The 'Stronger Councils, Stronger Communities' and the 'Dogs deserve better' government advertising campaigns complied with the Government Advertising Act and most elements of the Government Advertising Guidelines.

However, some advertisements were designed to build support for government policy and used subjective or emotive messages. This is inconsistent with the requirement in the Government Advertising Guidelines for 'objective presentation in a fair and accessible manner'.

Advertisements in the 'Stronger Councils, Stronger Communities' campaign used subjective statements such as 'the system is broken' and 'brighter future'. While advertisements in the 'Dogs deserve better' campaign used confronting imagery such as gun targets, blood smears and gravestones.

The Government Advertising Act 2011 (the Act) requires the Auditor-General to conduct a performance audit in relation to at least one government advertising campaign in each financial year. The performance audit assesses whether advertising campaigns were carried out effectively, economically and efficiently and in compliance with the Act, the regulations, other laws and the Government Advertising Guidelines (the Guidelines). In this audit, we examined two campaigns:

• the ‘Stronger Councils, Stronger Communities’ campaign run by the Office of Local Government and the Department of Premier and Cabinet
• the ‘Dogs deserve better’ campaign run by the Department of Justice.    

Section 6 of the Act details the specific prohibitions on political advertising. Under this section, material that is part of a government advertising campaign must not contain the name, voice or image of a minister, member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament or the name, logo or any slogan of a political party. Further, a campaign must not be designed so as to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party.

The ‘Stronger Councils, Stronger Communities’ government advertising campaign was run by the Office of Local Government and the Department of Premier and Cabinet in four phases from August 2015 to May 2016. The total cost of the campaign was over $4.5 million. See Appendix 2 for more details on this campaign.

No breach of specific prohibitions in the Act

Section 6 of the Act prohibits the use of government advertising for political advertising. A government advertising campaign must not:

• be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party
• contain the name, voice or image of a minister, any other member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament
• contain the name, logo or any slogan of, or any other reference relating to, a political party.

We did not identify any breach of the specific prohibitions listed above in the advertising content of this campaign.

Request for quotes to design advertisement did not reflect the full scope required

The request for quotes for the design of the Phase 1 advertisement did not reflect the full scale of work that was to be undertaken, and this created a risk to achieving value for money. The Office of Local Government sought quotes for design of a television advertisement only. It did not request an estimate for radio, online advertisements, or translation for linguistically diverse audiences, which were ultimately required for the campaign.
 

A full and fair assessment of which supplier could provide the best value for money could not be made given that the quotes obtained did not reflect the full scope of work. The final amount paid for the design of Phase 1 was 2.7 times the original quote. It is possible that another supplier that provided a quote could have provided overall better value for money.

The Office of Local Government continued to use the Phase 1 supplier for Phase 2 and Phase 2 extension (Exhibit 4). Where there are other suppliers that could feasibly compete for a contract, direct negotiation increases the risk the agency has not obtained the best value for money. The department advised that it continued with the same agency to avoid costs involved in briefing a new agency on the campaign.

The ‘Dogs deserve better’ government advertising campaign was run by the Department of Justice from August 2016, after the government announced its decision to prohibit greyhound racing, and was terminated in October 2016 after a change of government policy. The campaign had a budget of $1.6 million, with an actual spend of $1.3 million. See Appendix 2 for more details on this campaign.

No breach of specific prohibitions in the Act

Section 6 of the Act prohibits the use of government advertising for political advertising. A government advertising campaign must not:

• be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party
• contain the name, voice or image of a minister, any other member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament
• contain the name, logo or any slogan of, or any other reference relating to, a political party.

We did not identify any breach of the specific prohibitions listed above in the advertising content of this campaign.
 

Animal welfare concerns were identified as the reason for urgent advertising

A brief prepared by the department in July 2016 raised concerns about the welfare of greyhounds following the NSW Premier’s announcement that the government would prohibit greyhound racing. The brief raised the risk that industry members may make impulse decisions to destroy their greyhounds without information on support that was being offered.

The department used the provisions in Sections 7(4) and 8(3) of the Act to expedite the release of advertising due to ‘other urgent circumstances’. This provision allows advertising to commence prior to completing the peer review process and cost benefit analysis.
 
In introducing the Government Advertising Bill to parliament in 2011, the then Premier noted that exceptional circumstances would cover situations ‘such as a civil emergency or sudden health epidemic’. There is no other guidance on when it is appropriate to use this section. It is at the discretion of a government agency head to determine whether a campaign is urgent.
 

Phase 1 advertisements did not focus on the urgent needs

This advertising campaign had three overarching objectives:

• to increase public awareness of the animal welfare reasons for the closure of the greyhound racing industry
• to change the behaviour of dog owners from potentially harming their greyhounds to treating them humanely, by accessing the support options and packages available
• to promote greyhound adoptions by the public.

Alongside advertising, the department took other steps to engage with the greyhound racing industry. This included direct mail, face to face meetings around the State, setting up a call centre and community consultation through an online survey. Other government agencies and animal welfare agencies were also engaged to reach out to affected stakeholders.

Phase 1 advertising content focused on providing information about the reasons for the closure of the industry. The department’s radio and television advertisements did not refer to support packages or encourage the public to adopt a greyhound. While print advertisements did mention these things, this was only presented in fine print. In all advertisements, audiences were referred to a website for further information.

The focus of advertisements on the reasons for industry closure was not consistent with the identified needs to urgently commence advertising to influence the behaviour of dog owners and encourage the public to adopt a greyhound.

The content in Phase 2 advertisements, which began around four weeks after the first phase, was more explicit in highlighting the services and support for industry members such as offering business and retraining advice. These advertisements also referred audiences to a call centre number as well as the website.

Peer review process limited to influencing second phase of advertisements

In urgent circumstances, the Act allows for peer review to be completed after advertising has commenced. For this campaign, the peer review process was completed on 19 August 2016, two weeks after advertising had commenced. Where advertising commences before the peer review process is completed, the usefulness of peer reviewers’ recommendations is limited to informing subsequent phases of advertising and the post-campaign evaluation.

The peer review report found the messages in Phase 1 advertisements were not clearly defined, and the role of advertising was not clearly defined amongst other campaign activities. These recommendations informed the second phase of advertising, which ran from 27 August 2016 until the campaign was terminated in October 2016.
 

The department could not demonstrate value for money was achieved for creative work

The department provided a fixed budget for creative work when requesting quotes from creative agencies to develop advertising material. This is not consistent with the quotation requirements in the government’s Guidelines for Advertising and Digital Communication Services. This approach creates risks to achieving value for money as creative agencies are not required to compete on price for their services. The department advised that it had pre-set the creative costs based on a comparative government campaign of a similar size. This was done due to a concern that requiring agencies to compete on price would affect the short timeframe given to develop creative material.

Three creative agencies accepted the opportunity to present design ideas for the campaign. The department was unable to provide evidence of how it chose the preferred supplier out of these three agencies. Records are important for accountability and allow a procurement decision to be audited after an urgent decision.     
 

Short notice did not allow for cost-efficient media booking for all phases

Placement of advertisements in various media channels was done through the State’s Media Agency Services contract. This contract achieves savings as the government can use its aggregated media spend to gain discounts from the media supplier.

The Department of Premier and Cabinet provides guidance to ensure cost efficient media booking. For example, media time for a television advertisement should be booked at least 6 to 12 weeks in advance. Radio advertisements should be booked at least 2 to 8 weeks in advance.

The peer review report noted that the department did not have adequate time to look for the most cost-efficient way to advertise. In its response to the peer reviewers, the department acknowledged this to be due to the urgency to start advertising. The media booking authority was signed by the department one day before the campaign commenced.
 

The department used a wide public campaign for a narrow target audience

The campaign identified greyhound industry participants as the primary target audience. In 201516 there were 1,342 greyhound trainers, 1,695 owner/trainers, 983 attendants and 1,247 breeders in New South Wales. The department’s advertising submission identified ‘concerns that industry members could make impulsive decisions, potentially jeopardising the welfare of a large number of dogs, prior to the shutdown of the industry’.

The submission’s evidence of advertising effectiveness focused on increasing the level of wider community support for the ban rather than stopping industry members from making impulse decisions. It used an early opinion poll to show that total support for the ban on greyhound racing rises by 17 points and opposition drops by four points following explanation of the findings of the Special Commission of Inquiry report.

The peer review report noted that the role of advertising was not clearly defined amongst the department’s range of other direct and targeted communications and consultations held with industry members.

No demonstrated basis for use of confronting imagery and provocative language

The Guidelines require ‘objective presentation in a fair and accessible manner’. Neither the Guidelines or Handbook further explain what objective presentation means. We have used an ordinary definition of this term as ‘not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts’. This is synonymous with terms like ‘impartial’, ‘neutral’, and ‘dispassionate’ and opposite to ‘subjective’. We consider that to meet the current requirements in the Guidelines for objectivity, advertising content should contain accurate statements or facts, and avoid subjective language.

Phase 1 focussed on the ongoing consequences if no action was taken to close the industry. The advertisements used provocative language, for example ‘Up to 70 per cent of dogs are deemed wastage by their own industry. Wastage! Slaughtered just for being slow’. Advertisements used confronting imagery like gravestones, blood smears and gun targets.

Our literature review into this area highlighted mixed findings on the effectiveness of confrontational advertising materials. In some cases, shock campaigns may cause an audience to reject or ignore the message, and may even encourage people to do the opposite of the intended behaviour. In other cases, such as in road safety campaigns, this style of advertising can be successful. This shows the importance of conducting pre-campaign research before adopting a confrontational or emotive approach in advertising.

The Government Advertising Handbook recommends that an agency explain the rationale and the evidence for their chosen advertising approach. There was no evidence that the department researched the effectiveness of its advertising approach with its target audience. The department had planned to undertake creative concept testing as part of a strategy to ensure the creative material was understood by its audience. The department advised that due to the urgency of the campaign, it did not have time to conduct this testing.

Not all Phase 1 radio advertisements clearly identified that they were authorised by the New South Wales Government

For the first few days on air, Phase 1 radio advertisements ended by referring the audience to a government website, instead of clearly identifying that it had been authorised by the New South Wales Government. Government authorisations and logos ensure the work and the programs of the NSW Government are easily identifiable by the community.    

The department’s cost benefit analysis did not consider alternatives to advertising

For government advertising campaigns that cost over $1.0 million, the Act requires the advertising agency to carry out a cost benefit analysis and obtain approval from the Cabinet Standing Committee on Communications, prior to commencing the campaign.

The department engaged with audiences through direct mail, face to face forums, and a telephone helpline in addition to advertising. However, the department’s cost benefit analysis did not meet the requirements in the Guidelines to specify the extent to which expected benefits could be achieved without advertising, and to compare costs of options other than advertising that could be used to successfully implement the program (see Exhibit 6).

The cost benefit analysis made optimistic assumptions about the impact of the campaign on greyhound adoptions. It estimated that 2,360 greyhounds would be adopted if the campaign was run. This is significantly higher than the ‘most optimistic outcome’ of re-homing in the Special Commission Inquiry report (we calculated this to be 1,467 greyhounds). There was insufficient evidence to support the higher number of adoptions in the cost benefit analysis.

The sensitivity analysis shows that using the Special Commission’s ‘most optimistic outcome’ figure of re-homing would reduce the net present value of advertising to be negative. Further, the cost benefit analysis also assumed that increased government funding would be made available to animal welfare and rehoming organisations to support more adoptions, but did not estimate or include this cost when calculating the net present value of advertising.
 

There were two factual inaccuracies in key messages used for Phase 1 advertisements

Section 8(2) of the Act requires the head of a government agency to certify that the proposed campaign ‘contains accurate information’. The Secretary of the Department of Justice signed the compliance certificate on 29 July 2016, before advertisements commenced.

We examined the accuracy of factual claims in this advertising campaign, by comparing the key statements to the report of Special Commission of Inquiry into the Greyhound Racing Industry (the Commissioner report). The Commissioner report was quoted by the NSW Government as the basis for its policy to transition the greyhound racing industry to closure.

We identified that two of the key statements used in Phase 1 advertisements to support the animal welfare reasons for industry closure were inaccurate (Exhibit 7).    

Appendix one - Responses from agencies

Appendix two - About the campaigns

Appendix three - About the Audit

Appendix four - Performance Auditing

Parliamentary reference - Report number #294 - released 2 November 2017

The Department of Planning and Environment provides more than $245 million in energy rebates to around 27 percent of NSW households. This report highlights that the department is not monitoring the rebate schemes to understand whether they are delivering the best outcomes.

Most rebates are ongoing payments applied directly to energy bills reducing the amount payable by the householder. The structure of these rebates is complex and can be inequitable. Some households are eligible for four different rebates, each with its own eligibility criteria.  Also, some households in very similar circumstances receive different levels of support depending on what type of energy is used in their home or which adult in the house is the energy account holder. For example, a household using both electricity and gas receives more assistance than a household with electricity alone even if total energy bills are the same. 

By September 2018, the Department of Planning and Environment should:

1. Ensure effective strategies are in place to make information about rebates available to all eligible, low-income households
    
2. Evaluate alternative models and develop advice for government to reduce complexity and improve equity of ongoing rebates
    
3. Establish measurable objectives for schemes that provide ongoing support, and monitor and measure performance of all schemes against objectives and outcome measures
    
4. Assess the impacts of the forecast increase in embedded networks and develop strategies to manage any increased administrative risk
    
5. Strengthen assurance that EAPA is being provided in accordance with its objectives and guidelines by implementing accreditation and compliance programs
    
6. Ensure those eligible for EAPA financial support are not disadvantaged by inflexible payments, inconsistent provider practices, or inability to access an EAPA provider in a timely manner. Options include:
   • moving from a fixed-value voucher to a flexible payment based on need irrespective of energy type
   • establishing a ‘Provider of Last Resort’ facility for households that cannot access an EAPA Provider.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #292 - released 19 September 2017 

The Office of Strategic Lands effectively fulfils most aspects of its defined role, however, it could do more to support strategic land planning by identifying and acquiring land for future public use proactively rather than waiting for agencies or landholders to approach it. It may also have greater impact if it expanded its activities beyond greater Sydney.

The Office of Strategic Lands (OSL) was established under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EP&A Act) to identify, acquire, manage and divest land required for long-term planning by the NSW Government, particularly for open space and public purposes. 

OSL is a Corporation Sole acting on behalf of the Minister for Planning and is run within the Department of Planning and Environment (DPE). OSL is a self-funding entity, and is responsible for administering the Sydney Region Development Fund (SRDF), a statutory fund used for ongoing land acquisition and management. OSL currently only operates within greater Sydney and holds over a billion dollars in land assets in this region. 

This audit assessed whether OSL effectively fulfils its role to identify, acquire, manage and dispose of land, and whether OSL ensures it is sustainable over the long-term to meet its objectives. 

Conclusion:

OSL effectively fulfils most aspects of its defined role, but is not supporting strategic land planning through proactive identification and acquisition of land for future public use. OSL is diligent in its financial management over the short and medium terms. However, it has identified that relying on the sale of surplus land to continue funding its ongoing operations is not sustainable, and it is yet to finalise a strategy to address this.

OSL does not currently have a strategic or proactive focus to improve land planning outcomes. This is primarily due to the lack of a clear strategy and business plan to direct its work which defines OSL’s purpose, objectives, goals and performance targets.

OSL expects to finalise and implement a Strategic Business Plan to guide its future direction and long-term sustainability, in late 2017. 

OSL has three primary sources of funding. The largest source is Treasury loans which it needs to repay. The next most significant source of funding is from sales of land no longer required for government’s long-term needs. OSL has identified that it is likely to run out of surplus land within ten years. This is a significant financial risk for OSL, which should be addressed through a long-term financial strategy. 

Contributions by Sydney councils into the SRDF are OSL’s only regular and consistent income stream. The formula to calculate these contributions has not been reviewed for over 25 years, and recent council mergers and border changes have increased the need to review the formula. 

OSL is not used as extensively as it could be by other NSW Government agencies. It has the potential to play a much bigger role in assisting NSW Government agencies with longer term planning by partnering with them to identify, acquire, hold and manage land for future needs. For example, it could acquire land in future residential growth areas for needed public services such as schools, hospitals and transport corridors. There is also potential for OSL to expand its operations beyond the greater Sydney region into other parts of NSW to provide a statewide benefit from its unique role in government.

OSL has a unique role amongst government agencies, and could be used across NSW

NSW Government agencies we spoke with consider OSL fulfils an important role for the state that no other government agency performs. As a self-funding long-term land holder and manager, OSL can acquire and manage land beyond the four-year budget cycle that other government agencies face. Consideration should be given to expanding to other growth areas in NSW, where its unique role could assist in longer term land planning.

OSL has established good processes and procedures for most aspects of its role. This includes governance processes that we found to have been applied effectively. There was also adequate oversight and approvals for land transactions.

OSL has yet to finalise a business strategy to ensure long-term sustainability

OSL has shown that it is financially and operationally viable in the short to medium term. However, it does not have an overarching business strategy to guide its operations and ensure it is financially sustainable for the long-term. With a unique role in government, it is important for OSL to clarify its direction and implement a strategic business plan to drive its progress.

While there is no overarching long-term strategy, OSL has documented operating plans which guide its land acquisition and land divestment activities over the short to medium term. It has not developed a plan for its ongoing land management activities.
OSL advised that its Strategic Business Plan will be finalised and implemented in late 2017. This Plan should clarify OSL’s long-term direction, and guide its business to ensure it is financially sustainable.

OSL does not have adequate performance targets and measures

OSL has four key deliverables as part of DPE’s business plan. These deliverables cover land management, working with other agencies, and ensuring the SRDF is sustainable. There was no evidence that OSL or DPE monitor whether OSL achieves all key deliverables.

Currently, OSL’s performance targets are limited to meeting dollar values. OSL does not have any measures to demonstrate the achievement of outcomes that align with its core business, such as its success in land management or in working with other agencies. OSL staff also said that dollar targets were not always adequate or appropriate to measure its business performance.

With the development of its Strategic Business Plan, OSL has the opportunity to clarify its future business direction. This includes ensuring it has a range of relevant goals and performance measures that will support it becoming a strategic land planning partner with NSW Government agencies and local councils, and a land holder for the long-term.

OSL’s current financial management approach may impact long-term sustainability

OSL has valued the land that it needs to purchase on behalf of government to meet long-term strategic land needs in the Greater Sydney region, at $1.2 billion. However, OSLs annual budget for purchasing land is only between $40 million and $50 million until 2021. Also, in each of the last four years, OSL has not spent more than $30 million on land purchases because it relies on landowners to initiate contact when they are ready to sell their land.

Without a more proactive approach, it is not possible for OSL to make needed purchases in a timely manner. OSL acknowledges the substantial gap between these values, but has not established a budget or plan for how it will purchase all the identified land.

OSL has developed a Divestment Strategy which provides a five-year schedule of planned divestments. This is land OSL owns which has been identified as no longer required for government purposes. OSL has established an approach to generate the best and highest price for these sales. While funds are generated through the sale of surplus land, it also means that OSL holds fewer land assets to sell. OSL has identified it will run out of surplus land within ten years.

OSL needs to finalise and implement a business model to ensure it is financially and operationally capable to sustain and grow its business for the long-term.

OSL is working to improve transparency and engagement with key stakeholders

To deliver on its role, OSL needs to be able to effectively engage and work with its stakeholders, including NSW Government agencies, local councils, and people selling or buying land.

NSW Government agencies we spoke with are generally satisfied with OSL’s level of engagement and consultation. However, it would be beneficial for all parties to clarify and document their expectations of each other through a formal arrangement. OSL could also be more proactive in promoting its services, and working with additional NSW Government agencies to identify strategic lands.

The local councils in the Sydney region we spoke with are not as satisfied with OSL’s engagement and communication. The councils advised that they do not consider they are well-informed of OSL’s plans for their area, or how their contributions to the SRDF are spent.

More broadly, the activities of OSL are not reported transparently to stakeholders or the general public. OSL is developing a communication package for local councils and the community. This is an opportunity for OSL to improve the transparency of its role, operations, projects, and the SRDF, as well as promote its services and achievements.

The Office of Strategic Lands (OSL) was established in 1951 to identify, acquire, manage and divest land required for the NSW Government's long term planning purposes. OSL acts on behalf of the Minister for Planning, as a Corporation Sole, under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EP&A Act).

OSL acquires and manages land identified for long-term strategic needs, and then transfers or sells it to other government agencies for ultimate use. It also sells land identified as surplus to government’s long term strategic requirements. Surplus land can also be transferred to local councils. OSL operates only in the greater Sydney region (from Wyong in the north, to the base of the Blue Mountains in the west, and south to Wollondilly). OSL has 20 staff who manage over 6,000 parcels of land.
 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #290 - released 10 August 2017 

The processes used to assess NorthConnex adequately considered value for money for taxpayers.This report also found that the impact of tolling concessions on road users and the motorway network was consistent with policy objectives described in the 2012 NSW Long Term Transport Master Plan.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #287 - released 8 June 2017

The Department of Industry, Transport for NSW and the Department of Education were not able to demonstrate that the use of contingent labour is the best resourcing strategy to meet their business needs or deliver value for money.

Download appendices for report on Contingent workforce

Parliamentary reference - Report number #282 - released 27 April 2017

The Department of Family and Community Services has managed the risks of the transition to the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) in New South Wales effectively by increasing the overall capacity of the non-government sector and investing in provider capability.

The National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) is a major reform that aims to change the way disability support is provided and received. Responsibility for overseeing the system to support people with disability in New South Wales will transfer from the NSW Government to the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA), an independent statutory agency of the Australian Government. Eligible people with disability will receive individual funding from the NDIA and purchase support from their chosen service providers, rather than being referred to services funded or provided by government. The NSW Government will transfer all disability services it currently provides to the non-government sector.

Approximately 78,000 people received NSW Government-funded disability support in 2015–16 at a cost of around $3.3 billion. An estimated 142,000 people will have an individual NDIS support plan in New South Wales, with total funding rising to around $6.8 billion in 2018–19. NDIS trials began in New South Wales in 2013. The full scheme was introduced in July 2016 and is scheduled to be operating across the state by July 2018.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the NSW Department of Family and Community Services' (the Department's) management of the risks of the NDIS transition in New South Wales. It focused on the Department's work to build the readiness of the non-government sector for the NDIS. To make this assessment, we asked whether:

1. the Department supported the non-government sector to build capacity to meet the expected increase in demand under the NDIS
2. the Department supported disability service providers in NSW to improve their capability to deliver NDIS services
3. the Department's work to prepare for the NDIS has been coordinated with the Australian Government's NDIS readiness work.

In addition to the audit questions above, this audit identified principles governments should consider when building the capacity and capability of the non-government sector to deliver human services.

Building the capacity of the non-government sector

The Department supported an increase in the capacity of non-government providers

The Department started building the capacity of the non-government sector before the NDIS was developed. This included moving services provided by government into the non‑government sector, funding early intervention and community-based disability support, and introducing some individual support packages. The Department checks that the business and operational systems of non-government disability providers are adequate. However, its understanding of the outcomes for people using the services is limited.

Service gaps are possible for people with more complex support or access needs

There are risks to the supply of services to people who have more complex support or access needs, including people who need specialist clinical support, people in remote areas, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities and culturally and linguistically diverse communities. The Department has supported the NDIA's initial market development work and funded some programs to help providers build their capacity to support these groups.  However, there is a risk the market will not expand quickly enough to meet the increase in demand for services.

Sector sustainability depends on support from outside the disability services sector

The sustainability of funded disability services provided by the non-government sector depends on support from outside the sector. Most people with disability receive significant unpaid support from family members, so carers will play a key role in the sustainability of the NDIS. There are opportunities for organisations that do not provide specific disability services to contribute to sector sustainability by providing some NDIS services. To do this, many will need help to make their services more accessible and inclusive to people with disability.

Helping non-government providers develop their capability

The Department invested in capability building programs for providers

The Department has spent more than $30 million over six years on programs that aim to improve the capability of disability support providers. This work began before the NDIS was established and was adjusted to focus on NDIS readiness from December 2012. It was guided by an industry development strategy that was developed after consultation with the sector and delivered in partnership with sector peak bodies. This approach gave the sector some responsibility for developing its own capability, which is important because the sector will not receive support from the NSW Government after the transition to the NDIS.

The overall impact of the programs on the capability of providers is not clear

The overall effectiveness of the Department's spending on provider capability is not clear. The Department had some information on the general financial health and organisational capability of providers from previous industry development work. However, baseline information on provider capability was not collected before programs commenced and targets for improvements in provider capability were not set. Without this information, the Department cannot demonstrate clearly that the capability building programs it funded represent good value for money.

Most providers will need more support to transition to the NDIS effectively

In late 2015, the Department assessed the transition progress of providers in New South Wales. This assessment indicates almost one third of providers are highly likely to need additional assistance to transition to the NDIS successfully, with only 14 per cent unlikely to need further assistance. We conducted a survey of 299 providers in New South Wales in August 2016. Most reported that they feel they are on track to transition to the NDIS successfully. Sixty-two per cent said the Department-funded programs and resources they had used had improved their readiness for the NDIS. Fifty-four per cent said the changes made because of using these programs and resources had a lasting impact on their organisation.

Coordinating sector development

Governance systems and planning processes for the NDIS transition were established

The Department developed governance arrangements for the transition in New South Wales. It contributed actively to the development of national policy and strategy documents including a strategy for national market development.

The Department shared sector readiness lessons with the Australian Government

Two NDIS sector readiness programs funded by the NSW Government were later expanded to national programs through funding from the Australian Government. New South Wales only received around five per cent of the total Australian Government funding for NDIS sector readiness initiatives. A report by the Australian National Audit Office in 2016 found there was limited evidence of a strategic approach by the Australian Government when allocating this funding to states and territories.

The Department has monitored transition issues and mitigated these where possible

The Department has monitored administrative issues for providers, which have included the changes in funding arrangements and registering for the NDIS. It has taken action to mitigate these where possible, although some issues, such as the operation of NDIA administrative systems, are beyond its control.

The National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS)

The NDIS is a fundamental change to the disability support system

The NDIS is a major reform that aims to make significant changes to the way disability support is provided and received. Under the NDIS, the administration of funding for disability support in New South Wales will transfer from the NSW Government to the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA), an independent statutory agency of the Australian Government. The NSW and Australian Governments will both contribute to funding the NDIS. The size of the disability services sector in New South Wales is expected to more than double when the NDIS is fully operational (Exhibit 1).

One of the main objectives of the NDIS is to increase the choice and control that people with disability have over the support they receive. Under the NDIS, people with disability receive individual funding packages which they can use to pay their chosen providers for the support they need, instead of being referred to services that are deemed appropriate for their needs. This is a fundamental change to the nature of disability support. Before the NDIS, people with disability were moved around the system according to decisions made by government or other organisations providing disability support. Under the NDIS, the funding will move around the system based on the choices people with disability make. The development of the new market for NDIS disability services is expected to take up to ten years because the changes to the system are so extensive.

In addition to increasing choice and control for participants, the NDIS aims to:

• improve outcomes for people with disability by intervening early to help reduce the need for support later in life
• increase integration by helping people with disability access mainstream government services such as health and education
• increase the involvement of people with disability in the community by making it easier to access community services such as sports clubs and community groups.

The transition to the NDIS is underway

The transition to the NDIS is underway in most Australian states and territories, following trials over the last three years. In New South Wales, a trial site was established in the Hunter area in July 2013. Early roll out of the NDIS began in July 2015 for people aged under 18 in the Nepean Blue Mountains area. On 30 June 2016, about 7,800 people had an NDIS plan in the Hunter trial site and around 1,800 people had a plan in the Nepean Blue Mountains area.

The full roll out of the NDIS began in about half of New South Wales in July 2016. The NDIS will start operating in the rest of the state from July 2017 and the transition is scheduled to be completed by July 2018 (Exhibit 2).

For the rest of the transition, the Department of Family and Community Services should:

1. Work with the Australian Government, NDIA and other NSW Government agencies to identify gaps and develop the capacity of specialist clinical services, focusing on regional and rural areas.
2. Continue to implement projects to increase the number of organisations that can support Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander and culturally and linguistically diverse communities.
3. Target remaining capability building assistance to less prepared providers, including via one-to-one support and mentoring in identified areas of weakness.
4. Continue working with the Australian Government and the NDIA to ensure lessons from sector capability programs are shared.

Principles for developing the non-government sector

1. Commence work to increase the capacity of the non-government sector early to allow time for service capacity to be built in a sustainable way.
2. Decide whether to increase the capacity of the sector by supporting existing providers to expand their operations, attracting new organisations from outside the existing provider group, or some combination of these.
3. Tailor approaches to supporting groups that have additional support or access needs because of cultural or geographic factors.
4. Define the desired outcomes for people using services and, where possible, include outcomes in service delivery contracts.
5. Invest in the sector by partnering with sector peak bodies to deliver capability programs.
6. Include one-to-one support and mentoring in capability building programs where possible to improve the targeting of support to the specific needs of providers.
7. Collect baseline information on provider capability before commencing programs and build robust tracking and evaluation into their design.
8. Establish whole-of-government governance arrangements to ensure roles, responsibilities and accountability for delivery are clear.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #280 - released 23 February 2017 

The Planning Assessment Commission (the Commission) has improved its decision-making processes for major development applications in recent years. The Commission has improved how it consults the public and manages conflicts of interest, and now also publishes records of its meetings with applicants and stakeholders.

The Planning Assessment Commission (the Commission) is an independent body established in 2008 under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (the EP&A Act). It makes decisions on major development applications in New South Wales. Along with the Department of Planning and Environment (the Department) and the Land and Environment Court, it is one of three bodies that have a role in making decisions on these applications.

The Department refers development applications to the Commission where 25 or more objections have been received from the community, a local council objects to the proposal, or the applicant has donated to a political party.

These applications are often complex and controversial, and can attract a high level of public interest. This may mean that, regardless of the process, not all stakeholders are satisfied with the outcome.

The Commission is required to take into account section 79C of the EP&A Act when making decisions. Section 79C includes consideration of the likely environmental, social and economic impacts of the development.

This audit assessed the extent to which the Commission’s decisions on major development applications are made in a consistent and transparent manner. To assist us in making this assessment, we asked whether the Commission:

• has sound processes in place to help it make decisions on major development applications that are informed and made in a consistent manner
• ensures its decisions are free from bias and transparent to stakeholders and the public.

Decision-making processes have improved but some key aspects need to be addressed

Although not articulated in one document, there is a framework in place to assist Commissioners make decisions on major development applications. This includes setting out the information to be considered, who to consult, and that a report is to be prepared. The Commission has recently improved how it conducts public meetings and the level of support provided to Commissioners to ensure they understand the decision-making process. The Commissioners we interviewed all showed a good understanding of their role.

As a consent authority, the Commission is required to consider the matters in section 79C of the EP&A Act when making a decision. However, it was not able to show how it met this requirement in every decision we reviewed. We found some evidence of these considerations in six of the nine cases we reviewed, for example in meeting notes or in its report on a decision. Of these six cases, the degree to which the Commission considered all matters under section 79C varied considerably. The larger, more complex applications were more likely to address these considerations. To demonstrate compliance with the EP&A Act, the Commission must be able to show how it considers all matters in section 79C for each decision it makes.

We found that the Commission has access to relevant information to make a decision and consults stakeholders for their views of the development. The level of consultation depends on the size and complexity of an application. If Commissioners decide they need more information to make a decision, they consult local councils, the community, other government agencies and experts as needed.

The Commission’s public meetings are a valuable part of the decision-making process, where new perspectives or issues are often raised. However, some aspects could be improved. For example, many stakeholders thought the five minutes allowed for individual speakers was insufficient. The Commission could be more flexible with this timeframe. Identifying new ways to notify the public of its meetings, other than advertisements on its website and in newspapers, would also ensure it reaches as many interested parties as possible.

Improved transparency and probity but the Commission is not seen by some as impartial

The Commission has sound processes in place to ensure that its decisions are impartial and transparent to the community. It has improved its probity measures over the last two years, following a review by the NSW Ombudsman in 2014. We found that the Commission:

• has probity policies and procedures which are available on its website
• has improved its record keeping of some processes, such as meetings with applicants and stakeholders
• publishes its decision and supporting documentation, such as meeting notes, on its website.

Conflicts of interest are a significant risk for the Commission because they could lead to corruption, abuse of public office, and affect the public’s view of its independence. The Commission manages this risk well. It has a policy in place to address potential, perceived or actual conflicts. Commissioners update their conflicts of interest records annually, and declare any conflicts when the Commission assigns them to a development application. Unlike the Commission’s probity polices, Commissioners’ conflict of interest declarations are not available on its website. Providing a summary of this information on its website when Commissioners are allocated to a development application would further improve transparency around conflicts of interest.

The Commission has been improving how it communicates its decisions to the public. It now produces fact sheets for its decisions on matters that attract a high level of public interest. Its reports on decisions for complex applications also discuss issues raised by the community. However, the level of detail varied in the decisions we reviewed, and it was not always clear how conditions placed on a development would resolve identified issues. Similarly, the reports did not clearly address the matters under section 79C of the EP&A Act. Reporting this would further improve the transparency of its decisions, and clearly demonstrate compliance with the EP&A Act.

While we did not find any issues that would make us question the integrity or independence of Commissioners, there remains a perception among some stakeholders that the Commission is not impartial. Some of these concerns are within the Commission’s control to fix, such as allowing individual speakers at public meetings extra time to discuss their issues, therefore avoiding perceptions of bias.

Other perceptions, such as the Commission being part of the Department and not an independent decision making authority, are outside the Commission’s immediate control. For example, the Commission receives applications at the end of the assessment process, after the Department has prepared an assessment report recommending whether the application should be approved. This means there are effectively two reports on an application; the Department’s assessment report and the Commission’s report on its decision. However, there is only one decision-maker: the Commission. This may cause community confusion about the roles of the Department and the Commission in the decision-making process. Clearer separation of their roles in assessing applications and preparing reports is needed.

To minimise the perception that the Commission is simply ‘rubber stamping’ the Department’s recommendations, assessment reports should not recommend whether or not a project be approved. Instead, they should provide the Department’s views on whether a project meets relevant legislative and policy requirements. The Commission should also be involved earlier in the process, so it can establish key facts and identify relevant issues sooner. It should request that the Department’s assessment report covers matters Commissioners consider particularly important when assessing projects under section 79C. Earlier referral of applications should also help the Commission to plan its work in assessing applications, and may reduce the time taken to reach a decision.

Unless these issues are addressed, stakeholders will continue to believe the Commission does not act in a transparent and impartial manner, which could erode public confidence in the Commission.

The Planning Assessment Commission

The Planning Assessment Commission (the Commission) is a planning authority established in 2008 under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (the EP&A Act). One of its functions is to make decisions on major development applications.

The Commission is independent of the Department of Planning and Environment (the Department) and the Minister for Planning. This means its decisions are not subject to the direction or control of the Department or the Minister.

The Department refers applications for major development to the Commission, including state significant development and infrastructure applications. These projects are generally initiated by the private sector. Applications are referred to the Commission when one or more of the following criteria are met:

• more than 25 objections are received about the proposal
• the local council objects to the proposal
• the applicant has donated $1,000 or more to a political party or member of parliament.

These applications are often controversial and may attract a high level of public interest. Of the 29 development applications the Commission received in 2015–16, almost 40 per cent were in the mining and energy sectors, and another 40 per cent related to urban development.

Section 79C of the EP&A Act outlines the matters the Commission must consider when making decisions about major development applications. These include:

• any relevant environmental and planning instruments
• likely environmental, social and economic impacts of the development
• suitability of the site for the development
• submissions received about the application
• the public interest.

In addition to making decisions about major development applications, the Commission also reviews major developments as part of the planning process, and provides independent expert advice to the government on planning and development matters. Since the Commission’s inception, it has provided advice on 76 matters, conducted 39 reviews, and made 444 decisions on development applications.

Process for approving major development applications

The Commission is one of three bodies that have a role in the planning and approval process for major development applications in New South Wales, as seen in Exhibit 1. The other two bodies are the Department of Planning and Environment, and the Land and Environment Court.

The Department determines the outcomes of major development applications. When an application meets one of the criteria listed above, it refers these to the Commission to make the decision. In certain circumstances, the Land and Environment Court hears appeals against decisions made by either the Department or the Commission.

A Memorandum of Understanding between the Commission and the Department sets out timeframes the Commission must meet when making a decision, specifically:

• two weeks where no stakeholder meetings are required
• three weeks where stakeholder meetings are required
• six weeks when a public meeting is required.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #279 - released 19 January 2017 

Neither agency (NSW Ministry of Health and NSW Police Force) demonstrated that they continued to get value for money over the life of these long term contracts or that they had effectively managed all critical elements of the three contracts we reviewed post award. This is because both agencies treated contract extensions or renewals as simply continuing previous contractual arrangements, rather than as establishing a new contract and financial commitment. Consequently, there was not a robust analysis of the continuing need for the mix and quantity of services being provided or an assessment of value for money in terms of the prices being paid.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #220 - released 1 February 2012