.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations arising from our review of agency controls to manage key financial systems.

Section highlights

  • We continue to see a high number of deficiencies related to IT General Controls, particularly those related to user access administration and privileged user access.
  • We identified deficiencies within IT governance related to IT policies and procedures not effective in managing IT risks. We also identified weaknesses in arrangements with third-party IT service providers which can increase cyber security risk.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations arising from our review of agencies' cyber security planning and governance arrangements.

Section highlights

  • Only 80% of agencies specify how they monitor or ensure that third-party IT service providers comply with the agencies' cyber security policies. IT service providers may pose certain risks to the agency if the provider's cyber security controls have weaknesses.
  • There are inconsistent practices and definitions of cyber security incidents across agencies with respect to maintaining incident registers. Five agencies reported nil incidents in their registers for 2021–22, while other agencies recorded up to 1,913 incidents.
  • Agencies' self-assessed maturity levels against the NSW Cyber Security Policy mandatory requirements are lower than their target levels in at least one requirement. Maturity levels against the Australian Cyber Security Centre's Essential Eight controls have not improved since last year. 

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations arising from our review of agencies' practices in engaging external experts, such as consultants and contractors.

Section highlights

  • Agencies risk over-reliance on the same consultants, as some firms continue to be the highest paid consultants at 60% of agencies for at least three of the past five years.
  • Agencies could improve their policies on engaging consultants to include consideration of:
    • probity requirements/conflict of interests
    • rotation of independent consultants from time-to-time
    • additional review where multiple consultants are engaged on the same topic to address the risk of opinion shopping.
  • A quarter of agencies have re-engaged the same contractor over the past five years, with one contractor engaged for 19 years. Long-term engagements without reassessment against market increase the risk of dependency on the contractor.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations arising from our review of agencies' employment screening practices.

Section highlights

  • We identified that most agencies do not include the risk of employment application fraud in their risk registers.
    Post-employment screening has an important role in preventing fraud and managing risk as roles often change and the initial employment screening procedures may not be sufficient to control risk over time. Only 57% of agencies that have an employment screening policy include post-employment screening guidance.
  • Screening and induction practices for non-permanent workers are often less stringent than for permanent employees. There is an increased risk that agencies will:
    • fail to identify an applicant with a past history of corrupt or criminal conduct
    • not identify applications with false credentials
    • hire a worker with unsuitable qualifications, skills or experience.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations arising from our review of agencies' contract management processes.

Section highlights

  • All agencies maintain a central contract register but 40% are incomplete, risking non-compliance with the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (GIPA Act).
  • The contract renewal process could be improved. We identified only 76% of agencies assessed value for money before deciding to renew/extend the contract.
  • Most agencies provide some training and support to staff on procurement procedures. Ongoing training and awareness programs allow agencies to communicate to all staff their responsibilities and obligations in relation to procurement activities. 

Published

Actions for Stronger Communities 2022

Stronger Communities 2022

Justice
Community Services
Asset valuation
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Risk

What the report is about

Results of the Stronger Communities cluster agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2022.

What we found

Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all completed 30 June 2022 financial statement audits. One audit is ongoing.

All 13 cluster agencies that have accommodation arrangements with Property NSW derecognised right-of-use assets and lease liabilities of $917 million and $1 billion respectively. The agencies also collectively recorded a gain on derecognition of $136 million.

The Department of Communities and Justice (the department) assumed the responsibility for delivery of the Process and Technology Harmonisation program from the Department of Customer Service. In 2021–22, the department incurred costs of $42.8 million in relation to the project, which remains ongoing.

The number of monetary misstatements identified during the audits decreased from 50 in 2020–21 to 48 in 2021–22.

What the key issues were

Six of the 15 cluster agencies required to submit 2021–22 mandatory early close procedures did not meet the statutory deadlines. One agency did not complete all mandatory procedures.

Five high-risk findings were identified in 2021–22. They related to deficiencies in:

  • user access administration at the department, NSW Rural Fire Service and New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council (NSWALC)
  • segregation of duties at the NSW Trustee and Guardian and NSWALC.

Recommendations were made to those agencies to address these control deficiencies.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Stronger Communities cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster (the cluster) for 2022.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all completed 30 June 2022 financial statement audits of cluster agencies, including the acquittal and compliance audits for the Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales and Crown Solicitor's Office. One audit is ongoing.

  • Reported corrected misstatements decreased from 30 in 2020–21 to 23 with a gross value of $187 million in 2021–22 ($101 million in 2020–21). Reported uncorrected misstatements increased from 20 in 2020–21 to 25 with a gross value of $92.3 million in 2021–22 ($107 million in 2020–21).

  • Six of the 15 cluster agencies required to submit 2021–22 early close financial statements and all other mandatory procedures did not meet the statutory deadlines. One agency did not complete all mandatory procedures.

  • All 13 cluster agencies that have accommodation arrangements with Property NSW accepted the changes in the Client Acceptance Letters, resulting in the derecognition of right-of-use assets and lease liabilities of $917 million and $1 billion respectively. The agencies also collectively recorded a gain on derecognition of $136 million.

  • The Department of Communities and Justice (the department) assumed the responsibility to deliver the Process and Technology Harmonisation program from the Department of Customer Service. In 2021–22, the department incurred costs of $42.8 million in relation to the project.

  • In 2021–22, the department continued to implement the International Financial Reporting Standards Interpretations Committee's agenda decision on 'Configuration or customisation costs in a cloud computing arrangement'. The department's review of the remaining arrangements, with a net book value of $233 million at 30 June 2021, resulted in the recognition as an expense (through accumulated funds at 1 July 2020) of previously capitalised intangible assets totalling $106 million.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster.

Section highlights

  • The number of issues reported to management has decreased from 130 in 2020–21, to 110 in 2021–22, and 43% were repeat issues (51% in 2020–21). Many repeat issues related to information technology, governance and oversight controls, and non-compliance with key legislation and/or agency policies.

  • Five high-risk issues were identified in 2021–22, all of which are repeat issues and related to user access administration and segregation of duties.

  • Of the 24 newly identified moderate risk issues, 11 related to information technology. The rest related to governance and oversight controls and internal control deficiencies or improvements in payroll, asset management and other processes.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Health 2022

Health 2022

Health
Whole of Government
Asset valuation
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Information technology
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

What the report is about

Result of Health cluster (the cluster) agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2022.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for the financial statements for all Health cluster agencies.

The COVID-19 pandemic continued to increase the complexity and number of accounting matters faced by the cluster. The total gross value of corrected misstatements in 2021–22 was $353.3 million, of which $186.7 million related to an increase in the impairment provision for Rapid Antigen Tests (RATs).

A qualified audit opinion was issued on the Annual Prudential Compliance Statement related to five residential aged care facilities. There were 20 instances (19 in 2020–21) of non-compliance with the prudential responsibilities within the Aged Care Act 1997.

What the key issues were

The total number of matters we reported to management across the cluster decreased from 116 in 2020–21 to 67 in 2021–22. Of the 67 issues raised, four were high risk (three in 2020-21) and 37 were moderate risk (57 in 2020–21). Nearly half of all control deficiencies reported in 2021–22 were repeat issues.

Three unresolved high-risk issues were:

  • COVID-19 inventories impairment – we continued to identify issues relating to management’s impairment model which relies on anticipated future consumption patterns. RATs had not been assessed for impairment.

  • Asset capitalisation threshold – management has not reviewed the appropriateness of the asset capitalisation threshold since 2006.

  • Forced-finalisation of HealthRoster time records – we continued to observe unapproved rosters being finalised by system administrators so payroll can be processed on time. 2.6 million time records were processed in this way in 2021–22.

What we recommended

  • COVID-19 inventories impairment – ensure consumption patterns are supported by relevant data and plans.

  • Assets capitalisation threshold – undertake further review of the appropriateness of applying a $10,000 threshold before capitalising expenditure on property, plant and equipment.

  • Forced-finalisation of HealthRoster time records – develop a methodology to quantify the potential monetary value of unapproved rosters being finalised.

This report provides Parliament and other users of Health cluster (the cluster) agencies' financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting

  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Health cluster (the cluster) for 2022.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all cluster agencies required to prepare general purpose financial statements.

  • The total gross value of corrected monetary misstatements for 2021–22 was $353.3 million, of which, $186.7 million related to an increase in the impairment provision for Rapid Antigen Tests.

  • A qualified audit opinion was issued on the ministry's Annual Prudential Compliance Statements.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the cluster.

Section highlights

  • The total number of internal control deficiencies has decreased from 116 in 2020–21 to 67 in 2021–22. Of the 67 issues raised in 2021–22, four were high (2020–21: 3) and 37 were moderate (2020–21: 57); with nearly half of all control deficiencies reported in 2021–22 being repeat issues.

  • The following four issues were reported in 2021–22 as high risk:

    • impairment of COVID-19 inventories

    • inadequate review over the appropriateness of asset capitalisation threshold

    • forced-finalisation of HealthRoster time records

    • COVID-19 vaccination inventories – data quality issue at 31 March 2022.

  • Management of excessive leave balances and poor quality or lack of documentation supporting key agreements continued to be the key repeat issues observed in the 2021–22 financial reporting period.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Premier and Cabinet 2022

Premier and Cabinet 2022

Whole of Government
Premier and Cabinet
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Risk

What the report is about

Result of the Premier and Cabinet cluster financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2022. 

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all Premier and Cabinet cluster agencies.

The machinery of government changes within the Premier and Cabinet cluster resulted in the transfer of net assets of $1 billion from the Department of Premier and Cabinet.

The Department of Premier and Cabinet, Public Service Commission and Parliamentary Counsel's Office accepted changes to their office leasing arrangements managed by Property NSW. These changes resulted in the collective de-recognition of $167.3 million of right-of-use assets, $225.1 million in lease liabilities and recognition of $47.8 million of other gains/losses. 

What the key issues were

The number of issues we reported to management decreased. 

Forty per cent of issues were repeated from the prior year.

Four moderate risk issues were reported in the management letters for Department of Premier and Cabinet and New South Wales Electoral Commission. Three out of the four moderate risk issues were repeat issues. 

The repeat issues related to internal control deficiencies in agencies' including lack of updated procurement policies and procedures and information technology general controls.

Fast facts 

The Premier and Cabinet cluster comprises seven agencies, delivering the government's objectives and facilitating stewardship of the public service.

  • $0.2b property, plant and equipment as at 30 June 2022
  • $3b total expenditure incurred in 2021–22
  • 100% unqualified audit opinions issued on agencies’ 30 June 2022 financial statements
  • moderate risk findings identified
  • 15 monetary misstatements reported in 2021–22
  • 40% of reported issues were repeat issues

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Premier and Cabinet’s financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Premier and Cabinet cluster for 2022.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all the cluster agencies 2021–22 financial statements.
  • There were two corrected misstatements greater than $5 million.
  • Changes to accommodation arrangements managed by Property NSW on behalf of the department resulted in the collective derecognition of approximately $167.3 million in right of use assets and corresponding lease liabilities totalling $225.1 million from the balance sheets of these agencies.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Premier and Cabinet cluster.

Section highlights

  • The 2021–22 audits identified four moderate risk issues across the cluster.
  • Three out of the four moderate risk issues were repeat issues.
  • The repeat issues related to password and security configuration and a lack of updated procurement policies and procedures.

Appendix one – Early close procedures

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Audit Insights 2018-2022

Audit Insights 2018-2022

Community Services
Education
Environment
Finance
Health
Industry
Justice
Local Government
Premier and Cabinet
Planning
Transport
Treasury
Universities
Whole of Government
Asset valuation
Cross-agency collaboration
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Fraud
Information technology
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Regulation
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

What the report is about

In this report, we have analysed the key findings and recommendations from our audit reports over the past four years.

This analysis includes financial audits, performance audits, and compliance audits of state and local government entities that were tabled in NSW Parliament between July 2018 and February 2022.

The report is framed by recognition that the past four years have seen significant challenges and emergency events.

The scale of government responses to these events has been wide-ranging, involving emergency response coordination, service delivery, governance and policy.

The report is a resource to support public sector agencies and local government to improve future programs and activities.

What we found

Our analysis of findings and recommendations is structured around six key themes:

  • Integrity and transparency
  • Performance and monitoring
  • Governance and oversight
  • Cyber security and data
  • System planning for disruption
  • Resource management.

The report draws from this analysis to present recommendations for elements of good practice that government agencies should consider in relation to these themes. It also includes relevant examples from recent audit reports.

In this report we particularly call out threats to the integrity of government systems, processes and governance arrangements.

The report highlights the need for balanced advice to government on options and risks, for transparent documentation and reporting of directions and decisions, and for early and open sharing of information with integrity bodies and audit.

A number of the matters highlighted in this report are similar to those described in our previous Insights Report, (Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018) specifically in relation to cyber and information security, to performance measurement, reporting and evaluation, and system and workforce planning and capability.

Fast facts

  • 72 audits included in the Audit Insights 2018–2022 analysis
  • 4 years of audits tabled by the Auditor-General for New South Wales
  • 6 key themes for Audit Insights 2018–2022.

picture of Margaret Crawford Auditor-General for New South Wales in black dress with city skyline as backgroundI am pleased to present the Audit Insights 2018–2022 report. This report describes key findings, trends and lessons learned from the last four years of audit. It seeks to inform the New South Wales Parliament of key risks identified and to provide insights and suggestions to the agencies we audit to improve performance across the public sector.

The report is framed by a very clear recognition that governments have been responding to significant events, in number, character and scale, over recent years. Further, it acknowledges that public servants at both state and council levels generally bring their best selves to work and diligently strive to deliver great outcomes for citizens and communities. The role of audit in this context is to provide necessary assurance over government spending, programs and services, and make suggestions for continuous improvement.

A number of the matters highlighted in this report are similar to those described in our previous Insights Report, (Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018) specifically in relation to cyber and information security, to performance measurement, reporting and evaluation, and system and workforce planning and capability.

However, in this report we particularly call out threats to the integrity of government systems, processes and governance arrangements. We highlight the need for balanced advice to government on options and risks, for transparent documentation and reporting of directions and decisions, and for early and open sharing of information with integrity bodies and audit. Arguably, these considerations are never more important than in an increasingly complex environment and in the face of significant emergency events and they will be key areas of focus in our future audit program.

While we have acknowledged the challenges of the last few years have required rapid responses to address the short-term impacts of emergency events, there is much to be learned to improve future programs. I trust that the insights developed in this report provide a helpful resource to public sector agencies and local government across New South Wales. I would be pleased to receive any feedback you may wish to offer.

Margaret Crawford
Auditor-General for New South Wales

Integrity and transparency Performance and monitoring Governance and oversight Cyber security and data System planning Resource management
Insufficient documentation of decisions reduces the ability to identify, or rule out, misconduct or corruption. Failure to apply lessons learned risks mistakes being repeated and undermines future decisions on the use of public funds. The control environment should be risk-based and keep pace with changes in the quantum and diversity of agency work. Building effective cyber resilience requires leadership and committed executive management, along with dedicated resourcing to build improvements in cyber security and culture. Priorities to meet forecast demand should incorporate regular assessment of need and any emerging risks or trends. Absence of an overarching strategy to guide decision-making results in project-by-project decisions lacking coordination. Governments must weigh up the cost of reliance on consultants at the expense of internal capability, and actively manage contracts and conflicts of interest.
Government entities should report to the public at both system and project level for transparency and accountability. Government activities benefit from a clear statement of objectives and associated performance measures to support systematic monitoring and reporting on outcomes and impact. Management of risk should include mechanisms to escalate risks, and action plans to mitigate risks with effective controls. In implementing strategies to mitigate cyber risk, agencies must set target cyber maturity levels, and document their acceptance of cyber risks consistent with their risk appetite. Service planning should establish future service offerings and service levels relative to current capacity, address risks to avoid or mitigate disruption of business and service delivery, and coordinate across other relevant plans and stakeholders. Negotiations on outsourced services and major transactions must maintain focus on integrity and seeking value for public funds.
Entities must provide balanced advice to decision-makers on the benefits and risks of investments. Benefits realisation should identify responsibility for benefits management, set baselines and targets for benefits, review during delivery, and evaluate costs and benefits post-delivery. Active review of policies and procedures in line with current business activities supports more effective risk management. Governments hold repositories of valuable data and data capabilities that should be leveraged and shared across government and non-government entities to improve strategic planning and forecasting. Formal structures and systems to facilitate coordination between agencies is critical to more efficient allocation of resources and to facilitate a timely response to unexpected events. Transformation programs can be improved by resourcing a program management office.
Clear guidelines and transparency of decisions are critical in distributing grant funding. Quality assurance should underpin key inputs that support performance monitoring and accounting judgements. Governance arrangements can enable input into key decisions from both government and non-government partners, and those with direct experience of complex issues.     Workforce planning should consider service continuity and ensure that specialist and targeted roles can be resourced and allocated to meet community need.
Governments must ensure timely and complete provision of information to support governance, integrity and audit processes.          
Read more Read more Read more Read more Read more Read more

 

This report brings together a summary of key findings arising from NSW Audit Office reports tabled in the New South Wales Parliament between July 2018 and February 2022. This includes analysis of financial audits, performance audits, and compliance audits tabled over this period.

  • Financial audits provide an independent opinion on the financial statements of NSW Government entities, universities and councils and identify whether they comply with accounting standards, relevant laws, regulations, and government directions.
  • Performance audits determine whether government entities carry out their activities effectively, are doing so economically and efficiently, and in accordance with relevant laws. The activities examined by a performance audit may include a selected program or service, all or part of an entity, or more than one government entity. Performance audits can consider issues which affect the whole state and/or the local government sectors.
  • Compliance audits and other assurance reviews are audits that assess whether specific legislation, directions, and regulations have been adhered to.

This report follows our earlier edition titled 'Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018'. That report sought to highlight issues and themes emerging from performance audit findings, and to share lessons common across government. In this report, we have analysed the key findings and recommendations from our reports over the past four years. The full list of reports is included in Appendix 1. The analysis included findings and recommendations from 58 performance audits, as well as selected financial and compliance reports tabled between July 2018 and February 2022. The number of recommendations and key findings made across different areas of activity and the top issues are summarised at Exhibit 1.

The past four years have seen unprecedented challenges and several emergency events, and the scale of government responses to these events has been wide-ranging involving emergency response coordination, service delivery, governance and policy. While these emergencies are having a significant impact today, they are also likely to continue to have an impact into the future. There is much to learn from the response to those events that will help the government sector to prepare for and respond to future disruption. The following chapters bring together our recommendations for core elements of good practice across a number of areas of government activity, along with relevant examples from recent audit reports.

This 'Audit Insights 2018–2022' report does not make comparative analysis of trends in public sector performance since our 2018 Insights report, but instead highlights areas where government continues to face challenges, as well as new issues that our audits have identified since our 2018 report. We will continue to use the findings of our Insights analysis to shape our future audit priorities, in line with our purpose to help Parliament hold government accountable for its use of public resources in New South Wales.

Appendix one – Included reports, 2018–2022

Appendix two – About this report

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for COVID-19: response, recovery and impact

COVID-19: response, recovery and impact

Community Services
Education
Health
Justice
Premier and Cabinet
Transport
Treasury
Whole of Government
Cross-agency collaboration
Financial reporting
Management and administration
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration

What the report is about

This report draws together the financial impact of COVID-19 on the agencies integral to responses across the state government sector of New South Wales.

What we found

Since the COVID-19 pandemic hit NSW in January 2020, and until 30 June 2021, $7.5 billion was spent by state government agencies for health and economic stimulus. The response was largely funded by borrowings.

The key areas of spending since the start of COVID-19 in NSW to 30 June 2021 were:

  • direct health response measures – $2.2 billion
  • personal protective equipment – $1.4 billion
  • small business grants – $795 million
  • quarantine costs – $613 million
  • increases in employee expenses and cleaning costs across most agencies
  • vaccine distribution, including vaccination hubs – $71 million.

The COVID-19 pandemic significantly impacted the financial performance and position of state government agencies.

Decreases in revenue from providing goods and services were offset by increases in appropriations, grants and contributions, for health and economic stimulus funding in response to the pandemic.

Most agencies had expense growth, due to additional operating requirements to manage and respond to the pandemic along with implementing new or expanded stimulus programs and initiatives.

Response measures for COVID-19 have meant the NSW Government is unlikely to meet targets in the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012 being:

  • annual expense growth kept below long-term average revenue growth
  • elimination of State’s unfunded superannuation liability by 2030.

 Fast facts

  • First COVID-19 case in NSW on 25 January 2020
  • COVID-19 vaccinations commenced on 21 February 2021
  • By 31 December 2021, 25.2 million PCR tests had been performed in NSW and 13.6 million vaccines administered, with 93.6% of the 16 and over population receiving two doses
  • During 2020–21, NSW Health employed an extra 4,893 full-time staff and incurred $28 million in overtime mainly in response to COVID-19
  • During 2020–21, $1.2 billion was spent on direct health COVID-19 response measures and $532 million was spent on quarantine for incoming international travellers

Section highlights

  • Up to 30 June 2021, $7.5 billion has been spent by state government agencies for health and economic stimulus.
  • Revenue increased for most agencies as falling revenue from providing goods and services was offset by additional funding from appropriations, grants and contributions.
  • Expenses increased as most agencies incurred additional costs to manage and respond to the pandemic along with delivering stimulus and support programs.
  • Borrowings of $7.5 billion over the last two years helped to fund the response to COVID-19.

Section highlights

  • NSW Government unlikely to meet targets in Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012.

Published

Actions for Transport 2021

Transport 2021

Transport
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Information technology
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance

What the report is about

The results of the Transport cluster agencies’ financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.

What we found

Unmodified financial statement audit opinions were issued for all Transport cluster agencies. Resolution of issues delayed signing the Transport Asset Holding Entity of NSW (TAHE) until 24 December 2021. Matters relating to TAHE are also reported in the report on State Finances 2021.

Emphasis of Matter - TAHE

An Emphasis of Matter paragraph was included in TAHE's audit opinion to draw attention to uncertainty associated with:

  • future access and licence fees that are subject to re-signed agreements
  • an additional $4.1 billion of funding that is outside the forward estimates period
  • a significant portion of the fair value of TAHE’s non-financial assets is reflected in the terminal value, which is outside the ten-year contract period to 30 June 2031, and the risk that TAHE will not be able to negotiate contract terms to support current projections.

TAHE's transition from RailCorp also changed its valuation of assets to an income approach, resulting in a $20.3 billion decrease to the fair value. The fair value decrease was because the cash flows were not sufficient to support the previous recorded value.

TAHE corrected a misstatement of $1.2 billion relating to the valuation of its assets. This followed significant deliberation on key judgements and assumptions, with TAHE adopting risk assumptions in its valuation that were not in line with comparable benchmarks.

Emphasis of Matter - State Transit Authority of New South Wales

An Emphasis of Matter paragraph was included in the State Transit Authority of NSW's (the Authority) audit opinion to draw attention to the financial statements not prepared on a going concern basis. This was because the NSW Government put the Authority's bus contracts out to competitive tender and accordingly, management assessed the Authority's principal activities are not expected to operate for a full 12 months after 30 June 2021.

The implementation of AASB 1059 ‘Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors’ resulted in a net increase in assets of $23.5 billion across the Transport cluster.

The 2020–21 audits identified six high-risk and 45 moderate risk issues across the cluster. Fourteen of the moderate risk issues were repeat issues, including information technology controls around management of user access for key financial systems and payroll processes.

The high-risk issues, in addition to those related to TAHE and previously reported in the report on State Finances 2021, include:

  • absence of conflict of declarations related to land acquisition processes at Transport for NSW
  • no evidence of conflict of interest declarations obtained by TAHE from consultants and contractors regarding involvement in other engagements.

What we recommended

TAHE needs to:

  • finalise revised commercial agreements to reflect fees detailed in a Heads of Agreement signed on 18 December 2021
  • prepare robust projections and business plans to support the required rate of return.

NSW Treasury and TAHE should monitor the risk that control of TAHE assets could change in the future.

Transport for NSW needs to significantly improve its processes to ensure all key information is identified and shared with the Audit Office.

Transport agencies should implement a process to ensure conflicts of interest declarations are completed for land acquisitions and applied consistently across the cluster.

Transport agencies should implement a process to capture all contracts and agreements entered to ensure:

  • agencies are aware of contractual obligations
  • financial reporting implications are assessed, particularly with respect to leases, revenue and service concession arrangements.

Fast facts

The Transport cluster plans and delivers infrastructure and integrated services across all modes of transport. This includes road, rail, bus, ferry, light rail, cycling and walking. There are 11 agencies in the cluster.

  • $128b road and maritime system infrastructure assets as at 30 June 2021
  • 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued on agencies 30 June 2021 financial statements
  • 26 monetary misstatements were reported in 2020–21
  • $24.9b rail systems infrastructure assets as at 30 June 2021
  • high-risk management letter findings were identified
  • 37% of reported issues were repeat issues

 

This report provides Parliament and other users of the transport cluster (the cluster) agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the cluster for 2021.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all Transport agencies' financial statements.
  • An 'Emphasis of Matter' paragraph was included in the Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales' (TAHE) Independent Auditor's Report to draw attention to significant uncertainty associated with the judgements, estimates and assumptions supporting the valuation of TAHE’s property, plant and equipment (PPE) and intangible assets.
  • In 2020–21, the former RailCorp transitioned to TAHE, a for-profit state-owned corporation. When TAHE became a for-profit entity, it was required to change its valuation approach. The value of a for-profit entity's assets cannot exceed the cash flows they might realise either through their sale or continued use. This change in the basis of valuation resulted in a decrease of $20.3 billion in the fair value of the assets. The decrease in fair value was because the cash flows, which support measurement under the income approach, were insufficient to support the previous valuation based on the current replacement cost of those assets.
  • TAHE also corrected a misstatement of $1.2 billion relating to the valuation of its assets after significant deliberation on key judgements and assumptions, with TAHE adopting higher risk assumptions in its valuation when compared to the relevant market benchmarks.
  • On 18 December 2021, a Heads of Agreement (HoA) was signed between TAHE, Transport for NSW, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains. This HoA reflected TAHE's intention to negotiate higher access and licence fees in order to meet the shareholding ministers' revised expectation of a higher rate of return. This matter resolved the treatment of a significant accounting issue in the State’s consolidated (whole-of-government) financial statements. Refer to the Report on State Finances tabled on 9 February 2022. The expectation of an additional $5.2 billion in fees added to the valuation of TAHE's PPE and intangibles, with a final value of $17.15 billion.
  • The implementation of AASB 1059 ‘Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors’ resulted in a net increase in assets of $23.5 billion across the cluster. AASB 1059 had a significant impact on Transport for NSW, Sydney Metro, Sydney Ferries and TAHE's 2020–21 financial statements.
  • TAHE corrected a misstatement of $97.2 million relating to the application of AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors' for the Airport Link Company Contract. 

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the cluster.

Section highlights

  • The number of findings reported to management increased from 56 in 2019–20 to 73 in 2020–21.
  • Thirty-seven per cent were repeat findings. Many repeat issues related to information technology controls around user access management and payroll processes. These included deficiencies in the monitoring of privileged user access to key financial systems, review of user access to key financial systems and segregation of duties between preparer and reviewer for new employee hires.
  • Six new high-risk issues were identified in 2020–21, an increase of three compared to last year.
  • One high-risk issue related to conflicts of interests not being declared by all officers involved in the land acquisition process at Transport for NSW.
  • Five high-risk issues arose from the audit of TAHE, with respect to:
    • control over TAHE assets and operations
    • asset valuations
    • access price build up
    • detailed business modelling to support returns
    • conflict of interest management.
  • Based on the access and licence agreements signed at 30 June 2021 between TAHE, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains, our review of the expected returns calculated by NSW Treasury did not support the assumption that there was a reasonable expectation that a sufficient rate of return could be achieved from the NSW Government's investment in TAHE.
  • On 14 December 2021 the shareholding ministers' increased their expectations as to TAHE's target average return from 1.5 per cent to the expected long-term inflation rate of 2.5 per cent.
  • On 18 December 2021 the revised shareholder expectations were confirmed in a signed Heads of Agreement. The Heads of Agreement will increase access fees paid by rail operators to TAHE by $5.2 billion.
  • TAHE's access and licence agreements specified fees that were well short of the IPART regulated maximum (ceiling price).
  • The finalisation of the access and licence agreements with Sydney Trains and NSW Trains resulted in a significant write-down of TAHE's asset value by $20.3 billion. The revaluation loss will need to be recovered as part of the shareholders’ rate of return of 2.5 per cent in order to sustain the whole-of-government accounting treatment of cash contributions recorded as an equity contribution and not a grant expense.
  • There was a significant adjustment to TAHE’s valuation between the financial statements originally submitted for the audit and the final, signed financial statements due to differences in risk assumptions resulting in a correction of a $1.2 billion misstatement. 

Findings reported to management

The number of findings reported to management has increased, and 37 per cent of all issues were repeat issues

Breakdowns and weaknesses in internal controls increase the risk of fraud and error. Deficiencies in internal controls, matters of governance interest and unresolved issues were reported to management and those charged with governance of agencies. The Audit Office does this through management letters, which include observations, related implications, recommendations and risk ratings.

In 2020–21, there were 73 findings raised across the cluster (56 in 2019–20) and 37 per cent of all issues were repeat issues (43 per cent in 2019–20).

In view of the recent performance audit ‘Managing Cyber Risks’ and compliance audit ‘Compliance with the NSW Cyber Security Policy’ involving the cluster, it is noted with concern that the most common repeat issues related to weaknesses in controls over information technology user access administration and password management. Moderate risk issues included completeness and accuracy of contract registers, accounting for assets and management of supplier and payroll masterfiles.

A delay in implementing audit recommendations increases the risk of intentional and accidental errors in processing information, producing management reports, and generating financial statements. This can impair decision-making, affect service delivery and expose agencies to fraud, financial loss and reputational damage. Control deficiencies may also mean agency staff are less likely to follow internal policies, inadvertently causing the agency not to comply with legislation, regulation, and central agency policies.

The table below describes the common issues identified across the cluster by category and risk rating. 

Risk rating Issue
Information technology
Moderate: 7 new, 4 repeat**

The financial audits identified opportunities for agencies to improve information technology processes and controls that support the integrity of financial data used to prepare agencies' financial statements. Of particular concern are issues associated with:

  • monitoring of privileged user access
  • user access management
  • password configuration management.
Low: 4 new, 1 repeat***
Internal control deficiencies or improvements
High: 1 new*

The financial audits identified internal control deficiencies across key business processes, including:

  • declarations of conflicts of interest over land acquisitions (see further details below)
  • management of contracts and agreement register
  • accounting for assets
  • management of payroll and supplier masterfiles
  • payroll processes.
Moderate: 15 new, 8 repeat**
Low: 2 new, 5 repeat***
Financial reporting
High: 3 new*

The financial audits identified opportunities for agencies to strengthen financial reporting, including:

  • asset valuations (see further details below)
  • detailed business modelling to support returns (see further details below)
  • access price build-up (see further details below)
  • timely capitalisation of completed assets.
Moderate: 3 new, 1 repeat**
Low: 2 new***
Governance and oversight
High: 1 new*

The financial audits identified opportunities for agencies to improve governance and oversight processes, including:

  • control over TAHE assets and operations
  • governance over Cyber Security.
Moderate: 2 new**
Non-compliance with key legislation and/or central agency policies
High: 1 new*

The financial audits identified the need for agencies to improve its compliance with key legislation and central agency policies, including:

  • conflict of interest (COI) management
  • outdated policies and procedures
  • incomplete probation procedures.
Moderate: 4 new, 1 repeat**
Low: 1 new, 7 repeat***

* High-risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
** Moderate risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
*** Low risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
Note: Management letter findings are based either on final management letters issued to agencies.

2020–21 audits identified six high-risk findings

High-risk findings were reported at the following cluster agencies.

Agency Description
2020–21 findings
Transport for NSW (new finding)

Declaration of conflicts of interest in the land acquisition process

In 2021, we conducted a performance audit over the Acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia which examined:

  • whether Transport for NSW conducted an effective process to purchase 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia
  • whether Transport for NSW has effective processes and procedures to identify and acquire property required to deliver the NSW Government’s major infrastructure projects.

The report made several recommendations over Transport for NSW’s internal policies and procedures to guide the land acquisition process. As part of the financial audit, we obtained an understanding of key controls and processes relating to the acquisition of land, relevant to the audit of the financial statements. We found that conflicts of interests were not always declared by all officers involved in the land acquisition process. Furthermore, processes for declaring conflicts of interests are not consistently applied across cluster agencies.

Out of a sample of 19 land acquisitions tested, we identified:

  • 14 instances where there was no evidence of declarations of conflicts of interests made by the team members involved in the acquisition process
  • 2 instances where conflicts of interest declarations were completed by key members of the acquisition team only at a project level
  • 1 instance where conflicts of interest declarations were only completed by the property negotiator and the valuer, but not the other members of the acquisition team.

Management advised that the land acquisition processes, at the time of the land acquisitions, did not require formal conflicts of interests to be declared as they believe that as per Transport for NSW code of conduct, declaration is only required where the staff member considers that a potential or perceived Conflict of Interest exists. However, Transport for NSW's Procurement Policy requires the documentation of formal declarations from all staff involved in procurement activities to formally disclose any conflicts of interest or state that they do not have a conflict of interest.

This matter has been included as a high-risk finding in the management letter as absence of rigorous and consistent management of conflicts of interests, and non-compliance with established policies increases the risk that Transport for NSW may be exposed to reputational damage or financial losses in relation to land acquisitions. Furthermore, this may result in lack of probity or value-for money considerations during the land acquisition process.

Further details are elaborated below under 'Land acquisitions'.

Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (new finding)

Control over TAHE assets and operations

The State-Owned Corporations Act 1989 maintains that all decisions relating to the operation of a statutory state-owned corporation (SOC) are to be made by or under the authority of the board. However, under the Transport Administration Act 1988 (TAA), the functions of TAHE may only be exercised under one or more operating licences issued by the portfolio minister. The current Operating Licence confers terms and conditions for TAHE to carry out its functions, and imposes constraints on TAHE, including (but not limited to):

  • railway operations not permitted
  • transport services not permitted
  • TAHE must not carry out maintenance of its assets.

Such operating licences are short term in nature, and the TAA allows the transport minister (portfolio minister) to grant one or more operating licences to TAHE and may amend, substitute, or impose, amend or revoke conditions of the operating licence.

For the current year, the legal form of the arrangements established in its first year of operation imply TAHE has control over the assets based on the Implementation Deed and the agreements signed with the public operators.

However, risks remain as TAHE is in its early stages, and the actual substance of operations will need to be observed and considered.

Given the restrictions that can be placed on the entity through the Operating Licence, and the ability to make further changes to the Operating Licence and Statement of Expectations set by the portfolio minister, there is a risk there could be limitations placed on the Board of Directors to operate with sufficient independence in its decision-making with respect to the operations of TAHE. Over time, this may further impact the degree of control required by TAHE to satisfy the recognition criteria over its assets. It may also fundamentally change the presentation of TAHE’s financial statements.

Future limitations to the degree of control TAHE, and its Board, can exercise over its functions may impact the degree of control TAHE has over its assets going forward. As part of the 2021–22 audit, we will monitor and assess whether, in substance, these assets continue to be controlled by TAHE and whether, in substance, TAHE can operate as an independent SOC. We require management continue to demonstrate that TAHE continues to maintain control over its assets and has the ability to operate as an independent SOC. Further details are described below under 'Transport Asset Holding Entity'.

Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (new finding)

Asset valuation

The final updated valuation was based on cash flows that were in a signed Heads of Agreement, which stated that it set out the proposed indicative future access and licence fees which will form the basis of the negotiations between TAHE, Transport for NSW, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains, who will work together to review access fees and licence fees payable under the agreements and to make all necessary changes to the Operating Agreements by 1 July 2022.

This adds uncertainty in the cash flows. It is crucial that TAHE formalises these updated fees in legally binding signed access and licence agreements with the relevant parties as soon as possible.

Refer below for further details on the Heads of Agreement.

Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (new finding)

Conflict of interest (COI) management

For procurement transactions through direct negotiation with single quotes, there was no evidence of COI declarations obtained from the consultants and contractors regarding involvement in other engagements. Contractors and consultants are required to declare actual COI. However, there was no requirement to confirm nil conflict of interest. In addition, there is a risk that perceived COI may not be adequately assessed or managed. TAHE is expected to operate as an independent SOC and would need to ensure any perceived or actual conflict of interest is adequately addressed.

Management should implement a process to:

  • ensure conflicts of interest declarations are completed when engaging all consultants and contractors (including involvement with other engagements and confirmation of nil conflicts of interests)
  • ensure probity is undertaken to identify any actual or perceived conflicts of interest.

The declarations should consider individuals and relationships that may create, or may be perceived to create, conflicts of interest.

Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (new finding)

Detailed business modelling to support returns

On 18 December 2021, Transport for NSW, TAHE and the operators, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains entered into a Heads of Agreement (HoA). This HoA forms the basis of negotiations to revise the pricing within the existing 10-year contracts and deliver upon the shareholders' expectation of a return of 2.5 per cent per annum of contributed equity, including recovering the revaluation loss incurred in 2020–21.

TAHE needs to revise its business plan and include detailed business modelling that supports the shareholding ministers' revised expectations of return (2.5 per cent return on the State’s equity injections and recovery of the write-down of assets over the average useful life of those assets) and align the business plan and Statement of Corporate Intent. This requires more detailed projections, estimates and plans that support how TAHE expects to recover the asset write-down and expected returns to government. The current modelling for ten years needs to be enhanced with modelling over the expected recovery period of approximately 33 years.

Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (new finding)

Access price build-up

Management explained that in determining access and licence fees for the agreements with Sydney Trains and NSW Trains, assets prior to the commencement of equity injections in 2015–16 were excluded from the calculations. Management explained the premise being that these assets were previously funded by government through capital grants. The replacement and refurbishment of these assets is expected to be through government funded maintenance performed through the public rail operators and/or the equity injections from NSW Treasury rather than through access and licence fees.


The number of moderate risk findings increased from prior year

Forty-five moderate risk findings were reported in 2020–21, representing a 73.1 per cent increase from 2019–20. Of these, 14 were repeat findings, and 31 were new issues. 

Key moderate risk findings related to:

  • weaknesses in user access management to key financial systems
  • management of contracts and agreements register
  • management of supplier and payroll masterfiles
  • accounting for assets
  • control deficiencies at service organisations
  • segregation of duties relating to the hiring of employees
  • conflict of interest management
  • annual leave management
  • review of internal audit charter
  • disaster recovery planning.

Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales

Background

The establishment of TAHE was originally announced by the NSW Government in the 2015–16 State Budget. On 1 July 2020, the former Rail Corporation New South Wales (RailCorp), a not-for-profit entity, transitioned to the Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (TAHE), a for-profit statutory state-owned corporation under the Transport Administration Act 1988. There was no change in the structure of TAHE as a new entity was not created. Ownership remains fully with the government. TAHE, and the former RailCorp, were both classified as Public Non-Financial Corporation (PNFC) entities within the Total State Sector Accounts.

Prior to 1 July 2015, the government paid appropriations to Transport for NSW, a General Government Sector (GGS) agency, to construct transport assets. When completed, these assets were granted to the former RailCorp, a not for-profit entity within the PNFC sector. The grants to the former RailCorp were recorded as an expense in the State’s GGS budget result.

From 1 July 2015, the government announced the creation of TAHE (a dedicated asset manager). Funding for new capital projects was to be provided through equity injections and was no longer recorded as an expense to the GGS budget, even though the business model was yet to be determined. The change, as explained in the 2015–16 State Budget, was due to the expectation that the former RailCorp will transition to TAHE, which was intended, over time to provide a commercial return. That Budget also highlighted how the change, which was largely a change in the basis of accounting, was intended to improve the GGS budget result each year. In total, the GGS has contributed approximately $11.1 billion to TAHE since 2015–16. This includes the equity injections from the GGS to TAHE made in the current year of $2.4 billion.

NSW Treasury initially set a timetable for the stand-up of TAHE of 1 July 2019, which included finalising the business model, operating model and contracts for the use of TAHE's assets. The enactment of the Transport Administration Act 1988 resulted in RailCorp transitioning to TAHE on 1 July 2020, 12 months after its originally planned operational date. Contributions paid to the former RailCorp and subsequently to TAHE by the GGS were treated as equity investments from July 2015 forward. This treatment continued, despite delays in settling the business model. In 2020, the Audit Office raised a high-risk finding due to the significance of the financial reporting impacts and business risks for NSW Treasury and TAHE.

The business model adopted and the flow of funds between transport agencies in the GGS and PNFC sectors is shown in the diagram below. For further details refer to the Report on State Finances 2021.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Financial data

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Published

Actions for State Finances 2021

State Finances 2021

Whole of Government
Finance
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration

What the report is about

The results of the consolidated General Government Sector (GGS) and Total State Sector (TSS) financial statements audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.

What we found

The Independent Auditor’s Report on the 2020–21 GGS and TSS financial statements was unqualified but contained an emphasis of matter. The resolution of significant issues delayed signing until 24 December 2021.

The emphasis of matter draws attention to significant uncertainties associated with key assumptions related to the recognition by the GGS of a $2.4 billion investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE).

The Audit Office advised NSW Treasury that it intended to issue a qualified audit opinion, but actions by the NSW Government avoided this outcome. All evidence provided prior to 14 December indicated that the GGS’s return on the $2.4 billion cash contributed to TAHE was insufficient to support accounting for it as an investment. Projected returns were below the long term inflation rate and were insufficient to recover:

  • TAHE's revaluation loss of $20.3 billion in 2020–21
  • an average rate of return of at least 2.5 per cent of equity invested in TAHE.

In these circumstances, the $2.4 billion contributed to TAHE should have been expensed. This could have impacted the GGS’s budget result.

The NSW Government’s actions to avoid a qualified audit opinion included:

  • a government decision made on 14 December approving TAHE’s shareholding ministers communicating that their expectation of a return had increased to 2.5 per cent
  • reflecting the revised shareholding ministers’ expectations in the 2021–22 ‘NSW Half-Yearly Review’ on 16 December. The NSW Government provided an additional $1.1 billion to fund increased access and license fees to TAHE from the public sector operators (Sydney Trains and NSW Trains)
  • signing a Heads of Agreement (HoA) on 18 December between Transport for NSW (TfNSW),TAHE and the public sector operators. The HoA reflected the parties’ intent to renegotiate contracts to increase TAHE’s licence and access fees by $5.2 billion.

The uncertainty raised in our emphasis of matter relates to:

  • TAHE’s future estimated access and licence fees, which remain subject to re-negotiation and must meet or exceed the indicative future access and licence fees set out in the HoA
  • continued funding for TAHE's key customers (Sydney Trains and NSW Trains) to meet the price increases outlined in the HoA
  • the 2021–22 'NSW Budget Half Yearly Review', which provides for $1.1 billion of the additional funding over the forward estimates period to 2024–25. A further $4.1 billion is required over the following six years (2026–31), which are outside the forward estimates period
  • further significant cash flows required to support the funding model are outside the 10-year contract period. That is, beyond 30 June 2031.

There remains a risk that:

  • TAHE will not be able to re-contract with the rail operators for access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections
  • future government's funding to TAHE’s key customers, the rail operators, may not be consistent with the current shareholding ministers’ expectations
  • TAHE will be unable to grow its non-government revenues.

The audit found a risk of undue reliance on consultants, a need to improve quality controls on materials submitted to audit and an extreme risk finding raised with respect to providing key information on a timely basis.

The GGS Budget Result for the 2020–21 financial year was a deficit of $7.1 billion compared to an original forecast budget deficit of $16 billion.

The State did not achieve its fiscal target of maintaining annual expenditure growth below the long-term revenue growth target of 5.6 per cent. In 2020–21, the GGS expenditure grew by 6.9 per cent mainly due to grants and subsidies paid from the COVID-19 stimulus packages received from the Commonwealth.

What we recommended

Significant matters concerning TAHE

We recommend NSW Treasury:

  • implement effective quality review processes over key accounting information
  • establish a policy to determine the minimum expected rate of return on its equity injections into public sector entities
  • report on the performance of investments in TAHE and all other public sector entities
  • ensure the revised commercial agreements between TAHE and NSW rail operators reflect access and licence fees set out in the Heads of Agreement
  • with TAHE, prepare robust projections and business plans to support returns beyond FY2031
  • liaise with the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and reconfirm the sector classifications of TAHE, NSW Trains and Sydney Trains
  • with TAHE, monitor the risk that control of TAHE assets could change in future reporting periods
  • significantly improve its processes to ensure all key information is identified and shared on a timely basis
  • consider whether there is sufficient competent oversight of its use of consultants and assess the risk of an overdependence on consultants at the cost of internal capability.

A number of other non-TAHE related recommendations have been raised in Section 6 ‘Key Audit Findings’.

Fast facts 

The Total State Sector comprises the General Government Sector, the Public Non-Financial Corporation (PNFC) Sector and the Public Financial Corporation (PFC) Sector.

The 2020–21 consolidated financial statements of the General Government and Total State Sectors provide the financial performance and position of the NSW Government.

  • $391b government property, plant and equipment in the Total State Sector as at 30 June 2021
  • $3.3b government net contributions to other public sectors in 2020–21. $2.4 billion was contributed to TAHE
  • $19.3b net holding losses from the GGS's investment in other public sector entities recognised outside of the 2020–21 budget result
  • $7.1b budget deficit of the General Government Sector in 2021
  • 7 - six high risk and one extreme risk management letter findings related to the General Government Sector's investment into TAHE
  • 24 monetary misstatements exceeding $20 million were identified in agencies financial statements in 2020–21
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Margaret Crawford, Auditor-General for New South Wales

Pursuant to the Government Sector Audit Act 1983 I present my report on State Finances 2021. My independent auditor’s opinion on the State’s consolidated financial statements, albeit delayed, is unqualified. My independent auditor’s report however, does include an emphasis of matter drawing attention to significant uncertainties remaining in relation to the State’s equity investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE).

The 2020–21 year was challenging from many perspectives, not least being the continuing impact of and response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Once again, NSW Treasury provided government agencies extensions of time to submit financial statements for audit. Finance staff and management right across government must be congratulated for their responsiveness in meeting their financial reporting obligations in such challenging circumstances.

The General Government’s 2020–21 budget result, reflected within the Total State Sector Accounts, was a deficit of $7.1 billion. This compares with the original budgeted deficit of $16 billion. The factors that contributed to this outcome are presented in this Report to Parliament along with other significant matters related to the audit of the Total State Sector Accounts.

One section of my report is dedicated to issues related to the accounting for TAHE. This year’s audit was significantly delayed by protracted disagreement over the treatment of the government’s cash contribution to TAHE. This matter was further frustrated by the fact that information was withheld and not shared with my Office on a timely basis. This has warranted an extreme risk finding for NSW Treasury to significantly improve governance processes to ensure complete and timely sharing of information. This is key to preserving trust, which is one of the foundations that underpins my Office’s engagement with agencies in the conduct of their audits.

The challenges encountered in completing this year’s audit were extraordinary and tested the constructive partnership between the Audit Office and NSW Treasury. I want to acknowledge the enormous efforts of staff of both agencies to correct material errors and ultimately achieve my unmodified audit opinion. I saw first-hand the professionalism, resilience and dedication of my staff. A commitment to accurate and transparent financial reporting is a key basis upon which confidence in the financial management of New South Wales’ resources can be assured.

Margaret Crawford

Auditor-General for New South Wales

9 February 2022

The Independent Auditor's Report, which includes an emphasis of matter was issued on 24 December 2021

While the audit opinion on the State's 2020–21 financial statements was ultimately unmodified, NSW Treasury delayed signing the NSW Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA) in order to resolve significant accounting issues that were material to the TSSA, in particular the treatment of the General Government Sector's (GGS) investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE) during 2020–21.

The Treasurer and NSW Treasury signed the consolidated financial statements on 24 December 2021, eleven weeks later than the 2018–19 pre-pandemic timetable.

The Audit Office advised NSW Treasury that the 2020–21 TSSA would be qualified with respect to TAHE

Our review of all evidence received prior to 14 December indicated the GGS's expected returns were below the long-term inflation rate and that there was no expectation it should recover a significant asset revaluation loss. The levels of projected returns did not support the accounting treatment of the GGS's cash contribution of $2.4 billion to TAHE as an equity injection.

The TSSA are prepared in accordance with Australian Accounting Standards and particularly AASB 1049 ‘Whole-of-Government and General Government Sector Financial Reporting’. This standard requires contributions from owners to comply with the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Government Finance Statistics Manual 20151 (GFSM) where it would not conflict with Australian Accounting Standards.

The ABS GFSM states that an equity contribution is recognised unless there is no reasonable expectation that a sufficient rate of return can be generated by that investment, in which case the transfer is expensed. A realistic rate of return is defined in the ABS GFSM as the intention to earn a rate of return that is sufficient to generate dividends (including income tax equivalents) and holding gains or losses at a later date. Holding losses include the final asset revaluation decrement of $20.3 billion, which TAHE incurred on its property plant and equipment assets when it became a for-profit entity and was required to value its assets on the basis of the cash flows they are expected to generate. The lower the commercial returns (cashflows), the greater the potential valuation losses of a for-profit entity's assets. This $20.3 billion valuation loss is disclosed within notes 1 'Significant Accounting policies - TAHE Reform in 2020–21', Note 11 'Equity Investments in Other Public Sector Entities' and Note 14 'Property, Plant & Equipment of the Total State Sector and GGS' financial statements.

Multiple versions of models estimating the GGS's expected rate of return were submitted to the Audit Office by NSW Treasury attempting to demonstrate the commerciality of the GGS's investment in TAHE. Until 14 December 2021, our review of all calculations indicated the existing access and licence fees set up under commercial arrangements effective 1 July 2021 did not support a reasonable expectation that a sufficient rate of return would be earned on the equity injections to TAHE. The existing revenue arrangements reflected a shareholders' expected rate of return of only 1.5 per cent per annum of contributed equity and did not include recovery of the revaluation loss of $20.3 billion incurred in 2020–21.

Having reviewed all evidence provided, the Audit Office communicated to NSW Treasury that unless corrected, the State's accounts would be qualified as the $2.4 billion transfer made by the GGS to TAHE should have been reported as a grant expense instead of an investment. The GGS's estimated rate of return was not sufficient to cover:

  • TAHE's final revaluation loss of $20.3 billion in 2020–21
  • a dollar value equal to, or exceeding a 2.5 per cent rate of return on the equity invested in TAHE (ie: at least equal to the long term inflation rate).

Action was required by the NSW Government to avoid a qualified audit opinion

NSW Government actions avoided a qualified audit opinion related to the GGS’s cash contribution of $2.4 billion to TAHE. To support the TAHE structure as a commercial arrangement earning a sufficient rate of return, the NSW Government agreed to provide additional future funding to TAHE's key government customers (Sydney Trains and NSW Trains) to support increases in access and licence fees to be paid to TAHE.

Shareholding ministers increased their expectations as to TAHE's target average return to the expected long-term inflation rate of 2.5 per cent

On 14 December 2021, a government decision was made resulting in the TAHE shareholding ministers requesting that TAHE re-negotiate the access fees and license fees payable under the Operating Agreements between TAHE and the public operators (Sydney Trains and NSW Trains). The renegotiation was to target an average return to the GGS of 2.5 per cent on the equity contributed. TAHE's existing ten year agreements with the operators provide a mechanism by which the parties meet annually and consult in order to determine the amount of the access fees and licence fees that will be payable in the following financial year.

The revised shareholder expectations for TAHE were published in the 2021–22 'NSW Budget Half Yearly Review' on 16 December 2021. The revised expectations changed the basis of the expected returns on equity from the 10-year Commonwealth bond rate of only 1.5 per cent, to the expected long-term inflation rate of 2.5 per cent. This is consistent with the Reserve Bank's target band and the Commonwealth's Department of Finance's expected return on government investments in other sectors.

The revised shareholder expectations were confirmed in a signed Heads of Agreement

On 18 December 2021, Transport for NSW (TfNSW), TAHE and the operators, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains entered into a Heads of Agreement (HoA). This HoA forms the basis of negotiations to revise the pricing within the existing 10-year contracts and deliver upon the shareholders' expectation of a return of 2.5 per cent per annum of contributed equity. This revised return includes:

  • income earned over the estimated weighted average remaining useful lives of TAHE’s assets
  • recovery of the revaluation losses in 2020–21 on TAHE’s property, plant and equipment assets incurred when TAHE commenced operations as a for-profit entity, albeit the recovery of the revaluation loss is projected to take up to 2052.

The HoA reflects an intention between all parties to revise the contractual agreements to increase future access and license fees by $5.2 billion. This included $1.1 billion for the period FY2023–25, which is reflected in the 2021–22 'NSW Budget Half Yearly Review'. Further detail on the HoA is reported in Section 3 of this report ‘Investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity’.

NSW Treasury revised its calculations to reflect the increased future returns

Following these changes, NSW Treasury revised its calculations of estimated returns to reflect a cumulative return equivalent to the expected long-term inflation rate, and recovery of the 2021 valuation loss by 2052. The rate of return period is consistent with the weighted average remaining useful life of TAHE's assets. The changes supported the financial reporting treatment of the $2.4 billion transfer from the GGS to TAHE as an investment rather than an expense, even though TAHE is currently heavily reliant on revenues from the public rail operators, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains. If the cash contribution had to be treated as a capital grant expense, it would have reduced the GGS's budget result by $2.4 billion.

The Independent Auditor’s Report includes an emphasis of matter drawing attention to uncertainty relating to the General Government Sector's investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE)

Despite the investment in TAHE being better supported, and the independent auditor's opinion being unqualified, the Independent Auditor’s Report includes an emphasis of matter, which draws attention to the significant uncertainties remaining in relation to the GGS’s equity investment in TAHE. The significant uncertainty is associated with key assumptions that support the recognition by the GGS of its $2.4 billion investment in TAHE during 2020–21.

As at the time of signing the Independent Auditor's Report, there was significant uncertainty with regards to judgements around the commerciality of TAHE's operations because:

  • TAHE’s future estimated access and licence fees, which are critical to its ability to earn a realistic rate of return, remain subject to re-negotiation and re-signing of the current access agreements. The proposed indicative future access and licence fees, which are set out in the HoA are intended to form the basis of the re-negotiation.
  • $1.1 billion in additional funding for TAHE's key customers, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains, was provided in the 2021–22 'NSW Budget Half Yearly Review' consistent with the terms in the HoA. However, this funding only extends to the end of the forward estimates period in 2024–25. There is an additional $4.1 billion required over the following six years, which falls outside of the forward estimates period (up to the end of the 10-year contract period). While this has been communicated to the government's Expenditure Review Committee, it is yet to be provided for in government's budget figures. As TAHE's projections are currently highly dependent on its government customers, it is critical that the government continue to provide sufficient funding to the GGS to support increases in the prices government customers will pay for access to TAHE's assets.
  • A further significant portion of the required returns is earned outside of the 10-year contract period (terminating 30 June 2031). NSW Treasury has estimated $37.9 billion in returns from its investment in TAHE over the period from 1 July 2022 to 30 June 2052, but has not identified the source or means of these returns beyond 2031. Currently, TAHE derives the majority of its revenue from access and licence fee agreements with Sydney Trains and NSW trains, who in turn are both funded by grants to Transport for NSW from the GGS. The projected returns calculated by NSW Treasury beyond 2031 are calculated by assuming a 2.5 per cent growth rate. About 87 per cent of these estimated returns are being earned beyond the ten years, with $32.9 billion estimated over the period 2032–52. There remains risk that:
    • TAHE will not be able to re-contract for access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections
    • future governments' funding to TAHE's key customers will not be sufficient to fund payment of access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections
    • TAHE will be unable to grow its non-government revenues.

Significant accounting issues relating to TAHE are detailed in Section 3 to this report titled ‘Investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity’. Other significant matters related to the TSSA audit are covered in section 6 to this report titled ‘Key Audit findings’.

Other financial reporting matters

The State extended the date for submission of agency financial statements for audit to provide relief to agencies impacted by the New South Wales' COVID-19 lockdowns

All agencies were given a one-week extension (two weeks in 2019–20) to prepare their financial statements and submit them for audit by 2 August 2021. Further extensions were subsequently approved for the following ten agencies and funds (11 in 2019–20) to submit completed financial statements for audit:

  • Department of Communities and Justice (9 August 2021 for disclosures related to cloud computing costs)
  • Investment NSW (13 August 2021)
  • Jobs for NSW (13 August 2021)
  • TCorp IM Funds (19 August 2021)
  • Lord Howe Island Board (22 October 2021)
  • Department of Customer Service (31 August 2021 for disclosures related to AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors')
  • Department of Transport (20 August 2021)
  • Sydney Olympic Park Authority (12 August 2021)
  • Planning Ministerial Corporation (12 August 2021)
  • Transport Asset Holding Entity (16 August 2021).

Additional extensions provided agencies with more time to resolve accounting issues relating to:

  • asset valuations
  • first time implementation of AASB 1059
  • asset transfers and treatment of software as service costs.

The extensions outlined above resulted in a two-week delay submitting the State’s draft consolidated financial statements for audit.

In 2020–21, agency financial statements presented for audit contained 24 errors exceeding $20 million (19 in 2019–20). The total value of these errors was $6.6 billion, a significant increase from the previous year ($1.4 billion in 2019–20)

The graph below shows the number of reported errors exceeding $20 million over the past five years in agencies’ financial statements presented for audit.

The errors resulted from:

  • incorrect application of Australian Accounting Standards and NSW Treasury Policies
  • incorrect judgements and assumptions when valuing non-current physical assets and liabilities
  • human error or lack of oversight.

The completion of the 2020–21 Total State Sector Accounts was significantly delayed as material accounting issues were resolved. These issues related to how the General Government Sector’s (GGS)2 investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity was accounted for. The key areas of audit concern, which required considerable effort to satisfactorily resolve, included our assessment of:

  • the accounting treatment of funds transferred to TAHE from the GGS, specifically:
    • whether funds transferred to TAHE from the GGS should be considered an equity investment or capital grant expense, with the latter having implication to the presentation of the NSW Government Budget positions. Funds are expensed unless, as an investment, there is a reasonable expectation to generate a sufficient rate of return
    • forming a view as to what a ‘reasonable expectation of a sufficient rate of return on investment3’ should be with respect to the Australian Bureau of Statistics' Government Finance Statistics Manual 2015 (GFSM)
    • the valuation of TAHE’s property, plant and equipment at 30 June 2021
  • whether TAHE was correctly classified as a Public Non-Financial Corporation (PNFC) entity
  • whether, under the agreements in place for the use and price of TAHE's assets, TAHE controlled its property, plant and equipment.

Our assessments were hindered by errors and omissions in information and models provided by NSW Treasury to demonstrate expected returns from TAHE, as well as a lack of timeliness and completeness in their responses to requests for documentation to support NSW Treasury's proposed accounting of government's contributions to TAHE.

Up until 13 December 2021, evidence provided by NSW Treasury to support the treatment of a $2.4 billion equity transfer from the GGS to TAHE did not demonstrate a sufficient rate of return on the State's investment. Instead, the evidence suggested the transfer was of the nature of a capital grant expense, which would impact the GGS budget result. Unless corrected, by either reversing the equity investment to a capital grant expense (impacting the GGS budget result) or providing additional resources to the rail operators to support additional TAHE access and licence fees (adding additional expenses to future GGS budget results), this matter would have caused the State's accounts to have been qualified.

After the Audit Office communicated the likely audit outcome to NSW Treasury, significant changes were made by government from 14 December 2021. Government decisions that avoided qualification of the TSSA included:

  • On 14 December, a government decision approved communicating revised shareholders' expectations of rate of return of 2.5 per cent being the long-term inflation rate, and increased grants to Transport for NSW for the rail operators to pay increased access and licence fees to TAHE to support of the new rate of return (previously 1.5 per cent).
  • On 16 December, the 2021–22 'NSW Budget Half Yearly Review' included an increase in expected returns to be derived through higher access and license fees charged by TAHE. To facilitate these returns, an increased allocation of funds of $1.1 billion was made to Transport for NSW (TfNSW) from 1 July 2022 as part of the forward estimates for the period 2022–25. This was to pay for the proposed increased access and licence fees the operators would be required to pay TAHE.
  • On 18 December, TfNSW, TAHE and the operators Sydney Trains and NSW Trains signed a Heads of Agreement (HoA) forming the basis of negotiations to revise annual operating agreements to facilitate the shareholders’ expected returns of 2.5 per cent of contributed equity. The HoA included indicative access and licence charges to be used as a basis of renegotiation, increasing access fees and licence fees to be paid by Sydney Trains and NSW Trains over the 10-year period from 2022–2031 by a further $5.2 billion. Most of this increase occurs outside the forward estimates. The majority of the additional funding may need to be funded by future governments.

NSW Treasury has projected returns to be earned to 2052 (a period covering the weighted average remaining useful lives of TAHE's assets) as sufficient to recover the revaluation loss of $20.3 billion which arose when TAHE revalued its assets under the income approach. These assets were valued on a discounted cash flow basis as at 30 June 2021.

These key decisions and the circumstances leading up to these changes are detailed later in this section.

Background

On 1 July 2020, the former Rail Corporation of New South Wales (RailCorp), a not-for-profit entity, was renamed the Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (TAHE) transitioning to a for-profit statutory State-Owned Corporation under the Transport Administration Act 1988. There was no change in the structure of TAHE as a new entity was not created. Ownership remains fully with the government. TAHE, and the former RailCorp, were both classified as Public Non-Financial Corporation (PNFC) entities within the Total State Sector Accounts. TAHE was not a newly created entity, nor was it the result of a change in administrative re-arrangements (such as Machinery of Government change).

Prior to 1 July 2015, the government paid appropriations to TfNSW, a GGS agency, to construct transport assets. When completed, these assets were granted to RailCorp, a not for-profit entity within the PNFC sector. The grants to RailCorp were recorded as an expense in the State’s GGS budget result and in the NSW Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA).

From 1 July 2015, the government announced the creation of TAHE (a dedicated asset manager). Funding for new capital projects was to be provided through equity injections, even though the business model was yet to be determined. NSW Treasury initially set a timetable for finalising the business model, operating model and contracts for the use of TAHE's assets of 1 July 2019.

Contributions paid to TAHE by the GGS were treated as equity investments from July 2015 forward. This treatment continued, despite delays in settling the business model. In 2020, the Audit Office raised a high risk finding due to the significance of the financial reporting impacts and business risks for NSW Treasury and TAHE.

The business model eventually adopted was one whereby:

  • The GGS invests in TAHE with an expectation of a sufficient rate of return.
  • TAHE charges the operators (predominantly Sydney Trains and NSW Trains) to use network and rolling stock to deliver services. The operators remain responsible for both the delivery of the services and the maintenance and safe operation of the assets. The operators are primarily funded by TfNSW through grants.
  • The GGS grants funds to operators, which allows them to pay access fees to TAHE. The amount of these grants impacts the budget result.
  • TAHE pays a return back to GGS by way of dividends and tax equivalents. The return may also include holding gains and losses on the fair value of the net assets of TAHE.

TAHE earns relatively small amounts of income from transactions with the private sector. While the TAHE Board envisages that, over time, they will enhance the commerciality of TAHE’s operations, it is currently highly dependent on revenues from government contracts (over 80 per cent). The circularity in flow of funds between transport agencies in the GGS and PNFC sectors is shown in the diagram below:

The government continues to respond to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on New South Wales through its economic stimulus measures

The COVID-19 pandemic continues to significantly impact the State’s finances, reducing revenue and increasing expenses especially in sectors directly responsible for responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, such as Health. Over 2020–21, the government allocated an additional $5.6 billion to agencies as part of its economic stimulus and pandemic response. Measures included:

  • $1.8 billion in health measures including essential medical equipment purchases, vaccine distribution, quarantine, contract tracing and maintaining clinical health capacity (such as intensive care units)
  • $508 million in additional cleaning services primarily to the Department of Education and Transport for NSW
  • $500 million as part of the ‘Dine & Discovery NSW’ voucher program to the Department of Customer Service
  • $350 million in combined land tax relief and small business recovery grants to Department of Customer Service and NSW Treasury respectively.

Around $4.5 billion of this package was spent in 2020–21, leaving $1.1 billion unspent and carried forward into 2021–22. The graph below shows the total allocation and spend by cluster for 2021 compared to their target spend.

Deficit of $7.1 billion compared with a budgeted deficit of $16 billion

The outcomes of the government’s overall activity and policies are reflected its net operating balance (Budget Result). This is the difference between the cost of general government service delivery and the revenue earned to fund these sectors.

The General Government Sector, which comprises 204 entities, generally provides goods and services funded centrally by the State.

In addition to the 204 entities within the General Government Sector, a further 98 government controlled businesses are included within the consolidated Total State Sector financial statements. These businesses generally provide goods and services, such as water, electricity and financial services for which consumers pay for directly.

The Budget Result for the 2020–21 financial year was a deficit of $7.1 billion compared to an original forecast of a budget deficit of $16 billion.

Revenues increased $5.6 billion to $91.8 billion

In 2020–21, the State’s total revenues increased by $5.6 billion to $91.8 billion, 6.5 per cent higher than previous year. A decrease of 0.3 per cent was recorded in 2019–20. The main contributors to the increase in the State's revenues were an increase in taxation revenue of $4.6 billion and an increase in grants and subsidies of $1.4 billion when compared to the prior financial year.

Taxation revenue increased by 15.3 per cent

Taxation revenue increased by $4.6 billion, mainly due to:

  • $2.9 billion higher stamp duties collected from property sales driven by:
    • $2.7 billion increase in contracts and conveyance duties (transfer duties) from both higher transaction volumes and strong property price growth during 2020–21
    • $200 million increase in motor vehicle registration duty driven by increases in new vehicle sales
  • $520 million higher Gambling and Betting Taxes was earned as 2019–20. The previous year's revenues were impacted by club and hotel closures due to COVID-19. The operation of these venues in 2020–21 returned to normal for most of the year resulting in higher club gaming tax revenue of $216 million and hotel gaming taxes of $265 million
  • $439 million higher collections of payroll taxes. The previous year's revenues were impacted by tax relief measures implemented by the government in response to COVID-19. Lower payroll tax was collected in 2019–20 as employment levels dropped during the State’s first lock down
  • $416 million higher land tax revenues, driven by an average 3.2 per cent increase in valuer general land values, which are the basis for determining land tax values.

Stamp duties of $11.7 billion remains the largest source of taxation revenue, $2.9 billion higher than payroll tax of $8.8 billion, the second-largest source of taxation revenue.

Expenses increased $4.1 billion to $101 billion

The State’s expenses increased 4.3 per cent compared with 2019–20. Most of the increase was due to higher employee expenses, depreciation and amortisation, other operating costs and grants and subsidies expense.

Employee expenses, including superannuation, increased 3.6 per cent to $44.1 billion

Salaries and wages increased to $36.3 billion ($34.8 billion in 2019–20). This was mainly due to increases in staff numbers and an average increase of approximately three per cent in the cost of NSW's employees across the sector. Salaries and wages for the Education and Health sectors increased by $511 million and $619 million respectively.

The Health sector employed an additional 4,893 full time staff in 2020–21 (2,763 in 2019–20) and incurred an extra $28 million in overtime mainly in response to COVID-19. Education increased staff numbers by 2,418 full time equivalents in 2020–21 (4,866 in 2019–20). This year, the health and education sectors received a 0.3 per cent award increase in pay rates.

The Public Service Commission (PSC) noted in the ‘State of the NSW Public Sector Report, 2021’ that the government sector senior executive headcount increased by 347 to 3,680 (3,333 in 2019–20). The Transport cluster represented the majority of the increase in the government sector's senior executive headcount, with an increase of 182. The PSC report noted the increase was due to the growing portfolio of major transport infrastructure projects.

Historically, the government wages policy aims to limit growth in employee remuneration and other employee related costs to no more than 2.5 per cent per annum.

Depreciation and amortisation expense increased 7.6 per cent to $10.3 billion

Depreciation and amortisation increased to $10.3 billion in 2020–21 ($9.6 billion in 2019–20). This increase was mainly driven by the depreciation of completed infrastructure projects including the State’s WestConnex M8 and M5 East Motorways, and other road projects such as Woolgoolga to Ballina project. This year also includes twelve months of depreciation relating to the CBD and South-East Light Rail versus six months in the previous financial year.

Furthermore, the first time adoption of AASB 1059 ‘Service Concession Arrangements’ resulted in the State recognising $45.4 billion of service concession assets in its capacity as grantor under arrangements with operators. More than 87 per cent of this balance was recognised by the Transport cluster. These assets are valued at current replacement cost and are depreciated on an annual basis. A service concession arrangement is an arrangement whereby the government as grantor, contracts with an operator to develop (or upgrade), operate and maintain the grantor's public service assets such as roads, bridges or hospitals. The grantor controls or regulates what services the operator must provide using the assets, to whom, and at what price. The grantor also retains any significant residual interest in the assets at the end of the arrangement. Further details about AASB 1059 are included in the ‘Implementation of new accounting standards’ section of this report.

Grants and subsidies increased $1.5 billion to $15.6 billion

The increase in grants and subsidies is due to payments made by the State in supporting businesses and local communities in response to COVID-19. These mainly included $240 million in Dine & Discover voucher payments, $156 million in land tax relief assistance, $160 million increase in grants to non-government schools (including $31 million to support Covid intensive learning support programs), and $109 million relating to small business grant payments.

The State also transferred $592 million in newly constructed assets to local councils. These mainly related to $378 million in assets transferred following completion of WestConnex stage 2 and $180 million from Northern Roads.

Other operating expenses increased two per cent to $27.5 billion

Operating expenses increased to $27.5 billion in 2020–21 ($26.9 billion in 2019–20) due to higher operating activities as agencies responded to the pandemic.

Supplies and Other Services increased by $1.7 billion. This was mainly due to funding of $533 million in hotel quarantine and associated services, and $495 million in medical equipment for the health sector.

Inventories consumed increased by $266 million. This included $217 million in COVID-19 medical equipment that was written off because it had expired or did not meet the TGA regulatory standards. Contractor expenses increased by $306 million because of increased capital works activity, primarily in the Transport sector.

The increase was offset by $1.6 billion in lower insurance claims expense. In 2019–20 financial year, higher claims were made in respect to natural disaster events, including bush fires.

Health costs remain the State’s highest expense

Total expenses of the State were $101 billion ($96.4 billion in 2019–20). In 2020–21, Health remains the highest contributor of expenses for the State with $25.7 billion ($24.2 billion in 2019–20). Education remains the second highest contributor of expenses reporting $18.4 billion in 2020–21 ($17.5 billion in 2019–20).

The following sectors have the highest expenses as a percentage of total State expenses:

  • Health – 25.6 per cent (25.1 per cent in 2019–20)
  • Education – 18.3 per cent (18.2 per cent in 2019–20)
  • Transport – 14.5 per cent (13.3 per cent in 2019–20).

Assets grew by $12.3 billion to $526 billion

The State’s assets include physical assets such as land, buildings and infrastructure, and financial assets such as cash, and other financial instruments and equity investments. The value of total assets increased by $12.3 billion to $526 billion. This was a 2.4 per cent increase compared with 2019–20, mostly due to changes in asset carrying values.

Valuing the State’s physical assets

State’s physical assets valued at $391 billion

The value of the State’s physical assets increased by $1.7 billion to $391 billion in 2020–21 ($37.9 billion increase in 2019–20). The State’s physical assets include land and buildings ($172 billion), infrastructure systems ($202 billion) and plant and equipment ($16.7 billion).

The movement in physical asset values between years includes additions, disposals, depreciation and valuation adjustments. Other movements include assets reclassified to held for sale and other opening balance adjustments.

Liabilities increased $16.4 billion to $291 billion

The State borrowed additional funds in response to COVID-19

The State’s borrowings rose by $15.8 billion to $134 billion at 30 June 2021. This accounted for most of the increase in the State’s total liabilities.

The value of TCorp bonds on issue increased by $16.8 billion to $114 billion, which largely funded the State's capital expenditure and response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

TCorp bonds are traded in financial markets and are guaranteed by the NSW Government.

Over 2020–21, TCorp continued to take advantage of lower interest rates, buying back short-term bonds and replacing them with longer dated debt. This lengthens the portfolio matching liabilities with the funding requirements for infrastructure assets.

The State’s fiscal objective published in the 2021–22 Budget Papers is to repair the operating position by returning the budget to surplus by 2024–25 and rebuilding balance sheet capacity by bringing net debt down towards seven per cent of Gross State Product (GSP) over the medium-term. The State measures net debt as the sum of deposits held, government securities, loans payable and other borrowings, less the sum of cash and deposits, advances paid and investments, loans receivable and placements.

The chart below shows the actual net debt to GSP for NSW compared to the Commonwealth net debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) over the past six years. The trend shows an increase in net debt, particularly in the past two years, which is mainly driven by additional borrowings needed to fund stimulus measures when responding to COVID-19 and natural disaster relief.

GSF Act and GSF Regulation

Financial reporting provisions in the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 (GSF Act) have now commenced

From 1 July 2021, the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 (PF&A Act) financial reporting provisions were repealed. Agencies prepared their 2020–21 financial statements under Part 7 of the GSF Act. They were audited under the Government Sector Audit Act (GSA Act). The GSF Act requires the timeframe for annual financial statement submission be specified in the Treasurer’s Directions.

Under the GSF Act, all reporting GSF agencies are required to prepare annual financial statements, unless exempt from the definition of a reporting agency under the Government Sector Finance Regulation 2018 (GSF Regulation). Those agencies exempt from preparing financial statements include certain small agencies, Crown Land Managers, special purpose staff agencies and retained State interests. These agencies must meet prescribed requirements or thresholds and self-assess each year to determine whether they remain exempt against the criteria in the GSF Regulation.

Most of the financial reporting provisions of the GSF Act have now commenced except for requirements concerning special deposit accounts (SDA) and special purpose financial reports, which are scheduled to commence on 1 July 2023, subject to approval from the Governor.

The GSF Act now includes most of the provisions applicable to GSF agencies, as requirements for appropriations, expenditure, financial services, and other matters were enacted on 1 December 2018 and 1 July 2019.

Once fully commenced, the GSF Act will consolidate and replace reporting provisions of four Acts:

  • PF&A Act
  • Public Authorities (Financial Arrangements) Act 1987
  • Annual Reports (Departments) Act 1985
  • Annual Reports (Statutory Bodies) Act 1984.

GSA Act and GSA Regulation

The PF&A Act was renamed the GSA Act on 1 July 2021 and now only contains provisions relating to the Auditor-General and the Audit Office, the audit of government sector finances and governance of the Public Accounts Committee.

Of note in the renamed GSA Act is that:

  • a new principal object was added that specifically provides the Auditor-General is an independent and accountable statutory officer
  • the previous financial reporting provisions in the PF&A Act were repealed as the financial reporting provisions are contained in Part 7 of the GSF Act. As a result, there are no longer financial reporting provisions in the GSA Act
  • a new section 34 was added, which contains the requirements for the audit of State sector agencies’ financial statements. These were previously contained in two separate sections.

The GSA Regulation commenced on 1 July 2021, replacing the Public Finance and Audit Regulation 2015 (PF & A Regulation). The GSA Regulation contains the list of entities, funds and accounts prescribed for the purpose of audits under the GSA Act.

Inconsistencies exist in the GSF Act and GSA Act related to key statutory timeframes

There are inconsistencies between key statutory timeframes imposed on the Treasurer and Auditor-General in the GSF Act and GSA Act which has been brought to the attention of NSW Treasury. The inconsistencies identified include:

  • Section 34(3)(a) of the GSA Act defines the audit period for the Statements be as soon as practicable after the Auditor-General is given the Statements. This appears to be inconsistent with section 49(3) of the GSA Act, which requires that the Auditor-General, on or before 22 October transmit the Statements and audit report to the Treasurer. Neither provision is a paramount provision.
  • Section 49(3) of the GSA Act also appears to be inconsistent with section 52(1) of the GSA Act which provides that the Statements are to be given to the Auditor-General in accordance with section 7.17 of the GSF Act. Section 7.17 of the GSF Act requires that the Statements are to be prepared and given to the Auditor-General by an agreed date to enable the audit of the Statements. Part 7 of the GSF Act is a paramount provision under section 1.8 of the GSF Act, which means the requirements in section 7.17 of the GSF Act prevail.

There are also inconsistencies in key statutory reporting timeframes imposed on the Treasurer under the GSF Act.

The audited Statements are a key accountability mechanism that provides information on the State’s financial performance and position. Ambiguity in the statutory reporting timeframes could impact on the future timely provision of this information to Parliament. As noted at the beginning of this report, the delay in issuing the audit report for the 30 June 2021 Statements was due to NSW Treasury’s resolution of accounting issues that were material to the Statements, in particular the treatment of the General Government Sectors investment in TAHE during 2020–21. NSW Treasury's management letter will include a high risk finding with regards to the inconsistencies between the GSF Act and GSA Act.

Recommendation

NSW Treasury should seek legislative amendments in Parliament to resolve the inconsistencies in the GSF Act and GSA Act relating to key statutory reporting time frames.

Appropriations framework

NSW Treasury lacks a framework to monitor and provide assurance to ministers that they are in compliance with their appropriation authority

The GSF Act requires that money not be paid out of the Consolidated Fund except under the authority of an Act, such as the annual Appropriation Act or GSF Act. This means a minister is only authorised to spend out of the Consolidated Fund the amount they have been appropriated by the relevant Act(s).

Generally, money is authorised to be paid out of the Consolidated Fund either through:

  • The Annual Appropriation Act - this is an act to appropriate out of the Consolidated Fund sums for the services of the government for the relevant financial year. These appropriations are made to the responsible ministers of principal departments, Special Offices and certain SDAs.
  • The GSF Act - this act allows the responsible minister of a GSF agency to be given an appropriation out of the Consolidated Fund, at the time the agency receives or recovers any deemed appropriation money. Deemed appropriation money is defined in section 4.7(3) of the GSF Act.

Ministers can delegate and sub-delegate appropriation expenditure functions to accountable authorities and officers of GSF agencies. Any spending by accountable authorities and officers of GSF agencies in excess of the amount appropriated to their relevant minister would be made contrary to section 4.6(1) of the GSF Act.

The Budget Papers are an additional mechanism by which the government controls the level of expenditure by agencies both at the individual and departmental administrative cluster level. The Budget Papers set an administrative limit imposed by the government. Separately, the Treasurer can issue a Budget control authority under section 5.1 of the GSF Act. A Budget control authority can regulate expenditure of money by GSF agencies in a variety of ways, as set out in section 5.1(2) of the GSF Act.

In July 2021, NSW Treasury advised the Audit Office that it had received advice from the Crown Solicitor's Office, in January 2021, that payments between agencies in different administrative clusters would not meet the definition of a 'deemed appropriation' under the GSF Act by the receiving agency. This applies to money paid and received by two agencies across different administrative clusters that continue to hold the money in the Consolidated Fund. These intra-government receipts increase the amount an agency has available to spend, without there being a corresponding increase in the responsible minister’s appropriated expenditure limits, thus increasing the risk an agency’s expenditure could cause a minister to exceed their appropriated expenditure authority.

After being made aware of the issue, the Audit Office worked with NSW Treasury officers to clarify potential implications. The Audit Office also obtained further advice from the Crown Solicitor’s Office to clarify certain aspects of the appropriations framework more broadly. In the advice to the Audit Office, the Crown Solicitor advised that an agency is not subject to its own legally appropriated expenditure limit (assuming it is not subject to any annual spending limit imposed through an instrument of delegation or a budget control authority issued by the Treasurer under section 5.1 of the GSF Act). In effect, because responsible ministers are given appropriations, these legal expenditure limits, rest in aggregate, with the principal department and agencies the minister is responsible for. The advice also confirmed:

  • a deemed appropriation for the services of an agency would ordinarily be available for the services of other agencies, if the officers of the other agencies had a delegation from the minister(s) to expend the deemed appropriation and funds remained available under those deemed appropriations
  • that the ‘exhaustion’ of a minister’s appropriation may be precipitated by one agency’s level of expenditure in the financial year, but the effect is that the relevant appropriation is exhausted for all agencies (and their officers) that may otherwise rely on it
  • whether expenditure by an agency occurred beyond the scope of its authority would require a progressive examination of the total amounts expended from the minister’s appropriation
  • amounts expended from the Consolidated Fund without the authority of an appropriation are spent contrary to section 4.6(1) of the GSF Act
  • a minister is responsible to Parliament for (i) the manner in which appropriations are expended, and (ii) any ‘overspends’ (that is, expenditure without authority) by agencies for which they are responsible.

Determining whether expenditure has occurred without the authority of an appropriation is complex and it is not possible for an individual agency to monitor or determine at what ‘point in time’ expenditure has been incurred in excess of the minister’s appropriation authority. As noted earlier, there are mechanisms in place to manage agencies' administrative expenditure limits set by the Budget Papers, but there is no mechanism in place to ensure expenditure by agencies does not exceed a minister’s appropriation authority received under the annual Appropriations Act and GSF Act.

Recommendation

NSW Treasury should ensure a framework exists to monitor and provide assurance to ministers that expenditure incurred across a financial year by agencies under the relevant minister’s coordination does not exceed the appropriation authority conferred by the annual Appropriation Act and the GSF Act.

In addition, principal departments and agencies that hold money in the Consolidated Fund are required by Australian Accounting Standard AASB 1058 'Income of Not-for-Profit Entities' and NSW Treasury Circular TC20/08 'Mandates of options and major policy decisions under Australian Accounting Standards' to prepare a Summary of Compliance in their financial statements. The Summary of Compliance applies to agencies that obtain part or all of their spending authority from a Parliamentary appropriation. It is intended to provide information on the amounts appropriated or authorised for an agency’s use and whether those expenditures were authorised. There remains uncertainty around how the Crown Solicitor’s Office advice received by the Audit Office impacts these disclosures, as the total spending authority given by Parliamentary appropriations and expenditure against these appropriations cannot generally be attributed to an individual agency. Such a scenario is not contemplated by the relevant Australian Accounting Standard. NSW Treasury's management letter will include high risk findings about improving mechanisms in place to manage agencies administrative expenditure limits, uncertainties related to appropriation spending authority on agencies summary of compliance disclosures.

Recommendation

NSW Treasury should assess how the requirement to prepare a Summary of Compliance under Australian Accounting Standards impacts relevant principal departments and agencies' financial statement disclosures.

Delegations to incur expenditure

Further to last year's reporting, some agencies have again spent monies without an authorised delegation

The delegation to incur expenditure is an important accountability mechanism of responsible government.

Last year’s Report on State Finances reported instances where government agencies did not understand or correctly apply the requirements of the GSF Act for deemed appropriations, resulting in some agencies spending deemed appropriations money without an authorised delegation from the relevant minister(s) as required by sections 4.6(1) and 5.5(3) of the GSF Act.

This year’s financial audits identified that further agencies: TAFE Commission, Multicultural NSW and the Office of the Ageing and Disability Commissioner spent money received from an annual Appropriation and/or deemed appropriation money without an authorised delegation from the relevant minister(s), as required by sections 4.6(1) and 5.5(3) of the GSF Act. NSW Treasury's management letter will include high risk issues about improving mechanisms in place to ensure agencies have appropriate delegations in place to spend Appropriation and/or deemed appropriation money.

In addition, the audit of the Jobs for NSW Fund (the Fund) special purpose statements identified that five payments from the Fund were authorised by an officer without the necessary delegation from the minister as required by section 14 of the Jobs for NSW Act 2015 and sections 5.5(2) and 5.5(3) of the GSF Act.

Recommendation

Given the continued instances of non-compliance, NSW Treasury needs to promptly improve the guidance it provides agencies to ensure that expenditure of public monies is properly supported by authorised delegations.

Implementation of new accounting standards

This year, the State implemented the requirements of AASB 1059

AASB 1059 ‘Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors’

AASB 1059 is an Australian Accounting Standard that requires public sector entities (grantors) that enter service concession arrangements with private sector operators for the delivery of public services recognise service concession assets and liabilities in their financial statements. The standard was effective from 1 July 2020.

AASB 1059 requires a grantor to:

  • recognise an asset provided by the operator as a service concession asset if the grantor controls the asset
  • initially measure the service concession asset at current replacement cost (CRC) in accordance with AASB 13 ‘Fair Value Measurement’
  • recognise a corresponding liability measured initially at the fair value (CRC) of the service concession asset, adjusted for any consideration between the grantor and the operator
  • make sufficient disclosure in the financial statements so that users can understand the nature, amount and timing of assets, liabilities, revenue and cash flows arising from these.

The adoption of AASB 1059 increased the State’s total assets and liabilities by $19.5 billion and $19.6 billion respectively, with net worth reducing by $131 million at 1 July 2019

The State adopted a modified retrospective approach when adopting AASB 1059 and recognised and measured service concession assets and liabilities at the date of initial application of 1 July 2019, with any net adjustments recognised in accumulated funds at that date. This means comparatives were restated to reflect the impact of AASB 1059.

Most of the service concession assets recognised by the State related to Property, Plant & Equipment, in particular infrastructure assets.

Agencies had to devote significant effort to implement AASB 1059 and ensure their 2020–21 financial statements materially complied with the standard's requirements. Last year, the Audit Office highlighted advance preparation was key to ensuring agencies effectively transitioning to this new standard. Despite the new standard being issued well in advance of its commencement date, Sydney Water Corporation, Department of Customer Service, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) and TAHE did not prepare sufficiently for their respective implementations.

Whilst most agencies in 2019–20 had commenced assessing their existing commercial arrangements to determine whether they were within the scope of AASB 1059, calculating and posting the accounting entries to support the implementation of this standard was delayed for TfNSW. TfNSW had not finalised its opening balance adjustments in time for the Audit Office’s early close review. Critical assessments of AASB 1059 to identify the accounting implications for the Transport sector, in particular TfNSW and TAHE were still being considered as late as 30 September 2021.

Restart NSW

Restart NSW was established in 2011 to fund the State’s major infrastructure projects

Restart NSW funds Rebuilding NSW, the government’s 10-year plan to invest $23 billion in new infrastructure. Its infrastructure projects, including Sydney Metro West and Parramatta Light Rail, are primarily funded by proceeds from the government’s asset recycling program. The Restart Fund had a balance of $12.4 billion at 30 June 2021 ($15 billion in 2019–20).

The Fund paid $3.8 billion for infrastructure projects in 2020–21 ($4.3 billion in 2020–21). The largest payments were for transport projects, including Sydney Metro West, Parramatta Light Rail, and contributed $319 million of the $2.4 billion equity contribution to the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE).

The funds are invested in the NSW Infrastructure Future Fund (NIFF), which is allowed under the Restart NSW Fund Act 2011 (Restart Act). The NIFF is an investment vehicle for the fund to help the NSW Government meet its infrastructure objectives and this fund is managed by TCorp. In 2020–21, the fund earned a net return of 7.9 per cent, higher than its annual benchmark return of 4.2 per cent, benefiting from improved returns in financial markets over 2020–21.

The fund directed 30.1 per cent of its payments towards rural and regional infrastructure projects in 2020–21

The Restart Act requires the fund to report on the percentage of payments directed to rural and regional infrastructure projects and whether this represents at least 30 per cent of the total payments from the fund. The Restart NSW Fund Amendment (Rural and Regional Infrastructure Funding) Bill 2020 introduced in Parliament in 2020 would amend the Restart Act by requiring at least 30 per cent of the total payments each financial year and for the life of the Restart NSW Fund be made on infrastructure projects in rural and regional areas.

This year the fund exceeded its target of directing at least 30 per cent of funding towards rural and regional infrastructure projects. However, since the funds’ commencement, only 23 per cent of total payments went towards rural and regional infrastructure projects. Current projections for the life of the fund indicate only 27.5 per cent of funding will be spent on rural and regional projects, which is below the funds target of 30 per cent target for the life of the fund.

Audit Office’s work plan for 2021–22

The Audit Office’s 2021–22 work plan focuses on the State’s response, recovery and impact from the COVID-19 pandemic and natural disaster emergencies

The COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on the people and the public sector of New South Wales. Government continues to assist communities in their recovery from the 2019–20 bushfires and subsequent flooding. The scale of government responses to these events has been significant and has required a wide-ranging response involving emergency response coordination, service delivery, governance and policy.

Significant resources have been directed toward these responses, and in assisting rebuilding and economic recovery. Some systems and processes have changed to reflect the need for quick responses to immediate needs. The increasing and changing risk environment presented by these events has meant that we have recalibrated and focused our efforts on providing assurance on how effectively aspects of these emergency responses have been delivered. This includes financial and governance risks arising from the scale and complexity of government responses to these events.

While these emergencies are having a significant impact today, they are also likely to continue to have an impact into the future. We will take a phased approach to ensuring that our work addresses the following elements of the emergencies and government responses:

Appendix one – Prescribed entities

Appendix two – Legal opinions

Appendix three – TSS sectors and entities
 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Stronger Communities 2021

Stronger Communities 2021

Justice
Community Services
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance

This report analyses the results of our audits of the Stronger Communities cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2021.

Our preferred approach is to table the ‘Report on State Finances’ in Parliament before any other cluster report. This is because the 'Report on State Finances' focuses on the audit results and observations relating to the Total State Sector Accounts, in effect a consolidation of all government agencies. This year the 'Report on State Finances' has been delayed due to significant accounting issues being considered in the Total State Sector Accounts and which may impact the Treasury and Transport clusters.

As there are no outstanding matters relating to audits in the Stronger Communities cluster impacting the Total State Sector Accounts we have decided to break with normal practice and table this cluster report ahead of the ‘Report on State Finances’.

What the report is about

The results of the Stronger Communities cluster agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.

What we found

Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all 30 June 2021 financial statements of cluster agencies.

Eleven of the 15 cluster agencies required to submit 2020–21 early close financial statements and other mandatory procedures did not meet the statutory deadline. Five agencies did not perform all mandatory procedures.

The implementation of AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors' had a significant impact on the Department of Communities and Justice's (the department) 2020–21 financial statements. The department applied a modified retrospective approach upon initial adoption at 1 July 2020 and recognised service concession assets and liabilities of $1.0 billion and $1.2 billion respectively (relating to three correctional centres with private sector operators).

The department was, this year for the first time, able to reliably measure Incurred But Not Reported (IBNR) claims relating to its Victims Support Scheme. The department recorded a liability of $200 million at 30 June 2021. Liabilities for Child Sexual Assault IBNR claim continue to be not recorded on the basis they are unable to be reliably measured.

The number of monetary misstatements identified during the audit of the financial statements for the cluster increased from 61 in 2019–20 to 72 in 2020–21.

What the key issues were

The number of issues reported to management decreased from 191 in 2019–20 to 172 in 2020–21. However, 45 per cent were repeat issues related to information technology, governance and oversight controls.

Seven high risk issues were identified in 2020–21, an increase of five compared to last year. High risk issues related to deficiencies in IT access controls at Sydney Cricket and Sports Ground Trust; a lack of a formal agreement between the Office of Sport and Planning Ministerial Corporation over the management of a sporting venue; asset revaluations at both Fire and Rescue NSW and the Trustees of the Anzac Memorial Building; and three issues related to revenue recognition control deficiencies at New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council and two of its subsidiaries.

What we recommended

Cluster agencies should ensure all applicable mandatory early close procedures are completed and the outcomes provided to the audit team in accordance with the deadlines set by NSW Treasury.

We recommend cluster agencies action recommendations to address internal control weaknesses promptly. Focus should be given to addressing high risk and repeat issues.

Fast facts

The Stronger Communities cluster, consisting of 28 agencies, aims to deliver community services that support a safe and just New South Wales.

  • $14.0b property, plant and equipment as at 30 June 2021 
  • $20.9b total expenditure incurred in 2020–21
  • 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued for all 30 June 2021 financial statements
  • 7 high risk management letter findings were identified
  • 72 monetary misstatements were reported in 2020–21
  • 45% of reported issues were repeat issues.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Stronger Communities cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster (the cluster) for 2021.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all 30 June 2021 financial statements of cluster agencies including the acquittal and compliance audits for the Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales and Crown Solicitor's Office.
  • An 'Other Matter' paragraph was included within the Multicultural NSW and Office of the Ageing and Disability Commissioner’s Independent Auditor's Report. While the paragraph did not modify the audit opinion, it noted the agencies did not have a signed instrument of delegation from their responsible Minister(s) to incur expenditure for the 2020–21 financial year and therefore were non‑compliant with section 5.5 of the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 .
  • 11 of the 15 cluster agencies required to submit 2020–21 early close financial statements and all other mandatory procedures did not meet the statutory deadlines. The agencies cited changes in key staff, delays in finalising actuarial and valuation work and the timing of Audit and Risk Committee meetings as the main reasons for not meeting the deadlines. Five agencies did not complete all mandatory procedures.
  • The Department of Communities and Justice (the department) was, for the first time, able to reliably measure and record a liability of $200 million at 30 June 2021 for Incurred But Not Reported (IBNR) claims relating to its Victims Support Scheme. Child Sexual Assault IBNR claim liabilities continue to be not recorded on the basis they are still unable to be reliably measured.
  • The International Financial Reporting Standards Interpretations Committee released an agenda decision on 'Configuration or customisation costs in a cloud computing arrangement' (the IFRIC agenda decision). The department treated the financial impacts of the IFRIC agenda decision as a change in accounting policy and retrospectively recorded prepaid assets and expenses of $52.3 million and $90.5 million respectively relating to intangible assets they had previously capitalised.
  • The implementation of AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors' had a significant impact on the department's 2020–21 financial statements. The department applied a modified retrospective approach upon initial adoption at 1 July 2020 and recognised service concession assets and liabilities of $1.0 billion and $1.2 billion respectively in relation to three correctional centres with private sector operators.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster.

Section highlights

  • The number of issues reported to management has decreased from 191 in 2019–20 to 172 in 2020–21, and 45 per cent were repeat issues. Many repeat issues related to information technology, governance and oversight controls.
  • Seven high risk issues were identified in 2020–21, an increase of five compared to last year.
  • The two high risk issues identified in 2019–20 relating to New South Wales Institute of Sport were resolved.

Findings reported to management

The overall number of findings has decreased, but the level of repeat issues increased

Breakdowns and weaknesses in internal controls increase the risk of fraud and error. Deficiencies in internal controls, matters of governance interest and unresolved issues were reported to management and those charged with governance of agencies. The Audit Office does this through management letters, which include observations, related implications, recommendations and risk ratings.

In 2020–21, there were 172 findings raised across the cluster (191 in 2019–20). 45 per cent of all issues were repeat issues (32 per cent in 2019–20).

Repeat issues largely related to weaknesses in controls over information technology (IT), governance and oversight.

A delay in implementing audit recommendations increases the risk of intentional and accidental errors in processing information, producing management reports and generating financial statements. This can impair decision‑making, affect service delivery and expose agencies to fraud, financial loss and reputational damage. Poor controls may also mean agency staff are less likely to follow internal policies, inadvertently causing the agency not to comply with legislation, regulation and central agency policies.

2020–21 audits identified seven high risk findings

High risk findings were reported at the following cluster agencies. Two high risk findings reported in 2019–20 were resolved.

Agency Description
2020–21 findings
Sydney Cricket and Sports Ground Trust (new finding) * The audit of Sydney Cricket and Sports Ground Trust's IT access controls identified:
  • activity (audit) logs of privileged access within iPOS (purchasing system) and Microsoft Dynamics (sales system) are not maintained and periodically reviewed by an independent officer
  • the review of privileged activity logs of booking system Event Business Management Software (EBMS) is not formally documented
  • 8 generic super user accounts are being shared across four IT systems including iPOS, Microsoft Dynamics, EBMS and SUN (accounting system).
The matter has been included as a high risk finding in the management letter as there is an increased risk of:
  • unauthorised transactions and changes to financial data
  • unauthorised users gaining access to financial systems
  • data breaches or financial loss.
Fire and Rescue NSW (new finding) Fire and Rescue NSW (FRNSW) completed a comprehensive revaluation of its fire appliances in 2020–21. The audit of the revaluation found there was inadequate analysis and quality control by management over the valuation process prior to the outcomes being included in the financial statements.
FRNSW had 57 fleet assets that have not been revalued due to problems with data supplied by the valuer. The written down value:
  • did not agree to the valuer's calculations for 28 assets
  • was provided by the valuer for 29 assets, but there were no supporting calculations.
These assets have been left at their previous book values of $3.0 million. The accounting standards require the entire class of assets to be revalued when a revaluation is performed.
The review also found:
  • inconsistent valuation of vehicles of the same make, model, age and specifications
  • errors had been made when the previous valuation was uploaded into the fixed asset register
  • the valuer incorrectly included additional equipment in the replacement cost estimate for vehicles that did not have that equipment.
The matter has been included as a high risk finding as it resulted in monetary misstatements and caused delays to the overall timeframes for the audit.
New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council (NSWALC) (new finding) The audit of NSWALC's revenue identified there was no formal assessment of relevant contracts for the nature, amount and timing of revenue recognition before preparing the financial statements.
This matter has been included as a high risk finding as it contributed to material monetary misstatements and disclosure deficiencies relating to revenue transactions.
NSWALC Employment and Training Limited (new finding) The audit of NSWALC Employment and Training Limited's revenue found:
  • there was no formal assessment of relevant contracts for the nature, amount and timing of revenue recognition before preparing the financial statements
  • the financial statements' preparation did not include updated accounting policies reflecting the requirements of AASB 15 'Revenue from Contracts with Customers' (AASB 15) and AASB 1058 'Income of Not-for-Profit Entities' (AASB 1058).
This matter has been included as a high risk finding as it contributed to material monetary misstatements and disclosure deficiencies relating to revenue transactions.
NSWALC Housing Limited (new finding) The audit of NSWALC Housing Limited's revenue identified it:
  • did not perform formal assessments of relevant contracts for the nature, amount and timing of revenue recognition before preparing the financial statements
  • deferred revenue recognition for funding received from NSWALC  (the parent entity). There are no sufficiently specific performance obligations in the funding letter, hence revenue should be recognised on receipt of the funding
  • recognised rental income from managing properties from the Aboriginal Housing Office (AHO) without considering the agreement, which requires remittance of profit to the AHO
  • the financial statements did not include updated accounting policies according to the requirements of AASB 15 and AASB 1058.
This matter has been included as a high risk finding as it contributed to material monetary misstatements and disclosure deficiencies relating to revenue transactions.
Office of Sport (new finding)

The Olympic Co-ordination Authority Dissolution Act 2002 transferred the assets, rights and liabilities relating to the Sydney International Regatta Centre (SIRC) to the Planning Ministerial Corporation (the Corporation) effective from 1 July 2002. The Corporation recognised the related land assets but did not recognise any of the built assets at the time of transfer. The total value of the land and built assets at 30 June 2021 was
$13.8 million and $11.2 million (written down value) respectively.

The SIRC has been managed by the Office of Sport (the Office) for many years in accordance with a not yet executed management agreement.

It appears there was a clear intention in 2005 that the control of SIRC built assets was to be transferred from the then Department of Planning to the then Department of Tourism, Sport and Recreation (a predecessor of the Office), through the exchange of letters between the relevant Ministers and an Administrative Order (the Order). The Order transferred the SIRC staff from the then Department of Planning to the then Department of Tourism, Sport and Recreation. However, it was silent on whether the relevant built assets were transferred.

Currently, the Office recognises the SIRC built assets in the financial statements whilst the Corporation recognises the land assets as the legal owner of the property.

This matter has been included as a high risk finding as the lack of a formal management agreement casts doubt over the accounting treatment of SIRC property.

The Trustees of the Anzac Memorial Building (new finding)

The audit of the Trustees of the Anzac Memorial Building's property, plant and equipment identified:

  • the fixed assets register for plant and equipment had not previously included sufficient detail about the individual assets to which costs related to reconcile it to the work performed by management's valuation expert
  • the financial statements did not meet the requirement of AASB 108 ‘Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors’  to disclose the nature and reason why it corrected a prior period error of $778,000.

This matter has been included as a high risk finding as it contributed to material monetary misstatements and disclosure deficiencies relating to property, plant and equipment.


*         The finding related to the former Sydney Cricket and Sports Ground Trust (based on the completion audit for the period 1 March 2020 to 30 November 2020). This agency was dissolved and transferred to Venues NSW on 1 December 2020.
 

Recommendation (repeat issue)

We recommend cluster agencies action recommendations to address internal control weaknesses promptly. Focus should be given to addressing high risk and repeat issues.

The table below describes issues commonly identified across the cluster by category and risk rating.

Risk rating Issue
Information technology

High3
1 new

The financial audits identified weaknesses in information technology processes and controls that support the integrity of financial data used to prepare agencies' financial statements. Of particular concern are issues with:

  • user access administration
  • cyber security including governance arrangements, monitoring of third-party system access and patch management
  • password security and policy parameters
  • development, review and testing of disaster recovery plans.

Moderate2
8 new,
22 repeat

Low1
5 new,
6 repeat
Internal control deficiencies or improvements

High3
1 new

The financial audits identified internal control weaknesses across the following key business processes: 

  • expenditure, including the approval of purchase requisitions and review of open purchase orders
  • supplier and employee masterfile maintenance
  • segregation of duties.

Moderate2
6 new,
3 repeat

 Low1
23 new,
7 repeat

Financial reporting

High3
4 new

The financial audits identified weaknesses in financial reporting processes, including:

  • fully depreciated assets still in use, indicating the need to perform more frequent assessments of useful lives of assets
  • robustness of property, plant and equipment asset revaluations
  • incomplete or inaccurate recording of balances in the financial statements.

Moderate2
9 new,
1 repeat

Low1
11 new,
5 repeat

Governance and oversight
High3
1 new

The financial audits identified areas where agencies could strengthen governance and oversight processes, including:

  • review and update of policies and procedures
  • formalising existing key business arrangements
  • records management practices.
Moderate2
5 new,
11 repeat
Low1
12 new,
8 repeat
Non-compliance with key legislation and/or central agency policies
Moderate2
7 new,
6 repeat

The financial audits identified the need for agencies to improve their compliance with key legislation and/or central agency policies, including:

  • management of excessive annual leave balances
  • existence of and compliance with financial delegations
  • related party transactions disclosures from key management personnel.
Low1
2 new,
8 repeat

4 Extreme risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
3 High risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
2 Moderate risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
1 Low risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
Note: Management letter findings are based either on final management letters issued to agencies, or draft letters where findings have been agreed with management.

The number of moderate risk findings decreased from prior year

Seventy‑eight moderate risk findings were reported in 2020–21, representing a 22 per cent decrease from 2019–20. Of these, 43 were repeat findings, and 35 were new issues.

Moderate risk findings reported in 2020–21 include:

  • weaknesses in governance arrangements, including outdated policies and procedures and arrangements that do not align with NSW Government guidelines, such as the NSW Government Procurement Policy Framework and NSW Cyber Security Policy
  • weaknesses in user access administration including:
    • user access reviews
    • monitoring of privileged user access and activities
    • password policy configuration
  • cyber security improvements including:
    • implementation and update of governance arrangements
    • monitoring of third‑party system access
    • patch management improvement
  • outdated instruments of financial delegation and non‑compliance with established financial delegations
  • weaknesses in supplier and employee masterfile maintenance.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Published

Actions for Health 2021

Health 2021

Health
Asset valuation
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Procurement

This report analyses the results of our audits of the Health cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2021.

Our preferred approach is to table the ‘Report on State Finances’ in Parliament before any other cluster report. This is because the 'Report on State Finances' focuses on the audit results and observations relating to the Total State Sector Accounts, in effect a consolidation of all government agencies. This year the 'Report on State Finances' has been delayed due to significant accounting issues being considered in the Total State Sector Accounts and which may impact the Treasury and Transport clusters.

As there are no outstanding matters relating to audits in the Health cluster impacting the Total State Sector Accounts we have decided to break with normal practice and table this cluster report ahead of the ‘Report on State Finances’.

What the report is about

The results of Health cluster (the cluster) agencies' financial statements audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for the financial statements of all Health cluster agencies.

The COVID-19 pandemic increased the complexity and number of accounting matters faced by the cluster. The total gross value of corrected misstatements in 2020–21 was $250.2 million, of which $226.0 million were pandemic related.

A qualified audit opinion was issued on the Annual Prudential Compliance Statement. The basis of the qualification related to 19 instances (18 in 2018–19) of non-compliance relating to three of the 20 prudential requirements across five aged care facilities.

What the key issues were

The total number of matters we reported to management across the cluster increased from 112 in 2019–20 to 116 in 2020–21. Of the 116 issues raised in 2020–21, three were high risk (one in 2019–20) and 57 were moderate risk (47 in 2019–20). Nearly one half of the issues were repeat issues.

The three new high-risk issues identified were:

Hotel Quarantine (HQ) fees

The absence of a tailored debt recovery strategy, data integrity issues and uncertainties around future HQ arrangements increased risks around the recoverability of HQ fees from travellers.

COVID-19 inventories

Data errors and anomalies in the impairment model and difficulties forecasting key factors impacting the management of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) increased uncertainty associated with the valuation and impairment of COVID-19 inventories.

COVID-19 vaccines

The Commonwealth did not provide information about the cost of vaccines provided to NSW free of charge, which required the performance of internal valuations to reflect the consumption of vaccines in the financial statements.

What we recommended

Hotel Quarantine (HQ) fees

Develop a tailored assessment methodology to estimate recoverability of HQ fees and work with Revenue NSW to develop a tailored debt recovery strategy.

COVID-19 inventories

Review the current stocktaking and impairment methodology to incorporate validation of data key to the management of COVID-19 related PPE.

COVID-19 vaccines

Work with the Commonwealth to obtain primary price information on COVID-19 vaccines.

Fast facts

The Health cluster, comprising 15 local health districts, five pillars agencies, two specialty health networks and six shared state-wise services agencies, deliver health services to the people of New South Wales.

  • 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued on agencies' 30 June 2021 financial statements
  • 24 monetary misstatements were reported in 2020–21
  • high risk management letter findings were identified
  • 47.4% of reported issues were repeat issues
  • $23.5b property, plant and equipment as at 30 June 2021
  • $26.8b total expenditure incurred in 2020–21

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Health cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely. This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Health cluster (the cluster) for 2021.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all cluster agencies required to prepare general-purpose financial statements.

  • The total gross value of all corrected monetary misstatements for 2020–21 was $250.2 million, of which $226.0 million were related to complexities arising from the COVID-19 pandemic.

  • A qualified audit opinion was issued on the Ministry's Annual Prudential Compliance Statement.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making. This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Health cluster.

Section highlights

  • The total number of internal control deficiencies has increased from 112 issues in 2019–20 to 116 in 2020–21. Of the 116 issues raised in 2020–21, three were high (one in 2019–20) and 57 were moderate (47 in 2019–20); with nearly one half of all control deficiencies reported in 2020–21 being repeat issues.
  • The complexities arising from accounting for agreements between governments to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic presented three new high risk audit findings with respect to the:
    • expected rate of recoverability of outstanding Hotel Quarantine fees
    • procurement, stocktaking and impairment of COVID-19 inventories
    • valuation and recognition of COVID-19 vaccines received from the Commonwealth Government.
  • Management of excessive leave balances and poor quality or lack of documentation supporting key agreements were amongst the repeat issues observed again in the 2020–21 financial reporting period.

Findings reported to management

The number of findings reported to management has increased, with 47.4 per cent of all issues being repeat issues

Breakdowns and weaknesses in internal controls increase the risk of fraud and error. Deficiencies in internal controls, matters of governance interest and unresolved issues were reported to management and those charged with governance of cluster agencies. The Audit Office does this through our management letters, which include observations, implications, recommendations and risk ratings.

In 2020–21, there were 116 findings raised across the cluster (112 in 2019–20). 47.4 per cent of all issues were repeat issues (38.4 per cent in 2019–20).

A delay in implementing audit recommendations increases the risk of intentional and accidental errors in processing information, producing management reports and generating financial statements. This can impair decision-making, affect service delivery and expose agencies to fraud, financial loss and reputational damage. Poor controls may also mean agency staff are less likely to follow internal policies, inadvertently causing the agency not to comply with legislation, regulation and central agency policies.

The table below describes the common issues identified across the cluster by category and risk rating.

Risk rating Issue
Information technology

Moderate2
7 new,
3 repeat

We identified the need for agencies to improve information technology processes and controls that support the integrity of financial data used to prepare agencies' financial statements. Of particular concern are issues associated with:

  • lack of reviews of user access and privileged user access for
  • HealthRoster
  • Assets and Facilities Management Online
  • vMoney Powerhouse
  • Patient Billing and Revenue Collection system.

Repeat issues included:

  • deficient password controls
  • no independent review for data integrity of any changes made to HealthRoster
  • incomplete reviews of StaffLink User Access.

Low1
4 new,
5 repeat

Internal control deficiencies or improvements

High3

1 new, 

0 repeat

We identified internal control weaknesses across key business processes, including new issues relating to:

  • procurement, stocktaking and impairment of COVID-19 inventories (personal protective equipment)
  • instances where employees' timesheets were approved in advance
  •  monthly reconciliations not reviewed in a timely manner
  • asset revaluation processes at Illawarra Shoalhaven Local Health District.
     

Repeat issues included:

  • forced finalisation of rosters in order to finalise processing of payroll
  • partial repeat issue relating to HealthShare NSW's stocktake process, refer to details in the following section of this report.

Moderate2
6 new,
12 repeat

 Low1
10 new,
4 repeat

Financial reporting

High3

2 new, 
0 repeat

We identified weaknesses with respect to financial reporting in relation to the:

  • expected rate of recoverability of outstanding Hotel Quarantine fees
  • valuation and recognition of COVID-19 vaccines received from the Commonwealth Government
  • application of AASB 16 'Leases'
  • improvement in health agencies' grant register to better support management's accounting treatment under the applicable revenue accounting standards.

Moderate2
6 new,
1 repeat

Low1
8 new,
3 repeat

Governance and oversight
Moderate2
9 new,
5 repeat

We identified opportunities for agencies to improve governance and oversight processes, including:

  • ensure better documentation around governance arrangements for major health capital works delivered by Health Infrastructure
  • absence of documented practices at health agencies level relating to Visiting Medical Officer claims.
     

Repeat issues include:

  • delegations manual for Health Infrastructure remains in draft and has done so since 2017.
Low1
2 new,
2 repeat
Non-compliance with key legislation and/or central agency policies
Moderate2
1 new,
7 repeat

We identified the need for agencies to improve compliance with key legislation and central agency policies, with new findings including:

  • bank signatories list not updated to remove terminated employees
  • subsequent changes made to Junior Medical Officers' approved rosters not approved by an authorised delegate.
     

Repeat issues include:

  • management of excessive annual leave
  • non-compliance with the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (GIPA Act) by Ambulance NSW.
Low1
5 new,
13 repeat

4Extreme risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
3 High risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
2 Moderate risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
1 Low risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.

Note: Management letter findings are based either on final management letters issued to agencies, or draft letters where findings have been agreed with management.

Complexities arising from the COVID-19 response

The 2020–21 audit identified three new high-risk findings

COVID-19 has presented the cluster with several new accounting challenges. New and evolving matters arose from changes to operating conditions, which characterised the 2020–21 financial reporting period. Issues with a high degree of estimation uncertainty will require ongoing attention as the strategies employed to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic evolve.

Expected rate of recovery of outstanding Hotel Quarantine invoices

The estimation of the amount likely to be recovered is complicated not only by the uncertainties that exist regarding the assumptions those estimations rely upon, but also the debt collection processes and strategies put into place to manage the accumulated debtors' balance. Debt collection is not administered by the cluster, but rather Revenue NSW. We observed an absence of a methodology to assess the likelihood of recovery. Instead, Sydney Local Health District was relying on Revenue NSW to develop and execute on a collection strategy. Sydney Local Health District was using the same approach to hotel quarantine debts as it did to other Health receivables. As the approach to managing international borders evolves over time, so too will the cluster's need to develop robust estimation models to assess the likely collectability of debtors. 

Procurement, management and impairment of COVID-19 inventories

$656.2 million of COVID-19 inventories were procured in 2020–21, with $220.2 million consumed; $558.7 million impaired and a further $217.1 million written off. Estimates of the degree to which inventories are expired, not fit for purpose or are faulty is often based on management judgement at all stages in the procurement cycle.

With respect to the stocktaking methodology applied, the following issues were identified:

  • discrepancies noted in the stock bin listing provided for audit
  • discrepancies in the recount sheet generated
  • inconsistent application of the stocktake methodology
  • inconsistent labelling of quarantined stock
  • a lack of an approach for validating stock expiry dates, which is a key input to the impairment calculations.

Although management had developed processes and a methodology to count as well as to assess the level of inventory that was not fit for purpose, ongoing attention to the operating environment that emerges post pandemic will be important in assessing the degree to which existing COVID-19 inventories can be integrated into a ‘business as usual’ model going forward. Further refinement of the key elements of the stocktaking methodology will also be required to ensure that key inputs upon which management relies to calculate the year-end inventory impairment provision can be appropriately validated.

Valuation and recognition of COVID-19 vaccines received from the Commonwealth Government

The 2020–21 financial reporting period saw the Commonwealth acquire COVID-19 vaccines and provide these to state jurisdictions to dispense to their communities. The vaccines, although provided free of charge require recognition. However, Health entities were not responsible for acquiring the vaccines and data on the vaccines' cost was not shared by the Commonwealth. Management undertook a valuation using publicly available data to estimate the value to attribute to the vaccine inventory; developed new systems and leveraged existing pharmacy systems to track physical quantities received from the Commonwealth and ultimately distributed to NSW citizens. As the response to the pandemic evolves, larger quantities, and new lines of vaccine stock will be dealt with, and policy settings will need to adapt when patterns of distribution of those vaccines (e.g., timing of third booster shots) emerge. The Ministry of Health will need to ensure that the valuations applied to the prices of inventory distributed and held in stock are as accurate as possible. This can be done through further refinement of the existing valuation methodology, obtaining price information from the Commonwealth and engaging specialist pharmaceutical valuers.

Emerging trends

Recognition of provisions without sufficient support

Several NSW Health entities raised accruals and provisions in 2020–21, which did not have an appropriate basis for recognition. Liabilities can only be recognised where there is a present obligation to make a payment arising from a past event. A number of these errors remain uncorrected in the financial statements of those entities as they are not material, individually or in aggregate to the financial statements as a whole. Increased training and guidance are required to ensure that treatment within the cluster is consistent and reflects events that have occurred and give rise to obligations.

Treatment of Commonwealth funding

In the 2020–21 and 2019–20 financial reporting periods, we observed prior period errors arising from the treatment of Commonwealth funding. These errors related to recognising revenue under funding agreements entered into with the Commonwealth in the incorrect period. The conditions of these funding arrangements, the transactional information requiring validation and the circumstances when revenue should be recognised are not always clear and can be complex. Early and continuous engagement with the Commonwealth is required to ensure that revenue recognition principles are consistently applied across the cluster.

Key repeat issues

Management of excessive annual leave

NSW Treasury guidelines stipulate annual leave balances exceeding 30 days are considered excess annual leave balances. Managing excess annual leave balances has been reported as an issue for the cluster for more than five years, with the average percentage of employees with excessive leave balances over the last five years being 36.1 per cent (35.5 per cent over five years covering 2015–16 to 2019–20).

The operational demands required to manage the COVID-19 pandemic have presented new challenges for the cluster in trying to manage its excessive leave balances. 39.2 per cent of employees now have excess leave balances at 30 June 2021 (35.4 per cent at 30 June 2020).

The state's leave policy C2020-12 Managing Accrued Recreation Leave Balances requires agencies to manage excessive leave balances to 30 days or less to maintain their workforces physical and mental health.

Accurate time recording

Forced-finalisation of time records by system administrators within HealthRoster remains an issue and we continue to observe time records forced-finalised by system administrators so pay runs can be finalised on a timely basis. During 2020–21, a total of two million (2.2 million in 2019–20) time records were force approved, which represents 5.7 per cent of total time records (6.9 per cent in 2019–20).

Existence, completeness and accuracy of key agreements

Delivery of major capital projects

Health Infrastructure (a division of the Health Administration Corporation) is responsible for the delivery of major capital projects with a budgeted spend of more than $10.0 million. Health Infrastructure oversee the planning, design, procurement, and construction phases. Capital works in progress are recognised in the financial statements of the health entity that intends to use those assets upon completion. The health entities recognise both the capital work in progress and the revenue associated with the capital funding from the Ministry for the construction of the assets. Capital funding is currently agreed with health entities as part of the annual Service Agreement. The assumption that the health entities control the assets during their construction is consistent with Health Infrastructure's role as an agent for the health entity and the Ministry's policy directive PD2020-033 'Management and control of Health Administration Corporation owned Real Property'.

We continued to observe a lack of clarity regarding agreements between Health Infrastructure, the Ministry and the cluster agency that will eventually receive the completed asset. This can lead to confusion and uncertainty around the rights and obligations of each party to the transaction.

Cross border patient funding arrangements

When patients require medical care in a jurisdiction where they are not generally domiciled, there are arrangements in place to provide funding to support cross border patient treatments. We have previously observed that agreements between NSW and other jurisdictions have not been finalised, and this continues to be the case. In the case of Victoria, no agreement has been finalised for the past seven years.

We continue to note that the cluster has long outstanding receivables and payables with other states. The absence of formal agreements between the states hampers the settlement of the debts relating to the treatment of cross border patients. The following table shows the status of Cross Border Agreements between NSW and other jurisdictions:

States 2014–15 2015–16 2016–17 2017–18 2018–19 2019–20 2020–21
Queensland Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Not finalised Not finalised
Victoria Not finalised Not finalised Not finalised Not finalised Not finalised Not finalised Not finalised
Australian Capital Territory Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Not finalised
South Australia Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Not finalised
Tasmania Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Not finalised
Northern Territory Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Not finalised
Western Australia Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Not finalised

Albury Base Hospital

Albury Base hospital is located on the border of NSW and Victoria and services residents of both states. Documentation supporting the extension of the expired Intergovernmental Agreement 2009–2017 between NSW and Victoria in relation to the integration of health services in Wodonga and Albury could not be located.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

 

 

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