The Department of Planning and Environment provides more than $245 million in energy rebates to around 27 percent of NSW households. This report highlights that the department is not monitoring the rebate schemes to understand whether they are delivering the best outcomes.

Most rebates are ongoing payments applied directly to energy bills reducing the amount payable by the householder. The structure of these rebates is complex and can be inequitable. Some households are eligible for four different rebates, each with its own eligibility criteria.  Also, some households in very similar circumstances receive different levels of support depending on what type of energy is used in their home or which adult in the house is the energy account holder. For example, a household using both electricity and gas receives more assistance than a household with electricity alone even if total energy bills are the same. 

By September 2018, the Department of Planning and Environment should:

1. Ensure effective strategies are in place to make information about rebates available to all eligible, low-income households
    
2. Evaluate alternative models and develop advice for government to reduce complexity and improve equity of ongoing rebates
    
3. Establish measurable objectives for schemes that provide ongoing support, and monitor and measure performance of all schemes against objectives and outcome measures
    
4. Assess the impacts of the forecast increase in embedded networks and develop strategies to manage any increased administrative risk
    
5. Strengthen assurance that EAPA is being provided in accordance with its objectives and guidelines by implementing accreditation and compliance programs
    
6. Ensure those eligible for EAPA financial support are not disadvantaged by inflexible payments, inconsistent provider practices, or inability to access an EAPA provider in a timely manner. Options include:
   • moving from a fixed-value voucher to a flexible payment based on need irrespective of energy type
   • establishing a ‘Provider of Last Resort’ facility for households that cannot access an EAPA Provider.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #292 - released 19 September 2017 

The Office of Strategic Lands effectively fulfils most aspects of its defined role, however, it could do more to support strategic land planning by identifying and acquiring land for future public use proactively rather than waiting for agencies or landholders to approach it. It may also have greater impact if it expanded its activities beyond greater Sydney.

The Office of Strategic Lands (OSL) was established under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EP&A Act) to identify, acquire, manage and divest land required for long-term planning by the NSW Government, particularly for open space and public purposes. 

OSL is a Corporation Sole acting on behalf of the Minister for Planning and is run within the Department of Planning and Environment (DPE). OSL is a self-funding entity, and is responsible for administering the Sydney Region Development Fund (SRDF), a statutory fund used for ongoing land acquisition and management. OSL currently only operates within greater Sydney and holds over a billion dollars in land assets in this region. 

This audit assessed whether OSL effectively fulfils its role to identify, acquire, manage and dispose of land, and whether OSL ensures it is sustainable over the long-term to meet its objectives. 

Conclusion:

OSL effectively fulfils most aspects of its defined role, but is not supporting strategic land planning through proactive identification and acquisition of land for future public use. OSL is diligent in its financial management over the short and medium terms. However, it has identified that relying on the sale of surplus land to continue funding its ongoing operations is not sustainable, and it is yet to finalise a strategy to address this.

OSL does not currently have a strategic or proactive focus to improve land planning outcomes. This is primarily due to the lack of a clear strategy and business plan to direct its work which defines OSL’s purpose, objectives, goals and performance targets.

OSL expects to finalise and implement a Strategic Business Plan to guide its future direction and long-term sustainability, in late 2017. 

OSL has three primary sources of funding. The largest source is Treasury loans which it needs to repay. The next most significant source of funding is from sales of land no longer required for government’s long-term needs. OSL has identified that it is likely to run out of surplus land within ten years. This is a significant financial risk for OSL, which should be addressed through a long-term financial strategy. 

Contributions by Sydney councils into the SRDF are OSL’s only regular and consistent income stream. The formula to calculate these contributions has not been reviewed for over 25 years, and recent council mergers and border changes have increased the need to review the formula. 

OSL is not used as extensively as it could be by other NSW Government agencies. It has the potential to play a much bigger role in assisting NSW Government agencies with longer term planning by partnering with them to identify, acquire, hold and manage land for future needs. For example, it could acquire land in future residential growth areas for needed public services such as schools, hospitals and transport corridors. There is also potential for OSL to expand its operations beyond the greater Sydney region into other parts of NSW to provide a statewide benefit from its unique role in government.

OSL has a unique role amongst government agencies, and could be used across NSW

NSW Government agencies we spoke with consider OSL fulfils an important role for the state that no other government agency performs. As a self-funding long-term land holder and manager, OSL can acquire and manage land beyond the four-year budget cycle that other government agencies face. Consideration should be given to expanding to other growth areas in NSW, where its unique role could assist in longer term land planning.

OSL has established good processes and procedures for most aspects of its role. This includes governance processes that we found to have been applied effectively. There was also adequate oversight and approvals for land transactions.

OSL has yet to finalise a business strategy to ensure long-term sustainability

OSL has shown that it is financially and operationally viable in the short to medium term. However, it does not have an overarching business strategy to guide its operations and ensure it is financially sustainable for the long-term. With a unique role in government, it is important for OSL to clarify its direction and implement a strategic business plan to drive its progress.

While there is no overarching long-term strategy, OSL has documented operating plans which guide its land acquisition and land divestment activities over the short to medium term. It has not developed a plan for its ongoing land management activities.
OSL advised that its Strategic Business Plan will be finalised and implemented in late 2017. This Plan should clarify OSL’s long-term direction, and guide its business to ensure it is financially sustainable.

OSL does not have adequate performance targets and measures

OSL has four key deliverables as part of DPE’s business plan. These deliverables cover land management, working with other agencies, and ensuring the SRDF is sustainable. There was no evidence that OSL or DPE monitor whether OSL achieves all key deliverables.

Currently, OSL’s performance targets are limited to meeting dollar values. OSL does not have any measures to demonstrate the achievement of outcomes that align with its core business, such as its success in land management or in working with other agencies. OSL staff also said that dollar targets were not always adequate or appropriate to measure its business performance.

With the development of its Strategic Business Plan, OSL has the opportunity to clarify its future business direction. This includes ensuring it has a range of relevant goals and performance measures that will support it becoming a strategic land planning partner with NSW Government agencies and local councils, and a land holder for the long-term.

OSL’s current financial management approach may impact long-term sustainability

OSL has valued the land that it needs to purchase on behalf of government to meet long-term strategic land needs in the Greater Sydney region, at $1.2 billion. However, OSLs annual budget for purchasing land is only between $40 million and $50 million until 2021. Also, in each of the last four years, OSL has not spent more than $30 million on land purchases because it relies on landowners to initiate contact when they are ready to sell their land.

Without a more proactive approach, it is not possible for OSL to make needed purchases in a timely manner. OSL acknowledges the substantial gap between these values, but has not established a budget or plan for how it will purchase all the identified land.

OSL has developed a Divestment Strategy which provides a five-year schedule of planned divestments. This is land OSL owns which has been identified as no longer required for government purposes. OSL has established an approach to generate the best and highest price for these sales. While funds are generated through the sale of surplus land, it also means that OSL holds fewer land assets to sell. OSL has identified it will run out of surplus land within ten years.

OSL needs to finalise and implement a business model to ensure it is financially and operationally capable to sustain and grow its business for the long-term.

OSL is working to improve transparency and engagement with key stakeholders

To deliver on its role, OSL needs to be able to effectively engage and work with its stakeholders, including NSW Government agencies, local councils, and people selling or buying land.

NSW Government agencies we spoke with are generally satisfied with OSL’s level of engagement and consultation. However, it would be beneficial for all parties to clarify and document their expectations of each other through a formal arrangement. OSL could also be more proactive in promoting its services, and working with additional NSW Government agencies to identify strategic lands.

The local councils in the Sydney region we spoke with are not as satisfied with OSL’s engagement and communication. The councils advised that they do not consider they are well-informed of OSL’s plans for their area, or how their contributions to the SRDF are spent.

More broadly, the activities of OSL are not reported transparently to stakeholders or the general public. OSL is developing a communication package for local councils and the community. This is an opportunity for OSL to improve the transparency of its role, operations, projects, and the SRDF, as well as promote its services and achievements.

The Office of Strategic Lands (OSL) was established in 1951 to identify, acquire, manage and divest land required for the NSW Government's long term planning purposes. OSL acts on behalf of the Minister for Planning, as a Corporation Sole, under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EP&A Act).

OSL acquires and manages land identified for long-term strategic needs, and then transfers or sells it to other government agencies for ultimate use. It also sells land identified as surplus to government’s long term strategic requirements. Surplus land can also be transferred to local councils. OSL operates only in the greater Sydney region (from Wyong in the north, to the base of the Blue Mountains in the west, and south to Wollondilly). OSL has 20 staff who manage over 6,000 parcels of land.
 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #290 - released 10 August 2017 

In November 2013, Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) outsourced the maintenance of State roads in the Sydney region south and west zones using an innovative contracting approach called the Stewardship Maintenance Contract (SMC). The SMC links risk to reward, and uses a performance framework where outcomes should drive improved performance over time.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #288 - released 15 June 2017

The processes used to assess NorthConnex adequately considered value for money for taxpayers.This report also found that the impact of tolling concessions on road users and the motorway network was consistent with policy objectives described in the 2012 NSW Long Term Transport Master Plan.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #287 - released 8 June 2017

The Planning Assessment Commission (the Commission) has improved its decision-making processes for major development applications in recent years. The Commission has improved how it consults the public and manages conflicts of interest, and now also publishes records of its meetings with applicants and stakeholders.

The Planning Assessment Commission (the Commission) is an independent body established in 2008 under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (the EP&A Act). It makes decisions on major development applications in New South Wales. Along with the Department of Planning and Environment (the Department) and the Land and Environment Court, it is one of three bodies that have a role in making decisions on these applications.

The Department refers development applications to the Commission where 25 or more objections have been received from the community, a local council objects to the proposal, or the applicant has donated to a political party.

These applications are often complex and controversial, and can attract a high level of public interest. This may mean that, regardless of the process, not all stakeholders are satisfied with the outcome.

The Commission is required to take into account section 79C of the EP&A Act when making decisions. Section 79C includes consideration of the likely environmental, social and economic impacts of the development.

This audit assessed the extent to which the Commission’s decisions on major development applications are made in a consistent and transparent manner. To assist us in making this assessment, we asked whether the Commission:

• has sound processes in place to help it make decisions on major development applications that are informed and made in a consistent manner
• ensures its decisions are free from bias and transparent to stakeholders and the public.

Decision-making processes have improved but some key aspects need to be addressed

Although not articulated in one document, there is a framework in place to assist Commissioners make decisions on major development applications. This includes setting out the information to be considered, who to consult, and that a report is to be prepared. The Commission has recently improved how it conducts public meetings and the level of support provided to Commissioners to ensure they understand the decision-making process. The Commissioners we interviewed all showed a good understanding of their role.

As a consent authority, the Commission is required to consider the matters in section 79C of the EP&A Act when making a decision. However, it was not able to show how it met this requirement in every decision we reviewed. We found some evidence of these considerations in six of the nine cases we reviewed, for example in meeting notes or in its report on a decision. Of these six cases, the degree to which the Commission considered all matters under section 79C varied considerably. The larger, more complex applications were more likely to address these considerations. To demonstrate compliance with the EP&A Act, the Commission must be able to show how it considers all matters in section 79C for each decision it makes.

We found that the Commission has access to relevant information to make a decision and consults stakeholders for their views of the development. The level of consultation depends on the size and complexity of an application. If Commissioners decide they need more information to make a decision, they consult local councils, the community, other government agencies and experts as needed.

The Commission’s public meetings are a valuable part of the decision-making process, where new perspectives or issues are often raised. However, some aspects could be improved. For example, many stakeholders thought the five minutes allowed for individual speakers was insufficient. The Commission could be more flexible with this timeframe. Identifying new ways to notify the public of its meetings, other than advertisements on its website and in newspapers, would also ensure it reaches as many interested parties as possible.

Improved transparency and probity but the Commission is not seen by some as impartial

The Commission has sound processes in place to ensure that its decisions are impartial and transparent to the community. It has improved its probity measures over the last two years, following a review by the NSW Ombudsman in 2014. We found that the Commission:

• has probity policies and procedures which are available on its website
• has improved its record keeping of some processes, such as meetings with applicants and stakeholders
• publishes its decision and supporting documentation, such as meeting notes, on its website.

Conflicts of interest are a significant risk for the Commission because they could lead to corruption, abuse of public office, and affect the public’s view of its independence. The Commission manages this risk well. It has a policy in place to address potential, perceived or actual conflicts. Commissioners update their conflicts of interest records annually, and declare any conflicts when the Commission assigns them to a development application. Unlike the Commission’s probity polices, Commissioners’ conflict of interest declarations are not available on its website. Providing a summary of this information on its website when Commissioners are allocated to a development application would further improve transparency around conflicts of interest.

The Commission has been improving how it communicates its decisions to the public. It now produces fact sheets for its decisions on matters that attract a high level of public interest. Its reports on decisions for complex applications also discuss issues raised by the community. However, the level of detail varied in the decisions we reviewed, and it was not always clear how conditions placed on a development would resolve identified issues. Similarly, the reports did not clearly address the matters under section 79C of the EP&A Act. Reporting this would further improve the transparency of its decisions, and clearly demonstrate compliance with the EP&A Act.

While we did not find any issues that would make us question the integrity or independence of Commissioners, there remains a perception among some stakeholders that the Commission is not impartial. Some of these concerns are within the Commission’s control to fix, such as allowing individual speakers at public meetings extra time to discuss their issues, therefore avoiding perceptions of bias.

Other perceptions, such as the Commission being part of the Department and not an independent decision making authority, are outside the Commission’s immediate control. For example, the Commission receives applications at the end of the assessment process, after the Department has prepared an assessment report recommending whether the application should be approved. This means there are effectively two reports on an application; the Department’s assessment report and the Commission’s report on its decision. However, there is only one decision-maker: the Commission. This may cause community confusion about the roles of the Department and the Commission in the decision-making process. Clearer separation of their roles in assessing applications and preparing reports is needed.

To minimise the perception that the Commission is simply ‘rubber stamping’ the Department’s recommendations, assessment reports should not recommend whether or not a project be approved. Instead, they should provide the Department’s views on whether a project meets relevant legislative and policy requirements. The Commission should also be involved earlier in the process, so it can establish key facts and identify relevant issues sooner. It should request that the Department’s assessment report covers matters Commissioners consider particularly important when assessing projects under section 79C. Earlier referral of applications should also help the Commission to plan its work in assessing applications, and may reduce the time taken to reach a decision.

Unless these issues are addressed, stakeholders will continue to believe the Commission does not act in a transparent and impartial manner, which could erode public confidence in the Commission.

The Planning Assessment Commission

The Planning Assessment Commission (the Commission) is a planning authority established in 2008 under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (the EP&A Act). One of its functions is to make decisions on major development applications.

The Commission is independent of the Department of Planning and Environment (the Department) and the Minister for Planning. This means its decisions are not subject to the direction or control of the Department or the Minister.

The Department refers applications for major development to the Commission, including state significant development and infrastructure applications. These projects are generally initiated by the private sector. Applications are referred to the Commission when one or more of the following criteria are met:

• more than 25 objections are received about the proposal
• the local council objects to the proposal
• the applicant has donated $1,000 or more to a political party or member of parliament.

These applications are often controversial and may attract a high level of public interest. Of the 29 development applications the Commission received in 2015–16, almost 40 per cent were in the mining and energy sectors, and another 40 per cent related to urban development.

Section 79C of the EP&A Act outlines the matters the Commission must consider when making decisions about major development applications. These include:

• any relevant environmental and planning instruments
• likely environmental, social and economic impacts of the development
• suitability of the site for the development
• submissions received about the application
• the public interest.

In addition to making decisions about major development applications, the Commission also reviews major developments as part of the planning process, and provides independent expert advice to the government on planning and development matters. Since the Commission’s inception, it has provided advice on 76 matters, conducted 39 reviews, and made 444 decisions on development applications.

Process for approving major development applications

The Commission is one of three bodies that have a role in the planning and approval process for major development applications in New South Wales, as seen in Exhibit 1. The other two bodies are the Department of Planning and Environment, and the Land and Environment Court.

The Department determines the outcomes of major development applications. When an application meets one of the criteria listed above, it refers these to the Commission to make the decision. In certain circumstances, the Land and Environment Court hears appeals against decisions made by either the Department or the Commission.

A Memorandum of Understanding between the Commission and the Department sets out timeframes the Commission must meet when making a decision, specifically:

• two weeks where no stakeholder meetings are required
• three weeks where stakeholder meetings are required
• six weeks when a public meeting is required.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #279 - released 19 January 2017 

State Transit has developed fleet management plans and maintenance standards that meet its regulatory and contractual obligations as a bus operator and are consistent with vehicle manufacturers’ standards and best practice. However, assumptions used in fleet management plans to forecast fleet growth may not result in the most efficient and effective outcome for State Transit. Forecasts fail to take account of opportunities to redesign or reduce services where they exceed contract requirements and are difficult to justify on a commercial basis. Of greater concern are the consequences arising from bus maintenance practices not meeting State Transit’s own standards.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #97 - released 29 May 2002

Despite the issue being on the agenda for many years (formally, at least since 1988), at present there is not a comprehensive record of all government property assets in NSW. Whilst initiatives currently underway are promising, they will require continued priority to achieve tangible results. And careful coordination will be required to avoid duplication and waste.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #93 - released 31 January 2002