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Actions for Coordination of the response to COVID-19 (June to November 2021)

Coordination of the response to COVID-19 (June to November 2021)

Premier and Cabinet
Community Services
Health
Justice
Whole of Government
Internal controls and governance
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration

What the report is about

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies’ coordination of the response to COVID-19, with a focus on the Delta variant outbreak in the Dubbo and Fairfield Local Government Areas (LGA) between June and November 2021. We audited five agencies - the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Health, the NSW Police Force, Resilience NSW and the Department of Customer Service.

The audit also considered relevant planning and preparation activities that occurred prior to June 2021 to examine how emergency management and public health responses learned from previous events.

What we found

Prior to Delta, agencies developed capability to respond to COVID-19 related challenges.

However, lessons learned from prior reviews of emergency management arrangements, and from other jurisdictions, had not been implemented when Delta emerged in June 2021. As a result, agencies were not as fully prepared as they could have been to respond to the additional challenges presented by Delta.

Gaps in emergency management plans affected agencies' ability to support individuals, families and businesses impacted by restrictions to movement and gathering such as stay-at-home orders. In LGAs of concern, modest delays of a few days had a significant impact on people, especially those most vulnerable.

On 23 July 2021, the NSW Government established a cross-government coordinating approach, the Delta Microstrategy, which complemented existing emergency management arrangements, improved coordination between NSW Government agencies and led to more effective local responses.

Where possible, advice provided to government was supported by cross-government consultation, up-to-date evidence and insights. Public Health Orders were updated as the response to Delta intensified or to address unintended consequences of previous orders. The frequency of changes hampered agencies' ability to effectively communicate changes to frontline staff and the community in a rapidly evolving situation.

The NSW Government could provide greater transparency and accountability over decisions to apply Public Health Orders during a pandemic.

What we recommended

The audit made seven recommendations intended to improve transparency, accountability and preparedness for future emergency events.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies’ coordination (focused on the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Health, the NSW Police Force, Resilience NSW and the Department of Customer Service) of the COVID-19 response in selected Local Government Areas (Fairfield City Council and Dubbo Regional Council) between June and November 2021.

As noted in this report, Resilience NSW was responsible for the coordination of welfare services as part of the emergency management arrangements. On 16 December 2022, the NSW Government abolished Resilience NSW.

During the audited period, Resilience NSW was tasked with supporting the needs of communities subject to stay-at-home orders or stricter restrictions and it provided secretariat support to the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC). The SEMC was, and remains, responsible for the coordination and oversight of emergency management policy and preparedness.

Our work for this performance audit was completed on 15 November 2022, when we issued the final report to the five audited agencies. While the audit report does not make specific recommendations to Resilience NSW, it does include five recommendations to the State Emergency Management Committee. On 8 December 2022, the then Commissioner of Resilience NSW provided a response to the final report, which we include as it is the formal response from the audited entity at the time the audit was conducted.

The community of New South Wales has experienced significant emergency events during the past three years. COVID-19 first emerged in New South Wales after bushfire and flooding emergencies in 2019–20. The pandemic is now into its third year, and there have been further extreme weather and flooding events during 2021 and 2022.

Lessons taken from the experience of these events are important to informing future responses and reducing future risks to the community from emergencies.

This audit focuses on the NSW Government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and in particular, the Delta variant (Delta) that occurred between June and November 2021. The response to the Delta represents six months of heightened challenges for the NSW Government.

Government responses to emergencies are guided by legislation. The State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989 (SERM Act) establishes emergency management arrangements in New South Wales and covers:

  • coordination at state, regional and local levels through emergency management committees
  • emergency management plans, supporting plans and functional areas including the State Emergency Management Plan (EMPLAN)
  • operations centres and controllers at state, regional and local levels.

This audit focuses on the activities of five agencies during the audit period:

  • The NSW Police Force led the emergency management response and was responsible for coordinating agencies across government in providing the tactical and operational elements that supported and enhanced the health response to the pandemic. The NSW Police Force also led the compliance response which enforced Public Health Orders and included household checks on those required to isolate at home after testing positive to COVID-19. In some parts of NSW, they were supported by the Australian Defence Force in this role.
  • NSW Health was responsible for leading the health response which coordinated all parts of the health system, initially to prevent, and then to manage, the pandemic.
  • Resilience NSW coordinated welfare services as part of the emergency management arrangements and provided secretariat support to the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC). The SEMC is responsible for the coordination and oversight of emergency management policy and preparedness. Resilience NSW was also tasked with supporting the needs of communities subject to stay-at-home orders or stricter restrictions.
  • The Department of Customer Service (DCS) was responsible for the statewide strategic communications response.
  • The Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) held a key role in providing policy and legal services, as well as supporting the coordination of activity across a range of functional areas and decision-making by our State’s leaders.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies’ coordination (focused on the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Health, the NSW Police Force, Resilience NSW and the Department of Customer Service) of the COVID-19 response in selected Local Government Areas (LGA) (Fairfield City Council and Dubbo Regional Council) after June 2021.

The audit investigated whether:

  • government decisions to apply LGA-specific Public Health Orders were supported by effective crisis management governance and planning frameworks
  • agencies effectively coordinated in the communication (and enforcement) of Public Health Orders.

While focusing on the coordination of NSW Government agencies’ response to the Delta variant in June through to November 2021, the audit also considered relevant planning and preparation activities that occurred prior to June 2021 to examine how emergency management and public health responses learned from previous events.

This audit does not assess the effectiveness of other specific COVID-19 responses such as business support. It refers to the preparedness, planning and delivery of these activities in the context of supporting communities in selected LGAs. NSW Health's contribution to the Australian COVID-19 vaccine rollout was also subject to a separate audit titled 'New South Wales COVID-19 vaccine rollout' tabled in NSW Parliament on 7 December 2022. 

This audit is part of a series of audits which have been completed, or are in progress, regarding the New South Wales COVID-19 emergency response. The Audit Office of New South Wales '2022–2025 Annual Work Program' details the ongoing focus our audits will have on providing assurance on the effectiveness of emergency responses.

In this document Aboriginal refers to the First Nations peoples of the land and waters now called Australia, and includes Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.

Conclusion

Prior to June 2021, agencies worked effectively together to adapt and refine pre-existing emergency management arrangements to respond to COVID-19. However, lessons learned from prior reviews of emergency management arrangements, and from other jurisdictions, had not been implemented when Delta emerged in June 2021. As a result, agencies were not as fully prepared as they could have been to respond to the additional challenges presented by Delta.

In the period March 2020 to June 2021, the State's Emergency Management (EM) arrangements coordinated the New South Wales emergency response to COVID-19 with support from the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) which led the cross-government COVID-19 Taskforce. NSW Government agencies enhanced the EM arrangements, which until then had typically been activated in response to natural disasters, to meet the specific circumstances of the pandemic.

However, the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC), supported by Resilience NSW, did not address relevant recommendations arising from the 2020 Bushfires Inquiry before June 2021 and agencies did not always integrate lessons learned from other jurisdictions or scenario training exercises into emergency management plans or strategies before Delta. As a result, deficiencies in the EM arrangements, including representation of vulnerable communities on EM bodies, well-being support for multicultural communities in locked down environments and cross-agency information sharing, persisted when Delta emerged in June 2021.

It should be noted that for the purposes of this audit there is no benchmark, informed by precedent, that articulates what level of preparation would have been sufficient or proportionate. However, the steps required to address these gaps were reasonable and achievable, and the failure to do so meant that agencies were not as fully prepared as they could have been for the scale and escalation of Delta’s spread across the State.

The Delta Microstrategy complemented the EM arrangements to support greater coordination and agencies are working to improve their capability for future events

The Delta Microstrategy (the Microstrategy) led to innovations in information sharing and collaboration across the public service. Agencies involved in the response have completed, or are completing, reviews of their contribution to the response. That said, none of these reviews includes a focus on whole-of-government coordination.

On 23 July 2021, the NSW Government approved the establishment of the Microstrategy to respond to the additional challenges presented by Delta including the need to support communities most impacted by restrictions to movement and gathering in the LGAs of concern. An extensive range of government agencies were represented across eight Microstrategy workstreams, which coordinated with the existing EM arrangements to deliver targeted strategies to communities in high-risk locations and improve data and information sharing across government. This enhanced the public health, compliance, income and food support, communications and community engagement aspects of the response.

Agencies also leveraged learnings from early weeks of the Delta wave and were able to replicate those lessons in other locations. The use of pre-staging hubs in Fairfield to support food and personal hamper distribution was used a month later in Dubbo which acted as a central hub for more remote parts of the State.

Emergency management plans did not enable government to respond immediately to support vulnerable communities in high-risk LGAs or regional NSW

There are gaps in the emergency management plans relating to the support for individuals, families and businesses impacted by the stay-at-home orders and other restrictions to movement and gathering. These gaps affected agencies' ability to respond immediately when the need arose during Delta.

Emergency management plans and supporting instruments did not include provision for immediate relief for households, which meant arrangements for isolation income support and food security measures had to be designed in the early stages of Delta before it could be approved and deployed.

There were delays – sometimes only days, on occasion, weeks - in providing support to affected communities. In particular, there were delays to the provision of income support and in scaling up efforts to coordinate food and grocery hampers to households in isolation. In LGAs of concern, modest delays of a few days had a significant impact on people, especially those most vulnerable.

Although government issued stricter restrictions for workers in the Fairfield LGA on 14 July 2021, it only approved targeted income support for people in LGAs of concern on 16 August 2021.

Overall, agencies coordinated effectively to provide advice to government but there are opportunities to learn lessons to improve preparedness for future events

Agencies coordinated in providing advice to government. The advice was supported by timely public health information, although this was in the context of a pandemic, where data and information about the virus and its variants was changing regularly. However, agencies did not always consider the impact on key industries or supply chains when they provided advice to government, which meant that Public Health Orders would sometimes need to be corrected.

Public Health Orders were also updated as the response to Delta intensified or to address unintended consequences of previous orders. The frequency of changes hampered agencies' ability to effectively communicate changes to frontline staff and the community in a rapidly evolving situation.

The audit identified several occasions where there were delays, ranging from three to 21 days, between the provision of advice to government and subsequent decision-making (which we have not detailed due to the confidentiality of Cabinet deliberations). Agency officers advised of instances where they were not provided sufficient notice of changes to Public Health Orders to organise local infrastructure (such as traffic support for testing clinics) to support compliance with new requirements.

The COVID-19 pandemic arrived in Australia in late January 2020 as the bushfire and localised flooding emergencies were in their final stages. Between 2020 and mid-2021, agencies responded to the initial variants of COVID-19, managed a border closure with Victoria that lasted nearly four months and dealt with localised ‘flare-ups’ that required postcode-based restrictions on mobility in northern parts of Sydney and regional New South Wales. During this period, New South Wales had the opportunity to learn from events in Victoria which imposed strict restrictions on mobility across the State and the growing emergence of the Delta variant (Delta) across the Asia Pacific.

This section of the report assesses how emergency management and public health responses adapted to these lessons and determined preparedness for, and responses to, widespread community transmission of Delta in New South Wales.

The previous chapter discusses how agencies had refined the existing emergency management arrangements to suit the needs of a pandemic and describes some gaps that were not addressed. This chapter explores the first month of Delta (mid-June to mid-July 2021). It explores the areas where agencies were prepared and responses in place for the outbreak. It also discusses the impact of the gaps that were not addressed in the period prior to Delta and other issues that emerged.

NSW Health provided advice on the removal of restrictions based on up-to-date advice

The NSW Government discussed the gradual process for removing restrictions using the Doherty Institute modelling provided to National Cabinet on 10 August 2021. NSW Health highlighted the importance of maintaining a level of public health and safety measure bundles to further suppress case numbers. This was based on additional modelling from the Doherty Institute.

The Department of Regional NSW led discussion and planning around reopening with a range of proposal through August and September 2021. The Department of Premier and Cabinet and NSW Health jointly developed a paper to provide options on the restrictions when the State reached a level of 70% double dose vaccinations.

The roadmap to reopening was originally published on 9 September 2021. However, by 11 October 2021, the restrictions were relaxed when the 70% double dose threshold was reached to allow:

  • up to ten fully vaccinated visitors to a home (increased from five)
  • up to 30 fully vaccinated people attending outdoor gatherings (increased from 20)
  • weddings and funerals limits increased to 100 people (from 50)
  • the reopening of indoor pools for training, exercise and learning purposes only.

On the same day, the NSW Government announced further relaxation of restrictions once the 80% double dose threshold was reached. These restrictions were further relaxed on 8 November 2021. This included the removal of capacity restrictions to the number of visitors to a private residence, indoor pools to reopen for all purposes and density limits of one person for every two square metres, dancing allowed in nightclubs and 100% capacity in major stadia.

The NSW Government allowed workers in regional areas who received one vaccination dose to return to their workplace from 11 October 2021.

The Premier extended the date of easing of restrictions for unvaccinated people aged over 16 from 1 December to 15 December 2021.

Many agencies have undertaken reviews of their response to the Delta outbreak but a whole-of-government review has yet to be conducted

Various agencies and entities associated with the response to the Delta outbreak conducted after-action review processes. These processes assessed the achievements delivered, lessons learned and opportunities for improvement. However, a whole-of-government level review has not been conducted. This limits the New South Wales public service's ability to improve how it coordinates responses in future emergencies.

The agencies/entities that conducted reviews included:

  • South West Metropolitan region, Western NSW region, Fairfield Local Emergency Management Committee (LEMC), Dubbo Local Emergency Operations Controller (LEOCON), which were collated centrally by the State Emergency Operations Centre (SEOC)
  • Aboriginal Affairs NSW assessed representation and relevance of the emergency management arrangements for Aboriginal communities following the 2019 bushfires
  • Resilience NSW developed case studies to capture improved practice with regard to food security and supply chains
  • a community support and empowerment-focused after-action review undertaken by the Pillar 5 workstream of the Microstrategy.

Key lessons collated from the after-action reviews include:

  • the impact of variation in capability across agencies on the management of key aspects of the response including welfare support and logistics
  • issues with boundary differences between NSW Police Force regions, local government areas (LGA and local health districts (LHD) caused issues in delivering and coordinating services in an emergency situation 
  • the need to improve relationships between state and local Government outside of acute emergency responses to improve service delivery 
  • issues arising from impediments to information sharing between agencies and jurisdictions, such as:
    • timeliness and accuracy of data used to direct compliance activities
    • the impact of insufficient advance notice on changes to Public Health Orders
    • timely access to data across public sector agencies and other jurisdictions to inform decision-making, analysis and communications
    • gaps in data around ethnicity, geolocation of recent positive cases and infection/vaccination rates in Aboriginal communities.
  • the lack of Aboriginal community representation on many LEMCs
  • compared with the response to COVID-19 in 2020, improved coordination of communications with Culturally and Linguistically Diverse (CALD) populations with a reduction in overlapping messages and over-communication
  • improved attendance from agency representatives in LEMCs, and regional emergency operations centres (REOC) to improve interagency communications, planning, capability development and community engagement issues
  • deficiencies in succession planning and fatigue management practices
  • the potential for REOC Welfare/Well-being subgroups to be included as part of the wider efforts to community needs during emergencies.

NSW Health commenced a whole of system review of its COVID-19 response in May 2022. At the time of writing, the completion due date for the debrief is 7 November 2022. This debrief is expected to explore:

  • governance
  • engagement 
  • innovation and technology 
  • community impact 
  • workforce impact
  • system impact and performance.

NSW Health is also undertaking a parallel Intra-Action Review that is focused on the public health aspects of the response with finalisation estimated for the end of November 2022. At the time of completing this performance audit report, NSW Health had not finalised these reviews and, as a result, we cannot validate their findings against our own observations.

Recent inquiries are likely to impact the governance of emergency management in New South Wales

In March 2022, the NSW Government established an independent inquiry to examine and report on the causes of, preparedness for, response to and recovery from the 2022 floods. The Flood Inquiry report made 28 recommendations, which the NSW Government supported in full or in principle. Some of the recommendations relate directly to the governance and leadership of emergency management arrangements in New South Wales. 

The State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC) will likely be involved in, and impacted by, the recommendations arising from the Flood Inquiry with potential changes to its membership and reshaping of functional areas and agencies. At the same time, the SEMC may have a role in overseeing the changes that emerge from the SEOC consolidated after-action reviews. This can also extend to ensuring local and regional bodies have incorporated the required actions. There is a risk that the recommendations from the pandemic-based after-action reviews may not be considered due to the priority of action resulting from the Flood Inquiry.

Furthermore, there is potential for the SEMC to work with NSW Health during its system-wide review. Such an approach is likely to improve preparedness for future events.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – Chronology 2020–2021

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #371 - released 20 December 2022

Published

Actions for Development applications: assessment and determination stages

Development applications: assessment and determination stages

Planning
Local Government
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Service delivery

What the report is about

Local councils in New South Wales are responsible for assessing local and regional development applications.

Most development applications are assessed and determined by council staff under delegated authority. However, some development applications must be referred to independent local planning panels or Sydney and regional planning panels for determination.

Councils provide support to local planning panels. The Department of Planning and Environment provides support to Sydney and regional planning panels.

This audit assessed whether Byron Shire Council, Northern Beaches Council and The Hills Shire Council had effectively assessed and determined development applications in compliance with legislative and other requirements.

It also assessed whether The Hills Shire Council, Northern Beaches Council and the Department of Planning and Environment had provided effective support to relevant independent planning panels.

What we found

All councils had established clear roles, responsibilities and delegations for assessment and determination of development applications and had also established processes to ensure quality of assessment reports.

Northern Beaches Council and The Hills Shire Council have established comprehensive approaches to considering and managing risks related to development assessment.

Northern Beaches Council's approach to publishing its assessment reports promotes transparency.

Across a sample of development applications assessed and determined between 2020–22:

  • Northern Beaches Council and The Hills Shire Council had assessed and determined applications in compliance with legislative and other requirements. However, The Hills Shire Council could do more to transparently document any conflicts of interest within assessment reports.
  • Byron Shire Council had assessed most applications in compliance with legislative and other requirements. However, we found opportunities for the Council to:
    • ensure determinations were made in line with delegations
    • strengthen its approach to transparent management of conflicts of interest and quality review of assessments.

The Hills Shire Council and Northern Beaches Council had effectively supported their respective local planning panels.

The Department of Planning and Environment had processes that meet requirements for supporting regional planning panels but could do more to promote consistency in approach, share information across panels and measure the effectiveness of its support.

What we recommended

We made recommendations to Byron Shire Council, The Hills Shire Council and the Department of Planning and Environment to address the gaps identified and improve the transparency of processes.

Local councils in New South Wales are responsible for assessing local and regional development applications under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EP&A Act).

In assessing development applications, councils consider:

  • whether the proposed development application is compliant with legislation and environmental planning instruments
  • whether the proposed development meets local planning controls and objectives
  • any environmental, social and economic impacts
  • any submissions from impacted properties, neighbours and interested parties
  • the public interest.

Once assessed, a development application will be determined by council staff under delegated authority, the elected council, or an independent planning panel.1 

The involvement of a particular independent planning panel is established under legislative and policy instruments, and depends on the type and value of the proposed development. Most development applications are assessed and determined by council staff under delegated authority.

In determining development applications, independent planning panels must manage any potential, real or perceived conflicts of interest of panel members for a given development application, meet and vote on development applications, and publish their decisions and reasons.

Under the EP&A Act, and as required by statutory instruments and procedures, councils and the Department of Planning and Environment (DPE) must provide secretariat and other support functions to independent planning panels.

Previous reviews and inquiries have identified several significant risks that are present within the processes involved in the assessment and determination of development applications. These risks include possible non-compliance with complex legal and policy requirements, potential improper influence from developers and other stakeholders, and a perceived lack of transparency within the planning system and planning outcomes.

There are several planning pathways for development in New South Wales. This audit focuses on local and regional development that requires assessment and determination by a local council and/or an independent local planning panel or Sydney or regional planning panel in three Local Government Areas (LGAs): Byron Shire Council, Northern Beaches Council, The Hills Shire Council.

Audited councils were selected from a range of criteria, including:

  • the number, value and types of development applications determined in 2018–19
  • average determination timeframes
  • appeals against determinations and Land and Environment Court outcomes
  • LGA demographics.

The audit also avoided councils that had previously been subject to a performance audit.

The objective of this audit was to assess whether:

  • selected councils have effectively assessed and determined development applications in compliance with relevant legislation, regulations and government guidance
  • selected councils and DPE effectively support independent planning panels to determine development applications in compliance with relevant legislation, regulations and government guidance.

Conclusion – Byron Shire Council

Byron Shire Council has established clear roles, responsibilities and delegations for assessment and determination of development applications. However, the effectiveness of the Council's approach is limited by gaps in governance, risk management and internal controls.

Byron Shire Council has established clear roles, responsibilities and delegations for assessment and determination of development applications. However, the Council does not have a consolidated policy and procedure for development assessment, has not adequately followed up on the outcomes of internal reviews that identified opportunities to strengthen its assessment and determination procedures and approach, and has not demonstrated that it has managed relevant risks effectively.

The Council has not ensured that delegations have been consistently followed in the assessment of development applications.

Byron Shire Council's approach to managing conflicts of interest in development assessments does not provide transparency over potential conflicts of interest.

Byron Shire Council manages the risk of conflicts of interest for development assessment under its Code of Conduct. The Council has also implemented a separate policy that details additional requirements for managing conflicts of interest relevant to the development assessment process, but has not regularly updated this policy and requirements between it and the Code of Conduct have not been aligned. This creates a risk that planning staff may be following inconsistent or outdated advice in managing conflicts of interest.

Across the period of review, the Council did not require staff to provide a disclosure of interest for individual development applications to be contained within assessment reports. Including these disclosures would increase transparency and ensure that staff are sufficiently considering any conflicts of interest relevant to each separate assessment process.

Byron Shire Council has processes that promote compliance with legislation, regulation and government policy, but can improve how it undertakes some aspects of these that would ensure transparency, quality and consistency.

Our review of a sample of completed development applications from the Council indicated that most assessments were completed in compliance with relevant legislation, regulations and government guidance, but that there were some opportunities to improve elements of the assessment process, including: transparency of any conflicts of interest involved in the assessment process, ensuring compliance with delegated authority limits, and consideration of modification application provisions.

The Council has established templates to guide planners through relevant assessment considerations required by legislation, regulations and other guidance. However, it could do more to strengthen its approach to peer or manager review, monitoring legislative changes, and how it monitors the completion of relevant training by planning staff. 

 

Conclusion – Northern Beaches Council

Northern Beaches Council has established processes to support compliant and effective assessment and determination of development applications.

The Council has a clear governance and risk management framework for development assessment that sets out roles, responsibilities and delegations.

Northern Beaches Council has established clear roles, responsibilities and delegations for development application assessment and determination. The Council has identified development assessment related risks, and has put in place controls and mitigating actions to manage the risks to within risk tolerances.

Northern Beaches Council's approach to managing conflicts of interest promotes transparency.

Northern Beaches Council manages the risk of conflicts of interest for development assessment under its Code of Conduct. The Council has implemented an additional framework for planning staff to respond to the risk of conflicts of interest in development assessment processes. This framework requires its staff to disclose any conflicts of interest as a formal step in assessing development applications and includes declarations of any interests within assessment reports or planning panel minutes.

Our review of a sample of completed development applications indicated that the assessment reports had been compliant with the Council's approach to transparently documenting conflicts of interest.

Northern Beaches Council has established processes to deliver consistent, quality assessment of development applications.

Northern Beaches Council staff use an electronic development assessment tool that provides guidance, links to legislative and policy instruments and other applications that support assessment and drive consistency in approach. The Council applies a peer review process in which a manager or team member in a more senior position reviews an assessment report prior to determination to ensure that expected standards of quality and consistency have been met.

Our review of a sample of completed development applications indicated that assessments were undertaken in compliance with relevant legislation, regulations and government guidance.

Northern Beaches Council transparently documents assessment reports, supporting information and determination outcomes.

Northern Beaches Council has implemented a transparent approach to how it assesses and determines development applications. The Council publishes assessment reports, supporting technical reports, plans and submissions for all development applications. Notices of determination and final plans are also published alongside the assessment reports, allowing for greater transparency to the public.

Northern Beaches Council has established processes to effectively support the Northern Beaches Local Planning Panel.

Northern Beaches Council has established processes to support the Northern Beaches Local Planning Panel as required under legislative and policy instruments. The Council has processes to ensure that development applications required to be referred to a planning panel are identified and monitored, supports identification and documentation of any conflicts of interest, and transparently documents decisions of the panel.

Our review of a sample of meeting records held across the audit period of review indicated that these requirements were met and were transparently documented. 

 

Conclusion – The Hills Shire Council

The Hills Shire Council has established processes to support compliant and effective assessment and determination of development applications.

The Council has established a comprehensive governance and risk management framework for development assessment that sets out clear roles, responsibilities and delegations.

The Hills Shire Council has established a comprehensive framework for managing risks related to development assessment. Such risks are clearly identified and associated controls are in place to reduce or mitigate the risks. The Council has undertaken regular internal audits of development assessments, including reviewing completed applications to ensure compliance with relevant legislative and policy requirements.

The Council has established clear roles, responsibilities and delegations, and its staff assessing and determining development applications are supported by a standard set of policies and procedures for undertaking assessment and determination of applications.

The Hills Shire Council is managing conflicts of interest in line with Code of Conduct requirements but could more transparently document these.

The Hills Shire Council manages conflicts of interest for those involved in development application processes through provisions under its Code of Conduct. Under this Code of Conduct, staff must declare any conflicts of interest to their manager. However, the Council does not require staff to disclose any conflicts of interest in development application assessment reports which limits transparency to reviewing managers or any other determination bodies.

The Hills Shire Council has established processes to deliver consistent, quality assessment of development applications.

The Hills Shire Council has established templates to guide planners through relevant development assessment and determination considerations required by legislation, regulations and other guidance. The Council requires a peer review to occur prior to any determination which ensures a check on the compliance and quality of the assessment report prepared.

Our review of a sample of completed development applications from the Council indicated that assessments were performed in compliance with relevant legislation, regulations and government guidance.

The Hills Shire Council has established processes to effectively support The Hills Shire Local Planning Panel.

The Hills Shire Council has met requirements to provide secretariat and other support to The Hills Shire Local Planning Panel as required under legislative and policy instruments. It has processes to ensure that development applications required to be referred to a planning panel are identified and monitored, supports identification and documentation of any conflicts of interest, and transparently documents decisions of the panel.

Our review of a sample of meeting records held across the audit period of review indicated that these requirements were met and were transparently documented. 

 

Conclusion – Department of Planning and Environment

The Department of Planning and Environment (DPE) has established processes that meet its statutory and policy requirements to support Sydney and regional planning panels.

DPE has established processes to provide secretariat and other support to planning panels. It has met requirements to provide administrative support to the panels through its planning panels secretariat including undertaking administrative functions, supporting recruitment of panel members, and addressing complaints about the panel processes.

DPE has not ensured collection of annual pecuniary interest declarations for all panel members for the three Sydney and regional planning panels in scope for this audit. DPE could not provide annual pecuniary interest declarations for part of the audit period for three of the 47 members of these panels, as is required by DPE's Code of Conduct for Regional Planning Panels.

DPE does not formally measure its effectiveness in providing support to panels, but panel chairs consulted as part of this audit advised that they had no concerns with the level of secretariat support provided by DPE.

DPE could do more to facilitate information sharing between panels and could formalise how it provides comparative information to panels to improve consistency and standardisation in approach and share good practice. DPE has identified these gaps in reviews of its services and functions and has a plan in place to address them.

DPE has effectively documented planning panel decisions and made them available to all stakeholders. It also effectively documented interests declared as part of consideration of development applications for in-scope panels. 


1 Prescribed councils within designated Sydney districts are required to refer contentious development applications to local planning panels for determination. If the proposed development is above a threshold for estimated cost of works, or meets other prescribed criteria, the EP&A Act may require it to be referred to a Sydney or regional planning panel.

This audit continues a series of audits examining the development assessment process in NSW local councils and is focused on the assessment and determination stages.

The Audit Office of New South Wales previously considered local government development assessments in our 2019 performance audit: 'Development assessment: pre-lodgement and lodgement in Camden Council and Randwick City Council'.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – Council profile: Byron Shire Council

Appendix three – Council profile: Northern Beaches Council

Appendix four – Council profile: The Hills Shire Council

Appendix five – About the audit 

Appendix six – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #370 - released 12 December 2022

 

Published

Actions for New South Wales COVID-19 vaccine rollout

New South Wales COVID-19 vaccine rollout

Health
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Project management
Risk
Service delivery

What the report is about

The Australian Government led and implemented the Australian COVID-19 vaccine rollout, with the support of state and territory governments. As part of the Australian Government's vaccine rollout, NSW Health launched its vaccination program on 22 February 2021, with responsibility for distributing and administering COVID-19 vaccine stock provided by the Australian Government.

This audit examined the period 1 January 2021 to 31 December 2021 and focused on NSW Health's contribution to the Australian Government led vaccine roll out in four Local Health Districts (LHDs), in particular the administration of two doses of vaccine to people aged 16 and over.

What we found

On 16 October 2021, NSW Health, in partnership with the Australian Government's vaccination program, achieved its first objective to fully vaccinate 80% of people in NSW aged 16 and over. Demand for the vaccine reduced in December 2021, and NSW Health did not reach its target of 95% fully vaccinated for people aged 16 and over until June 2022.

Despite challenges such as uncertain supply and changes to clinical advice affecting vaccine eligibility, NSW Health's overall delivery of vaccination services was effective and efficient.

During the audit period, NSW Health implemented effective strategies to allocate vaccines and reduce wastage to optimise the number of vaccines available.

NSW Health implemented its own booking system after it identified that the Australian Government's system would not manage bookings. There were problems with NSW Health's interim vaccine booking system, and NSW Health fully resolved these issues by September 2021.

As at 19 October 2022, vaccination rates for Aboriginal peoples and culturally and linguistically diverse people remained below the 95% target.

What we recommended

By June 2023, NSW Health should conduct a comprehensive review of the COVID-19 vaccine rollout and incorporate lessons learned into pandemic response plans.

The first three cases of COVID-19 in New South Wales were diagnosed in January 2020. By 30 June 2021, 128 people were being treated in hospital and one person was in intensive care. By the end of December 2021, 187,504 total cases and 663 deaths were reported in New South Wales. As at 27 October 2022, NSW Health reported more than three million total cases and 5,430 deaths.

The COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on the people and the health sector of New South Wales. The Australian, state, territory, and local governments have directed significant resources towards health responses and economic recovery.

On 13 November 2020, National Cabinet (comprised of the Australian, state, and territory governments) endorsed the Australian COVID-19 Vaccination Policy. Australia's vaccination program was launched on 21 February 2021 with the goal of providing safe and effective vaccines to the people who most needed them as quickly as possible, to support the physical, mental and economic wellbeing of the nation.

The Australian Government led and implemented the Australian vaccine rollout, with the support of state and territory governments. As part of the Australian Government's vaccine rollout, NSW Health launched its vaccination program on 22 February 2021, with responsibility for distributing and administering COVID-19 vaccine stock provided by the Australian Government.

The overall objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of NSW Health’s contribution to the Australian COVID-19 vaccine rollout. It is important to note that in New South Wales, primary care providers (GPs and pharmacies) and aged care providers administered the majority of vaccines. Primary care providers and aged care providers are the responsibility of the Australian Government.

The audit had a particular focus on whether NSW Health:

  • set clear vaccination targets underpinned and/or guided by evidence
  • managed the rollout of the vaccination program effectively and efficiently
  • managed demand of vaccines effectively and efficiently.

The audit examined the period 1 January 2021 to 31 December 2021 and focused on NSW Health's contribution to the Australian Government led vaccine rollout in four Local Health Districts (LHDs), in particular the administration of two doses of vaccine to people aged 16 and over. We did not audit the subsequent rollout for ages five to 15, or the booster rollout (third and fourth doses) as these activities mostly occurred outside the date of our review.

This audit also did not assess the Australian Government’s allocation of vaccine supplies to New South Wales because we do not audit the Australian Government's activities. On 17 August 2022, the Australian National Audit Office completed a performance audit which assessed the Australian Department of Health and Aged Care's effectiveness in the planning and implementation of Australia's COVID-19 vaccine rollout.

This audit is one of a series of audits that have been completed or are in progress regarding the New South Wales COVID-19 emergency response. This includes the planned performance audit ‘Coordination of the response to COVID-19 (June to November 2021)’, and financial audit assurance activities focusing on Local Health District processes and controls to manage the receipt, distribution and inventory management of vaccine stock. The Audit Office New South Wales '2022–25 Annual Work Program' details the ongoing focus our audits will have on providing assurance on the effectiveness of emergency responses.

Conclusion

By 12 December 2021, NSW Health had administered two doses of vaccines to one third of eligible people in New South Wales aged 16 and over – contributing significantly to the achievement of the NSW Government vaccination target of 80% fully vaccinated before 31 December 2021. Despite challenges such as uncertain supply and changes to clinical advice affecting vaccine eligibility, NSW Health's overall delivery of vaccination services was effective and efficient.

NSW Health implemented its own booking system after it identified that the Australian Government's system would not manage bookings. There were problems with NSW Health's interim vaccine booking system, and NSW Health fully resolved these issues by September 2021.

Vaccination levels in some vulnerable populations remain below the 95% double dose target currently in place. Access to quality data to regularly measure vaccination rates in some vulnerable populations remains an ongoing challenge for the NSW and Australian Governments. As a result, NSW Health is unable to fully ensure it has delivered on its shared responsibility with the Australian Government to vaccinate vulnerable people.

NSW Health managed challenges regarding the uncertain supply of vaccines from the Australian Government and filled gaps beyond its agreed responsibilities in the National Partnership on COVID-19 Response. During the Delta outbreak of the pandemic, NSW Health sought to achieve the best possible public health outcome from limited vaccine supply by opening up additional vaccination clinics in highly affected areas and redistributing vaccine supplies from areas with fewer cases to highly affected local government areas in south west Sydney.

During the audit period, NSW Health implemented effective strategies to allocate vaccines and reduce wastage to optimise the number of vaccines available. Our financial audit report, 'Health 2022', includes additional information on vaccine supply stock held by NSW Health.

NSW Health demonstrated agility by using a range of strategies to promote vaccination, including direct engagement with communities to develop culturally appropriate services such as pop-up clinics. NSW Heath recruited prominent community members, such as faith leaders, elders and sportspeople, to promote vaccination within their communities. However, at the date of this report, there are still vulnerable populations with vaccination rates lower than the current 95% double dose vaccination target. There is also a lack of regularly updated data for some cohorts which prevents NSW Health from accurately monitoring vaccination rates in some populations it has identified as vulnerable.

In March 2021, NSW Health identified that the booking system provided by the Australian Government was an online directory of vaccine clinics and would not manage bookings. To overcome this, NSW Health amended an internal-use system to be publicly facing. This solution was not user-friendly for staff or those seeking to make an appointment. Between June to September 2021, NSW Health progressively resolved booking system related issues, by developing and rolling out a new purpose-built booking solution for NSW Health vaccination clinics.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Australian audits on the vaccine rollouts

Appendix three – Committee members 

Appendix four – About the audit 

Appendix five – Performance auditing 

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #369 - released 7 December 2022

Published

Actions for Effectiveness of the Biodiversity Offsets Scheme

Effectiveness of the Biodiversity Offsets Scheme

Planning
Environment
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Regulation

What the report is about

This audit examined whether the Department of Planning and Environment (DPE) and the Biodiversity Conservation Trust (BCT) have effectively designed and implemented the Biodiversity Offsets Scheme (‘the Scheme’) to compensate for the loss of biodiversity due to development.

Under the Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016, the Scheme enables landholders to establish in-perpetuity Biodiversity Stewardship Agreements on sites to generate credits for the unique biodiversity on that land. These credits can be sold to offset the negative impact of development on biodiversity.

What we found

DPE has not effectively designed core elements of the Scheme. DPE did not establish a clear strategic plan to guide the implementation of the Scheme.

The BCT has various roles in the Scheme but lacked safeguards against potential conflicts, creating risks to credit supply.

The effectiveness of its implementation has also been limited. Key concerns around the Scheme’s transparency, sustainability and integrity are yet to be fully resolved.

A market-based approach to biodiversity offsetting is central to the Scheme's operation but credit supply is lacking and poorly matched to growing demand. DPE has not established a clear, resourced plan to manage the shortage in credit supply. Data about the market, published by the DPE and the BCT, does not provide an adequate picture of credit supply, demand and price to readily support market participation.

These factors create a risk that biodiversity gains made through the Scheme will not be sufficient to offset losses resulting from development, and that the DPE will not be able to assess the Scheme’s overall effectiveness.

DPE is leading work with the BCT to improve the Scheme, but this is not yet guided by a long-term strategy with clear goals.

What we recommended

The audit made 11 recommendations to DPE and the BCT, focusing on:

  • a long-term strategic plan for the Scheme
  • improvements to the operation and transparency of the market and credit supply
  • frameworks to ensure the financial and ecological sustainability of biodiversity stewardship sites
  • enhanced public reporting and data management
  • resolving issues in conflicting governance and oversight.

 

 Fast facts

  • 96% –  proportion of developer demand for species credits not met by current supply
  • 97% – proportion of species credits that have never been traded on the biodiversity market
  • 60% – proportion of the 226 Biodiversity Stewardship sites under active land management
  • $90m – value of developers’ obligations paid directly into the Biodiversity Conservation Fund
  • 20% – proportion of developer obligations transferred to the BCT that have been acquitted.

The NSW Government's Biodiversity Outlook Report 2020 estimates that, without effective management, only 50% of species and 59% of ecological communities that are listed as threatened in New South Wales will still exist in 100 years. The NSW State of the Environment 2021 report identifies habitat destruction and native vegetation clearing as presenting the single greatest threat to biodiversity in the State.

According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), biodiversity offsets are 'measurable conservation outcomes that result from actions designed to compensate for significant, residual biodiversity loss from development projects'. The OECD states that a feature of such schemes is that biodiversity offsets are intended to be implemented as the 'final step of a mitigation hierarchy' whereby reasonable first steps are taken to avoid and minimise the negative impacts.

The NSW Biodiversity Offsets Scheme was established in 2017 under the Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016 (the Act). The purpose of the Act is to 'maintain a healthy, productive and resilient environment for the greatest well-being of the community, now and into the future, consistent with the principles of ecologically sustainable development'.

The Department of Planning and Environment (DPE) designed and manages this Scheme. Under the Act, a feature of the Scheme is a 'market-based conservation mechanism through which the impacts to biodiversity can be offset.' The Scheme enables landholders to establish in-perpetuity Biodiversity Stewardship Agreements (BSAs) on sites to generate biodiversity credits, which can be sold to offset the negative impact of development on biodiversity. BSA sites are intended to be managed over the long term to generate the biodiversity gains required to offset the impact.

The Biodiversity Conservation Trust (BCT) monitors and supports landholders to manage BSA sites under the Scheme. This includes making payments to landholders from funds held in the Biodiversity Stewardship Payments Fund for undertaking the required biodiversity management actions.

This Scheme was preceded by several other offsetting schemes in New South Wales, including the BioBanking scheme that started in 2008. DPE has arrangements to transition sites, credits, and offset obligations from this and other previous schemes.

The current biodiversity credit market in New South Wales consists of 1394 different types of ecosystem credits, which are approved to be traded in 364 different offset trading groups, and 867 different species credits. Trading rules, set out in the Biodiversity Conservation Regulation 2017 (the Regulation), prioritise offsetting the obligations of a development with like-for-like ecosystem or species credits.

The Scheme is implemented through the planning system in New South Wales. Proposed development that involves the clearing of native vegetation, and meets certain thresholds, is required to undertake a Biodiversity Development Assessment Report. These reports determine an offset obligation, in biodiversity credits, to compensate for the biodiversity loss proposed. These reports are considered by consent authorities (such as a council, for local development, or by the Minister for Planning for major projects). An offset obligation is then included in the conditions of development approval.

In addition to establishing a market for trading between developers, with offset obligations, and landholders, who sell credits from their BSA sites, the Scheme allows developers to pay into the Biodiversity Conservation Fund and transfer their obligations to the BCT. This allows the developer to proceed with their project. The BCT must then meet these acquired obligations by buying the required credits, or by undertaking other approved activities set out in the Regulation. The BCT has more options than developers on how and when it acquits its obligations.

This audit examined whether DPE and the BCT have effectively designed and implemented the Biodiversity Offsets Scheme to compensate for the loss of biodiversity due to development.

Conclusion

The Department of Planning and Environment (DPE) has not effectively designed core elements of the NSW Biodiversity Offsets Scheme. DPE did not establish a clear strategy to develop the biodiversity credit market or determine whether the Scheme’s operation and outcomes are consistent with the purposes of the Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016.

The effectiveness of the Scheme's implementation by DPE and the BCT has been limited. A market-based approach to biodiversity offsetting is central to the Scheme's operation but credit supply is lacking and poorly matched to growing demand: this includes a potential undersupply of in-demand credits for numerous endangered species. Key concerns around the Scheme’s integrity, transparency, and sustainability are also yet to be fully resolved. As such, there is a risk that biodiversity gains made through the Scheme will not be sufficient to offset losses resulting from the impacts of development, and that DPE will not be able to assess the Scheme’s overall effectiveness.

DPE developed the Scheme following a 2014 review of the State's biodiversity legislation and building on previous offsetting arrangements in New South Wales. At the time the Scheme commenced in 2017, DPE lacked a strategic plan to guide its implementation, set clear outcomes and performance measures, and respond effectively to risks. DPE did establish a detailed scientific method for assessing biodiversity impacts under the Scheme and a system for accrediting assessors to undertake this technical work. These are important foundations for the robustness of the Scheme.

The Scheme has been in place for five years, but the biodiversity credit market is not well developed. Most credit types have never been traded. Also, according to DPE data, around 90% of demand cannot be matched to credit supply – and there is likely to be a substantial credit undersupply for at least seven endangered flora species, three endangered fauna species, and eight threatened ecological communities. Credit demand is projected to grow – especially in relation to the NSW Government’s $112.7 billion four-year infrastructure pipeline.

As with any market, potential participants need information about demand and price in order to understand risks and opportunities. But information about the biodiversity credit market, published by DPE and the BCT, does not provide an adequate picture of credit supply, demand and price to support market participation. This can create uncertainty for landholders who may be weighing the costs and benefits of establishing Biodiversity Stewardship Agreement (BSA) sites, and for development proponents who need to know whether they can purchase sufficient credits and at what price. Development proponents who lack market information are being incentivised to meet their offset obligations by paying into the Biodiversity Conservation Fund, which is managed by the BCT. This option provides developers with more certainty that enables them to progress their projects, but does not result in the development being offset until the BCT later acquits the obligation.

The BCT has multiple roles in the Scheme. These include setting-up and administering BSAs which generate credits, acquiring offset obligations from developers who pay into the Biodiversity Conservation Fund, and purchasing credits to meet its acquired obligations. There have been inadequate safeguards to mitigate the potential for conflicts between these roles. As the BCT directs its efforts towards facilitating BSA sites and purchasing credits to meet its obligations, there is a risk that government is insufficiently focused on supporting overall credit supply.

DPE has begun developing a credit supply strategy. Its absence, and a lack of clarity around responsibility for credit supply under the Scheme, has contributed to the significant risk of insufficient and poorly matched credits to meet the growing demand. The BCT's acquired obligations from developers have been increasing year-on-year, and are likely to continue to grow. 

There is a risk that the BCT will not have sufficient funds to acquit its growing obligations with like-for-like credits, which could result in sub-optimal biodiversity outcomes. The Scheme rules allow the BCT to acquit its obligations with measures other than like-for-like credits. DPE has not provided clear guidance to the BCT on when or how to do so, or how this would fulfil the 'no net loss' of biodiversity standard.

There are transparency and integrity risks to the Scheme. DPE does not maintain a public register of biodiversity credits with complete information, including credits' transaction histories, consistent with the legislative intent for a single register. DPE also does not have ready access to information to check that developments have been acquitted with the required credits.

Risks to the sustainability of the Scheme and its outcomes remain. DPE and the BCT have not yet implemented a decision-making and intervention framework to ensure adequate initial and ongoing funding for the long-term management of new and existing BSA sites. DPE also did not collect ecological data from sites under previous schemes before they were transitioned, and BCT only introduced ecological monitoring requirements for new BSA sites in March 2021. The lack of monitoring requirements creates a risk that the biodiversity gains, which BSA sites are required to generate to offset biodiversity losses, will not be measured and achieved under the Scheme.

This section presents an overview of the status of the biodiversity credit market in New South Wales. It describes development of the market under the Scheme in the context of transitional arrangements from previous schemes, and the extent of market participation and transactions to date. It also presents information about emerging trends in credit demand and supply.

Background

A purpose of the Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016 (the Act) is to establish a market-based conservation mechanism through which impacts on biodiversity can be offset. Sufficient credits of appropriate types, which are well matched to demand, are necessary for enough transactions to inform prices and enable efficient like-for-like offsetting. For transactions to occur efficiently in the market, participants require reliable and easy-to-access information about supply, demand and price.

The Scheme was established in 2017 with an existing credit supply and offset obligations (credit demand) as regulations had been introduced to preserve and transition credits and obligations from previous schemes including the BioBanking Scheme, which started in 2008.

Credits under the BioBanking scheme are referred to as 'BBAM credits', and credits under the current Scheme are referred to as 'BAM credits'. BBAM credits are still available, and the transitional arrangements enable DPE to determine the 'reasonable equivalence' of these to the current Scheme's credit numbers and classes. DPE has stated that reasonable equivalence of credits is based on ecological not financial equivalence. 

This section assesses the clarity and alignment of the goals of the Scheme to key features of its design and operations. It also examines structural elements of the Scheme that aim to maintain integrity within administering agencies, and the status of actions to address risks or issues.

Background

The Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016 (the Act) sets out the legal framework for the Scheme. Given the complexities, financial interests, and range of stakeholders associated with the Scheme, it requires strong safeguards. Transparency and assurances around the Scheme's integrity are also relevant to participants' confidence in it, which in turn is important for market development.

Core components of the Scheme, identified in section 1.3 of the Act, are to be consistent with the ‘principles of ecologically sustainable development’.

The Act and other administrative arrangements of government allocate responsibility to DPE and the Minister for Environment and Heritage for the Scheme’s design and elements of its implementation. This includes responsibility for the Scheme’s policy, legislative and regulatory framework.

Responsibility is allocated to the BCT for implementing and operating certain elements of the Scheme. This includes administering Biodiversity Stewardship Agreements (which generate credits) and securing offsets on behalf of development proponents who pay into the Biodiversity Conservation Fund to meet their offset obligations.

This broad legislative framework is not intended to detail responsibilities for the full range of roles and activities that agencies need to take to implement and regulate the Scheme effectively, and ensure its good governance. Agencies should do this as part of sound and transparent public administration. 

This section assesses how effectively components of the Scheme have been designed and are being implemented to provide assurance that the impacts of development are being avoided and minimised such that only ‘unavoidable’ impacts remain to be offset. The section also assesses whether the Scheme and its market embeds the necessary controls to ensure that obligations are offset as required.

Background

The Biodiversity Assessment Method, and the quality of its application by DPE-Accredited Assessors, is critical to the robustness the Scheme. The method is designed to be applied to avoid and minimise impacts at proposed development sites before identifying offset obligations. The effectiveness of Scheme outcomes requires that obligations are offset with the retirement of the necessary and appropriate credits.

The Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016 (the Act) requires the relevant Minister (the current Minister for Environment and Heritage) to establish a method for the purpose of assessing the impacts of actions on threatened species and ecological communities.

The Act also specifies that this method must be applied by an accredited person. DPE is responsible for the design and implementation of this accreditation system, arrangements for which are set out in an instrument under the Act.

A Biodiversity Development Assessment Report is a report by a DPE-Accredited Assessor using the Biodiversity Assessment Method. These reports assess the biodiversity impacts of the proposed development and establish offset obligations as part of the development approval process. It is important that local councils and other development consent authorities understand and can assess the quality of these reports.

DPE manages the process of ‘retiring’ credits against the identified offset obligations. Once a credit is retired it cannot be reused to acquit another obligation, which is critical to Scheme outcomes. DPE is also responsible for maintaining records of credit transactions, which results in a legally binding transfer of credit ownership from seller to buyer. 

This section assesses how effectively the supply of biodiversity credits has been supported by encouraging and enabling landholders to participate in the Scheme. It also assesses whether sufficient action is underway to address issues and risks to the establishment of BSA sites, especially in the context of known credit supply issues (section 2).

Background

Credit supply is generated when a landholder establishes a Biodiversity Stewardship Agreement (BSA) on their land. Establishing a BSA site requires landholders agree to an in-perpetuity management plan, so it is important that they have sufficient support and access to relevant information about risks and opportunities when deciding to do so. Ensuring adequate credits supply underpins the Scheme's ability to deliver the intended biodiversity outcomes.

A landholder establishes an offset site through a BSA, which is a legal agreement with the Minister of Environment and Heritage (delegated to the Biodiversity Conservation Trust). The BSA is registered on the title of the land.

DPE-Accredited Assessors develop Biodiversity Stewardship Site Assessment Reports, which are submitted by landholders to the BCT as part of the BSA application. These reports apply the Biodiversity Assessment Method to detail the number and types of credits that a BSA site is expected to generate by implementing a 20-year management plan. The BCT issues credits to landholders on registration of the BSA.

Ensuring an adequate and appropriate supply of credits is important so that like-for-like matches between credits and obligations can be efficiently secured in a timely way. This minimises the use of offset variation rules, and can avoid potential delays in developers securing appropriate offsets to meet their offset obligations. It also makes it easier for the BCT to locate the necessary credits to acquit the obligations it acquires from developers. 

This section assesses how effectively BSA sites, which need to be managed by landholders to generate the biodiversity gains represented by credits, are regulated and supported by the Biodiversity Conservation Trust. It also assesses whether actions have been taken to address identified risks to the suitability of funds required to ensure long-term BSA site management.

Background

For Biodiversity Stewardship Agreement (BSA) sites to achieve the expected biodiversity gains to offset losses from development impact, they need sufficient funding for the required management actions, and to be effectively regulated and supported over the long-term. Funding for these sites is generated through the returns on landholders' initial investment (Total Fund Deposit). The BCT is required to monitor landholders' compliance with BSAs and should also ensure ecological outcomes on sites are measured.

DPE and the BCT are responsible for developing and implementing a system of oversight to ensure the implementation of management actions at BSA sites is delivering the intended outcomes in a financially and environmentally sustainable way. The agencies' key mechanisms for delivering this are:

  • calculating the costs of the required land management actions in perpetuity
  • annual reporting systems for monitoring compliance with land management requirements
  • reporting systems for monitoring ecological outcomes arising from land management actions.

Landholders are required to pay the required Total Fund Deposit amount for their BSA accounts into the Biodiversity Stewardship Payments Fund, which is held in trust and managed by the BCT. A costing tool is used by landholders to calculate the value of the deposit, based on the required management payments (in perpetuity), administrative fees, and the discount rate applied.

The Total Fund Deposit can be paid upfront but is usually paid from the proceeds of the sale of credits. Once this occurs the BSA site becomes 'active' and management payments commence to enable the landholder to undertake the required management actions. BSA sites that have not yet sold enough credits to make the deposit are 'passive' sites that do not require active land management.

Sites in passive management for an extended duration present risks to biodiversity outcomes, and potentially to Scheme integrity, if the quality of credits is undermined due to an absence of active site management. 

Appendix one – Response from agencies 

Appendix two – Like-for-like, variation and ancillary rules

Appendix three – Detail on progress of the IIAP

Appendix four – About the audit 

Appendix five – Performance auditing 

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #367 - released 30 August 2022

Published

Actions for NSW planning portal

NSW planning portal

Planning
Industry
Environment
Local Government
Information technology
Project management
Risk

What the report is about

The ePlanning program is an initiative of the Department of Planning and Environment (the department) to deliver a digital planning service for New South Wales through the NSW planning portal (the portal).

Using the portal, relevant planning activities can be carried out online, including all stages of development applications.

The portal has been developed under three separate business cases in 2013, 2014 and 2020.

In late 2019, the government mandated the use of the portal for all development applications. This decision took effect across 2020–21.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the department's implementation, governance and stakeholder engagement in delivering the NSW planning portal. 

What we found

Since implementation commenced in 2013, the NSW planning portal has progressively achieved its objectives to provide citizens with access to consolidated planning information, and allow them to prepare and submit development applications online.

Shortcomings in the department's initial planning and management of the program led to a significant time overrun. It has taken the department longer and cost significantly more to implement the portal than first anticipated. 

In recent years the department has improved the planning, implementation and governance of the ePlanning program, resulting in improved delivery of the portal’s core functions.

The department now has a clear view of the scope necessary to finalise the program, but has not yet published the services it plans to implement in 2022 and 2023.

Mandating the use of the portal for all development applications changed the program's strategic risk environment and required the department to work more closely with a cohort of stakeholders, many of whom did not want to adopt the portal.

Despite this change, the department kept its overall delivery approach the same.

While implementation of the portal has delivered financial benefits, the department has overestimated their value.

The Department has only reported benefits since 2019 and has not independently assured the calculation of benefits.

What we recommended

By December 2022, the department should:

  • publish a roadmap of the services it expects to release on the portal across 2022 and 2023
  • update its ePlanning program assumptions, benefits targets and change management approach to reflect the government's decision to mandate the use of the portal for all stages of a development application
  • independently assure and report publicly the correct calculation of ePlanning program benefits.

Fast facts

  • 10 years taken to implement the portal when completed
  • 3 years longer than initially planned to implement the portal
  • $146m capital expenditure on the portal when completed
  • $38.5m more spent than planned in the business cases.

The ePlanning program is an initiative of the Department of Planning and Environment (the department) to deliver a digital planning service for New South Wales through the NSW planning portal (the portal, or the planning portal). The department defines the portal as an online environment where community, industry and government can work together to better understand and meet their obligations under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW). Using the portal, relevant planning activities can be carried out online throughout New South Wales. This includes, but is not limited to:

  • applying for and gaining planning approval
  • applying for and gaining approval for building works, sub-dividing land and similar activities
  • issuing occupancy and other certificates.

The portal has been developed under three separate business cases. The first business case in 2013 led to the creation of a central portal, which made planning information available to view by planning applicants and allowed some planning applications to be lodged and tracked online.

Under a second business case prepared in 2014, the department set out to improve and widen the functions available via the portal. The department prepared a third business case in 2020 to fund further improvements to the portal over the period July 2020 to June 2023. The third business case also extended the portal's functions to support the building and occupation stages of the planning cycle.

In late 2019, the government mandated the use of the portal for all stages of development applications. This decision took effect across 2020–21 and applied to all councils as well as certifiers and others involved in the planning process.

The objective of this performance audit was to assess the effectiveness of the department's implementation, governance and stakeholder engagement in delivering the NSW planning portal. We investigated whether:

  • delivery of the NSW planning portal was planned effectively
  • sound governance arrangements are in place to ensure effective implementation of the program
  • users of the NSW planning portal are supported effectively to adopt and use the system.
Conclusion

Since implementation commenced in 2013, the NSW planning portal has progressively achieved its objectives to provide citizens with access to consolidated planning information and allow them to prepare and submit development applications online. Implementation was initially hindered by deficiencies in planning and it has taken the department significantly longer and cost significantly more to implement the portal than first anticipated. While the portal's implementation has delivered financial benefits, the department has overestimated their value. As a result, the department cannot yet demonstrate that the portal has achieved overall financial benefits, relative to its costs.

In the first two years of the ePlanning program, the department delivered a portal that allowed planners, developers, certifiers and the public to view important planning information. However, the department found the delivery of a second, transactional version of the portal in 2017 to be much more challenging. This version was intended to offer more integrated information and allow development applications to be submitted and managed online. The department did not rollout this version after a pilot showed significant weaknesses with the portal's performance. A subsequent review found that this was partly because the department did not have a clear view of the portal’s role or the best way to implement it. In recent years the department has improved the planning, implementation and governance of the ePlanning program resulting in improved delivery of the portal’s core functions.

By the time the program reaches its scheduled completion in 2023, it will have taken the department ten years and around $146 million in capital expenditure to implement the portal. This will be significantly longer and more expensive than the department originally expected. This overrun is partly due to an increased scope of services delivered through the portal and an initial under-appreciation of what is involved in creating a standard, central resource such as the portal. The department also experienced some significant implementation difficulties – which saw the transactional portal discontinued after it was found to be not fit for purpose. Following this, the department re-set the program in 2017–18 and re-planned much of the portal's subsequent development.

In November 2019, the New South Wales Government decided to mandate the use of the portal for all stages of development applications by the end of 2020–21. The department had previously planned that the portal would be progressively adopted by all councils and other stakeholders over the five years to 2025. The decision to mandate the portal's use for all development applications brought forward many of the portal's benefits as well as the challenges of its implementation. The department did not change its overall delivery approach in response to the changed risks associated with the government's decision to mandate use of the portal.

The current version of the portal has given the department more timely and comprehensive planning information and has helped New South Wales to provide continuous planning services during COVID-19 lockdowns, which interrupted many other public functions. The portal has also delivered financial benefits, however the department has not independently assured benefits calculations carried out by its consultant, and the reported benefits are overstated. In addition, some stakeholders report that the portal is a net cost to their organisation. This has included some certifiers and some councils which had implemented or had started to implement their own ePlanning reforms when use of the portal was mandated in 2019. The department now needs to address the issues faced by these stakeholders while continuing to deliver the remaining improvements and enhancements to the portal. Over the remaining year of the program, it will be critical that the department focuses on the agreed program scope and carefully evaluates any opportunities to further develop the portal to support future planning reforms.

This part of the report sets out how:

  • the ePlanning program has been planned and delivered
  • users of the portal have been supported
  • the program has been governed.

This part of the report sets out the ePlanning program's:

  • expected and reported financial benefits
  • calculation of financial benefits.

In 2019, the department increased its expectations for net financial benefits

The department's three ePlanning business cases each forecast substantial financial benefits from the implementation of the planning portal. The department expected that most financial benefits would flow to planning applicants due to a quicker and more consistent planning process. It also expected that government agencies and councils would benefit from the portal.

Exhibit 6: Summary of the financial benefits originally expected
  Business case 1
($ million)
Business case 2
($ million)
Business case 3
($ million)
Total
($ million)
Benefits 90.0 44.3 270.9 405.2
Costs 43.3 29.4 89.8 162.5
Net benefits 46.7 15.0 181.1 242.7

Note: Benefits and costs are incremental. All amounts are calculated over ten years. Amounts for business case 1, 2 and 3 amounts are expressed in 2013, 2015 and 2019 dollars respectively. All amounts are discounted at seven per cent to show their value at the time when they were calculated. Amounts may not add due to rounding.
Source: Audit Office analysis of data provided by the Department of Planning and Environment.

In 2019 the department commissioned a review to explore opportunities to better identify, monitor and realise the benefits of the ePlanning program. Using this work, the department updated the expected benefits for business cases 1 and 2 to take account of:

  • errors and miscalculations in the original benefits calculations
  • slower delivery of the portal and changes to the take-up of portal services by councils
  • changes to the services supported by the portal.
Exhibit 7: Summary of the financial benefits expected for business case 1 and 2 after the 2019 update
  Original business case 1 and 2 (combined)
($ million)
New business case 1 and 2 (combined)
($ million)
Benefits 134.3 210.6
Costs 72.7 96.3
Net benefits 61.7 114.3

Note: Benefits and costs are incremental. All amounts are calculated over ten years. Amounts for the original business case 1 and 2 are expressed in 2013 and 2015 dollars respectively. The new combined amount is expressed in 2019 dollars. All amounts are discounted or inflated at seven per cent to show their value at the time when they were calculated. Amounts may not add due to rounding.
Source: Audit Office analysis of data provided by the Department of Planning and Environment.

Reported benefits significantly exceed the current targets

In September 2021, the department reported that the program had achieved $334 million of benefits over the three financial years up to June 2021 plus the first two months of 2021–22. These reported benefits were significantly higher than expected. 

Exhibit 8: Reported financial benefits from the ePlanning program
  2018–19
($ million)
2019–20
($ million)
2020–21
($ million)
July to August 2021
($ million)
Total
($ million)
Benefits 5.2 68.8 214.7 45.1 333.8
Target 2.5 14.4 56.7 19.2 92.8
Amount and per cent above target 2.7
108%
54.4
378%
158
279%
25.9
135%
241
260%

Source: Audit Office analysis of data provided by the Department of Planning and Environment.

The department attributes the higher-than-expected financial benefits to the following:

  • benefit targets have not been updated to reflect the impact of the 2019 decision to mandate the use of the portal for all development applications. This decision brought forward the expected benefits as well as potential costs of the program. However, the department did not update its third business case which was draft at the time. The business case was subsequently approved in July 2020
  • one-off cost savings for agencies not having to develop their own systems
  • public exhibitions of planning proposals continuing to be available online during 2020 when some newspapers stopping printing due to COVID-19.

The calculation of benefits is overstated

The department reported $334 million of benefits in September 2021 due to the ePlanning program. This calculation is overstated because:

  • a proportion of reported benefits is likely to be due to other planning reforms
  • the calculation of the largest single benefit is incorrect
  • the reported benefits may not fully account for dis-benefits reported by some stakeholders.

The program’s benefits are calculated primarily from changes in planning performance data, such as the time it takes to determine a planning development application. The department currently attributes the benefits from shorter planning cycles entirely to the effect of the ePlanning program. However, planning cycles are impacted by many other factors such as the complexity of planning regulations and the availability of planning professionals. Planning cycles may also be impacted by other departmental initiatives which are designed to improve the time that it takes for a planning application to be evaluated. The Introduction describes some of these initiatives.

The largest contribution to the department’s September 2021 benefit report was an estimated saving of $151 million for developers due to lower costs associated with holding their investment for a shorter time. However, the department’s calculation of this benefit assumes a high baseline for the time to determine a development application. It also assumes that all development applications except for additions or alterations to existing properties will incur financing costs. However, a small but material number of these applications will be self-financed. The calculation also includes several data errors in spreadsheets.

The calculation of some benefits relies upon an extrapolation of the benefits experienced by a small number of early-adopter councils, including lower printing and scanning costs, fewer forms and quicker processing times. However, some councils report that their costs have increased following the introduction of the portal, primarily because aspects of the portal duplicate work that they carry out in their own systems. The portal has also required some councils to re-engineer aspects of their own systems, such as the integration of their planning systems with other council systems such as finance or property and rating systems. It has also required councils to create new ways of integrating council information systems with the planning portal.

The department has published information to help councils and certifiers to automatically integrate their systems with the planning portal. This approach uses application programming interfaces (or APIs) which are an industry-standard way for systems to share information. In April and May 2021, the government granted $4.8 million to 96 regional councils to assist with the cost of developing, implementing and maintaining APIs. The maximum amount of funding for each council was $50,000. The department is closely monitoring the implementation of APIs by councils and other portal users. Once they are fully implemented the department expects APIs to reduce costs incurred by stakeholders.

The department has not yet measured stakeholder costs. It was beyond the scope of this audit to validate these costs.

The department has not independently assured the calculation of reported benefits

In 2020 the department appointed an external provider to calculate the benefits achieved by the ePlanning program. The department advised that it chose to outsource the calculation of benefits because the provider had the required expertise and because it wanted an independent calculation of the benefits. The process involves:

  • extraction and verification of planning performance data by the department
  • population of data input sheets by the department
  • calculation of benefits by the external provider using the data input
  • confirmation by the department that the calculation includes all expected benefit sources.

The department does not have access to the benefits calculation model which is owned and operated by the external provider. The department trusts that the provider correctly calculates the benefits and does not verify the reported benefit numbers. However, as the benefits model involves many linked spreadsheets and approximately 300 individual data points, there is a risk that the calculation model contains errors beyond those discussed in this audit.

The reported benefits have only been calculated since 2019

The department originally intended to track benefits from October 2014. However, it only started to track benefits in 2019 when it appointed an external provider to calculate the benefits achieved by the portal. Any benefits or dis-benefits between the introduction of the portal and 2019 are unknown and not included in the department’s calculation of benefits.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #366 - released 21 June 2022

Published

Actions for Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program

Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program

Transport
Planning
Compliance
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management

The urban renewal projects on former railway land in the Newcastle city centre are well targeted to support the objectives of the Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program), according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the government. However, the evidence that the cost of the light rail will be justified by its contribution to the Program is not convincing.

The Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program) is an urban renewal and transport program in the Newcastle city centre. The Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation (HCCDC) has led the Program since 2017. UrbanGrowth NSW led the Program from 2014 until 2017. Transport for NSW has been responsible for delivering the transport parts of the Program since the Program commenced. All references to HCCDC in this report relate to both HCCDC and its predecessor, the Hunter Development Corporation. All references to UrbanGrowth NSW in this report relate only to its Newcastle office from 2014 to 2017.

This audit had two objectives:

  1. To assess the economy of the approach chosen to achieve the objectives of the Program.
  2. To assess the effectiveness of the consultation and oversight of the Program.

We addressed the audit objectives by answering the following questions:

a) Was the decision to build light rail an economical option for achieving Program objectives?
b) Has the best value been obtained for the use of the former railway land?
c) Was good practice used in consultation on key Program decisions?
d) Did governance arrangements support delivery of the program?

Conclusion
1. The urban renewal projects on the former railway land are well targeted to support the objectives of the Program. However, there is insufficient evidence that the cost of the light rail will be justified by its contribution to Program objectives.

The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the Government. HCCDC, and previously UrbanGrowth NSW, identified and considered options for land use that would best meet Program objectives. Required probity processes were followed for developments that involved financial transactions. Our audit did not assess the achievement of these objectives because none of the projects have been completed yet.

Analysis presented in the Program business case and other planning documents showed that the light rail would have small transport benefits and was expected to make a modest contribution to broader Program objectives. Analysis in the Program business case argued that despite this, the light rail was justified because it would attract investment and promote economic development around the route. The Program business case referred to several international examples to support this argument, but did not make a convincing case that these examples were comparable to the proposed light rail in Newcastle.

The audited agencies argue that the contribution of light rail cannot be assessed separately because it is a part of a broader Program. The cost of the light rail makes up around 53 per cent of the total Program funding. Given the cost of the light rail, agencies need to be able to demonstrate that this investment provides value for money by making a measurable contribution to the Program objectives.

2. Consultation and oversight were mostly effective during the implementation stages of the Program. There were weaknesses in both areas in the planning stages.

Consultations about the urban renewal activities from around 2015 onward followed good practice standards. These consultations were based on an internationally accepted framework and met their stated objectives. Community consultations on the decision to close the train line were held in 2006 and 2009. However, the final decision in 2012 was made without a specific community consultation. There was no community consultation on the decision to build a light rail.

The governance arrangements that were in place during the planning stages of the Program did not provide effective oversight. This meant there was not a single agreed set of Program objectives until 2016 and roles and responsibilities for the Program were not clear. Leadership and oversight improved during the implementation phase of the Program. Roles and responsibilities were clarified and a multi-agency steering committee was established to resolve issues that needed multi-agency coordination.
The light rail is not justified by conventional cost-benefit analysis and there is insufficient evidence that the indirect contribution of light rail to achieving the economic development objectives of the Program will justify the cost.
Analysis presented in Program business cases and other planning documents showed that the light rail would have small transport benefits and was expected to make a modest contribution to broader Program objectives. Analysis in the Program business case argued that despite this, the light rail was justified because it would attract investment and promote economic development around the route. The Program business case referred to several international examples to support this argument, but did not make a convincing case that these examples were comparable to the proposed light rail in Newcastle.
The business case analysis of the benefits and costs of light rail was prepared after the decision to build light rail had been made and announced. Our previous reports, and recent reports by others, have emphasised the importance of completing thorough analysis before announcing infrastructure projects. Some advice provided after the initial light rail decision was announced was overly optimistic. It included benefits that cannot reasonably be attributed to light rail and underestimated the scope and cost of the project.
The audited agencies argue that the contribution of light rail cannot be assessed separately because it is part of a broader Program. The cost of the light rail makes up around 53 per cent of the total Program funding. Given the high cost of the light rail, we believe agencies need to be able to demonstrate that this investment provides value for money by making a measurable contribution to the Program objectives.

Recommendations
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should support economical decision-making on infrastructure projects by:
  • providing balanced advice to decision makers on the benefits and risks of large infrastructure investments at all stages of the decision-making process
  • providing scope and cost estimates that are as accurate and complete as possible when initial funding decisions are being made
  • making business cases available to the public.​​​​​​
The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the government.

The planned uses of the former railway land align with the objectives of encouraging people to visit and live in the city centre, creating attractive public spaces, and supporting growth in employment in the city. The transport benefits of the activities are less clear, because the light rail is the major transport project and this will not make significant improvements to transport in Newcastle.

The processes used for selling and leasing parts of the former railway land followed industry standards. Options for the former railway land were identified and assessed systematically. Competitive processes were used for most transactions and the required assessment and approval processes were followed. The sale of land to the University of Newcastle did not use a competitive process, but required processes for direct negotiations were followed.

Recommendation
By March 2019, the Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation should:
  • work with relevant stakeholders to explore options for increasing the focus on the heritage objective of the Program in projects on the former railway land. This could include projects that recognise the cultural and industrial heritage of Newcastle.
Consultations about the urban renewal activities followed good practice standards, but consultation on transport decisions for the Program did not.

Consultations focusing on urban renewal options for the Program included a range of stakeholders and provided opportunities for input into decisions about the use of the former railway land. These consultations received mostly positive feedback from participants. Changes and additions were made to the objectives of the Program and specific projects in response to feedback received. 

There had been several decades of debate about the potential closure of the train line, including community consultations in 2006 and 2009. However, the final decision to close the train line was made and announced in 2012 without a specific community consultation. HCCDC states that consultation with industry and business representatives constitutes community consultation because industry representatives are also members of the community. This does not meet good practice standards because it is not a representative sample of the community.

There was no community consultation on the decision to build a light rail. There were subsequent opportunities for members of the community to comment on the implementation options, but the decision to build it had already been made. A community and industry consultation was held on which route the light rail should use, but the results of this were not made public. 

Recommendation
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should consult with a wide range of stakeholders before major decisions are made and announced, and report publicly on the results and outcomes of consultations. 

The governance arrangements that were in place during the planning stages of the Program did not provide effective oversight. Project leadership and oversight improved during the implementation phase of the Program.

Multi-agency coordination and oversight were ineffective during the planning stages of the Program. Examples include: multiple versions of Program objectives being in circulation; unclear reporting lines for project management groups; and poor role definition for the initial advisory board. Program ownership was clarified in mid-2016 with the appointment of a new Program Director with clear accountability for the delivery of the Program. This was supported by the creation of a multi-agency steering committee that was more effective than previous oversight bodies.

The limitations that existed in multi-agency coordination and oversight had some negative consequences in important aspects of project management for the Program. This included whole-of-government benefits management and the coordination of work to mitigate impacts of the Program on small businesses.

Recommendations
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should: 

  • develop and implement a benefits management approach from the beginning of a program to ensure responsibility for defining benefits and measuring their achievement is clear
  • establish whole-of-government oversight early in the program to guide major decisions. This should include:
    • agreeing on objectives and ensuring all agencies understand these
    • clearly defining roles and responsibilities for all agencies
    • establishing whole-of-government coordination for the assessment and mitigation of the impact of major construction projects on businesses and the community.

By March 2019, the Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation should update and implement the Program Benefits Realisation Plan. This should include:

  • setting measurable targets for the desired benefits
  • clearly allocating ownership for achieving the desired benefits
  • monitoring progress toward achieving the desired benefits and reporting publicly on the results.

Appendix one - Response from agencies    

Appendix two - About the audit

Appendix three - Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #310 - released 12 December 2018

Published

Actions for Matching skills training with market needs

Matching skills training with market needs

Industry
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

The NSW Department of Industry targets subsidies towards training programs delivering skills most needed in New South Wales. However, the Department still provides subsidies to qualifications that the market may no longer need, according to a report released by Margaret Crawford, Auditor-General for New South Wales. 

In 2012, governments across Australia entered into the National Partnership Agreement on Skills Reform. Under the National Partnership Agreement, the Australian Government provided incentive payments to States and Territories to move towards a more contestable Vocational Education and Training (VET) market. The aim of the National Partnership Agreement was to foster a more accessible, transparent, efficient and high quality training sector that is responsive to the needs of students and industry. 

The New South Wales Government introduced the Smart and Skilled program in response to the National Partnership Agreement. Through Smart and Skilled, students can choose a vocational course from a list of approved qualifications and training providers. Students pay the same fee for their chosen qualification regardless of the selected training provider and the government covers the gap between the student fee and the fixed price of the qualification through a subsidy paid to their training provider. 

Smart and Skilled commenced in January 2015, with the then Department of Education and Communities having primary responsibility for its implementation. Since July 2015, the NSW Department of Industry (the Department) has been responsible for VET in New South Wales and the implementation of Smart and Skilled. 

The NSW Skills Board, comprising nine part-time members appointed by the Minister for Skills, provides independent strategic advice on VET reform and funding. In line with most other States and Territories, the Department maintains a 'Skills List' which contains government subsidised qualifications to address identified priority skill needs in New South Wales.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the Department in identifying, prioritising, and aligning course subsidies to the skill needs of NSW. To do this we examined whether:

  • the Department effectively identifies and prioritises present and future skill needs 
  • Smart and Skilled funding is aligned with the priority skill areas
  • skill needs and available VET courses are effectively communicated to potential participants and training providers.

Smart and Skilled is a relatively new and complex program, and is being delivered in the context of significant reform to VET nationally and in New South Wales. A large scale government funded contestable market was not present in the VET sector in New South Wales before the introduction of Smart and Skilled. This audit's findings should be considered in that context.
 

Conclusion
The Department effectively consults with industry, training providers and government departments to identify skill needs, and targets subsidies to meet those needs. However, the Department does not have a robust, data driven process to remove subsidies from qualifications which are no longer a priority. There is a risk that some qualifications are being subsidised which do not reflect the skill needs of New South Wales. 
The Department needs to better use the data it has, and collect additional data, to support its analysis of priority skill needs in New South Wales, and direct funding accordingly.
In addition to subsidising priority qualifications, the Department promotes engagement in skills training by:
  • funding scholarships and support for disadvantaged students
  • funding training in regional and remote areas
  • providing additional support to deliver some qualifications that the market is not providing.

The Department needs to evaluate these funding strategies to ensure they are achieving their goals. It should also explore why training providers are not delivering some priority qualifications through Smart and Skilled.

Training providers compete for funding allocations based on their capacity to deliver. The Department successfully manages the budget by capping funding allocated to each Smart and Skilled training provider. However, training providers have only one year of funding certainty at present. Training providers that are performing well are not rewarded with greater certainty.

The Department needs to improve its communication with prospective students to ensure they can make informed decisions in the VET market.

The Department also needs to communicate more transparently to training providers about its funding allocations and decisions about changes to the NSW Skills List. 

The NSW Skills List is unlikely to be missing high priority qualifications, but may include lower priority qualifications because the Department does not have a robust process to identify and remove these qualifications from the list. The Department needs to better use available data, and collect further data, to support decisions about which qualifications should be on the NSW Skills List.

The Department relies on stakeholder proposals to update the NSW Skills List. Stakeholders include industry, training providers and government departments. These stakeholders, particularly industry, are likely to be aware of skill needs, and have a strong incentive to propose qualifications that address these needs. The Department’s process of collecting stakeholder proposals helps to ensure that it can identify qualifications needed to address material skill needs. 

It is also important that the Department ensures the NSW Skills List only includes priority qualifications that need to be subsidised by government. The Department does not have robust processes in place to remove qualifications from the NSW Skills List. As a result, there is a risk that the list may include lower priority skill areas. Since the NSW Skills List was first created, new additions to the list have outnumbered those removed by five to one.

The Department does not always validate information gathered from stakeholder proposals, even when it has data to do so. Further, its decision making about what to include on, or delete from, the NSW Skills List is not transparent because the rationale for decisions is not adequately documented. 

The Department is undertaking projects to better use data to support its decisions about what should be on the NSW Skills List. Some of these projects should deliver useful data soon, but some can only provide useful information when sufficient trend data is available. 

Recommendation

The Department should: 

  • by June 2019, increase transparency of decisions about proposed changes to the NSW Skills List and improve record-keeping of deliberations regarding these changes
  • by December 2019, use data more effectively and consistently to ensure that the NSW Skills List only includes high priority qualifications
The Department funds training providers that deliver qualifications on the NSW Skills List. Alignment of funding to skill needs relies on the accuracy of the NSW Skills List, which may include some lower priority qualifications.

Only qualifications on the NSW Skills List are eligible for subsidies under Smart and Skilled. As the Department does not have a robust process for removing low priority qualifications from the NSW Skills list, some low priority qualifications may be subsidised. 

The Department allocates the Smart and Skilled budget through contracts with Smart and Skilled training providers. Training providers that meet contractual obligations and perform well in terms of enrolments and completion rates are rewarded with renewed contracts and more funding for increased enrolments, but these decisions are not based on student outcomes. The Department reduces or removes funding from training providers that do not meet quality standards, breach contract conditions or that are unable to spend their allocated funding effectively. Contracts are for only one year, offering training providers little funding certainty. 

Smart and Skilled provides additional funding for scholarships and for training providers in locations where the cost of delivery is high or to those that cater to students with disabilities. The Department has not yet evaluated whether this additional funding is achieving its intended outcomes. 

Eight per cent of the qualifications that have been on the NSW Skills List since 2015 are not delivered under Smart and Skilled anywhere in New South Wales. A further 14 per cent of the qualifications that are offered by training providers have had no student commencements. The Department is yet to identify the reasons that these high priority qualifications are either not offered or not taken up by students.

Recommendation

The Department should:

  • by June 2019, investigate why training providers do not offer, and prospective students do not enrol in, some Smart and Skilled subsidised qualifications 
  • by December 2019, evaluate the effectiveness of Smart and Skilled funding which supplements standard subsidies for qualifications on the NSW Skills List, to determine whether it is achieving its objectives
  • by December 2019, provide longer term funding certainty to high performing training providers, while retaining incentives for them to continue to perform well.
The Department needs to improve its communication, particularly with prospective students.

In a contestable market, it is important for consumers to have sufficient information to make informed decisions. The Department does not provide some key information to prospective VET students to support their decisions, such as measures of provider quality and examples of employment and further education outcomes of students completing particular courses. Existing information is spread across numerous channels and is not presented in a user friendly manner. This is a potential barrier to participation in VET for those less engaged with the system or less ICT literate.

The Department conveys relevant information about the program to training providers through its websites and its regional offices. However, it could better communicate some specific information directly to individual Smart and Skilled training providers, such as reasons their proposals to include new qualifications on the NSW Skills List are accepted or rejected. 

While the Department is implementing a communication strategy for VET in New South Wales, it does not have a specific communications strategy for Smart and Skilled which comprehensively identifies the needs of different stakeholders and how these can be addressed. 

Recommendation

By December 2019, the Department should develop and implement a specific communications strategy for Smart and Skilled to:

  • support prospective student engagement and informed decision making
  • meet the information needs of training providers 

Appendix one - Response from agency

Appendix two - About the audit

Appendix three - Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #305 - released 26 July 2018

Published

Actions for Regulation of water pollution in drinking water catchments and illegal disposal of solid waste

Regulation of water pollution in drinking water catchments and illegal disposal of solid waste

Environment
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Regulation
Risk

There are important gaps in how the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) implements its regulatory framework for water pollution in drinking water catchments and illegal solid waste disposal. This limits the effectiveness of its regulatory responses, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford.

The NSW Environment Protection Authority (the EPA) is the State’s primary environmental regulator. The EPA regulates waste and water pollution under the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (the Act) through its licensing, monitoring, regulation and enforcement activities. The community should be able to rely on the effectiveness of this regulation to protect the environment and human health. The EPA has regulatory responsibility for more significant and specific activities which can potentially harm the environment.

Activities regulated by the EPA include manufacturing, chemical production, electricity generation, mining, waste management, livestock processing, mineral processing, sewerage treatment, and road construction. For these activities, the operator must have an EPA issued environment protection licence (licence). Licences have conditions attached which may limit the amount and concentrations of substances the activity may produce and discharge into the environment. Conditions also require the licensee to report on its licensed activities.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the EPA’s regulatory response to water pollution in drinking water catchments and illegal solid waste disposal. The findings and recommendations of this review can be reasonably applied to the EPA’s other regulatory functions, as the areas we examined were indicative of how the EPA regulates all pollution types and incidents.

 
Conclusion
There are important gaps in how the EPA implements its regulatory framework for water pollution in drinking water catchments and illegal solid waste disposal which limit the effectiveness of its regulatory response. The EPA uses a risk-based regulatory framework that has elements consistent with the NSW Government Guidance for regulators to implement outcomes and risk-based regulation. However, the EPA did not demonstrate that it has established reliable practices to accurately and consistently detect the risk of non compliances by licensees, and apply consistent regulatory actions. This may expose the risk of harm to the environment and human health.
The EPA also could not demonstrate that it has effective governance and oversight of its regulatory operations. The EPA operates in a complex regulatory environment where its regional offices have broad discretions for how they operate. The EPA has not balanced this devolved structure with an effective governance approach that includes appropriate internal controls to monitor the consistency or quality of its regulatory activities. It also does not have an effective performance framework that sets relevant performance expectations and outcome-based key performance indicators (KPIs) for its regional offices. 
These deficiencies mean that the EPA cannot be confident that it conducts compliance and enforcement activities consistently across the State and that licensees are complying with their licence conditions or the Act.
The EPA's reporting on environmental and regulatory outcomes is limited and most of the data it uses is self reported by industry. It has not set outcome-based key result areas to assess performance and trends over time. 
The EPA uses a risk-based regulatory framework for water pollution and illegal solid waste disposal but there are important gaps in implementation that reduce its effectiveness.
Elements of the EPA’s risk-based regulatory framework for water pollution and illegal solid waste disposal are consistent with the NSW Government Guidance for regulators to implement outcomes and risk-based regulation. There are important gaps in how the EPA implements its risk-based approach that limit the effectiveness of its regulatory response. The EPA could not demonstrate that it effectively regulates licensees because it has not established reliable practices that accurately and consistently detect licence non compliances or breaches of the Act and enforce regulatory actions.
The EPA lacks effective governance arrangements to support its devolved regional structure. The EPA's performance framework has limited and inconclusive reporting on regional performance to the EPA’s Chief Executive Officer or to the EPA Board. The EPA cannot assure that it is conducting its regulatory responsibilities effectively and efficiently. 
The EPA does not consistently evaluate its regulatory approach to ensure it is effective and efficient. For example, there are no set requirements for how EPA officers conduct mandatory site inspections, which means that there is a risk that officers are not detecting all breaches or non-compliances. The inconsistent approach also means that the EPA cannot rely on the data it collects from these site inspections to understand whether its regulatory response is effective and efficient. In addition, where the EPA identifies instances of non compliance or breaches, it does not apply all available regulatory actions to encourage compliance.
The EPA also does not have a systematic approach to validate self-reported information in licensees’ annual returns, despite the data being used to assess administrative fees payable to the EPA and its regulatory response to non-compliances. 
The EPA does not use performance frameworks to monitor the consistency or quality of work conducted across the State. The EPA has also failed to provide effective guidance for its staff. Many of its policies and procedures are out-dated, inconsistent, hard to access, or not mandated.
Recommendations
By 31 December 2018, to improve governance and oversight, the EPA should:
1. implement a more effective performance framework with regular reports to the Chief Executive Officer and to the EPA Board on outcomes-based key result areas that assess its environmental and regulatory performance and trends over time
By 30 June 2019, to improve consistency in its practices, the EPA should:
2. progressively update and make accessible its policies and procedures for regulatory operations, and mandate procedures where necessary to ensure consistent application
3. implement internal controls to monitor the consistency and quality of its regulatory operations. 
The EPA does not apply a consistent approach to setting licence conditions for discharges to water.
The requirements for setting licence conditions for water pollution are complex and require technical and scientific expertise. In August 2016, the EPA approved guidance developed by its technical experts in the Water Technical Advisory Unit to assist its regional staff. However, the EPA did not mandate the use of the guidance until mid-April 2018. Up until then, the EPA had left discretion to regional offices to decide what guidance their staff use. This meant that practices have differed across the organisation. The EPA is yet to conduct training for staff to ensure they consistently apply the 2016 guidance.
The EPA has not implemented any appropriate internal controls or quality assurance process to monitor the consistency or quality of licence conditions set by its officers across the State. This is not consistent with good regulatory practice.
The triennial 2016 audit of the Sydney drinking water catchment report highlighted that Lake Burragorang has experienced worsening water quality over the past 20 years from increased salinity levels. The salinity levels were nearly twice as high as in other storages in the Sydney drinking water catchment. The report recommended that the source and implication of the increased salinity levels be investigated. The report did not propose which public authority should carry out such an investigation. 
To date, no NSW Government agency has addressed the report's recommendation. There are three public authorities, the EPA, DPE and WaterNSW that are responsible for regulating activities that impact on water quality in the Sydney drinking water catchment, which includes Lake Burragorang. 
Recommendation
By 30 June 2019, to address worsening water quality in Lake Burragorang, the EPA should:
4. (a) review the impact of its licensed activities on water quality in Lake Burragorang, and
  (b) develop strategies relating to its licensed activities (in consultation with other relevant NSW Government agencies) to improve and maintain the lake's water quality.
The EPA’s risk-based approach to monitoring compliance of licensees has limited effectiveness. 
The EPA tailors its compliance monitoring approach based on the performance of licensees. This means that licensees that perform better have a lower administrative fee and fewer mandatory site inspections. 
However, this approach relies on information that is not complete or accurate. Sources of information include licensees’ annual returns, EPA site inspections and compliance audits, and pollution reports from the public. 
Licensees report annually to the EPA on their performance, including compliance against their licence conditions. The Act contains significant financial penalties if licensees provide false and misleading information in their annual returns. However, the EPA does not systematically or consistently validate information self-reported by licensees, or consistently apply regulatory actions if it discovers non-compliance. 
Self-reported compliance data is used in part to assess a licensed premises’ overall environmental risk level, which underpins the calculation of the administrative fee, the EPA’s site inspection frequency, and the licensee’s exposure to regulatory actions. It is also used to assess the load-based licence fee that the licensee pays.
The EPA has set minimum mandatory site inspection frequencies for licensed premises based on its assessed overall risk level. This is a key tool to detect non-compliance or breaches of the Act. However, the EPA has not issued a policy or procedures that define what these mandatory inspections should cover and how they are to be conducted. We found variations in how the EPA officers in the offices we visited conducted these inspections. The inconsistent approach means that the EPA does not have complete and accurate information of licensees’ compliance. The inconsistent approach also means that the EPA is not effectively identifying all non-compliances for it to consider applying appropriate regulatory actions.
The EPA also receives reports of pollution incidents from the public that may indicate non-compliance. However, the EPA has not set expected time frames within which it expects its officers to investigate pollution incidents. The EPA regional offices decide what to investigate and timeframes. The EPA does not measure regional performance regarding timeframes. 
The few compliance audits the EPA conducts annually are effective in identifying licence non-compliances and breaches of the Act. However, the EPA does not have a policy or required procedures for its regulatory officers to consistently apply appropriate regulatory actions in response to compliance audit findings. 
The EPA has not implemented any effective internal controls or quality assurance process to check the consistency or quality of how its regulatory officers monitor compliance across the State. This is not consistent with good regulatory practice.
Recommendations
To improve compliance monitoring, the EPA should implement procedures to:
5. by 30 June 2019, validate self-reported information, eliminate hardcopy submissions and require licensees to report on their breaches of the Act and associated regulations in their annual returns
6. by 31 December 2018, conduct mandatory site inspections under the risk-based licensing scheme to assess compliance with all regulatory requirements and licence conditions.
 
The EPA cannot assure that its regulatory enforcement approach is fully effective.
The EPA’s compliance policy and prosecution guidelines have a large number of available regulatory actions and factors which should be taken into account when selecting an appropriate regulatory response. The extensive legislation determining the EPA’s regulatory activities, and the devolved regional structure the EPA has adopted in delivering its compliance and regulatory functions, increases the risk of inconsistent compliance decisions and regulatory responses. A good regulatory framework needs a consistent approach to enforcement to incentivise compliance. 
The EPA has not balanced this devolved regional structure with appropriate governance arrangements to give it assurance that its regulatory officers apply a consistent approach to enforcement.
The EPA has not issued standard procedures to ensure consistent non-court enforcement action for breaches of the Act or non-compliance with licence conditions. Given our finding that the EPA does not effectively detect breaches and non-compliances, there is a risk that it is not applying appropriate regulatory actions for many breaches and non-compliances.
A recent EPA compliance audit identified significant non-compliances with incident management plan requirements. However, the EPA has not applied regulatory actions for making false statements on annual returns for those licensees that certified their plans complied with such requirements. The EPA also has not applied available regulatory actions for the non-compliances which led to the false or misleading statements.
Recommendation
By 31 December 2018 to improve enforcement, the EPA should:
7. Implement procedures to systematically assess non-compliances with licence conditions and breaches of the Act and to implement appropriate and consistent regulatory actions.
The EPA has implemented the actions listed in the NSW Illegal Dumping Strategy 2014–16. To date, the EPA has also implemented four of the six recommendations made by the ICAC on EPA's oversight of Regional Illegal Dumping Squads.
The EPA did not achieve the NSW Illegal Dumping Strategy 2014–16 target of a 30 per cent reduction in instances of large scale illegal dumping in Sydney, the Illawarra, Hunter and Central Coast from 2011 levels. 
In the reporting period, the incidences of large scale illegal dumping more than doubled. The EPA advised that this increase may be the result of greater public awareness and reporting rather than increased illegal dumping activity. 
By June 2018, the EPA is due to implement one outstanding recommendation made by the ICAC but has not set a time for the other outstanding recommendation.  

Published

Actions for HealthRoster benefits realisation

HealthRoster benefits realisation

Health
Compliance
Information technology
Management and administration
Project management
Workforce and capability

The HealthRoster system is delivering some business benefits but Local Health Districts are yet to use all of its features, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales,  Margaret Crawford. HealthRoster is an IT system designed to more effectively roster staff to meet the needs of Local Health Districts and other NSW health agencies.

The NSW public health system employs over 100,000 people in clinical and non-clinical roles across the state. With increasing demand for services, it is vital that NSW Health effectively rosters staff to ensure high quality and efficient patient care, while maintaining good workplace practices to support staff in demanding roles.

NSW Health is implementing HealthRoster as its single state-wide rostering system to more effectively roster staff according to the demands of each location. Between 2013–14 and 2016–17, our financial audits of individual LHDs had reported issues with rostering and payroll processes and systems.

NSW Health grouped all Local Health Districts (LHDs), and other NSW Health organisations, into four clusters to manage the implementation of HealthRoster over four years. Refer to Exhibit 4 for a list of the NSW Health entities in each cluster.

  • Cluster 1 implementation commenced in 2014–15 and was completed in 2015–16.
  • Cluster 2 implementation commenced in 2015–16 and was completed in 2016–17.
  • Cluster 3 began implementation in 2016–17 and was underway during the conduct of the audit.
  • Cluster 4 began planning for implementation in 2017–18.

Full implementation, including capability for centralised data and reporting, is planned for completion in 2019.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the HealthRoster system in delivering business benefits. In making this assessment, we examined whether:

  • expected business benefits of HealthRoster were well-defined
  • HealthRoster is achieving business benefits where implemented.

The HealthRoster project has a timespan from 2009 to 2019. We examined the HealthRoster implementation in LHDs, and other NSW Health organisations, focusing on the period from 2014, when eHealth assumed responsibility for project implementation, to early 2018.

Conclusion
The HealthRoster system is realising functional business benefits in the LHDs where it has been implemented. In these LHDs, financial control of payroll expenditure and rostering compliance with employment award conditions has improved. However, these LHDs are not measuring the value of broader benefits such as better management of staff leave and overtime.
NSW Health has addressed the lessons learned from earlier implementations to improve later implementations. Business benefits identified in the business case were well defined and are consistent with business needs identified by NSW Health. Three of four cluster 1 LHDs have been able to reduce the number of issues with rostering and payroll processes. LHDs in earlier implementations need to use HealthRoster more effectively to ensure they are getting all available benefits from it.
HealthRoster is taking six years longer, and costing $37.2 million more, to fully implement than originally planned. NSW Health attributes the increased cost and extended timeframe to the large scale and complexity of the full implementation of HealthRoster.

Business benefits identified for HealthRoster accurately reflect business needs.

NSW Health has a good understanding of the issues in previous rostering systems and has designed HealthRoster to adequately address these issues. Interviews with frontline staff indicate that HealthRoster facilitates rostering which complies with industrial awards. This is a key business benefit that supports the provision of quality patient care. We saw no evidence that any major business needs or issues with the previous rostering systems are not being addressed by HealthRoster.

In the period examined in this audit since 2015, NSW Health has applied appropriate project management and governance structures to ensure that risks and issues are well managed during HealthRoster implementation.

HealthRoster has had two changes to its budget and timeline. Overall, the capital cost for the project has increased from $88.6 million to $125.6 million (42 per cent) and has delayed expected project completion by four years from 2015 to 2019. NSW Health attributes the increased cost and extended time frame to the large scale and complexity of the full implementation of HealthRoster.

NSW Health has established appropriate governance arrangements to ensure that HealthRoster is successfully implemented and that it will achieve business benefits in the long term. During implementation, local steering committees monitor risks and resolve implementation issues. Risks or issues that cannot be resolved locally are escalated to the state-wide steering committee.

NSW Health has grouped local health districts, and other NSW Health organisations, into four clusters for implementation. This has enabled NSW Health to apply lessons learnt from each implementation to improve future implementations.

NSW Health has a benefits realisation framework, but it is not fully applied to HealthRoster.

NSW Health can demonstrate that HealthRoster has delivered some functional business benefits, including rosters that comply with a wide variety of employment awards.

NSW Health is not yet measuring and tracking the value of business benefits achieved. NSW Health did not have benefits realisation plans with baseline measures defined for LHDs in cluster 1 and 2 before implementation. Without baseline measures NSW Health is unable to quantify business benefits achieved. However, analysis of post-implementation reviews and interviews with frontline staff indicate that benefits are being achieved. As a result, NSW Health now includes defining baseline measures and setting targets as part of LHD implementation planning. It has created a benefits realisation toolkit to assist this process from cluster 3 implementations onwards.

NSW Health conducted post-implementation reviews for clusters 1 and 2 and found that LHDs in these clusters were not using HealthRoster to realise all the benefits that HealthRoster could deliver.

By September 2018, NSW Health should:

  1. Ensure that Local Health Districts undertake benefits realisation planning according to the NSW Health benefits realisation framework
  2. Regularly measure benefits realised, at state and local health district levels, from the statewide implementation of HealthRoster
  3. Review the use of HealthRoster in Local Health Districts in clusters 1 and 2 and assist them to improve their HealthRoster related processes and practices.

By June 2019, NSW Health should:

  1. Ensure that all Local Health Districts are effectively using demand based rostering.

Appendix one - Response from agency

Appendix two - About the audit

Appendix three - Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #301 - released 7 June 2018

Published

Actions for Managing risks in the NSW public sector: risk culture and capability

Managing risks in the NSW public sector: risk culture and capability

Finance
Health
Justice
Treasury
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk
Workforce and capability

The Ministry of Health, NSW Fair Trading, NSW Police Force, and NSW Treasury Corporation are taking steps to strengthen their risk culture, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford. 'Senior management communicates the importance of managing risk to their staff, and there are many examples of risk management being integrated into daily activities', the Auditor-General said.

We did find that three of the agencies we examined could strengthen their culture so that all employees feel comfortable speaking openly about risks. To support innovation, senior management could also do better at communicating to their staff the levels of risk they are willing to accept.

Effective risk management is essential to good governance, and supports staff at all levels to make informed judgements and decisions. At a time when government is encouraging innovation and exploring new service delivery models, effective risk management is about seizing opportunities as well as managing threats.

Over the past decade, governments and regulators around the world have increasingly turned their attention to risk culture. It is now widely accepted that organisational culture is a key element of risk management because it influences how people recognise and engage with risk. Neglecting this ‘soft’ side of risk management can prevent institutions from managing risks that threaten their success and lead to missed opportunities for change, improvement or innovation.

This audit assessed how effectively NSW Government agencies are building risk management capabilities and embedding a sound risk culture throughout their organisations. To do this we examined whether:

  • agencies can demonstrate that senior management is committed to risk management
  • information about risk is communicated effectively throughout agencies
  • agencies are building risk management capabilities.

The audit examined four agencies: the Ministry of Health, the NSW Fair Trading function within the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation, NSW Police Force and NSW Treasury Corporation (TCorp). NSW Treasury was also included as the agency responsible for the NSW Government's risk management framework.

Conclusion
All four agencies examined in the audit are taking steps to strengthen their risk culture. In these agencies, senior management communicates the importance of managing risk to their staff. They have risk management policies and funded central functions to oversee risk management. We also found many examples of risk management being integrated into daily activities.
That said, three of the four case study agencies could do more to understand their existing risk culture. As good practice, agencies should monitor their employees’ attitude to risk. Without a clear understanding of how employees identify and engage with risk, it is difficult to tell whether the 'tone' set by the executive and management is aligned with employee behaviours.
Our survey of risk culture found that three agencies could strengthen a culture of open communication, so that all employees feel comfortable speaking openly about risks. To support innovation, senior management could also do better at communicating to their staff the levels of risk they are willing to accept.
Some agencies are performing better than others in building their risk capabilities. Three case study agencies have reviewed the risk-related skills and knowledge of their workforce, but only one agency has addressed the gaps the review identified. In three agencies, staff also need more practical guidance on how to manage risks that are relevant to their day-to-day responsibilities.
NSW Treasury provides agencies with direction and guidance on risk management through policy and guidelines. Its principles-based approach to risk management is consistent with better practice. Nevertheless, there is scope for NSW Treasury to develop additional practical guidance and tools to support a better risk culture in the NSW public sector. NSW Treasury should encourage agency heads to form a view on the current risk culture in their agencies, identify desirable changes to that risk culture, and take steps to address those changes. 

In assessing an agency’s risk culture, we focused on four key areas:

Executive sponsorship (tone at the top)

In the four agencies we reviewed, senior management is communicating the importance of managing risk. They have endorsed risk management frameworks and funded central functions tasked with overseeing risk management within their agencies.

That said, we found that three case study agencies do not measure their existing risk culture. Without clear measures of how employees identify and engage with risk, it is difficult for agencies to tell whether employee's behaviours are aligned with the 'tone' set by the executive and management.

For example, in some agencies we examined we found a disconnect between risk tolerances espoused by senior management and how these concepts were understood by staff.

Employee perceptions of risk management

Our survey of staff indicated that while senior leaders have communicated the importance of managing risk, more could be done to strengthen a culture of open communication so that all employees feel comfortable speaking openly about risks. We found that senior management could better communicate to their staff the levels of risk they should be willing to accept.

Integration of risk management into daily activities and links to decision-making

We found examples of risk management being integrated into daily activities. On the other hand, we also identified areas where risk management deviated from good practice. For example, we found that corporate risk registers are not consistently used as a tool to support decision-making.

Support and guidance to help staff manage risks

Most case study agencies are monitoring risk-related skills and knowledge of their workforce, but only one agency has addressed the gaps it identified. While agencies are providing risk management training, surveyed staff in three case study agencies reported that risk management training is not adequate.

NSW Treasury provides agencies with direction and guidance on risk management through policy and guidelines. In line with better practice, NSW Treasury's principles-based policy acknowledges that individual agencies are in a better position to understand their own risks and design risk management frameworks that address those risks. Nevertheless, there is scope for NSW Treasury to refine its guidance material to support a better risk culture in the NSW public sector.

Recommendation

By May 2019, NSW Treasury should:

  • Review the scope of its risk management guidance, and identify additional guidance, training or activities to improve risk culture across the NSW public sector. This should focus on encouraging agency heads to form a view on the current risk culture in their agencies, identify desirable changes to that risk culture, and take steps to address those changes.