Reports
Design and implementation of the Transport Asset Holding Entity
What the report is about
The Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE) is the State's custodian of rail assets. It is a state owned corporation and commenced operating on 1 July 2020.
This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies' design and implementation of TAHE. We audited TAHE, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) and NSW Treasury.
Separate and related audits on TAHE are reported in 'State Finances 2022', 'State Finances 2021' and 'Transport and Infrastructure 2022' reports.
What we found
The design and implementation of TAHE, which spanned seven years, was not effective.
The process was not cohesive or transparent. It delivered an outcome that is unnecessarily complex in order to support an accounting treatment to meet the NSW Government's short-term Budget objectives, while creating an obligation for future governments.
The benefits of TAHE were claimed in the 2015–16 NSW Budget before the enabling legislation was passed by Parliament in 2017. This committed the agencies to implement a solution that justified the 2015–16 Budget impacts, regardless of any challenges that arose.
Rail safety arrangements were a priority throughout TAHE's design and implementation, and risks were raised and addressed.
Agencies relied heavily on consultants on matters related to the creation of TAHE, but failed to effectively manage these engagements. Agencies failed to ensure that consultancies delivered independent advice as an input to decision-making. A small number of firms were used repeatedly to provide advice on the same topic. The final cost of TAHE-related consultancies was $22.6 million compared to the initial estimated cost of $12.9 million.
What we recommended
We recommended that the audited agencies should:
- improve accountability and transparency for major new fiscal transformation initiatives
- ensure entities do not reflect the financial impact of significant initiatives in the Budget when there is uncertainty, or it creates perverse incentives
- review record keeping practices, systems and policies to ensure compliance with the State Records Act 1998, and the NSW Government Information Classification, Labelling and Handling Guidelines
- review procurement policies to ensure that consultant use complies with all NSW Government policy requirements.
The NSW Government established the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE), a statutory State Owned Corporation (SOC), on 1 July 2020 to replace the former rail infrastructure owner – RailCorp. It is the State's custodian of rail network assets, including rail tracks and other infrastructure, rolling stock, land, train stations and facilities, retail space, and signal and power systems, within metropolitan and regional New South Wales. It is responsible for $2.8 billion of major capital projects in 2022–23.
TAHE was established under Part 2 of the Transport Administration Act 1988 and is governed by a decision-making board. The Treasurer and the Minister for Finance and Employee Relations are the Shareholding Ministers of TAHE, and they annually agree performance expectations articulated in a Statement of Corporate Intent.
Whereas TAHE is the custodian of rail assets, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains operate public rail services. TAHE does not have responsibility for the operation of the heavy rail network or train services, nor does it have network control functions. TAHE, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains are in the Transport and Infrastructure cluster in the public sector (formerly the Transport cluster and renamed in April 2022), which also includes Sydney Metro and Transport for NSW (TfNSW).
TfNSW leads the Transport and Infrastructure cluster. Its role is to set the strategic direction for transport across the State. This involves the shaping of planning, policy, strategy, regulation, resource allocation and other service and non-service delivery functions for all modes of transport.
TAHE's Operating Licence is granted by the Portfolio Minister and authorises the entity to perform the functions required to acquire, develop, finance, divest and hold assets, pursuant to the Transport Administration Act 1988. The Portfolio Minister also issues a Statement of Expectations which outlines the government’s expectation for the business for the next three to five years.
TAHE's original Portfolio Minister was the Minister for Transport who approved, on 30 June 2020, the issuing of an interim 12-month Operating Licence to enable TAHE to commence operating on 1 July 2020. The Portfolio Minister then granted TAHE's current Operating Licence in 2021. After TAHE requested a 12-month extension to its current Operating Licence, its next Operating Licence is due on 1 July 2024. The current Portfolio Minister is the Minister for Infrastructure, Cities and Active Transport.
About this audit
This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies' design and implementation of TAHE. In making this assessment, we considered whether:
- the process of designing and implementing TAHE was cohesive and transparent, and delivered an effective outcome
- agencies' roles and responsibilities were clear in the planning of TAHE
- agencies effectively identified and managed certain risks.
Conclusion
The design and implementation of TAHE was not effective. The process was not cohesive or transparent. It delivered an outcome that is unnecessarily complex in order to meet the NSW Government's short-term Budget objectives, while creating an obligation for future governments to sustain TAHE through continuing investment, and funding of the state owned rail operators. The ineffective process to design TAHE delivered a model that entails significant uncertainty as to whether the anticipated longer-term financial improvements to the Budget position can be achieved or sustained.
NSW Treasury and TfNSW had different objectives for TAHE
Up to June 2013, RailCorp had been the owner and operator of rail services and maintainer of the metropolitan rail network for almost a decade. It had been operating as a not-for-profit Public Non-Financial Corporation (PNFC).
In 2012, NSW Treasury (hereafter Treasury) decided there was a risk that the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) would reclassify RailCorp to the General Government Sector (GGS), meaning depreciation expenses of approximately $870 million would be reflected in the GGS Budget. Treasury wanted to avoid this impact on the GGS Budget, and considered the establishment of a transport asset holding entity as a means to do so. Capital grants to RailCorp were being treated as an expense to the GGS Budget.
TfNSW also wanted an asset holding entity – but one that would be a non-trading ‘shell’ company with no staff that would hold and manage all public transport assets. TfNSW's concept envisaged the entity would have a structure that would enable future public transport reforms and strategic directions while ensuring vertical integration of operations between asset owners and the rail operators to maintain rail safety.
However, Treasury pursued its objective to improve the GGS Budget result, and sought to expand on TfNSW's 'shell' asset holding entity concept. Treasury wanted an entity that could generate a return on investment, as this meant that government investment in transport assets could be treated as equity investments, rather than a Budget expense, and in turn improve the GGS Budget position. As an example of the potential impact of creating this new entity, capital grants of $2.3 billion were paid to RailCorp in 2013–14. If Treasury's objective was met, grants of this significance would then be treated as an equity investment, rather than an expense in the GGS Budget.
In 2017, Treasury's preferred option was progressed through legislation, but both agencies' central objectives for the proposed asset holding entity would continue to prove difficult to reconcile. To achieve Treasury's objective to improve the Budget result, the entity would need to generate a return on investment (this is further discussed below). However, TfNSW expressed concerns that the prioritisation of rail safety, and the effective management of governance, regulation and operations would be more complex in an entity with commercial imperatives.
Asset holding entities are a common approach to the management of transport assets in Australia and internationally, and there are a range of approaches to how they are structured and used. Such structures should be driven by the goal of improved asset management. Ultimately, TfNSW's objectives could have been delivered through a simpler entity structure. However, reconciling TfNSW's objectives with Treasury's imperative to deliver and justify a Budget improvement in the short-term resulted in an overly lengthy process and an unnecessarily complex outcome that places an obligation on future governments to sustain. There is still significant uncertainty as to whether the short-term improvements to the Budget can continue to be realised in the longer-term.
The Budget benefits of TAHE were claimed before the entity was legislated, committing the agencies to deliver, regardless of the complexities that subsequently arose
The 2015–16 GGS Budget treated the government's investment in TAHE (still known at this time as RailCorp) as an equity contribution. This had the immediate impact of improving the Budget result by $1.8 billion per annum. However, the legislation to enable the establishment of TAHE had not yet been passed by Parliament, key elements of the operating model were still under development, and imminent changes in accounting standards had the potential to impact TAHE's financial model. The decision to book the benefits in the Budget early committed the involved agencies to implement a solution that justified the 2015–16 Budget impacts, irrespective of the challenges that arose.
TAHE's financial structure requires circular government investment to work
For the NSW Government to continue to treat its investment in TAHE as an equity contribution, rather than an expense to the Budget, there must be a reasonable expectation that TAHE will generate a sufficient rate of return as required by the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) framework. In doing so, it needs to recover a revaluation loss created by a $20.3 billion reduction in the value of its assets which was incurred in its first full year of operation. This loss occurred as a result of a revaluation of TAHE's assets when RailCorp (a not-for profit entity) became TAHE (a for-profit commercial entity) – and is discussed further in the 'Key findings' below.
TAHE generates a small portion of its income from transactions with the private sector but, as noted in our report 'State Finances 2021', TAHE receives the majority of its revenue (more than 80%) from access and licence fee agreements with Sydney Trains and NSW Trains. Both of these entities are funded by grants (a Budget expense) to TfNSW from the GGS Budget.
Based on Treasury’s correspondence with the ABS in 2015, TAHE was initially expected to pay a return on equity of 7% in 2016–17. The assumption of a 7% return persisted through to 2018, after the legislation enabling the establishment of TAHE was passed by Parliament. However, when the initial access and licence fees were agreed on 1 July 2020, this figure had been revised to an expected rate of return of 1.5% excluding the revaluation loss. This was below the long-term inflation target and did not include the recovery of the revaluation loss – risking the government's ability to treat its investment in TAHE as an equity contribution. Importantly, as TAHE is primarily reliant on fees paid by the state owned rail operators that, in turn, are funded by the GGS Budget (as an expense), the decision to change the returns model from 7% to 1.5% would in its own right have had a positive impact on the GGS Budget. However, the decision to use a 1.5% return would ultimately be problematic as it made it difficult to treat the government's contributions to TAHE as an equity investment, as discussed below.
On 14 December 2021, to avoid a qualified audit opinion, the NSW Government made the decision to increase TAHE's expected rate of return to 2.5%, equal to the Reserve Bank’s long-term inflation target.
In 2021-22, TAHE needed to start charging rail operators higher access and licence fees in order to generate a return of 2.5%, so as to support the government's treatment of its investment in TAHE as an equity contribution in the GGS Budget. This meant the government needed to provide additional grant (expense) funding to the state owned rail operators so they could pay the increased access and licence fees to TAHE. Based on current projections, TAHE is not expected to recover the revaluation loss until 2046.
There remains a risk that TAHE will not be able to generate a sufficient return on the NSW Government's investment without relying on increased funding to state owned rail operators so that they can in turn pay the higher access and licence fees. TAHE's ability to generate returns on government investment from other sources are uncertain and may not be achievable or sustainable. Current modelling highlights that TAHE remains largely reliant, through to 2046, on increasing fees (which are assumed to increase at 2.5% per annum from 2031 onwards when the current 10 year contracts with rail operators expire) paid by the state owned rail operators that remain principally reliant on GGS Budget grants.
The process of designing and implementing TAHE was not transparent to independent scrutiny
Our report 'State Finances 2021' commented that Treasury did not always provide this Office with information relating to TAHE on a timely basis. Similarly, during this performance audit, there were also multiple instances where auditees were unable to provide documentation regarding key activities in the process to deliver TAHE. Agencies also applied higher sensitivity classifications to large tranches of documents than was justified or required by policy. Of particular concern is the incorrect classification of documents as Cabinet sensitive information. The incorrect or over-classification of documentation as Cabinet sensitive delayed this Office's ability to provide scrutiny or independent assurance.
There was a lack of clarity around the roles and responsibilities of governance structures set up to oversee the design and implementation of TAHE
From 2014, multiple workstreams and advisory committees were established to progress the design and implementation of TAHE. For some of these committees and workstreams, there is limited information on what they were tasked to do and what they achieved. Most had ceased meeting by 2018, before significant work needed to deliver TAHE was completed.
The lack of clarity around the roles and responsibilities of these governance structures reduced opportunities for TfNSW and Treasury to reconcile their differing objectives for TAHE, and resolve key questions earlier in the process.
There was a heavy reliance on consulting firms throughout the process to establish TAHE, and the management of consultant engagements failed to ensure that agencies received independent advice to support objective decision-making
In 2020, Treasury and TfNSW failed to prevent, identify, or adequately manage a conflict of interest when they engaged the same 'Big 4' consulting firm to work on separate TAHE-related projects. Both agencies used the firm's work to further their respective views with regard to the financial implications of TAHE's operating model. At this time those views were still unreconciled.
Treasury engaged the firm to provide a fiscal risk management strategy and advice on the impact of changes to accounting standards. TfNSW engaged the same firm to develop operating and financial models for TAHE, which raised concerns regarding the viability of TAHE. Disputes arose around the findings of these reports. Treasury disagreed with some of the outcomes of the work commissioned by TfNSW, relating to accounting treatment and fiscal advice.
The management of this conflict (real or perceived) was left to the 'Big 4' consulting firm when it was more appropriate for it to be managed by Treasury and TfNSW. If these agencies had communicated more effectively, used available governance structures consistently, and shared information openly about their use of the firm and the nature of their respective engagements, these disputes might have been avoided. This issue, coupled with deficiencies in procurement by both agencies, reflected and further perpetuated the lack of cohesion in the design and implementation of TAHE.
More broadly, over the period 2014 – 2021, 16 separate consulting firms were employed to work on 36 contracts, valued at over $22.56 million, relating to TAHE ranging from accounting and legal advice, project management, and the provision of administrative support and secretariat services.
Consultants are legitimately used by agencies to provide advice on how to achieve the outcomes determined by government, including advising agencies on the risks and challenges in achieving those outcomes. Similarly, consultants can provide expert knowledge in the service of achieving those outcomes and managing the risks. However, the heavy reliance on consulting firms during the design and implementation of TAHE heightened the risk that agencies were not receiving value for money, were outsourcing tasks that should be performed by the public service, and did not mitigate the risk that the advice received was not objective and impartial. The risk that the role of consultants could have been blurred between providing independent advice to government on options and facilitating a pre-determined outcome was not effectively treated or mitigated. This risk was amplified because a small number of firms were used repeatedly to provide advice on one topic. The effective procurement and management of consultants is an obligation of government agencies.
Appendix two – Classification of government entities
Appendix three – About the audit
Appendix four – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #372 - released 24 January 2023
Grants administration for disaster relief
What the report is about
The report examined whether NSW Treasury, Service NSW and the Department of Customer Service effectively administered grants programs funded under the $750 million Small Business Support Fund, including:
- $10,000 Small Business Support Grant
- $3,000 Small Business Recovery Grant.
What we found
The agencies effectively implemented the grants within required timeframes, reflecting the NSW Government’s decision to deliver urgent financial support to small businesses impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic.
NSW Treasury met urgent timeframes to design the grants and Service NSW made timely payments in line with the grants' objectives and eligibility criteria.
Service NSW and the Department of Customer Service strengthened processes to detect and minimise fraud in response to identified external fraud risks, and to investigate suspected fraudulent applications.
Fraud security checks and investigations are ongoing, and the agencies will not know the full extent of fraud across the grants until these processes have been completed.
The agencies regularly monitored and reported on the timeliness of payments to small business applicants but have not yet measured all benefits of the grants programs.
The $10,000 Support Grant and the $3,000 Recovery Grant have provided around $630 million in one off grant payments to eligible small businesses.
What we recommended
NSW Treasury should finalise and implement an evaluation of both grants programs, including obtaining feedback from businesses.
Service NSW should develop a framework that documents expected controls for how it administers grants, including business processes, fraud control and governance and probity requirements.
Service NSW should publish information on all grants programs, including grants distribution and uptake.
The Department of Customer Service should ensure its processes for managing conflicts of interest meets its policy requirements.
Upcoming performance audit
The Audit Office is conducting a further performance audit into grants administration for disaster relief focussing on bushfire grants. This is planned to complete in 2021-22.
Fast factsSmall Business Support Fund
Grant program administration
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Further information
Please contact Ian Goodwin, Deputy Auditor-General on 9275 7347 or by email.
The NSW Government responded to the partial shutdown of the NSW economy caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 by, among other measures, announcing on 3 April 2020 that it would place $750 million into the Small Business Support Fund (the Fund).
Under the Fund, the NSW Government would pay one-off grants of up to $10,000 to small business impacted by the shutdown. The objectives of the $10,000 Small Business Support Grant ($10,000 Support Grant) were to:
- ease the pressure on small businesses that have been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic
- support the ongoing operations of small businesses highly impacted by the COVID-19 restrictions
- deliver cash-flow into small businesses as soon as possible so that small businesses could meet pressing financial needs.
Grant applications were assessed against eligibility criteria that were determined by the NSW Government. The eligibility criteria for the $10,000 Support Grant required an employing small business to demonstrate it was significantly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic by self-declaring or demonstrating a significant decline of 75 per cent or more in turnover compared to 2019. Documentation requirements were relaxed for small businesses within highly impacted industries.
In June 2020, the NSW Government announced a second round of one-off grants of up to $3,000 to small businesses that were highly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic ($3,000 Recovery Grant). The objective of the $3,000 Recovery Grant was to help small businesses in 'highly impacted industries' — those directly impacted by the restrictions and closures put in place under the Public Health Orders — to meet the costs of safely reopening or scaling up operations.
The eligibility criteria for the $3,000 Recovery Grant required that a small business be in a highly impacted industry, demonstrate that it was significantly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic by declaring a significant decline in turnover, and had costs associated with reopening under the 'COVID-Safe' requirements.
NSW Treasury and Service NSW implemented both grants on behalf of the NSW Government. The process of applying for a grant was intended to be quick and easy, with Service NSW using automated assessments and simple online application forms to process applications. Applicants applied for the $10,000 Support Grant through the Service NSW website between 14 April 2020 to 30 June 2020 and applied for the $3,000 Small Business Recovery Grant between 1 July 2020 and 31 August 2020.
At May 2021, around $520 million has been paid to over 52,500 grant applicants under the $10,000 Support Grant and around $109 million had been paid to around 36,700 grant applicants under the $3,000 Recovery Grant.
The Audit Office plans to undertake a performance audit into grants administration for disaster relief focussing on bushfire grants in 2021–22.
This audit assessed whether the grants funded under the $750 million Small Business Support Fund were effectively administered and implemented to provide disaster relief. It addressed the following questions:
- Were funded grants programs planned, designed and targeted effectively?
- Were funded grants programs implemented in line with the objectives and criteria and delivery requirements?
- Have agencies established measures to monitor intended benefits and outcomes?
This audit did not seek to assess the effectiveness of any other grant programs or stimulus measures. It also did not seek to assess the impact of the funding on applicants, or the future prospects of small businesses that received support.
ConclusionNSW Treasury and Service NSW effectively implemented two grants within required timeframes reflecting the NSW Government's decision to deliver urgent financial support to small businesses impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. The $10,000 Support Grant and the $3,000 Recovery Grant have provided around $630 million in one-off grant payments to eligible small businesses.NSW Treasury met urgent timeframes to design the grants and Service NSW made timely payments in line with the grants' objectives and eligibility criteria.NSW Treasury met urgent timeframes to provide advice to the NSW Government on the grant design, proposed delivery partner, expected numbers of eligible businesses and the suitability of the proposed grant payment amount within the required timeframes. This was achieved within one day for the $10,000 Support Grant and within four days for the $3,000 Support Grant. In the context of the complex and changing pandemic and economic conditions between March and July 2020, NSW Treasury's advice to government outlined the risk, feasibility, expected demand estimates and assumptions for the grants. NSW Treasury's demand projections were limited by uncertainty as to the pandemic's economic impact. Estimated demand for the grants was not met, resulting in around $120 million from the Small Business Support Fund remaining unspent. Service NSW met urgent timeframes to stand-up both grants: 11 days for the $10,000 Support Grant and 26 days for the $3,000 Recovery Grant. It met agreed delivery requirements and made timely payments to small businesses in line with the grants' objectives and eligibility criteria. Over 65,000 businesses have received a payment under either grant, and over 23,000 businesses received both grants. Gaps in project and risk management processes were expected given the tight timeframe to implement the grants.The tight timeframe in which the agencies had to implement the grants contributed to gaps in project and risk management. The agencies advised that compromises were understood by both parties and were a necessary trade-off to ensure payments were made quickly. Service NSW and the Department of Customer Service have acted to strengthen their processes to detect and minimise fraud in response to identified external fraud risks and to investigate suspected fraudulent applications since the grants commenced. Service NSW intends to further enhance fraud controls for grants applications and payments for future grants by implementing a fraud control framework by December 2021. The agencies regularly monitored and reported on the timeliness of payments to small business applicants but have not yet measured all benefits of the grants programs.Service NSW and NSW Treasury established processes to monitor and report on the timeliness of payments to grant applicants. NSW Treasury has not yet measured all intended impacts of the grants, nor undertaken processes to obtain detailed feedback from grant recipients. Without these measures, there is limited insight into the extent to which the grants helped to support small businesses or ability to capture lessons which could be applied in future grants programs. NSW Treasury advises that an evaluation will commence from mid-2021. |
1. Key findings
Around $630 million in timely one-off grant payments have been made to small businesses
Service NSW and NSW Treasury have paid around $630 million in one-off grant payments to small businesses via two grants administered under the $750 million Small Business Support Fund. At May 2021:
- around $520 million has been paid to over 52,500 grant applications received for the $10,000 Small Business Support Grant ($10,000 Support Grant)
- around $109 million has been paid to 36,700 grant applications received for the $3,000 Small Business Recovery Grant ($3,000 Recovery Grant).
Across both grants, over 65,000 small businesses received a payment across either grant, and over 23,000 businesses received payments under both grants.
NSW Treasury advise that, while no data was collected on the time to pay applicants for the $10,000 Support Grant, from its monitoring of the grants' outputs it was satisfied that payment timeframes met its expectations. Service NSW met its targeted time to pay applicants with payments made within ten days for the $3,000 Recovery Grant.
Funds for both grants were not fully spent due to limitations in data and uncertainty of the COVID-19 pandemic's impact. At May 2021, the final demand for the $10,000 Support Grant was around 30 per cent less than initially anticipated and the final demand for the $3,000 Recovery Grant was around 40 per cent less than initially anticipated.
NSW Treasury developed proposals establishing high level design and delivery expectations within rapid timeframes
NSW Treasury put forward proposals to the NSW Government for the two grants administered under the $750 million Small Business Support Fund. It met rapid timeframes for producing this advice: within one day for the $10,000 Support Grant and within four days for the $3,000 Recovery Grant. NSW Treasury's advice to the NSW Government on how to best target the total funding, eligibility criteria and the feasibility of delivering the grants through Service NSW was based on comparable grants programs – including the $10,000 Small Business Bushfire Support Grant – which at that time were ongoing.
The proposals established, at a high-level, the rationale for the grants, expected financial costs, risks and analysis on budget impacts, and confirmation that Service NSW could deliver the grants applications platform. NSW Treasury's demand projections were uncertain due to limited data in the early stages of the pandemic regarding potential economic impact.
Given the tight timeframes, the proposals did not fully consider all planning and design aspects for both grants. For example, there was minimal identification of the costs and benefits of the programs, and a lack of detailed design and delivery requirements. The proposals outlined that arrangements to finalise the risk management, controls, and auditing plan would be agreed by Service NSW and NSW Treasury before implementation.
In future circumstances where urgent advice on program design is required, NSW Treasury could set clearer expectations for the delivery agency, including fully considering costs, benefits and delivery requirements that could be carried through to project governance and implementation.
Service NSW implemented both grants in line with delivery expectations
Service NSW met urgent timeframes to stand-up both grants: 11 days for the $10,000 Support Grant and 26 days for the $3,000 Recovery Grant. Delivery expectations for each grant were established under a grant project agreement (grant agreement). Service NSW delivered the online application platform, assessment of applications, payments and reporting of the grants' uptake as per the grant agreements.
The urgent timeframes to deliver the grants contributed to gaps in Service NSW's project and risk management processes throughout the lifecycle of both grants. For example, the requirement to meet pressing timeframes for the $10,000 Support Grant launch meant agencies had reduced time to achieve sign-off on key documentation. As a result, important documents and processes – including the grant agreement, risk documentation and key business process and quality assurance processes – were not finalised ahead of launch.
Quality assurance and compliance processes for detecting fraud were not settled until after the conclusion of the applications for the $10,000 Support Grant, and were not completed until late 2020. Some project documents, including risk registers, communication plans and project briefs are still not finalised.
The longer timeframe to develop the $3,000 Recovery Grant meant that agencies were able to build on their understanding of the implementation requirements from the $10,000 Support Grant, and better document these expectations and understanding while ensuring that key documents and sign-offs were in place prior to launch.
Service NSW tightened its risk management and controls in response to evidence of fraudulent applications
In May 2020, Service NSW and the Department of Customer Service (DCS) were alerted to suspected fraudulent activity within grants administered by Service NSW. Initially, Service NSW anticipated that up to $8.8 million of the $10,000 Support Grant was at risk of exposure to fraudulent applications. However, Service NSW reported that, at April 2021, $1.9 million for the $10,000 Support Grant and $254,000 for the $3,000 Recovery Grant from paid applications were at risk of fraud exposure.
Following an internal review of the potential exposure to fraudulent or ineligible applications, Service NSW implemented additional automated security checks on applications, increased manual assessments of grant applications, established a dedicated taskforce for grants administration and engaged a unit within DCS to manage high-risk investigations.
Service NSW and DCS's increased governance and oversight has resulted in an established case management function, increased referrals to law enforcement, prioritised investigations of suspicious applications and the development of a 'Fraud Control Framework' aimed at addressing external fraud risks. Given Service NSW had limited experience in these processes in context of administering grant payments, such actions were an appropriate response.
Security checks and investigations of suspicious applications are ongoing. Service NSW will not know the full extent of fraud across the grants until these processes have been fully completed.
Service NSW and Department of Customer Service can improve how conflicts of interest are managed for future programs
Compliance with agency policies and processes to manage conflicts of interest and financial subdelegations demonstrates that investment decisions are being made by appropriately skilled and experienced staff, allowing agencies to operate efficiently, and reducing the risk of internal fraud.
DCS was unable to produce employee conflicts of interest declarations for the $10,000 Support Grant. Therefore, it is not known how many employees had completed conflicts of interest declarations for this round.
DCS provided information on conflicts of interest declarations for the $3,000 Recovery Grant. Twenty-nine per cent of declarations provided for employees undertaking grant assessments for the $3,000 Recovery Grant were incomplete at March 2021, and a further nine per cent were not finalised even though they indicated a real, potential or perceived conflict.
For future grants programs, ensuring compliance with conflicts of interest policies would help DCS and Service NSW to have greater confidence that conflicts of interest are appropriately identified and managed.
NSW Treasury has not yet measured all benefits or outcomes of the grants
In April 2021, NSW Treasury updated its evaluation plan for the $10,000 Support Grant and $3,000 Recovery Grant in support of an economic evaluation to commence from mid-2021. The updated evaluation plan outlines inputs, activities, and outputs as well as immediate, short term and medium term outcomes for both grants.
The evaluation will consider the extent to which both grants achieved their intended outcomes, and whether the economic benefits exceeded the costs to help inform decisions about the nature and design of any future small business support programs. This will complement, and feed into a broader review of all NSW Government COVID-19 stimulus measures.
Service NSW rapidly developed an approach to administer the grants
Over recent disasters, such as the 2019–20 bushfires and the COVID-19 pandemic, Service NSW has been responsible for administering grant programs on behalf of other government agencies.
Service NSW implemented both grants under its Project Management Framework and under each grant agreement with NSW Treasury as it does not have its own grants administration framework. To address the risks that emerged during delivery, Service NSW developed an approach to standardise and monitor the administration of the grants while they were being implemented.
Service NSW now has an opportunity to establish a grants administration framework, based on the processes, lessons and outcomes captured under the grants administration taskforce and in developing its fraud control framework. Embedding these processes into business as usual for grants administration will enable Service NSW to have a consistent set of expectations for controls, business processes and governance and probity requirements for future grants it implements.
2. Recommendations
By December 2021, NSW Treasury should:
1. finalise and implement an evaluation of the $10,000 Support Grant and $3,000 Recovery Grant, including obtaining direct feedback from businesses on how grant funds achieved the grant objectives.
By December 2021, Service NSW should:
2. develop a grants administration framework, which documents expected controls – including fraud controls – business processes and governance and probity requirements
3. publish information on all grants programs, including grants distribution and uptake.
By December 2021, the Department of Customer Service should:
4. ensure its process for managing conflicts of interest meets policy requirements by:
- ensuring employees promptly declare any real, potential or perceived conflicts of interest
- annually producing a list of conflicts of interest for records retention purposes
- requiring a separate register of conflicts of interest declarations where a grant program is deemed as high risk.
3. Lessons for grants administered within urgent timeframes
The two grants this audit examined were administered within a context of urgent timeframes, and increased complexity and uncertainty about the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The following lessons are shared to assist sponsor and delivery agencies in administering future grants where rapid implementation is required.
Sponsor agencies should consider the following lessons:
1. develop an approach to define and measure benefits for rapidly developed programs and projects where a full business case and cost-benefit analysis is not feasible
2. establish common processes and expectations for co-administered grants:
- periodically assure agencies' capability to deliver grants programs
- agree and establish risk appetite statements with administering agencies
- clearly establish expected performance levels and targets under any agreement
3. review the processes and outcomes of rapidly developed programs, capture lessons learned, and apply these in planning and delivering future programs.
Delivery agencies should consider the following lessons:
1. risk management and risk appetite:
- perform robust assessment procedures to ensure risks associated with delivery of the project are identified
- ensure the controls implemented adequately address identified risks
- agree and document the acceptable risk appetite at the outset
- review risk management processes after the grants are issued when unable to finalise risk management processes ahead of launch
2. grant agreements between NSW public sector agencies:
- ensure agreements are finalised in a timely manner
- ensure agreements clearly outline:
- roles and responsibilities of both parties,
- changes in scope of services provided
- fees and charges applicable
3. frameworks for grants administration:
- ensure that there is a common set of expectations in place to guide grants administration including standard controls and processes for managing risk, capturing lessons learned and reporting on outcomes.
Appendix one – Response from agencies
Appendix three – Public Health Orders
Appendix four – Highly impacted industries
Appendix five – About the audit
Appendix six – Performance auditing
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #352 - released (24 June 2021).
Acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia
The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, has today released a report on Transport for NSW’s (TfNSW) acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue in Camellia.
This audit, which was requested on 17 November 2020 by the Hon. Andrew Constance MP, the Minister for Transport and Roads, examined:
- whether TfNSW conducted an effective process to purchase 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia
- whether TfNSW has effective processes and procedures to identify and acquire property required to deliver the NSW Government’s major infrastructure projects.
The audit found that TfNSW conducted an ineffective process when it purchased 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia. The audit also found that TfNSW’s internal policies and procedures to guide the transaction were, and continue to be, insufficient.
The Auditor-General has made seven recommendations to address the issues identified in the report.
On 17 November 2020, the Hon. Andrew Constance MP, the Minister for Transport and Roads, requested this audit under section 27B(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983.
On 15 June 2016, Transport for New South Wales (TfNSW) acquired 6.3 hectares of land at 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia, by agreement from Grand 4 Investments Pty Ltd. Grand 4 Investments was a business entity established by the owners of Billbergia Pty Ltd, a property development and investment company.
TfNSW paid Grand 4 Investments $53.5 million and assumed liability for addressing environmental issues and contamination associated with the site. This took place seven months after the vendor acquired the land as part of a competitive Expression of Interest process, in which TfNSW also participated, for $38.15 million.
TfNSW is the NSW Government agency responsible for most major transport infrastructure projects in New South Wales. TfNSW acquired the Camellia site for use as a stabling and maintenance depot to support the Parramatta Light Rail (PLR) project.
Consistent with the minister’s request, this audit assessed:
- whether TfNSW conducted an effective process to purchase 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia
- whether TfNSW has effective processes and procedures to identify and acquire property required to deliver the NSW Government’s major infrastructure projects.
In considering the effectiveness of the processes for this purchase, the audit considered:
- the requirements of the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (the Act)
- the application of sound processes to manage risk to the NSW Government and to achieve value for money
- the application of disciplines associated with complex procurement, such as probity, in a NSW Government context.
The acquisition of the 4–6 Grand Avenue site in Camellia was consistent with a 2014 feasibility study for the PLR, but occurred before the completion of detailed project planning or an acquisition strategy.
TfNSW made two attempts to acquire the 4–6 Grand Avenue site in Camellia, and was successful on the second attempt. TfNSW recognised the risks associated with early acquisition and had high-level strategies in place should the site not be required.
The specific site had been identified in a feasibility study for the PLR commissioned by TfNSW in 2014 as one of several options in Camellia for a stabling and maintenance depot. However, TfNSW had not done any substantive analysis of the various options to identify a preferred location before the two opportunities to acquire 4–6 Grand Avenue were brought to TfNSW’s attention by the landowners (or their agents). On both occasions, TfNSW chose to actively pursue acquisition in advance of any such analysis.
The acquisition was also not informed by a Property Acquisition Strategy, which TfNSW policy recommends in order to guide the process and manage acquisition specific risks.
In 2015, TfNSW identified that it would require a stabling and maintenance depot in the Camellia area for the Parramatta Light Rail
In 2014, TfNSW commissioned an external engineering consultancy to undertake a feasibility design study for the Parramatta Light Rail - the Parramatta Transport Corridor Strategy Feasibility Design study (herein referred to as ‘the feasibility study’). In early 2015, TfNSW received the feasibility study, which was one of several key sources that informed the development of business cases for the PLR.
The feasibility study recommended that TfNSW should consolidate the maintenance and cleaning operations with overnight stabling facilities on one site. The study noted that the optimal location for any such site would be in close proximity to the proposed network, and noted that the site must have access to road connections to accommodate access for cars and trucks.
The study found that a centrally located stabling and maintenance facility would be required for all routes serving the Parramatta CBD, and that the Camellia industrial area was a preferred location for such a facility. The study noted that the Camellia area was contaminated.
The feasibility study notes that its conclusions were based on assumptions about the light rail system adopted and decisions made by the future operator of the system, who had not yet been selected or appointed.
TfNSW's decision to progress a potential acquisition in 2015 considered the risk that the site may not be required
TfNSW's FIC was responsible for making decisions on funding allocations at a whole of program level within TfNSW. FIC was also responsible for approving ‘high-risk/high-value’ variations to program budgets. Members of the FIC included:
- Secretary of Transport for NSW
- Deputy Secretary, Infrastructure and Services
- Deputy Secretary, Freight, Strategy and Planning
- Deputy Secretary, Customer Services
- Deputy Secretary Finance and Investment
- Deputy Secretary People and Corporate Services.
An April 2015 submission, from the then Deputy Director-General to the agency’s FIC, sought authorisation and funding approval to participate in an Expression of Interest sale process. It noted the risk that the project may not go ahead. The submission advised that:
By acquiring a strategic site now, it reduces the risk of having to pay an improved value or a value that may be subject to rapidly improving land values due to changes in land use and rezoning.
The property can be acquired for the project, held strategically and income generated by leasing the site as hardstand 1 space until the project requires the land for the Parramatta Light Rail project.
If the project does not proceed in the medium to longer term, the property can be sold at a premium to what has been paid today as property fundamentals improve.
This submission acknowledged the risks associated with environmental contamination and proposed that these risks would be managed by negotiating a contract where the remediation and associated expenses would be at the landowner’s cost.
TfNSW assessed the 4–6 Grand Avenue site as one of several sites in Camellia that was a feasible location for a stabling and maintenance facility
The Departmental feasibility study assessed six potential sites for a stabling and maintenance facility, including 4–6 Grand Avenue, noting strengths and weaknesses of each site. A different site on Grand Avenue was assessed as the ‘base case’ option (1 Grand Avenue). The study’s comments on the 4–6 Grand Avenue site included the following:
With an area of approximately 63,000m2, this site has sufficient space for a depot with the required stabling yard and maintenance facilities. The location allows for good road access and LRT [light rail transit] access would be from Grand Avenue, which may require a road crossing or signalised intersection. The site has been used for general industrial uses; however the land has been cleared and is currently undergoing remediation 2. The site is not affected by flooding based on one in 100-year flood data.
In early 2015, once the opportunity to acquire 4–6 Grand Avenue emerged, TfNSW commissioned a specific feasibility study of the 4–6 Grand Avenue site. The feasibility studies clearly documented the existence of environmental contamination. In April 2015, the report concluded:
Given the limitations of this report and within the parameters that have been set it is concluded that from a spatial and geographic perspective the site at 6 Grand Avenue would be suitable as a stabling and maintenance depot for the Parramatta light rail project. There are few engineering and environmental constraints that would affect the feasibility level analysis of this site and all issues identified, within this desk study, are considered to be resolvable. However this being said there is a significant amount of work necessary to reach the final layout and definition of the stabling and maintenance depot. There are numerous items which require further consideration and conformation; planning approvals could impose restrictions on building heights, noise mitigation measures, light and visual impact requirements all of which can have significant impacts on the spatial requirements of any stabling and maintenance depot.
The acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue was not informed by a Property Acquisition Strategy
For major projects, TfNSW typically requires the project team to complete a Property Acquisition Strategy, which is intended to guide both process as well as specific acquisition issues expected to be faced during the project. The Property Acquisition Strategy is not a mandated document but is a recommended tool to support property acquisition as part of major projects.
TfNSW did not have a Property Acquisition Strategy in place to guide the 2015 Expression of Interest process. On 6 November 2015, the then Project Director for the PLR project emailed the property team, noting a need to develop a Property Acquisition Strategy to close off the scoping design and preliminary business case.
In January 2016, TfNSW developed a draft Property Acquisition Strategy for the Parramatta Light Rail Project, although it was silent on the potential sites for the stabling and maintenance facility.
TfNSW focussed on 4–6 Grand Avenue because it was available and aligned to TfNSW's strategic interests
In early 2015, officials commenced monitoring the market for industrial real estate in the Camellia area and surrounds for possible sites for a stabling and maintenance facility.
In March 2015, then owner of the site, Akzo Nobel Pty Limited released the 4–6 Grand Avenue site through an Expression of Interest process managed by CBRE.
TfNSW’s then Deputy Director-General, Planning, sought approval from FIC to lodge an Expression of Interest up to $30.0 million. Approval was sought on the basis that it would ‘provide certainty for the Parramatta Light Rail project by allowing for a depot site in a suitable location and potentially avoid higher costs or longer timeframes associated with compulsory acquisition following completion of the project’s business case’. FIC approved the request at its meeting on 9 April 2015.
At this time, TfNSW had not conducted any analysis of financial or operational benefits and costs of the potential sites identified in earlier feasibility studies. TfNSW staff advised us that the decision to participate in the Expression of Interest process for 4–6 Grand Avenue was because it was available. There is no documentation substantiating this statement, which TfNSW staff provided verbally as part of this audit.
In November 2015, TfNSW was advised that it was unsuccessful in the Expression of Interest process and that Grand 4 Investments (a related entity of Billbergia) had purchased 4–6 Grand Avenue. TfNSW did not conduct any further analysis of alternative potential sites in Camellia between this date and commencing discussions with Grand 4 Investments in April 2016. In that time there had been some movement on other properties that were included in the feasibility study, including 37–39a Grand Avenue being under offer in September 2015.
In March 2016, TfNSW approached CBRE to organise a meeting with Grand 4 Investments. On 1 April 2016, TfNSW met with Grand 4 Investments.
TfNSW advises that a perceived benefit of the 4–6 Grand Avenue site was that it was not subject to other uses or leaseholds that would increase the cost of compulsory acquisition. Officers involved in the acquisition advised that other nominated sites in the feasibility study were subject to other uses or leaseholds.
2 Officers familiar with the acquisition could not confirm the nature of remediation being undertaken, but noted that the previous landowner had cleared buildings from the site, which may have been considered part of remediation.
TfNSW's independent valuation, which it commissioned and received after the acquisition, specifically excluded consideration of environmental contamination risk. As a result, TfNSW is exposed to the risk that the acquisition was not fully compliant with the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (the Act) because it did not use an accurate estimate of market value during negotiations. That said, the acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue by agreement was consistent with preferred processes described in the Act.
TfNSW acquired the site from the landowner by agreement, and this is consistent with provisions in the Act. Obtaining approval for compulsory acquisition should negotiations for agreement break down is also consistent with the Act. That said, TfNSW did not at any time assess whether a compulsory acquisition could have resulted in acquisition at a lower cost than what was negotiated by agreement.
Despite the high risks associated with the acquisition, TfNSW did not commission a formal valuation in time to inform the negotiation and purchase. Instead, TfNSW relied on internal advice to estimate market value, but did not obtain a formal valuation from those advisors. For high-risk transactions, the greater expertise and arm's-length independence of an external specialist valuer should be preferred over an agency's own staff.
On 15 June 2016, the settlement date for the acquisition, TfNSW commissioned a formal independent valuation of the site. On 23 November 2016, TfNSW received the final formal valuation report. By not obtaining a formal independent valuation of the property in advance of acquisition to inform the acquisition value, TfNSW exposed itself to non-compliance with the Act by not establishing the market value as the basis for the acquisition price. TfNSW also breached its own internal policies.
TfNSW instructed the valuer to conduct its valuation within the following parameters:
- Market valuation on an ‘as is’ basis – market value based on the methodology described in the Act. This approach valued the site at $25.0 million.
- Market valuation on a speculative development basis – market value based on the financial value of the vendor's intended use of the site which, in this case, involved leasing the site for industrial use. This approach valued the site at $52.0 million, and TfNSW advised us this valuation supported the purchase price.
- Disregard the impact of environmental contamination – TfNSW specifically instructed the independent valuer to disregard any known (or unknown) site contamination. As TfNSW knew of the significant environmental contamination affecting the site, this parameter resulted in a valuation that overstated the value of the site as it did not consider the cost of environmental remediation. The valuer applied this assumption for both market valuation approaches.
Additionally, as the independent valuer completed the valuation after the purchase was finalised, there is a risk that the valuation may have been influenced by the known purchase price.
TfNSW's failure to acquire a formal valuation and an assessment of the financial impact of environmental remediation before it purchased 4–6 Grand Avenue represents ineffective administration and governance.
TfNSW acquired the site at a time when there was demand and increasing prices for industrial property in the area. However, TfNSW did not effectively assess and manage the risks associated with the acquisition, and gaps in process led to increased risk. Briefings to decision-makers did not contain important information, and we found no evidence that gaps in advice were queried or explored by decision-makers.
TfNSW did not have plans or advice in place to assist in managing risk, such as:
- a property acquisition plan
- a comprehensive and up-to-date risk management plan
- a negotiation strategy, or any authorisation limit or minimal acceptable position
- an independent professional evaluation
- external expert advice (with the exception of legal advice relating to the contract of sale).
TfNSW was aware of contamination issues affecting the land and had access to considerable information about the environmental conditions, such as site environmental audit reports and information on the NSW Environment Protection Authority's contaminated land register. However, TfNSW had not analysed specific technical information about the contamination and therefore was not aware of the risk implications and cost for remediation. Despite this, TfNSW changed its position from not accepting the risks and costs of contamination, to acquiring the site unconditionally. The basis for this decision is unclear and undocumented.
Briefing to senior leaders on the acquisition was silent on a number of important matters that would have been important for approvers to consider, including:
- an explanation of the 40 per cent increase in purchase price between November 2015 and May 2016, and a 165 per cent increase from TfNSW’s offer in April 2015
- the contamination risks associated with the site and an evidence-based estimate of potential costs to remediate the site
- advice that an independent valuation had not been obtained, inconsistent with TfNSW policy.
Consideration of the acquisition by FIC was based on a summary business paper and was managed out-of-session, thereby removing the ability for comprehensive consideration of the acquisition proposal and its risks.
The probity management controls and assurances in place for the acquisition of the 4–6 Grand Avenue site were insufficient. These insufficiencies were exacerbated by the probity risk profile of the transaction.
The 4–6 Grand Avenue acquisition was a high-risk/high-value transaction, undertaken in a volatile property market in a short timeframe under pressure from Grand 4 Investments. TfNSW was engaging in a direct negotiation in advance of detailed planning for the acquisition, or the PLR as a whole. These circumstances contribute to heightened probity risk.
TfNSW did not establish a probity plan and sought no probity support throughout the acquisition. Also, with one exception, the staff involved in the acquisition did not complete conflict of interest declarations.
TfNSW was aware of the potential for probity or integrity issues with the transaction when it commissioned an internal audit in connection with the transaction in 2019. Internal discussions considered whether a misconduct investigation may be more appropriate, however no such investigation was undertaken.
TfNSW's insufficient probity practices, in addition to its failure to keep complete or comprehensive records of negotiations or decisions, reduce transparency of the process and its outcome and expose TfNSW to a greater risk of misconduct, corruption and maladministration.
At the time of the transaction, the TfNSW policy framework was not sufficiently risk-focussed and did not provide clarity on when officers ought to apply specific guidance or procedures. TfNSW's policies and procedures are more focussed on acquiring land to meet project needs and timeframes, and less on assuring value for money and managing risks.
At the time of its acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue, TfNSW had property acquisitions policies and procedures in place. Each of these were broadly sound in their content and intent. However, they lacked specificity on how or when to apply guidance, and when risk levels should elevate the importance of recommended guidance.
TfNSW's key guidance was principles based and relied on agency staff using their experience and expertise to apply guidance according to the circumstances of an individual transaction. This guidance was not duly applied in the acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia. In addition, TfNSW does not have quality or control assurance to identify when TfNSW officers did not apply important policies or processes.
The primary focus of the TfNSW’s property acquisition guidance is to achieve vacant possession of land in a timeframe that meets the need of the relevant transport project. There is less specific focus on the need to meet the requirements of the NSW Government financial management framework.
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Performance auditing
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Parliamentary reference - Report number #349 - released (18 May 2021).
Property Asset Utilisation
Property NSW’s effectiveness in managing NSW Government owned and leased commercial office property is limited in three areas according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford.
At 30 June 2018, the NSW Government owned $160 billion worth of land and buildings. The NSW Treasury predicts this figure will rise over the coming years. Property NSW manages more than 900 leased office properties across the state. Approximately 250 of these are owned by Property NSW. Other NSW Government agencies maintain ownership and control of properties considered essential for service provision, such as schools, prisons and hospitals. Between 2012–13 and 2017–18 sales of property assets across the whole of the NSW Government have raised $10 billion, of which Property NSW has sold property assets of approximately $2 billion.
In September 2012, the Property Asset Utilisation Taskforce (the Taskforce) released its report on ‘real property asset management across government’ and concluded that the government has accumulated, over time, ‘a real property asset portfolio it cannot afford to maintain or protect’. The Taskforce noted that ‘a lack of centralised information seriously inhibits any whole-of-government strategic asset planning’ and that maintaining under-utilised or unnecessary properties diverted funds from areas where they might be better used. The Taskforce’s key findings included:
- the NSW Government should own property only as a means to deliver or enhance services
- many government properties were under-utilised, poorly maintained and inappropriate to support service delivery.
The Taskforce recommended the creation of Property NSW, as a replacement for the State Property Authority, to improve property asset utilisation and to drive efficiencies in the government’s owned and leased property portfolio. Property NSW was to achieve these goals by:
- collating property information across the whole-of-government
- working with agencies on longer-term strategic real property asset planning to:
- provide services to agencies as customers
- bring a whole-of-government perspective to real property asset planning.
In response to the Taskforce report, in December 2012, the Premier's Memorandum M2012-20 (the Memorandum) established Property NSW to improve the management of the NSW Government's owned and leased real property portfolio.
Under the Memorandum, Property NSW is responsible for:
- management of all leased and owned commercial office accommodation
- acting as the central acquisition and disposal agency
- providing advice to the government on property matters and developing property policy
- conducting regular and ongoing reviews of agencies portfolios, working with agencies to identify efficiencies to improve service delivery, in relation to the review of capital planning1
- maintaining the register of all government owned property.
The Memorandum states that ownership of all commercial office property should be vested in Property NSW.
This audit assessed whether Property NSW is effective in the management of NSW Government owned and leased commercial office property. To do this we assessed whether NSW Government leased commercial office space is being effectively utilised and whether the Government Property Register, a register of all government owned property, is accurate and up-to-date.
In December 2017, Property NSW started working across the NSW Government to help agencies identify real property assets, including commercial office properties, that are under-utilised or surplus and that could be recycled, repurposed, or vested to Property NSW.
1 Capital Planning was previously referred to as Total Asset Management (TAM).
By December 2019, Property NSW should:
- combine the results of property portfolio reviews to produce a whole-of-government picture of the NSW Government property portfolio
- devise a strategy and plan to recycle or repurpose under-utilised properties using a whole-of-government picture of the NSW Government property portfolio
- develop and report on indicators for progress in reducing the number and value of under-utilised properties at the whole-of-government level, referencing progress against an accurate baseline stocktake.
By December 2019, Property NSW should:
4. improve the data held on government owned and leased properties by combining and automating data feeds to construct a single, consolidated and accurate whole-of-government property data set.
By December 2019, Property NSW should:
5. document and communicate to stakeholders how its assessment criteria inform key decisions including agency relocations, lease renewals and rectifying under-utilisation
6. include customer satisfaction measures in its annual reports and reviews, in accordance with the requirements set out in the Premier's Memorandum M2012-20
7. improve record-keeping and compliance with the State Records Act 1998 and the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation Records Management Policy.
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - Audit Office response
Appendix three - About the audit
Appendix four - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #312 - released 18 December 2018
Use of Purchasing Cards and Electronic Payment Methods
NSW government agencies are not making sufficient use of purchasing cards and EFTs to pay for goods and services. There are potential savings in processing costs of around $22 per transaction from purchasing cards and over $7 when using EFTs instead of cheques.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #243 - released 5 June 2014
Managing Gifts and Benefits
Overall, the audited entities are managing some aspects of gifts and benefits effectively but other aspects require improvement. We found that all five entities had gifts and benefits policies that addressed some but not all of the attributes of a sound policy. All five have communicated their gifts and benefits policies to staff and external stakeholders, although in each case we identified opportunities to better communicate their policies.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #228 - released 27 March 2013
Purchasing Hospital Supplies: Follow-up of 2002 Performance Audit
Periodically we review the extent to which agencies have changed their practices as a result of our audits. This gives Parliament and the public an update on the extent of progress made.
In this follow-up audit, we examine changes following our September 2002 report, to assess whether NSW Health has improved its buying of hospital supplies using electronic systems.
NSW Health spends over $1.3 billion on hospital supplies. It is the largest expenditure area after employee costs. Reform of this area has the potential to make significant savings that could be redirected to frontline services.
As part of our series of audits in the area of e-government, our previous audit looked closely at the extent to which technology was being used to deliver potentially major savings in purchasing hospital supplies. This is a key area of so-called “process re-engineering” in the “e” field, and NSW Health provided an ideal case study.
Whilst implementing large-scale e-procurement has many technical aspects, it is not chiefly a technical issue. The key requirements for success reside in effective change management, in particular being clear as to who has the authority to make change decisions and be held accountable.
This audit looks at NSW Health’s successes to date, and its frustrations and challenges in making further progress in this field. Many of the issues raised in this report may provide lessons for any agency that is seeking to drive a significant change program.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #145 - released 23 November 2005
Oversight of State Owned Electricity Corporations
Issues of corporate governance have long been a matter for concern in the private sector. Following recent corporate collapses and scandals, legislators and regulators in a number of countries have focused on strengthening governance in publicly traded corporations. Considerable attention has been given to setting clear expectations for the performance of boards and for the disclosure of information to various stakeholders.
Good governance is no less important in the public sector.
Indeed issues of oversight and accountability may be more complex in the public sector, particularly in government businesses. There are more stakeholders involved (portfolio Ministers, shareholder Ministers, Parliament and central agencies) and there are competing – and potentially conflicting - objectives (financial, social, environmental, etc).
Because of these potential conflicts, it is important that Boards understand what government expects of them. Some of these expectations reflect the government’s regulatory role in areas such as safety, pricing and ensuring consumers receive essential services. Some expectations reflect the government’s role as a business owner.
Having a clear separation of regulatory expectations from ownership expectations is essential if boards are to be accountable for their performance on both aspects. To assist in this separation, New South Wales (like many other jurisdictions) has adopted the concept of ‘shareholder Ministers’ – as distinct from the portfolio Minister – to exercise the ownership function.
This report looks more closely at a particular area - how the State conducts itself as the owner of the State owned electricity corporations. This is an important issue as the State’s (ie taxpayers’) equity in these businesses is worth over $9 billion. Managing the risks associated with continuing ownership of these businesses is an essential aspect of good governance.
Although the audit focuses on the State’s holdings in the electricity sector, its findings and recommendations have relevance for all State owned corporations.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #144 - released 19 October 2005
Implementing Asset Management Reforms
Hospitals, schools, public housing, roads, bridges, buses and trains are just some of the assets used by government in providing services to citizens.
The NSW Government’s asset base is impressive in size - with a value of around $167 billion and with government plans to spend around $8 billion acquiring or replacing assets in the current year. Another $2 billion is spent each year on maintenance.
Good asset management is very important to government; even a small efficiency gain in this area can provide significant returns. Good practice by those responsible for managing assets can improve reliability, extend asset life, save on maintenance costs and aid in identifying and disposing of unnecessary or non-performing assets.
Improving the NSW public sector’s approach to asset management has been on the reform agenda for at least a decade. Changes in practice have been accelerated more recently by integrating asset management policy with the budget process.
In this audit we examined NSW Treasury’s efforts to improve asset management practices in the public sector and the progress made by 3 agencies - the Department of Corrective Services, NSW Fire Brigades and the Powerhouse Museum - towards better managing their asset portfolios.
This report informs Parliament and the community on progress to date and what more needs to be done to ensure that agencies manage assets effectively and achieve best value.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #143 - released 12 October 2005
Follow-up of Performance Audit: Bus Maintenance and Bus Contracts
Periodically we review the extent to which agencies have implemented the recommendations they accepted from our earlier audits.
This gives Parliament and the public an update on the extent of progress made.
In this follow-up audit, we examine changes following our May 2002 report on how well the:
- State Transit Authority maintained its buses
- Ministry of Transport administered contracts for the provision of regular passenger bus services.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #138 - released 14 June 2005
