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Actions for Ensuring contract management capability in government - HealthShare NSW

Ensuring contract management capability in government - HealthShare NSW

Health
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management

This report examined whether HealthShare NSW, a part of NSW Health, has the required contract management capability to effectively manage goods and services contracts valued over $250,000. 

The report found that HealthShare has a procurement framework that should support effective contract management, but it is not applying it consistently. In particular, the audit found that HealthShare was not applying key contract management elements to over 80 per cent of the high-value contracts it manages. The audit also found that HealthShare’s contract management practices were limited by inadequate performance monitoring.

'Effective contract management is essential to ensure the contracts HealthShare enters into are delivering as expected and ensuring value for money,' said the Auditor-General. 'Without this, the value for money or savings HealthShare achieves when it negotiates these contracts is at risk of being eroded over the life of the contract.'

The report recommends that NSW Health develop a performance improvement plan to ensure HealthShare is fully compliant with procurement policies and that NSW Health meets its obligations under the Government's Accreditation Program for Goods and Services Procurement.

HealthShare is a NSW Health entity responsible for providing shared services, including procurement, to support the delivery of patient care within the NSW health system. In 2018, HealthShare procured high value goods and services contracts with an annual estimated total spend of around $1.8 billion, with most of the contracts of long duration.

NSW Government agencies are increasingly delivering services and projects through contracts with third parties. These contracts can be complex and governments face challenges in negotiating and implementing them effectively. A robust contract management framework helps ensure all parties meet their obligations, contractual relationships are well managed, agencies achieve value for money, and deliverables meet the required standards and agreed timeframes.

Contract management capability is a broad term, which can include aspects of individual staff capability (such as staff knowledge, skills and experience) as well as organisational capability (such as policies, frameworks and processes).

The NSW Procurement Board is responsible for overseeing the Government's procurement system, setting policy and ensuring compliance. It has accredited the Health Administration Corporation (HAC) to procure goods and services with no upper financial limit. Under the terms of this accreditation, the Secretary, NSW Health (as head of HAC) has delegated the procurement of high-value (over $250,000) goods and services contracts within NSW Health to only the Ministry of Health and HealthShare NSW (HealthShare).

HealthShare NSW (HealthShare) is a NSW Health entity responsible for providing shared services, including procurement, to support the delivery of patient care within the NSW health system. In 2018, HealthShare procured high-value goods and services contracts with an annual estimated total spend of around $1.8 billion, with most of the contracts of long duration.

HealthShare’s Contract Management Guide states that, without rigorous contract management, 75 per cent of projected sourcing savings can disappear within 18 months of the contract starting.

This audit examined whether HealthShare has the required capability to effectively manage high-value goods and services contracts. Contracts we examined included critical items such as food services in hospitals, patient transport services, intravenous equipment and kidney dialysis services, where risks include patient safety as well as value for money. We did not examine infrastructure, construction or information communication and technology contracts. We also did not examine HealthShare’s sourcing processes, including identifying business needs, tendering and contract award.

We assessed HealthShare against the following criteria:

  1. HealthShare's systems, policies and procedures support effective contract management and are consistent with relevant frameworks, policies and guidelines.
  2. HealthShare has capable personnel to effectively conduct the monitoring activities throughout the life of the contract.

We included the NSW Public Service Commission and NSW Treasury, through NSW Procurement, as auditees because they administer policies which directly affect contract management capability. These include:

  • NSW Procurement Board Directions and policies
  • NSW Government Procurement Policy Framework
  • Accreditation Program for Goods and Services Procurement
  • the NSW Public Sector Capability Framework.

NSW Procurement was transferred to NSW Treasury from the former Department of Finance, Services and Innovation on 1 July 2019 as part of changes to government administrative arrangements.

Conclusion
HealthShare is not applying the capability needed to effectively manage high-value (over $250,000) goods and services contracts. HealthShare's procurement framework includes elements that should support effective contract management, and it has a systematic approach to managing staff contract management capability. That said, HealthShare is not implementing key contract management elements of its own framework. As such, the value for money or savings it achieves when it negotiates contracts is at risk of being eroded over the life of these contracts.
Effective contract management is essential for HealthShare to ensure contracts it enters into are delivering the goods and services expected and achieving value for money, safety and quality. The Ministry of Health and HealthShare have invested in developing and implementing systems and tools to support effective contract management. In line with its obligations under the Agency Accreditation Program for Goods and Services Procurement (accreditation program), the Ministry of Health mandates the use of contract management plans for high-value contracts. The Ministry of Health also requires that all health entities use the PROcure contract management system for ongoing management of contracts with a value over $150,000. HealthShare is not complying with these directions for over 80 per cent of the contracts it manages.
In the absence of HealthShare following its framework, and the Ministry of Health’s directions, we looked for other evidence that HealthShare was effectively managing high-value contracts. We found that HealthShare’s contract management practices were limited by inadequate performance monitoring.
When Local Health Districts (LHDs) need to procure high-value goods and services, the Ministry of Health’s procurement policy requires that they use HealthShare to source and manage the procurement. This is to manage risk and provide oversight of procurement and contracts across the NSW health system. Despite this policy, HealthShare was only managing the sourcing stage of the procurement and transferring responsibility for contract management to the relevant LHD.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – Contract performance management summary

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary Reference: Report number #328 - released 31 October 2019

Published

Actions for Mental health service planning for Aboriginal people in New South Wales

Mental health service planning for Aboriginal people in New South Wales

Health
Management and administration
Project management
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

A report released by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, has found that NSW Health is not forming effective partnerships with Aboriginal communities to plan, design and deliver appropriate mental health services. There is limited evidence that NSW Health is using the knowledge and expertise of Aboriginal communities to guide how mental health care is structured and delivered.

Mental illness (including substance use disorders) is the main contributor to lower life expectancy and increased mortality in the Aboriginal population of New South Wales. It contributes to a higher burden of disease and premature death at rates that are 40 per cent higher than the next highest chronic disease group, cardiovascular disease.1 

Aboriginal people have significantly higher rates of mental illness than non Aboriginal people in New South Wales. They are more likely to present at emergency departments in crisis or acute phases of mental illness than the rest of the population and are more likely to be admitted to hospital for mental health treatments.2 

In acknowledgement of the significant health disparities between Aboriginal and non Aboriginal people, NSW Health implemented the NSW Aboriginal Health Plan 2013 2023 (the Aboriginal Health Plan). The overarching message of the Aboriginal Health Plan is ‘to build respectful, trusting and effective partnerships with Aboriginal communities’ and to implement ‘integrated planning and service delivery’ with sector partners. Through the Plan, NSW Health commits to providing culturally appropriate and ‘holistic approaches to the health of Aboriginal people'.

The mental health sector is complex, involving Commonwealth, state and non government service providers. In broad terms, NSW Health has responsibility to support patients requiring higher levels of clinical support for mental illnesses, while the Commonwealth and non government organisations offer non acute care such as assessments, referrals and early intervention treatments.

The NSW Health network includes 15 Local Health Districts and the Justice Health and Forensic Mental Health Network that provide care to patients during acute and severe phases of mental illness in hospitals, prisons and community service environments. This includes care to Aboriginal patients in the community at rates that are more than four times higher than the non Aboriginal population. Community services are usually provided as follow up after acute admissions or interactions with hospital services. The environments where NSW Health delivers mental health care include:

  • hospital emergency departments, for short term assessment and referral
  • inpatient hospital care for patients in acute and sub acute phases of mental illness
  • mental health outpatient services in the community, such as support with medications
  • custodial mental health services in adult prisons and juvenile justice centres.

The NSW Government is reforming its mental health funding model to incrementally shift the balance from hospital care to enhanced community care. In 2018–19, the NSW Government committed $400 million over four years into early intervention and specialist community mental health teams.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Health’s planning and coordination of mental health services and service pathways for Aboriginal people in New South Wales. We addressed the audit objective by answering three questions: 

  1. Is NSW Health using evidence to plan and inform the availability of mental health services for Aboriginal people in New South Wales?
  2. Is NSW Health collaborating with partners to create accessible mental health service pathways for Aboriginal people?
  3. Is NSW Health collaborating with partners to ensure the appropriateness and quality of mental health services for Aboriginal people?
Conclusion

NSW Health is not meeting the objectives of the NSW Aboriginal Health Plan, to form effective partnerships with Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Services and Aboriginal communities to plan, design and deliver mental health services.

There is limited evidence that existing partnerships between NSW Health and Aboriginal communities meet its own commitment to use the ‘knowledge and expertise of the Aboriginal community (to) guide the health system at every level, including (for) the identification of key issues, the development of policy solutions, the structuring and delivery of services' 3 and the development of culturally appropriate models of mental health care.

NSW Health is planning and coordinating its resources to support Aboriginal people in acute phases of mental illness in hospital environments. However, it is not effectively planning for the supply and delivery of sufficient mental health services to assist Aboriginal patients to manage mental illness in community environments. Existing planning approaches, data and systems are insufficient to guide the $400 million investment into community mental health services announced in the 2018–19 Budget.

NSW Health is not consistently forming partnerships to ensure coordinated care for patients as they move between mental health services. There is no policy to guide this process and practices are not systematised or widespread.

In this report, the term ‘Aboriginal people’ is used to describe both Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. The Audit Office of NSW acknowledges the diversity of traditional countries and Aboriginal language groups across the state of New South Wales.


1 Australian Burden of Disease Study: Impact and causes of illness and death in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people 2011 (unaudited).
2 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare data 2016–17 (unaudited).
3 NSW Health, The Aboriginal Health Plan 2013-2023.

In May 2019, the Audit Office of New South Wales invited Aboriginal mental health clinicians and policy experts from government and non-government organisations to attend a one-day workshop. Workshop attendees advised on factors that improve the quality and appropriateness of mental health care for Aboriginal people in New South Wales. They described appropriate mental health care as:

  • culturally safe, allowing Aboriginal people to draw strength in their identity, culture and community
  • person centred and focussed on individual needs
  • delivered by culturally competent staff with no bias
  • holistic, trauma-informed and focussed on early intervention where possible
  • delivered in places that are appropriate including outreach to homes and communities
  • welcoming of the involvement of local Aboriginal community and connected to local knowledge and expertise including totems and kinship structures. 

The definition of 'appropriate' mental health care for Aboriginal people throughout this report is based on this advice.

Aboriginal people access emergency services at much higher rates than non-Aboriginal people

The choices that people make in relation to health service options provide some insight into the suitability and appropriateness of the service to their needs.

Aboriginal people have different mental health service use patterns than non-Aboriginal people. Aboriginal people are much more likely to be in a crisis situation before receiving mental health services, usually in an emergency department of a hospital.

Aboriginal people make up three per cent of the total New South Wales population, but they constitute 11 per cent of emergency department presentations for mental health treatments. In regional areas, Aboriginal people make up 20.5 per cent of presentations at emergency departments for mental health reasons. 

A number of factors help to explain Aboriginal mental health service usage patterns. According to government and non-government mental health organisations:

  • emergency department services are better known to Aboriginal people than other mental health services
  • community-based models of care are not appropriate for Aboriginal people
  • Aboriginal people are reluctant to access community-based mental health services to prevent crisis situations
  • community mental health services are not available for Aboriginal people after hours and during the weekend, so emergency services are the only option.

The statewide proportions of Aboriginal people presenting at emergency departments for mental health treatments has been increasing over time (Exhibit 6).

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – The NSW Aboriginal Health Plan

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary Reference: Report number #326 - released 29 August 2019

Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Contracting non-government organisations

Contracting non-government organisations

Community Services
Compliance
Fraud
Management and administration
Procurement
Regulation
Service delivery

This report found the Department of Family and Community Services (FACS) needs to do more to demonstrate it is effectively and efficiently contracting NGOs to deliver community services in the Permanency Support Program (a component of out-of-home-care services) and Specialist Homelessness Services. It notes that FACS is moving to an outcomes-based commissioning model and recommends this be escalated consistent with government policy.

Government agencies, such as the Department of Family and Community Services (FACS), are increasingly contracting non-government organisations (NGOs) to deliver human services in New South Wales. In doing so, agencies are responsible for ensuring these services are achieving expected outcomes. Since the introduction of the Commissioning and Contestability Policy in 2016, all NSW Government agencies are expected to include plans for customer and community outcomes and look for ways to use contestability to raise standards.

Two of the areas receiving the greatest funding from FACS are the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services. In the financial year 2017–18, nearly 500 organisations received $784 million for out-of-home care programs, including the Permanency Support Program. Across New South Wales, specialist homelessness providers assist more than 54,000 people each year and in the financial year 2017–18, 145 organisations received $243 million for providing short term accommodation and homelessness support, including Specialist Homelessness Services.

In the financial year 2017–18, FACS entered into 230 contracts for out-of-home care, of which 49 were for the Permanency Support Program, representing $322 million. FACS also entered into 157 contracts for the provision of Specialist Homelessness Services which totalled $170 million. We reviewed the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services for this audit.

This audit assessed how effectively and efficiently FACS contracts NGOs to deliver community services. The audit could not assess how NGOs used the funds they received from FACS as the Audit Office does not have a mandate that could provide direct assurance that NGOs are using government funds effectively.

Conclusion
FACS cannot demonstrate it is effectively and efficiently contracting NGOs to deliver community services because it does not always use open tenders to test the market when contracting NGOs, and does not collect adequate performance data to ensure safe and quality services are being provided. While there are some valid reasons for using restricted tenders, it means that new service providers are excluded from consideration - limiting contestability. In the service delivery areas we assessed, FACS does not measure client outcomes as it has not yet moved to outcomes-based contracts. 
FACS' procurement approach sometimes restricts the selection of NGOs for the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services
FACS has a procurement policy and plan which it follows when contracting NGOs for the provision of human services. This includes the option to use restricted tenders, which FACS sometimes uses rather than opening the process to the market. The use of restricted tenders is consistent with its procurement plan where there is a limited number of possible providers and the services are highly specialised. However, this approach perpetuates existing arrangements and makes it very difficult for new service providers to enter the market. The recontracting of existing providers means FACS may miss the opportunity to benchmark existing providers against the whole market. 
FACS does not effectively use client data to monitor the performance of NGOs funded under the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services
FACS' contract management staff monitor individual NGO performance including safety, quality of services and compliance with contract requirements. Although FACS does provide training materials on its intranet, FACS does not provide these staff with sufficient training, support or guidance to monitor NGO performance efficiently or effectively. FACS also requires NGOs to self-report their financial performance and contract compliance annually. FACS verifies the accuracy of the financial data but conducts limited validation of client data reported by NGOs to verify its accuracy. Instead, FACS relies on contract management staff to identify errors or inaccurate reporting by NGOs.
FACS' ongoing monitoring of the performance of providers under the Permanency Support Program is particularly limited due to problems with timely data collection at the program level. This reduces FACS' ability to monitor and analyse NGO performance at the program level as it does not have access to ongoing performance data for monitoring service quality.
In the Specialist Homelessness Services program, FACS and NGOs both provide the data required for the National Minimum Data Set on homelessness and provide it to the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, as they are required to do. However, this data is not used for NGO performance monitoring or management.
FACS does not yet track outcomes for clients of NGOs
FACS began to develop an approach to outcomes-based contracting in 2015. Despite this, none of the contracts we reviewed are using outcomes as a measure of success. Currently, NGOs are required to demonstrate their performance is consistent with the measures stipulated in their contracts as part of an annual check of their contract compliance and financial accounts. NGOs report against activity-based measures (Key Performance Indicators) and not outcomes.
FACS advises that the transition to outcomes-based contracting will be made with the new rounds of funding which will take place in 2020–2021 for Specialist Homelessness Services and 2023 for the Permanency Support Program. Once these contracts are in place, FACS can transition NGOs to outcomes based reporting.
Incomplete data limits FACS' effectiveness in continuous improvement for the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services
FACS has policies and procedures in place to learn from past experiences and use this to inform future contracting decisions. However, FACS has limited client data related to the Permanency Support Program which restricts the amount of continuous improvement it can undertake. In the Specialist Homelessness Support Program data is collected to inform routine contract management discussions with service providers but FACS is not using this data for continuous improvement. 

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary Reference: Report number #323 - released 26 June 2019

Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Managing growth in the NSW prison population

Managing growth in the NSW prison population

Justice
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Project management
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

The Department of Justice has relied heavily on temporary responses to accommodate growing prisoner numbers according to a report released today by the Acting Auditor-General for New South Wales, Ian Goodwin.

At the time of this audit, the NSW Department of Justice (DOJ) was responsible for delivering custodial corrections services in New South Wales through its Corrective Services NSW division (Corrective Services NSW). From 1 July 2019, the Department of Family and Community Services and Justice will be responsible for these functions. 

Within DOJ, Corrective Services NSW is responsible for administering sentences and legal orders through custodial and community-based management of adult offenders. Its key priorities are:

  • providing safe, secure and humane management of prisoners
  • reducing reoffending
  • improving community safety and confidence in the justice system. 

The prison population in New South Wales grew by around 40 per cent between 2012 to 2018, from 9,602 to 13,630 inmates. This rate of growth was higher than experienced prior to 2012. DOJ forecasts growth to continue over the short and longer-term. 

DOJ has responded to inmate population growth by doubling-up and tripling-up the number of prison beds in cells, reactivating previously closed prisons, and a $3.8 billion program of new prison capacity. DOJ has also developed a long-term prison infrastructure strategy that projects long-term needs and recommended investments to meet these needs. 

This audit assessed how efficiently and effectively DOJ is responding to growth in the NSW prison population. In this report, we have not analysed the sources of demand or recommended ways that custody may be avoided. These are largely government policy issues. 

Conclusion
The DOJ has relied heavily on temporary responses to accommodate growth in the NSW prison population. Sustained reliance on these responses is inefficient and creates risks to safety, and timely access to prisoner support services.
DOJ has experienced significant growth in the prison population since 2012. To meet demand, it has relied on temporary responses that are not designed to be sustained, including doubling-up or tripling-up the number of beds in cells, reopening previously closed facilities and using obsolete facilities. DOJ has also regularly moved inmates between its facilities to accommodate the increasing need for beds in metropolitan Sydney. 
Relying on temporary approaches over a long period contributes to prison crowding and has affected DOJ's ability to manage inmates in line with its correctional principles. It has increased risks to staff and prisoner safety, and timely inmate access to prisoner support services and programs. In addition, the cost per prisoner per day increased over the past two years.
DOJ is progressively delivering new capacity to address the growing prison population.
In response to continuing and projected growth in the prison population, the NSW Government announced a one-off $3.8 billion program to deliver around 6,100 beds by May 2021. Under the program, DOJ developed and delivered two rapid build dormitory style prisons within 18 months. DOJ’s capability to deliver the program, including implementation of new beds and new prisons, governance, project management, risk assessment and commissioning has improved over time. Most new capacity will be delivered on existing DOJ sites, mainly in regional New South Wales. 
DOJ has developed a strategy to respond to long-term projected growth in the prison population, but it has yet to be funded. 
The Corrective Services NSW Infrastructure Strategy (CSIS) sets out challenges, strategic priorities, and planned actions to respond to projected growth over the next 20 years and improve overall system efficiency and effectiveness. But, proposed actions are subject to individual business cases and funding decisions. Three versions of the CSIS have been provided to, and endorsed by, the NSW Government. The key challenge identified in the CSIS is to overcome demand for prison beds in the Sydney metropolitan region. DOJ advised that it is developing a final business case to address metropolitan capacity needs, but this is subject to government approval and funding. DOJ should continue to highlight the urgency of this issue until it is addressed, as it prevents planned actions to improve system efficiency and effectiveness.
 

The Productivity Commission’s Report on Government Services outlines the performance indicator framework for corrective services in Australia (Appendix three). We have used measures from this framework to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of DOJ’s responses to prison bed capacity needs. 

In this section, we analyse system-wide indicators as DOJ has not consistently published or reported data for individual correctional centres over the period of review.
 

Published

Actions for Governance of Local Health Districts

Governance of Local Health Districts

Health
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration

The main roles, responsibilities and relationships between Local Health Districts (LHDs), their Boards and the Ministry of Health are clear and understood, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. However, there are opportunities to achieve further maturity in the system of governance and the audit report recommended a series of actions to further strengthen governance arrangements.

Fifteen Local Health Districts (LHDs) are responsible for providing public hospital and related health services in NSW. LHDs are:

  • established as statutory corporations under the Health Services Act 1997 to manage public hospitals and provide health services within defined geographical areas
  • governed by boards of between six and 13 people appointed by the Minister for Health
  • managed by a chief executive who is appointed by the board with the concurrence of the Secretary of NSW Health
  • accountable for meeting commitments made in annual service agreements with the NSW Ministry of Health.

The NSW Ministry of Health (the Ministry) is the policy agency for the NSW public health system, providing regulatory functions, public health policy, as well as managing the health system, including monitoring the performance of hospitals and health services.

The current roles and responsibilities of LHDs and the Ministry, along with other agencies in NSW Health, were established in 2011 following a series of reforms to the structure and governance of the system. These reforms began with the report of the 'Special Commission of Inquiry into Acute Care Services in NSW Public Hospitals' ('the Garling Inquiry'), which was released in 2008, and were followed by reforms announced by the incoming coalition government in 2011.

These reforms were intended to deliver greater local decision making, including better engagement with clinicians, consumers, local communities, and other stakeholders in the primary care (such as general practitioners) and non-government sectors.

The reforms empowered LHDs by devolving some management and accountability from the Ministry for the delivery of health services in their area. LHDs were made accountable for meeting annual obligations under service agreements.

This audit assessed the efficiency and effectiveness of the governance arrangements for LHDs. We answered two questions:

  • Are there clear roles, responsibilities and relationships between the Ministry of Health and LHDs and within LHDs?
  • Does the NSW Health Performance Framework establish and maintain accountability, oversight and strategic guidance for LHDs?
Conclusion
Main roles, responsibilities and relationships between LHDs, their boards, and the Ministry of Health are clear and understood, though there is opportunity to achieve further maturity in the system of governance for LHDs.
Main roles and responsibilities are clear and understood by local health district (LHD) board members and staff, Ministry of Health executive staff, and key stakeholders. However, there is some ambiguity for more complex and nuanced functions. A statement of principles to support decision making in a devolved system would help to ensuring that neither LHDs or the Ministry 'over-reach' into areas that are more appropriately the other's responsibility.
Better clinician engagement in LHD decision making was a key driver for devolution. This engagement has not met the expectations of devolution and requires attention as a priority.
Relationships between system participants are collaborative, though the opportunity should be taken to further embed this in the system structures and processes and complement existing interpersonal relationships and leadership styles.
Accountability and oversight mechanisms, including the Health Performance Framework and Service Agreements, have been effective in establishing accountability, oversight and strategic guidance for LHDs.
The Health Performance Framework and Service Agreements have underpinned a cultural shift toward greater accountability and oversight. However, as NSW Health is a large, complex and dynamic system, it is important that these accountability and oversight mechanisms continue to evolve to ensure that they are sufficiently robust to support good governance.
There are areas where accountability and oversight can be improved including:
  • continued progress in moving toward patient experience, outcome, and quality and safety measures
  • improving the Health Performance Framework document to ensure it is comprehensive, clear and specifies decision makers
  • greater clarity in the nexus between underperformance and escalation decisions
  • including governance-related performance measures
  • more rigour in accountability for non-service activity functions, including consumer and community engagement
  • ensuring that performance monitoring and intervention is consistent with the intent of devolution. 
There is clear understanding of the main roles and responsibilities of LHDs and the Ministry of Health under the structural and governance reforms introduced in 2011. Strongly collaborative relationships provide a good foundation on which governance arrangements can continue to mature, though there is a need to better ensure that clinicians are involved in LHD decision making.

NSW Health is large and complex system, operating in a dynamic environment. The governance reforms introduced in 2011 were significant and it is reasonable that they take time to mature.

The main roles of LHDs and the Ministry are clear and well-understood, and there is good collaboration between different parts of the system. This provides a sound foundation on which to further mature the governance arrangements of LHDs.

While the broad roles of LHDs, their boards, and the Ministry are well understood by stakeholders in the system, there are matters of detail and complexity that create ambiguity and uncertainty, including:

  • the roles and relationships between the LHDs and the Pillars
  • to what extent LHDs have discretion to pursue innovation
  • individual responsibility and obligations between chairs, boards, executive staff, and the Ministry.

These should be addressed collaboratively between boards, their executives, and the Ministry, and should be informed by a statement of principles that guides how devolved decision making should be implemented.

Better clinician engagement in health service decision making was a key policy driver for devolution. Priority should be given by LHDs and the Ministry to ensuring that clinicians are adequately engaged in LHD decision making. It appears that in many cases they are not, and this needs to be addressed.

The quality of board decision making depends on the information they are provided and their capacity to absorb and analyse that information. More can be done to promote good decision making by improving the papers that go to boards, and by ensuring that board members are well positioned to absorb the information provided. This includes ensuring that the right type and volume of information are provided to boards, and that members and executive managers have adequate data literacy skills to understand the information.

Recommendations

  1. By December 2019, the Ministry of Health should:
     
    1. work with LHDs to identify and overcome barriers that are limiting the appropriate engagement of clinicians in decision making in LHDs
    2. develop a statement of principles to guide decision making in a devolved system
    3. provide clarity on the relationship of the Agency for Clinical Innovation and the Clinical Excellence Commission to the roles and responsibilities of LHDs.
       
  2. By June 2020, LHDs boards, supported where appropriate by the Ministry of Health, should address the findings of this performance audit to ensure that local practices and processes support good governance, including:
     
    1. providing timely and consistent induction; training; and reviews of boards, members and charters
    2. ensuring that each board's governance and oversight of service agreements is consistent with their legislative functions
    3. improving the use of performance information to support decision making by boards and executive managers.
Accountability and oversight mechanisms, including the Health Performance Framework and service agreements, have been effective in establishing accountability, oversight and strategic guidance for LHDs. They have done this by driving a cultural shift that supports LHDs being accountable for meeting their obligations. These accountablity and oversight mechanisms must continue to evolve and be improved.

This cultural shift has achieved greater recognition of the importance of transparency in how well LHDs perform. However, as NSW Health is a large, complex and dynamic system, it is important that these accountability and oversight mechanisms continue to evolve to ensure that they are sufficiently robust to support good governance.

There are areas where accountability and oversight can be improved including:

  • continued progress in moving toward patient experience, outcome and value-based measures
  • improving the Health Performance Framework document to ensure it is comprehensive, clear and specifies decision makers
  • greater clarity in the nexus between underperformance and escalation decisions
  • by adding governance-related performance measures to service agreements
  • more rigour in accountability for non-service activity functions, such as consumer and community engagement
  • ensuring that performance monitoring and intervention is consistent with the intent of devolution.

Recommendations

3.    By June 2020, the Ministry of Health should improve accountability and oversight mechanisms by:

a)    revising the Health Performance Framework so that it is a cohesive and comprehensive document
b)    clarifying processes and decision making for managing performance concerns
c)    developing a mechanism to adequately hold LHDs accountable for non-service activity functions
d)    reconciling performance monitoring and intervention with the policy intent of devolution.

Published

Actions for Firearms regulation

Firearms regulation

Justice
Management and administration

There are gaps in how the Firearms Registry administers the firearms licencing and registration scheme for existing licence holders, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. These gaps reduce the Registry’s effectiveness in regulating firearms use and ownership. 

While the Firearms Registry has systems to promptly update details in the firearms register for changes in firearm ownership and for criminal or anti-social behaviour of licence holders, some key information, including addresses, is not accurate or up-to date. 'This exposes a critical gap in the Registry’s data on the location of licence holders and their firearms,' Ms Crawford said. 

The Firearms Registry may also be making unsound or inconsistent administrative decisions due to a lack of clear internal policies and guidance. These decisions include licence suspensions or revocations, assessing reasons for the acquisition of firearms, and initiating enforcement actions for breaches by licence holders. Ms Crawford noted that 'these gaps mean the Registry cannot be confident it conducts aspects of its licencing activities effectively.'

The report’s recommendations aim to improve the integrity of the data in the register and ensure that the Firearms Registry is making sound and consistent decisions in regulating firearms use and ownership.

Firearms used by the general public in NSW are regulated through the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW) (the Act) and the Firearms Regulation 2017 (NSW) (Regulation). In October 2018, there were over 237,500 firearm licence holders and just over one million registered firearms in NSW.

The Act and Regulation reflect the National Firearms Agreement reached by all Australian jurisdictions in 1996 and confirmed in 2017. This Agreement sets out the minimum requirements for regulating firearms. The Act recognises that possessing and using firearms are privileges conditional on the overriding need to ensure public safety.

The NSW Police Force (NSW Police), which includes the Firearms Registry (the Registry), is responsible for administering the Act and Regulation, and for operating the NSW firearms licensing and registration scheme. Relevant third parties such as approved clubs, firearms dealers and shooting ranges also carry some administrative and oversight responsibilities under the Act and Regulation.

The role of the Registry includes administering the following requirements under the Act and Regulation that are relevant to this audit:

  • licence conditions
  • licence suspensions and revocations
  • initiating seizure of firearms
  • assessing permits to acquire firearms
  • administering the good reason test
  • maintaining the register of firearms
  • approving alternative safe storage arrangements.

The Registry's other activities identified in this report support its regulatory responsibilities under the NSW Government framework for better regulation.

This audit assessed how well the Registry administers the requirements of the Act and Regulation for existing firearms licence holders. To effectively administer these requirements, the Registry should have:

  • a reliable database that supports the firearms licensing and registration scheme
  • appropriate risk-based policies and procedures for the Registry’s operation that are consistent with the Act and Regulation.

We did not assess the Registry’s processes in assessing and issuing firearms licences to new applicants or renewing licences of existing licence holders. We also did not examine the administrative actions conducted by police officers who are not part of the Registry.

See Section 1 for details on the role of the Registry. See Appendix six for details of the audit.

Conclusion
There are gaps in how the Registry administers important requirements for existing licence holders which reduce the Registry’s ability to take an effective risk-based approach to regulating firearm ownership.
The Registry has some good processes to monitor and apply changes to the register.
The Registry is promptly advised of the sale of firearms or potential criminal or anti-social behaviour activity of licence holders and it promptly updates relevant information in the register.
Information in the register is not accurate or up-to-date.
Licence holders do not always advise the Registry of their address changes within the time required. The Registry does not have processes to efficiently identify these changes if not advised. This exposes a critical gap in the Registry's data on the location of some firearms. While the Registry has implemented a number of programs for checking the accuracy of data in the register, some of these programs have either ceased or been severely curtailed. For example, the Registry was conducting various checks on the accuracy of the data relating to the description of firearms in the register and correcting errors. These checks ceased after July 2017, with only around 50 per cent of the register checked.

There is an increased risk of the Registry making unsound or inconsistent administrative decisions.
The Registry lacks appropriate policies and guidance for important administrative decisions and sanctions. These include making decisions about licence suspensions and revocations, assessing good reasons for acquiring firearms, and initiating some enforcement actions. There is also limited review of these critical decisions.
Regulatory context
The Commissioner of Police’s response to this report (Appendix one) indicates he disagrees with some of our findings and recommendations based on his view that the firearms licensing and registration scheme is a ‘co-regulatory model’. The conclusion and recommendations of this report are based on the provisions in the Act which indicate that the Commissioner, and through him the NSW Police Force (including the Firearms Registry), is the responsible regulator. We acknowledge that other stakeholders have obligations to undertake certain actions in accordance with the Act and Regulation. This is further discussed below. 

To effectively administer the requirements of the Act and Regulation, the register that supports the firearms licensing and registration scheme should have readily accessible, accurate and up-to-date information regarding the status of licence holders and registered firearms.

Published

Actions for Government Advertising 2017-18

Government Advertising 2017-18

Premier and Cabinet
Compliance
Regulation

The State Insurance Regulatory Authority’s (SIRA) ‘green slip refund’ campaign, and the TAFE semester one 2018 student recruitment campaign, complied with most requirements of the Government Advertising Act 2011 and the Government Advertising Guidelines, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford.

The Government Advertising Act 2011 (the Act) requires the Auditor-General to conduct a performance audit on the activities of one or more government agencies in relation to government advertising campaigns in each financial year. The performance audit assesses whether a government agency or agencies has carried out activities in relation to government advertising in an effective, economical and efficient manner and in compliance with the Act, the regulations, other laws and the Government Advertising Guidelines (the Guidelines).

This audit examined two campaigns conducted in 2017–18:

  • the 'Green slip refund' campaign run by the State Insurance Regulatory Authority (SIRA)
  • the semester one component of the 'TAFE NSW 2018 Student Recruitment Annual Campaign Program' run by the NSW TAFE Commission (TAFE).

Section 6 of the Act prohibits political advertising. Under this section, material that is part of a government advertising campaign must not contain the name, voice or image of a minister, member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament or the name, logo or any slogan of a political party. Further, a campaign must not be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party.

Conclusion
Neither campaign breached the prohibition on political advertising contained in section 6 of the Act. Both campaigns also complied with most requirements of the Act, the regulations, other laws and the Guidelines. Neither agency could demonstrate that their campaigns were fully effective or economical.
SIRA did not breach section 6 of the Act, which prohibits political advertising. However, SIRA used its post-campaign evaluation to ask the public whether they believe the government was helping to reduce the cost of living by making reforms in a variety of areas, including some that were not related to the green slip campaign. SIRA advised that these additional statements were included to provide a broader context for any change in the green slip campaign survey results. This is not an appropriate use of the post-campaign evaluation because the post-campaign evaluation should measure the success of the campaign against its stated objectives.
Neither campaign met all their key objectives, limiting the overall effectiveness of the campaigns. SIRA successfully increased awareness of the availability of green slip refunds and met the target for the proportion of people claiming their refunds online. However, it did not meet its objective to inform the public about the reforms to the green slip scheme, beyond the refunds available to motorists. While 62 per cent of surveyed people were aware of the reforms, there was little knowledge about many specific aspects of the reforms, which people largely associated with lower insurance prices and refunds. TAFE was successful in achieving targets for changing the public perception of TAFE. However, it failed to achieve its semester one enrolment target.
SIRA was not able to demonstrate that its campaign was economical as it directly negotiated with a single supplier for the campaign's creative materials. This is contrary to the NSW Government's and SIRA's own procurement guidance that advise it to seek quotes from suppliers on a prequalification scheme if available. SIRA had access to the Advertising and Digital Communication Services prequalification scheme, but still continued with direct negotiations. While SIRA sought to demonstrate value for money by comparing the supplier's quote to the expenditure on creative materials in other campaigns, it did not document this evaluation to ensure that decision makers were fully informed. 
TAFE was not able to demonstrate that its campaign was economical as it did not compare the campaign with a zero-advertising scenario to demonstrate the exact benefits directly attributable to the campaign. TAFE's cost-benefit analysis also did not identify to what extent benefits could be achieved without advertising, nor did it consider alternatives to advertising which could achieve the same impact as the advertising campaign. All these elements should have been included in TAFE's cost benefit analysis.
Both agencies achieved some efficiencies in implementing their campaigns. SIRA booked all of its media placements in a cost-efficient manner. TAFE booked most of its media placements in a cost-efficient manner and achieved further efficiencies through the re-use of previous campaign material.

The State Insurance Regulatory Authority (SIRA) conducted the 'Green slip refund' campaign between March and June 2018. SIRA ran this campaign to raise awareness of the Compulsory Third Party (CTP) refunds and reforms after the Motor Accidents Injuries Act 2017 commenced in December 2017. SIRA's view is that the reforms include a reduced cost for CTP insurance, benefits for at-fault drivers, reduced opportunity for fraud and attempts to lower insurance company profits. Green slip holders are also able to claim partial refunds on their 2017 green slip insurance premium. The campaign aimed to make green slip holders aware of the refunds available, encourage them to claim online and to inform people about the changes to the green slip scheme. The campaign focused on the first two of these objectives. The total cost of the campaign was $1.9 million. See Appendix two for more details on this campaign.

The 'Green slip refund' advertising campaign did not breach section 6 of the Act which prohibits political advertising. However, SIRA used its post-campaign evaluation to ask the public whether they believe the government was helping to reduce the cost of living by making reforms in a variety of areas, including some that were not related to the green slip campaign. SIRA advised that these additional statements were included to provide a broader context for any change in the green slip campaign survey results. This is not an appropriate use of the post-campaign evaluation because the post-campaign evaluation should measure the success of the campaign against its stated objectives. 
The campaign met most of its objectives, including raising awareness of the green slip refunds and encouraging people to claim online. However, the campaign was not fully effective because it did not inform the public of the green slip reforms. This was one of the objectives of the campaign. Sixty-two per cent of people in the post-campaign survey stated that they were aware of the reforms, an increase from the baseline of 20 per cent. However, these people largely associated the reforms with lower insurance prices and had a low awareness of any other elements of the reforms, such as SIRA's view that the reforms introduced better support for people injured on the road. This indicates that the campaign did little to inform people about the green slip reforms beyond the price of insurance. 
SIRA was able to ensure cost-efficient media purchases by signing its media booking authority within the timeframe advised by DPC.
SIRA could not demonstrate that the campaign was carried out economically. SIRA directly negotiated with a single supplier to procure the creative materials for this campaign. Direct negotiations make it difficult to ensure value for money due to the lack of competition. SIRA proceeded with direct negotiations despite being able to access a prequalification scheme which could increase competition. In doing so, SIRA did not follow government's or its internal procurement guidance. While SIRA sought to demonstrate value for money by comparing the supplier's quote to the expenditure on creative materials in other campaigns, it did not document this evaluation to ensure that decision makers were fully informed. 

Campaign materials we reviewed did not breach section 6 of the Act

Section 6 of the Act prohibits political advertising as part of a government advertising campaign. A government advertising campaign must not:

  • be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party
  • contain the name, voice or image of a minister, a member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament
  • contain the name, logo, slogan or any other reference to a political party.

The audit team found no breaches of section 6 of the Act in the campaign material we reviewed.

Before the start of the campaign, SIRA conducted a survey which asked people whether they agreed ‘that the NSW Government is helping to reduce the cost of living by making positive reforms to:

  • reduce the cost of green slips
  • reduce the cost of health insurance
  • increase the number of jobs
  • increase investment in the state.'

SIRA's initial submission to peer review listed one of the campaign objectives as improving the perception of the government as a positive reformer. DPC advised SIRA that this should not be included. SIRA removed this objective.

Even though SIRA appropriately removed this objective, the post-campaign evaluation still measured agreement with the above statements, three of which did not relate to this campaign or SIRA's responsibilities. SIRA advised that these three additional statements were included to provide a broader context for any change in the green slip campaign survey results. For example, if all four measures reported an increase in positive responses of roughly the same size, then the increase may have been due to factors other than the advertising campaign.

This is not an appropriate use of the post-campaign evaluation, which should measure the success of the campaign against its stated objectives. The Guidelines list the purposes that government advertising may serve and none of these relate to improving the perception of the government. The inclusion of the above questions in SIRA's post-campaign evaluation creates a risk that the results may be used for party political purposes.

The campaign met most targets, however some were not challenging to achieve

The post-campaign evaluation demonstrated that the campaign met the targets for 12 of its 13 objectives including the targets relating to raising awareness of the refunds and the proportion of people claiming their refunds online. A fourteenth objective, the percentage of people aware that they should contact SIRA after a road accident injury, did not have a target set, meaning that it is not possible to say whether the campaign had the desired impact in this case.

In August 2017, before the campaign commenced, SIRA conducted a survey to determine the baselines for some of its objectives. This is a good practice to support an effective post campaign evaluation process. The survey found that 20 per cent of people were aware of the green slip reforms. SIRA's objective was to raise this to 25 per cent, which represents a small gain relative to the proposed campaign expenditure. The campaign aimed for 40 per cent of motorists to be aware of refunds, which is very low given that this was the primary focus of the campaign. SIRA followed the advice of its survey provider when setting these targets. 

In the survey carried out after the campaign, 66 per cent of people were aware of the availability of green slip refunds for most motorists. The campaign also aimed to get 83 per cent of motorists to claim their refunds via online channels. It met this target, with a total of 84 per cent. Finally, 62 per cent of people in the post-campaign survey were aware of the green slip reforms. This result is discussed further below.

The overall target for total number of refunds claimed is 85 per cent of eligible drivers, that is to say CTP holders. SIRA will evaluate the results of this objective after the conclusion of the refund period in June 2019.

The campaign did little to inform the public about the broader green slip reforms

One objective of the green slip refund campaign was to inform the public about the green slip reforms. The final campaign creative material focused almost entirely on the green slip refunds rather than the range of other reforms. This was because the peer review raised concerns that the creative material was attempting to deliver too many messages. 

The campaign submission stated that the advertising campaign would raise awareness of the broader reforms to the CTP scheme, citing several examples such as reduced opportunities for fraud and reduced insurer profits. SIRA also advised the Minister for Finance, Services and Property that secondary messaging in the campaign would benefit public understanding of the reforms.

Some of the television and radio advertisements referred to ‘more protection’ or ‘better protection’ for people injured on New South Wales roads, however advertisements did not refer to other elements of the reforms. Other campaign creative materials contained messages solely relating to the green slip refund and made no further reference to the broader reforms. SIRA used other communication channels, such as giving wallet cards to health service providers, to spread these messages to people, particularly those who had been injured.

Sixty two per cent of people in the post-campaign survey were aware of the green slip reforms. SIRA asked these people which benefits they associated with the reforms. The results of this survey are in Exhibit 4. Seventy-one per cent of this sample identified the reduced costs of green slips as one of the changes, but awareness of other elements of the reforms remains low. Though 29 per cent of people perceive the reforms to make the green slip scheme ‘fairer’, no more than 15 per cent of people could list a specific benefit which did not relate to insurance prices.

Exhibit 4: Perceived benefits associated with the changes to the CTP green slip scheme
Perceived benefit Percentage aware of this benefit
Reduced costs of green slips for vehicle owners 71%
A fairer scheme for all people 29%
Reduced costs of comprehensive vehicle insurance 20%
Better support for people injured on our roads 15%
Less chances of fraudulent claims 15%
Lowering insurance company profits 13%
Quicker payment of claims to injured people 10%

Source: State Insurance Regulatory Authority.

Another campaign target was to ensure that people understood that they should contact SIRA in case of an injury. None of the campaign creative materials contained this information. SIRA did some limited work to inform the public about this through its social media channels. One of the pieces of creative material directed the reader to SIRA's website for further information on the reforms, which contained this information. During the campaign period, there was an increase in the number of calls received by SIRA's CTP Assist phone line. However, in the post-campaign evaluation, only two per cent of surveyed people identified that they should contact SIRA in case of an injury.

The media plan allowed sufficient time for cost-efficient media placement

During the peer review process, DPC provides advice to agencies about the time they should allow to ensure cost-efficient media placement. For example, DPC advise that agencies book television advertising six to 12 weeks in advance and that agencies book radio advertising two to eight weeks in advance.

SIRA allowed sufficient time between the completion of the peer review process and the commencement of the first advertising. SIRA signed the agreement with the approved Media Agency Services provider eight weeks before the campaign started, meaning that it could achieve cost-efficient media placement for all types of media used in this campaign.

SIRA directly negotiated with a single supplier, making it difficult to demonstrate value for money

SIRA directly negotiated with a single supplier to procure the campaign's creative material. A direct negotiation occurs when an agency negotiates with a proponent without first undergoing a competitive process. It is difficult to demonstrate value for money using direct negotiation due to the lack of competition. 

ICAC's 'Guidelines for managing risks in direct negotiations' (ICAC Guidelines) provide guidance on how to undertake direct negotiations. SIRA has a direct negotiation checklist that aligns to the ICAC Guidelines. The SIRA checklist advises that staff should confirm that existing New South Wales prequalification schemes cannot provide the procurement before undertaking a direct negotiation. SIRA did not do this.

To procure creative materials, agencies can access the Advertising and Digital Communication Services prequalification scheme (the prequalification scheme). Using the prequalification scheme allows agencies to quickly seek quotes from suppliers who have a demonstrated track record and expertise. While agencies are not required to use the prequalification scheme, the NSW Procurement Board advises that agencies should use prequalification schemes where they are available to promote competition. 

By using direct negotiation when the prequalification scheme was available, and by not seeking quotes from other suppliers, SIRA was acting in a way that reduced competition. This increases the risk that SIRA did not achieve value for money in its procurement of creative materials.

SIRA advised that it sought to ensure value for money by comparing the quote from its selected supplier with the amount spent on creative materials in other campaigns of similar size. SIRA did not document this analysis at the time or include it as part of the briefing note staff used to seek approval for undertaking direct negotiation. As a result, decision-makers were not fully informed when approving this engagement. 

SIRA reported in a briefing note that it engaged in direct negotiations because:

  • it believed that the original timeframe did not allow for a competitive tender process
  • the supplier had done previous work on a related campaign for SIRA
  • the supplier provided sample work which received positive feedback from focus groups.

In July 2017, when peer review commenced, SIRA planned to launch the campaign in November 2017 to coincide with the beginning of the green slip reforms. SIRA believed that this timeframe was narrow enough to warrant entering direct negotiations. The ICAC Guidelines advise that a narrow timeframe is not a valid reason to enter into a direct negotiation. In late October 2017, the campaign launch was delayed until March 2018 to stagger the demand on the resources of Service NSW, which is administering the refund. 

The ICAC Guidelines also advise against re-appointing a supplier because it has performed previous work. Instead, agencies could consider previous experience as one of several factors when deciding between quotes. In cases where an agency asks a supplier to provide sample work, the ICAC Guidelines advise that agencies should request sample work from multiple potential suppliers to promote competition.

The campaign's cost benefit analysis complied with the Act and Guidelines 

The Act requires a cost benefit analysis (CBA) for any government advertising campaign likely to exceed $1.0 million in value. Section six of the Guidelines set out the requirements for a government advertising CBA. The campaign's CBA complied with the requirements of the Act and the Guidelines.

The campaign CBA could have demonstrated further cost effectiveness if it considered alternative media mixes as outlined in NSW Treasury's 'Cost Benefit Analysis Framework for Government Advertising and Information Campaigns'. This would also have been consistent with the Handbook.

The cluster Secretary signed the compliance certificate instead of the head of SIRA

The Act requires the head of the agency running the campaign to sign a compliance certificate. 

The Secretary of the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation, the cluster to which SIRA belongs, signed the campaign's compliance certificate. However, section 17(2) of the State Insurance and Care Governance Act 2015 states that SIRA is ‘for the purposes of any Act, a NSW Government agency.’ Given this, the Chief Executive of SIRA was responsible for signing the compliance certificate for this campaign.

This is a minor non-compliance with the Act because the Chief Executive had reviewed the campaign and recommended that the Secretary sign the compliance certificate.  

The NSW TAFE Commission (TAFE) ran the 'TAFE NSW 2018 Student Recruitment Annual Campaign Program' from November 2017 to September 2018. The aim of the campaign was to assist TAFE in achieving its 2018 student enrolment target by improving the perception of TAFE's brand and generating student enquiries. This is the first state-wide campaign run by TAFE operating under the One TAFE model. Previously, each TAFE Institute ran its own campaigns. The total budget of the campaign was $19.5 million. This audit examined only the semester one 2018 component of the campaign, which ran from November 2017 to April 2018 at a total cost of $9.5 million. See Appendix two for more details on this campaign.

The semester one component of the 'TAFE NSW 2018 Student Recruitment Annual Campaign Program' did not breach the specific provisions of section 6 of the Act which prohibits political advertising.
The campaign was not fully effective because it did not achieve its objective of reaching TAFE's semester one enrolment target.
The campaign was successful at achieving the campaign's targets which related to changing the public perception of TAFE.
TAFE was able to place most of its campaign media within cost-efficient timeframes. TAFE also achieved efficiencies by re-using many creative materials from a previous campaign.
TAFE could not demonstrate this campaign was carried out economically. TAFE's cost benefit analysis (CBA) for this campaign did not comply with three requirements of the Guidelines. For example, TAFE did not compare the campaign to a baseline case of not advertising. 
The Guidelines require government advertising to be accurate in all statements. TAFE breached this requirement. The campaign material included one statement that was inaccurate and one that was overstated.
The revision of the Brand Guidelines in August 2017 impacted this campaign. TAFE re-used many creative materials that were created when TAFE was not required to include the NSW Government logo on its advertising material. DPC appears to have directed agencies that were launching advertising campaigns to immediately comply with the Brand Guidelines, however we could not find evidence that this advice was given to TAFE. As such, 59 per cent of TAFE's materials were not compliant with the Brand Guidelines at the launch of the campaign in November 2017. TAFE had made most of this campaign's creative materials compliant by June 2018.

The campaign materials we reviewed did not breach section 6 of the Act

Section 6 of the Act prohibits political advertising as part of a government advertising campaign. A government advertising campaign must not:

  • be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party
  • contain the name, voice or image of a minister, a member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament
  • contain the name, logo, slogan or any other reference to a political party.

The audit team found no breaches of section 6 of the Act in the campaign material we reviewed.

The campaign achieved 16 of 24 objectives, but did not reach its enrolment target

The campaign had 24 objectives which had a target for semester one. TAFE set these targets using a combination of previous experience, corporate objectives and brand surveys.

The overall objective of the combined semester one and two campaigns was to support TAFE achieving its 2018 total enrolment target of 549,636. TAFE's semester one target was 361,350, which it did not achieve. This indicates that the campaign was not fully effective.

The campaign achieved 11 of its 16 output objectives. The output targets related to TAFE's media placements and ability to reach an audience efficiently. TAFE tracked progress against many of the campaign's output objectives daily. TAFE altered its media channels throughout the campaign meaning that some of the output objectives were not met because TAFE decided to focus on alternative media channels. The campaign also achieved all seven of its outcome objectives. The outcome objectives related to changing the public perception of TAFE.

TAFE's initial media plan allowed for efficient media placement

During the peer review process, DPC provides advice to agencies about the time they should allow to ensure cost-efficient media placement. For example, DPC advise that agencies book television advertising six to 12 weeks in advance and that agencies book radio advertising two to eight weeks in advance. 

While TAFE's initial media plan allowed sufficient time between the approval of the campaign and its launch, a delay in receiving final approval for the campaign meant TAFE could not purchase media placements until two months later than planned. Most purchases still remained within DPC's recommended timeframes, but Indigenous television advertisements and metropolitan out of home advertisements both fell outside DPC's recommended time periods by one week. These delays did not impact on TAFE's efficiency.

TAFE re-used many creative materials, achieving some cost-savings

Rather than commissioning new creative materials, TAFE re-used many creative materials from the previous campaign and supplemented these with a selection of new creative materials. TAFE advised that this led to a cost saving of approximately $130,000.
TAFE sought quotes from suppliers on the government's Advertising and Digital Communication Services prequalification scheme for two creative material contracts. These contracts covered updates to existing materials and a selection of new materials.

The campaign's cost-benefit analysis did not comply with three requirements of the Guidelines

The Act requires an agency to conduct a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) if the cost of an advertising campaign is likely to exceed $1.0 million. The Guidelines set out the requirements of this CBA. TAFE did not comply with three of these requirements, outlined in Exhibit 5.

Exhibit 5: Guideline requirements for CBAs with which TAFE did not comply
6.2 The cost benefit analysis must isolate the additional costs and benefits attributable to the advertising campaign itself compared to the base-case of not-advertising.
6.3 The cost benefit analysis must specify the extent to which the expected benefits could be achieved without advertising.
6.4 The cost benefit analysis must outline what options other than advertising could be used to successfully implement the program and achieve the program benefits and a comparison of their costs.
Source: NSW Government Advertising Guidelines (2012).

In this circumstance, section 6.2 of the Guidelines required the CBA to identify the number of enrolments TAFE would expect if it did not advertise. TAFE advised us that it is not possible to say what this scenario would look like because there had always been some degree of advertising, however, this argument is not reflected in the CBA. 

TAFE used 2017 as the baseline in the CBA. In 2017, TAFE spent $13.2 million on advertising. As such, the CBA was only able to isolate the impact of the increased expenditure rather than the impact of the campaign's entire $19.5 million expenditure. TAFE advised that 2017 had the most reliable state-wide data and this contributed to the decision to use it as the baseline.

During the audit, TAFE sought advice from NSW Treasury regarding whether a 2017 baseline was appropriate and NSW Treasury advised that it was. Regardless, TAFE did not receive this advice prior to writing the CBA and did not put commentary around this in the CBA. This would also not be sufficient for fulfilling the requirements of the Guidelines.

The CBA did not comply with sections 6.3 and 6.4 of the Guidelines. The CBA briefly considered the impact of spending the campaign budget directly on new training courses, however there was no sustained analysis of this option. TAFE staff advised that there are no realistic alternatives to advertising for achieving the campaign's objectives. However we did not see analysis to support this conclusion in documents provided to us. 

The campaign CBA could have better demonstrated cost effectiveness if it considered alternative media mixes as outlined in NSW Treasury's 'Cost Benefit Analysis Framework for Government Advertising and Information Campaigns'. This would also have been consistent with the Handbook.

TAFE made one inaccurate claim in its advertising and overstated a second

The Guidelines set out rules regarding the content of a government advertising campaign. Exhibit 6 sets out one of the principles with which agencies must comply.

Exhibit 6: Guidelines' requirement for accuracy
The following principles apply to the style and content of government advertising campaigns:
  • Accuracy in the presentation of all facts, statistics, comparisons and other arguments. All statements and claims of fact included in government advertising campaigns must be able to be substantiated.
Source: NSW Government Advertising Guidelines (2012).

TAFE made one inaccurate claim in its advertising and overstated a second.

In some campaign creative material, TAFE claimed that 78 per cent of its own graduates are employed after training (Exhibit 15 in Appendix 2). According to the National Centre for Vocational Education Research, 78 per cent of New South Wales Vocational Education and Training (VET) graduates (i.e. from all training providers) are employed after training. The result for TAFE graduates is 70.4 per cent.

One of the campaign's television advertisements refers to TAFE as ‘Australia's most reputable education provider’. This statement referred to a survey of current TAFE students who were asked where they would consider studying in future: TAFE, University or a private college. The current TAFE students selected TAFE by a large margin. The limited scope of TAFE's student survey and its results do not support the claim that it is ‘Australia's most reputable education provider’.

DPC did not consistently communicate the transitional arrangements for the Brand Guidelines and as such much of TAFE's creative material did not comply at campaign launch

On 7 August 2017, the government released the NSW Government Brand Guidelines (Brand Guidelines), setting out how agencies use the NSW Government logo. The Brand Guidelines replaced the Branding Style Guide which had been in place since September 2015. Some agencies were exempt from using the Branding Style Guide and the introduction of the new Brand Guidelines required these agencies to apply for a new exemption.

TAFE had recently commenced the peer review process for this campaign when the Brand Guidelines were released. TAFE was exempt from the requirements of the Branding Style Guide and as such the material which TAFE was planning to re-use in the new campaign did not contain the NSW Government logo.

Communication about how long agencies had to make themselves compliant with the Brand Guidelines was unclear. On 11 August 2017, the Chair of the Cabinet Standing Committee on Communication and Government Advertising (the Committee) sent a letter to the Secretary of the Department of Industry informing him that the Department must update all its material to be compliant with the Brand Guidelines ‘as soon as practicable within an 18-month transition period’. The Department of Industry advised TAFE that new advertising would need to be immediately compliant, however it was not clear if this included materials which agencies were re-using from previous campaigns. DPC advised the audit team that it expected re-used materials to be compliant when agencies launched new campaigns. DPC provided this advice to some agencies but did not communicate it more broadly. We could not source evidence that DPC provided this advice to TAFE.

DPC ran workshops to explain the transitional arrangements in September 2017 for the changes in the Brand Guidelines, however these did not specifically address the transitional timeframes for new advertising campaigns.

The Department of Industry, on behalf of TAFE, applied to the Committee for approval to co-brand the TAFE logo with the NSW Government logo. This was approved in October 2017. The requirements for co-branding are in Exhibit 7.

Exhibit 7: Co-branding in the NSW Government Brand Guidelines

Co-branding partners the agency logo with the NSW Government logo. The NSW Government logo must always be presented as the dominant or lead brand. The Brand Guidelines provide the following template shown below the exhibit box.

The NSW Government logo is on the left and the agency logo is placed on the right, with a dividing line between them.

Published

Actions for Unsolicited proposal process for the lease of Ausgrid

Unsolicited proposal process for the lease of Ausgrid

Premier and Cabinet
Asset valuation
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration

In October 2016, the NSW Government accepted an unsolicited proposal from IFM Investors and AustralianSuper to lease 50.4 per cent of Ausgrid for 99 years. The deal followed the Federal Government’s rejection of two bids from foreign investors, for national security reasons.

A performance audit of the lease of Ausgrid has found shortcomings in the unsolicited proposal process. Releasing the audit findings today, the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford said ‘this transaction involved a $20 billion asset owned by the people of New South Wales. As such, it warranted strict adherence to established guidelines’.

Ausgrid is a distributor of electricity to eastern parts of Sydney, the Central Coast, Newcastle and the Hunter Region.

In June 2014, the then government announced its commitment to lease components of the state's electricity network as part of the Rebuilding NSW plan. Implementation of the policy began after the government was re-elected in 2015. Between November 2015 and August 2016, the NSW Government held a competitive tender process to lease 50.4 per cent of Ausgrid for 99 years. The NSW Government abandoned the process on 19 August 2016 after the Australian Treasurer rejected two bids from foreign investors, for national security reasons. That day, the Premier and Treasurer released a media statement clarifying the government's objective to complete the transaction via a competitive process in time to include the proceeds in the 2017–18 budget.

On 31 August 2016, the state received an unsolicited proposal from IFM Investors and AustralianSuper to acquire an interest in Ausgrid under the same terms proposed by the state during the tender process. In October 2016, the government accepted the unsolicited proposal. 

This audit examined whether the unsolicited proposal process for the partial long-term lease of Ausgrid was effectively conducted and in compliance with the government’s 2014 Unsolicited Proposals: Guide for Submission and Assessment (Unsolicited Proposals Guide or the Guide). 

The audit focused on how the government-appointed Assessment Panel and Proposal Specific Steering Committee assessed key requirements in the Guide that unsolicited proposals must be demonstrably unique and represent value for money. 

Conclusion

The evidence available does not conclusively demonstrate the unsolicited proposal was unique, and there were some shortcomings in the negotiation process, documentation and segregation of duties. That said, before the final commitment to proceed with the lease, the state obtained assurance that the proposal delivered value for money. 

It is particularly important to demonstrate unsolicited proposals are unique, in order to justify the departure from other transaction processes that offer greater competition, transparency and certainty about value for money.

The Assessment Panel and the Proposal Specific Steering Committee determined the Ausgrid unsolicited proposal was unique, primarily on the basis that the proponent did not require foreign investment approval from the Australian Treasurer, and the lease transaction could be concluded earlier than through a second tender process. However, the evidence that persuaded the Panel and Committee did not demonstrate that no other proponent could conclude the transaction in time to meet the government’s deadline. 

It is not appropriate to determine an unsolicited proposal is unique because it delivers an earlier outcome than possible through a tender process. The Panel and Committee did not contend, and it is not evident, that the unsolicited proposal was the only way to meet the government’s transaction deadline.

The evidence does not demonstrate that the proponent was the only party that would not have needed foreign investment approval to participate in the transaction. It also does not demonstrate that the requirement for foreign investment approval would have reduced the pool of foreign buyers to the degree that it would be reasonable to assume none would emerge. 

The Panel, Committee and financial advisers determined that the final price represented value for money, and that retendering offered a material risk of a worse financial outcome. However, an acceptable price was revealed early in the negotiation process, and doing so made it highly unlikely that the proponent would offer a higher price than that disclosed. The Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) and NSW Treasury were not able to provide a documented reserve price, bargaining strategy or similar which put the negotiations in context. It is not evident that the Panel or Committee authorised, justified or endorsed negotiations in advance. 

Key aspects of governance recommended by the Guide were in place. Some shortcomings relating to role segregation, record keeping and probity assurance weakened the effectiveness of the unsolicited proposal process adopted for Ausgrid.

The reasons for accepting that the proposal and proponent were unique are not compelling.

The Unsolicited Proposals Guide says the 'unique benefits of the proposal and the unique ability of the proponent to deliver the proposal' must be demonstrated. 

The conclusion reached by the Panel and Committee that the proposal offered a ‘unique ability to deliver (a) strategic outcome’ was primarily based on the proponent not requiring foreign investment approval from the Australian Treasurer, and allowing the government to complete the lease transaction earlier than by going through a second tender process. 

It is not appropriate to determine an unsolicited proposal is unique because it delivers an earlier outcome than possible through a tender process. The Panel and Committee did not contend, and it is not evident, that the unsolicited proposal was the only way to meet the government’s transaction deadline.

The evidence does not demonstrate that the proponent was the only party that would not have needed foreign investment approval to participate in the transaction. Nor does it demonstrate that the requirement for foreign investment approval would have reduced the pool of foreign buyers to the degree that it would be reasonable to assume none would emerge. 

That said, the Australian Treasurer’s decision to reject the two bids from the previous tender process created uncertainty about the conditions under which he would approve international bids. The financial advisers engaged for the Ausgrid transaction informed the Panel and Committee that:

  • it was not likely another viable proponent would emerge soon enough to meet the government’s transaction deadline
  • the market would be unlikely to deliver a better result than offered by the proponent
  • going to tender presented a material risk of a worse financial result. 

The Unsolicited Proposals Guide says that a proposal to directly purchase or acquire a government-owned entity or property will generally not be unique. The Ausgrid unsolicited proposal fell into this category. 

Recommendations:
DPC should ensure future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government business or asset:

  • recognise that when considering uniqueness they should: 
    • require very strong evidence to decide that both the proponent and proposal are the only ones of their kind that could meet the government’s objectives 
    • give thorough consideration to any reasonable counter-arguments against uniqueness.
  • rigorously consider all elements of the Unsolicited Proposals Guide when determining whether a proposal should be dealt with as an unsolicited proposal, and document these deliberations and all relevant evidence
  • do not use speed of transaction compared to a market process as justification for uniqueness.
The process to obtain assurance that the final price represented value for money was adequate. However, the negotiation approach reduced assurance that the bid price was maximised. 

The Panel and Committee concluded the price represented value for money, based on peer-reviewed advice from their financial advisers and knowledge acquired from previous tenders. The financial advisers also told the Panel and Committee that there was a material risk the state would receive a lower price than offered by the unsolicited proposal if it immediately proceeded with a second market transaction. 

The state commenced negotiations on price earlier than the Guide says they should have. Early disclosure of a price that the state would accept reduced the likelihood of achieving a price greater than this. DPC says the intent of this meeting was to quickly establish whether the proponents could meet the state’s benchmark rather than spending more time and resources on a proposal which had no prospect of proceeding.

DPC and NSW Treasury were not able to provide a documented reserve price, negotiation strategy or similar which put the negotiations and price achieved in context. It was not evident that the Panel or Committee authorised, justified or endorsed negotiations in advance. However, the Panel and Committee endorsed the outcomes of the negotiations. 

The negotiations were informed by the range of prices achieved for similar assets and the specific bids for Ausgrid from the earlier market process.

Recommendations:
DPC should ensure any future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government business or asset:

  • document a minimum acceptable price, and a negotiating strategy designed to maximise price, before commencing negotiations
  • do not communicate an acceptable price to the proponent, before the negotiation stage of the process, and then only as part of a documented bargaining strategy.
Key aspects of governance recommended by the Guide were in place, but there were some shortcomings around role segregation, record keeping and probity assurance.

The state established a governance structure in accordance with the Unsolicited Proposals Guide, including an Assessment Panel and Proposal Specific Steering Committee. The members of the Panel and Steering Committee were senior and experienced officers, as befitted the size and nature of the unsolicited proposal. 

The separation of negotiation, assessment and review envisaged by the Guide was not maintained fully. The Chair of the Assessment Panel and a member of the Steering Committee were involved in negotiations with the proponent. 

DPC could not provide comprehensive records of some key interactions with the proponent or a documented negotiation strategy. The absence of such records means the Department cannot demonstrate engagement and negotiation processes were authorised and rigorous. 

The probity adviser reported there were no material probity issues with the transaction. The probity adviser also provided audit services. This is not good practice. The same party should not provide both advisory and audit services on the same transaction.

Recommendations:
DPC should ensure any future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government entity or asset:
•    maintain separation between negotiation, assessment and review in line with the Unsolicited Proposals Guide
•    keep an auditable trail of documentation relating to the negotiation process
•    maintain separation between any probity audit services engaged and the probity advisory and reporting services recommended in the current Guide.

Published

Actions for Progress and measurement of the Premier's Priorities

Progress and measurement of the Premier's Priorities

Premier and Cabinet
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Project management
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

The Premier’s Implementation Unit uses a systematic approach to measuring and reporting progress towards the Premier’s Priorities performance targets, but public reporting needed to improve, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General of NSW, Margaret Crawford.

The Premier of New South Wales has established 12 Premier’s Priorities. These are key performance targets for government.

The 12 Premier's Priorities
  • 150,000 new jobs by 2019

  • Reduce the volume of litter by 40 per cent by 2020

  • 10 key projects in metro and regional areas to be delivered on time and on budget, and nearly 90 local infrastructure projects to be delivered on time

  • Increase the proportion of NSW students in the top two NAPLAN bands by eight per cent by 2019

  • Increase the proportion of women in senior leadership roles in the NSW Government sector from 33 to 50 per cent by 2025 and double the number of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in senior leadership roles in the NSW Government sector, from 57 to 114

  • Increase the proportion of young people who successfully move from Specialist Homelessness Services to long-term accommodation to more than 34 per cent by 2019

  • 61,000 housing completions on average per year to 2021

  • Reduce the proportion of domestic violence perpetrators reoffending by 25 per cent by 2021

  • Improve customer satisfaction with key government services every year, this term of government to 2019

  • Decrease the percentage of children and young people re-reported at risk of significant harm by 15 per cent by 2020

  • 81 per cent of patients through emergency departments within four hours by 2019

  • Reduce overweight and obesity rates of children by five percentage points by 2025


Source: Department of Premier and Cabinet, Premier’s Priorities website.

Each Premier’s Priority has a lead agency and minister responsible for achieving the performance target.

The Premier’s Implementation Unit (PIU) was established within the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) in 2015. The PIU is a delivery unit that supports agencies to measure and monitor performance, make progress toward the Premier’s Priorities targets, and report progress to the Premier, key ministers and the public.

This audit assessed how effectively the NSW Government is progressing and reporting on the Premier's Priorities.

 


The Premier’s Implementation Unit (PIU) is effective in assisting agencies to make progress against the Premier’s Priorities targets. Progress reporting is regular but transparency to the public is weakened by the lack of information about specific measurement limitations and lack of clarity about the relationship of the targets to broader government objectives.The PIU promotes a systematic approach to measuring performance and reporting progress towards the Premier’s Priorities’ performance targets. Public reporting would be improved with additional information about the rationale for choosing specific targets to report on broader government objectives.

The PIU provides a systematic approach to measuring performance and reporting progress towards the Premier's Priorities performance targets. Public reporting would be improved with additional information about the rationale for choosing specific targets to report on broader government objectives. The data used to measure the Premier’s Priorities comes from a variety of government and external datasets, some of which have known limitations. These limitations are not revealed in public reporting, and only some are revealed in progress reported to the Premier and ministers. This limits the transparency of reporting.

The PIU assists agencies to avoid unintended outcomes that can arise from prioritising particular performance measures over other areas of activity. The PIU has adopted a collaborative approach to assisting agencies to analyse performance using data, and helping them work across organisational silos to achieve the Premier’s Priorities targets.


 


Data used to measure progress for some of the Premier’s Priorities has limitations which are not made clear when progress is reported. This reduces transparency about the reported progress. Public reporting would also be improved with additional information about the relationship between specific performance measures and broader government objectives.

The PIU is responsible for reporting progress to the Premier, key ministers and the public. Agencies provide performance data and some play a role in preparing progress reports for the Premier and ministers. For 11 of the Premier's Priorities, progress is reported against measurable and time-related performance targets. For the infrastructure priority, progress is reported against project milestones.

Progress of some Priorities is measured using data that has known limitations, which should be noted wherever progress is reported. For example, the data used to report on housing completions does not take housing demolitions into account, and is therefore overstating the contribution of this performance measure to housing supply. This known limitation is not explained in progress reports or on the public website.

Data used to measure progress is sourced from a mix of government and external datasets. Updated progress data for most Premier’s Priorities is published on the Premier’s Priorities website annually, although reported to the Premier and key ministers more frequently. The PIU reviews the data and validates it through fieldwork with front line agencies. The PIU also assists agencies to avoid unintended outcomes that can arise from prioritising single performance measures. Most, but not all, agencies use additional indicators to check for misuse of data or perverse outcomes.

We examined the reporting processes and controls for five of the Premier’s Priorities. We found that there is insufficient assurance over the accuracy of the data on housing approvals.

The relationships between performance measures and broader government objectives is not always clearly explained on the Premier’s Priority website, which is the key source of public information about the Premier’s Priorities. For example, the Premier’s Priority to reduce litter volumes is communicated as “Keeping our Environment Clean.” While the website explains why reducing litter is important, it does not clearly explain why that particular target has been chosen to measure progress in keeping the environment clean.

By December 2018, the Department of Premier and Cabinet should:

  1. improve transparency of public reporting by:
    • providing information about limitations of reported data and associated performance
    • clarifying the relationship between the Premier’s Priorities performance targets and broader government objectives.
  2. ensure that processes to check and verify data are in place for all agency data sources
  3. encourage agencies to develop and implement additional supporting indicators for all Premier’s Priority performance measures to prevent and detect unintended consequences or misuse of data.

 


The Premier's Implementation Unit is effective in supporting agencies to deliver progress towards the Premier’s Priority targets.

The PIU promotes a systematic approach to monitoring and reporting progress against a target, based on a methodology used in delivery units elsewhere in the world. The PIU undertakes internal self-evaluation, and commissions regular reviews of methodology implementation from the consultancy that owns the methodology and helped to establish the PIU. However, the unit lacks periodic independent reviews of their overall effectiveness. The PIU has adopted a collaborative approach and assists agencies to analyse performance using data, and work across organisational silos to achieve the Premier’s Priorities targets.

Agency representatives recognise the benefits of being responsible for a Premier's Priority and speak of the value of being held to account and having the attention of the Premier and senior ministers.

By June 2019, the Department of Premier and Cabinet should:

  1. establish routine collection of feedback about PIU performance including:
    • independent assurance of PIU performance
    • opportunity for agencies to provide confidential feedback.

 

 

Published

Actions for Managing Antisocial behaviour in public housing

Managing Antisocial behaviour in public housing

Community Services
Asset valuation
Infrastructure
Regulation
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

The Department of Family and Community Services (FACS) has not adequately supported or resourced its staff to manage antisocial behaviour in public housing according to a report released today by the Deputy Auditor-General for New South Wales, Ian Goodwin. 

In recent decades, policy makers and legislators in Australian states and territories have developed and implemented initiatives to manage antisocial behaviour in public housing environments. All jurisdictions now have some form of legislation or policy to encourage public housing tenants to comply with rules and obligations of ‘good neighbourliness’. In November 2015, the NSW Parliament changed legislation to introduce a new approach to manage antisocial behaviour in public housing. This approach is commonly described as the ‘strikes’ approach. 

When introduced in the NSW Parliament, the ‘strikes’ approach was described as a means to:

  • improve the behaviour of a minority of tenants engaging in antisocial behaviour 
  • create better, safer communities for law abiding tenants, including those who are ageing and vulnerable.

FACS has a number of tasks as a landlord, including a responsibility to collect rent and organise housing maintenance. FACS also has a role to support tenants with complex needs and manage antisocial behaviour. These roles have some inherent tensions. The FACS antisocial behaviour management policy aims are: 

to balance the responsibilities of tenants, the rights of their neighbours in social housing, private residents and the broader community with the need to support tenants to sustain their public housing tenancies.

This audit assessed the efficiency and effectiveness of the ‘strikes’ approach to managing antisocial behaviour in public housing environments.

We examined whether:

  • the approach is being implemented as intended and leading to improved safety and security in social housing environments
  • FACS and its partner agencies have the capability and capacity to implement the approach
  • there are effective mechanisms to monitor, report and progressively improve the approach.
Conclusion

FACS has not adequately supported or resourced its staff to implement the antisocial behaviour policy. FACS antisocial behaviour data is incomplete and unreliable. Accordingly, there is insufficient data to determine the nature and extent of the problem and whether the implementation of the policy is leading to improved safety and security

FACS management of minor and moderate incidents of antisocial behaviour is poor. FACS has not dedicated sufficient training to equip frontline housing staff with the relevant skills to apply the antisocial behaviour management policy. At more than half of the housing offices we visited, staff had not been trained to:

  • conduct effective interviews to determine whether an antisocial behaviour complaint can be substantiated

  • de escalate conflict and manage complex behaviours when required

  • properly manage the safety of staff and tenants

  • establish information sharing arrangements with police

  • collect evidence that meets requirements at the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal

  • record and manage antisocial behaviour incidents using the information management system HOMES ASB.

When frontline housing staff are informed about serious and severe illegal antisocial behaviour incidents, they generally refer them to the FACS Legal Division. Staff in the Legal Division are trained and proficient in managing antisocial behaviour in compliance with the policy and therefore, the more serious incidents are managed effectively using HOMES ASB. 


FACS provides housing services to most remote townships via outreach visits from the Dubbo office. In remote townships, the policy is not being fully implemented due to insufficient frontline housing staff. There is very limited knowledge of the policy in these areas and FACS data shows few recorded antisocial behaviour incidents in remote regions. 


The FACS information management system (HOMES ASB) is poorly designed and has significant functional limitations that impede the ability of staff to record and manage antisocial behaviour. Staff at most of the housing offices we visited were unable to accurately record antisocial behaviour matters in HOMES ASB, making the data incorrect and unreliable.