Reports
Health 2020
This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Health cluster for the year ended 30 June 2020. The table below summarises our key observations.
1. Financial reporting
| Financial reporting |
Unqualified financial audit opinions The financial statements of NSW Health and its 25 controlled entities received unqualified opinions. The number of corrected and uncorrected misstatements increased from the prior year. Misstatements related predominantly to the implementation of new accounting standards, asset revaluations and accounting for new revenue streams to cover the cost of HSW Health’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Qualified compliance audit opinion We issued a qualified audit opinion for the Ministry of Health’s Annual Prudential Compliance Statement for aged care facilities operated by NSW Health. We identified 18 instances of material non-compliance with the Fees and Payments Principles 2014 (No. 2) (the Principles) in 2019–20 (30 in 2018–19). |
| Financial performance |
NSW Health received an additional $3.3 billion in funding to cover costs associated with its response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the cluster were significant for health entities and included changes to operations, increased revenues, expenditure, assets and liabilities. Cancellation of elective surgery and decreased emergency department presentations meant that despite the pandemic, activity levels at many health entities decreased. Health Pathology and HealthShare were notable exceptions. In the period to the 30 June 2020, NSW Health reported that over 900,000 COVID-19 tests were conducted. Health Pathology conducted over 500,000 of these tests. Health Pathology's surge requirements were enhanced through arrangements with 13 private sector providers. HealthShare purchased $864.2 million of personal protective equipment. Overall, NSW Health recorded an operating surplus of $3.1 billion in 2019–20, an increase of $2.0 billion from 2018–19. As in previous years, the surplus largely resulted from additional revenue received to fund capital projects including the construction of new facilities, upgrades and redevelopments. In 2019–20 additional Commonwealth and State funding for the purchase and stockpiling of personal protective equipment also contributed to the operating surplus. |
| Overtime payments | The Ambulance Service of NSW’s (NSW Ambulance) reduced their overtime payments to $79.7 million in 2019–20 ($83.1 million in 2018–19). Overtime payments in 2019–20 included $6.8 million related to the response to the 2019–20 bushfire season. NSW Ambulance overtime payments represent 16.8 per cent of total overtime payments in the cluster. |
2. Audit observations
| Internal control deficiencies |
We identified more internal control deficiencies in 2019–20. The number of repeat issues from prior years also remains high. NSW Health addressed 18 out of the 25 information system control deficiencies during the year. Several key agreements lacked formal documentation. This included agreements between the Ministry and health entities, between health entities and agencies in other clusters and between the Ministry and health departments in other jurisdictions. |
| Infrastructure delivery | NSW Health had 44 ongoing major capital projects at 30 June 2020 with a total revised budget of $12.3 billion. The revised total budget of $12.3 billion is $2.0 billion more than the original budget. NSW Health revises budgets when it combines project stages. |
This report provides parliament and other users of the Health cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- audit observations.
The impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the cluster were significant and included changes to the operations of the health entities and increased revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities.
As a part of this year's audits of health entities, we have considered:
- financial implications of the COVID-19 emergency at both health entity and cluster levels
- changes to agencies' operating models
- agencies' access to technology and the maturity of systems and controls to prevent unauthorised and fraudulent access to data.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
The response to the COVID-19 pandemic primarily impacted the financial reporting of NSW Health through:
- additional revenue from the State government in the form of grants and stimulus payments
- additional revenue from the Commonwealth government under the National Partnership Agreement for COVID-19 to cover part of the cost of responding to the COVID-19 pandemic
- increased expenses, largely due to increased payments to private health operators to maintain their viability during the COVID-19 pandemic and later to assist with public patient elective surgery waitlists and increased cleaning costs
- increased purchases of personal protective equipment.
Chapter one outlines the impacts of NSW Health’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This chapter outlines our other audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Health cluster for 2020.
Section highlights
- Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all health entities’ financial statements, although more misstatements were identified than last year.
- NSW Health recorded an operating surplus of $3.1 billion, an increase of $2.0 billion from 2018–19. This is largely due to additional capital grants for new facilities, upgrades and redevelopments and additional Commonwealth and State funding for the purchase of personal protective equipment.
- NSW Health’s expenses increased by 5.5 per cent in 2019–20 (7.0 per cent in 2018–19) despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The primary causes for the growth in expenses are increases in:
- employee related expenses due to higher employee numbers, increased overtime and a 2.5 per cent award increase
- payments to private health operators to maintain their viability during the COVID-19 pandemic and later to assist with public patient elective surgery waitlists
- payments to private health operators due to the first full year of operation of the Northern Beaches hospital.
- The Ambulance Service of NSW (NSW Ambulance) continued to report higher overtime payments than other health entities. However, despite the response to the 2019–20 bushfire season, their overtime payments were lower than last year. NSW Ambulance paid $79.7 million in overtime payments in 2019–20 ($83.1 million in 2018–19).
- A qualified audit opinion was issued for the Ministry of Health’s Annual Prudential Compliance Statement for aged care facilities operated by NSW Health. There were 18 instances of material non-compliance with the Fees and Payments Principles 2014 (No. 2) (the Principles) in 2019–20 (30 in 2018–19)
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.
The primary impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the effectiveness of the internal controls of NSW Health and health entities relates to the effectiveness of controls implemented by HealthShare relating to the stocktake of personal protective equipment inventories. Inventory managed by HealthShare increased by 2,746 per cent during 2019–20. HealthShare’s inventory controls did not maintain pace with the sudden, significant increase.
The impacts of NSW Health’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic are outlined in chapter one. This chapter outlines other observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Health cluster.
Section highlights
- The number of internal control deficiencies has increased since 2018–19. More than a third of control deficiencies are repeat issues.
- Control deficiencies that relate to managing employees’ leave and employee’s time recording continue to be difficult for entities to resolve, particularly during the ongoing response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
- Several key agreements were undocumented. These included agreements between the Ministry and the health entities, between health entities, and between the Ministry and entities in other clusters and jurisdictions. These related to:
- a loan arrangement between the Ministry and HealthShare for $319 million.
- Northern Sydney Local Health District's use of land and buildings owned by the Graythwaite Charitable Trust
- agreements for the treatment of New South Wales residents while they are interstate, and interstate residents receiving treatment while they are in New South Wales from Queensland, Victoria, South Australia and the ACT for both 2019–20 and 2018–19.
- NSW Health reported that they completed nine major capital projects during 2019–20. As at 30 June 2020 there were 44 ongoing major capital health projects in NSW. The revised capital budget for these projects in total was $2.0 billion more than the original budget of $10.3 billion. NSW Health reported the budget revisions are largely the result of combining project stages.
Appendix one – List of 2020 recommendations
Appendix two – Status of 2019 recommendations
Appendix three – Financial data
Appendix four – Analysis of financial indicators
Appendix five – Analysis of performance against budget
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament
Health 2020
11 December 2020
This corrigendum has been prepared to amend the following text within the Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament on Health 2020, dated 10 December 2020.
NSW Health emergency department treatment times
On page five the original text was as follows:
NSW Health also measures the percentage of patients whose clinical care in emergency departments is completed within four hours. The measure is used as an indicator of accessibility to public hospital services.
NSW Health aims to complete clinical care in the emergency department for 81 per cent of patients within four hours. In 2019–20 NSW Health reports it completed clinical care within four hours for 72.1 per cent of patients (a 7.3 per cent decrease from 2018–19).
At Western Sydney Local Health District, 59 per cent of patients were treated within the targeted timeframe. NSW Health attribute this to the profile of patients presenting in emergency departments and additional time taken processing COVID-19 patients to ensure staff safety.
The original text has now been changed to:
NSW Health also measures the percentage of patients with total time in the emergency department of four hours or less for each local health district. The measure is used as an indicator of accessibility to public hospital services.
| Local Health Districts | Target % (2019–20) | Actual % (2019–20) |
| Central Coast | 77.0 | 59.9 |
| Far West | 90.2 | 86.6 |
| Hunter New England | 81.0 | 72.5 |
| Illawarra Shoalhaven | 79.0 | 60.2 |
| Mid North Coast | 82.0 | 76.7 |
| Murrumbidgee | 85.3 | 81.9 |
| Nepean Blue Mountains | 79.0 | 65.5 |
| Northern NSW | 81.0 | 78.2 |
| Northern Sydney | 79.0 | 73.9 |
| South Eastern Sydney | 78.0 | 70.3 |
| South Western Sydney | 78.0 | 61.2 |
| Southern NSW | 85.0 | 83.0 |
| Sydney | 76.0 | 70.9 |
| Sydney Children’s Hospitals Network | 80.0 | 72.1 |
| Western NSW | 85.9 | 81.0 |
| Western Sydney | 78.0 | 59.0 |
| St Vincent's Health Network* | 75.0 | 65.4 |
The above changes will be reflected in the version of the report published on the Audit Office website and should be considered the true and accurate version.
Stronger Communities 2020
This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the agencies comprising the Stronger Communities cluster for the year ended 30 June 2020. The table below summarises our key observations.
1. Financial reporting |
|
| Quality of financial reporting | Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' 30 June 2020 financial statements. |
| Compliance with financial reporting requirements |
The Treasury extended the statutory deadline for the submission of the 2019–20 financial statements. For agencies subject to Treasurer's Directions, Treasury required agencies to submit their 30 June 2020 financial statements by 5 August 2020. For other agencies, the deadline was extended to 31 October 2020. All agencies in the cluster met the revised statutory deadlines. Cluster agencies substantially completed the mandatory early close procedures set by NSW Treasury. However, nine agencies including the Department of Communities and Justice (the department) did not complete one or more mandatory requirements, such as assessing the impact of new and updated accounting standards. |
| Financial implications of recent emergencies |
Emergency events significantly impacted cluster agencies in 2019–20. Our review of seven cluster agencies most affected highlighted some had incurred additional expenditure because of the bushfires and floods. Others lost revenue due to the COVID-19 pandemic. During the year these agencies collectively received additional funding of $1.1 billion from the State to respond to:
The Sydney Cricket Ground Trust, Venues NSW and Office of Sport lodged insurance claims of $51.3 million with the Treasury Managed Fund with respect to lost revenues from the pandemic. The losses were mainly due to event cancellations and covered various periods ranging from mid-March to 31 December 2020. The change in economic conditions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in the NSW Government cancelling the refurbishment of Stadium Australia it had previously approved in August 2019. Venues NSW wrote off $16.8 million of redevelopment costs during 2019–20. |
| Restatement of the Sydney Cricket Ground valuation | The valuation of the Sydney Cricket Ground (the Stadium) included costs of $28.6 million which were not eligible for capitalisation. The financial statements were restated to reflect the reduction in the value of the Stadium and the asset revaluation reserve. |
| Unresolved data quality issues in the VS Connect system |
The department continues to address significant data quality issues resulting from its implementation of the VS Connect system (the System) in 2019. The issues relate to the completeness and accuracy of the data transferred from the legacy system. The System is used by the department to manage its Victims Support Services (VSS) and for financial reporting purposes. An independent actuary helps the department estimate its liability for VSS claims. The actuary's valuation at 30 June 2020 was again impacted by the data quality issues. Consequently, the actuary adopted a revised valuation methodology compared to previous years. Recommendation (repeat issue): The department should resolve the data quality issues in the VS Connect System before 31 March 2021. |
| AASB 16 'Leases' resulted in significant changes to agencies' financial position |
Cluster agencies implemented three new accounting standards for the first time in 2019–20. Adoption of AASB 16 'Leases' resulted in cluster agencies collectively recognising right-of-use assets and lease liabilities of $1.7 billion and $1.1 billion respectively on 1 July 2019. Significant misstatements in how lease related balances had been calculated were found in 17 of the 29 cluster agencies. The cluster outsources the management of most of its owned and leased property portfolio to Property NSW, but cluster agencies remain responsible for any deliverables under that arrangement. The misstatements were mainly caused by late revisions of key assumptions and issues with the accuracy and completeness of Property NSW's lease information. |
2. Audit observations |
|
| Internal control deficiencies |
Our 2019–20 financial audits identified 191 internal control issues. Of these, two were high risk and almost one-third were repeat findings from previous audits. While repeat findings reduced by 5.7 percentage points in 2019–20, the number remains high. Recommendation (repeat issue): Cluster agencies should action recommendations to address internal control weaknesses promptly. Focus should be given to addressing high risk and repeat issues. |
| Agencies response to recent emergencies |
The severity of the recent bushfires and floods meant natural disaster expenses incurred by emergency services agencies rose from $67.4 million in 2018–19 to $497 million in 2019–20. The COVID-19 pandemic presented unprecedented challenges for the cluster. Social distancing and other infection control measures disrupted the traditional means of delivering services. Agencies established committees or response teams to respond to these challenges. The department introduced measures to minimise the risk of the spread of COVID-19 amongst inmates in custodial settings. |
| Managing excess annual leave |
Managing excess annual leave was a challenge for cluster agencies directly involved in the government's response to the emergency events. Employees in frontline cluster agencies deferred leave plans and many have taken little or no annual leave during the reporting period. Annual leave liabilities rose at the department, NSW Police Force, Fire and Rescue NSW, Office of the NSW Rural Fire Service, the Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales and the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions. The combined liabilities increased from $620 million to $692 million or 11.6 per cent between 30 June 2019 and 30 June 2020. |
| Implementation of Machinery of Government (MoG) changes |
Administrative Arrangement Orders effective from 1 July 2019, created the department of Communities and Justice and transferred functions and staff, together with associated assets and liabilities into the department from the former departments of Justice and Family and Community Services. The department continues to establish its governance arrangements following the MoG changes. Recommendation: The department should finalise appropriate governance arrangements for its new organisational structure as soon as possible. This includes:
|
| Delivery of the Prison Bed Capacity Program |
The department continued to expand prison system capacity through the NSW Government's $3.8 billion Prison Bed Capacity Program. The department reported it spent $480 million on the Program in 2019–20. Six prison expansion projects were completed during the year, which added 1,660 new and 395 refurbished beds to the NSW prison system. Data from the department shows the number of adult inmates in the NSW prison system reached a maximum of 14,165 during the year. Operational capacity was 16,096 beds on 19 August 2020. |
This report provides parliament and other users of the financial statements of agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations.
Agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster were significantly impacted by the bushfires, floods and the COVID-19 pandemic in 2019–20. Our 2019–20 financial audits of the seven cluster agencies most significantly impacted by the recent emergency events considered:
- the financial implications of the emergency events
- changes to agencies' operating models and control environments
- delivery of new or expanded projects, programs or services at short notice.
Our findings on these seven agencies' responses to the recent emergencies are included throughout this report. These agencies are:
- Department of Communities and Justice
- Fire and Rescue NSW
- NSW Police Force
- Office of the NSW Rural Fire Service
- Office of the NSW State Emergency Service
- Sydney Cricket and Sports Ground Trust
- Venues NSW.
The Department of Communities and Justice is the principal agency of the cluster. The names of all agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster are included in Appendix one.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster for 2020, including any financial implications from the recent emergency events.
Section highlights
|
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.
This chapter outlines our:
- observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster
- assessment of how well cluster agencies adapted their systems, policies and procedures, and governance arrangements in response to recent emergencies
- review of how the cluster agencies managed the increased risks associated with new programs aimed at stemming the spread of COVID-19 and stimulating the economy.
Section highlights
|
Appendix one – Timeliness of financial reporting by agency
Appendix two – Management letter findings by agency
Appendix three – List of 2020 recommendations
Appendix four – Status of 2019 recommendations
Appendix five – Selected agencies for review of response to emergency events
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Waste levy and grants for waste infrastructure
The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today that examined the effectiveness of the waste levy and grants for waste infrastructure in minimising the amount of waste sent to landfill and increasing recycling rates.
The audit found that the waste levy has a positive impact on diverting waste from landfill. However, while the levy rates increase each year in line with the consumer price index, the EPA has not conducted a review since 2009 to confirm whether they are set at the optimal level. The audit also found that there were no objective and transparent criteria for which local government areas should pay the levy, and the list of levied local government areas has not been reviewed since 2014.
Grant funding programs for waste infrastructure administered by the EPA and the Environmental Trust have supported increases in recycling capacity. However, these grant programs are not guided by a clear strategy for investment in waste infrastructure.
The Auditor-General made six recommendations aimed at ensuring the waste levy is as effective as possible at meeting its objectives and ensuring funding for waste infrastructure is contributing effectively to recycling and waste diversion targets.
Overall, waste generation in New South Wales (NSW) is increasing. This leads to an increasing need to manage waste in ways that reduce the environmental impact of waste and promote the efficient use of resources. In 2014, the NSW Government set targets relating to recycling rates and diversion of waste from landfill, to be achieved by 2021–22. The NSW Waste and Resource Recovery (WARR) Strategy 2014–21 identifies the waste levy, a strong compliance regime, and investment in recycling infrastructure as key tools for achieving these waste targets.
This audit assessed the effectiveness of the NSW Government in minimising waste sent to landfill and increasing recycling rates. The audit focused on the waste levy, which is paid by waste facility operators when waste is sent to landfill, and grant programs that fund infrastructure for waste reuse and recycling.
The waste levy is regulated by the Environment Protection Authority (EPA) and is generally paid when waste is disposed in landfill. The waste levy rates are set by the NSW Government and prescribed in the Protection of Environment Operations (Waste) Regulation 2014. As part of its broader role in reviewing the regulatory framework for managing waste and recycling, the EPA can provide advice to the government on the operation of the waste levy.
The purpose of the waste levy is to act as an incentive for waste generators to reduce, re-use or recycle waste by increasing the cost of sending waste to landfill. In 2019–20, around $750 million was collected through the waste levy in NSW. The government spends approximately one third of the revenue raised through the waste levy on waste and environmental programs.
One of the waste programs funded through the one third allocation of the waste levy is Waste Less, Recycle More (WLRM). This initiative funds smaller grant programs that focus on specific aspects of waste management. This audit focused on five grant programs that fund projects that provide new or enhanced waste infrastructure such as recycling facilities. Four of these programs were administered by the Environmental Trust and one by the EPA.
Conclusion
The waste levy has a positive impact on diverting waste from landfill. However, aspects of the EPA's administration of the waste levy could be improved, including the frequency of its modelling of the waste levy impact and coverage, and the timeliness of reporting. Grant funding programs have supported increases in recycling capacity but are not guided by a clear strategy for investment in waste infrastructure which would help effectively target them to where waste infrastructure is most needed. Data published by the EPA indicates that the NSW Government is on track to meet the recycling target for construction and demolition waste, but recycling targets for municipal solid waste and commercial and industrial waste are unlikely to be met.
Waste levy
The waste levy rate, including a schedule of annual increases to 2016, was set by the NSW Government in 2009. Since 2016, the waste levy rate has increased in line with the consumer price index (CPI). The EPA has not conducted recent modelling to test whether the waste levy is set at the optimal level to achieve its objectives. The waste levy operation was last reviewed in 2012, although some specific aspects of the waste levy have been reviewed more recently, including reviews of waste levy rates for two types of waste. The waste levy is applied at different rates across the state. Decisions about which local government areas (LGAs) are subject to the levy, and which rate each LGA pays, were made in 2009 and potential changes were considered but not implemented in 2014. Currently, there are no objective and transparent criteria for determining which LGAs pay the levy. The EPA collects waste data from waste operators. This data has improved since 2015, but published data is at least one year out of date which limits its usefulness to stakeholders when making decisions relating to waste management.
Grants for waste infrastructure
All state funding for new and enhanced waste infrastructure in NSW is administered through grants to councils and commercial waste operators. The government's Waste and Resource Recovery (WARR) Strategy 2014–21 includes few priorities for waste infrastructure and there is no other waste infrastructure strategy in place to guide investment. The absence of a formal strategy to guide infrastructure investment in NSW limits the ability of the State Government to develop a shared understanding between planners, councils and the waste industry about waste infrastructure requirements and priorities. The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment is currently developing a 20-year waste strategy and there is an opportunity for the government to take a more direct role in planning the type, location and timing of waste infrastructure needed in NSW.
The grants administration procedures used for the grant programs reviewed in this audit were well designed. However, we identified some gaps in risk management, record-keeping and consistency of information provided to applicants and assessment teams. In four of the five programs we examined, there was no direct alignment between program objectives and the NSW Government's overall waste targets.
Achievement of the 2014–21 state targets for waste and resource recovery (WARR targets) is reliant in part on the availability of infrastructure that supports waste diversion and recycling. The state WARR targets dependent on waste infrastructure are:
- Increase recycling rates to 70 per cent for municipal solid waste and commercial and industrial waste, and 80 per cent for construction and demolition waste.
- Increase waste diverted from landfill to 75 per cent.
A further target — manage problem waste better by establishing or upgrading 86 drop-off facilities or services for managing household problem wastes state-wide — is dependent on accessible community waste drop-off facilities across NSW.
Exhibit 7 identifies the five grant programs that provide funding for new or enhanced waste infrastructure to increase capacity for reuse or recycling of waste. All five of these programs were examined in the audit.
In addition to the grant programs shown in Exhibit 7, other programs provide funding for infrastructure, but at a smaller scale. Examples of these include:
- Bin Trim which provides rebates to small businesses for small scale recycling equipment such as cardboard and soft plastic balers.
- Litter grants which provide funding for litter bins.
- Weighbridges grants for installation of a weighbridge at waste facilities.
- Landfill consolidation and environmental improvement grants for rural councils to replace old landfills with transfer stations or to improve the infrastructure at landfill sites.
Appendix one – Responses from audited agencies
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #343 - released 26 November 2020
Governance and internal controls over local infrastructure contributions
The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today on how well four councils managed their local infrastructure contributions during the 2017-18 and 2018-19 financial years.
Local infrastructure contributions, also known as developer contributions, are collected from developers to pay for local infrastructure such as drainage, local roads, open space and community facilities. Controls over local infrastructure contributions help to ensure that all contributions owed are collected, funds are spent as intended, and any contributions paid in the form of works-in-kind or dedicated land are correctly valued.
The audit found that Blacktown City Council and City of Sydney Council provided effective governance over their local infrastructure contributions whereas Central Coast and Liverpool City Councils’ governance arrangements require improvement.
The audit found that three councils had spent local infrastructure contributions in accordance with approved contributions plans. Central Coast Council and the former Gosford City Council had spent $13.2 million on administration costs in breach of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979. These funds were repaid into the council’s local infrastructure fund during the course of the audit.
The Auditor-General made a number of recommendations for each council relating to improving controls over contributions and increasing transparency.
This audit examined the effectiveness of governance and internal controls over local infrastructure contributions, also known as developer contributions, held by four councils during the 2017–18 and 2018–19 financial years.
This performance audit was conducted with reference to the legislative and regulatory planning framework that was in place during that period.
Our work for this performance audit was completed at the end of March 2020 when we issued the final report to the four audited councils and the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment. We received their respective formal responses to the report’s recommendations during April and May 2020.
Concurrently to this audit, we sought Crown Solicitor’s advice (the ‘Advice’) regarding the use of local infrastructure contributions collected by local councils under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (‘the EPA Act’) for our financial audit work. The Advice clarified the applicable legislative requirements with reference to the application, investment and pooling of local infrastructure contributions. The Advice is included in Appendix 2 of this report. The Advice has not impacted on the findings and recommendations of this report.
Councils collect Local Infrastructure Contributions (LICs) from developers under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act (1979), the Local Government Act (1993) and the City of Sydney Act (2000) (EP&A Act, LG Act and City of Sydney Act) to fund infrastructure required to service and support new development. At 30 June 2018, councils across NSW collectively held more than $3.0 billion in LICs collected from developers. Just over $1.37 billion in total was held by ten councils. Councils collecting LICs must prepare a contributions plan, which outlines how LICs will be calculated and apportioned across different types of infrastructure. Councils that deliver water and sewer services prepare a development servicing plan (DSP) which allows them to collect contributions for water and sewer infrastructure.
Development timeframes are such that there is often several years between when LICs are collected and the infrastructure is required. Good governance and internal controls are needed over these funds to ensure they are available when needed and spent appropriately.
This audit assessed the effectiveness of governance and internal controls over LICs collected by four councils during the 2017–18 and 2018–19 financial years: Blacktown City Council, Central Coast Council, City of Sydney Council and Liverpool City Council. As at June 2018 these councils held the four highest LIC balances, each in excess of $140 million.
Audit Conclusion
Three of the four councils audited were currently compliant with legislation, regulations and Ministerial Directions regarding LICs. All had gaps in governance and controls over LICs which limited effective oversight.
Three of the councils included in the audit complied with legislation, regulations and Ministerial Directions relating to LICs. Central Coast Council breached the EP&A Act between 2001 and 2019 when it used LICs for administration costs. These funds were repaid in late 2019.
While controls over the receipt and expenditure of contributions funds were largely in place at all councils, there were some exceptions relating to valuing work and land delivered in lieu of cash. Three councils do not provide probity guidance in policies relating to LICs delivered through works-in-kind. Three of the councils had contributions plans that were more than five years old.
Staff at all four councils are knowledgeable about LICs but not all councils keep procedures up to date. Three councils' governance frameworks operate effectively with senior officers from across the council involved in decisions about spending LICs, entering into voluntary planning agreements (VPAs) and reviewing contributions plans.
Transparency over key information relating to LICs is important for senior management so they can make informed decisions, and for the community who pay LICs and expect infrastructure to be provided. During the period of the audit, none of the councils included in the audit provided sufficient information to senior management or their councillors about the projected financial status of contributions plans. This information would be valuable when making broader strategic and financial decisions. Information about LIC levies and intended infrastructure is available to the community but not always easy to find.
A strong governance framework is important at each council to ensure that the funds are managed well, available when needed and spent as intended. The audit examined the following features of each council's governance framework as they apply to LICs:
- decision-making by councillors and council officers relating to LICs
- monitoring delivery of contributions plans and DSPs including:
- reviewing assumptions underlying the plans
- monitoring projected status of plans.
Internal controls over LICs are important to promote accountability, prevent fraud and deliver infrastructure to the required standard at the best possible price. If financial controls are weak or are not implemented well, there is a risk that LICs are misspent or that councils pay too much for infrastructure.
Not all councils' internal controls adequately addressed risks associated with the administration of LICs
The audit examined a number of internal controls that manage risks related to LICs. These included:
- financial controls over receipt and expenditure of LIC funds
- management of conflicts-of-interest when dealing with developers
- independent valuations of works-in-kind and dedicated land
- ensuring delivery and quality of works-in-kind, and obtaining security from developers in the event of non-delivery or poor quality work
- management of variations to VPAs and works-in-kind agreements.
We reviewed controls included in policies and procedures and then checked samples of work to ensure that controls were implemented. We found variation in the controls that councils implemented, and some weaknesses in controls. It is a matter for each council to assess their financial risk and develop internal controls that support the collection, management, and expenditure of LICs. However, councils must be able to assure their communities and developers that they are doing everything possible to collect all LICs owing and that work conducted by developers in lieu of cash payments is properly valued and carried out to the required standard.
Further information about audit findings in relation to internal controls for each council are included in chapters five to eight. The exhibit below demonstrates variation in several controls implemented in the audited councils.
In a 2018 report, the Independent Commission Against Corruption noted that 'the appetite for transparency is expanding in both the public and private sectors'.
The Practice Note and S64 Guidance refer to transparency, including the importance of transparency over:
- calculation and apportionment of LICs
- funding of infrastructure, including where and when infrastructure is delivered
- arrangements made with developers through VPAs.
The LIC system is largely transparent for community members who know where to look
Contributions plans and DSPs are public documents, exhibited to the public before being adopted by council. Councils included in the audit publish their contributions plans and DSPs on their websites and meet statutory requirements with regard to reporting and accessibility of information.
However, other public information relating to the LIC system is fragmented across different websites and reports and varies in detail across councils.
| Blacktown City Council | Central Coast Council | City of Sydney Council | Liverpool City Council | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Financial details about contributions collected and spent | Financial statements | Financial statements | Financial statements | Financial statements |
| Implementation plans for spending LICs | Contribution plans | S64 implementation plans in DSPs. S7.11 & S7.12 implementation plans developed annually within capital works plan | Contribution plans | Developed annually within capital works plan |
| Capital works underway or completed, funded by LICs | Capital works plan and annual report | Not published | Not published | Capital works plan |
The Practice Note states that councils are accountable for providing the infrastructure for which contributions are collected. Demonstrating that infrastructure has been provided is difficult with fragmented information. As an example of transparent reporting, Blacktown City Council's 2018–19 annual report includes information about infrastructure that has been delivered for every contributions plan, providing transparency over how LICs have been spent.
Use of LICs collected under VPAs is not always transparent
Contributions collected under VPAs are not required to demonstrate the same relationship to a development as LICs collected under section 7.11 of the EP&A Act. VPAs are often negotiated because a developer requests a change to a planning instrument, and it is important that these arrangements, and their outcomes, are transparent to the community.
The EP&A Regulation includes mechanisms to ensure that VPAs are partially transparent. VPAs are exhibited to the public and approved by the elected council. Councils must maintain a VPA Register and make the VPA Deeds of Agreement available on request. However, there is no obligation on council to report on the outcomes or delivery of developers' obligations under VPAs. The four audited councils vary in transparency and accessibility of information available about VPAs.
| Blacktown City Council | Central Coast Council | City of Sydney Council | Liverpool City Council | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| VPA Register | Council website and annual report | Annual report | Annual report | Council website and annual report |
| VPA Deeds of Agreement | Council website | Available on request | Available on request | Council website |
| Intended use of LICs collected under VPAs | In Deeds of Agreement | In Deeds of Agreement | In VPA Register and most Deeds of Agreement | In VPA Register and most Deeds of Agreement |
| Completion of work funded by cash collected under VPAs | Not published | Not published | Not published | Not published |
| Delivery of works-in-kind or land negotiated under VPAs | Not published | Not published | In VPA Register | Not published |
The Practice Note suggests that councils incorporate the intended use of LICs collected under VPAs in the Deed of Agreement, but there is no guidance relating to transparency over where and when funds have actually been spent. There is merit in councils providing greater transparency over public benefits delivered through VPAs to give communities confidence in VPAs as a planning tool.
Credit arrangements with developers are not always well documented or monitored
When levying LICs, section 7.11(6) of the EP&A Act requires councils to take into account land, money, or works-in-kind that the developer has contributed on other development sites over and above their LIC obligations. This section of the EP&A Act allows a developer to offset a LIC owed on one site against land or works contributed on another. This leads to some developers carrying 'credits' for work delivered to councils, to be paid back by reduced LICs on a future development. Blacktown City Council and Central Coast Council allow developers to carry credits. Liverpool City Council and City of Sydney Council do not permit credits and instead pay the developers for any additional work undertaken.
Councils should formally document credit arrangements and have a robust process to validate and keep track of credit balances and report on them. Central Coast Council does not keep good track of credit arrangements and neither Blacktown City Council or Central Coast Council aggregate or report on outstanding credit balances.
Blacktown City Council manages the largest LIC fund in NSW and negotiates more VPAs than any other council. Overall, Blacktown City Council demonstrates effective governance over the LIC funds but there is scope for improved oversight of the projected financial status of contributions plans and credit arrangements with developers. Blacktown City Council also needs to update its operating procedures relating to LICs and improve security over key information.
Blacktown City Council is managing areas with high growth. There is a risk that Blacktown City Council will be unable to collect sufficient LICs to fund the infrastructure required to support that growth. However, Blacktown City Council does not assess and report to senior management or its Audit, Risk and Improvement Committee about the projected financial status of contributions plans.
Blacktown City Council has policies in place to guide the management of LICs although management of credit arrangements with developers requires greater oversight. Policies relating to works-in-kind agreements provide no guidance about probity in negotiations with developers and valuations of works-in-kind are not independent as they are paid for by the developer. Blacktown City Council's S7.11 committee structure could act as a model for other councils. Blacktown City Council is spending LICs according to its contributions plans. Staff managing LICs demonstrate good knowledge of the regulatory environment. However, a number of administrative processes need attention such as outdated procedures, lack of security over key spreadsheets, and inappropriate retention of sensitive personal data.
Recommendations
By December 2020, Blacktown City Council should:
- regularly report to senior management on the projected financial status of contributions plans
- update council's works-in-kind policy to address probity risks during negotiations with developers
- mitigate risks associated with lack of independence in valuations of works-in-kind
- improve public reporting about expenditure of cash collected under VPAs
- improve management oversight of credit arrangements with developers
- update procedures for managing LICs
- implement security measures over critical or personal information and spreadsheets.
Central Coast Council's governance and internal controls over LICs were not fully effective. Between 2001 and 2019, more than $13.0 million in LICs was misspent on administration costs in breach of the EP&A Act. There is scope for improved oversight of the projected financial status of contributions plans and credit arrangements with developers. Policies and procedures from the two former councils are not aligned.
In May 2016, the newly amalgamated Central Coast Council inherited 53 contributions plans from the former Gosford City and Wyong Shire Councils. Managing this number of contributions plans fragments the available funds and increases complexity. Central Coast Council is currently working on consolidating these plans. Between June 2016 and June 2019, its LIC balance doubled from $90.0 million to $196 million. Central Coast Council does not assess and report to senior management or its Audit, Risk and Improvement Committee about the projected financial status of contributions plans. Central Coast Council has a LIC committee but it has no formal charter and senior officers do not regularly attend meetings. This limits the committee's effectiveness as a decision-making body. A draft policy relating to works-in-kind agreements provide no guidance about probity in negotiations with developers. Valuations of works-in-kind and land dedications are not independent as they are paid for by the developer.
Central Coast Council has adjusted its accounts in 2018–19 by $13.2 million to repay the LIC fund for administration expenses that were not provided for in 40 contributions plans.
Recommendations
By June 2020, Central Coast Council should:
1. obtain independent validation of the adjustment made to the restricted asset accounts and general fund to repay LICs spent on administration, and adjustments made to each infrastructure category within the contributions plans
2. publish current contributions plans from the former Gosford City Council on the Central Coast Council website.
By December 2020, Central Coast Council should:
3. regularly report to senior management on the projected financial status of contributions plans
4. increase transparency of information available to the public about LIC works planned and underway, including intended use of contributions collected under VPAs
5. consolidate existing plans, ensuring the new contributions plans includes a regular review cycle
6. develop a formal charter for the developer contributions committee and increase the seniority of membership
7. complete and adopt council's works-in-kind policy currently under development, ensuring it addresses probity risks during negotiations with developers
8. mitigate risks associated with lack of independence in valuations of works-in-kind and dedicated land
9. improve public reporting about expenditure of cash collected under VPAs
10. improve management oversight of credit arrangements with developers
11. implement security measures to ensure the integrity of key spreadsheets used to manage LICs
12. align policies and procedures relating to LICs across the amalgamated council including developing policies and procedures for the management of S64 LICs
13. update council's VPA policy to address increased or indexed bank guarantees to accommodate cost increases.
City of Sydney Council manages a complex development environment across the Sydney CBD and inner suburbs. Overall, governance and internal controls over LICs are effective although there is scope for improved oversight of the projected financial status of contributions plans.
City of Sydney Council maintains a large balance of LICs, although not excessive relative to the annual level of LIC expenditure. Unspent contributions are largely associated with open space infrastructure that cannot be delivered until suitable land is available. Thirty per cent of cash contributions are collected under VPAs and there is limited transparency over how these funds are spent. City of Sydney Council does not assess and report to management or its Audit, Risk and Compliance Committee about the projected financial status of contributions plans.
In 2017–18 and 2018–19, LICs were spent in accordance with the corresponding contributions plans. City of Sydney Council staff are knowledgeable about the regulatory environment and are supported by up-to-date policies and procedures.
Recommendations
By December 2020, City of Sydney Council should:
- regularly report to senior management on the projected financial status of contributions plans
- improve public reporting about expenditure of cash collected under VPAs
- periodically review the risk of unpaid LICs associated with complying development certificates and assess whether additional controls are required
- implement security measures to ensure the integrity of key spreadsheets used to manage LICs.
During the audit period 2017–18 and 2018–19, Liverpool City Council did not have effective governance and internal controls over LICs. Liverpool City Council is addressing deficiencies and risks identified through an internal audit published in December 2018 although further work is required. There is scope for improved oversight of the projected financial status of contributions plans.
In the two years to 30 June 2019, the balance of unspent LICs increased by more than 60 per cent against a relatively low pattern of expenditure. Prior to an internal audit completed in late 2018, there was no regular reporting on the status of LICs and a lack of transparency when prioritising the expenditure of LIC funds. During 2019, and following the internal audit, Liverpool City Council engaged additional skilled resources to improve focus and accountability for LICs. A LIC committee has been established to manage contributions plans and support business units to initiate relevant infrastructure projects, although it is too early to assess whether this committee is operating effectively. From February 2019, Liverpool City Council commenced monthly reporting to its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) about the point-in-time status of LIC funds, and to its Audit, Risk and Improvement Committee about risks associated with LICs and the implementation of internal audit recommendations. There is limited reporting to senior management about the projected financial status of some contributions plans. Our audit found no evidence of misuse of funds during the audited period. Methods for valuing work and land are not aligned with policies and procedures and are implemented inconsistently. In addition, valuations of works-in-kind and land dedications are not independent as they are paid for by the developer. The policy relating to works-in-kind provides no guidance about managing probity risks when negotiating with developers.
Recommendations
By December 2020, Liverpool City Council should:
- regularly report to senior management on the projected financial status of contributions plans
- update council's policies and procedures to provide consistent guidance about how works and land offered by developers should be valued
- update council's Works-in-Kind and Land Acquisition Policy to address probity risks during negotiations with developers
- improve public reporting about expenditure of cash collected under VPAs
- mitigate risks associated with lack of independence in valuations of works-in-kind and dedicated land
- implement security measures over critical or private information.
Appendix one – Responses from councils and the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment
Appendix two – Advice from the Crown Solicitor
Appendix three – About the audit
Appendix four – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #339 - released 17 August 2020
CBD South East Sydney Light Rail: follow-up performance audit
This is a follow-up to the Auditor-General's November 2016 report on the CBD South East Sydney Light Rail project. This follow-up report assessed whether Transport for NSW has updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits.
The audit found that Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public.
The Auditor-General reports that the total cost of the project will exceed $3.1 billion, which is above the revised cost of $2.9 billion published in November 2019. $153.84 million of additional costs are due to omitted costs for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays.
The report makes four recommendations to Transport for NSW to publicly report on the final project cost, the updated expected project benefits, the benefits achieved in the first year of operations and the average weekly journey times.
The CBD and South East Light Rail is a 12 km light rail network for Sydney. It extends from Circular Quay along George Street to Central Station, through Surry Hills to Moore Park, then to Kensington and Kingsford via Anzac Parade and Randwick via Alison Road and High Street.
Transport for NSW (TfNSW) is responsible for planning, procuring and delivering the Central Business District and South East Light Rail (CSELR) project. In December 2014, TfNSW entered into a public private partnership with ALTRAC Light Rail as the operating company (OpCo) responsible for delivering, operating and maintaining the CSELR. OpCo engaged Alstom and Acciona, who together form its Design and Construct Contractor (D&C).
On 14 December 2019, passenger services started on the line between Circular Quay and Randwick. Passenger services on the line between Circular Quay and Kingsford commenced on 3 April 2020.
In November 2016, the Auditor-General published a performance audit report on the CSELR project. The audit found that TfNSW would deliver the CSELR at a higher cost with lower benefits than in the approved business case, and recommended that TfNSW update and consolidate information about project costs and benefits and ensure the information is readily accessible to the public.
In November 2018, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) examined TfNSW's actions taken in response to our 2016 performance audit report on the CSELR project. The PAC recommended that the Auditor-General consider undertaking a follow-up audit on the CSELR project. The purpose of this follow-up performance audit is to assess whether TfNSW has effectively updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits for the CSELR project.
Conclusion
Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated CSLER project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public. In line with the NSW Government Benefits Realisation Management Framework, TfNSW intends to measure benefits after the project is completed and has not updated the expected project benefits since April 2015.Between February 2015 and December 2019, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) regularly updated capital expenditure costs for the CSELR in internal monthly financial performance and risk reports. These reports did not include all the costs incurred by TfNSW to manage and commission the CSELR project.
Omitted costs of $153.84 million for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays will bring the current estimated total cost of the CSELR project to $3.147 billion.
From February 2015, TfNSW did not regularly provide the financial performance and risk reports to key CSELR project governance bodies. TfNSW publishes information on project costs and benefits on the Sydney Light Rail website. However, the information on project costs has not always been accurate or current.
TfNSW is working with OpCo partners to deliver the expected journey time benefits. A key benefit defined in the business plan was that bus services would be reduced owing to transfer of demand to the light rail - entailing a saving. However, TfNSW reports that the full expected benefit of changes to bus services will not be realised due to bus patronage increasing above forecasted levels.
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – Governance and reporting arrangements for the CSELR
Appendix three – 2018 CSELR governance changes
Appendix four – About the audit
Appendix five – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #335 - released 11 June 2020
Train station crowding
This report focuses on how Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains manage crowding at selected metropolitan train stations.
The audit found that while Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, it does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. Sydney Trains 'do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed’, the Auditor-General said.
Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or station entries before crowding reaches unsafe levels or when it impacts on-time running. Assuming rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, causing customer delay. ‘Restricting customer access to platforms or station entries is not a sustainable approach to manage station crowding’, said the Auditor-General.
The Auditor-General made seven recommendations to improve Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains' management of station crowding. Transport for NSW have accepted these recommendations on behalf of the Transport cluster.
Public transport patronage has been impacted by COVID-19. This audit was conducted before these impacts occurred.
Sydney Trains patronage has increased by close to 34 per cent over the last five years, and Transport for NSW (TfNSW) expects the growth in patronage to continue over the next 30 years. As patronage increases there are more passengers entering and exiting stations, moving within stations to change services, and waiting on platforms. As a result, some Sydney metropolitan train stations are becoming increasingly crowded.
There are three main causes of station crowding:
- patronage growth exceeding the current capacity limits of the rail network
- service disruptions
- special events.
Crowds can inhibit movement, cause discomfort and can lead to increased health and safety risks to customers. In the context of a train service, unmanaged crowds can affect service operation as trains spend longer at platforms waiting for customers to alight and board services which can cause service delays. Crowding can also prevent customers from accessing services.
Our 2017 performance audit, ‘Passenger Rail Punctuality’, found that rail agencies would find it hard to maintain train punctuality after 2019 unless they significantly increased the capacity of the network to carry trains and people. TfNSW and Sydney Trains have plans to improve the network to move more passengers. These plans are set out in strategies such as More Trains, More Services and in the continued implementation of new infrastructure such as the Sydney Metro. Since 2017, TfNSW and Sydney Trains have introduced 1,500 more weekly services to increase capacity. Additional network capacity improvements are in progress for delivery from 2022 onwards.
In the meantime, TfNSW and Sydney Trains need to use other ways of managing crowding at train stations until increased capacity comes on line.
This audit examined how effectively TfNSW and Sydney Trains are managing crowding at selected metropolitan train stations in the short and medium term. In doing so, the audit examined how TfNSW and Sydney Trains know whether there is a crowding problem at stations and how they manage that crowding.
TfNSW is the lead agency for transport in NSW. TfNSW is responsible for setting the standard working timetable that Sydney Trains must implement. Sydney Trains is responsible for operating and maintaining the Sydney metropolitan heavy rail passenger service. This includes operating, staffing and maintaining most metropolitan stations. Sydney Trains’ overall responsibility is to run a safe rail network to timetable.
ConclusionSydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, but does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. TfNSW and Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers, but do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed. TfNSW is delivering a program to influence demand for transport in key precincts but the effectiveness of this program and its impact on station crowding is unclear as Transport for NSW has not evaluated the outcomes of the program. TfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. Data and observation on dwell time, which is the time a train waits at a platform for customers to get on and off trains, inform the development of operational approaches to manage crowding at stations. Sydney Trains has KPIs on reliability, punctuality and customer experience and use these to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. TfNSW and Sydney Trains only formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events. Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for crowd management to Customer Area Managers, who rely on frontline Sydney Trains staff to understand how crowding affects individual stations. Station staff at identified key metropolitan train stations have developed customer management plans (also known as crowd management plans). However, Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring and evaluation of these plans and does not systematically collect data on when station staff activate crowding interventions under these plans. Sydney Trains stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services. Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or stations before crowding reaches unsafe levels, or when it impacts on-time running. As rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will need to increase its use of interventions to manage crowding. As Sydney Trains restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, it is likely these customers will experience delays caused by these interventions. Since 2015, TfNSW has been delivering the 'Travel Choices' program which aims to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services in key precincts. TfNSW is unable to provide data demonstrating the overall effectiveness of this program and the impact the program has on distributing public transport usage out of peak AM and PM times. TfNSW and Sydney Trains continue to explore initiatives to specifically address crowd management. |
ConclusionTfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. There are no key performance indicators directly related to station crowding. Sydney Trains uses performance indicators on reliability, punctuality and customer experience to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. Sydney Trains does not have a routine process for identifying whether crowding contributed to minor safety incidents. TfNSW and Sydney Trains formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events. |
ConclusionSydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a strategic risk but does not have an overarching strategy to manage station crowding. Sydney Trains' stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services. Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers but does not have sufficient oversight to know that station crowding is effectively managed. Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring or evaluation of crowd management plans at key metropolitan train stations. The use of crowding interventions is likely to increase due to increasing patronage, causing more customers to experience delays directly caused by these activities. TfNSW and Sydney Trains have developed interventions to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services but are yet to evaluate these interventions. As such, their impact on managing station crowding is unclear. |
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – Sydney rail network
Appendix three – Rail services contract
Appendix four – Crowding pedestrian modelling
Appendix five – Airport Link stations case study
Appendix six – About the audit
Appendix seven – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #333 - released 30 April 2020
Destination NSW's support for major events
This report focuses on whether Destination NSW (DNSW) can demonstrate that its support for major events achieves value for money.
The audit found that DNSW’s processes for assessing and evaluating the major events it funds are mostly effective, but its public reporting does not provide enough transparency.
DNSW provides clear information to event organisers seeking funding and has a comprehensive methodology for conducting detailed event assessments. However, the reasons for decisions to progress events from the initial assessment to the detailed assessment stage are not documented in sufficient detail.
DNSW does not publish detailed information about the events it funds or the outcomes of these events. This means that members of the public are unable to see whether its activities achieve value for money. However, DNSW’s internal reporting to its key decision‑makers, including the CEO, the Board and the Minister is appropriate.
The Auditor-General made four recommendations to DNSW, aimed at improving the transparency of its activities, improving the documentation of decisions and certain compliance matters, and streamlining its approach to assessing and evaluating events that receive smaller amounts of funding.
Destination NSW (DNSW) provides funding to attract a range of major events to New South Wales, including high-profile professional sports matches and tournaments, musicals, art and museum exhibitions, and participation-focused events such as festivals and sports events that members of the public can enter. The NSW Government's rationale for providing funding is to encourage event organisers to hold events in New South Wales, and to ensure that events held in New South Wales maximise the potential for attracting overseas and interstate visitors.
This audit assessed whether DNSW can demonstrate that its support for major events achieves value for money. In making this assessment, the audit examined whether:
- DNSW effectively assesses proposals to support major events
- DNSW effectively evaluates the impact of its support for major events.
This audit focused on DNSW's work to attract major events to New South Wales. It did not assess DNSW's tourism promotion or development work, which includes developing tourism strategies, marketing and advertising campaigns, national and international partnerships, and regional programs.
ConclusionDestination NSW's processes for assessing event applications and evaluating its support for major events are mostly effective. DNSW's internal systems allow it to know whether its decisions are achieving value for money. Its public reporting does not provide enough information about its activities and their outcomes, although it is consistent with that of equivalent organisations in other Australian jurisdictions. DNSW's process for assessing applications for funding from organisers of major events is mostly effective. Clear information is provided to event organisers seeking funding, and DNSW has a comprehensive methodology for conducting detailed event assessments. However, the reasons for decisions to progress events from the initial assessment to the detailed assessment stage are not documented in sufficient detail. DNSW has a framework for disclosure and monitoring staff conflicts of interest. However, its forms for staff to disclose conflicts of interest on specific events they are working on are ambiguous. DNSW's management of gifts and benefits broadly complies with the minimum standards set by the Public Service Commission, but there are some gaps in its implementation of these. DNSW conducts an evaluation of each major event it supports. DNSW articulates expected outcomes in contracts with event organisers and uses a sound methodology to evaluate events. Internal reporting to its key decision-makers, including the CEO, the Board and the Minister is appropriate. However, DNSW does not publish detailed information about the events it funds or the outcomes of these events. This means that members of the public are unable to see whether its activities achieve value for money. |
Appendix one – Response from Destination NSW
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Performance auditing
Copyright Notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #332 - released 9 April 2020.
Managing demand for ambulance services 2017
NSW Ambulance has introduced several initiatives over the past decade to better manage the number of unnecessary ambulance responses and transports to hospital emergency departments. However, there is no overall strategy to guide the development of these initiatives nor do NSW Ambulance's data systems properly monitor their impact. As a result, the Audit Office was unable to assess whether NSW Ambulance's approach to managing demand is improving the efficiency of ambulance services.
NSW Ambulance uses a telephone referral system to manage triple zero calls from people with medical issues that do not require an ambulance. This has the potential to achieve efficiency improvements but there are weaknesses in NSW Ambulance's use and monitoring of this system. Paramedics are now able to make decisions about whether patients need transport to a hospital emergency department. NSW Ambulance does not routinely measure or monitor the decisions paramedics make, so it does not know whether these decisions are improving efficiency. Extended Care Paramedics who have additional skills in diagnosing and treating patients with less urgent medical issues were introduced in 2007. NSW Ambulance analysis indicates that these paramedics have the potential to improve efficiency, but have not been used as effectively as possible.
Our 2013 audit of NSW Ambulance found that accurate monitoring of activity and performance was not being conducted. More than four years later, this remains the case.
NSW Ambulance has recognised the need to change the way it manages demand and has developed initiatives that have the potential to improve efficiency. However, there are significant weaknesses in the strategy for and implementation of its demand management initiatives.
NSW Ambulance has identified the goal of moving from an emergency transport provider to a mobile health service and developed several initiatives to support this. Its demand management initiatives have the potential to contribute to the broader policy directions for the health system in New South Wales. However, there is no clear overall strategy guiding these initiatives and their implementation has been poor.
NSW Ambulance's reasons for changing its approach to demand management have not been communicated proactively to the community. Demand management initiatives that have been operating for over a decade still do not have clear performance measures or targets. Project management of new initiatives has been inadequate, with insufficient organisational resources to oversee them and inadequate engagement with other healthcare providers.
NSW Ambulance uses an in-house Vocational Education and Training course to recruit some paramedics, as well as recruiting paramedics who have completed a university degree. No other Australian ambulance services continue to provide their own Vocational Education and Training qualifications. Paramedics will need more support in several key areas to be able to fulfil their expanded roles in providing a mobile health service. Performance and development systems for paramedics are not used effectively. Up to date technology would help paramedics make better decisions and improve NSW Ambulance's ability to monitor demand management activity.
There are gaps in NSW Ambulance's oversight of the risks of some of the initiatives it has introduced, particularly its lack of information on the outcomes for patients who are not transported to hospital. Weaknesses in the way NSW Ambulance uses its data limit its ability to properly assess the risks of the demand management initiatives it has introduced.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #295 - released 13 December 2017
Planning and evaluating palliative care services in NSW
NSW Health’s approach to planning and evaluating palliative care is not effectively coordinated. There is no overall policy framework for palliative and end-of-life care, nor is there comprehensive monitoring and reporting on services and outcomes.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #291 - released 17 August 2017
Therapeutic programs in prisons
Corrective Services NSW should ensure eligible prisoners receive timely programs to reduce the risk they will reoffend on release.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #283 - released 3 May 2017
