Reports
Actions for Managing Antisocial behaviour in public housing
Managing Antisocial behaviour in public housing
The Department of Family and Community Services (FACS) has not adequately supported or resourced its staff to manage antisocial behaviour in public housing according to a report released today by the Deputy Auditor-General for New South Wales, Ian Goodwin.
In recent decades, policy makers and legislators in Australian states and territories have developed and implemented initiatives to manage antisocial behaviour in public housing environments. All jurisdictions now have some form of legislation or policy to encourage public housing tenants to comply with rules and obligations of ‘good neighbourliness’. In November 2015, the NSW Parliament changed legislation to introduce a new approach to manage antisocial behaviour in public housing. This approach is commonly described as the ‘strikes’ approach.
When introduced in the NSW Parliament, the ‘strikes’ approach was described as a means to:
- improve the behaviour of a minority of tenants engaging in antisocial behaviour
- create better, safer communities for law abiding tenants, including those who are ageing and vulnerable.
FACS has a number of tasks as a landlord, including a responsibility to collect rent and organise housing maintenance. FACS also has a role to support tenants with complex needs and manage antisocial behaviour. These roles have some inherent tensions. The FACS antisocial behaviour management policy aims are:
to balance the responsibilities of tenants, the rights of their neighbours in social housing, private residents and the broader community with the need to support tenants to sustain their public housing tenancies.
This audit assessed the efficiency and effectiveness of the ‘strikes’ approach to managing antisocial behaviour in public housing environments.
We examined whether:
- the approach is being implemented as intended and leading to improved safety and security in social housing environments
- FACS and its partner agencies have the capability and capacity to implement the approach
- there are effective mechanisms to monitor, report and progressively improve the approach.
Conclusion
FACS has not adequately supported or resourced its staff to implement the antisocial behaviour policy. FACS antisocial behaviour data is incomplete and unreliable. Accordingly, there is insufficient data to determine the nature and extent of the problem and whether the implementation of the policy is leading to improved safety and security. FACS management of minor and moderate incidents of antisocial behaviour is poor. FACS has not dedicated sufficient training to equip frontline housing staff with the relevant skills to apply the antisocial behaviour management policy. At more than half of the housing offices we visited, staff had not been trained to:
When frontline housing staff are informed about serious and severe illegal antisocial behaviour incidents, they generally refer them to the FACS Legal Division. Staff in the Legal Division are trained and proficient in managing antisocial behaviour in compliance with the policy and therefore, the more serious incidents are managed effectively using HOMES ASB.
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Parliamentary reference - Report number #306 - released 10 August 2018
Actions for Fraud controls in local councils
Fraud controls in local councils
Many local councils need to improve their fraud control systems, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. The report highlights that councils often have fraud control procedures and systems in place, but are not ensuring people understand them and how they work. There is also significant variation between councils in the quality of their fraud controls.
Fraud can directly influence councils’ ability to deliver services, and undermine community confidence and trust. ICAC investigations, such as the recent Operation Ricco into the former City of Botany Bay Council, show the financial and reputational damage that major fraud can cause. Good fraud control practices are critical for councils and the community.
The Audit Office of New South Wales 2015 Fraud Control Improvement Kit (the Kit) aligns with the Fraud and Corruption Control Standard AS8001-2008 and identifies ten attributes of an effective fraud control system. This audit used the Kit to assess how councils manage the risk of fraud. It identifies areas where fraud control can improve.
Fraud can disrupt the delivery and quality of services and threaten the financial stability of councils.
Recent reviews of local government in Queensland and Victoria identify that councils are at risk of fraud because they purchase large quantities of goods and services using devolved decision making arrangements. The Queensland Audit Office in its 2014–15 report 'Fraud Management in Local Government' found that ‘Councils are exposed to high-risks of fraud and corruption because of the high volume of goods and services they procure, often from local suppliers; and because of the high degree of decision making vested in councils'. They also highlight some common problems faced by councils including the absence of fraud control plans and failure to conduct regular reviews of their internal controls. Also, in 2008 and 2012 the Victorian Auditor-General identified the importance of up-to-date fraud control planning, clearly documented related policies, training staff to identify fraud risks and the importance of controls such as third party management.
Investigations into councils by the NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), such as the recent Operation Ricco, show the impact that fraud can have on councils. These impacts include significant financial loss, and negative public perceptions about how well councils manage fraud. The findings of these investigations also show the importance of good fraud controls for councils.
Operation Ricco In its report on Operation Ricco, the ICAC found that the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of the City of Botany Bay Council and others dishonestly exercised official functions to obtain financial benefits for themselves and others by causing fraudulent payments from the Council for their benefit. It also identified the CFO received inducements for favourable treatment of contractors. The report noted that there were overwhelming failures in the council’s procedures and governance framework that created significant opportunities for corruption, of which the CFO and others took advantage. It found weaknesses across a wide variety of governance processes and functions, including those involving the general manager, the internal audit function, external audit, and the operation of the audit committee. |
The strength of fraud control systems varies significantly across New South Wales local councils, and many councils we surveyed need to improve significantly.
Most surveyed councils do not have fraud control plans that direct resources to mitigating the specific fraud risks they face. Few councils reported that they conduct regular risk assessments or health checks to ensure they respond effectively to the risks they identify.
There are sector wide weaknesses that impact on the strength of councils' fraud control practice. Less than one-third of councils that responded to the survey:
- communicate their expectations about ethical conduct and responsibility for fraud control to staff
- regularly train staff to identify and respond to suspected fraud
- inform staff or the wider community how to report suspected fraud and how reports made will be investigated.
The audit also identified a pattern of councils developing policies, procedures or systems without ensuring people understand them, or assessing that they work. This reduces the likelihood that staff will actually use them.
In general, metropolitan and regional councils surveyed have stronger fraud control systems than rural councils.
Newly amalgamated councils are operating with systems inherited from two or more pre-amalgamated councils. These councils are developing new systems for their changed circumstances.
Five councils surveyed reported that they did not comply with the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1994.
Observations for the sector:
Councils should improve their fraud controls by:
- tailoring fraud control plans to their circumstances and specific risks
- systematically and regularly reviewing their fraud risks and fraud control systems to keep their plans up to-date
- effectively communicating fraud risks, and how staff and the community can report suspected fraud
- ensuring that they comply with the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1994.
Recommendation:
That the Office of Local Government:
- work with councils to ensure they comply with the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1994.
That the Office of Local Government:
- work with state entities and councils to develop a common approach to how fraud complaints and incidences are defined and categorised so that they can:
- better use data to provide a clearer picture of the level of fraud within councils
- measure the effectiveness of, and drive improvement in councils' fraud controls systems
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix three – About the audit
Appendix four – Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #303 - released 22 June 2018