Reports
Management of the Critical Communications Enhancement Program
What the report is about
Effective radio communications are crucial to NSW's emergency services organisations.
The Critical Communications Enhancement Program (CCEP) aims to deliver an enhanced public safety radio network to serve the five emergency services organisations (ESOs), as well as a range of other users.
This report assesses whether the NSW Telco Authority is effectively managing the CCEP.
What we found
Where it has already been delivered (about 50% of the state), the enhanced network meets most of the requirements of ESOs.
The CCEP will provide additional infrastructure for public safety radio coverage in existing buildings agreed to with ESOs. However, radio coverage inside buildings constructed after the CCEP concludes will be at risk because building and fire regulations do not address the need for in-building public safety radio coverage.
Around 98% of radios connected to the network can be authenticated to protect against cloning, though only 42% are.
The NSW Telco Authority has not settled with ESOs on how call encryption will be used across the network. This creates the risk that radio interoperability between ESOs will not be maximised.
When completed, the public safety radio network will be the only mission critical radio network for ESOs. It is unclear whether governance for the ongoing running of the network will allow ESOs to participate in future network operational decisions.
The current estimated capital cost for the NSW Telco Authority to complete the CCEP is $1.293 billion. This is up from an estimated cost of $400 million in 2016. The estimated capital cost was not publicly disclosed until $1.325 billion was shown in the 2021–22 NSW Budget Papers.
We estimate that the full cost to government, including costs to the ESOs, of implementing the enhanced network is likely to exceed $2 billion.
We made recommendations about
- The governance of the enhanced Public Safety Network (PSN) to support agency relationships.
- The need to finalise a Traffic Mitigation Plan for when the network is congested.
- The need to provide advice to the NSW Government about the regulatory gap for ensuring adequate network reach in future buildings.
- The need to clarify how encryption and interoperability will work on the enhanced network.
- The need for the NSW Telco Authority to comply with its policy on Infrastructure Capacity Reservation.
- Expediting measures to protect against the risk of cloning by unauthenticated radios.
Public safety radio networks are critical for operational communications among Emergency Services Organisations (ESOs), which in New South Wales include:
- NSW Ambulance
- Fire and Rescue NSW
- NSW Police Force
- NSW Rural Fire Service
- NSW State Emergency Service.1
Since 1993, these five ESOs have had access to a NSW Government owned and operated radio communications network, the Public Safety Network (PSN), to support their operational communications. Around 60 to 70 other entities also have access to this network, including other NSW government entities, Commonwealth government entities, local councils, community organisations, and utility companies.
Pursuant to the Government Telecommunications Act 2018 ('the Act'), the New South Wales Government Telecommunications Authority ('NSW Telco Authority') is responsible for the establishment, control, management, maintenance and operation of the PSN.2
Separate to the PSN, all ESOs and other government entities have historically maintained their own radio communication capabilities and networks. Accordingly, the PSN has been a supplementary source of operational radio communications for these entities.
These other radio networks maintained by ESOs and other entities are of varying size and capability, with many ageing and nearing their end-of-life. There was generally little or no interoperability between networks, infrastructure was often co-located and duplicative, and there were large gaps in geographic coverage.
In 2016, the NSW Telco Authority received dedicated NSW Government funding to commence the Critical Communications Enhancement Program (CCEP).
According to NSW Telco Authority's 2021–22 annual report, the CCEP is a transformation program for operational communications for NSW government agencies. The CCEP '…aims to deliver greater access to public safety standard radio communications for the State’s first responders and essential service agencies'. The objective of CCEP is to consolidate the large number of separate radio networks that are owned and operated by various NSW government entities and to enhance the state’s existing shared PSN. The program also aims to deliver increased PSN coverage throughout New South Wales.
The former NSW Government intended that as the enhanced PSN was progressively rolled-out across NSW, ESOs would migrate their radio communications to the enhanced network, before closing and decommissioning their own networks.
About this Audit
This audit assessed whether the CCEP is being effectively managed by the NSW Telco Authority to deliver an enhanced PSN that meets ESOs' requirements for operational communications.
We addressed the audit objective by answering the following two questions:
- Have agreed ESO user requirements for the enhanced PSN been met under day-to-day and emergency operational conditions?
- Has there been adequate transparency to the NSW Government and other stakeholders regarding whole-of-government costs related to the CCEP?
In answering the first question, we also considered how the agreed user requirements were determined. This included whether they were supported by evidence, whether they were sufficient to meet the intent of the CCEP (including in considering any role for new or alternative technologies), and whether they met any relevant technical standards and compliance obligations (including for cyber security resilience).
While other NSW government agencies and entities use the PSN, we focused on the experience of the five primary ESOs because these will be the largest users of the enhanced PSN.
Both the cost and time required to complete the CCEP roll-out have increased since 2016. While it was originally intended to be completed in 2020, this is now forecast to be 2027. Infrastructure NSW has previously assessed the reasons for the increases in time and cost. A summary of the findings made by Infrastructure NSW is presented in Chapter 1 of this report. Accordingly, as these matters had already been assessed, we did not re-examine them in this performance audit.
The auditee for this performance audit is the NSW Telco Authority, which is a statutory authority within the Department of Customer Service portfolio.
In addition to being responsible for the operation of the PSN, section 5 of the Act also prescribes that the NSW Telco Authority is:
- to identify, develop and deliver upgrades and enhancements to the government telecommunications network to improve operational communications for government sector agencies
- to develop policies, standards and guidelines for operational communications using telecommunications networks.
The NSW Telco Authority Advisory Board is established under section 10 of the Act. The role of the board is to advise the NSW Telco Authority and the minister on any matter relating to the telecommunications requirements of government sector agencies and on any other matter relating to the functions of the Authority. As of 2 June 2023, the responsible minister is the Minister for Customer Service and Digital Government.
The five identified ESOs are critical stakeholders of the CCEP and therefore they were consulted during this audit. However, the ESOs were not auditees for this performance audit.
ConclusionIn areas of New South Wales where the enhanced Public Safety Network has been implemented under the Critical Communications Enhancement Program, the NSW Telco Authority has delivered a radio network that meets most of the agreed requirements of Emergency Services Organisations for routine and emergency operations.In April 2023, the enhanced Public Safety Network (PSN) was approximately 50% completed. In areas where it is used by Emergency Services Organisations (ESOs), the PSN generally meets agreed user requirements. This is demonstrated through extensive performance monitoring and reporting, which shows that agreed performance standards are generally achieved. Reviews by the NSW Government and the NSW Telco Authority found that the PSN performed effectively during major flood events in 2021 and 2022.Where it is completed, PSN coverage is generally equal to or better than each ESO's individual pre-existing coverage. The NSW Telco Authority has a dedicated work program to address localised coverage gaps (or 'blackspots') in those areas where coverage has otherwise been substantively delivered. Available call capacity on the network far exceeds demand in everyday use. Any operational issues that may occur with the PSN are transparent to ESOs in real time. The NSW Telco Authority consulted extensively with ESOs on requirements for the enhanced PSN, with relatively few ESO requirements not being included in the specifications for the enhanced PSN. Lessons from previous events, including the 2019–20 summer bushfires, have informed the design and implementation of the enhanced PSN (such as the need to ensure adequate backup power supply to inaccessible sites). The network is based on the Project 25 technical standards for mission-critical radio communications, which is widely-accepted in the public safety radio community throughout Australia and internationally. There is no mechanism to ensure adequate radio coverage within new building infrastructure after the CCEP concludes, but the NSW Telco Authority and ESOs have agreed an approach to prioritise existing in-building sites for coverage for the duration of the CCEP.The extent to which the PSN works within buildings and other built structures (such as railway tunnels) is of crucial importance to ESOs, especially the NSW Police Force, NSW Ambulance, and Fire and Rescue NSW. This is because a large proportion of their operational communications occurs within buildings.There is no mechanism to ensure the adequacy of future in-building coverage for the PSN in new or refurbished buildings after the CCEP concludes. Planning, building, and fire regulations are silent on this issue. We note there are examples in the United States of how in-building coverage for public safety radio networks can be incorporated into building or fire safety codes. In regard to existing buildings, it is not possible to know whether a building requires its own in-building PSN infrastructure until nearby outside radio sites, including towers and antennae, have been commissioned into the network. Only then can it be determined whether their radio transmissions are capable of penetrating inside nearby buildings. Accordingly, much of this work for in-building coverage cannot be done until outside radio sites are finished and operating. In March 2023, the NSW Telco Authority and ESOs agreed on a list of 906 mandatory and 7,086 non-mandatory sites for in-building PSN coverage. Most of these sites will likely be able to receive radio coverage via external antennae and towers, however this cannot be confirmed until those nearby external PSN sites are completed. The parties also agreed on an approach to prioritising those sites where coverage is needed but not provided by antennae and towers. Available funding will likely only extend to ensuring coverage in sites deemed mandatory, which is nonetheless expected to meet the overall benchmark of achieving 'same or better' coverage than what ESOs had previously. There is a risk that radio interoperability between ESOs will not be maximised because the NSW Telco Authority has not settled with ESOs how encryption will be used across the enhanced PSN.End-to-end encryption of radio transmissions is a security feature that prevents radio transmissions being intercepted or listened to by people who are not meant to. The ability of the PSN to provide end-to-end encryption of operational communications is of critical importance to the two largest prospective users of the PSN: the NSW Police Force and NSW Ambulance. Given that encryption excludes other parties that do not have the requisite encryption keys, its use creates an obstacle to achieving a key intended benefit of the CCEP, that is a more interoperable PSN, where first responders are better able to communicate with other ESOs.Further planning and collaboration between PSN participants are necessary to consider how these dual benefits can be achieved, including in what operational circumstances encrypted interoperability is necessary or appropriate. The capital cost to the NSW Telco Authority of the CCEP, originally estimated at $400 million in 2016, was not made public until the 2021–22 NSW Budget disclosed an estimate of $1.325 billon.The estimated capital cost to complete all stages of the CCEP increased over time. This increasing cost was progressively disclosed to the NSW Government through Cabinet processes between 2015–16 and 2021–22.In 2016, the full capital cost to the NSW Telco Authority of completing the CCEP was estimated to be $400 million. This estimated cost was not publicly disclosed, nor were subsequent increases, until the cost of $1.325 billion was publicly disclosed in the 2021–22 NSW Budget (revised down in the 2022–23 NSW Budget to $1.293 billion). There has been no transparency about the whole-of-government cost of implementing the enhanced PSN through the CCEP.In addition to the capital costs incurred directly by the NSW Telco Authority for the CCEP, ESOs have incurred costs to maintain their own networks due to the delay in implementing the CCEP. The ESOs will continue to incur these costs until they are able to fully migrate to the enhanced PSN, which is expected to be in 2027. These costs have not been tracked or reported as part of transparently accounting for the whole-of-government cost of the enhanced PSN. This is despite Infrastructure NSW in 2019 recommending to the NSW Telco Authority that it conduct a stocktake of such costs so that a whole-of-government cost impact is available to the NSW Government. |
1 The definition of 'emergency services organisation' is set out in the State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989 (NSW). In addition to the five ESOs discussed in this report, the definition also includes: Surf Life Saving New South Wales; New South Wales Volunteer Rescue Association Inc; Volunteer Marine Rescue NSW; an agency that manages or controls an accredited rescue unit; and a non-government agency that is prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this definition.
2 Section 15(1) of the Government Telecommunications Act 2018 (NSW).
The NSW Telco Authority established and tracked its own costs for the CCEP
Over the course of the program from 2016, the NSW Telco Authority prepared a series of business cases and program reviews that estimated its cost of implementing the program in full, including those shown in Exhibit 6 below.
| Source | Capital cost ($ million) | Operating cost ($ million) |
Completion date |
| March 2016 business case | 400 | 37.3 | 2020 |
| November 2017 internal review | 476.7 | 41.7 | 2022 |
| March 2020 business case | 950–1,050 | -- | 2025 |
| October 2020 business case | 1,263.1 | 56.1 | 2026 |
In response to the 2016 CCEP business case, the then NSW Government approved the NSW Telco Authority implementing the CCEP in full, with funding provided in stages. The NSW Telco Authority tracked its costs against approved funding, with monthly reports provided to the multi-agency Program Steering Committee
Throughout the program, the NSW Government was informed of increasing costs being incurred by the NSW Telco Authority for the CCEP
The various business cases, program updates, and program reviews prepared by the NSW Telco Authority were provided to the NSW Government through the required Cabinet process when seeking approval for the program proceeding and requests for both capital and operational funding. These provided clear indication of the changing overall cost of the CCEP to the NSW Telco Authority, as well as the delays that were being experienced.
There was no transparency to the Parliament and community about changes in the capital cost of the CCEP until the 2021–22 NSW Budget
As the business cases for the CCEP were not publicly available, the only sources of information about capital cost were NSW Budget papers and media releases. The information provided in the annual Budget papers prior to the 2021–22 NSW Budget provided no visibility of the estimated full capital cost to complete all stages of the CCEP. As shown in Exhibit 7 below, this information was fragmented and complex.
Media releases about the progress of the CCEP did not provide the estimated total cost to the NSW Telco Authority of $1.325 billion to complete all stages of the CCEP until June 2021. Prior to this date, media releases only provided funding for the initial stages of the program or for the stages subject to a funding announcement.
Even during the September 2019 and March 2020 Parliamentary Estimate Committee hearings where the costings and delays to the CCEP were raised, the estimated full cost of the CCEP was not revealed.
| Financial year | Type of major work | Description of expenditure | Forecast estimate to complete ($ million) | Estimated duration |
| 2015–16 | New work | Infrastructure Rationalisation Program: Planning and Pilot | 18.3 | 2015–16 |
| 2016–17 | Work in progress | CCEP Planning and Pilot | 18.3 | 2015–17 |
| New work | CCEP | 45 | 2016–17 | |
| 2017–18 | New work | CCEP | 190.75 | 2017–21 |
| 2018–19 | Work in progress | CCEP North Coast and State-wide Detailed Design | 190.75 | 2017–21 |
| New work | CCEP Greater Metropolitan Area | 236 | 2018–22 | |
| 2019–20 | Work in progress | CCEP | 426.9 | 2018–22 |
| 2020–21 | Work in progress | CCEP | 664.8 | 2018–22 |
| 2021–22 | Work in progress | CCEP | 1,325 | 2018–26 |
| 2022–23 | Work in progress | CCEP | 1,292.8 | 2018–26 |
The original business case for the CCEP included estimated ESO costs, though these costs were not tracked throughout the program
Estimates for ESO costs for operating and maintaining their own radio networks over the four years from 2016–17 were included in the original March 2016 business case. They included $75.2 million for capital expenditure and $95 million for one-off operating costs. These costs, as well as costs incurred by ESOs due to the delay in the program, were not subsequently tracked by the NSW Telco Authority.
In January 2017, Infrastructure NSW reviewed the CCEP business case of March 2016. In this review, Infrastructure NSW recommended that the NSW Telco Authority identify combined and apportioned costs and cashflow for all ESOs over the CCEP funding period reflecting all associated costs to deliver the CCEP. These to include additional incidental capital costs accruing to ESOs, transition and migration to the new network and the cost (capital and operational) of maintaining existing networks. This recommendation was implemented in the November 2017 program review, with ESO capital costs estimated as $183 million.
In 2019, Infrastructure NSW conducted a Deep Dive Review on the progress of the CCEP. In this review, Infrastructure NSW made what it described as a 'critical recommendation' that the NSW Telco Authority:
| …coordinate a stocktake of the costs of operational bridging solutions implemented by PSAs [ESOs] as a result of the 18-month delay, so that a whole-of-government cost impact is available to the NSW Government. |
It should be noted that the delay to CCEP completion now is seven years and that further ‘operational bridging solutions’ have been needed by the ESOs.
'Stay Safe and Keep Operational' costs incurred by ESOs will be significantly higher than originally estimated
Stay Safe and Keep Operational (SSKO) funding was established to provide funding to ESOs to maintain their legacy networks while the CCEP was refreshing and enhancing the PSN. This recognised that much of the network infrastructure relied on by ESOs had reached – or was reaching – obsolescence and would either require extensive maintenance or replacement before the PSN was available for ESOs to migrate to it. ESOs may apply to NSW Treasury for SSKO funding, with their specific proposals being reviewed (and endorsed, where appropriate) by the NSW Telco Authority. Accordingly, SSKO expenditure does not fall within the CCEP budget allocation.
As shown in the table below, extracted from the March 2016 CCEP business case, the total expected cost for SSKO purposes over the course of the CCEP was originally $40 million, assuming the enhanced PSN would be fully available by 2020.
| Year | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Total |
| SSKO forecast ($ million) | 12.5 | 15 | 10 | 2.5 | 40 |
In October 2022, the expected completion date for the CCEP was re-baselined to August 2027. Accordingly, ESOs will be required to continue to maintain their radio networks using legacy equipment for seven years longer than the original 2020 forecast. This will likely become progressively more expensive and require additional SSKO funding. For example, NSW Telco Authority endorsed SSKO bids for 2022–23 exceeded $35 million for that year alone.
Compared to the original forecast made in the March 2016 CCEP business case of $40 million, we found ESOs had estimated SSKO spending to 2027 will be $292.5 million.
A refresh of paging network used by ESOs and the decommissioning of redundant sites were both removed from the original 2016 scope of the CCEP
Paging
A paging network is considered an important user requirement by the Fire and Rescue NSW, NSW Rural Fire Service, and NSW State Emergency Service. The 2016 CCEP business case included a paging network refresh within the program scope of works. This was reiterated in the November 2017 internal review of the program. These documents did not estimate a cost for this refresh. The March 2020 and October 2020 business cases excluded paging from the program scope. The audit is unable to identify when, why or by whom the decision was made to remove paging from the program scope, something that was also not well communicated to the affected ESOs.
In 2021, after representations from the affected ESOs, the NSW Telco Authority prepared a separate business case for a refresh of the paging network at an estimated capital cost of $60.31 million. This program was subsequently approved by the NSW Government and included in the 2022–23 NSW Budget.
In determining an estimated full whole-of-government cost of delivering the enhanced PSN, we have included the budgeted cost of the paging network refresh on the basis that:
- it was expressly included in the original approved March 2016 business case
- the capability is deemed essential to the needs of three ESOs.
Decommissioning costs
The 2016 CCEP business case included cost estimates for decommissioning surplus sites (whether ‘old’ GRN sites or sites belonging to ESOs’ own networks). These estimates were provided for both the NSW Telco Authority ($38 million) and for the ESOs ($55 million). However, while these estimates were described, they were not included as part of the NSW Telco Authority's estimated capital cost ($400 million) or (more relevantly) operating cost ($37.3 million) for the CCEP. This is despite decommissioning being included as one of eight planned activities for the rollout of the program.
In the October 2020 business case, an estimate of $201 million was included for decommissioning agency networks based on a model whereby:
- funding would be coordinated by the NSW Telco Authority
- scheduling and reporting through an inter-agency working group and
- where appropriate, agencies would be appointed as the most appropriate decommissioning party.
This estimated cost is not included in the CCEP budget.
In determining an estimated full whole-of-government cost of the enhanced PSN, we have included the estimated cost of decommissioning on the basis that:
- decommissioning was included in the 2016 CCEP business case as one of eight 'planned activities for the rollout of the program'
- effective decommissioning of surplus sites and equipment (including as described in the business case as incorporating asset decommissioning, asset re-use, and site make-good) is an inherent part of the program management for an enhanced PSN
- costs incurred in decommissioning are entirely a consequence of the CCEP program.
The estimated minimum cost of building an enhanced PSN consistent with the original proposal is over $2 billion
We have derived two estimated minimum whole-of-government costs for delivering an enhanced PSN. These are:
- $2.04 billion when calculated from NSW Telco Authority data – shown as estimate A in Exhibit 9 below.
- $2.26 billion when calculated from ESO supplied data – shown as estimate B in Exhibit 9.
Both totals include:
- budgeted amounts for both CCEP capital expenditure ($1,292.8 million) and operating expenditure ($139 million)
- the NSW Telco Authority's 2020 estimated cost for decommissioning ($201 million)
- the NSW Telco Authority's approved funding for paging refresh ($60.3 million).
The two estimated totals primarily vary around the capital expenditure of ESOs (particularly SSKO funding). To determine these costs, we used ESO provided actual SSKO costs to date, as well as their estimates for maintaining their legacy radio networks through to 2027.
The equivalent cost estimates from the NSW Telco Authority were sourced from the November 2017 internal review and the October 2020 business case for CCEP. It should be noted that the amounts for both estimates are not audited, or verified, but do provide an indication of how whole-of-government costs have grown over the course of the program.
The increase in and reasons for the increase in total CCEP costs (capital and one-off operating) incurred or forecast by the NSW Telco Authority (from $437.3 million in 2016 to $1,431.8 million in 2022) have been provided to the NSW Government through various business cases and reviews prepared by the NSW Telco Authority, as well as by reviews conducted by Infrastructure NSW as part of its project assurance responsibilities.
However, the growth in ESO costs and other consequential costs, such as paging and decommissioning, from around $263 million in the 2016 CCEP business case to between $600 million and $800 million, has to a large degree remained invisible and unexplained to the NSW Government and other stakeholders
| Estimated whole-of-government cost, over time | |||||
| Cost type | 20161 | 20172 | 20203 | 2023–Estimate A4 | 2023–Estimate B5 |
| $ million | $ million | $ million | $ million | $ million | |
| CCEP capital expenditure | 400a | 476.7b | 1,263.1c | 1,292.8d | 1,292.8d |
| CCEP operating expenditure | 37.3a | 41.7b | 41.5e | 139d | 139d |
| CCEP total | 437.3 | 518.4 | 1,304.6 | 1,431.8 | 1,431.8 |
| ESO capital expenditure | 75.2a,f | 183b,e | 75.4e | 258.4g | 292.5 |
| ESO one-off operating expenditure | 93a | n.a.l | 86.5e | 86.5h | 273 |
| ESO total | 168.2 | 183 | 161.9 | 344.9 | 565.5 |
| Paging | n.a.i | n.a.i | n.a.j | 60.3k | 60.3k |
| Decommissioning | 93 | n.a.l | 201.0 | 201h | 201 |
| Paging and decommissioning total | 93 | n.a. | 201 | 261.3 | 261.3 |
| Whole-of-government total | 698.5 | 701.4 | 1,667.5 | 2,038 | 2,258.6 |
- Financial year 2016 to Financial year 2020.
- Financial year 2016 to Financial year 2021.
- Financial year 2016 to Financial year 2025.
- Financial year 2016 to Financial year 2026.
- Financial year 2022 to Financial year 2025.
- Stay Safe and Keep Operational (SSKO) costs plus terminals costs.
- November 2017 internal review and October 2020 Business case.
- October 2020 Business case.
- Included in CCEP capital expenditure at that time.
- By 2020, a refresh of the paging network had been removed from the CCEP scope.
- A separate business case for a refresh of the paging network was approved by government in 2022.
- Figure not included in the source document.
- March 2016 CCEP business case.
- November 2017 Internal Review conducted by the NSW Telco Authority.
- October 2020 CCEP business case.
- Derived from business cases, with ESO costs drawn from NSW Telco Authority data.
- Derived from business cases, with ESO costs based on data provided to the Audit Office of New South Wales by each of the five ESOs.
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – Trunked public safety radio networks
Appendix three – About the audit
Appendix four – Performance auditing
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Parliamentary reference - Report number #383 - released 23 June 2023
Design and implementation of the Transport Asset Holding Entity
What the report is about
The Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE) is the State's custodian of rail assets. It is a state owned corporation and commenced operating on 1 July 2020.
This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies' design and implementation of TAHE. We audited TAHE, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) and NSW Treasury.
Separate and related audits on TAHE are reported in 'State Finances 2022', 'State Finances 2021' and 'Transport and Infrastructure 2022' reports.
What we found
The design and implementation of TAHE, which spanned seven years, was not effective.
The process was not cohesive or transparent. It delivered an outcome that is unnecessarily complex in order to support an accounting treatment to meet the NSW Government's short-term Budget objectives, while creating an obligation for future governments.
The benefits of TAHE were claimed in the 2015–16 NSW Budget before the enabling legislation was passed by Parliament in 2017. This committed the agencies to implement a solution that justified the 2015–16 Budget impacts, regardless of any challenges that arose.
Rail safety arrangements were a priority throughout TAHE's design and implementation, and risks were raised and addressed.
Agencies relied heavily on consultants on matters related to the creation of TAHE, but failed to effectively manage these engagements. Agencies failed to ensure that consultancies delivered independent advice as an input to decision-making. A small number of firms were used repeatedly to provide advice on the same topic. The final cost of TAHE-related consultancies was $22.6 million compared to the initial estimated cost of $12.9 million.
What we recommended
We recommended that the audited agencies should:
- improve accountability and transparency for major new fiscal transformation initiatives
- ensure entities do not reflect the financial impact of significant initiatives in the Budget when there is uncertainty, or it creates perverse incentives
- review record keeping practices, systems and policies to ensure compliance with the State Records Act 1998, and the NSW Government Information Classification, Labelling and Handling Guidelines
- review procurement policies to ensure that consultant use complies with all NSW Government policy requirements.
The NSW Government established the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE), a statutory State Owned Corporation (SOC), on 1 July 2020 to replace the former rail infrastructure owner – RailCorp. It is the State's custodian of rail network assets, including rail tracks and other infrastructure, rolling stock, land, train stations and facilities, retail space, and signal and power systems, within metropolitan and regional New South Wales. It is responsible for $2.8 billion of major capital projects in 2022–23.
TAHE was established under Part 2 of the Transport Administration Act 1988 and is governed by a decision-making board. The Treasurer and the Minister for Finance and Employee Relations are the Shareholding Ministers of TAHE, and they annually agree performance expectations articulated in a Statement of Corporate Intent.
Whereas TAHE is the custodian of rail assets, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains operate public rail services. TAHE does not have responsibility for the operation of the heavy rail network or train services, nor does it have network control functions. TAHE, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains are in the Transport and Infrastructure cluster in the public sector (formerly the Transport cluster and renamed in April 2022), which also includes Sydney Metro and Transport for NSW (TfNSW).
TfNSW leads the Transport and Infrastructure cluster. Its role is to set the strategic direction for transport across the State. This involves the shaping of planning, policy, strategy, regulation, resource allocation and other service and non-service delivery functions for all modes of transport.
TAHE's Operating Licence is granted by the Portfolio Minister and authorises the entity to perform the functions required to acquire, develop, finance, divest and hold assets, pursuant to the Transport Administration Act 1988. The Portfolio Minister also issues a Statement of Expectations which outlines the government’s expectation for the business for the next three to five years.
TAHE's original Portfolio Minister was the Minister for Transport who approved, on 30 June 2020, the issuing of an interim 12-month Operating Licence to enable TAHE to commence operating on 1 July 2020. The Portfolio Minister then granted TAHE's current Operating Licence in 2021. After TAHE requested a 12-month extension to its current Operating Licence, its next Operating Licence is due on 1 July 2024. The current Portfolio Minister is the Minister for Infrastructure, Cities and Active Transport.
About this audit
This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies' design and implementation of TAHE. In making this assessment, we considered whether:
- the process of designing and implementing TAHE was cohesive and transparent, and delivered an effective outcome
- agencies' roles and responsibilities were clear in the planning of TAHE
- agencies effectively identified and managed certain risks.
Conclusion
The design and implementation of TAHE was not effective. The process was not cohesive or transparent. It delivered an outcome that is unnecessarily complex in order to meet the NSW Government's short-term Budget objectives, while creating an obligation for future governments to sustain TAHE through continuing investment, and funding of the state owned rail operators. The ineffective process to design TAHE delivered a model that entails significant uncertainty as to whether the anticipated longer-term financial improvements to the Budget position can be achieved or sustained.
NSW Treasury and TfNSW had different objectives for TAHE
Up to June 2013, RailCorp had been the owner and operator of rail services and maintainer of the metropolitan rail network for almost a decade. It had been operating as a not-for-profit Public Non-Financial Corporation (PNFC).
In 2012, NSW Treasury (hereafter Treasury) decided there was a risk that the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) would reclassify RailCorp to the General Government Sector (GGS), meaning depreciation expenses of approximately $870 million would be reflected in the GGS Budget. Treasury wanted to avoid this impact on the GGS Budget, and considered the establishment of a transport asset holding entity as a means to do so. Capital grants to RailCorp were being treated as an expense to the GGS Budget.
TfNSW also wanted an asset holding entity – but one that would be a non-trading ‘shell’ company with no staff that would hold and manage all public transport assets. TfNSW's concept envisaged the entity would have a structure that would enable future public transport reforms and strategic directions while ensuring vertical integration of operations between asset owners and the rail operators to maintain rail safety.
However, Treasury pursued its objective to improve the GGS Budget result, and sought to expand on TfNSW's 'shell' asset holding entity concept. Treasury wanted an entity that could generate a return on investment, as this meant that government investment in transport assets could be treated as equity investments, rather than a Budget expense, and in turn improve the GGS Budget position. As an example of the potential impact of creating this new entity, capital grants of $2.3 billion were paid to RailCorp in 2013–14. If Treasury's objective was met, grants of this significance would then be treated as an equity investment, rather than an expense in the GGS Budget.
In 2017, Treasury's preferred option was progressed through legislation, but both agencies' central objectives for the proposed asset holding entity would continue to prove difficult to reconcile. To achieve Treasury's objective to improve the Budget result, the entity would need to generate a return on investment (this is further discussed below). However, TfNSW expressed concerns that the prioritisation of rail safety, and the effective management of governance, regulation and operations would be more complex in an entity with commercial imperatives.
Asset holding entities are a common approach to the management of transport assets in Australia and internationally, and there are a range of approaches to how they are structured and used. Such structures should be driven by the goal of improved asset management. Ultimately, TfNSW's objectives could have been delivered through a simpler entity structure. However, reconciling TfNSW's objectives with Treasury's imperative to deliver and justify a Budget improvement in the short-term resulted in an overly lengthy process and an unnecessarily complex outcome that places an obligation on future governments to sustain. There is still significant uncertainty as to whether the short-term improvements to the Budget can continue to be realised in the longer-term.
The Budget benefits of TAHE were claimed before the entity was legislated, committing the agencies to deliver, regardless of the complexities that subsequently arose
The 2015–16 GGS Budget treated the government's investment in TAHE (still known at this time as RailCorp) as an equity contribution. This had the immediate impact of improving the Budget result by $1.8 billion per annum. However, the legislation to enable the establishment of TAHE had not yet been passed by Parliament, key elements of the operating model were still under development, and imminent changes in accounting standards had the potential to impact TAHE's financial model. The decision to book the benefits in the Budget early committed the involved agencies to implement a solution that justified the 2015–16 Budget impacts, irrespective of the challenges that arose.
TAHE's financial structure requires circular government investment to work
For the NSW Government to continue to treat its investment in TAHE as an equity contribution, rather than an expense to the Budget, there must be a reasonable expectation that TAHE will generate a sufficient rate of return as required by the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) framework. In doing so, it needs to recover a revaluation loss created by a $20.3 billion reduction in the value of its assets which was incurred in its first full year of operation. This loss occurred as a result of a revaluation of TAHE's assets when RailCorp (a not-for profit entity) became TAHE (a for-profit commercial entity) – and is discussed further in the 'Key findings' below.
TAHE generates a small portion of its income from transactions with the private sector but, as noted in our report 'State Finances 2021', TAHE receives the majority of its revenue (more than 80%) from access and licence fee agreements with Sydney Trains and NSW Trains. Both of these entities are funded by grants (a Budget expense) to TfNSW from the GGS Budget.
Based on Treasury’s correspondence with the ABS in 2015, TAHE was initially expected to pay a return on equity of 7% in 2016–17. The assumption of a 7% return persisted through to 2018, after the legislation enabling the establishment of TAHE was passed by Parliament. However, when the initial access and licence fees were agreed on 1 July 2020, this figure had been revised to an expected rate of return of 1.5% excluding the revaluation loss. This was below the long-term inflation target and did not include the recovery of the revaluation loss – risking the government's ability to treat its investment in TAHE as an equity contribution. Importantly, as TAHE is primarily reliant on fees paid by the state owned rail operators that, in turn, are funded by the GGS Budget (as an expense), the decision to change the returns model from 7% to 1.5% would in its own right have had a positive impact on the GGS Budget. However, the decision to use a 1.5% return would ultimately be problematic as it made it difficult to treat the government's contributions to TAHE as an equity investment, as discussed below.
On 14 December 2021, to avoid a qualified audit opinion, the NSW Government made the decision to increase TAHE's expected rate of return to 2.5%, equal to the Reserve Bank’s long-term inflation target.
In 2021-22, TAHE needed to start charging rail operators higher access and licence fees in order to generate a return of 2.5%, so as to support the government's treatment of its investment in TAHE as an equity contribution in the GGS Budget. This meant the government needed to provide additional grant (expense) funding to the state owned rail operators so they could pay the increased access and licence fees to TAHE. Based on current projections, TAHE is not expected to recover the revaluation loss until 2046.
There remains a risk that TAHE will not be able to generate a sufficient return on the NSW Government's investment without relying on increased funding to state owned rail operators so that they can in turn pay the higher access and licence fees. TAHE's ability to generate returns on government investment from other sources are uncertain and may not be achievable or sustainable. Current modelling highlights that TAHE remains largely reliant, through to 2046, on increasing fees (which are assumed to increase at 2.5% per annum from 2031 onwards when the current 10 year contracts with rail operators expire) paid by the state owned rail operators that remain principally reliant on GGS Budget grants.
The process of designing and implementing TAHE was not transparent to independent scrutiny
Our report 'State Finances 2021' commented that Treasury did not always provide this Office with information relating to TAHE on a timely basis. Similarly, during this performance audit, there were also multiple instances where auditees were unable to provide documentation regarding key activities in the process to deliver TAHE. Agencies also applied higher sensitivity classifications to large tranches of documents than was justified or required by policy. Of particular concern is the incorrect classification of documents as Cabinet sensitive information. The incorrect or over-classification of documentation as Cabinet sensitive delayed this Office's ability to provide scrutiny or independent assurance.
There was a lack of clarity around the roles and responsibilities of governance structures set up to oversee the design and implementation of TAHE
From 2014, multiple workstreams and advisory committees were established to progress the design and implementation of TAHE. For some of these committees and workstreams, there is limited information on what they were tasked to do and what they achieved. Most had ceased meeting by 2018, before significant work needed to deliver TAHE was completed.
The lack of clarity around the roles and responsibilities of these governance structures reduced opportunities for TfNSW and Treasury to reconcile their differing objectives for TAHE, and resolve key questions earlier in the process.
There was a heavy reliance on consulting firms throughout the process to establish TAHE, and the management of consultant engagements failed to ensure that agencies received independent advice to support objective decision-making
In 2020, Treasury and TfNSW failed to prevent, identify, or adequately manage a conflict of interest when they engaged the same 'Big 4' consulting firm to work on separate TAHE-related projects. Both agencies used the firm's work to further their respective views with regard to the financial implications of TAHE's operating model. At this time those views were still unreconciled.
Treasury engaged the firm to provide a fiscal risk management strategy and advice on the impact of changes to accounting standards. TfNSW engaged the same firm to develop operating and financial models for TAHE, which raised concerns regarding the viability of TAHE. Disputes arose around the findings of these reports. Treasury disagreed with some of the outcomes of the work commissioned by TfNSW, relating to accounting treatment and fiscal advice.
The management of this conflict (real or perceived) was left to the 'Big 4' consulting firm when it was more appropriate for it to be managed by Treasury and TfNSW. If these agencies had communicated more effectively, used available governance structures consistently, and shared information openly about their use of the firm and the nature of their respective engagements, these disputes might have been avoided. This issue, coupled with deficiencies in procurement by both agencies, reflected and further perpetuated the lack of cohesion in the design and implementation of TAHE.
More broadly, over the period 2014 – 2021, 16 separate consulting firms were employed to work on 36 contracts, valued at over $22.56 million, relating to TAHE ranging from accounting and legal advice, project management, and the provision of administrative support and secretariat services.
Consultants are legitimately used by agencies to provide advice on how to achieve the outcomes determined by government, including advising agencies on the risks and challenges in achieving those outcomes. Similarly, consultants can provide expert knowledge in the service of achieving those outcomes and managing the risks. However, the heavy reliance on consulting firms during the design and implementation of TAHE heightened the risk that agencies were not receiving value for money, were outsourcing tasks that should be performed by the public service, and did not mitigate the risk that the advice received was not objective and impartial. The risk that the role of consultants could have been blurred between providing independent advice to government on options and facilitating a pre-determined outcome was not effectively treated or mitigated. This risk was amplified because a small number of firms were used repeatedly to provide advice on one topic. The effective procurement and management of consultants is an obligation of government agencies.
Appendix two – Classification of government entities
Appendix three – About the audit
Appendix four – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #372 - released 24 January 2023
Destination NSW's support for major events
This report focuses on whether Destination NSW (DNSW) can demonstrate that its support for major events achieves value for money.
The audit found that DNSW’s processes for assessing and evaluating the major events it funds are mostly effective, but its public reporting does not provide enough transparency.
DNSW provides clear information to event organisers seeking funding and has a comprehensive methodology for conducting detailed event assessments. However, the reasons for decisions to progress events from the initial assessment to the detailed assessment stage are not documented in sufficient detail.
DNSW does not publish detailed information about the events it funds or the outcomes of these events. This means that members of the public are unable to see whether its activities achieve value for money. However, DNSW’s internal reporting to its key decision‑makers, including the CEO, the Board and the Minister is appropriate.
The Auditor-General made four recommendations to DNSW, aimed at improving the transparency of its activities, improving the documentation of decisions and certain compliance matters, and streamlining its approach to assessing and evaluating events that receive smaller amounts of funding.
Destination NSW (DNSW) provides funding to attract a range of major events to New South Wales, including high-profile professional sports matches and tournaments, musicals, art and museum exhibitions, and participation-focused events such as festivals and sports events that members of the public can enter. The NSW Government's rationale for providing funding is to encourage event organisers to hold events in New South Wales, and to ensure that events held in New South Wales maximise the potential for attracting overseas and interstate visitors.
This audit assessed whether DNSW can demonstrate that its support for major events achieves value for money. In making this assessment, the audit examined whether:
- DNSW effectively assesses proposals to support major events
- DNSW effectively evaluates the impact of its support for major events.
This audit focused on DNSW's work to attract major events to New South Wales. It did not assess DNSW's tourism promotion or development work, which includes developing tourism strategies, marketing and advertising campaigns, national and international partnerships, and regional programs.
ConclusionDestination NSW's processes for assessing event applications and evaluating its support for major events are mostly effective. DNSW's internal systems allow it to know whether its decisions are achieving value for money. Its public reporting does not provide enough information about its activities and their outcomes, although it is consistent with that of equivalent organisations in other Australian jurisdictions. DNSW's process for assessing applications for funding from organisers of major events is mostly effective. Clear information is provided to event organisers seeking funding, and DNSW has a comprehensive methodology for conducting detailed event assessments. However, the reasons for decisions to progress events from the initial assessment to the detailed assessment stage are not documented in sufficient detail. DNSW has a framework for disclosure and monitoring staff conflicts of interest. However, its forms for staff to disclose conflicts of interest on specific events they are working on are ambiguous. DNSW's management of gifts and benefits broadly complies with the minimum standards set by the Public Service Commission, but there are some gaps in its implementation of these. DNSW conducts an evaluation of each major event it supports. DNSW articulates expected outcomes in contracts with event organisers and uses a sound methodology to evaluate events. Internal reporting to its key decision-makers, including the CEO, the Board and the Minister is appropriate. However, DNSW does not publish detailed information about the events it funds or the outcomes of these events. This means that members of the public are unable to see whether its activities achieve value for money. |
Appendix one – Response from Destination NSW
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Performance auditing
Copyright Notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #332 - released 9 April 2020.
Implementation of the NSW Government’s program evaluation initiative
The NSW Government’s ‘program evaluation initiative’, introduced to assess whether service delivery programs achieve expected outcomes and value for money, is largely ineffective according to a report released today by NSW Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford.
Government services, in areas such as public order and safety, health and education, are delivered by agencies through a variety of programs. In 2016–17, the NSW Government estimates that it will spend over $73 billion on programs to deliver services.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #277 - released 3 November 2016
Purchasing Hospital Supplies: Follow-up of 2002 Performance Audit
Periodically we review the extent to which agencies have changed their practices as a result of our audits. This gives Parliament and the public an update on the extent of progress made.
In this follow-up audit, we examine changes following our September 2002 report, to assess whether NSW Health has improved its buying of hospital supplies using electronic systems.
NSW Health spends over $1.3 billion on hospital supplies. It is the largest expenditure area after employee costs. Reform of this area has the potential to make significant savings that could be redirected to frontline services.
As part of our series of audits in the area of e-government, our previous audit looked closely at the extent to which technology was being used to deliver potentially major savings in purchasing hospital supplies. This is a key area of so-called “process re-engineering” in the “e” field, and NSW Health provided an ideal case study.
Whilst implementing large-scale e-procurement has many technical aspects, it is not chiefly a technical issue. The key requirements for success reside in effective change management, in particular being clear as to who has the authority to make change decisions and be held accountable.
This audit looks at NSW Health’s successes to date, and its frustrations and challenges in making further progress in this field. Many of the issues raised in this report may provide lessons for any agency that is seeking to drive a significant change program.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #145 - released 23 November 2005
Oversight of State Owned Electricity Corporations
Issues of corporate governance have long been a matter for concern in the private sector. Following recent corporate collapses and scandals, legislators and regulators in a number of countries have focused on strengthening governance in publicly traded corporations. Considerable attention has been given to setting clear expectations for the performance of boards and for the disclosure of information to various stakeholders.
Good governance is no less important in the public sector.
Indeed issues of oversight and accountability may be more complex in the public sector, particularly in government businesses. There are more stakeholders involved (portfolio Ministers, shareholder Ministers, Parliament and central agencies) and there are competing – and potentially conflicting - objectives (financial, social, environmental, etc).
Because of these potential conflicts, it is important that Boards understand what government expects of them. Some of these expectations reflect the government’s regulatory role in areas such as safety, pricing and ensuring consumers receive essential services. Some expectations reflect the government’s role as a business owner.
Having a clear separation of regulatory expectations from ownership expectations is essential if boards are to be accountable for their performance on both aspects. To assist in this separation, New South Wales (like many other jurisdictions) has adopted the concept of ‘shareholder Ministers’ – as distinct from the portfolio Minister – to exercise the ownership function.
This report looks more closely at a particular area - how the State conducts itself as the owner of the State owned electricity corporations. This is an important issue as the State’s (ie taxpayers’) equity in these businesses is worth over $9 billion. Managing the risks associated with continuing ownership of these businesses is an essential aspect of good governance.
Although the audit focuses on the State’s holdings in the electricity sector, its findings and recommendations have relevance for all State owned corporations.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #144 - released 19 October 2005
Implementing Asset Management Reforms
Hospitals, schools, public housing, roads, bridges, buses and trains are just some of the assets used by government in providing services to citizens.
The NSW Government’s asset base is impressive in size - with a value of around $167 billion and with government plans to spend around $8 billion acquiring or replacing assets in the current year. Another $2 billion is spent each year on maintenance.
Good asset management is very important to government; even a small efficiency gain in this area can provide significant returns. Good practice by those responsible for managing assets can improve reliability, extend asset life, save on maintenance costs and aid in identifying and disposing of unnecessary or non-performing assets.
Improving the NSW public sector’s approach to asset management has been on the reform agenda for at least a decade. Changes in practice have been accelerated more recently by integrating asset management policy with the budget process.
In this audit we examined NSW Treasury’s efforts to improve asset management practices in the public sector and the progress made by 3 agencies - the Department of Corrective Services, NSW Fire Brigades and the Powerhouse Museum - towards better managing their asset portfolios.
This report informs Parliament and the community on progress to date and what more needs to be done to ensure that agencies manage assets effectively and achieve best value.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #143 - released 12 October 2005
The Sydney 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games - Review of estimates
The Olympic Coordination Authority (OCA) has made a concerted and commendable effort in preparing the Games Budget within the definition of expenditure for the Games approved by the Government. OCA has also effectively used the definition of cost to control claims made by government agencies against the estimates to host the Games.
However, because the Games Budget was prepared in accordance with that definition, the Games Budget arguably does not capture the overall expenditure associated with the Games, as required by the Olympic Co-Ordination Authority Act. Accordingly, the taxpayers of NSW do not have a complete picture of the costs for hosting the Games.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #62 - released 14 January 1999
