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Published

Actions for Flood housing response

Flood housing response

Planning
Whole of Government
Community Services
Premier and Cabinet
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration

What this report is about

Extreme rainfall across eastern Australia in 2021 and 2022 led to a series of major flood events in New South Wales.

This audit assessed how effectively the NSW Government provided emergency accommodation and temporary housing in response to the early 2022 Northern Rivers and late 2022 Central West flood events.

Responsible agencies included in this audit were the Department of Communities and Justice, NSW Reconstruction Authority, the former Department of Planning and Environment, the Department of Regional NSW and the Premier’s Department.

Findings

The Department of Communities and Justice rapidly provided emergency accommodation to displaced persons immediately following these flood events.

There was no plan in place to guide a temporary housing response and agencies did not have agency-level plans for implementing their responsibilities.

The NSW Government rapidly procured and constructed temporary housing villages. However, the amount of temporary housing provided did not meet the demand.

There is an extensive waitlist for temporary housing and the remaining demand in the Northern Rivers is unlikely to be met. The NSW Reconstruction Authority has not reviewed this list to confirm its accuracy.

Demobilisation plans for the temporary housing villages have been developed, but there are no long-term plans in place for the transition of tenants out of the temporary housing.

Agencies are in the process of evaluating the provision of emergency accommodation and temporary housing.

The findings from the 2022 State-wide lessons process largely relate to response activities.

Audit recommendations

The NSW Reconstruction Authority should:

  • Develop a plan for the provision of temporary housing.
  • Review the temporary housing waitlist.
  • Determine a timeline for demobilising the temporary housing villages.
  • Develop a strategy to manage the transition of people into long-term accommodation.
  • Develop a process for state-wide recovery lessons learned.

All audited agencies should:

  • Finalise evaluations of their role in the provision of emergency accommodation and temporary housing.
  • Develop internal plans for implementing their roles under state-wide plans.

Read the PDF report

Parliamentary reference - Report number #389 - released 22 February 2024

Published

Actions for Regional road safety

Regional road safety

Transport
Health
Community Services
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Project management
Risk

What this report is about

Around one-third of the state’s population lives in regional NSW, but deaths on regional roads make up around two-thirds of the state’s road toll.

Transport for NSW (TfNSW) is responsible for managing road safety outcomes across the NSW road network. This audit assessed the effectiveness of TfNSW’s delivery of road safety strategies, plans and policies in regional areas.

The NSW Road Safety Action Plan 2022–2026 has the stated goal of ‘no death or serious injury occurring on the road transport network’ by 2050.

What we found

There is a disproportionate amount of trauma on regional roads, but there are no specific road safety plans or trauma reduction targets for regional NSW.

TfNSW advises that the setting of state-wide road safety targets is consistent with other jurisdictions and international best practice. However, the proportion of road fatalities and serious injuries in regional NSW is almost the same as ten years ago.

There is no regional implementation plan to assist TfNSW to target the Road Safety Action Plan 2026 to regional areas.

TfNSW considers that local road safety outcomes should be managed by councils, but only 52% of regional councils participated in its Local Government Road Safety Program (LGRSP) in 2022–23. This program has not been updated since 2014, despite commitments to do so in 2021 and 2022.

TfNSW has not undertaken a systematic and integrated analysis of the combined impact of its road safety strategies and plans in regional NSW since 2012.

TfNSW reports against the Community Road Safety Fund (CRSF) annually but there is no consolidated, public reporting on total road safety funding allocated to regional NSW. The Fund underspend increased from 12% in 2019–20 to 20% in 2022–23.

What we recommended

We recommended TfNSW:

  • develop a regional implementation plan to support the NSW Road Safety Action Plan, including a framework to annually measure, analyse and publicly report on progress
  • develop a plan to measure and mitigate risks causing underspend in the CRSF
  • expedite the review of the LGRSP including recommendations to increase involvement of regional councils.

Disclosure of confidential information

Under the Government Sector Audit Act 1983 (the Act), the Auditor-General may disclose confidential information if, in the Auditor-General’s opinion, the disclosure is in the public interest, and that disclosure is necessary for the exercise of the Auditor-General’s functions.

Confidential information in the Act means Cabinet information or information subject to legal privilege. This performance audit report contained confidential information.

The NSW Premier has certified that in his opinion the disclosure of the confidential information was not in the public interest.

The confidential information has been redacted from this report.

Under section 36A(2) of the Government Sector Audit Act 1983, the Auditor-General may authorise the disclosure of confidential information if, in the Auditor-General’s opinion, the disclosure is in the public interest and necessary for the exercise of the Auditor-General’s functions. Confidential information under the Government Sector Audit Act 1983 means Cabinet information, or information that could be subject to a claim of privilege by the State or a public official in a court of law. This performance audit report contained confidential information which, in the opinion of the Auditor-General, is in the public interest to disclose and that disclosure is necessary for the exercise of the Auditor-General’s functions.

On 26 October 2023, pursuant to section 36A(2)(b) of the Government Sector Audit Act 1983, the Auditor-General notified the NSW Premier of the intention to include this information in the published report, having formed the opinion that its disclosure is in the public interest and is necessary for the exercise of the Auditor-General’s functions.

On 23 November 2023, pursuant to section 36A(2)(c) of the Government Sector Audit Act 1983, the NSW Premier certified that, in his opinion, the proposed disclosure of the confidential information contained in this report was not in the public interest. The Premier’s certificate follows. Section 36A(4) states that a certificate of the Premier that it is not in the public interest to disclose confidential information is conclusive evidence of that fact.

The issuance of the certificate by the NSW Premier prevents the publication of this information. The relevant sections of the report containing confidential information have been redacted.

One-third of the New South Wales population resides in regional areas, but two-thirds of the state’s road crash fatalities take place on regional roads.

Between 2017 and 2021, the average number of fatalities for every 100,000 of the population living in regional New South Wales was 8.33 — approximately four times higher than the equivalent measure for Greater Sydney. Similarly, the average number of serious injuries in regional New South Wales over the same period was 75.24 per 100,000 of the population, compared with 50.53 in Greater Sydney. Further, more than 70% of people who lose their lives in accidents on regional roads are residents of regional areas.

Residents of regional areas face particular transport challenges. They often need to travel longer distances for work, health care, or recreation purposes, yet their public transport options are more limited than metropolitan residents. Vehicle safety is also an issue. According to the NSW Road Safety Progress Report 2021, of the light vehicles registered in New South Wales that were manufactured in or after 2000, 48.4% of light vehicles in regional areas had a five-star Australasian New Car Assessment Program (ANCAP) rating, compared to 54.8% in metropolitan areas. Road conditions in regional areas can also be more challenging for drivers.

Regional New South Wales covers 98.5% of the total area of the state. The road network in New South Wales is vast — spanning approximately 200,000 kilometres.

The road network includes major highways, state roads and local roads. Speed limits range from 10 km/hr in high pedestrian shared zones, up to 110 km/hr on high volume and critical road corridors. Eighty per cent of the network has a 100 km/h speed limit, which is mostly applied as a default speed limit, regardless of the presence of safety features and treatments.

Speed is the primary causal factor in more crashes in New South Wales than any other factor, and car crashes in regional areas are more likely to be fatal because of the higher average speeds involved.

The responsibility for managing road safety outcomes across the entire New South Wales road network lies with Transport for NSW (TfNSW), pursuant to Schedule 1 of the Transport Administration Act 1988.

While its safety responsibilities are state-wide, TfNSW does not own or directly manage all of the road network in regional New South Wales, which spans approximately 200,000 kilometres. Approximately 80% of the roads are classified as Local Roads and are administered and managed by local councils. Local councils also maintain Regional Roads that run through their local government areas. TfNSW is responsible for managing State Roads (approximately 20% of roads), which are major arterial roads. It also provides funding for councils to manage over 18,000 km (approximately 10%) of state-significant Regional Roads.

According to TfNSW, between 2016 and 2020, there were 9,776 people killed or seriously injured on roads in regional New South Wales. Adding to the tragic loss of life, according to TfNSW, the estimated cost to the community between 2016 and 2020 resulting from regional road trauma and fatalities was around $13.7 billion.

TfNSW also noted that the ‘risk of road trauma is pervasive, and a combination of effective road safety measures is required to systematically reduce this risk’.

TfNSW released its first long-term road-safety strategy in December 2012, which introduced the goal of ‘Vision Zero’ — a long-term goal of zero deaths or serious injuries on NSW roads. The terminology was changed to ‘Towards Zero’ in the 2021 Road Safety Plan and has been retained in the NSW Road Safety Action Plan 2022–2026. Towards Zero has the stated goal of ‘no death or serious injury occurring on the road transport network’ by 2050.

The objective of this audit is to assess the effectiveness of TfNSW’s delivery of ‘Towards Zero’ in regional areas.

In making this assessment, the audit examined whether TfNSW:

  • is effectively reducing the number of fatalities and serious injuries on regional roads
  • has an effective framework, including governance arrangements, for designing and refreshing the NSW Road Safety Strategy 2012–2021 and the NSW Road Safety Action Plan 2022–2026
  • effectively makes use of whole-of-government and other relevant sources of data to support decision-making, and to evaluate progress and outcomes
  • effectively manages accountabilities, including roles and responsibilities, with respect to road safety outcomes and the use of data.

This audit focused on the policies and strategies used by TfNSW for managing road safety outcomes in regional areas. We did not evaluate individual road safety projects, programs and initiatives as part of this audit.

Whilst Regional Roads and Local Roads (as defined by the Road Network Classifications) are owned and maintained by local councils, we included these roads in this audit as TfNSW may advise and assist councils to promote and improve road safety, as well as manage grant programs that focus on improving road safety outcomes on these roads. Hereafter, unless otherwise stated, references to ‘regional roads’ refer to all classifications of roads in the state which are in regional New South Wales, irrespective of their ownership.

Local councils in regional areas are key stakeholders for the purposes of this audit, and we interviewed eight as part of the audit process (noting that this was not intended to be a representative sample). Road asset management by local councils is also out of scope for this audit as it is the focus of a subsequent performance audit by the Audit Office of New South Wales.b

The Audit Office of New South Wales has undertaken several performance audits relating to road safety since 2009 and these have been referenced while undertaking this audit. They include:

  • Condition of State Roads (August 2006)
  • Improving Road Safety: Heavy Vehicles (May 2009)
  • Improving Road Safety: School Zones (March 2010)
  • Improving Road Safety: Speed Cameras (July 2011)
  • Regional Assistance Programs (May 2018)
  • Mobile speed cameras (October 2018)
  • Rail freight and Greater Sydney (October 2021).

Conclusion

TfNSW has acknowledged that there is a disproportionate amount of road trauma on regional roads in the NSW Road Safety Strategy 2012–2021, the NSW Road Safety Plan 2021, and the NSW Road Safety Action Plan 2022–2026. However, TfNSW has not articulated or evaluated a strategy for implementing road safety policy in regional New South Wales to assist in guiding targeted activities to address regional road trauma. There is also no transparency about the total amount of funding invested in improving road safety outcomes for regional New South Wales.

People living in regional New South Wales make up one-third of the state’s population, but deaths on regional roads make up around two-thirds of the state’s total road toll. This statistic is almost the same in 2023 as it was ten years ago when TfNSW released its first long-term road safety strategy.

More than 70% of people who died on roads between 2012 and 2022 in regional New South Wales were residents of regional areas. Speed is the greatest contributing factor to road fatalities and serious injuries across the entire state. However, it is responsible for more fatalities on regional roads (43%) than in Greater Sydney (34%).

TfNSW’s road safety strategies and plans acknowledge that most road fatalities occur in regional New South Wales but none of its existing strategies or plans show evidence of tailoring measures to suit particular regional settings or ‘hot spots’. There are infrastructure initiatives (such as Saving Lives on Country Roads) and behavioural programs targeting regional areas (such as Driver Reviver). However, these activities are not aligned to a regional-specific strategy or plan that addresses issues specific to regional areas.

TfNSW has state-wide responsibility for managing road safety outcomes. TfNSW advised the audit that a regional plan and regional trauma reduction targets are not needed as the state-wide plan and targets apply equally for all areas of New South Wales, and local road safety factors are best managed by local councils. TfNSW partners with local councils. However, only 52% of councils in regional New South Wales participate in TfNSW’s Local Government Road Safety Program, compared to 84% of councils in metropolitan areas. TfNSW has not undertaken any evaluations to determine whether projects completed under the Local Government Road Safety Program have reduced road trauma at the local level.

Notwithstanding the above points, TfNSW works with local councils (who are road authorities for local roads in their respective areas under the Roads Act 1993) and other key stakeholders such as the NSW Police Force to achieve the NSW Government’s road safety policy objectives.

TfNSW advised that ‘the setting of state-wide road safety targets is consistent with other jurisdictions and international best practice. Importantly, delivery of road safety countermeasures is tailored and applied with a focus on road user groups across all geographic locations to maximise trauma reductions’. There may be legitimate reasons for the existing approach, as articulated by TfNSW. However, the proportion of road fatalities in regional New South Wales roads has not reduced since 2012 – despite a long-term reduction in the overall number of deaths on the state’s roads between 2012–2021. The audit report has recommended that a regionally focused implementation plan could address this issue. TfNSW has accepted this report’s recommendation that such a plan be developed.

Specific road safety initiatives targeted to regional areas have not been implemented or expanded

Text removed pursuant to section 36A of the Government Sector Audit Act 1983 (NSW), in compliance with the issuance of a Premier’s certificate preventing the publication of this information.

TfNSW increased the use of other forms of automated enforcement (such as tripling enforcement hours in mobile speed cameras).
However, the use of automated enforcement has a strong metropolitan focus with most red light and fixed speed cameras being in metropolitan areas. Average speed cameras are the only camera type overwhelmingly located in regional areas but these apply only to heavy vehicles and are positioned on major freight routes. 

There is no consolidated, public reporting of what proportion of total road safety funding is directed to regional New South Wales each year. The main source of funding for road safety in New South Wales, the Community Road Safety Fund, has been underspent since 2019.

Fines from camera-detected speeding, red-light and mobile phone use offences are required to be used solely for road safety purposes through the Community Road Safety Fund (CRSF), as set out in the Transport Administration Amendment (Community Road Safety Fund) Act 2012.

The CRSF has been underspent every year since 2019–20. The underspend has increased from 12% in 2019–20 to 20% in 2022–23 where the full year underspend was forecasted to be $104 million. Of this underspend, $13.5 million was dedicated for regional road infrastructure projects. TfNSW advised the audit that much of the underspend is the result of delays to infrastructure projects due to COVID-19, bushfires, and floods, as well as skills shortages. However, TfNSW has not provided any evidence that it had a plan to mitigate these risks – meaning the level of underspend could continue to grow. TfNSW also advised ‘there is no reason to expect budget management and controls will not return to pre-COVID circumstances’.

In total, TfNSW received $700 million in funding for road safety in 2021–22 (including federal contributions and the Community Road Safety Fund). Of this, $411 million (or ~59%) was directed to regional New South Wales. This is the most recent comprehensive financial data that was provided by TfNSW to the audit team. The 2022–23 NSW Budget allocated $880 million for road safety in 2022–23, with a forecasted total allocation for road safety of $1.6 billion in recurrent expenses and $0.8 billion in capital expenditure over the period 2022–23 to 2025–26.

Appendix one – Response from Transport for NSW

Appendix two – The Safe Systems framework and NSW road safety strategies and plans

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #386 - released 30 November 2023

Published

Actions for State heritage assets

State heritage assets

Environment
Local Government
Planning
Compliance
Management and administration
Regulation
Risk

What the report is about

This audit assessed how effectively the Department of Planning and Environment (Heritage NSW) is overseeing and administering heritage assets of state significance.

Heritage that is rare, exceptional or outstanding to New South Wales may be listed on the State Heritage Register under the Heritage Act 1977. This provides assets with legal recognition and protection. Places, buildings, works, relics, objects and precincts can be listed, whether in public or private ownership.

Heritage NSW has administrative functions and regulatory powers, including under delegation from the Heritage Council of NSW, relevant to the listing, conservation and adaptive re-use of heritage assets of state significance.

In summary, the audit assessed whether Heritage NSW:

  • is effectively administering relevant advice and decisions
  • is effectively supporting and overseeing assets
  • has established clear strategic priorities and can demonstrate preparedness to implement these.

What we found

Heritage NSW does not have adequate oversight of state significant heritage assets, presenting risks to its ability to promote the objects of the Heritage Act.

Information gaps and weaknesses in quality assurance processes limit its capacity to effectively regulate activities affecting assets listed on the State Heritage Register.

Heritage NSW has adopted a focus on customer service and recently improved its timeliness in providing advice and making decisions about activities affecting listed assets. But Heritage NSW has not demonstrated how its customer-focused priorities will address known risks to its core regulatory responsibilities.

Listed assets owned by government entities are often of high heritage value. Heritage NSW could do more to promote effective heritage management among these entities.

What we recommended

The report made eight recommendations to Heritage NSW, focusing on:

  • improving quality assurance over advice and decisions
  • improving staff guidance and training
  • defining and maintaining data in the State Heritage Register
  • clarifying its regulatory intent and approach
  • sector engagement and interagency capability to support heritage outcomes.

The Heritage Act 1977 (the Heritage Act) and accompanying regulation provide the legal framework for the identification, conservation and adaptive re-use of heritage assets in New South Wales.

The Department of Planning and Environment (Heritage NSW) has responsibility for policy, legislative and program functions for state heritage matters, including supporting the Minister for Heritage to administer the Heritage Act.

Heritage assets that are rare, exceptional or outstanding beyond a local area or region may be listed on the State Heritage Register under the Heritage Act. These assets include places, buildings, works, relics, moveable objects and precincts, and assets that have significance to Aboriginal communities in New South Wales. Assets nominated for and listed on the State Heritage Register ('listed assets') may be owned privately or publicly, including by local councils and state government entities.

The Heritage Act establishes the Heritage Council of NSW (the Heritage Council) to undertake a range of functions in line with its objectives. Heritage NSW provides administrative support to the Heritage Council, for example providing advice on assets that have been nominated for listing on the State Heritage Register. Many of Heritage NSW’s core activities also relate to exercising functions and powers under delegation from the Heritage Council. These include making administrative decisions about works affecting listed assets, and exercising powers to regulate asset owners’ compliance with requirements under the Heritage Act.

Heritage NSW states that heritage:

…gives us a sense of our history and provides meaningful insights into how earlier generations lived and developed. It also enriches our lives and helps us to understand who we are.  

According to Heritage NSW, an effective heritage system will facilitate the community in harnessing the cultural and economic value of heritage.

The objective of this audit was to assess how effectively the Department of Planning and Environment (Heritage NSW) is overseeing and administering heritage assets of state significance.

For this audit, ‘heritage assets of state significance’ refers to items (including a place, building, work, relic, moveable object or precinct) listed on the State Heritage Register ('listed assets'), and those which have been nominated for listing.

Conclusion

The Department of Planning and Environment (Heritage NSW) does not have adequate oversight of state significant heritage assets. Information gaps and weaknesses in certain assurance processes limit its capacity to effectively regulate activities affecting assets listed on the State Heritage Register. These factors also constrain its ability to effectively support voluntary compliance and promote the objects of the Heritage Act, which include encouraging conservation and adaptive re-use.
Heritage NSW has adopted a focus on customer service and recently improved the timeliness of its advice and decisions on activities affecting listed assets. But Heritage NSW has not demonstrated how its customer service priorities will address known risks to its regulatory responsibilities. It could also do more to enable and promote effective heritage management among state government entities that own listed assets.

The information that Heritage NSW maintains about assets listed on the State Heritage Register ('listed assets') is insufficient for its regulatory and owner engagement purposes. Data quality and completeness issues have arisen since the register was established in 1999. But Heritage NSW's progress to address important gaps in the register, and its other information systems, has been limited in recent years. These gaps limit Heritage NSW’s capacity to detect compliance breaches early and implement risk-based regulatory responses, and to strategically target its owner engagement activities to promote conservation and re-use.

Heritage NSW makes decisions on applications for works on listed assets, requiring technical skills and professional judgement. But Heritage NSW does not provide its staff with adequate guidance to ensure that consistent approaches are used, and it lacks sufficient quality assurance processes. There are similar weaknesses in Heritage NSW's oversight of decisions on applications that are delegated to other government entities.

Heritage NSW has prioritised the implementation of customer service-focused activities, policies, and programs to reduce regulatory burdens on asset owners since 2017. For example, Heritage NSW has refreshed its website, introduced new information management systems, and implemented new regulation for the self-assessment of exemptions for minor works. However, Heritage NSW has not taken steps to mitigate oversight and quality risks introduced with the reduced regulatory burdens. Heritage NSW has made some, but to date insufficient, progress on a key project to update its publications. These documents (over 150 publications) are intended to play an important role in promoting voluntary compliance and supporting heritage outcomes. Heritage NSW started a new project to update relevant publications in April 2023.

Heritage NSW has recently implemented processes to improve its efficiency, such as screening new nominations for listing on the State Heritage Register. Heritage NSW has also reported improvements in the time it takes to decide on applications for works affecting listed assets. In the third quarter of 2022–23, 87% of decisions were made within the statutory timeframes. This compares to 48% in 2021–22. Heritage NSW has similarly improved how quickly it provides heritage advice on major projects, with 90% of advice reported as delivered on time in the third quarter of 2022–23, compared to 44% in 2020–21.

Assets owned by state government entities comprise a large proportion of State Heritage Register listings. These assets are often of high heritage value or situated within large and complex precincts or portfolios. But Heritage NSW does not implement targeted capability building activities to support good practice heritage management among state government entities and to promote compliance with their obligations under the Heritage Act.

The expected interaction between Heritage NSW's strategic plans and activities, and the priorities of the Heritage Council of NSW, is unclear. Actions to clarify the relevant governance arrangements have also been slow following a review in 2020 but this work re-commenced in late 2022.

Heritage NSW has been progressing work to draft reforms to the Heritage Act. This follows recommendations made in a 2021 Upper House Inquiry into the Heritage Act. To build preparedness for future reforms, Heritage NSW will need to do more to address the risks and opportunities identified in this audit report. In particular, it will need to ensure it has sufficient information and capacity to implement a risk-based regulatory approach; clear and effective governance arrangements with the Heritage Council of NSW; and enhanced engagement with government entities to promote the conservation and adaptive re-use of listed assets in public ownership.

This chapter assesses the effectiveness of Heritage NSW's oversight of state heritage assets, including its visibility of listed assets, and its oversight of regulatory decision-making. It also assesses Heritage NSW's activities to engage with owners to meet their obligations under the Heritage Act and to support heritage outcomes.

This chapter assesses the timeliness of Heritage NSW’s provision of advice, recommendations, and decisions on heritage issues to support heritage management outcomes with respect to listed assets.

This chapter assesses whether the Department of Planning and Environment (Heritage NSW) has established clear strategic priorities to effectively oversee and administer activities related to listed assets, and its preparedness to implement reforms. It also assesses the adequacy of planning activities and governance arrangements to support the achievement of strategic directions.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #384 - released 27 June 2023

Published

Actions for Regulation of public native forestry

Regulation of public native forestry

Environment
Industry
Compliance
Management and administration
Regulation
Risk

What this report is about

The Forestry Corporation of NSW (FCNSW) is a state-owned corporation that manages over two million hectares of public native forests and plantations supplying timber to sawmills across NSW.

The NSW Environment Protection Authority (EPA) is responsible for regulating the native forestry industry in NSW.

FCNSW must comply with Integrated Forestry Operations Approvals (IFOAs), which set out rules for how timber harvesting may occur.

Most harvesting is undertaken under the Coastal IFOA, which commenced in 2018.

This audit assessed how effectively Forestry Corporation of NSW manages its public native forestry activities to ensure compliance, and how effectively the Environment Protection Authority regulates these activities.

What we found

Forestry Corporation of NSW (FCNSW) clearly articulates its compliance obligations.

While FCNSW undertakes monitoring of its contractors, it does not do so consistently and does not target its monitoring activities on a risk basis.

FCNSW has largely fulfilled mandatory Coastal IFOA training requirements, but has not yet trained other staff who would also benefit from the training.

Contractor compliance appears to be improving, but there are gaps and inconsistencies in FCNSW's documentation of this.

FCNSW is not measuring its overall compliance to determine how it is tracking against its target.

The EPA undertakes proactive inspections of Coastal IFOA harvesting operations on a risk basis. However, it does not assess the risk at harvest sites covered by other IFOAs.

Most EPA compliance staff have received basic training, but few have received more advanced training required to effectively undertake forestry inspections.

Some EPA offices do not have the necessary equipment to undertake forestry inspections.

The EPA and FCNSW are not implementing all elements of a Memorandum of Understanding that aims to promote a cooperative relationship between the agencies.

What we recommended

The report made recommendations to FCNSW which aim to improve:

  • staff training
  • consistency of compliance reviews and data capture
  • targeting of compliance activities
  • measurement of performance.

The report made recommendations to the EPA which aim to improve:

  • risk-assessments
  • staff training
  • staff equipment.

The report also recommended that FCNSW and EPA should fully implement their Memorandum of Understanding.

The Forestry Corporation of NSW (FCNSW) is a state-owned corporation that supplies timber to sawmills in New South Wales, including timber harvested from public native forests. FCNSW is responsible for the management of around two million hectares of public native forests and plantations. Around half the area of native forests is permanently set aside for conservation.

Public native forestry is regulated through the Forestry Act 2012, Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016, Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 and associated regulations. Under the Forestry Act 2012, the objectives of FCNSW include, where its activities affect the environment, to conduct its operations in compliance with the principles of ecologically sustainable development contained in section 6(2) of the Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991. This involves the integration of social, economic and environmental considerations in decision-making processes.

In undertaking its native forestry operations, FCNSW must comply with Integrated Forestry Operations Approvals (IFOA), issued jointly by the Minister for the Environment and the Minister for Agriculture, which set out rules to protect species and ecosystems where timber harvesting is occurring, and aim to ensure forests are managed in an ecologically sustainable way. FCNSW must also ensure that its contractors undertake forestry operations in line with IFOAs. The Coastal IFOA, developed in 2018, consolidated the four IFOAs for the Eden, Southern, Upper and Lower North East coastal regions of New South Wales into a single IFOA. The other three current IFOAs are Brigalow Nandewar, South Western Cypress and Riverina Redgum (the Western IFOAs).

The NSW Environment Protection Authority (EPA) is responsible for regulating native forestry in New South Wales. Under the Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991, one of the objectives of the EPA is to protect, restore and enhance the quality of the environment in New South Wales, having regard to the need to maintain ecologically sustainable development. This includes monitoring FCNSW’s compliance with IFOA conditions, including by maintaining and enforcing a compliance program.

The Coastal IFOA also introduced a new structure and regulatory approach for IFOAs, establishing outcomes, conditions and protocols. The conditions set mandatory actions and controls intended to protect threatened plants, animals, habitats, soils and water. The protocols, referenced in the conditions, set out additional enforceable actions and controls intended to support the effective implementation of the conditions.

Public native forestry is the largest component of hardwood supply in New South Wales. The 2019–20 bushfires had a major impact on regional communities, and large areas of native forest. This heightened environmental risks and challenges in public native forestry. Five million hectares of New South Wales was impacted, including more than 890,000 hectares of native State Forests. This is over 40% of the coastal and tablelands native State Forests in New South Wales.

In addition to effective compliance activities, the success of the regulatory approach to public native forestry operations depends on how wood supply yields are modelled, and ensuring that harvested volumes do not exceed these yields. This is of particular importance in areas where forests have been severely damaged by fire. This audit did not consider sustainable yields. Recent reviews of this include an independent review of the FCNSW sustainable yield model and a Natural Resources Commission review in 2021.

This audit assessed how effectively Forestry Corporation of NSW manages its public native forestry activities to ensure compliance, and how effectively the Environment Protection Authority regulates these activities.

Conclusion

Forestry Corporation of NSW (FCNSW) clearly articulates its compliance obligations at the corporate level and for each harvest site. However, there are deficiencies in FCNSW’s compliance approach. While FCNSW undertakes monitoring of its contractors in a number of ways, it does not consistently monitor compliance across its contractors and does not target its monitoring activities on a risk basis. This increases the risk that non-compliant practices will not be identified, potentially leading to environmental harm.

FCNSW has a compliance strategy and program that sets out its compliance obligations and how they will be managed. FCNSW’s Compliance Policy outlines compliance requirements, actions to ensure compliance, and responsibilities for staff, supervisors, senior management and board members. FCNSW also has a compliance monitoring system manual that outlines its monitoring program, and its risk-assessment and incident reporting procedures. These corporate documents set out FCNSW’s overall approach to managing compliance.

Harvesting in State Forests is undertaken by contractors or sub-contractors. FCNSW provides training to its staff and contractors and undertakes monitoring to identify contractor compliance with relevant requirements through a variety of means, including its quality assurance assessment (QAA) program. FCNSW also communicates compliance obligations to contractors in harvest plans.

FCNSW is not undertaking its monitoring activities on a risk basis. The frequency of contractor supervision is inconsistent and is not tied to the contractor’s past performance, meaning that monitoring resources are not necessarily being targeted at the areas of highest -risk.

FCNSW also does not target its QAAs on a risk basis. FCNSW does not have procedures for how QAAs should occur outside the North Coast region. QAAs are conducted inconsistently, with some reviews occurring in only part of the harvest site while others cover the whole harvest site. In addition, some QAAs do not meet FCNSW’s minimum standards. FCNSW’s record keeping of QAAs is also inconsistent, making it difficult to determine true levels of compliance and the cause of identified potential non-compliances.

In addition, FCNSW does not collate and analyse the results of its compliance monitoring to target its compliance audits. Undertaking these audits on a risk basis would allow FCNSW to apply its resources to the highest-risk harvest sites and contractors.

The EPA identifies native forestry as a high priority regulatory activity and undertakes proactive inspections of Coastal IFOA harvest sites on a risk basis. However, the EPA does not assess the risk at Western IFOA harvest sites, leaving a significant gap in its inspection regime. This means that the EPA may not be inspecting all high-risk harvest sites to ensure compliance with regulations across those sites. The EPA has started to train more of its staff in conducting forestry inspections, but it currently has a limited number of trained and experienced staff to undertake this work.

The EPA has developed a Regulatory and Compliance Priorities Statement 2022–23 which identifies native forestry as a key risk. This statement identifies that forestry is a priority area for its compliance activities because of the increased environmental risk and sensitivity in forests following the 2019–20 bushfires. A divisional plan for its regulatory operations contains specific actions for forestry, including ensuring that the EPA has a consistent approach to recording regulatory actions undertaken and identifying priority areas for assurance over State Forests.

As part of its compliance activities, the EPA responds to complaints received, or reports of non-compliance, across all four IFOA areas and also carries out proactive inspections in the Coastal IFOA area. To guide these inspections, the EPA determines the level of risk posed by each harvest site in the Coastal IFOA area using information it gathers from FCNSW. The EPA prioritises inspections of sites rated as high and medium-risk, but the EPA has not undertaken risk-assessments for the three Western IFOAs. By not determining the risks in these areas, the EPA does not have assurance that it is checking FCNSW compliance with regulations across all high-risk sites.

Most EPA staff have basic training in forestry matters, but few staff have the more advanced training required to effectively undertake forestry inspections. In addition, not all EPA officers have access to the technology required to undertake forestry inspections, such as internet-enabled tablets and specialised tapes for measuring tree diameter. This limits the EPA’s ability to determine the level of compliance with regulations and respond effectively to instances of environmental harm in relation to public native forestry.

The Coastal IFOA does not contain provisions which allow the EPA to unilaterally restrict forestry activities in the aftermath of a catastrophic event such as the 2019–20 bushfires. Following the bushfires, FCNSW approached the EPA and asked for additional site-specific operating conditions (SSOC) at some locations to assist it in maintaining compliance. The SSOCs were issued by the EPA and FCNSW was required to carry out forestry operations in accordance with the SSOCs at relevant harvest sites. These SSOCs were in place for 12 months. After a year, FCNSW decided not to renew this approach with the EPA, but implemented its own voluntary measures during harvesting operations. Unlike the SSOCs, the EPA was unable to undertake enforcement activities for breaches of voluntary measures.

Appendix one – Responses from agencies
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #382 - released 22 June 2023

Published

Actions for Regulation and monitoring of local government

Regulation and monitoring of local government

Planning
Whole of Government
Environment
Local Government
Compliance
Regulation
Risk

What the report is about

The Office of Local Government (OLG) in the Department of Planning and Environment is responsible for strengthening the local government sector, including through its regulatory functions.

This audit assessed whether the OLG is effectively monitoring and regulating the sector under the Local Government Act 1993. The audit covered:

  • the effectiveness of departmental arrangements for the OLG to undertake its regulatory functions
  • whether the OLG has effective mechanisms to monitor and respond to risks and issues relating to council compliance and performance.

What we found

The OLG does not conduct effective, proactive monitoring to enable timely risk-based responses to council performance and compliance issues.

The OLG has not clearly defined and communicated its regulatory role to ensure that its priorities are well understood.

The OLG does not routinely review the results of its regulatory activities to improve its approaches.

The department lacks an adequate framework to define, measure and report on the OLG's performance, limiting transparency and its accountability.

The OLG's new strategic plan presents an opportunity for the OLG to better define, communicate, and deliver on its regulatory objectives.

What we recommended

The OLG should:

  • publish a tool to support councils to self-assess risks and report on their performance and compliance
  • ensure its council engagement strategy is consistent with its regulatory approach
  • report each year on its regulatory activities and performance
  • publish a calendar of its key sector support and monitoring activities
  • enhance processes for internally tracking operational activities
  • develop and maintain a data management framework
  • review and update frameworks and procedures for regulatory responses.

 

The Local Government Act 1993 (the LG Act) provides the legal framework for the system of local government in New South Wales. The LG Act describes the functions of councils, county councils and joint organisations which should be exercised consistent with the guiding principles and requirements of the LG Act. Councils also have functions and responsibilities under other Acts.

There are 128 local councils, nine county councils and 13 joint organisations of councils in the New South Wales local government sector. Each council is unique in size and location, owns and manages assets, and delivers services for their communities. According to 2021–22 data provided by the Department of Planning and Environment (the department), local councils managed $175.2 billion in infrastructure, property plant and equipment, held $16.8 billion of cash and investments, collected $7.8 billion in rates and charges and entered into $3.7 billion of borrowings. Councils' decision-making responsibilities directly impact the communities they serve, including responsibilities relevant to financial management, economic development, environmental sustainability and community wellbeing.

Under the LG Act, each elected council is accountable to the community they serve. In addition to Auditor-General reports, issues relating to council performance and compliance have been identified in public inquiries commissioned by the Minister for Local Government and investigations by the Independent Commission Against Corruption, NSW Ombudsman and Office of Local Government (OLG). Challenges and opportunities related to the operations and sustainability of the local government sector have also been reported by the sector and identified in reports by NSW government agencies such as the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal.

The department is the primary state government agency with responsibility for policy, legislative, regulatory and program functions for local government matters. The Office of Local Government (OLG) is a business unit within the department that advises the Minister for Local Government and exercises delegated functions of the Secretary of the Department of Planning and Environment under the LG Act.

Key departmental planning documents state that the OLG is responsible for strengthening the sustainability, performance, integrity, transparency and accountability of the local government sector. As the state regulator of the local government sector, the OLG aims to promote voluntary compliance, build councils' capacity for high performance, and intervene only when 'warranted and appropriate'. Relevant regulatory activities include issuing guidelines, investigating councils and councillors, and supporting the Minister for Local Government's discretionary intervention powers. The OLG's other functions include developing policy, administering grants and programs, supporting local government election processes, and issuing certain approvals.

The objective of this audit was to assess whether the OLG is effectively monitoring and regulating the local government sector under the LG Act. The assessment included:

  • the effectiveness of departmental arrangements for the OLG to undertake its regulatory functions
  • whether the OLG has effective mechanisms to monitor and respond to risks and issues relating to council compliance and performance.

This report focuses on the OLG’s activities relevant to powers under Chapter 13 of the LG Act, and related regulatory activities, such as monitoring risks, issuing guidance and engaging with councils. It also examines strategic and operational planning for these activities in the context of the OLG's other activities, and departmental arrangements to oversee and enable the OLG's regulatory effectiveness.

Other OLG activities were not in scope of the audit but are commented on in this report where contextually relevant. This includes the OLG's responsibilities under the LG Act with respect to councillor misconduct, and the 2022 review of the councillor misconduct framework commissioned by the former Minister for Local Government.

Conclusion

The Office of Local Government (OLG) in the Department of Planning and Environment (the department) does not conduct effective, proactive monitoring to enable timely risk-based responses to council performance and compliance issues. Council performance and compliance varies and a range of issues continue across the local government sector – some significant – that can impact on councils' operations and sustainability.

The department recognises that an effective and efficient sector is 'crucial to the economic and social wellbeing of communities across the State,' but the OLG does not routinely review the results of its regulatory activities to improve its approaches. The OLG has also not clearly defined and communicated its regulatory role to ensure that its priorities are well understood.

Inadequate performance measurement and reporting on its regulatory activities is a significant transparency and accountability issue, and the OLG cannot demonstrate that it is effectively regulating the local government sector.

The department lacks an adequate framework to define, measure and report on the OLG's performance as the state regulator of the sector under the Local Government Act 1993 (the LG Act). The OLG's various council engagement activities are not well structured and coordinated towards delivering on a clearly defined regulatory role and its regulatory priorities are not well understood. In 2022, the OLG identified, in its new strategic plan, that there is a need for it to define its role in the sector. It would be expected that a clearly defined role already underpins its aim to 'strike the right mix of monitoring, intervention, capability improvement and engagement activities'.

The OLG collects various sources of information about council compliance and performance but its systems and processes do not enable structured, proactive sector monitoring to enable timely, risk-based responses. Ineffective sector monitoring is a particular issue in the context of compliance, financial management and governance risks that have been identified in inquiries and reviews by other government agencies including integrity bodies and reported by the sector. Audit Office data for 2021–22 shows that 62 councils did not have or regularly update key corporate governance policies, and 63 do not have basic controls to manage cyber security risks. Further, 31 councils or joint organisations did not meet the statutory requirement to have an audit, risk and improvement committee by 30 June 2022.1

Overall, the OLG has made limited progress on projects that have been identified since 2019 to improve its sector monitoring, such as updating its performance measurement framework for councils. These factors limit its capacity to identify and act on issues early. In early 2023, the OLG started to implement a new council risk assessment tool.

The OLG's two main frameworks to guide its sector improvement and intervention activities were last updated in 2014 and 2017. The OLG considered relevant statutory criteria when advising the Minister on the use of powers to issue performance improvement and suspension orders under the LG Act. But the OLG lacks complete and approved procedures to guide staff when preparing advice and recommendations related to interventions, and other response options. This creates risks to the consistency and transparency of relevant processes.

The department and the OLG have identified that resourcing issues present a risk to the OLG's regulatory functions. Projects since 2021 to review the OLG's budget did not progress. The OLG does not routinely review the costs or evaluate the effectiveness of its regulatory activities.

The OLG's 2022–2026 strategic plan sets out a vision to be, 'A trusted regulator and capability builder enabling councils to better serve their communities'. Implementing the strategic plan presents an opportunity for the OLG to better define, communicate, and deliver on its regulatory objectives towards strengthening the sector. The OLG advises that a delivery plan and performance indicators for its new strategy are being developed, alongside work resulting from the 2022 review of the councillor misconduct framework.

 


1 This data has been sourced through the Audit Office's financial audits of councils. The Local Government 2022 report, which compiles results from the local government sector financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2022, will include this and additional data, and related information. This report is expected to be tabled in June 2023.

This chapter considers the effectiveness of departmental arrangements for the OLG to undertake its regulatory functions.

This chapter assesses whether the OLG has effective mechanisms to monitor and respond to risks and issues relating to council compliance and performance.

The OLG’s 2017 Improvement and Intervention Framework is intended to guide appropriate responses to council compliance or performance risks and issues. The publicly available framework states that generally, the OLG will encourage councils to meet their obligations before a more formal intervention will be considered. It also states that any intervention or improvement response will be proportionate to the circumstances.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Statutory powers relevant to council accountability under the Local Government Act

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #380 - released 23 May 2023

Published

Actions for Managing the affairs of people under financial management and/or guardianship orders

Managing the affairs of people under financial management and/or guardianship orders

Justice
Community Services
Management and administration
Project management
Regulation
Risk
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

Click here for the Easy English version of the report highlights

The Easy English version of the report highlights is intended to meet the needs of some people with lower literacy skills, some people with an intellectual disability, and some people from different cultural backgrounds.

The Easy English document is not the final audit report that has been prepared and tabled in NSW Parliament under s.38EB and s.38EC of the Government Sector Audit Act 1983. It should not be relied on or quoted from as the final audit report.


What this report is about

This audit assessed whether NSW Trustee and Guardian is effectively delivering public guardianship and financial management services in line with legislative requirements and standards.

What we found

NSW Trustee and Guardian is delivering guardianship and financial management services in line with its broad legal authority.

However, NSW Trustee and Guardian does not have sufficient oversight to ensure that its services are consistent with legislative principles which aim to promote positive client outcomes.

The agency's governance and practices could be better supported by relevant training and guidance to account for the diversity of its clients.

It does not track the actual costs of service delivery, the quality of services or client experiences and key findings from previous reviews remain unresolved.

Government funding for public guardianship services and direct financial management services for low-wealth clients has not kept pace with the growth in clients.

There is a risk that some fee-paying clients are unknowingly subsidising others.

NSW Trustee and Guardian has applied additional funding to increase frontline staff, but gaps in monitoring and IT system constraints create a risk that it will not address service quality issues, nor be able to demonstrate the impact of this new funding.

What we recommended

We recommended that NSW Trustee and Guardian:

  • Broaden governance arrangements to enable input to key decisions from people with lived experience, relevant peak bodies and representatives of diverse communities.
  • Implement mechanisms to seek feedback on the effectiveness and quality of services from clients under orders.
  • Assess staff competency and implement regular training in effectively serving clients with disability, dementia, mental illness, cognitive impairments and other factors relevant to decision-making incapacity.
  • Implement a risk-based quality framework to assess whether public guardian and financial management decisions are in line with policy and the legislative principles.
  • Improve data collection and monitoring to track performance, the costs to serve, and client outcomes and report on these publicly.

NSW Trustee and Guardian is a NSW Government agency in the Stronger Communities cluster. It supports the NSW Trustee and the Public Guardian in the exercise of their statutory functions. It is accountable to the relevant Minister, the Attorney General.

The legislative responsibilities for the Public Guardian and the NSW Trustee are provided in separate statutes (NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009 and Guardianship Act 1987). Together, these establish a number of functions and services that NSW Trustee and Guardian as an agency is expected to deliver, including:

  • acting as executor and administrator of deceased estates
  • acting as a trustee responsible for managing trust property on behalf of another person or organisation in line with the trust terms
  • drafting Will, Power of Attorney and Enduring Guardianship instruments, and educating the community about the importance of having these documents in place
  • making decisions on behalf of people under guardianship or financial management orders as a guardian or a financial manager 'of last resort', or overseeing and assisting private financial managers.

This audit focuses on the last of these - NSW Trustee and Guardian's financial management and guardianship services.

The NSW Trustee and the Public Guardian are appointed to provide direct financial management and/or guardianship services (respectively) to over 13,300 people (as at 30 June 2022) who are deemed by a court or tribunal unable to manage their own affairs. This involves making decisions for people under a relevant court or tribunal order, within the terms of the order. The court or tribunal order enables the appointed guardian or financial manager to make decisions on behalf of the person for whom the order is made. The legislation allows the financial manager or guardian to exercise all the functions of the person under management has or would have were they not incapable of managing for themselves. From a legal perspective, these 'substitute decisions' have the same effect as if the person had made the decision themselves. While the legal presumption is that a person has capacity to care for themselves and manage their own affairs, a financial manager or guardian can be appointed without the person's consent if the court or tribunal finds the person does not have relevant decision-making capacity.

There can be a range of factors that impact on a person's decision-making capacity, including cognitive impairment, intellectual disability, dementia, mental illness and addiction. Guardianship (of both the person and their estate) developed as a response, through European and English law over hundreds of years. In Australia, it was a function of the Supreme Court of NSW before the establishment of government agencies. What is now known as substitute decision-making can sometimes be referred to as a 'protective' function because:

  • it relates to decisions or actions that need to be taken, which the person under an order cannot take because they are incapable of managing their own affairs
  • due to this lack of competence, the person may be disadvantaged in the conduct of their affairs (for example, their money or property may be dissipated or lost, they may enter agreements unwisely or they may be at risk of abuse or exploitation)
  • substitute decisions must be made in the best interests of the person on whose behalf they are made.

An alternative model is 'supported decision-making'. This refers to processes and approaches that assist people with impaired decision-making capacity to exercise their autonomy and legal capacity by supporting them to make decisions. This approach seeks to give effect to the will and preferences of the person requiring decision-making support wherever possible, including decisions involving risk. There has been a longstanding legal and community push for Australian guardianship and administration systems to move from substituted to supported decision-making. However, the legislation in New South Wales provides for 'best interests' substitute decision-making and this is the framework against which we have audited NSW Trustee and Guardian.

The Public Guardian and the NSW Trustee may be appointed as substitute decision makers by the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT) and the Supreme Court. The NSW Trustee may also be appointed by the Mental Health Review Tribunal for financial management orders only.1 They are intended to be appointed as a 'last resort' when there is no one willing or suitable to fill the role, or there is significant family conflict regarding decision-making for the person. The Public Guardian and the NSW Trustee cannot refuse to accept a court or tribunal appointment to administer an order for guardianship or financial management.

Public Guardian decisions cover healthcare, lifestyle, accommodation and/or medical decisions such as where a person should live (for example: at home, in an aged care facility or disability group home), what disability or other support services they receive, who can have access to them (for example: through establishing visiting schedules between conflicting family members) and consent to the use of restrictive practices on the advice of independent experts (for example: seclusion, chemical restraint such as anti-psychotic medication, environmental restraints such as limiting access to knives).

Under a financial management order where the NSW Trustee is appointed as financial manager, the NSW Trustee carries out such functions as securing and collecting assets, income and entitlements, paying expenses, debts and designing budgets, investing financial assets, lodging tax returns and paying maintenance for dependents, taking or defending legal proceedings and managing other financial and legal affairs for the person. This is referred to as direct financial management.

A court or tribunal may appoint a private financial manager, such as a family member, friend, private trustee company or other commercial provider. Where a private manager is appointed, the NSW Trustee provides authorisation and directions to the private manager and oversees their performance. As at 30 June 2022, over 6,200 people had private managers.

As an agency, the majority of NSW Trustee and Guardian's overall revenue is from fees (including for services outside the scope of the audit, such as will preparation) and investments. The remainder is from the NSW Government as funding for non-commercial services including guardianship services and subsidised financial management services for low-wealth clients. Public guardian clients do not pay fees. Financial management clients pay fees, but these are subsidised where the client does not have capacity to pay full fees. NSW Trustee and Guardian is considered a self-funded agency by NSW Treasury definitions.

Demand for financial management and guardianship services, and the complexity of clients' circumstances for these services, has grown over the last decade. In November 2020, NSW Trustee and Guardian advised the Attorney General that it had run an operating deficit in 2019–20 driven by an increase in non/low fee paying customers and an increase in the complexity of matters. NSW Trustee and Guardian advised the Attorney General that government funding was no longer meeting the full cost of guardianship services, and of direct financial management services for people with low balances. NSW Trustee and Guardian's analysis had identified a shortfall in government funding of $8.4 million in 2019–20 that was expected to increase over the forward estimates. A working group was established with officers from NSW Trustee and Guardian, NSW Treasury and the Department of Communities and Justice to advise the government on options for improving the financial sustainability of NSW Trustee and Guardian overall.

NSW Trustee and Guardian subsequently received a funding boost of $41.5 million across four years in the 2021–22 State Budget. NSW Trustee and Guardian applied the majority of the budget enhancement to recruit approximately 120 new roles mostly in financial management and guardianship services.

The objective of this audit was to assess whether NSW Trustee and Guardian is effectively delivering guardianship and financial management services in line with legislative requirements and relevant non-legislative standards. These include a legislative duty to observe certain principles when exercising the relevant legislative functions, including to: give primary consideration to clients’ welfare and interests, restrict their freedom of decision and action as little as possible, take account of their views, and encourage their self-reliance.

The audit was guided by three questions:

  • Does NSW Trustee and Guardian align its service delivery with its legislative functions and principles, and relevant standards?
  • Does NSW Trustee and Guardian drive and monitor performance to give effect to its legislative functions and principles, and relevant standards?
  • Has NSW Trustee and Guardian effectively planned the use of additional funding to improve service delivery and adherence to its legislative functions and principles, and relevant standards?

The audit review period was the five years between 1 July 2017 - 30 June 2022.

Throughout this report:

  • 'client' refers to a person who is under a guardianship order and/or whose estate is under financial management, for whom the Public Guardian and/or the NSW Trustee is appointed to act or responsible to oversee their private financial manager
  • 'financial management' refers to clients under financial management orders (direct and private financial management) and/or the services provided by NSW Trustee and Guardian to these clients or their private managers
  • 'guardianship' refers to clients under guardianship orders where the Public Guardian is appointed, and/or the services provided by the Public Guardian to these clients
  • 'frontline staff' refers to the staff responsible for engagement with, and decision-making for, clients and private managers (titled client service officers, senior client service officers and principal client service officers in NSW Trustee and Guardian)
  • Aboriginal refers to the First Nations peoples of the land and waters now called Australia and includes Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.

Conclusion

NSW Trustee and Guardian is delivering guardianship and financial management services in line with its legal authority. However, it does not have sufficient oversight to ensure that its services are consistent with legislative principles which aim to promote positive client outcomes

NSW Trustee and Guardian's guardianship and direct financial management services rightly emphasise the legal requirement to give paramount consideration to the welfare and interests of its clients when making decisions for them. However, NSW Trustee and Guardian does not consistently obtain and record relevant client information to determine which of the other legislative principles should be applied to individual decisions. It also does not test that staff decision-making aligns with the legislative principles in practice.

Staff caseloads for financial management and guardianship services have limited the amount of time that staff can spend in building a relationship with each client or working on each client matter. This constrains the extent to which they can get to know a client and understand their circumstances - both of which are central to applying the legislative principles. Poor client information sharing in legacy IT systems, insufficient quality monitoring, and limited staff training and staff supports exacerbate this further.

NSW Trustee and Guardian governance and practices for financial management and guardianship do not reflect the nature and diversity of its client base

Despite direct financial management and public guardian clients having, by definition, impaired decision-making capacity often related to traumatic brain injury, dementia, intellectual disability and mental illness, an understanding of the sometimes-complex conditions that affect its clients has only been expected of all frontline staff since late 2021, and relevant training has been insufficient.

NSW Trustee and Guardian also does not have a consumer advisory entity to provide it with advice on financial management and guardianship services from the perspective of clients with lived experience.

Despite a significant over-representation amongst its client group, NSW Trustee and Guardian does not have specific governance, consultation, staff roles or practice guidance for its engagement with Aboriginal clients and their representatives.

NSW Trustee and Guardian does not know how well it delivers financial management and guardianship services

NSW Trustee and Guardian does not routinely track its performance with respect to service quality or how well it gives effect to the legislative functions, principles and standards for direct financial management and guardianship services. It has not been effectively monitoring whether these services are improving over time. Nor does it measure its performance with respect to the experiences and outcomes of clients of these services.

Key findings and recommendations from previous reviews remain unresolved. This includes a repeated finding by the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) that direct financial management services should be subject to transparent fee-for-service charges rather than fees calculated as a proportion of client estate value.

NSW Trustee and Guardian does not have effective monitoring in place to know the actual costs of service delivery

Direct financial management services are resourced predominantly by client fees, comprising 81% of revenue between FY2018-FY2022. Government funding makes up the balance and is directed to fee subsidies and waivers for low-wealth clients (those with assets apart from their principal place of residence, motor vehicle and furniture valued under $75,000). Sixty-eight per cent of direct financial management clients at 30 June 2022 were low-wealth and eligible for fee subsidies. Private financial management services are resourced predominantly by client fees; government funding is not provided. Fees for both direct financial management and private management are capped by regulation.

On the other hand, guardianship services are funded entirely by government funding as an annual grant, with the objective of providing these services for free to the client.

NSW Trustee and Guardian has taken steps to try to capture data on the actual cost of providing guardianship and subsidised financial management services, and to estimate these costs in the absence of such data collection. However, system limitations have frustrated attempts to fully identify and quantify the costs of service provision, including the varying complexity of client needs and related staff effort. Without data on actual costs to serve, NSW Trustee and Guardian cannot confidently demonstrate that its guardianship and financial management expenses are efficient, or determine whether revenue - either from government funding or client fees - is sufficient to meet these costs. This is hampering its efforts to address a gap between the rate of growth in client numbers and complexity, and government funding for guardianship and subsidised direct financial management services.

Government funding for guardianship services and direct financial management services for low-wealth clients has not kept pace with the growth in clients. There is a risk that some fee-paying clients are unknowingly subsidising others

Under its enabling legislation, NSW Trustee and Guardian cannot decline to receive a guardianship or direct financial management client once the court or tribunal make relevant orders. It is intended to be a provider of 'last resort' where no other suitable person is willing or able to be the guardian or financial manager for a client. It also cannot decline to oversee a private financial manager.

Demand for guardianship and direct financial management services is growing. Over the five- year audit review period (FY2018-FY2022), there has been an eight per cent increase in the number of people who have the NSW Trustee as their financial manager, a 32% increase in the number of people who have private managers and a 46% increase in the number of people who have the Public Guardian as their guardian. NSW Trustee and Guardian data suggests the complexity of client circumstances has also grown over time, increasing the staff effort required on client matters.

The risk of cross-subsidisation arises when the revenue or income for a service (whether from fees, government funding or other sources) is less than the cost to provide the service. IPART found in a 2014 review that NSW Trustee and Guardian's fee structure across all its charged services at that time was resulting in significant cross-subsidies between services and between clients within each service. Such a gap remains evident with respect to NSW Trustee and Guardian's private management, direct financial management and guardianship services.

However, NSW Trustee and Guardian cannot determine whether high-wealth direct financial management clients are subsidising services for guardianship and low-wealth direct financial management clients or private management clients without data on the actual costs to serve each client. There is a risk that some clients of these or other NSW Trustee and Guardian services are unknowingly subsidising financial management or guardianship clients.

Cross-subsidisation is inequitable, inefficient and not aligned with NSW Treasury policy on government funding for non-commercial activities. NSW Trustee and Guardian has recognised this and repeatedly sought increased government funding for guardianship services, and subsidised direct financial management services, over the five-year audit review period.

NSW Trustee and Guardian has applied additional funding received in the 2021–22 Budget to increase frontline service delivery staff, but gaps in monitoring and continuing IT system constraints create a risk that it will not address service quality issues, nor be able to demonstrate the impact of this new funding

NSW Trustee and Guardian received a funding boost of $41.5 million across four years in the 2021–22 State Budget. The budget enhancement represented a significant increase in government funding for NSW Trustee and Guardian to provide free guardianship services and subsidised direct financial management services. Nevertheless, NSW Trustee and Guardian expects the budget enhancement will address immediate funding shortfalls for these services, but not those forecast to occur in the future on existing client growth and fee revenue trends.

NSW Trustee and Guardian has targeted the additional funding received in 2021–22 to improve adherence to its legislation through new operating models and a significant uplift in frontline staff numbers for guardianship and financial management services. Capital funding for IT system enhancements was not included in the additional funding allocated.

However, there is a risk that existing gaps in monitoring service quality, performance and consumer experiences - and continuing IT system constraints - could lead to increasing frontline staff numbers without also addressing key issues in service quality, or in being able to demonstrate impact from the budget enhancement in seeking future funding.


1 Some direct financial management clients are not subject to court or tribunal order, but are voluntary patients admitted to a mental health facility in accordance with the Mental Health Act 2007. NSW Trustee and Guardian may assume a financial management role if requested by the patient or, if the patient is under 18 years, a person with parental responsibility: NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009, s 53.

NSW Trustee and Guardian has only recently identified measures to track the performance of its financial management and guardianship services

Between 2021 and 2022, NSW Trustee and Guardian developed new divisional key performance indicators which aim to track the quality of services delivered to people under financial management and guardianship orders. These measures are reported quarterly to the organisation's executive leadership team. The divisions have started measuring some of these new performance indicators, but many will require changes to consumer engagement processes and IT legacy systems to collect additional data. At this stage it is unclear when these necessary changes will occur, and when relevant data will begin to be collected and analysed.

Before 2021, NSW Trustee and Guardian measured the performance of some of its financial management and guardianship operational processes. While these operational measures identify whether it is fulfilling some of its legislative functions, they are predominantly activity measures and do not inform on the quality of decision-making for direct financial management or guardianship clients, or on client experiences and outcomes.

Operational performance targets and measures have only recently been developed and used to centrally track the time elapsed between requests for certain decisions and the decisions made or relevant actions taken by relevant frontline staff. Baseline data for these measures show that target timeframes are not close to being met for minor medical decisions for people under guardianship orders, or for first customer payment, and redirection of income for people who are directly financially managed.

NSW Trustee and Guardian has proactively developed a benefits realisation framework to monitor the expected benefits from the additional funding received in 2021–22

NSW Trustee and Guardian has developed a benefits realisation framework to monitor the expected benefits from the additional funding (and other elements of the budget bid including increased fees and business improvements for efficiencies). This is not a requirement imposed by NSW Treasury, but a proactive step taken by NSW Trustee and Guardian to account for the use of the additional funding and to attempt to identify its impacts.

The benefits realisation framework includes interim and preferred measures, which reflect the things that can be tracked with existing data, and those that require new data collection, respectively. The measures are underpinned by separate program logics for direct and private financial management, and guardianship, and an overall investment logic. 'Logics' articulate the inputs, outputs and short/medium/long term outcomes expected from a project, program or investment, as well as the underpinning assumptions about how desired changes will occur (the 'mechanism' or 'theory' of change).

The targets and measures for NSW Trustee and Guardian's benefits realisation framework are the responsibility of the organisational divisions delivering guardianship and financial management services. The baseline data against which change will be measured is 30 June 2021, as the budget enhancement funds were allocated from 1 July 2021. The audit has been provided with baseline data, but not first year results (covering 2021–22) and as such, cannot assess whether any progress has been made towards the targets.

The benefits realisation framework may not provide the information needed to demonstrate the effectiveness of the budget enhancement

A lack of available data and limited measures in the benefits realisation framework may mean NSW Trustee and Guardian will not be able to meaningfully assess the impact of the additional funding.

The 22 measures in the benefits realisation framework across guardianship and financial management functions are predominantly monitoring activity and outputs which seek to track staff caseloads, the number of decisions made, the timeliness of key actions/tasks, and annual consumer engagements.

There is one service quality outcome measure: that customers, family and carers report an improved experience. The metrics for this measure will initially be monitored using the whole-of-government customer satisfaction measurement survey administered by the Department of Customer Service, until such time as other additional sources are developed. The whole-of-government survey is built around six core customer commitments relating to respondents' experiences with government services and staff - that they are: 'easy to access, act with empathy, respect my time, explain what to expect, resolve the situation and engage the community'. It is not clear whether or how the whole-of-government survey targets and engages people with impaired decision-making capacity or accessible communication needs.

Some measures in the NSW Trustee and Guardian benefits realisation framework do not yet have targets set, such as the ratio of the number of clients to the number of guardians or financial managers. Many relate to compliance with internal operational policies.

One interim measure for a direct financial management service indicator is 'increased personalised face-to-face consultations by phone or virtually'. It is intended to be replaced with the preferred measure 'ensure the client’s story is understood by staff and systems by consulting stakeholders and adding to the client’s story in the IT system'. However, the interim measure would better align with the national standards regarding regular and accessible engagement (discussed above).

A lack of availability of key data to track the preferred measures was identified by NSW Trustee and Guardian as an enterprise risk, and issues with existing data collected were identified early on, including that:

  • data can be entered into systems inconsistently by staff
  • current systems mask some issues – for example, a task can be completed within internal timeframes but not reflect the actual waiting time of consumers
  • current systems cater to measuring outputs rather than service quality.

IT system improvements are slated in order to allow data to be collected to inform on preferred measures, but these depend on capital funding that has not yet been secured. At the time of writing, data sources were yet to be identified for three of the 22 measures, and NSW Trustee and Guardian did not have staff trained and available to run and analyse data for the benefits realisation framework.

The mechanisms of change and the underlying assumptions in the program and investment logics are also not clearly articulated in the benefits realisation framework, and nor is the underpinning evidence (such as from earlier reviews, research or pilots, or experiences elsewhere). Identifying and evidencing these would give some confidence that the assumptions are sound and that the mechanisms of change will operate as expected (for example, that a decline in frontline staff caseloads will translate into more time spent on individual matters, and improved service quality).

Given these limitations in measures, data collection and logics, there is a risk that the benefits realisation framework may not provide the performance and impact evidence necessary to assess the effectiveness of the budget enhancement, or to justify further additional funding in the future.

NSW Trustee and Guardian cannot track its financial management and guardianship service performance over time

NSW Trustee and Guardian's operational performance activity measures have changed over the audit review period, which limits NSW Trustee and Guardian’s ability to identify whether it has sustained or improved performance in its guardianship and financial management services over time.

NSW Trustee and Guardian has consistently tracked the number and themes of complaints about financial management and guardianship services, which do provide some insight into service quality and experiences. However, this is an incomplete measure as people under financial management and guardianship orders are a more vulnerable cohort than other NSW Trustee and Guardian customers and may require support to make a complaint. There is also a structural power imbalance between clients and their guardian or financial manager which may dissuade clients and their stakeholders from raising concerns. Therefore, it is not clear whether the numbers and themes in complaints received are representative of broader experiences.

Appendix one – Response

Appendix two – Client characteristics

Appendix three – Easy English, Easy Read and Plain English formats

Appendix four – Financial management fees

Appendix five – NSW Trustee and Guardian Common Funds

Appendix six – About the audit

Appendix seven – Performance auditing

 

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #379 - released 18 May 2023

Published

Actions for Planning and managing bushfire equipment

Planning and managing bushfire equipment

Community Services
Justice
Planning
Environment
Local Government
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Information technology
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Regulation
Risk
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

What the report is about

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the NSW Rural Fire Service (RFS) and local councils in planning and managing equipment for bushfire prevention, mitigation, and suppression.

What we found

The RFS has focused its fleet development activity on modernising and improving the safety of its firefighting fleet, and on the purchase of new firefighting aircraft.

There is limited evidence that the RFS has undertaken strategic fleet planning or assessment of the capability of the firefighting fleet to respond to current bushfire events or emerging fire risks.

The RFS does not have an overarching strategy to guide its planning, procurement, or distribution of the firefighting fleet.

The RFS does not have effective oversight of fleet maintenance activity across the State, and is not ensuring the accuracy of District Service Agreements with local councils, where maintenance responsibilities are described.

What we recommended

  1. Develop a fleet enhancement framework and strategy that is informed by an assessment of current fleet capability, and research into appropriate technologies to respond to emerging fire risks.
  2. Develop performance measures to assess the performance and capabilities of the fleet in each RFS District by recording and publicly reporting on fire response times, fire response outcomes, and completions of fire hazard reduction works.
  3. Report annually on fleet allocations to RFS Districts, and identify the ways in which fleet resources align with district-level fire risks.
  4. Develop a strategy to ensure that local brigade volunteers are adequate in numbers and appropriately trained to operate fleet appliances in RFS Districts where they are required.
  5. Establish a fleet maintenance framework to ensure regular update of District Service Agreements with local councils.
  6. Review and improve processes for timely recording of fleet asset movements, locations, and maintenance status.

This audit assessed how effectively the NSW Rural Fire Service (the RFS) plans and manages the firefighting equipment needed to prevent, mitigate, and suppress bushfires. This audit also examined the role of local councils in managing bushfire equipment fleet assets. Local councils have vested legal ownership of the majority of the land-based firefighting fleet, including a range of legislated responsibilities to carry out fleet maintenance and repairs. The RFS has responsibilities to plan and purchase firefighting fleet assets, and ensure they are ready for use in response to fires and other emergencies.

This report describes the challenges in planning and managing the firefighting fleet, including a confusion of roles and responsibilities between the RFS and local councils in relation to managing certain land-based rural firefighting fleet – a point that has been made in our Local Government financial audits over several years. This role confusion is further demonstrated in the responses of the RFS and local councils to this audit report – included at Appendix one.

The lack of cohesion in roles and responsibilities for managing rural firefighting vehicles increases the risk that these firefighting assets are not properly maintained and managed, and introduces a risk that this could affect their readiness to be mobilised when needed.

While the audit findings and recommendations address some of the operational and organisational inefficiencies in relation to rural firefighting equipment management, they do not question the legislative arrangements that govern them. This is a matter for the NSW Government to consider in ensuring the fleet arrangements are fit for purpose, and are clearly understood by the relevant agencies.

The NSW Rural Fire Service (hereafter the RFS) is the lead combat agency for bushfires in New South Wales, and has the power to take charge of bushfire prevention and response operations anywhere in the State. The RFS has responsibilities to prevent, mitigate and suppress bushfires across 95% of the State, predominantly in the non-metropolitan areas of New South Wales. Fire and Rescue NSW is responsible for fire response activity in the cities and large townships that make up the remaining five per cent of the State.

The RFS bushfire fleet is an integral part of the agency's overall bushfire risk management. The RFS also uses this fleet to respond to other emergencies such as floods and storms, motor vehicle accidents, and structural fires. Fleet planning and management is one of a number of activities that is necessary for fire mitigation and suppression.

The Rural Fires Act 1997 (Rural Fires Act) imposes obligations on all landowners and land managers to prevent the occurrence of bushfires and reduce the risk of bushfires from spreading. Local councils have fire prevention responsibilities within their local government areas, principally to reduce fire hazards near council owned or managed assets, and minor roads.

The RFS is led by a Commissioner and is comprised of both paid employees and volunteer rural firefighters. Its functions are prescribed in the Rural Fires Act and related legislation such as the State Emergency Rescue Management Act 1989. The RFS functions are also described in Bush Fire Risk Management Plans, the State Emergency Management Plan, District Service Agreements, and RFS procedural documents. Some of the core responsibilities of the RFS include:

  • preventing, mitigating, and suppressing fires across New South Wales
  • recruiting and managing volunteer firefighters in rural fire brigades
  • purchasing and allocating firefighting fleet assets to local councils
  • establishing District Service Agreements with local councils to give the RFS permissions to use the fleet assets that are vested with local councils
  • carrying out fleet maintenance and repairs when authorised to do so by local councils
  • inspecting the firefighting fleet
  • supporting land managers and private property owners with fire prevention activity.

In order to carry out its legislated firefighting functions, the RFS relies on land-based vehicles, marine craft, and aircraft. These different firefighting appliance types are referred to in this report as the firefighting fleet or fleet assets.

RFS records show that in 2021 there were 6,345 firefighting fleet assets across NSW. Most of the land-based appliances commonly associated with firefighting, such as water pumpers and water tankers, are purchased by the RFS and vested with local councils under the Rural Fires Act. The vesting of firefighting assets with local councils means that the assets are legally owned by the council for which the asset has been purchased. The RFS is able to use the firefighting assets through District Service Agreements with local councils or groups of councils.

In addition to the land-based firefighting fleet, the RFS owns a fleet of aircraft with capabilities for fire mitigation, suppression, and reconnaissance during fire events. The RFS hires a fleet of different appliances to assist with fire prevention and hazard reduction works. These include aircraft for firefighting and fire reconnaissance, and heavy plant equipment such as graders and bulldozers for hazard reduction. Hazard reduction works include the clearance of bush and grasslands around major roads and protected assets, and the creation and maintenance of fire trails and fire corridors to assist with fire response activity.

The RFS is organised into 44 RFS Districts and seven Area Commands. The RFS relies on volunteer firefighters to assist in carrying out most of its firefighting functions. These functions may include the operation of the fleet during fire response activities and training exercises, and the routine inspection of the fleet to ensure it is maintained according to fleet service standards. Volunteer fleet inspections are supervised by the RFS Fire Control Officer.

In 2021 there were approximately 73,000 volunteers located in 1,993 rural fire brigades across the State, making the RFS the largest volunteer fire emergency service in Australia. In addition to brigade volunteers, the RFS has approximately 1,100 salaried staff who occupy leadership and administrative roles at RFS headquarters and in the 44 RFS Districts.

Local councils have legislative responsibilities relating to bushfire planning and management. Some of the core responsibilities of local councils include:

  • establishing and equipping rural fire brigades
  • contributing to the Rural Fire Fighting Fund
  • vested ownership of land-based rural firefighting equipment
  • carrying out firefighting fleet maintenance and repairs
  • conducting bushfire prevention and hazard reduction activity.

The objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness of the RFS and local councils in planning and managing equipment for bushfire prevention, mitigation, and suppression. From the period of 2017 to 2022 inclusive, we addressed the audit objective by examining whether the NSW RFS and local councils effectively:

  • plan for current and future bushfire fleet requirements
  • manage and maintain the fleet required to prevent, mitigate, and suppress bushfires in NSW.

This audit did not assess:

  • the operational effectiveness of the RFS bushfire response
  • the effectiveness of personal protective equipment and clothing
  • the process of vesting of rural firefighting equipment with local councils
  • activities of any other statutory authorities responsible for managing bushfires in NSW.

As the lead combat agency for the bushfire response in NSW, the RFS has primary responsibility for bushfire prevention, mitigation, and suppression.

Three local councils were selected as case studies for this audit, Hawkesbury City Council, Wagga Wagga City Council and Uralla Shire Council. These case studies highlight the ways in which the RFS and local councils collaborate and communicate in rural fire districts.

Conclusion

The RFS has focused its fleet development activity on modernising and improving the safety of its land-based firefighting fleet, and on the purchase of new firefighting aircraft

The RFS has reduced the average age of the firefighting fleet from approximately 21 years in 2017, to approximately 16 years in 2022. The RFS has also enhanced the aerial fleet with the addition of six new aircraft to add to the existing three aircraft.

Recommendations from inquiries into the 2019–20 bushfires have driven significant levels of fleet improvement activity, mainly focused on the addition of safety features to existing fleet appliances. The RFS has dedicated most of its efforts to purchasing and refurbishing firefighting appliances of the same type and in the same volumes year on year.

However, the RFS is unable to demonstrate how the composition, size, or the locations of the NSW firefighting fleet is linked to current fire prevention, mitigation, and suppression requirements, or future fire risks.

There is limited evidence that the RFS has undertaken strategic fleet planning or assessment of the capability of the firefighting fleet to respond to current bushfire events or emerging fire risks

The RFS has not established a methodology to assess the composition or volumes of the firefighting fleet against fire activity and fire risks in the 44 NSW Rural Fire Districts. The RFS has not developed performance measures or targets to assess or report on fire response times in each of its districts, nor has it developed measures to assess the effectiveness of responses according to fire sizes and fire types. Similarly, the RFS has limited performance measures to assess fire prevention activity, or to assess fuel load reduction works, so it is not possible to assess whether its fleet capabilities are fit for these purposes.

The RFS does not have an overarching strategy to guide its planning, procurement, or distribution of the firefighting fleet

RFS fleet planning and fleet allocations are based on historical fleet sizes and compositions, and distributed to locations where there are appropriately trained brigade volunteers.

The RFS takes an asset protection approach to bushfire prevention and planning that is based on the Australian and New Zealand Standard for Risk Management. This approach requires that the RFS identify assets at risk of fire, and develop treatment plans to protect these assets. However, fleet requirements are not linked to NSW asset protection plans, meaning that fleet is not allocated according to the identified risks in these plans. Further, the RFS does not develop fire prevention plans for areas where there are no identified assets.

The RFS has not conducted future-focused fleet research or planning into technologies that match fleet capabilities to emerging or future fire risks. Since the significant fire events of 2019–2020, the RFS has not changed its approach to planning for, or assessing, the operational capabilities of the fleet. The RFS advises it is scoping a project to match resources to risk, which it plans to commence in 2023.

The RFS does not have effective oversight of fleet maintenance activity across the State, and is not ensuring the accuracy of District Service Agreements where maintenance responsibilities are described

The RFS does not have a framework to ensure that District Service Agreements with local councils are accurate. Almost two thirds of service agreements have not been reviewed in the last ten years, and some do not reflect actual maintenance practices. There is no formalised process to ensure communication occurs between the RFS and local councils for fleet management and maintenance.

RFS fleet management systems at the central level are not integrated with RFS district-level databases to indicate when fleet assets are in workshops being maintained and serviced. The RFS has a new centralised Computer Aided Dispatch System that relies on accurate fleet locations and fleet condition information in order to dispatch vehicles to incidents and fires. A lack of interface between the district-level fleet systems and the centralised RFS fleet dispatch system, may impact on operational responses to bushfires. 

The RFS has not made significant changes to the size or composition of the firefighting fleet in the past five years and does not have an overarching strategy to drive fleet development

Since 2017, the RFS has made minimal changes to its firefighting fleet volumes or vehicle types. The RFS is taking a fleet renewal approach to fleet planning, with a focus on refurbishing and replacing ageing firefighting assets with newer appliances and vehicles of the same classification and type. While the RFS has adopted a fleet renewal approach, driven by its Appliance Replacement Program Guide, it does not have a strategy or framework to guide its future-focused fleet development. There is no document that identifies and analyses bushfire events and risks in NSW, and matches fleet resources and fleet technologies to meet those risks. The RFS does not have fleet performance measures or targets to assess whether the size and composition of the fleet is meeting current or emerging bushfire climate hazards, or fuel load risks across its 44 NSW Fire Districts.

The RFS fleet currently comprises approximately 4,000 frontline, operational firefighting assets such as tankers, pumpers, and air and marine craft, and approximately 2,300 logistical vehicles, such as personnel transport vehicles and specialist support vehicles. Of the land-based firefighting vehicles, the RFS has maintained a steady number of approximately 3,800 tankers and 65 pumpers, year on year, for the past five years. This appliance type is an essential component of the RFS land-based, firefighting fleet with capabilities to suppress and extinguish fires.

Since 2017, most RFS fleet enhancement activity has been directed to upgrades and the modernisation of older fleet assets with new safety features. There is limited evidence of research into new fleet technologies for modern firefighting. The RFS fleet volumes and fleet types have remained relatively static since 2017, with the exception of the aerial firefighting fleet. Since 2017, the RFS has planned for, and purchased, six additional aircraft to add to the existing three aircraft in its permanent fleet.

While the RFS has made minimal changes to its fleet since 2017, in 2016 it reduced the overall number of smaller transport vehicles, by purchasing larger vehicles with increased capacity for personnel transport. The consolidation of logistical and transport vehicles accounts for an attrition in fleet numbers from 7,058 in 2016, to 6,315 in 2017 as shown in Exhibit 2.

The firefighting fleet management system is not always updated in a timely manner due to insufficient RFS personnel with permissions to make changes in the system

The RFS uses a fleet management system known as SAP EAM to record the location and status of firefighting fleet assets. The system holds information about the condition of the firefighting fleet, the home location of each fleet asset, and the maintenance, servicing, and inspection records of all assets. The RFS uses the system for almost all functions related to the firefighting fleet, including the location of vehicles so that they can be dispatched during operational exercises or fire responses.

Staff at RFS Headquarters are responsible for creating and maintaining asset records in the fleet management system. RFS District staff have limited permissions in relation to SAP EAM. They are able to raise work orders for repairs and maintenance, upload evidence to show that work has been done, and close actions in the system.

RFS District staff are not able to enter or update some fleet information in the system, such as the location of vehicles. When an RFS District receives a fleet appliance, it cannot be allocated to a brigade until the location of the asset is accurately recorded in the system. The location of the asset must be updated in the SAP EAM system by staff at RFS Headquarters. District staff can request system support from staff at RFS Headquarters to enter this information. At the time of writing, the position responsible for updating the fleet management system at RFS Headquarters was vacant, and RFS District personnel reported significant wait times in response to their service requests.

The RFS conducts annual audits of SAP EAM system information to ensure data is accurate and complete. RFS staff are currently doing data cleansing work to ensure that fleet allocations are recorded correctly in the system.

Communication between brigades, local councils and the RFS needs improvement to ensure that fleet information is promptly updated in the fleet management system

RFS brigade volunteers do not have access to the fleet management system. When fleet assets are used or moved, volunteers report information about the location and condition of the fleet to RFS District staff using a paper-based form, or by email or phone. Information such as vehicle mileage, engine hours, and defects are all captured by volunteers in a logbook which is scanned and sent to RFS District staff. RFS District staff then enter the relevant information into the fleet management system, or raise a service ticket with RFS Headquarters to enter the information.

Brigade volunteers move fleet assets for a range of reasons, including for fire practice exercises. If volunteers are unable to report the movement of assets to RFS District staff in a timely manner, this can lead to system inaccuracies. Lapses and backlogs in record keeping can occur when RFS staff at district offices or at Headquarters are not available to update records at the times that volunteers report information. A lack of accurate record keeping can potentially impact on RFS operational activities, including fire response activity.

Brigade volunteers notify RFS District staff when fleet appliances are defective, or if they have not been repaired properly. District staff then enter the information into the fleet management system. The inability of volunteers to enter information into the system means they have no visibility over their requests, including whether they have been approved, actioned, or rejected.

Local councils are responsible for servicing and maintaining the firefighting fleet according to the Rural Fires Act, but this responsibility can be transferred to the RFS through arrangements described in local service agreements. Council staff record all fleet servicing and maintenance information in their local systems. The types of fleet information that is captured in local council records can vary between councils. RFS staff described the level of council reporting, and the effectiveness of this process, as 'mixed'.

Councils use different databases and systems to record fleet assets, and some councils are better resourced for this activity than others

Firefighting fleet information is recorded in different asset management systems across NSW. Each council uses its own asset management system to record details about the vested fleet assets. All three councils that were interviewed for this audit had different systems to record information about the fleet. In addition, the type of information captured by the three councils was varied.

Exhibit 10: Systems used by local councils to manage the firefighting fleet
System Hawkesbury City Council Uralla Shire Council Wagga Wagga City Council
Financial asset management system TechnologyOne Civica Assetic
Asset management system TechnologyOne Manual MEX

Source: Audit Office analysis of information provided by the RFS and local councils.

Local councils have varying levels of resources and capabilities to manage the administrative tasks associated with the firefighting fleet. Some of the factors that impact on the ability of councils to manage administrative tasks include: the size of the council; the capabilities of the information management systems, the size of the staff team, and the levels of staff training in asset management.

Uralla Shire Council is a small rural council in northern NSW. This council uses financial software to record information about the firefighting fleet. While staff record information about the condition of the asset, its replacement value, and its depreciation, staff do not record the age of the asset, or its location. Staff manually enter fleet maintenance information into their systems. Uralla Shire Council would like to purchase asset maintenance software that generates work orders for fleet repairs and maintenance. However, the council does not have trained staff in the use of asset management software, and the small size of the fleet may not make it financially worthwhile.

The Hawkesbury City Council uses a single system to capture financial and asset information associated with the firefighting fleet. Hawkesbury is a large metropolitan council located north-west of Sydney, with a relatively large staff team in comparison with Uralla Shire Council. The Hawkesbury City Council has given RFS District staff access to their fleet information system. RFS District staff can directly raise work orders for fleet repairs and maintenance through the council system, and receive automated notifications when the work is complete.

Two of the three audited councils report that they conduct annual reviews of fleet assets to assess whether the information they hold is accurate and up-to-date.

More than half of the fleet maintenance service agreements between the RFS and local councils have not been reviewed in ten years, and some do not reflect local practices

Local councils have a legislated responsibility to service, repair, and maintain the firefighting fleet to service standards set by the RFS. Councils may transfer this responsibility to the RFS through District Service Agreements. The RFS Districts are responsible for ensuring that the service agreements are current and effective.

The RFS does not have monitoring and quality control processes to ensure that service agreements with local councils are reviewed regularly. The RFS has 73 service agreements with local councils or groups of councils. Sixty-three per cent of service agreements had not been reviewed in the last ten years. Only four service agreements specify an end date and, of those, one agreement expired in 2010 and had not been reviewed at the time of this audit.

The RFS does not have a framework to ensure that service agreements with local councils reflect actual practices. Of the three councils selected for audit, one agreement does not describe the actual arrangements for fleet maintenance practices in RFS Districts. The service agreement with Hawkesbury City Council specifies that the RFS will maintain the firefighting fleet on behalf of council when, in fact, council maintains the firefighting fleet. The current agreement commenced in 2012, and at the time of writing had not been updated to reflect local maintenance practices.

When District Service Agreements are not reviewed periodically, there is a risk that neither local councils nor the RFS have clear oversight of the status of fleet servicing, maintenance, and repairs.

RFS District Service Agreements set out a requirement that RFS and local councils establish a liaison committee. Liaison committees typically include council staff, RFS District staff, and RFS brigade volunteers. While service agreements state that liaison committees must meet periodically to monitor and review the performance of the service agreement, committee members determine when and how often the committee meets.

RFS District staff and staff at the three audited councils are not meeting routinely to review or update their service agreements. At Wagga Wagga City Council, staff meet with RFS District staff each year to report on activity to fulfil service agreement requirements. Uralla Shire Council staff did not meet routinely with RFS District staff before 2021. When liaison committees do not meet regularly, there is a risk that the RFS and local councils have incorrect or outdated information about the location, status, or condition of the firefighting fleet. Given that councils lack systems to track and monitor fleet locations, regular communication between the RFS and local councils is essential.

The RFS has not established processes to ensure that local councils and RFS District personnel meet and exchange information about the fleet. Of the three councils selected for this audit, one council had not received information about the number, type, or status of the fleet for at least five years, and did not receive an updated list of appliances until there was a change in RFS District personnel. This has impacted on the accuracy of council record keeping. Councils do not always receive notification about new assets or information about the location of assets from the RFS, and therefore cannot reflect this information in their accounting and reporting.

RFS area commands audit system records to ensure fleet inspections occur as planned, but central systems are not always updated, creating operational risks

RFS District staff are required by the Rural Fires Act to ensure the firefighting fleet is inspected at least once a year. Regular inspections of the fleet are vital to ensure that vehicles are fit-for-purpose and safe for brigade volunteers. Inspections are also fundamental to the operational readiness and capability of RFS to respond to fire incidents.

RFS Area Command personnel conduct audits of fleet maintenance data to ensure that fleet inspections are occurring as planned. These inspections provide the RFS with assurance that the fleet is being maintained and serviced by local council workshops, or third-party maintenance contractors.

Some RFS Districts run their own fleet management systems outside of the central management system. They do this to manage their fleet inspection activity effectively. Annual fleet inspection dates are programmed by staff at RFS Headquarters. Most of the inspection dates generated by RFS Headquarters are clustered together and RFS Districts need to separate inspection times to manage workloads over the year. Spreading inspection dates is necessary to avoid exceeding the capacity of local council workshops or third party contractors, and to ensure that fleet are available during the bushfire season.

The fleet inspection records at RFS Headquarters are not always updated in a timely manner to reflect actual inspection and service dates of vehicles. District staff are not able to change fleet inspection and service dates in the central management system because they do not have the necessary permissions to access the system. The usual practice is for RFS District staff to notify staff at RFS Headquarters, and ask them to retrospectively update the system. As there is a lag in updating the central database, at a point in time, the actual inspection and service dates of vehicles can be different to the dates entered in the central fleet management system.

Fleet inspection and maintenance records must be accurately recorded in the central RFS management system for operational reasons. RFS Headquarters personnel need to know the location and maintenance status of fleet vehicles at all times in order to dispatch vehicles to incidents and fires. The RFS fleet management system is integrated with a new Computer Aided Dispatch System. The Computer Aided Dispatch System assigns the nearest and most appropriate vehicles to fire incidents. The system relies on accurate fleet locations and fleet condition information in order to dispatch these vehicles.

There is a risk that RFS Headquarters' systems do not contain accurate information about the location and status of vehicles. Some may be in workshops for servicing and repair, while the system may record them as available for dispatch. As there are many thousands of fleet vehicles, all requiring an annual service and inspection, a lack of accurate record keeping has wide implications for State fire operations.

RFS is currently exploring ways to improve the ways in which fleet inspections are programmed into the fleet management system.

RFS provides funds to councils to assist with maintaining the firefighting fleet, but does not receive fleet maintenance cost information from all local councils

Each year the RFS provides local councils with a lump sum to assist with the cost of repairing and maintaining the firefighting fleet. This lump sum funding is also used for meeting the costs of maintaining brigade stations, utilities, and other miscellaneous matters associated with RFS business.

In 2020–21, the RFS provided NSW local councils with approximately $23 million for maintenance and repairs of appliances, buildings, and utilities. Ninety councils were provided with lump sum funding in 2021, receiving on average $257,000. The amounts received by individual councils ranged from $56,200 to $1,029,884.

Some councils provide itemised repairs and maintenance reports to RFS District staff, showing the work completed and the cost of that work. However, not all councils collect this information or provide it to the RFS. Local councils collect fleet maintenance information in their local council systems. In some cases, the responsibility for fleet maintenance is shared across a group of councils, and not all councils have oversight of this process.

The RFS has not taken steps to require local councils to provide itemised maintenance costings for the firefighting fleet. Thus, the RFS does not have a clear understanding of how local councils are spending their annual fleet maintenance funding allocations. The RFS does not know if the funding allocations are keeping pace with the actual cost of repairing and maintaining the fleet.

RFS District staff report that funding shortfalls are impacting on the prioritisation of fleet servicing and maintenance works in some council areas. When fleet servicing and maintenance is not completed routinely or effectively, there is a risk that it can negatively impact the overall condition and lifespan of the vehicle. Poor processes in relation to fleet maintenance and repair risk impacting on the operational capabilities of the fleet during fire events.

The timeliness and effectiveness of fleet servicing and maintenance is affected by resource levels in RFS Districts and local councils

Local councils have a legislated responsibility to service and maintain the firefighting fleet to the service standards set by the RFS. Fleet maintenance is usually done by the entity with the appropriate workshops and resources, and the maintenance arrangements are described in District Service Agreements. RFS District staff conduct annual inspections to ensure that the firefighting fleet has been serviced and maintained appropriately, and is safe for use by brigade volunteers. If the fleet has not been maintained to RFS service standards or timelines, RFS District staff may work with local councils to support or remediate these works.

The effectiveness of this quality control activity is dependent on relationships and communication between the RFS Districts and local councils. While some RFS staff reported having positive relationships with local councils, others said they struggled to get fleet maintenance work done in a timely manner. Some councils reported that funding shortfalls for fleet maintenance activity was impacting on the prioritisation of RFS fleet maintenance works. When fleet maintenance work is not completed routinely or effectively, it can negatively impact on the overall condition and lifespan of the vehicle. It can also reduce the capacity of the RFS to respond to fire events.

Fleet quality control activities are carried out by RFS District staff. In some of the smaller RFS Districts, one person is responsible for liaising with local councils and brigade volunteers about fleet maintenance and repairs. In the regions where resources are limited, there is less ability to maintain ongoing communication. This is impacting on fleet service and maintenance timelines and the timeliness of fleet monitoring activity.

The RFS has mutual support arrangements with agencies in NSW and interstate, though shared fleet levels are yet to be quantified

The RFS has arrangements with state, federal, and international fire authorities to provide mutual support during fire incidents. In NSW, the RFS has agreements with the three statutory authorities – Fire and Rescue NSW, the Forestry Corporation of NSW, and the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service. The agreement with Fire and Rescue NSW provides a framework for cooperation and joint operations between the agencies. The agreements with the Forestry Corporation of NSW and the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service describe the control and coordination arrangements for bush and grass fires across NSW. These arrangements are set out in legislation and incorporated into local Bush Fire Risk Management Plans.

The RFS has agreements with fire authorities in three of the four Australian states and territories that share a border with NSW – the Australian Capital Territory, Queensland, and South Australia. Each agreement sets out the arrangements for mutual assistance and joint operations, including arrangements for sharing aircraft. The agreement between the RFS and Victoria had lapsed. The RFS told the NSW Bushfire Inquiry that the agreement with Victoria would be finalised by June 2020. In June 2022, the RFS reported that the agreement was in the process of being finalised.

The arrangements for mutual aid from Western Australia, Northern Territory and Tasmania, are managed by the National Resource Sharing Centre. These agreements set out the arrangements for interstate assistance between Australian fire services, emergency services, and land management agencies in those states and territories.

These mutual support arrangements may assist during state-based fire events. However, when there are competing demands for resources, such as during the bushfires of 2019–2020, there can be limits on fleet availability. During the 2019–2020 fires, resources were stretched in all jurisdictions as these fires affected NSW, Victoria, and Queensland.

There are opportunities for the RFS and other NSW agencies to quantify fleet resources across the State and identify assets that can be mobilised for different fire activities. This form of fleet planning may be used to enhance surge capabilities during times of high fire activity. There are also opportunities for the RFS and other agencies to match the levels of shared assets to projected bushfire risks.

Appendix one – Responses from agencies 

Appendix two – About the audit 

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #376 - released 27 February 2023

 

Published

Actions for Bushfire recovery grants

Bushfire recovery grants

Environment
Industry
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Service delivery

What the report is about

The Bushfire Local Economic Recovery (BLER) program was created after the 2019–20 bushfires, and commits $541.8 million to bushfire affected areas in New South Wales. It is co-funded by the Commonwealth and NSW governments.

This audit assessed how effectively the Department of Regional NSW (the department) and Resilience NSW administered rounds one and two of the BLER program. These rounds were:

  • Round one: early co-funding, split between two streams:
    • ­Fast-Tracked projects 
    • ­Sector Development Grants (SDG)
  • Round two: open round.

What we found

The Department of Regional NSW did not effectively administer the Fast-Tracked stream of the BLER. 

The administration process lacked integrity, given it did not have sufficiently detailed guidelines and the assessment process for projects lacked transparency and consistency. 

At the request of the Deputy Premier's office, a $1 million threshold was applied, below which projects were not approved for funding. The department advises that some of the projects excluded were subsequently funded from other programs. 

This threshold resulted in a number of shortlisted projects in areas highly impacted by the bushfires being excluded, including all shortlisted projects located in Labor Party-held electorates.

The department's administration of the SDG stream had a detailed and transparent assessment process. However, conflicts of interest were not effectively managed. 

The department's administration of the open round included a clearly documented, detailed and transparent assessment framework. Some weaknesses in the approach to conflicts of interest remained.

What we recommended

The Department of Regional NSW should ensure that for all future grant programs it:

  1. establishes and follows guidelines that align with relevant good practice guidance 
  2. ensures a communications plan is in place, including the communication of guidelines to potential applicants
  3. ensures staff declare conflicts of interest prior to the commencement of a grants stream, and that these conflicts of interest are recorded and managed
  4. ensures regular monitoring is in place as part of funding deeds 
  5. documents all key decisions and approvals in line with record keeping obligations.

This audit assessed how effectively the Department of Regional NSW and Resilience NSW administered rounds one and two of the Bushfire Local Economic Recovery (BLER) program.

As noted in this report, Resilience NSW was involved in the set-up and ongoing administration and monitoring of the BLER program. During the audited period, Resilience NSW was tasked with working with the Department of Regional NSW to create program objectives, guidelines and criteria. Their role also involved liaising with the Commonwealth Government, which provided co-funding for the program. Resilience NSW also had an ongoing role in quality assurance and compliance to ensure agencies administering disaster assistance did so in accordance with relevant guidelines. On 16 December 2022, the NSW Government abolished Resilience NSW.

Our work for this performance audit was completed on 3 November 2022, when we issued the final report to the two audited agencies. The audit report does not make specific recommendations to Resilience NSW. On 24 November 2022, the then Commissioner of Resilience NSW provided a response to the final report, which we include as it is the formal response from the audited entity at the time the audit was conducted.

During the 2019–20 bushfire season, New South Wales experienced 11,774 fire incidents, burning 5.5 million hectares of the state. There were 26 fatalities and 2,476 homes destroyed. The agriculture sector was heavily impacted with 601,858 hectares of pasture damaged.

Due to the widespread impacts of these fires on the state, the NSW and Commonwealth governments committed $4.4 billion toward bushfire response, recovery, and preparedness. This included the establishment of the Bushfire Local Economic Recovery (BLER) program, with $541.8 million committed to support job retention and creation in areas impacted by bushfires. The program also aims to strengthen community resilience and reduce the impact of future natural disasters. The BLER program is co-funded, with the Commonwealth and NSW governments funding 50% each.

The BLER program is comprised of three funding rounds:

  • round one early co-funding, split between
    • Fast-Tracked projects
    • Sector Development Grants (SDG)
  • round two: open round
  • round three: final projects and initiatives.

Resilience NSW was involved in setting up the BLER program and the Department of Regional NSW (the department) is responsible for administering it. The Commonwealth National Recovery and Resilience Agency must also endorse any projects proposed by the NSW Government for funding as part of the funding agreement between the State and Commonwealth governments.

Successful projects under the SDG stream were announced in September 2020 and projects funded through the Fast-Tracked stream were announced in October 2020. Round two (the open round) was administered after these two streams and successful projects were announced in June 2021.

The Department of Premier and Cabinet established the 'Good Practice Guide to Grants Administration' (the Good Practice Guide) in 2010 to assist the NSW Government in ensuring grants administration was performed consistently across all NSW Government grants programs. Compliance with the Good Practice Guide was not compulsory, but provided an outline of best practice covering the entire lifecycle of a grants program. This guide was in place at the time these grants were designed and administered.

The design and delivery of round one of the program occurred quickly, as part of the response to the 2019–20 bushfires, and was responding to a request from the Commonwealth Government for rapid project identification.

The objective of this audit was to assess how effectively the Department of Regional NSW and Resilience NSW administered rounds one and two of the BLER program. Round three was excluded from this audit because it had not been announced at the time of the audit.

We addressed this objective by examining whether the audited agencies:

  • effectively planned administration of the BLER program and established appropriate guidelines
  • implemented an effective assessment process for the BLER program
  • are effectively monitoring implementation of projects and program outcomes.

Conclusion

The Department of Regional NSW did not effectively administer the Fast-Tracked stream of the Bushfire Local Economic Recovery program. The administration process lacked integrity, given it did not have sufficiently detailed guidelines, and the assessment process for projects lacked transparency and consistency.

There were significant gaps in the documentation of decision-making throughout this funding stream. At the request of the Deputy Premier's office, a $1 million threshold was applied, below which projects were not approved for funding. This threshold was applied without a documented reason and was not part of the program guidelines. The department advises that some of the projects excluded through application of the threshold were subsequently funded from other programs.

The department's administration of the Sector Development Grants stream had a detailed and transparent assessment process. That said, conflicts of interest were not effectively managed, and the department did not effectively engage with stakeholders during the grants process.

The department's administration of the open round included a clearly documented, detailed and transparent assessment framework that it followed throughout. The department also implemented probity arrangements in the open round, although some weaknesses in the department's approach to conflicts of interest remained.

Fast-Tracked stream

Following requests from the Commonwealth Government in May and June 2020 to identify projects rapidly and as soon as practical, the department used an expedited process to identify relevant projects that had applied for other grants programs but had not received funding or which were identified as local priority projects. The department developed a set of guidelines for the Fast-Tracked stream based on draft Commonwealth funding criteria, but the department's guidelines lacked sufficient detail to ensure transparent and consistent decision-making. The guidelines also did not contain detailed information on how the assessment and approval processes would work. The department did not implement conflict of interest declarations for staff involved in the assessment process.

The assessment process implemented for the Fast-Tracked stream deviated from the guidelines. For example, the guidelines did not set out a role for the then Deputy Premier or his office in the assessment process, but the Deputy Premier's office played a key role in project selection. At the direction of the Deputy Premier's office, a $1 million minimum threshold, not mentioned in the guidelines, was applied to projects, below which, projects would not be funded. This resulted in a number of shortlisted projects in areas highly impacted by the bushfires, including all shortlisted projects located in Labor Party-held electorates, being excluded without a rationale being documented at the time. The department advised that some of these projects were subsequently funded through other funding streams.

The department's assessment process was inconsistent, poorly documented and lacked transparency. The department initially identified 445 potential projects through consultation with councils and through identifying projects that had been unsuccessful for other grant programs. The department only assessed 164 of these 445 projects for funding against the criteria in the guidelines. The department did not document the rationale for not assessing the remaining 281 projects against the criteria. The department also sought advice from Public Works Advisory (PWA) on whether projects could commence within six months, which was an eligibility criterion for the Fast-Tracked stream. PWA were only asked to assess 25 of the 445 projects, of which 19 were funded through the Fast-Tracked stream. The department also did not consistently follow PWA's advice and funded projects which PWA had advised were unable to commence within six months, which was not in line with the guidelines.

The department monitors 21 of the 22 Fast-Tracked projects on a quarterly basis to ensure projects are on track. Resilience NSW is responsible for the remaining project and does not monitor this on a quarterly basis but has established a project control group that performs a similar function. The agencies advised that this project is being transitioned to the department's management.

Sector Development Grants (SDG)

The department designed and published guidelines for the SDG stream. The guidelines largely align with the Department of Premier and Cabinet's 'Good Practice Guide to Grants Administration', although they could have been strengthened by including more detail on the eligibility of projects and the role of cost benefit analyses in the assessment process. The guidelines included a detailed and transparent assessment process which the department largely followed.

There were gaps in the administration of the SDG stream assessment process. The department did not effectively manage conflicts of interest as it did not ensure all required conflict of interest forms were completed and some forms were completed after the assessment process was finalised. The department also advised that the final version of the conflict of interest register, which contained the declarations for the SDG stream, was lost during a record management system change. The department did not develop guidance for communicating with stakeholders for the SDG stream. Feedback was received from industries which had been excluded from the SDG stream, relaying their concerns, and requesting a broader range of agribusiness sectors be considered for eligibility. A communications plan or strategy could have incorporated guidance on engaging agribusiness stakeholders during the planning stages of the stream, ensuring they were aware of the rationale for the eligible industries selected.

The majority of SDG funding went to areas highly impacted by the bushfires, although some highly impacted areas received less funding than lower impacted areas, and there is no clear reason for this.

The department does not monitor SDG projects on a quarterly basis to ensure that they remain on track but it ensures it has sufficient evidence that milestones have been completed before making funding payments.

Open round

The department designed and implemented a clearly documented and detailed assessment process for the open round. There were some areas where the process could have been improved, for example, the published guidelines did not set out the role of the former Deputy Premier or include reference to consultation with members of Parliament (MP) as part of the process, despite the fact that MPs were consulted as part of this round.

The department improved its management of conflicts of interest compared to the Fast-Tracked and SDG streams by maintaining a conflict of interest register, though not all conflict of interest declarations were collected. The department also developed a communications plan which led to improvements in stakeholder engagement.

One of the purposes of the open round was to distribute funding to local government areas (LGA) which did not receive funding through the Fast-Tracked stream. This intention was not outlined in the guidelines for this funding stream. The majority of funding from the open round went to LGAs which had been highly impacted by the bushfires.

The department monitors the open round projects on a quarterly basis to ensure that they are on track.

1. Recommendations

To promote integrity and transparency, the Department of Regional NSW should ensure that for all future grant programs it:

  1. establishes and follows guidelines that align with relevant good practice guidance including accountabilities, key assessment steps and clear assessment criteria
  2. ensures a communications plan is in place, including the communication of guidelines to potential applicants
  3. ensures staff declare conflicts of interest prior to the commencement of a grants stream, and that these conflicts of interest are recorded and managed
  4. ensures regular monitoring is in place as part of funding deeds
  5. documents all key decisions and approvals in line with record keeping obligations.

Stage one of the BLER program consisted of early co-funded projects valued at a total of $180 million. This included 22 Fast-Tracked priority projects valued at a total of $107.8 million. The purpose of these projects was to deliver immediate and significant economic impacts to high and moderate bushfire-impacted areas.

A timeline of key dates may be found at Exhibit 5.

Fifty-two projects worth a total of $73.2 million were funded through the SDG stream. One grantee withdrew their project from the stream in early 2021, leaving a total of 51 projects (of which 49 are co-funded with the Commonwealth Government).

A timeline of key dates may be found at Exhibit 9.

The department distributed $283 million to 195 successful projects as part of the open round of the BLER program.

A timeline of key dates may be found at Exhibit 11.

The department entered into funding deeds with successful applicants

The Good Practice Guide advises that the agency administering a grant should enter into a formal agreement with each grant recipient which sets out the arrangements under which a grant is provided, received, managed and acquitted. Across all three streams, the department sent out a letter of offer to successful project managers to let them know that they had been successful in receiving funding, and then entered into funding deeds with grantees. The one exception was the project that RNSW managed, discussed below.

The reviewed funding deeds were signed by department staff with the appropriate level of delegation. They contained an appropriate level of information and key clauses that would allow the department to monitor the progress of the grant to ensure its completion as agreed with the grantee. The reviewed funding deeds contained key information, including:

  • total value of the grant
  • key deliverables at each milestone
  • expected completion date of both the overall project and each milestone
  • reporting requirements, including provisions to allow the department to request relevant information
  • variation procedures.

The department only makes payments after confirming that milestones have been reached

The department has provided payments to grantees only after they could demonstrate that they had completed the agreed milestone. To ensure each milestone has been completed, the department requires grantees to provide evidence that they have fulfilled the milestone. Types of evidence provided includes photographs and invoices. Where the grantee provides insufficient evidence to the department, the department follows-up with the grantee to ensure that enough information is provided to justify the milestone payment.

The department also plans to undertake site visits of projects at select milestones and at the completion of most projects. The department has undertaken a risk assessment of each SDG and open round project, and uses this risk assessment to determine the number of milestones for the project, as well as the number of site visits that the department will undertake. Fast-Tracked projects all had PWA providing either project management or assurance and as such oversight is being provided through that mechanism. The milestones and site visits at each level of risk can be seen in Exhibit 15 for SDG and Exhibit 16 for open round.

Exhibit 15: Milestones and site visits for each level of risk - SDG
Risk rating Milestones Site visits
Low Two Zero
Medium Three One
High Four Two
Source: Department of Regional NSW.
 
Exhibit 16: Milestones and site visits for each level of risk - open round
Risk rating Milestones Site visits
Low Three One
Medium Four Two
High Five Three
 Source: Department of Regional NSW.

The department does not monitor quarterly progress for SDG grants

As part of the LER framework, the department reports to the Commonwealth every quarter on the status and financials of each project, including whether there are any risks to project delivery and the mitigations in place for those risks. For projects funded through the Fast-Tracked stream and the open round, the department collects quarterly progress reports from the grantees. These progress reports allow the department to determine if there are project risks, which can then be reported to the Commonwealth. The progress reports also allow the department to determine if a milestone is likely to be met within the next quarter or whether a project variation may be needed.

While the department monitors projects funded through the Fast-Tracked stream and the open round on a quarterly basis, there is no quarterly monitoring of progress for projects funded through the SDG stream. The SDG funding deeds do not include a provision to require quarterly reporting to the department. The department only collects progress reports from grantees when the grantee reports that it has completed a milestone. Quarterly monitoring of the SDG stream would allow the department to determine if projects require corrective action.

Resilience NSW is not collecting quarterly reports for the Fast-Tracked grant it is responsible for administering

One of the projects funded through the Fast-Tracked stream was the rebuilding of three local halls across two LGAs, for a total value of $3 million. RNSW is responsible for managing this grant and entered into funding deeds with the relevant councils. It is not documented why RNSW is responsible for these funding deeds rather than the department, which is the signatory for all of the other Fast-Tracked stream funding deeds. RNSW advised it was due to the responsible RNSW Director having a strong working relationship with the relevant councils.

The funding deeds which RNSW signed with the relevant councils set out a requirement that the councils would report on this project to RNSW every quarter. The second milestone of each of these projects involved the submission of a quarterly report. However, RNSW was unable to provide evidence that it carried out this monitoring of the project. At the time of the audit, no second milestone payment had been made. Undertaking quarterly monitoring would provide RNSW with assurance that the money is being expended for the proper purpose and whether the projects will be completed by the target date.

RNSW and the relevant councils developed project control groups for each project, which allows it to monitor the implementation of the projects. PWA is also represented on these project control groups and provides an advisory role in the implementation of the projects.

RNSW and the department advised that responsibility for this project will be transitioned to the department and it will be monitored on a quarterly basis, in line with the other Fast-Tracked projects.

The department has a consistent approach to validating variations

The department's funding deeds with grantees allow for the variation of contracts at the department's discretion after the grantee has written to the department. It is important for the department to consider the impact of any project variation request on the overall program objectives, because a project which costs more than was originally planned or which takes additional time may put at risk the objectives of the BLER program. To ensure that requests for variation are handled consistently and appropriately, the department's Grants Management Office (GMO) has developed a process document which applies to variation requests across the BLER program.

For the grants reviewed as part of this audit, the GMO applied this variation process consistently and has documented the outcomes. Larger variations are reviewed at a higher level of delegation and sign-off. To determine whether a variation is accepted, the GMO considers the following factors:

  • consistency with BLER program objectives
  • delivery within the timeframes of the BLER program
  • eligibility under the BLER program guidelines
  • financial viability to deliver within the requested budget.

The department is preparing multiple evaluations, but it has delayed its process evaluation

When developing round one of the BLER program, the department developed an evaluation plan. A total of $1.1 million has been reserved for conducting process, outcome, and economic evaluations of the BLER program and two other bushfire recovery grant programs.

To assist with evaluating program outcomes and economic impact, the department is planning a post-completion survey in 2023–24. This timeline will allow most projects to be completed and enough time for project outcomes to be realised. The department advised that the data collected through this survey would allow the department to determine whether the BLER program has achieved its objectives, as it includes information such as the number of jobs created through each project.

The process evaluation was initially planned for March to June 2021. This would have aligned with the announcement of the open round funding and would have allowed for the learnings from rounds one and two of the BLER program to be applied to the development of round three. However, the department did not conduct this evaluation in a timely way. The department advised that this was because funding deed negotiations were still ongoing, and the department was waiting for 50% of funding deeds to be signed. Given this, the department was not in a position to commence its process evaluation. In December 2021, the department revised its evaluation plan and advised that it commenced its process evaluation in April 2022. It is unlikely that this will allow time for the department to apply learnings to round three, which is currently underway.

Appendix one – Responses from agencies

Appendix two – BLER program distribution

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #373 - released 2 February 2023

Published

Actions for Coordination of the response to COVID-19 (June to November 2021)

Coordination of the response to COVID-19 (June to November 2021)

Premier and Cabinet
Community Services
Health
Justice
Whole of Government
Internal controls and governance
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration

What the report is about

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies’ coordination of the response to COVID-19, with a focus on the Delta variant outbreak in the Dubbo and Fairfield Local Government Areas (LGA) between June and November 2021. We audited five agencies - the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Health, the NSW Police Force, Resilience NSW and the Department of Customer Service.

The audit also considered relevant planning and preparation activities that occurred prior to June 2021 to examine how emergency management and public health responses learned from previous events.

What we found

Prior to Delta, agencies developed capability to respond to COVID-19 related challenges.

However, lessons learned from prior reviews of emergency management arrangements, and from other jurisdictions, had not been implemented when Delta emerged in June 2021. As a result, agencies were not as fully prepared as they could have been to respond to the additional challenges presented by Delta.

Gaps in emergency management plans affected agencies' ability to support individuals, families and businesses impacted by restrictions to movement and gathering such as stay-at-home orders. In LGAs of concern, modest delays of a few days had a significant impact on people, especially those most vulnerable.

On 23 July 2021, the NSW Government established a cross-government coordinating approach, the Delta Microstrategy, which complemented existing emergency management arrangements, improved coordination between NSW Government agencies and led to more effective local responses.

Where possible, advice provided to government was supported by cross-government consultation, up-to-date evidence and insights. Public Health Orders were updated as the response to Delta intensified or to address unintended consequences of previous orders. The frequency of changes hampered agencies' ability to effectively communicate changes to frontline staff and the community in a rapidly evolving situation.

The NSW Government could provide greater transparency and accountability over decisions to apply Public Health Orders during a pandemic.

What we recommended

The audit made seven recommendations intended to improve transparency, accountability and preparedness for future emergency events.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies’ coordination (focused on the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Health, the NSW Police Force, Resilience NSW and the Department of Customer Service) of the COVID-19 response in selected Local Government Areas (Fairfield City Council and Dubbo Regional Council) between June and November 2021.

As noted in this report, Resilience NSW was responsible for the coordination of welfare services as part of the emergency management arrangements. On 16 December 2022, the NSW Government abolished Resilience NSW.

During the audited period, Resilience NSW was tasked with supporting the needs of communities subject to stay-at-home orders or stricter restrictions and it provided secretariat support to the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC). The SEMC was, and remains, responsible for the coordination and oversight of emergency management policy and preparedness.

Our work for this performance audit was completed on 15 November 2022, when we issued the final report to the five audited agencies. While the audit report does not make specific recommendations to Resilience NSW, it does include five recommendations to the State Emergency Management Committee. On 8 December 2022, the then Commissioner of Resilience NSW provided a response to the final report, which we include as it is the formal response from the audited entity at the time the audit was conducted.

The community of New South Wales has experienced significant emergency events during the past three years. COVID-19 first emerged in New South Wales after bushfire and flooding emergencies in 2019–20. The pandemic is now into its third year, and there have been further extreme weather and flooding events during 2021 and 2022.

Lessons taken from the experience of these events are important to informing future responses and reducing future risks to the community from emergencies.

This audit focuses on the NSW Government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and in particular, the Delta variant (Delta) that occurred between June and November 2021. The response to the Delta represents six months of heightened challenges for the NSW Government.

Government responses to emergencies are guided by legislation. The State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989 (SERM Act) establishes emergency management arrangements in New South Wales and covers:

  • coordination at state, regional and local levels through emergency management committees
  • emergency management plans, supporting plans and functional areas including the State Emergency Management Plan (EMPLAN)
  • operations centres and controllers at state, regional and local levels.

This audit focuses on the activities of five agencies during the audit period:

  • The NSW Police Force led the emergency management response and was responsible for coordinating agencies across government in providing the tactical and operational elements that supported and enhanced the health response to the pandemic. The NSW Police Force also led the compliance response which enforced Public Health Orders and included household checks on those required to isolate at home after testing positive to COVID-19. In some parts of NSW, they were supported by the Australian Defence Force in this role.
  • NSW Health was responsible for leading the health response which coordinated all parts of the health system, initially to prevent, and then to manage, the pandemic.
  • Resilience NSW coordinated welfare services as part of the emergency management arrangements and provided secretariat support to the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC). The SEMC is responsible for the coordination and oversight of emergency management policy and preparedness. Resilience NSW was also tasked with supporting the needs of communities subject to stay-at-home orders or stricter restrictions.
  • The Department of Customer Service (DCS) was responsible for the statewide strategic communications response.
  • The Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) held a key role in providing policy and legal services, as well as supporting the coordination of activity across a range of functional areas and decision-making by our State’s leaders.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies’ coordination (focused on the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Health, the NSW Police Force, Resilience NSW and the Department of Customer Service) of the COVID-19 response in selected Local Government Areas (LGA) (Fairfield City Council and Dubbo Regional Council) after June 2021.

The audit investigated whether:

  • government decisions to apply LGA-specific Public Health Orders were supported by effective crisis management governance and planning frameworks
  • agencies effectively coordinated in the communication (and enforcement) of Public Health Orders.

While focusing on the coordination of NSW Government agencies’ response to the Delta variant in June through to November 2021, the audit also considered relevant planning and preparation activities that occurred prior to June 2021 to examine how emergency management and public health responses learned from previous events.

This audit does not assess the effectiveness of other specific COVID-19 responses such as business support. It refers to the preparedness, planning and delivery of these activities in the context of supporting communities in selected LGAs. NSW Health's contribution to the Australian COVID-19 vaccine rollout was also subject to a separate audit titled 'New South Wales COVID-19 vaccine rollout' tabled in NSW Parliament on 7 December 2022. 

This audit is part of a series of audits which have been completed, or are in progress, regarding the New South Wales COVID-19 emergency response. The Audit Office of New South Wales '2022–2025 Annual Work Program' details the ongoing focus our audits will have on providing assurance on the effectiveness of emergency responses.

In this document Aboriginal refers to the First Nations peoples of the land and waters now called Australia, and includes Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.

Conclusion

Prior to June 2021, agencies worked effectively together to adapt and refine pre-existing emergency management arrangements to respond to COVID-19. However, lessons learned from prior reviews of emergency management arrangements, and from other jurisdictions, had not been implemented when Delta emerged in June 2021. As a result, agencies were not as fully prepared as they could have been to respond to the additional challenges presented by Delta.

In the period March 2020 to June 2021, the State's Emergency Management (EM) arrangements coordinated the New South Wales emergency response to COVID-19 with support from the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) which led the cross-government COVID-19 Taskforce. NSW Government agencies enhanced the EM arrangements, which until then had typically been activated in response to natural disasters, to meet the specific circumstances of the pandemic.

However, the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC), supported by Resilience NSW, did not address relevant recommendations arising from the 2020 Bushfires Inquiry before June 2021 and agencies did not always integrate lessons learned from other jurisdictions or scenario training exercises into emergency management plans or strategies before Delta. As a result, deficiencies in the EM arrangements, including representation of vulnerable communities on EM bodies, well-being support for multicultural communities in locked down environments and cross-agency information sharing, persisted when Delta emerged in June 2021.

It should be noted that for the purposes of this audit there is no benchmark, informed by precedent, that articulates what level of preparation would have been sufficient or proportionate. However, the steps required to address these gaps were reasonable and achievable, and the failure to do so meant that agencies were not as fully prepared as they could have been for the scale and escalation of Delta’s spread across the State.

The Delta Microstrategy complemented the EM arrangements to support greater coordination and agencies are working to improve their capability for future events

The Delta Microstrategy (the Microstrategy) led to innovations in information sharing and collaboration across the public service. Agencies involved in the response have completed, or are completing, reviews of their contribution to the response. That said, none of these reviews includes a focus on whole-of-government coordination.

On 23 July 2021, the NSW Government approved the establishment of the Microstrategy to respond to the additional challenges presented by Delta including the need to support communities most impacted by restrictions to movement and gathering in the LGAs of concern. An extensive range of government agencies were represented across eight Microstrategy workstreams, which coordinated with the existing EM arrangements to deliver targeted strategies to communities in high-risk locations and improve data and information sharing across government. This enhanced the public health, compliance, income and food support, communications and community engagement aspects of the response.

Agencies also leveraged learnings from early weeks of the Delta wave and were able to replicate those lessons in other locations. The use of pre-staging hubs in Fairfield to support food and personal hamper distribution was used a month later in Dubbo which acted as a central hub for more remote parts of the State.

Emergency management plans did not enable government to respond immediately to support vulnerable communities in high-risk LGAs or regional NSW

There are gaps in the emergency management plans relating to the support for individuals, families and businesses impacted by the stay-at-home orders and other restrictions to movement and gathering. These gaps affected agencies' ability to respond immediately when the need arose during Delta.

Emergency management plans and supporting instruments did not include provision for immediate relief for households, which meant arrangements for isolation income support and food security measures had to be designed in the early stages of Delta before it could be approved and deployed.

There were delays – sometimes only days, on occasion, weeks - in providing support to affected communities. In particular, there were delays to the provision of income support and in scaling up efforts to coordinate food and grocery hampers to households in isolation. In LGAs of concern, modest delays of a few days had a significant impact on people, especially those most vulnerable.

Although government issued stricter restrictions for workers in the Fairfield LGA on 14 July 2021, it only approved targeted income support for people in LGAs of concern on 16 August 2021.

Overall, agencies coordinated effectively to provide advice to government but there are opportunities to learn lessons to improve preparedness for future events

Agencies coordinated in providing advice to government. The advice was supported by timely public health information, although this was in the context of a pandemic, where data and information about the virus and its variants was changing regularly. However, agencies did not always consider the impact on key industries or supply chains when they provided advice to government, which meant that Public Health Orders would sometimes need to be corrected.

Public Health Orders were also updated as the response to Delta intensified or to address unintended consequences of previous orders. The frequency of changes hampered agencies' ability to effectively communicate changes to frontline staff and the community in a rapidly evolving situation.

The audit identified several occasions where there were delays, ranging from three to 21 days, between the provision of advice to government and subsequent decision-making (which we have not detailed due to the confidentiality of Cabinet deliberations). Agency officers advised of instances where they were not provided sufficient notice of changes to Public Health Orders to organise local infrastructure (such as traffic support for testing clinics) to support compliance with new requirements.

The COVID-19 pandemic arrived in Australia in late January 2020 as the bushfire and localised flooding emergencies were in their final stages. Between 2020 and mid-2021, agencies responded to the initial variants of COVID-19, managed a border closure with Victoria that lasted nearly four months and dealt with localised ‘flare-ups’ that required postcode-based restrictions on mobility in northern parts of Sydney and regional New South Wales. During this period, New South Wales had the opportunity to learn from events in Victoria which imposed strict restrictions on mobility across the State and the growing emergence of the Delta variant (Delta) across the Asia Pacific.

This section of the report assesses how emergency management and public health responses adapted to these lessons and determined preparedness for, and responses to, widespread community transmission of Delta in New South Wales.

The previous chapter discusses how agencies had refined the existing emergency management arrangements to suit the needs of a pandemic and describes some gaps that were not addressed. This chapter explores the first month of Delta (mid-June to mid-July 2021). It explores the areas where agencies were prepared and responses in place for the outbreak. It also discusses the impact of the gaps that were not addressed in the period prior to Delta and other issues that emerged.

NSW Health provided advice on the removal of restrictions based on up-to-date advice

The NSW Government discussed the gradual process for removing restrictions using the Doherty Institute modelling provided to National Cabinet on 10 August 2021. NSW Health highlighted the importance of maintaining a level of public health and safety measure bundles to further suppress case numbers. This was based on additional modelling from the Doherty Institute.

The Department of Regional NSW led discussion and planning around reopening with a range of proposal through August and September 2021. The Department of Premier and Cabinet and NSW Health jointly developed a paper to provide options on the restrictions when the State reached a level of 70% double dose vaccinations.

The roadmap to reopening was originally published on 9 September 2021. However, by 11 October 2021, the restrictions were relaxed when the 70% double dose threshold was reached to allow:

  • up to ten fully vaccinated visitors to a home (increased from five)
  • up to 30 fully vaccinated people attending outdoor gatherings (increased from 20)
  • weddings and funerals limits increased to 100 people (from 50)
  • the reopening of indoor pools for training, exercise and learning purposes only.

On the same day, the NSW Government announced further relaxation of restrictions once the 80% double dose threshold was reached. These restrictions were further relaxed on 8 November 2021. This included the removal of capacity restrictions to the number of visitors to a private residence, indoor pools to reopen for all purposes and density limits of one person for every two square metres, dancing allowed in nightclubs and 100% capacity in major stadia.

The NSW Government allowed workers in regional areas who received one vaccination dose to return to their workplace from 11 October 2021.

The Premier extended the date of easing of restrictions for unvaccinated people aged over 16 from 1 December to 15 December 2021.

Many agencies have undertaken reviews of their response to the Delta outbreak but a whole-of-government review has yet to be conducted

Various agencies and entities associated with the response to the Delta outbreak conducted after-action review processes. These processes assessed the achievements delivered, lessons learned and opportunities for improvement. However, a whole-of-government level review has not been conducted. This limits the New South Wales public service's ability to improve how it coordinates responses in future emergencies.

The agencies/entities that conducted reviews included:

  • South West Metropolitan region, Western NSW region, Fairfield Local Emergency Management Committee (LEMC), Dubbo Local Emergency Operations Controller (LEOCON), which were collated centrally by the State Emergency Operations Centre (SEOC)
  • Aboriginal Affairs NSW assessed representation and relevance of the emergency management arrangements for Aboriginal communities following the 2019 bushfires
  • Resilience NSW developed case studies to capture improved practice with regard to food security and supply chains
  • a community support and empowerment-focused after-action review undertaken by the Pillar 5 workstream of the Microstrategy.

Key lessons collated from the after-action reviews include:

  • the impact of variation in capability across agencies on the management of key aspects of the response including welfare support and logistics
  • issues with boundary differences between NSW Police Force regions, local government areas (LGA and local health districts (LHD) caused issues in delivering and coordinating services in an emergency situation 
  • the need to improve relationships between state and local Government outside of acute emergency responses to improve service delivery 
  • issues arising from impediments to information sharing between agencies and jurisdictions, such as:
    • timeliness and accuracy of data used to direct compliance activities
    • the impact of insufficient advance notice on changes to Public Health Orders
    • timely access to data across public sector agencies and other jurisdictions to inform decision-making, analysis and communications
    • gaps in data around ethnicity, geolocation of recent positive cases and infection/vaccination rates in Aboriginal communities.
  • the lack of Aboriginal community representation on many LEMCs
  • compared with the response to COVID-19 in 2020, improved coordination of communications with Culturally and Linguistically Diverse (CALD) populations with a reduction in overlapping messages and over-communication
  • improved attendance from agency representatives in LEMCs, and regional emergency operations centres (REOC) to improve interagency communications, planning, capability development and community engagement issues
  • deficiencies in succession planning and fatigue management practices
  • the potential for REOC Welfare/Well-being subgroups to be included as part of the wider efforts to community needs during emergencies.

NSW Health commenced a whole of system review of its COVID-19 response in May 2022. At the time of writing, the completion due date for the debrief is 7 November 2022. This debrief is expected to explore:

  • governance
  • engagement 
  • innovation and technology 
  • community impact 
  • workforce impact
  • system impact and performance.

NSW Health is also undertaking a parallel Intra-Action Review that is focused on the public health aspects of the response with finalisation estimated for the end of November 2022. At the time of completing this performance audit report, NSW Health had not finalised these reviews and, as a result, we cannot validate their findings against our own observations.

Recent inquiries are likely to impact the governance of emergency management in New South Wales

In March 2022, the NSW Government established an independent inquiry to examine and report on the causes of, preparedness for, response to and recovery from the 2022 floods. The Flood Inquiry report made 28 recommendations, which the NSW Government supported in full or in principle. Some of the recommendations relate directly to the governance and leadership of emergency management arrangements in New South Wales. 

The State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC) will likely be involved in, and impacted by, the recommendations arising from the Flood Inquiry with potential changes to its membership and reshaping of functional areas and agencies. At the same time, the SEMC may have a role in overseeing the changes that emerge from the SEOC consolidated after-action reviews. This can also extend to ensuring local and regional bodies have incorporated the required actions. There is a risk that the recommendations from the pandemic-based after-action reviews may not be considered due to the priority of action resulting from the Flood Inquiry.

Furthermore, there is potential for the SEMC to work with NSW Health during its system-wide review. Such an approach is likely to improve preparedness for future events.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – Chronology 2020–2021

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #371 - released 20 December 2022

Published

Actions for Effectiveness of the Biodiversity Offsets Scheme

Effectiveness of the Biodiversity Offsets Scheme

Planning
Environment
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Regulation

What the report is about

This audit examined whether the Department of Planning and Environment (DPE) and the Biodiversity Conservation Trust (BCT) have effectively designed and implemented the Biodiversity Offsets Scheme (‘the Scheme’) to compensate for the loss of biodiversity due to development.

Under the Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016, the Scheme enables landholders to establish in-perpetuity Biodiversity Stewardship Agreements on sites to generate credits for the unique biodiversity on that land. These credits can be sold to offset the negative impact of development on biodiversity.

What we found

DPE has not effectively designed core elements of the Scheme. DPE did not establish a clear strategic plan to guide the implementation of the Scheme.

The BCT has various roles in the Scheme but lacked safeguards against potential conflicts, creating risks to credit supply.

The effectiveness of its implementation has also been limited. Key concerns around the Scheme’s transparency, sustainability and integrity are yet to be fully resolved.

A market-based approach to biodiversity offsetting is central to the Scheme's operation but credit supply is lacking and poorly matched to growing demand. DPE has not established a clear, resourced plan to manage the shortage in credit supply. Data about the market, published by the DPE and the BCT, does not provide an adequate picture of credit supply, demand and price to readily support market participation.

These factors create a risk that biodiversity gains made through the Scheme will not be sufficient to offset losses resulting from development, and that the DPE will not be able to assess the Scheme’s overall effectiveness.

DPE is leading work with the BCT to improve the Scheme, but this is not yet guided by a long-term strategy with clear goals.

What we recommended

The audit made 11 recommendations to DPE and the BCT, focusing on:

  • a long-term strategic plan for the Scheme
  • improvements to the operation and transparency of the market and credit supply
  • frameworks to ensure the financial and ecological sustainability of biodiversity stewardship sites
  • enhanced public reporting and data management
  • resolving issues in conflicting governance and oversight.

 

 Fast facts

  • 96% –  proportion of developer demand for species credits not met by current supply
  • 97% – proportion of species credits that have never been traded on the biodiversity market
  • 60% – proportion of the 226 Biodiversity Stewardship sites under active land management
  • $90m – value of developers’ obligations paid directly into the Biodiversity Conservation Fund
  • 20% – proportion of developer obligations transferred to the BCT that have been acquitted.

The NSW Government's Biodiversity Outlook Report 2020 estimates that, without effective management, only 50% of species and 59% of ecological communities that are listed as threatened in New South Wales will still exist in 100 years. The NSW State of the Environment 2021 report identifies habitat destruction and native vegetation clearing as presenting the single greatest threat to biodiversity in the State.

According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), biodiversity offsets are 'measurable conservation outcomes that result from actions designed to compensate for significant, residual biodiversity loss from development projects'. The OECD states that a feature of such schemes is that biodiversity offsets are intended to be implemented as the 'final step of a mitigation hierarchy' whereby reasonable first steps are taken to avoid and minimise the negative impacts.

The NSW Biodiversity Offsets Scheme was established in 2017 under the Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016 (the Act). The purpose of the Act is to 'maintain a healthy, productive and resilient environment for the greatest well-being of the community, now and into the future, consistent with the principles of ecologically sustainable development'.

The Department of Planning and Environment (DPE) designed and manages this Scheme. Under the Act, a feature of the Scheme is a 'market-based conservation mechanism through which the impacts to biodiversity can be offset.' The Scheme enables landholders to establish in-perpetuity Biodiversity Stewardship Agreements (BSAs) on sites to generate biodiversity credits, which can be sold to offset the negative impact of development on biodiversity. BSA sites are intended to be managed over the long term to generate the biodiversity gains required to offset the impact.

The Biodiversity Conservation Trust (BCT) monitors and supports landholders to manage BSA sites under the Scheme. This includes making payments to landholders from funds held in the Biodiversity Stewardship Payments Fund for undertaking the required biodiversity management actions.

This Scheme was preceded by several other offsetting schemes in New South Wales, including the BioBanking scheme that started in 2008. DPE has arrangements to transition sites, credits, and offset obligations from this and other previous schemes.

The current biodiversity credit market in New South Wales consists of 1394 different types of ecosystem credits, which are approved to be traded in 364 different offset trading groups, and 867 different species credits. Trading rules, set out in the Biodiversity Conservation Regulation 2017 (the Regulation), prioritise offsetting the obligations of a development with like-for-like ecosystem or species credits.

The Scheme is implemented through the planning system in New South Wales. Proposed development that involves the clearing of native vegetation, and meets certain thresholds, is required to undertake a Biodiversity Development Assessment Report. These reports determine an offset obligation, in biodiversity credits, to compensate for the biodiversity loss proposed. These reports are considered by consent authorities (such as a council, for local development, or by the Minister for Planning for major projects). An offset obligation is then included in the conditions of development approval.

In addition to establishing a market for trading between developers, with offset obligations, and landholders, who sell credits from their BSA sites, the Scheme allows developers to pay into the Biodiversity Conservation Fund and transfer their obligations to the BCT. This allows the developer to proceed with their project. The BCT must then meet these acquired obligations by buying the required credits, or by undertaking other approved activities set out in the Regulation. The BCT has more options than developers on how and when it acquits its obligations.

This audit examined whether DPE and the BCT have effectively designed and implemented the Biodiversity Offsets Scheme to compensate for the loss of biodiversity due to development.

Conclusion

The Department of Planning and Environment (DPE) has not effectively designed core elements of the NSW Biodiversity Offsets Scheme. DPE did not establish a clear strategy to develop the biodiversity credit market or determine whether the Scheme’s operation and outcomes are consistent with the purposes of the Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016.

The effectiveness of the Scheme's implementation by DPE and the BCT has been limited. A market-based approach to biodiversity offsetting is central to the Scheme's operation but credit supply is lacking and poorly matched to growing demand: this includes a potential undersupply of in-demand credits for numerous endangered species. Key concerns around the Scheme’s integrity, transparency, and sustainability are also yet to be fully resolved. As such, there is a risk that biodiversity gains made through the Scheme will not be sufficient to offset losses resulting from the impacts of development, and that DPE will not be able to assess the Scheme’s overall effectiveness.

DPE developed the Scheme following a 2014 review of the State's biodiversity legislation and building on previous offsetting arrangements in New South Wales. At the time the Scheme commenced in 2017, DPE lacked a strategic plan to guide its implementation, set clear outcomes and performance measures, and respond effectively to risks. DPE did establish a detailed scientific method for assessing biodiversity impacts under the Scheme and a system for accrediting assessors to undertake this technical work. These are important foundations for the robustness of the Scheme.

The Scheme has been in place for five years, but the biodiversity credit market is not well developed. Most credit types have never been traded. Also, according to DPE data, around 90% of demand cannot be matched to credit supply – and there is likely to be a substantial credit undersupply for at least seven endangered flora species, three endangered fauna species, and eight threatened ecological communities. Credit demand is projected to grow – especially in relation to the NSW Government’s $112.7 billion four-year infrastructure pipeline.

As with any market, potential participants need information about demand and price in order to understand risks and opportunities. But information about the biodiversity credit market, published by DPE and the BCT, does not provide an adequate picture of credit supply, demand and price to support market participation. This can create uncertainty for landholders who may be weighing the costs and benefits of establishing Biodiversity Stewardship Agreement (BSA) sites, and for development proponents who need to know whether they can purchase sufficient credits and at what price. Development proponents who lack market information are being incentivised to meet their offset obligations by paying into the Biodiversity Conservation Fund, which is managed by the BCT. This option provides developers with more certainty that enables them to progress their projects, but does not result in the development being offset until the BCT later acquits the obligation.

The BCT has multiple roles in the Scheme. These include setting-up and administering BSAs which generate credits, acquiring offset obligations from developers who pay into the Biodiversity Conservation Fund, and purchasing credits to meet its acquired obligations. There have been inadequate safeguards to mitigate the potential for conflicts between these roles. As the BCT directs its efforts towards facilitating BSA sites and purchasing credits to meet its obligations, there is a risk that government is insufficiently focused on supporting overall credit supply.

DPE has begun developing a credit supply strategy. Its absence, and a lack of clarity around responsibility for credit supply under the Scheme, has contributed to the significant risk of insufficient and poorly matched credits to meet the growing demand. The BCT's acquired obligations from developers have been increasing year-on-year, and are likely to continue to grow. 

There is a risk that the BCT will not have sufficient funds to acquit its growing obligations with like-for-like credits, which could result in sub-optimal biodiversity outcomes. The Scheme rules allow the BCT to acquit its obligations with measures other than like-for-like credits. DPE has not provided clear guidance to the BCT on when or how to do so, or how this would fulfil the 'no net loss' of biodiversity standard.

There are transparency and integrity risks to the Scheme. DPE does not maintain a public register of biodiversity credits with complete information, including credits' transaction histories, consistent with the legislative intent for a single register. DPE also does not have ready access to information to check that developments have been acquitted with the required credits.

Risks to the sustainability of the Scheme and its outcomes remain. DPE and the BCT have not yet implemented a decision-making and intervention framework to ensure adequate initial and ongoing funding for the long-term management of new and existing BSA sites. DPE also did not collect ecological data from sites under previous schemes before they were transitioned, and BCT only introduced ecological monitoring requirements for new BSA sites in March 2021. The lack of monitoring requirements creates a risk that the biodiversity gains, which BSA sites are required to generate to offset biodiversity losses, will not be measured and achieved under the Scheme.

This section presents an overview of the status of the biodiversity credit market in New South Wales. It describes development of the market under the Scheme in the context of transitional arrangements from previous schemes, and the extent of market participation and transactions to date. It also presents information about emerging trends in credit demand and supply.

Background

A purpose of the Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016 (the Act) is to establish a market-based conservation mechanism through which impacts on biodiversity can be offset. Sufficient credits of appropriate types, which are well matched to demand, are necessary for enough transactions to inform prices and enable efficient like-for-like offsetting. For transactions to occur efficiently in the market, participants require reliable and easy-to-access information about supply, demand and price.

The Scheme was established in 2017 with an existing credit supply and offset obligations (credit demand) as regulations had been introduced to preserve and transition credits and obligations from previous schemes including the BioBanking Scheme, which started in 2008.

Credits under the BioBanking scheme are referred to as 'BBAM credits', and credits under the current Scheme are referred to as 'BAM credits'. BBAM credits are still available, and the transitional arrangements enable DPE to determine the 'reasonable equivalence' of these to the current Scheme's credit numbers and classes. DPE has stated that reasonable equivalence of credits is based on ecological not financial equivalence. 

This section assesses the clarity and alignment of the goals of the Scheme to key features of its design and operations. It also examines structural elements of the Scheme that aim to maintain integrity within administering agencies, and the status of actions to address risks or issues.

Background

The Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016 (the Act) sets out the legal framework for the Scheme. Given the complexities, financial interests, and range of stakeholders associated with the Scheme, it requires strong safeguards. Transparency and assurances around the Scheme's integrity are also relevant to participants' confidence in it, which in turn is important for market development.

Core components of the Scheme, identified in section 1.3 of the Act, are to be consistent with the ‘principles of ecologically sustainable development’.

The Act and other administrative arrangements of government allocate responsibility to DPE and the Minister for Environment and Heritage for the Scheme’s design and elements of its implementation. This includes responsibility for the Scheme’s policy, legislative and regulatory framework.

Responsibility is allocated to the BCT for implementing and operating certain elements of the Scheme. This includes administering Biodiversity Stewardship Agreements (which generate credits) and securing offsets on behalf of development proponents who pay into the Biodiversity Conservation Fund to meet their offset obligations.

This broad legislative framework is not intended to detail responsibilities for the full range of roles and activities that agencies need to take to implement and regulate the Scheme effectively, and ensure its good governance. Agencies should do this as part of sound and transparent public administration. 

This section assesses how effectively components of the Scheme have been designed and are being implemented to provide assurance that the impacts of development are being avoided and minimised such that only ‘unavoidable’ impacts remain to be offset. The section also assesses whether the Scheme and its market embeds the necessary controls to ensure that obligations are offset as required.

Background

The Biodiversity Assessment Method, and the quality of its application by DPE-Accredited Assessors, is critical to the robustness the Scheme. The method is designed to be applied to avoid and minimise impacts at proposed development sites before identifying offset obligations. The effectiveness of Scheme outcomes requires that obligations are offset with the retirement of the necessary and appropriate credits.

The Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016 (the Act) requires the relevant Minister (the current Minister for Environment and Heritage) to establish a method for the purpose of assessing the impacts of actions on threatened species and ecological communities.

The Act also specifies that this method must be applied by an accredited person. DPE is responsible for the design and implementation of this accreditation system, arrangements for which are set out in an instrument under the Act.

A Biodiversity Development Assessment Report is a report by a DPE-Accredited Assessor using the Biodiversity Assessment Method. These reports assess the biodiversity impacts of the proposed development and establish offset obligations as part of the development approval process. It is important that local councils and other development consent authorities understand and can assess the quality of these reports.

DPE manages the process of ‘retiring’ credits against the identified offset obligations. Once a credit is retired it cannot be reused to acquit another obligation, which is critical to Scheme outcomes. DPE is also responsible for maintaining records of credit transactions, which results in a legally binding transfer of credit ownership from seller to buyer. 

This section assesses how effectively the supply of biodiversity credits has been supported by encouraging and enabling landholders to participate in the Scheme. It also assesses whether sufficient action is underway to address issues and risks to the establishment of BSA sites, especially in the context of known credit supply issues (section 2).

Background

Credit supply is generated when a landholder establishes a Biodiversity Stewardship Agreement (BSA) on their land. Establishing a BSA site requires landholders agree to an in-perpetuity management plan, so it is important that they have sufficient support and access to relevant information about risks and opportunities when deciding to do so. Ensuring adequate credits supply underpins the Scheme's ability to deliver the intended biodiversity outcomes.

A landholder establishes an offset site through a BSA, which is a legal agreement with the Minister of Environment and Heritage (delegated to the Biodiversity Conservation Trust). The BSA is registered on the title of the land.

DPE-Accredited Assessors develop Biodiversity Stewardship Site Assessment Reports, which are submitted by landholders to the BCT as part of the BSA application. These reports apply the Biodiversity Assessment Method to detail the number and types of credits that a BSA site is expected to generate by implementing a 20-year management plan. The BCT issues credits to landholders on registration of the BSA.

Ensuring an adequate and appropriate supply of credits is important so that like-for-like matches between credits and obligations can be efficiently secured in a timely way. This minimises the use of offset variation rules, and can avoid potential delays in developers securing appropriate offsets to meet their offset obligations. It also makes it easier for the BCT to locate the necessary credits to acquit the obligations it acquires from developers. 

This section assesses how effectively BSA sites, which need to be managed by landholders to generate the biodiversity gains represented by credits, are regulated and supported by the Biodiversity Conservation Trust. It also assesses whether actions have been taken to address identified risks to the suitability of funds required to ensure long-term BSA site management.

Background

For Biodiversity Stewardship Agreement (BSA) sites to achieve the expected biodiversity gains to offset losses from development impact, they need sufficient funding for the required management actions, and to be effectively regulated and supported over the long-term. Funding for these sites is generated through the returns on landholders' initial investment (Total Fund Deposit). The BCT is required to monitor landholders' compliance with BSAs and should also ensure ecological outcomes on sites are measured.

DPE and the BCT are responsible for developing and implementing a system of oversight to ensure the implementation of management actions at BSA sites is delivering the intended outcomes in a financially and environmentally sustainable way. The agencies' key mechanisms for delivering this are:

  • calculating the costs of the required land management actions in perpetuity
  • annual reporting systems for monitoring compliance with land management requirements
  • reporting systems for monitoring ecological outcomes arising from land management actions.

Landholders are required to pay the required Total Fund Deposit amount for their BSA accounts into the Biodiversity Stewardship Payments Fund, which is held in trust and managed by the BCT. A costing tool is used by landholders to calculate the value of the deposit, based on the required management payments (in perpetuity), administrative fees, and the discount rate applied.

The Total Fund Deposit can be paid upfront but is usually paid from the proceeds of the sale of credits. Once this occurs the BSA site becomes 'active' and management payments commence to enable the landholder to undertake the required management actions. BSA sites that have not yet sold enough credits to make the deposit are 'passive' sites that do not require active land management.

Sites in passive management for an extended duration present risks to biodiversity outcomes, and potentially to Scheme integrity, if the quality of credits is undermined due to an absence of active site management. 

Appendix one – Response from agencies 

Appendix two – Like-for-like, variation and ancillary rules

Appendix three – Detail on progress of the IIAP

Appendix four – About the audit 

Appendix five – Performance auditing 

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #367 - released 30 August 2022