Roads and Maritime Services and Transport for NSW have deployed many controls to protect traffic management systems but these would have been only partially effective in detecting and preventing incidents and unlikely to support a timely response. There was a potential for unauthorised access to sensitive information and systems that could have disrupted traffic.
 
Until Roads and Maritime Services’ IT disaster recovery site is fully commissioned, a disaster involving the main data centre is likely to lead to higher congestion in the short-term as traffic controllers would be operating on a regional basis without the benefit of the Traffic Management Centre.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #248 - released 21 January 2015

Between 2004 and 2006, the number of signalling failures, signalling downtime and the number of trains delayed as a result of signal failures all fell. RailCorp’s on-time running performance improved over the same period. The fall in failures is a clear indication of improved performance. Changes in the definition of on-time and to the timetable during 2005 and 2006 however make it difficult to determine whether improvements in response downtime and signalling delays are due to a true performance improvement. To build upon this strong base, RailCorp needs to determine with more confidence the number and duration of signalling failures the network can tolerate without impacting on service levels.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #170 - released 15 August 2007