Reports
Funding enhancements for police technology
This report focuses on how the NSW Police Force managed a $100 million program to acquire new technology. The program invested in technologies intended to make police work safer and quicker. These included body-worn video (BWV) cameras, smart phone devices, mobile fingerprint scanners and hand-held drug testing devices.
The audit found that while the NSW Police Force mostly managed the ‘Policing for Tomorrow’ program effectively, investment decision making could be improved in the future. The NSW Police Force missed an opportunity to take a whole-of-organisation approach to identify capability gaps and target the acquired technologies to plug these.
The NSW Police Force has processes in place to monitor the benefits of some of the larger technology, but it does not do this consistently for all procured technology. It could not demonstrate that smaller projects are improving the efficiency or effectiveness of policing.
The audit also found that the NSW Police Force does not routinely engage with external stakeholders on the use or impacts of new technology that changes how officers interact with the public, noting that this will not always be possible for particularly sensitive procurements that involve covert technologies or methodologies.
The Auditor-General made three recommendations to guide improvement of NSW Police Force ICT procurement, benefits management and stakeholder engagement processes.
Ahead of the March 2015 election, the NSW Government announced a $100 million Policing for Tomorrow fund for the NSW Police Force to acquire technology intended to make police work safer and quicker. The announcement committed the NSW Police Force to several investment priorities, including body-worn video (BWV) cameras, smart phone devices (MobiPOL), mobile fingerprint scanners and hand-held drug testing devices. Otherwise, the NSW Police Force was allowed flexibility in identifying and resourcing suitable projects.
This audit assessed whether the Policing for Tomorrow fund was effectively managed to improve policing in New South Wales. We addressed the audit objective with the following audit questions:
- Did the NSW Police Force efficiently and effectively identify, acquire, implement and maintain technology resourced by the fund?
- Did the NSW Police Force establish effective governance arrangements for administering the fund, and for monitoring expected benefits and unintended consequences?
- Did technology implemented under the fund improve the efficiency and effectiveness of policing in New South Wales?
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Conclusion The NSW Police Force's management of the Policing for Tomorrow fund was mostly effective. There are measures in place to assess the impact of the technologies on the efficiency and effectiveness of policing in NSW. However, these measures are not in place for all technologies funded by Policing for Tomorrow. A strategic whole-of-organisation approach to identifying and filling technology capability gaps may have assisted in better targeting funds and managing expected benefits. The NSW Police Force identified, acquired, implemented and maintained a range of technologies resourced by the fund in an efficient and effective way. The election announcement committed the NSW Police Force to four specific projects which made up over three quarters of the fund value. Investment decisions for remaining funds were driven by the availability of funding and individual technology requirements rather than targeting improved policing outcomes and the capability necessary to achieve these. The NSW Police Force missed an opportunity to take a whole-of-organisation approach to selecting technology projects for the remainder of the funds where it had discretion. This may have included considering less obvious back office technology or making different investment decisions driven by gaps in the agency's technology capabilities. The NSW Police Force used effective governance arrangements for administering the Policing for Tomorrow fund, including using its existing ICT Executive Board. The NSW Police Force has adequate processes in place to drive benefits and monitor the impact of technology on the efficiency and effectiveness of policing for the larger projects funded by Policing for Tomorrow. Further work is required to ensure this for smaller projects. The NSW Police Force tends to consider only impacts on the organisation in managing benefits and identifying unintended consequences. It does not routinely engage proactively with stakeholders, including partner criminal justice agencies and members of the community, on new technology that changes how police interact with the public. |
We examined how effectively the NSW Police Force governed the Policing for Tomorrow fund, to ensure that key accountability and decision-making arrangements were in place to direct the $100 million spend to appropriate technologies. We also assessed how the NSW Police Force acquired, implemented and maintained technology funded by Policing for Tomorrow to determine the effectiveness of the relevant asset management.
The Policing for Tomorrow election commitment aimed to invest in technology to ‘make police work safer and quicker – meaning more time on the street combatting crime’. We assessed whether the NSW Police Force ensured that funded technologies have improved policing efficiency and effectiveness. We did not seek to independently assure the benefits or outcomes resulting from the technologies.
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – Policing for Tomorrow projects and expenditure
Appendix three – About the audit
Appendix four – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #334 - released 2 June 2020
Integrity of data in the Births, Deaths and Marriages Register
This report outlines whether the Department of Customer Service (the department) has effective controls in place to ensure the integrity of data in the Births, Deaths and Marriages Register (the register), and to prevent unauthorised access and misuse.
The audit found that the department has processes in place to ensure that the information entered in the register is accurate and that any changes to it are validated. Although there are controls in place to prevent and detect unauthorised access to, and activity in the register, there were significant gaps in these controls. Addressing these gaps is necessary to ensure the integrity of information in the register.
The Auditor-General made nine recommendations to the department, aimed at strengthening controls to prevent and detect unauthorised access to, and activity in the register. These included increased monitoring of individuals who have access to the register and strengthening security controls around the databases that contain the information in the register.
The NSW Registry of Births Deaths and Marriages is responsible for maintaining registers of births, deaths and marriages in New South Wales as well as registering adoptions, changes of names, changes of sex and relationships. Maintaining the integrity of this information is important as it is used to confirm people’s identity and unauthorised access to it can lead to fraud or identity theft.
The NSW Registry of Births Deaths and Marriages (BD&M) is responsible for maintaining registers of births, deaths and marriages in New South Wales. BD&M is also responsible for registering adoptions, changes of name, changes of sex and relationships. These records are collectively referred to as 'the Register'. The Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (the BD&M Act) makes the Registrar (the head of BD&M) responsible for maintaining the integrity of the Register and preventing fraud associated with the Register. Maintaining the integrity of the information held in the Register is important as it is used to confirm people's identity. Unauthorised access to, or misuse of the information in the Register can lead to fraud or identity theft. For these reasons it is important that there are sufficient controls in place to protect the information.
BD&M staff access, add to and amend the Register through the LifeLink application. While BD&M is part of the Department of Customer Service, the Department of Communities and Justice (DCJ) manages the databases that contain the Register and sit behind LifeLink and is responsible for the security of these databases.
This audit assessed whether BD&M has effective controls in place to ensure the integrity of data in the Births, Deaths and Marriages Register, and to prevent unauthorised access and misuse. It addressed the following:
- Are relevant process and IT controls in place and effective to ensure the integrity of data in the Register and the authenticity of records and documents?
- Are security controls in place and effective to prevent unauthorised access to, and modification of, data in the Register?
ConclusionBD&M has processes and controls in place to ensure that the information entered in the Register is accurate and that amendments to the Register are validated. BD&M also has controls in place to prevent and detect unauthorised access to, and activity in the Register. However, there are significant gaps in these controls. Addressing these gaps is necessary to ensure the integrity of the information in the Register. BD&M has detailed procedures for all registrations and amendments to the Register, which include processes for entering, assessing and checking the validity and adequacy of source documents. Where BD&M staff have directly input all the data and for amendments to the Register, a second person is required to check all information that has been input before an event can be registered or an amendment can be made. BD&M carries out regular internal audits of all registration processes to check whether procedures are being followed and to address non-compliance where required. BD&M authorises access to the Register and carries out regular access reviews to ensure that users are current and have the appropriate level of access. There are audit trails of all user activity, but BD&M does not routinely monitor these. At the time of the audit, BD&M also did not monitor activity by privileged users who could make unauthorised changes to the Register. Not monitoring this activity created a risk that unauthorised activity in the Register would not be detected. BD&M has no direct oversight of the database environment which houses the Register and relies on DCJ's management of a third-party vendor to provide the assurance it needs over database security. The vendor operates an Information Security Management System that complies with international standards, but neither BD&M nor DCJ has undertaken independent assurance of the effectiveness of the vendor's IT controls. |
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #330 - released 7 April 2020.
Detecting and responding to cyber security incidents
A report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, found there is no whole-of-government capability to detect and respond effectively to cyber security incidents. There is very limited sharing of information on incidents amongst agencies, and some agencies have poor detection and response practices and procedures.
The NSW Government relies on digital technology to deliver services, organise and store information, manage business processes, and control critical infrastructure. The increasing global interconnectivity between computer networks has dramatically increased the risk of cyber security incidents. Such incidents can harm government service delivery and may include the theft of information, denial of access to critical technology, or even the hijacking of systems for profit or malicious intent.
This audit examined cyber security incident detection and response in the NSW public sector. It focused on the role of the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation (DFSI), which oversees the Information Security Community of Practice, the Information Security Event Reporting Protocol, and the Digital Information Security Policy (the Policy).
The audit also examined ten case study agencies to develop a perspective on how they detect and respond to incidents. We chose agencies that are collectively responsible for personal data, critical infrastructure, financial information and intellectual property.
Some of our case study agencies had strong processes for detection and response to cyber security incidents but others had a low capability to detect and respond in a timely way.
Most agencies have access to an automated tool for analysing logs generated by their IT systems. However, coverage of these tools varies. Some agencies do not have an automated tool and only review logs periodically or on an ad hoc basis, meaning they are less likely to detect incidents.
Few agencies have contractual arrangements in place for IT service providers to report incidents to them. If a service provider elects to not report an incident, it will delay the agency’s response and may result in increased damage.
Most case study agencies had procedures for responding to incidents, although some lack guidance on who to notify and when. Some agencies do not have response procedures, limiting their ability to minimise the business damage that may flow from a cyber security incident. Few agencies could demonstrate that they have trained their staff on either incident detection or response procedures and could provide little information on the role requirements and responsibilities of their staff in doing so.
Most agencies’ incident procedures contain limited information on how to report an incident, who to report it to, when this should occur and what information should be provided. None of our case study agencies’ procedures mentioned reporting to DFSI, highlighting that even though reporting is mandatory for most agencies their procedures do not require it.
Case study agencies provided little evidence to indicate they are learning from incidents, meaning that opportunities to better manage future incidents may be lost.
Recommendations
The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should:
- assist agencies by providing:
- better practice guidelines for incident detection, response and reporting to help agencies develop their own practices and procedures
- training and awareness programs, including tailored programs for a range of audiences such as cyber professionals, finance staff, and audit and risk committees
- role requirements and responsibilities for cyber security across government, relevant to size and complexity of each agency
- a support model for agencies that have limited detection and response capabilities
- revise the Digital Information Security Policy and Information Security Event Reporting Protocol by
- clarifying what security incidents must be reported to DFSI and when
- extending mandatory reporting requirements to those NSW Government agencies not currently covered by the policy and protocol, including State owned corporations.
DFSI lacks a clear mandate or capability to provide effective detection and response support to agencies, and there is limited sharing of information on cyber security incidents.
DFSI does not currently have a clear mandate and the necessary resources and systems to detect, receive, share and respond to cyber security incidents across the NSW public sector. It does not have a clear mandate to assess whether agencies have an acceptable detection and response capability. It is aware of deficiencies in agencies and across whole‑of‑government, and has begun to conduct research into this capability.
Intelligence gathering across the public sector is also limited, meaning agencies may not respond to threats in a timely manner. DFSI has not allocated resources for gathering of threat intelligence and communicating it across government, although it has begun to build this capacity.
Incident reporting to DFSI is mandatory for most agencies, however, most of our case study agencies do not report incidents to DFSI, reducing the likelihood of containing an incident if it spreads to other agencies. When incidents have been reported, DFSI has not provided dedicated resources to assess them and coordinate the public sector’s response. There are currently no formal requirements for DFSI to respond to incidents and no guidance on what it is meant to do if an incident is reported. The lack of central coordination in incident response risks delays and increased damage to multiple agencies.
DFSI's reporting protocol is weak and does not clearly specify what agencies should report and when. This makes agencies less likely to report incidents. The lack of a standard format for incident reporting and a consistent method for assessing an incident, including the level of risk associated with it, also make it difficult for DFSI to determine an appropriate response.
There are limited avenues for sharing information amongst agencies after incidents have been resolved, meaning the public sector may be losing valuable opportunities to improve its protection and response.
Recommendations
The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should:
- develop whole‑of‑government procedure, protocol and supporting systems to effectively share reported threats and respond to cyber security incidents impacting multiple agencies, including follow-up and communicating lessons learnt
- develop a means by which agencies can report incidents in a more effective manner, such as a secure online template, that allows for early warnings and standardised details of incidents and remedial advice
- enhance NSW public sector threat intelligence gathering and sharing including formal links with Australian Government security agencies, other states and the private sector
- direct agencies to include standard clauses in contracts requiring IT service providers report all cyber security incidents within a reasonable timeframe
- provide assurance that agencies have appropriate reporting procedures and report to DFSI as required by the policy and protocol by:
- extending the attestation requirement within the DISP to cover procedures and reporting
- reviewing a sample of agencies' incident reporting procedures each year.
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - ISMS maturity model
Appendix three - About the audit
Appendix four - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #297 - released 2 March 2018
Managing IT Services Contracts
Neither agency (NSW Ministry of Health and NSW Police Force) demonstrated that they continued to get value for money over the life of these long term contracts or that they had effectively managed all critical elements of the three contracts we reviewed post award. This is because both agencies treated contract extensions or renewals as simply continuing previous contractual arrangements, rather than as establishing a new contract and financial commitment. Consequently, there was not a robust analysis of the continuing need for the mix and quantity of services being provided or an assessment of value for money in terms of the prices being paid.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #220 - released 1 February 2012
