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Published

Actions for Family and Community Services 2018

Family and Community Services 2018

Community Services
Compliance
Financial reporting
Information technology
Management and administration
Project management
Risk
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford released her report today on the Family and Community Services cluster. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial audits of agencies in the cluster. Cluster entities received unqualified audit opinions for their 30 June 2018 financial statements. Opportunities to improve the quality of financial reporting were identified and reported to management.

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Family and Community Services cluster for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report provides NSW Parliament and other users of the financial statements of Family and Community Services' agencies with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations
  • service delivery.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Family and Community Services cluster for 2018.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
2.1 Quality of financial reporting
Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all cluster agencies' financial statements. Conclusion: Sufficient audit evidence was obtained to conclude the financial statements were free of material misstatement.
Agencies complied with NSW Treasury’s mandatory early close requirements.

Completing other early close procedures was inconsistent and not always supported by adequate evidence.
Conclusion: There are opportunities for agencies to improve the quality of financial reporting by:
  • documenting all significant judgements and assumptions used when preparing the financial statements
  • regularly reconciling inter-agency balances and transactions
  • reconciling key account balances on a timely basis
  • quantifying the impact of new and revised accounting standards.
2.2 Timeliness of financial reporting
Agencies completed revaluations of property, plant and equipment and submitted 31 March 2018 financial statements by the due date as required by NSW Treasury.

Agencies submitted year-end financial statements by the statutory deadline.
Conclusion: Early revaluations of property, plant and equipment contributes to agencies meeting the year-end statutory reporting deadline.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:

  • our financial statement audits of agencies in the Family and Community Services cluster for 2018
  • the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office annual work program.

The Audit Office Annual Work Program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each NSW Government cluster.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
3.1 Internal controls
The 2017–18 audits reported 47 internal control weaknesses. While none were high risk, there were 15 repeat issues.

Conclusion: Management accepted audit findings and advised they are actioning recommendations. Timely action is important to ensure internal controls operate effectively.

Twenty-two of these internal control weaknesses related to information technology processes and control environment. Conclusion: Control weaknesses in information systems may compromise the integrity and security of financial data used for decision making and financial reporting.

Recommendation: Agencies should strengthen user access administration to prevent inappropriate access to key IT systems by:
  • ensuring privileged user access is limited to those requiring access to maintain the IT systems
  • monitoring privileged user access to address risks from unauthorised activity
  • ensuring IT password settings comply with password policies
  • ensuring timely removal of access to business systems for terminated and casual employees.
The Department, NSW Land and Housing Corporation (LAHC) and three other cluster agencies’ contract registers are incomplete and/or inaccurate. Recommendation: Agencies should ensure their contract registers are complete and accurate so they can more effectively govern contracts and manage compliance obligations.
3.2 Audit Office annual work program
Financial impact of the commissioning approach.

The transfer of disability services to the National Disability Insurance Scheme and other commissioning of service delivery has contributed to a 36 per cent decrease in frontline employee numbers since 2015–16. Similarly, corporate services’ employee numbers reduced by 34 per cent.

The Department’s salary costs have reduced by $232 million or 18 per cent from 2016–17.
Conclusion: The ratio of corporate services employee numbers to support frontline and support services has remained at 1:10 since 2015–16, which indicates restructures have been planned to align with the transfer of disability services.
Impact of the new social housing maintenance contract

Maintenance expenses have increased by about 40 per cent since the new maintenance contract commenced in April 2016. LAHC measures the benefits of the new maintenance contract such as improved tenant satisfaction.
Conclusion: The new maintenance contract has contributed to some positive social outcomes such as tenants being employed by the contractors to conduct maintenance, as call centre operators and in administration. However, more can be done to ensure value for money is being achieved.
ChildStory IT Project

Whilst phase one of the ChildStory IT project went 'live' in 2017–18, the planned timetable has not been met and the revised date for full implementation is end of 2018.

According to the 2014–15 NSW Budget, the budget for ChildStory was $100 million over a four-year period. During the design and implementation stage, this amount was revised to $128 million, with approval of the Expenditure Review Committee. The actual cost incurred over the four years until 30 June 2018, is approximately $131 million.

We identified issues with the data migration from the legacy systems to ChildStory.
Conclusion: To inform future IT projects, we understand the Department is capturing our findings, along with the findings from the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation’s ‘Healthchecks’.

This chapter outlines certain service delivery outcomes for 2017–18. The data on activity levels and performance is provided by Cluster agencies. The Audit Office does not have a specific mandate to audit performance information. Accordingly, the information in this chapter is unaudited.

In our recent performance audit, Progress and measurement of Premier's Priorities, we identified 12 limitations of performance measurement and performance data. We recommended that the Department of Premier and Cabinet ensure that processes to check and verify data are in place for all agency data sources.

Published

Actions for Central Agencies 2018

Central Agencies 2018

Treasury
Premier and Cabinet
Finance
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released her report today on the results of the financial audits of NSW Government central agencies. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet, and Finance, Services and Innovation clusters. While clear audit opinions were issued on all agency financial statements, the report notes that some complex accounting requirements caused significant errors in agency financial statements submitted for audit, which were corrected before the financial statements were approved. 

This report analyses the results of our audits of the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Finance, Services and Innovation cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report provides parliament and other users of the NSW Government's central agencies and their cluster agencies financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations
  • liquidity risk management
  • government financial services.

The central agencies and their key responsibilities are set out below.

Central agencies Key central agency responsibilities Cluster responsibilities
The Treasury
  • Financial and economic advisor to NSW Government
  • Manages the NSW Government’s financial resources.

The cluster:

  • provides investment and debt management services though TCorp
  • manages residual business arising from privatisation of government businesses
  • provides insurance and compensation cover, including workers compensation insurance
  • includes NSW Government superannuation funds.
Department of Premier and Cabinet
  • Drives NSW Government’s objectives and sets targets
  • Works with clusters to coordinate policy and achieve NSW Government priorities.

The cluster:

  • includes integrity agencies, such as the Independent Commission Against Corruption, Audit Office of NSW and Ombudsman’s Office
  • other agencies, such as Barangaroo Delivery Authority and Infrastructure NSW.
Department of Finance, Services and Innovation
  • Supports agency service delivery in relation to the key enabling functions of NSW Government, including procurement, property and asset management, ICT and digital innovation.

The cluster:

  • is responsible for state revenue and rental bond administration
  • regulates statutory insurance schemes, workplace safety and consumer protection
  • provides access to a range of NSW Government services via Service NSW
  • manages the NSW Government communications network.
Public Service Commission
  • Works to promote and maintain a strong ethical culture across the government sector and improve the capabilities, performance and configuration of the sector’s workforce to deliver better services to the public.
  • The Public Service Commission is an independent agency within the Premier and Cabinet cluster.

Note: The Audit Office of NSW is an independent agency included in the Premier and Cabinet cluster for administrative purposes, but not commented on in this report.


A full list of agencies that this report covers by relevant cluster is included in Appendix three.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Finance, Services and Innovation clusters for 2018.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
2.1 Quality of financial reporting
Unqualified opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements submitted to the Audit Office.

Complex accounting requirements caused significant errors in some agency financial statements, which were corrected before the financial statements were approved.
Sufficient audit evidence was obtained to conclude the financial statements were free of material misstatement.
Recommendation: Agencies should respond to key accounting issues when they are identified by preparing accounting papers and engaging with Treasury, the Audit Office and their Audit and Risk Committee when these matters are identified.
2.2 Timeliness of financial reporting
Most agencies complied with the statutory timeframe for completion of early close procedures, 48 agencies in the Treasury cluster did not comply with the statutory requirement to prepare financial statements, and the audits of nine agencies in the Treasury cluster were not completed within the statutory timeframe.
All financial statement information of the 48 agencies that did not prepare financial statements has been captured in the consolidated financial statements of their parent entity, which was subject to audit.
Early close procedures allow financial reporting issues and risks to be addressed early in the audit process. The timeliness of financial reporting can be improved by performing more robust early close procedures.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:

  • our financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Finance, Services and Innovation cluster for 2018
  • the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office work program.

The Audit Office work program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each of the NSW Government clusters.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
3.1 Internal controls
The 2017–18 audits found one high risk issue and 83 moderate risk issues across the agencies. Nineteen per cent of all issues were repeat issues. Agencies should focus on rectifying repeat issues.
The high risk issue at Service NSW related to several deficiencies in procurement and contract management processes. Service NSW may not be achieving value-for-money
from their procurement and contract management activities. The high risk issue should be rectified as a matter of priority. This includes updating and implementing its procurement, vendor and contract management frameworks and delivering training to key staff involved in procurement and contract management activities.
Property NSW has implemented several controls during the year to rectify the high risk issue identified last year related to its transition to a new property and facility management service provider. However, the service providers performance remains below expectations and there are further opportunities to improve oversight and lift performance. Property NSW can better define roles and accountabilities with the service provider and formalise policies and processes associated with its monitoring and oversight of the service provider.

Implementing relevant KPIs, receiving timely reports and providing timely review and feedback to the service provider may help to lift performance.
GovConnect received unqualified opinions from their service auditor on all business process controls, except for information technology controls provided by Unisys, where a qualified opinion was received from the service auditor. A qualified opinion was received because of several deficiencies in user access controls. These internal control deficiencies increase the risk of unauthorised access to key business systems, and increase audit effort and costs associated with addressing the risks arising from the deficiencies.
3.2 Audit Office annual work program

Remediation of the Barangaroo site is now estimated to cost the Barangaroo Delivery Authority in excess of net $400 million.
 
The increase in the estimate over the last five years is mainly due to the extent of remediation required, as more evidence of contamination has become known.

Measuring the remaining costs to remediate requires the use of estimation techniques and judgements, making the actual outcome inherently uncertain. We reviewed evidence to support the provision for remediation, including future costs estimates and this evidence supported management’s estimate.
The State Insurance Regulatory Authority have administered the refund of $138 million in Green slip refunds to policy holders through Service NSW during 2017–18. At 30 June 2018, $112 million in refunds are yet to be claimed.
 
We reviewed the systems and processes supporting the refund process. While we found that this supports the disbursement of refunds to policyholders there were some deficiencies in Service NSW’s project controls when the program was being developed.

 
Service NSW should apply the lessons learnt from this program to other programs it is delivering or will be delivering for agencies.
Revenue NSW recorded $30.4 billion from taxes, fines and fees in 2017–18 ($30.0 billion in 2016–17) to support the State’s finances. 
 
Crown revenue has steadily increased over the last five years predominately driven by rises in payroll tax and land tax and responsibility for collection of the Emergency Services Levy transferring to Revenue NSW under the Emergency Services Levy Act 2017 effective from July 2017. 
3.3 Managing maintenance
Place Management NSW manages significant commercial and retail leases and maintains public domain spaces and other assets around the harbour foreshore. It has consistently underspent its asset maintenance budget. In 2017–18, asset maintenance expenses were only 34 per cent of budgeted maintenance expense.

Currently, Place Management NSW does not use any ratios or benchmarks to determine the adequacy of its maintenance spend or to monitor whether it is achieving its budgeted maintenance program. 
This may be contributing to a high proportion of unplanned maintenance, which Place Management NSW reports was 38 per cent of total maintenance expense in 2017–18.

Place Management NSW is outsourcing its property and facilities management function from 1 December 2018 to an external service provider. 
 

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations specific to NSW Government agencies providing financial services.

Observation Conclusions and recommendation
5.1 Superannuation funds
The SAS Trustee Corporation (STC) Pooled Fund and the Parliamentary Contributory Superannuation (PCS) Fund are not required to comply with the prudential and reporting standards issued by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA). 
However, legislation allows the responsible Minister to prescribe prudential standards, reporting and audit requirements. 
Structured and comprehensive prudential oversight of these Funds is important as they operate in a volatile financial sector, have 103,000 members and manage investments of $43.3 billion.
Recommendation: Treasury should consult with the Trustees of the STC Pooled Fund and PCS Fund to prescribe appropriate prudential standards and requirements, including oversight arrangements.
5.2 Insurance and compensation
Nominal Insurer and NSW Self Insurance Corporation investment performance marginally exceeded benchmark over the past five years. Investment returns can impact on the premiums required to maintain an adequate funding ratio in addition to other factors such as claims experience and discount rates.
The Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer (Nominal Insurer) and NSW Self Insurance Corporation's net collected premiums and contributions decreased over the past five years.  The insurance schemes' investment performance and stable claim payments have enabled less reliance on net collected premiums and contributions as a source of funding, over the past five years. 
Reforms were introduced to manage the Home Warranty Scheme's financial sustainability risks.  The Home Warranty Scheme has not collected sufficient premiums to fund expected claims costs, since commencing operations in 2011. In 2017–18, the Crown contributed $181 million for historical shortfalls. New reforms started on 1 January 2018 enabling the Scheme to price premiums based on risk. 

Published

Actions for Managing Antisocial behaviour in public housing

Managing Antisocial behaviour in public housing

Community Services
Asset valuation
Infrastructure
Regulation
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

The Department of Family and Community Services (FACS) has not adequately supported or resourced its staff to manage antisocial behaviour in public housing according to a report released today by the Deputy Auditor-General for New South Wales, Ian Goodwin. 

In recent decades, policy makers and legislators in Australian states and territories have developed and implemented initiatives to manage antisocial behaviour in public housing environments. All jurisdictions now have some form of legislation or policy to encourage public housing tenants to comply with rules and obligations of ‘good neighbourliness’. In November 2015, the NSW Parliament changed legislation to introduce a new approach to manage antisocial behaviour in public housing. This approach is commonly described as the ‘strikes’ approach. 

When introduced in the NSW Parliament, the ‘strikes’ approach was described as a means to:

  • improve the behaviour of a minority of tenants engaging in antisocial behaviour 
  • create better, safer communities for law abiding tenants, including those who are ageing and vulnerable.

FACS has a number of tasks as a landlord, including a responsibility to collect rent and organise housing maintenance. FACS also has a role to support tenants with complex needs and manage antisocial behaviour. These roles have some inherent tensions. The FACS antisocial behaviour management policy aims are: 

to balance the responsibilities of tenants, the rights of their neighbours in social housing, private residents and the broader community with the need to support tenants to sustain their public housing tenancies.

This audit assessed the efficiency and effectiveness of the ‘strikes’ approach to managing antisocial behaviour in public housing environments.

We examined whether:

  • the approach is being implemented as intended and leading to improved safety and security in social housing environments
  • FACS and its partner agencies have the capability and capacity to implement the approach
  • there are effective mechanisms to monitor, report and progressively improve the approach.
Conclusion

FACS has not adequately supported or resourced its staff to implement the antisocial behaviour policy. FACS antisocial behaviour data is incomplete and unreliable. Accordingly, there is insufficient data to determine the nature and extent of the problem and whether the implementation of the policy is leading to improved safety and security

FACS management of minor and moderate incidents of antisocial behaviour is poor. FACS has not dedicated sufficient training to equip frontline housing staff with the relevant skills to apply the antisocial behaviour management policy. At more than half of the housing offices we visited, staff had not been trained to:

  • conduct effective interviews to determine whether an antisocial behaviour complaint can be substantiated

  • de escalate conflict and manage complex behaviours when required

  • properly manage the safety of staff and tenants

  • establish information sharing arrangements with police

  • collect evidence that meets requirements at the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal

  • record and manage antisocial behaviour incidents using the information management system HOMES ASB.

When frontline housing staff are informed about serious and severe illegal antisocial behaviour incidents, they generally refer them to the FACS Legal Division. Staff in the Legal Division are trained and proficient in managing antisocial behaviour in compliance with the policy and therefore, the more serious incidents are managed effectively using HOMES ASB. 


FACS provides housing services to most remote townships via outreach visits from the Dubbo office. In remote townships, the policy is not being fully implemented due to insufficient frontline housing staff. There is very limited knowledge of the policy in these areas and FACS data shows few recorded antisocial behaviour incidents in remote regions. 


The FACS information management system (HOMES ASB) is poorly designed and has significant functional limitations that impede the ability of staff to record and manage antisocial behaviour. Staff at most of the housing offices we visited were unable to accurately record antisocial behaviour matters in HOMES ASB, making the data incorrect and unreliable.

Published

Actions for Regulation of water pollution in drinking water catchments and illegal disposal of solid waste

Regulation of water pollution in drinking water catchments and illegal disposal of solid waste

Environment
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Regulation
Risk

There are important gaps in how the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) implements its regulatory framework for water pollution in drinking water catchments and illegal solid waste disposal. This limits the effectiveness of its regulatory responses, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford.

The NSW Environment Protection Authority (the EPA) is the State’s primary environmental regulator. The EPA regulates waste and water pollution under the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (the Act) through its licensing, monitoring, regulation and enforcement activities. The community should be able to rely on the effectiveness of this regulation to protect the environment and human health. The EPA has regulatory responsibility for more significant and specific activities which can potentially harm the environment.

Activities regulated by the EPA include manufacturing, chemical production, electricity generation, mining, waste management, livestock processing, mineral processing, sewerage treatment, and road construction. For these activities, the operator must have an EPA issued environment protection licence (licence). Licences have conditions attached which may limit the amount and concentrations of substances the activity may produce and discharge into the environment. Conditions also require the licensee to report on its licensed activities.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the EPA’s regulatory response to water pollution in drinking water catchments and illegal solid waste disposal. The findings and recommendations of this review can be reasonably applied to the EPA’s other regulatory functions, as the areas we examined were indicative of how the EPA regulates all pollution types and incidents.

 
Conclusion
There are important gaps in how the EPA implements its regulatory framework for water pollution in drinking water catchments and illegal solid waste disposal which limit the effectiveness of its regulatory response. The EPA uses a risk-based regulatory framework that has elements consistent with the NSW Government Guidance for regulators to implement outcomes and risk-based regulation. However, the EPA did not demonstrate that it has established reliable practices to accurately and consistently detect the risk of non compliances by licensees, and apply consistent regulatory actions. This may expose the risk of harm to the environment and human health.
The EPA also could not demonstrate that it has effective governance and oversight of its regulatory operations. The EPA operates in a complex regulatory environment where its regional offices have broad discretions for how they operate. The EPA has not balanced this devolved structure with an effective governance approach that includes appropriate internal controls to monitor the consistency or quality of its regulatory activities. It also does not have an effective performance framework that sets relevant performance expectations and outcome-based key performance indicators (KPIs) for its regional offices. 
These deficiencies mean that the EPA cannot be confident that it conducts compliance and enforcement activities consistently across the State and that licensees are complying with their licence conditions or the Act.
The EPA's reporting on environmental and regulatory outcomes is limited and most of the data it uses is self reported by industry. It has not set outcome-based key result areas to assess performance and trends over time. 
The EPA uses a risk-based regulatory framework for water pollution and illegal solid waste disposal but there are important gaps in implementation that reduce its effectiveness.
Elements of the EPA’s risk-based regulatory framework for water pollution and illegal solid waste disposal are consistent with the NSW Government Guidance for regulators to implement outcomes and risk-based regulation. There are important gaps in how the EPA implements its risk-based approach that limit the effectiveness of its regulatory response. The EPA could not demonstrate that it effectively regulates licensees because it has not established reliable practices that accurately and consistently detect licence non compliances or breaches of the Act and enforce regulatory actions.
The EPA lacks effective governance arrangements to support its devolved regional structure. The EPA's performance framework has limited and inconclusive reporting on regional performance to the EPA’s Chief Executive Officer or to the EPA Board. The EPA cannot assure that it is conducting its regulatory responsibilities effectively and efficiently. 
The EPA does not consistently evaluate its regulatory approach to ensure it is effective and efficient. For example, there are no set requirements for how EPA officers conduct mandatory site inspections, which means that there is a risk that officers are not detecting all breaches or non-compliances. The inconsistent approach also means that the EPA cannot rely on the data it collects from these site inspections to understand whether its regulatory response is effective and efficient. In addition, where the EPA identifies instances of non compliance or breaches, it does not apply all available regulatory actions to encourage compliance.
The EPA also does not have a systematic approach to validate self-reported information in licensees’ annual returns, despite the data being used to assess administrative fees payable to the EPA and its regulatory response to non-compliances. 
The EPA does not use performance frameworks to monitor the consistency or quality of work conducted across the State. The EPA has also failed to provide effective guidance for its staff. Many of its policies and procedures are out-dated, inconsistent, hard to access, or not mandated.
Recommendations
By 31 December 2018, to improve governance and oversight, the EPA should:
1. implement a more effective performance framework with regular reports to the Chief Executive Officer and to the EPA Board on outcomes-based key result areas that assess its environmental and regulatory performance and trends over time
By 30 June 2019, to improve consistency in its practices, the EPA should:
2. progressively update and make accessible its policies and procedures for regulatory operations, and mandate procedures where necessary to ensure consistent application
3. implement internal controls to monitor the consistency and quality of its regulatory operations. 
The EPA does not apply a consistent approach to setting licence conditions for discharges to water.
The requirements for setting licence conditions for water pollution are complex and require technical and scientific expertise. In August 2016, the EPA approved guidance developed by its technical experts in the Water Technical Advisory Unit to assist its regional staff. However, the EPA did not mandate the use of the guidance until mid-April 2018. Up until then, the EPA had left discretion to regional offices to decide what guidance their staff use. This meant that practices have differed across the organisation. The EPA is yet to conduct training for staff to ensure they consistently apply the 2016 guidance.
The EPA has not implemented any appropriate internal controls or quality assurance process to monitor the consistency or quality of licence conditions set by its officers across the State. This is not consistent with good regulatory practice.
The triennial 2016 audit of the Sydney drinking water catchment report highlighted that Lake Burragorang has experienced worsening water quality over the past 20 years from increased salinity levels. The salinity levels were nearly twice as high as in other storages in the Sydney drinking water catchment. The report recommended that the source and implication of the increased salinity levels be investigated. The report did not propose which public authority should carry out such an investigation. 
To date, no NSW Government agency has addressed the report's recommendation. There are three public authorities, the EPA, DPE and WaterNSW that are responsible for regulating activities that impact on water quality in the Sydney drinking water catchment, which includes Lake Burragorang. 
Recommendation
By 30 June 2019, to address worsening water quality in Lake Burragorang, the EPA should:
4. (a) review the impact of its licensed activities on water quality in Lake Burragorang, and
  (b) develop strategies relating to its licensed activities (in consultation with other relevant NSW Government agencies) to improve and maintain the lake's water quality.
The EPA’s risk-based approach to monitoring compliance of licensees has limited effectiveness. 
The EPA tailors its compliance monitoring approach based on the performance of licensees. This means that licensees that perform better have a lower administrative fee and fewer mandatory site inspections. 
However, this approach relies on information that is not complete or accurate. Sources of information include licensees’ annual returns, EPA site inspections and compliance audits, and pollution reports from the public. 
Licensees report annually to the EPA on their performance, including compliance against their licence conditions. The Act contains significant financial penalties if licensees provide false and misleading information in their annual returns. However, the EPA does not systematically or consistently validate information self-reported by licensees, or consistently apply regulatory actions if it discovers non-compliance. 
Self-reported compliance data is used in part to assess a licensed premises’ overall environmental risk level, which underpins the calculation of the administrative fee, the EPA’s site inspection frequency, and the licensee’s exposure to regulatory actions. It is also used to assess the load-based licence fee that the licensee pays.
The EPA has set minimum mandatory site inspection frequencies for licensed premises based on its assessed overall risk level. This is a key tool to detect non-compliance or breaches of the Act. However, the EPA has not issued a policy or procedures that define what these mandatory inspections should cover and how they are to be conducted. We found variations in how the EPA officers in the offices we visited conducted these inspections. The inconsistent approach means that the EPA does not have complete and accurate information of licensees’ compliance. The inconsistent approach also means that the EPA is not effectively identifying all non-compliances for it to consider applying appropriate regulatory actions.
The EPA also receives reports of pollution incidents from the public that may indicate non-compliance. However, the EPA has not set expected time frames within which it expects its officers to investigate pollution incidents. The EPA regional offices decide what to investigate and timeframes. The EPA does not measure regional performance regarding timeframes. 
The few compliance audits the EPA conducts annually are effective in identifying licence non-compliances and breaches of the Act. However, the EPA does not have a policy or required procedures for its regulatory officers to consistently apply appropriate regulatory actions in response to compliance audit findings. 
The EPA has not implemented any effective internal controls or quality assurance process to check the consistency or quality of how its regulatory officers monitor compliance across the State. This is not consistent with good regulatory practice.
Recommendations
To improve compliance monitoring, the EPA should implement procedures to:
5. by 30 June 2019, validate self-reported information, eliminate hardcopy submissions and require licensees to report on their breaches of the Act and associated regulations in their annual returns
6. by 31 December 2018, conduct mandatory site inspections under the risk-based licensing scheme to assess compliance with all regulatory requirements and licence conditions.
 
The EPA cannot assure that its regulatory enforcement approach is fully effective.
The EPA’s compliance policy and prosecution guidelines have a large number of available regulatory actions and factors which should be taken into account when selecting an appropriate regulatory response. The extensive legislation determining the EPA’s regulatory activities, and the devolved regional structure the EPA has adopted in delivering its compliance and regulatory functions, increases the risk of inconsistent compliance decisions and regulatory responses. A good regulatory framework needs a consistent approach to enforcement to incentivise compliance. 
The EPA has not balanced this devolved regional structure with appropriate governance arrangements to give it assurance that its regulatory officers apply a consistent approach to enforcement.
The EPA has not issued standard procedures to ensure consistent non-court enforcement action for breaches of the Act or non-compliance with licence conditions. Given our finding that the EPA does not effectively detect breaches and non-compliances, there is a risk that it is not applying appropriate regulatory actions for many breaches and non-compliances.
A recent EPA compliance audit identified significant non-compliances with incident management plan requirements. However, the EPA has not applied regulatory actions for making false statements on annual returns for those licensees that certified their plans complied with such requirements. The EPA also has not applied available regulatory actions for the non-compliances which led to the false or misleading statements.
Recommendation
By 31 December 2018 to improve enforcement, the EPA should:
7. Implement procedures to systematically assess non-compliances with licence conditions and breaches of the Act and to implement appropriate and consistent regulatory actions.
The EPA has implemented the actions listed in the NSW Illegal Dumping Strategy 2014–16. To date, the EPA has also implemented four of the six recommendations made by the ICAC on EPA's oversight of Regional Illegal Dumping Squads.
The EPA did not achieve the NSW Illegal Dumping Strategy 2014–16 target of a 30 per cent reduction in instances of large scale illegal dumping in Sydney, the Illawarra, Hunter and Central Coast from 2011 levels. 
In the reporting period, the incidences of large scale illegal dumping more than doubled. The EPA advised that this increase may be the result of greater public awareness and reporting rather than increased illegal dumping activity. 
By June 2018, the EPA is due to implement one outstanding recommendation made by the ICAC but has not set a time for the other outstanding recommendation.  

Published

Actions for Managing risks in the NSW public sector: risk culture and capability

Managing risks in the NSW public sector: risk culture and capability

Finance
Health
Justice
Treasury
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk
Workforce and capability

The Ministry of Health, NSW Fair Trading, NSW Police Force, and NSW Treasury Corporation are taking steps to strengthen their risk culture, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford. 'Senior management communicates the importance of managing risk to their staff, and there are many examples of risk management being integrated into daily activities', the Auditor-General said.

We did find that three of the agencies we examined could strengthen their culture so that all employees feel comfortable speaking openly about risks. To support innovation, senior management could also do better at communicating to their staff the levels of risk they are willing to accept.

Effective risk management is essential to good governance, and supports staff at all levels to make informed judgements and decisions. At a time when government is encouraging innovation and exploring new service delivery models, effective risk management is about seizing opportunities as well as managing threats.

Over the past decade, governments and regulators around the world have increasingly turned their attention to risk culture. It is now widely accepted that organisational culture is a key element of risk management because it influences how people recognise and engage with risk. Neglecting this ‘soft’ side of risk management can prevent institutions from managing risks that threaten their success and lead to missed opportunities for change, improvement or innovation.

This audit assessed how effectively NSW Government agencies are building risk management capabilities and embedding a sound risk culture throughout their organisations. To do this we examined whether:

  • agencies can demonstrate that senior management is committed to risk management
  • information about risk is communicated effectively throughout agencies
  • agencies are building risk management capabilities.

The audit examined four agencies: the Ministry of Health, the NSW Fair Trading function within the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation, NSW Police Force and NSW Treasury Corporation (TCorp). NSW Treasury was also included as the agency responsible for the NSW Government's risk management framework.

Conclusion
All four agencies examined in the audit are taking steps to strengthen their risk culture. In these agencies, senior management communicates the importance of managing risk to their staff. They have risk management policies and funded central functions to oversee risk management. We also found many examples of risk management being integrated into daily activities.
That said, three of the four case study agencies could do more to understand their existing risk culture. As good practice, agencies should monitor their employees’ attitude to risk. Without a clear understanding of how employees identify and engage with risk, it is difficult to tell whether the 'tone' set by the executive and management is aligned with employee behaviours.
Our survey of risk culture found that three agencies could strengthen a culture of open communication, so that all employees feel comfortable speaking openly about risks. To support innovation, senior management could also do better at communicating to their staff the levels of risk they are willing to accept.
Some agencies are performing better than others in building their risk capabilities. Three case study agencies have reviewed the risk-related skills and knowledge of their workforce, but only one agency has addressed the gaps the review identified. In three agencies, staff also need more practical guidance on how to manage risks that are relevant to their day-to-day responsibilities.
NSW Treasury provides agencies with direction and guidance on risk management through policy and guidelines. Its principles-based approach to risk management is consistent with better practice. Nevertheless, there is scope for NSW Treasury to develop additional practical guidance and tools to support a better risk culture in the NSW public sector. NSW Treasury should encourage agency heads to form a view on the current risk culture in their agencies, identify desirable changes to that risk culture, and take steps to address those changes. 

In assessing an agency’s risk culture, we focused on four key areas:

Executive sponsorship (tone at the top)

In the four agencies we reviewed, senior management is communicating the importance of managing risk. They have endorsed risk management frameworks and funded central functions tasked with overseeing risk management within their agencies.

That said, we found that three case study agencies do not measure their existing risk culture. Without clear measures of how employees identify and engage with risk, it is difficult for agencies to tell whether employee's behaviours are aligned with the 'tone' set by the executive and management.

For example, in some agencies we examined we found a disconnect between risk tolerances espoused by senior management and how these concepts were understood by staff.

Employee perceptions of risk management

Our survey of staff indicated that while senior leaders have communicated the importance of managing risk, more could be done to strengthen a culture of open communication so that all employees feel comfortable speaking openly about risks. We found that senior management could better communicate to their staff the levels of risk they should be willing to accept.

Integration of risk management into daily activities and links to decision-making

We found examples of risk management being integrated into daily activities. On the other hand, we also identified areas where risk management deviated from good practice. For example, we found that corporate risk registers are not consistently used as a tool to support decision-making.

Support and guidance to help staff manage risks

Most case study agencies are monitoring risk-related skills and knowledge of their workforce, but only one agency has addressed the gaps it identified. While agencies are providing risk management training, surveyed staff in three case study agencies reported that risk management training is not adequate.

NSW Treasury provides agencies with direction and guidance on risk management through policy and guidelines. In line with better practice, NSW Treasury's principles-based policy acknowledges that individual agencies are in a better position to understand their own risks and design risk management frameworks that address those risks. Nevertheless, there is scope for NSW Treasury to refine its guidance material to support a better risk culture in the NSW public sector.

Recommendation

By May 2019, NSW Treasury should:

  • Review the scope of its risk management guidance, and identify additional guidance, training or activities to improve risk culture across the NSW public sector. This should focus on encouraging agency heads to form a view on the current risk culture in their agencies, identify desirable changes to that risk culture, and take steps to address those changes.

Published

Actions for Detecting and responding to cyber security incidents

Detecting and responding to cyber security incidents

Finance
Cyber security
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Workforce and capability

A report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, found there is no whole-of-government capability to detect and respond effectively to cyber security incidents. There is very limited sharing of information on incidents amongst agencies, and some agencies have poor detection and response practices and procedures.

The NSW Government relies on digital technology to deliver services, organise and store information, manage business processes, and control critical infrastructure. The increasing global interconnectivity between computer networks has dramatically increased the risk of cyber security incidents. Such incidents can harm government service delivery and may include the theft of information, denial of access to critical technology, or even the hijacking of systems for profit or malicious intent.

This audit examined cyber security incident detection and response in the NSW public sector. It focused on the role of the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation (DFSI), which oversees the Information Security Community of Practice, the Information Security Event Reporting Protocol, and the Digital Information Security Policy (the Policy).

The audit also examined ten case study agencies to develop a perspective on how they detect and respond to incidents. We chose agencies that are collectively responsible for personal data, critical infrastructure, financial information and intellectual property.

Conclusion
There is no whole‑of‑government capability to detect and respond effectively to cyber security incidents. There is limited sharing of information on incidents amongst agencies, and some of the agencies we reviewed have poor detection and response practices and procedures. There is a risk that incidents will go undetected longer than they should, and opportunities to contain and restrict the damage may be lost.
Given current weaknesses, the NSW public sector’s ability to detect and respond to incidents needs to improve significantly and quickly. DFSI has started to address this by appointing a Government Chief Information Security Officer (GCISO) to improve cyber security capability across the public sector. Her role includes coordinating efforts to increase the NSW Government’s ability to respond to and recover from whole‑of‑government threats and attacks.

Some of our case study agencies had strong processes for detection and response to cyber security incidents but others had a low capability to detect and respond in a timely way.

Most agencies have access to an automated tool for analysing logs generated by their IT systems. However, coverage of these tools varies. Some agencies do not have an automated tool and only review logs periodically or on an ad hoc basis, meaning they are less likely to detect incidents.

Few agencies have contractual arrangements in place for IT service providers to report incidents to them. If a service provider elects to not report an incident, it will delay the agency’s response and may result in increased damage.

Most case study agencies had procedures for responding to incidents, although some lack guidance on who to notify and when. Some agencies do not have response procedures, limiting their ability to minimise the business damage that may flow from a cyber security incident. Few agencies could demonstrate that they have trained their staff on either incident detection or response procedures and could provide little information on the role requirements and responsibilities of their staff in doing so.

Most agencies’ incident procedures contain limited information on how to report an incident, who to report it to, when this should occur and what information should be provided. None of our case study agencies’ procedures mentioned reporting to DFSI, highlighting that even though reporting is mandatory for most agencies their procedures do not require it.

Case study agencies provided little evidence to indicate they are learning from incidents, meaning that opportunities to better manage future incidents may be lost.

Recommendations

The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should:

  • assist agencies by providing:
    • better practice guidelines for incident detection, response and reporting to help agencies develop their own practices and procedures
    • training and awareness programs, including tailored programs for a range of audiences such as cyber professionals, finance staff, and audit and risk committees
    • role requirements and responsibilities for cyber security across government, relevant to size and complexity of each agency
    • a support model for agencies that have limited detection and response capabilities
       
  • revise the Digital Information Security Policy and Information Security Event Reporting Protocol by
    • clarifying what security incidents must be reported to DFSI and when
    • extending mandatory reporting requirements to those NSW Government agencies not currently covered by the policy and protocol, including State owned corporations.

DFSI lacks a clear mandate or capability to provide effective detection and response support to agencies, and there is limited sharing of information on cyber security incidents.

DFSI does not currently have a clear mandate and the necessary resources and systems to detect, receive, share and respond to cyber security incidents across the NSW public sector. It does not have a clear mandate to assess whether agencies have an acceptable detection and response capability. It is aware of deficiencies in agencies and across whole‑of‑government, and has begun to conduct research into this capability.

Intelligence gathering across the public sector is also limited, meaning agencies may not respond to threats in a timely manner. DFSI has not allocated resources for gathering of threat intelligence and communicating it across government, although it has begun to build this capacity.

Incident reporting to DFSI is mandatory for most agencies, however, most of our case study agencies do not report incidents to DFSI, reducing the likelihood of containing an incident if it spreads to other agencies. When incidents have been reported, DFSI has not provided dedicated resources to assess them and coordinate the public sector’s response. There are currently no formal requirements for DFSI to respond to incidents and no guidance on what it is meant to do if an incident is reported. The lack of central coordination in incident response risks delays and increased damage to multiple agencies.

DFSI's reporting protocol is weak and does not clearly specify what agencies should report and when. This makes agencies less likely to report incidents. The lack of a standard format for incident reporting and a consistent method for assessing an incident, including the level of risk associated with it, also make it difficult for DFSI to determine an appropriate response.

There are limited avenues for sharing information amongst agencies after incidents have been resolved, meaning the public sector may be losing valuable opportunities to improve its protection and response.

Recommendations

The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should:

  • develop whole‑of‑government procedure, protocol and supporting systems to effectively share reported threats and respond to cyber security incidents impacting multiple agencies, including follow-up and communicating lessons learnt
  • develop a means by which agencies can report incidents in a more effective manner, such as a secure online template, that allows for early warnings and standardised details of incidents and remedial advice
  • enhance NSW public sector threat intelligence gathering and sharing including formal links with Australian Government security agencies, other states and the private sector
  • direct agencies to include standard clauses in contracts requiring IT service providers report all cyber security incidents within a reasonable timeframe
  • provide assurance that agencies have appropriate reporting procedures and report to DFSI as required by the policy and protocol by:
    • extending the attestation requirement within the DISP to cover procedures and reporting
    • reviewing a sample of agencies' incident reporting procedures each year.

Published

Actions for Justice 2016

Justice 2016

Justice
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Fraud
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Procurement
Project management
Risk

Overcrowding in the NSW prison system continues to worsen along with the backlog of cases in the District Court, according to a report released by the New South Wales Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford on the annual financial statements audits in the Justice cluster.

Published

Actions for Family and Community Services 2016

Family and Community Services 2016

Community Services
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Fraud
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Project management
Risk

The Family and Community Services report was released today by the Acting Deputy Auditor-General. Financial reporting within the cluster continues to improve but there are opportunities to improve governance and performance reporting.

Published

Actions for Fraud Survey

Fraud Survey

Education
Community Services
Finance
Health
Industry
Justice
Local Government
Planning
Premier and Cabinet
Transport
Treasury
Universities
Whole of Government
Environment
Fraud
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Procurement
Risk

In a report released today, the NSW Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford provides a snapshot of reported fraud in the NSW public sector and an analysis of NSW Government agencies’ fraud controls based on a survey of 102 agencies.

Published

Actions for Finance, Services and Innovation 2016

Finance, Services and Innovation 2016

Finance
Asset valuation
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Project management
Risk

This report analyses the results of the financial statement audits of the Finance, Services and Innovation cluster entities for the year ended 30 June 2016.