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Actions for Managing growth in the NSW prison population

Managing growth in the NSW prison population

Justice
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Project management
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

The Department of Justice has relied heavily on temporary responses to accommodate growing prisoner numbers according to a report released today by the Acting Auditor-General for New South Wales, Ian Goodwin.

At the time of this audit, the NSW Department of Justice (DOJ) was responsible for delivering custodial corrections services in New South Wales through its Corrective Services NSW division (Corrective Services NSW). From 1 July 2019, the Department of Family and Community Services and Justice will be responsible for these functions. 

Within DOJ, Corrective Services NSW is responsible for administering sentences and legal orders through custodial and community-based management of adult offenders. Its key priorities are:

  • providing safe, secure and humane management of prisoners
  • reducing reoffending
  • improving community safety and confidence in the justice system. 

The prison population in New South Wales grew by around 40 per cent between 2012 to 2018, from 9,602 to 13,630 inmates. This rate of growth was higher than experienced prior to 2012. DOJ forecasts growth to continue over the short and longer-term. 

DOJ has responded to inmate population growth by doubling-up and tripling-up the number of prison beds in cells, reactivating previously closed prisons, and a $3.8 billion program of new prison capacity. DOJ has also developed a long-term prison infrastructure strategy that projects long-term needs and recommended investments to meet these needs. 

This audit assessed how efficiently and effectively DOJ is responding to growth in the NSW prison population. In this report, we have not analysed the sources of demand or recommended ways that custody may be avoided. These are largely government policy issues. 

Conclusion
The DOJ has relied heavily on temporary responses to accommodate growth in the NSW prison population. Sustained reliance on these responses is inefficient and creates risks to safety, and timely access to prisoner support services.
DOJ has experienced significant growth in the prison population since 2012. To meet demand, it has relied on temporary responses that are not designed to be sustained, including doubling-up or tripling-up the number of beds in cells, reopening previously closed facilities and using obsolete facilities. DOJ has also regularly moved inmates between its facilities to accommodate the increasing need for beds in metropolitan Sydney. 
Relying on temporary approaches over a long period contributes to prison crowding and has affected DOJ's ability to manage inmates in line with its correctional principles. It has increased risks to staff and prisoner safety, and timely inmate access to prisoner support services and programs. In addition, the cost per prisoner per day increased over the past two years.
DOJ is progressively delivering new capacity to address the growing prison population.
In response to continuing and projected growth in the prison population, the NSW Government announced a one-off $3.8 billion program to deliver around 6,100 beds by May 2021. Under the program, DOJ developed and delivered two rapid build dormitory style prisons within 18 months. DOJ’s capability to deliver the program, including implementation of new beds and new prisons, governance, project management, risk assessment and commissioning has improved over time. Most new capacity will be delivered on existing DOJ sites, mainly in regional New South Wales. 
DOJ has developed a strategy to respond to long-term projected growth in the prison population, but it has yet to be funded. 
The Corrective Services NSW Infrastructure Strategy (CSIS) sets out challenges, strategic priorities, and planned actions to respond to projected growth over the next 20 years and improve overall system efficiency and effectiveness. But, proposed actions are subject to individual business cases and funding decisions. Three versions of the CSIS have been provided to, and endorsed by, the NSW Government. The key challenge identified in the CSIS is to overcome demand for prison beds in the Sydney metropolitan region. DOJ advised that it is developing a final business case to address metropolitan capacity needs, but this is subject to government approval and funding. DOJ should continue to highlight the urgency of this issue until it is addressed, as it prevents planned actions to improve system efficiency and effectiveness.
 

The Productivity Commission’s Report on Government Services outlines the performance indicator framework for corrective services in Australia (Appendix three). We have used measures from this framework to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of DOJ’s responses to prison bed capacity needs. 

In this section, we analyse system-wide indicators as DOJ has not consistently published or reported data for individual correctional centres over the period of review.
 

Published

Actions for Governance of Local Health Districts

Governance of Local Health Districts

Health
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration

The main roles, responsibilities and relationships between Local Health Districts (LHDs), their Boards and the Ministry of Health are clear and understood, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. However, there are opportunities to achieve further maturity in the system of governance and the audit report recommended a series of actions to further strengthen governance arrangements.

Fifteen Local Health Districts (LHDs) are responsible for providing public hospital and related health services in NSW. LHDs are:

  • established as statutory corporations under the Health Services Act 1997 to manage public hospitals and provide health services within defined geographical areas
  • governed by boards of between six and 13 people appointed by the Minister for Health
  • managed by a chief executive who is appointed by the board with the concurrence of the Secretary of NSW Health
  • accountable for meeting commitments made in annual service agreements with the NSW Ministry of Health.

The NSW Ministry of Health (the Ministry) is the policy agency for the NSW public health system, providing regulatory functions, public health policy, as well as managing the health system, including monitoring the performance of hospitals and health services.

The current roles and responsibilities of LHDs and the Ministry, along with other agencies in NSW Health, were established in 2011 following a series of reforms to the structure and governance of the system. These reforms began with the report of the 'Special Commission of Inquiry into Acute Care Services in NSW Public Hospitals' ('the Garling Inquiry'), which was released in 2008, and were followed by reforms announced by the incoming coalition government in 2011.

These reforms were intended to deliver greater local decision making, including better engagement with clinicians, consumers, local communities, and other stakeholders in the primary care (such as general practitioners) and non-government sectors.

The reforms empowered LHDs by devolving some management and accountability from the Ministry for the delivery of health services in their area. LHDs were made accountable for meeting annual obligations under service agreements.

This audit assessed the efficiency and effectiveness of the governance arrangements for LHDs. We answered two questions:

  • Are there clear roles, responsibilities and relationships between the Ministry of Health and LHDs and within LHDs?
  • Does the NSW Health Performance Framework establish and maintain accountability, oversight and strategic guidance for LHDs?
Conclusion
Main roles, responsibilities and relationships between LHDs, their boards, and the Ministry of Health are clear and understood, though there is opportunity to achieve further maturity in the system of governance for LHDs.
Main roles and responsibilities are clear and understood by local health district (LHD) board members and staff, Ministry of Health executive staff, and key stakeholders. However, there is some ambiguity for more complex and nuanced functions. A statement of principles to support decision making in a devolved system would help to ensuring that neither LHDs or the Ministry 'over-reach' into areas that are more appropriately the other's responsibility.
Better clinician engagement in LHD decision making was a key driver for devolution. This engagement has not met the expectations of devolution and requires attention as a priority.
Relationships between system participants are collaborative, though the opportunity should be taken to further embed this in the system structures and processes and complement existing interpersonal relationships and leadership styles.
Accountability and oversight mechanisms, including the Health Performance Framework and Service Agreements, have been effective in establishing accountability, oversight and strategic guidance for LHDs.
The Health Performance Framework and Service Agreements have underpinned a cultural shift toward greater accountability and oversight. However, as NSW Health is a large, complex and dynamic system, it is important that these accountability and oversight mechanisms continue to evolve to ensure that they are sufficiently robust to support good governance.
There are areas where accountability and oversight can be improved including:
  • continued progress in moving toward patient experience, outcome, and quality and safety measures
  • improving the Health Performance Framework document to ensure it is comprehensive, clear and specifies decision makers
  • greater clarity in the nexus between underperformance and escalation decisions
  • including governance-related performance measures
  • more rigour in accountability for non-service activity functions, including consumer and community engagement
  • ensuring that performance monitoring and intervention is consistent with the intent of devolution. 
There is clear understanding of the main roles and responsibilities of LHDs and the Ministry of Health under the structural and governance reforms introduced in 2011. Strongly collaborative relationships provide a good foundation on which governance arrangements can continue to mature, though there is a need to better ensure that clinicians are involved in LHD decision making.

NSW Health is large and complex system, operating in a dynamic environment. The governance reforms introduced in 2011 were significant and it is reasonable that they take time to mature.

The main roles of LHDs and the Ministry are clear and well-understood, and there is good collaboration between different parts of the system. This provides a sound foundation on which to further mature the governance arrangements of LHDs.

While the broad roles of LHDs, their boards, and the Ministry are well understood by stakeholders in the system, there are matters of detail and complexity that create ambiguity and uncertainty, including:

  • the roles and relationships between the LHDs and the Pillars
  • to what extent LHDs have discretion to pursue innovation
  • individual responsibility and obligations between chairs, boards, executive staff, and the Ministry.

These should be addressed collaboratively between boards, their executives, and the Ministry, and should be informed by a statement of principles that guides how devolved decision making should be implemented.

Better clinician engagement in health service decision making was a key policy driver for devolution. Priority should be given by LHDs and the Ministry to ensuring that clinicians are adequately engaged in LHD decision making. It appears that in many cases they are not, and this needs to be addressed.

The quality of board decision making depends on the information they are provided and their capacity to absorb and analyse that information. More can be done to promote good decision making by improving the papers that go to boards, and by ensuring that board members are well positioned to absorb the information provided. This includes ensuring that the right type and volume of information are provided to boards, and that members and executive managers have adequate data literacy skills to understand the information.

Recommendations

  1. By December 2019, the Ministry of Health should:
     
    1. work with LHDs to identify and overcome barriers that are limiting the appropriate engagement of clinicians in decision making in LHDs
    2. develop a statement of principles to guide decision making in a devolved system
    3. provide clarity on the relationship of the Agency for Clinical Innovation and the Clinical Excellence Commission to the roles and responsibilities of LHDs.
       
  2. By June 2020, LHDs boards, supported where appropriate by the Ministry of Health, should address the findings of this performance audit to ensure that local practices and processes support good governance, including:
     
    1. providing timely and consistent induction; training; and reviews of boards, members and charters
    2. ensuring that each board's governance and oversight of service agreements is consistent with their legislative functions
    3. improving the use of performance information to support decision making by boards and executive managers.
Accountability and oversight mechanisms, including the Health Performance Framework and service agreements, have been effective in establishing accountability, oversight and strategic guidance for LHDs. They have done this by driving a cultural shift that supports LHDs being accountable for meeting their obligations. These accountablity and oversight mechanisms must continue to evolve and be improved.

This cultural shift has achieved greater recognition of the importance of transparency in how well LHDs perform. However, as NSW Health is a large, complex and dynamic system, it is important that these accountability and oversight mechanisms continue to evolve to ensure that they are sufficiently robust to support good governance.

There are areas where accountability and oversight can be improved including:

  • continued progress in moving toward patient experience, outcome and value-based measures
  • improving the Health Performance Framework document to ensure it is comprehensive, clear and specifies decision makers
  • greater clarity in the nexus between underperformance and escalation decisions
  • by adding governance-related performance measures to service agreements
  • more rigour in accountability for non-service activity functions, such as consumer and community engagement
  • ensuring that performance monitoring and intervention is consistent with the intent of devolution.

Recommendations

3.    By June 2020, the Ministry of Health should improve accountability and oversight mechanisms by:

a)    revising the Health Performance Framework so that it is a cohesive and comprehensive document
b)    clarifying processes and decision making for managing performance concerns
c)    developing a mechanism to adequately hold LHDs accountable for non-service activity functions
d)    reconciling performance monitoring and intervention with the policy intent of devolution.

Published

Actions for Firearms regulation

Firearms regulation

Justice
Management and administration

There are gaps in how the Firearms Registry administers the firearms licencing and registration scheme for existing licence holders, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. These gaps reduce the Registry’s effectiveness in regulating firearms use and ownership. 

While the Firearms Registry has systems to promptly update details in the firearms register for changes in firearm ownership and for criminal or anti-social behaviour of licence holders, some key information, including addresses, is not accurate or up-to date. 'This exposes a critical gap in the Registry’s data on the location of licence holders and their firearms,' Ms Crawford said. 

The Firearms Registry may also be making unsound or inconsistent administrative decisions due to a lack of clear internal policies and guidance. These decisions include licence suspensions or revocations, assessing reasons for the acquisition of firearms, and initiating enforcement actions for breaches by licence holders. Ms Crawford noted that 'these gaps mean the Registry cannot be confident it conducts aspects of its licencing activities effectively.'

The report’s recommendations aim to improve the integrity of the data in the register and ensure that the Firearms Registry is making sound and consistent decisions in regulating firearms use and ownership.

Firearms used by the general public in NSW are regulated through the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW) (the Act) and the Firearms Regulation 2017 (NSW) (Regulation). In October 2018, there were over 237,500 firearm licence holders and just over one million registered firearms in NSW.

The Act and Regulation reflect the National Firearms Agreement reached by all Australian jurisdictions in 1996 and confirmed in 2017. This Agreement sets out the minimum requirements for regulating firearms. The Act recognises that possessing and using firearms are privileges conditional on the overriding need to ensure public safety.

The NSW Police Force (NSW Police), which includes the Firearms Registry (the Registry), is responsible for administering the Act and Regulation, and for operating the NSW firearms licensing and registration scheme. Relevant third parties such as approved clubs, firearms dealers and shooting ranges also carry some administrative and oversight responsibilities under the Act and Regulation.

The role of the Registry includes administering the following requirements under the Act and Regulation that are relevant to this audit:

  • licence conditions
  • licence suspensions and revocations
  • initiating seizure of firearms
  • assessing permits to acquire firearms
  • administering the good reason test
  • maintaining the register of firearms
  • approving alternative safe storage arrangements.

The Registry's other activities identified in this report support its regulatory responsibilities under the NSW Government framework for better regulation.

This audit assessed how well the Registry administers the requirements of the Act and Regulation for existing firearms licence holders. To effectively administer these requirements, the Registry should have:

  • a reliable database that supports the firearms licensing and registration scheme
  • appropriate risk-based policies and procedures for the Registry’s operation that are consistent with the Act and Regulation.

We did not assess the Registry’s processes in assessing and issuing firearms licences to new applicants or renewing licences of existing licence holders. We also did not examine the administrative actions conducted by police officers who are not part of the Registry.

See Section 1 for details on the role of the Registry. See Appendix six for details of the audit.

Conclusion
There are gaps in how the Registry administers important requirements for existing licence holders which reduce the Registry’s ability to take an effective risk-based approach to regulating firearm ownership.
The Registry has some good processes to monitor and apply changes to the register.
The Registry is promptly advised of the sale of firearms or potential criminal or anti-social behaviour activity of licence holders and it promptly updates relevant information in the register.
Information in the register is not accurate or up-to-date.
Licence holders do not always advise the Registry of their address changes within the time required. The Registry does not have processes to efficiently identify these changes if not advised. This exposes a critical gap in the Registry's data on the location of some firearms. While the Registry has implemented a number of programs for checking the accuracy of data in the register, some of these programs have either ceased or been severely curtailed. For example, the Registry was conducting various checks on the accuracy of the data relating to the description of firearms in the register and correcting errors. These checks ceased after July 2017, with only around 50 per cent of the register checked.

There is an increased risk of the Registry making unsound or inconsistent administrative decisions.
The Registry lacks appropriate policies and guidance for important administrative decisions and sanctions. These include making decisions about licence suspensions and revocations, assessing good reasons for acquiring firearms, and initiating some enforcement actions. There is also limited review of these critical decisions.
Regulatory context
The Commissioner of Police’s response to this report (Appendix one) indicates he disagrees with some of our findings and recommendations based on his view that the firearms licensing and registration scheme is a ‘co-regulatory model’. The conclusion and recommendations of this report are based on the provisions in the Act which indicate that the Commissioner, and through him the NSW Police Force (including the Firearms Registry), is the responsible regulator. We acknowledge that other stakeholders have obligations to undertake certain actions in accordance with the Act and Regulation. This is further discussed below. 

To effectively administer the requirements of the Act and Regulation, the register that supports the firearms licensing and registration scheme should have readily accessible, accurate and up-to-date information regarding the status of licence holders and registered firearms.

Published

Actions for Compliance of expenditure with Section 12A of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 - Law Enforcement Conduct Commission

Compliance of expenditure with Section 12A of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 - Law Enforcement Conduct Commission

Justice
Compliance
Management and administration

The Hon. Troy Grant MP, Minister for Police and Minister for Emergency Services requested an audit under section 27B(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983, to determine whether expenditure on overseas travel by the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission (the Commission) complied with section 12A of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983.

On 9 November 2018, the Hon. Troy Grant MP, Minister for Police and Minister for Emergency Services (the Minister), requested an audit under s. 27B(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 (the PF&A Act) to determine whether the expenditure of $8,074.66 on overseas travel by the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission (the LECC) complied with s. 12A of the PF&A Act.

In forming my audit conclusion, I have reviewed documentation provided by the Minister and the LECC, made enquiries of LECC staff, and sought independent legal advice on key aspects of the PF&A Act and the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission Act 2016 (the LECC Act) and their interface.
 

In my opinion, the LECC did not comply with s. 12A of the PF&A Act because the Minister:

  • had not delegated his authority to approve expenditure for overseas travel to an officer in the LECC
  • had specifically declined approving a request from the LECC to incur expenditure on the travel in question.

Despite this, the LECC incurred the expenditure.

In my view, the LECC required the Minister’s approval to incur the overseas travel expenditure before it could legally spend funds for this purpose from its appropriation.

The LECC is an independent investigative body, funded by appropriation, to oversight NSW Police and the Crime Commission 

The Bill to establish the LECC was introduced to parliament following a review of the police oversight system.1 The establishment of the LECC drew together functions previously undertaken by the Police Integrity Commission, the Ombudsman and the Inspector of the Crime Commission. It aimed to ‘remove overlapping responsibilities, inefficiencies and failures’ and ‘create a single civilian law enforcement oversight body’.2 

Part 4 of the LECC Act sets out the functions of the Commission as an independent investigative body. The objects of the LECC Act are summarised in Appendix one. The LECC Act provides that the Minister cannot direct the LECC on how to perform its functions. 

Notably, s. 22 of the LECC Act states:

The Commission and Commissioners are not subject to the control or direction of the Minister in the exercise of their functions.

For the financial year ended 30 June 2018, under s. 22 of the Appropriation Act 2017 (NSW), $21,195,000 was appropriated to the Minister for the LECC’s services. This provided the statutory basis for the sum in question to be drawn from the Consolidated Fund, but only in accordance with the PF&A Act.

The PF&A Act is the legislation that governs the administration of public finances

The PF&A Act determines how expenditure is to occur and sets out the conditions under which such expenditure can occur in NSW public sector agencies.The LECC is an agency within the NSW public sector.

Section 12A of the PF&A Act stipulates that:

A Minister to whom a sum of money is appropriated out of the Consolidated Fund for a use or purpose (whether by an annual Appropriation Act or other Act) may delegate to another Minister or to an officer of any authority, or authorise another Minister to delegate to an officer of any authority, the committing or incurring of expenditure from the sum so appropriated.

Section 12 of the PF&A Act also stipulates that:

Expenditure shall be committed or incurred by an officer of an authority only within the limits of a delegation in writing conferred on the officer by a person entitled to make the delegation.

The relevant ‘authority’ in this case was the Office of the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission (Office of the LECC) - a body which, under the Government Sector Employment Act 2013 (the GSE Act)employs the staff of the LECC.

Prima facie, as the LECC is funded by appropriation and is subject to the PF&A Act, its officers can only commit or incur expenditure with a delegation from the Minister.

The Minister did not delegate his right to approve expenditure on overseas travel

In April 2017, the Minister approved the LECC’s financial delegations under the authority vested in him by s. 12A of the PF&A Act. However, he reserved his right to approve any expenditure on overseas travel. This effectively required the LECC to obtain his approval for each instance of such expenditure.

The Minister declined approval of a LECC request for an officer to travel overseas 

In August 2017, the Chief Commissioner sought the Minister’s approval to incur overseas travel expenditure. The Minister exercised his right under the PF&A Act to decline the request and confirmed this in writing:

Establishment of LECC being in its infancy, travel is not supported at this time. Operating priorities should be the focus at this time.

The LECC paid the overseas travel expenses without a delegation or Ministerial approval

In October 2017, despite the absence of a delegation or approval from the Minister to incur expenditure on overseas travel, the Chief Commissioner approved a total of $8,074.66 for the LECC’s Director of Covert Services to travel to, and attend an international conference.

The LECC booked and paid for the travel in four payments between October and December 2017. Over the same period the Chief Commissioner reimbursed the agency for these expenses from his personal funds. On 13 October 2017, the Chief Commissioner wrote to the Minister asking him to reconsider his decision. On 12 January 2018, in the absence of a response from the Minister, the Chief Commissioner directed the LECC’s finance officer to ‘repay the relevant costs to my account’.5 On 16 January 2018, the LECC’s Chief Executive Officer approved the reimbursement to the Chief Commissioner, which occurred on 17 January 2018. Appendix three provides further detail on the series of payments. 

The Chief Commissioner first disclosed he had been reimbursed for the expenses, without Ministerial approval, in March 2018. In August 2018, the Chief Commissioner made a further disclosure about the expenditure at Budget Estimates.6

The Chief Commissioner argues the overseas travel expenditure was properly incurred

The Chief Commissioner argues the LECC’s overseas travel expenditure was properly incurred because:

  • the travel was undertaken in pursuit of the detective and investigative functions specified in s. 26(b)(i) of Part 4 of the LECC Act7  
  • a specific reservation in public policy cannot be qualified by general rules of public policy.8 The Chief Commissioner argues s. 22 of the LECC Act is a specific provision that conflicts with the general provisions in ss. 12 and 12A of the PF&A Act. In his view, the conflict is resolved by applying the principle that a specific later provision effectively repeals an earlier general provision. In his view, the LECC Act contains a specific provision that the Minister cannot direct the LECC in exercising its functions, whereas the PF&A Act contains general provisions which deal with the spending of public money.

The Chief Commissioner believes the Minister’s decision7:

  • was not made in the bona fide exercise of the power conferred on him by the PF&A Act as it interfered with the management of the LECC’s operating priorities
  • and his failure to enquire into the operational situation of the LECC were not decisions a rational decision maker could have made
  • was made for an improper purpose and was biased, in that the Minister had approved expenditure for a member of NSW Police to travel to the conference, but denied the same to a member of the LECC, which oversights NSW Police
  • breached s. 22 of the LECC Act, because it directed the LECC Commissioners in the exercise of their functions.

The Crown Solicitor and Solicitor General advised the expenditure breached the PF&A Act

On 7 September 2017, the Crown Solicitor advised the Office of Police (part of the Department of Justice) that:

The Minister’s authority to determine whether or not to approve a particular expenditure from the amount appropriated from the Consolidated Fund for the purpose of the Commission under the Constitution Act 1902 and the PF&A Act is not affected by s.22 of the LECC Act. These have different spheres of operation. It is not unusual for otherwise independent bodies to be subject to restrictions with respect to the use of public moneys.9

Subsequently, the Crown Solicitor asked the Solicitor General to review the matter of her previous advice. On 14 December 2017, the Solicitor General concurred with the Crown Solicitor’s advice. He concluded that:

Although LECC has a high degree of independence under its legislation, it is a body operating in the public sector and within the context of the broad policies of the government of the day in relation to public administration... it is not a function of LECC or its Commissioners to deal directly with money appropriated to the Minister out of the Consolidated Fund.10

The Secretary of the Department of Justice forwarded the Crown Solicitor’s and the Solicitor General’s advice to the Chief Commissioner.11 The Chief Commissioner continues to contest the Crown Solicitor’s and the Solicitor General’s advice.12

The Minister referred the matter to the Inspector of the LECC

In August 2018, the Minister referred the Chief Commissioner’s disclosure in Budget Estimates13 that he had been personally reimbursed for an expense concerning overseas travel by an officer of the LECC, to the Inspector of the LECC (the Inspector).14 The Inspector is the person, under s. 122 of the LECC Act, responsible for 'auditing the operation of the Commission for the purpose of monitoring compliance with the law of the State'. On 4 September 2018, the Inspector recused himself from investigating the Minister’s complaint.15 In his letter to the Premier dated 19 September 2018, he wrote ‘I informed the Minister for Police that I had acquired information in my capacity as Inspector of LECC (and in the discharge of my statutory functions) prior to receiving his letter of complaint…’. He further suggested to the Minister and the Premier that an Assistant Inspector be appointed to investigate the complaint under s. 121(1) of the LECC Act to give ‘proper and independent’ consideration to the Minister’s complaint.16 

The Minister asks the Auditor General to audit the transaction’s compliance with the PF&A Act

An Assistant Inspector appointed under section 121 of the LECC Act can exercise any function of the Inspector, including ‘auditing the operations of the Commission’. The reasons why an Assistant Inspector was not appointed to investigate the matter are not apparent. Instead, on 9 November 2018, the Minister requested the Auditor General to conduct an audit of whether the expenditure complied with s. 12A of the PF&A Act.17


1  By the former shadow Attorney General, Mr Andrew Tink AM.
2  Second reading speech of Minister Troy Grant for the LECC Bill.
3  Per the definition of ‘authority’ in s. 4(1) of the PF&A Act and the definition of ‘Public Service agency’ in s. 3 of the GSE Act and Part 3 of Schedule 1 to the GSE Act.
4  A timeline of the key events relevant to this audit is set out in Appendix two.
5  Note from the Chief Commissioner to LECC’s finance officer.
7  Letter from the Chief Commissioner to the Secretary of the Department of Justice 24 November 2017.
8  Letter from the Chief Commissioner to the Auditor‑General 12 December 2018.
9  Crown Solicitor’s advice ‑ NSW Parliamentary website.
10  Solicitor‑General’s advice ‑ NSW Parliamentary website.
11  The Chief Commissioner acknowledged receipt of the Crown Solicitor’s and Solicitor‑General’s advice on 24 November 2017 and 26 February 2018 respectively.
12  Letter from the Chief Commissioner to the Auditor‑General 12 December 2018.
14  Letter from the Minister to the Hon. Terry Buddin SC, Inspector of the LECC.
15  Letter from the Hon. Terry Buddin SC, Inspector of the LECC to the Minister 4 September 2018.
16  Letter from the Hon. Terry Buddin to the Premier 19 September 2018.
17  Ss. 12 and12A of the PF&A Act were repealed by the Government Sector Finance Legislation (Repeal and Amendment) Act 2018 Schedule 2[5] and re‑enacted as s5.2 of the Government Sector Finance Act 2018. However, these provisions were the law at the time of the events.

In forming my adverse conclusion, I considered the Chief Commissioner’s argument that s. 22 of the LECC Act prevailed over those sections of the PF&A Act that deal with spending public money, and:

  • the principles of statutory interpretation that might apply when a potential conflict between a general provision in one Act and specific provisions in another exists
  • whether an apparent conflict exists
  • whether the Chief Commissioner was entitled to incur the expenditure without Ministerial approval
  • whether the Minister was lawfully entitled to withhold approval for the expenditure from the Chief Commissioner.

The principles of statutory interpretation apply where potential conflicts exist between Acts

A basic principle of statutory interpretation is that all legislation be given its full scope and effect. Courts, and thereby other interpreters, are not at liberty to consider any word or meaning as superfluous. The starting point is that all words must be given some meaning and effect.18 If there is an apparent conflict between two Acts, the pieces of legislation should be read in such a way as to avoid that conflict by giving the words the construction that produces the greatest harmony and the least inconsistency.19

One way conflict can be avoided is to apply the approach that a later general provision does not override an earlier specific provision.20 However, this approach is rebuttable, as a later general Act might also be said to qualify an earlier specific Act.21 The reverse can also apply, in that a later specific Act can be claimed to qualify or supersede an earlier general provision. In such a case, it is said that the later Act impliedly repeals the earlier. This is an easier case to make out because it is apparent the parliament has dealt with the specific instance and it would be reasonable to expect that it had considered any contrary general legislation. However, here again, the courts have qualified this approach by suggesting it should be presumed unlikely that a parliament would intend to contradict itself. If the specific Act was intended to qualify an earlier general Act, then the legislation would have spelt this out.

One must therefore always start from the premise that all words are to be given meaning and effect, and that meaning should enable both pieces of legislation to operate. It is only where the point is reached that it is not possible for both pieces of legislation to operate to their full extent that the approaches to resolving conflicts can be usefully invoked. The approaches may then be useful to determine which is the primary provision and which provision must give way to the requirements set out in that primary provision.

Is there an apparent conflict between the LECC Act and the PF&A Act that needs to be resolved?

No. The LECC Act deals specifically with the operational functions of the LECC, while the PF&A Act deals with the specific issue of expenditure by a delegate of the Minister. 

The Chief Commissioner argues that s. 22 of the LECC Act is a specific provision and should take precedence over general delegation provisions in the PF&A Act, namely ss. 12 and 12A. He argues this because s. 22 deals specifically with the operation of the LECC and prohibits the Minister from directing the LECC in the performance of its functions. In his view, this includes the administrative and financial functions impliedly invested in the LECC for it to perform the specific functions referred to in the LECC Act.

However, it can also be readily argued that s. 22 of the LECC Act deals with the general issue of Minister's directions to the LECC and the PF&A deals with the specific issue of expenditure by a delegate of the Minister. While the expenditure of funds may be essential for the LECC to perform its functions, that expenditure is controlled by the PF&A Act, as it controls all expenditure from the Consolidated Fund. The PF&A Act is the specific legislation that relates to expenditure.

The issues that have arisen can be resolved by looking at the effect of the two Acts in their application to the facts. In my view, the PF&A Act and the LECC Act can be applied to the facts under consideration as they deal with different issues and are thereby capable of separate operation. 

Was the LECC able to incur expenditure without Ministerial approval?

No. The PF&A Act applies to the LECC in the same way it applies to all NSW Government agencies. While the Minister had approved the LECC’s financial delegations under the authority vested in him by s. 12A of the PF&A Act, he reserved his right to approve all expenditure on overseas travel. This effectively required the LECC to obtain his approval for each instance of such expenditure. As the Minister did not approve the overseas travel request, the Chief Commissioner was not legally able to authorise the expenditure.

The PF&A Act determines how expenditure is to occur and sets out the conditions under which such expenditure can occur in New South Wales public sector agencies. Expenditure can ‘only be committed or incurred by an officer of an authority within the limits of a delegation in writing conferred on the officer by a person entitled to make the delegation’.22

Was the Minister lawfully entitled to withhold approval of the overseas travel expenditure?

Yes. If one accepts the premise that the PF&A Act determines the basis on which public money can be spent, it follows that the Minister could exercise the discretion reserved to him by financial delegation and withhold approval of the overseas travel expenditure for the LECC officer.

Section 22 of the LECC Act prevents the Minister from directing the LECC to send (or not to send) an officer to a conference. However, the Minister did not direct the LECC as to whether the person should or should not attend the conference. Rather, he exercised the responsibility given to him to determine how public funds were to be spent.

The appropriation to the LECC provided funding to the delegate of the Minister to support the performance of the agency’s functions. However, the expenditure of money for overseas travel was governed by ss. 12 and 12A of the PF&A Act. This gave the Minister discretion to approve or refuse to approve expenditure for overseas travel on a case by case basis. It follows from this that the Chief Commissioner was not entitled to spend money for overseas travel, even though in the Commissioner’s view it was beneficial to the performance of the LECC’s functions.

It may be suggested that the Minister’s refusal to provide funding for a particular function may have the same effect as directing an agency not to perform that function. NSW’s constitutional structure of government establishes that public money can only be spent in accordance with legislation and if expenditure requires a Minister’s approval, that approval establishes the ability of an agency to spend that money. That said, in reserving approval for certain types of expenditures, care should be exercised not to unduly interfere with the legitimate functions of independent agencies.


18  Commonwealth v Baume (1905) 2 CLR 405 per Griffith CJ at 414.
19  Australian Alliance Assurance Co Ltd v Attorney‑General (Qld) [1916] St R Qld 135 at 161.
20  Maybury v Plowman (1913) 16 CLR 468 at 473‑4 the approach is often described within the Latin tag (generalia specialibus non derogant).
21  Associated Minerals Consolidated Ltd v Wyong Shire Council [1974] 2 NSWLR 681 at 686.
22  Section 12(1) of the PF&A Act.
 

This assurance audit is a ‘direct engagement’ whereby the Auditor‑General provides the Minister and parliament with reasonable assurance about whether $8,074.66 spent on overseas travel by the LECC complied, in all material respects with s. 12A of the PF&A Act.

My audit was conducted in accordance with applicable Standards on Assurance Engagements (ASAE 3100 ‘Compliance Engagements’).

In conducting my audit, I have complied with:

  • the independence requirements of Australian Auditing and Assurance Standards
  • ASQC 1 ‘Quality Control for firms that Perform Audits and Reviews of Financial Reports and Other Financial Information, Other Assurance Engagements and Related Service Engagements’
  • relevant ethical pronouncements.

Parliament promotes independence by ensuring the Auditor‑General and the Audit Office of New South Wales are not compromised in their roles by:

  • providing that only parliament, and not the executive government, can remove an Auditor‑General
  • mandating the Auditor‑General as auditor of public sector agencies
  • precluding the Auditor‑General from providing non‑audit services.

I have reviewed documentation provided by the Minister and the LECC, gained an understanding of the LECC’s controls and processes for approving and making expenditure and made enquiries of LECC staff. I have also:

  • gained an understanding of the relevant pieces of legislation and case law
  • reviewed the advice of the Crown Solicitor and the Solicitor‑General
  • sought independent legal advice on key aspects of the PF&A Act and the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission Act 2016 (the LECC Act) from an acknowledged expert in statutory interpretation
  • conducted interviews with key persons
  • reviewed the documentation listed in Appendix four.

Published

Actions for Transport Access Program

Transport Access Program

Transport
Infrastructure
Project management
Service delivery

The following report is available in an Easy English version that is intended to meet the needs of some people with lower literacy skills, some people with an intellectual disability and some people from different cultural backgrounds.

View the Easy English version of the Transport Access Program report

Transport for NSW’s process for selecting and prioritising projects for the third stage of its Transport Access Program balanced compliance with national disability standards with broader customer outcomes. Demographics, deliverability and value for money were also considered. However, Transport for NSW does not know the complete scope of work required for full compliance, limiting its ability to demonstrate that its approach is effective, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford.

Access to transport is critical to ensuring that people can engage in all aspects of community life, including education, employment and recreation. People with disability can encounter barriers when accessing public transport services. In 2015, there were 1.37 million people living with disability in New South Wales.

Accessible public transport is about more than physical accessibility. It also means barrier-free access for people who have vision, hearing or cognitive impairments. All users, not just people with disability, benefit from improvements to the accessibility and inclusiveness of transport services. 

Transport for NSW has an obligation under Australian Government legislation to provide accessible services to people with disabilities in a manner which is not discriminatory. Under the Disability Standards for Accessible Public Transport 2002 (the DSAPT - an instrument of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (the Act) (Commonwealth)), there is a requirement to modify and develop new infrastructure, means of transport and services to provide access for people with disabilities. All public transport operators are required to ensure that at least 90 per cent of their networks met DSAPT by December 2017 and the networks will need to be 100 per cent compliant with all parts of the standards by 31 December 2022. Trains are not required to be fully compliant with DSAPT until December 2032. 

The Transport Access Program (TAP) is Transport for NSW's largest program with a specific focus on improving access to public transport for people with disability. The TAP is a series of projects to upgrade existing public transport infrastructure across four networks: Sydney Trains, Intercity Trains, Regional Trains and Sydney Ferries. Transport for NSW established the TAP as a rolling program and, to date, it has delivered the first tranche of TAP (TAP 1) and is completing the final projects for the second tranche (TAP 2). NSW budget papers estimate that by 30 June 2018, Transport for NSW had spent $1.2 billion in the TAP since its commencement in 2011-12.

After the completion of TAP 1 and TAP 2 (as well as through other transport infrastructure programs), Transport for NSW estimates that 58.5 per cent of the Sydney Trains, Regional Trains and Intercity Trains networks, and 66 per cent of the Sydney Ferries network, will be accessible. To close the significant gap in compliance with the DSAPT target, the objective for TAP 3 is ‘to contribute to Disability Discrimination Act 1992 related targets through DSAPT compliance upgrades’. 

The audit assessed whether Transport for NSW has an effective process to select and prioritise projects as part of the TAP, with a specific focus on the third tranche of TAP funding.

In August 2018, at the commencement of this audit, Transport for NSW intended to complete the selection of projects for the TAP 3 final business case in December 2018. Transport for NSW advise that it now intends to complete the development stage and final business case in the first quarter of 2019, prior to the final investment decision of the TAP program. This report is based on the TAP 3 strategic business case and information provided by Transport for NSW up to December 2018.

Conclusion
Transport for NSW’s process for selecting and prioritising projects for TAP 3 balanced DSAPT compliance goals with broader customer outcomes. It also considered demographics, deliverability and value for money. However, Transport for NSW does not know the complete scope of work required for full DSAPT compliance, and this limits its ability to demonstrate that its approach is effective. 
Transport for NSW has applied most of the external review recommendations from previous funding rounds to the implementation of the third round of TAP funding (TAP3), with positive results. Changes made include a clear objective for TAP 3 to focus on improving compliance, improved governance arrangements, and better consideration of deliverability and design during project planning. 
Through TAP 3, Transport for NSW is also trying to better address disability access in a way that balances DSAPT compliance with other considerations - such as population demographics, access to services and value for money. Transport for NSW developed an objective prioritisation and selection methodology to assess projects for TAP 3 funding. 
Transport for NSW cannot quantify the work needed to meet DSAPT compliance targets across the rail and ferry networks as it has not completed a comprehensive audit of compliance. This information is needed to ensure the effective targeting of funding, and to measure the contribution of TAP 3 work to meeting the DSAPT compliance targets. Instead, Transport for NSW has undertaken a phased approach to completing a comprehensive audit of compliance across the networks, with a focus on first assessing compliance at locations that are not wheelchair accessible. This creates two problems. First, Transport for NSW does not know the complete scope of work required to achieve DSAPT compliance. Second, not all wheelchair accessible locations fully meet DSAPT standards.
Transport for NSW's proposed communication plan for the schedule of TAP 3 funded works does not align with its Disability Inclusion Action Plan 2018-2022. The Disability Inclusion Action Plan commits Transport for NSW to providing a full list of stations and wharves to be upgraded with their estimated time of construction when the next round of funding, TAP 3, is announced. Given the long timeframes associated with improving transport infrastructure, this information is important as it allows people to make informed decisions about where they live, work or study. Instead, Transport for NSW plans to communicate information to customers on a project by project basis.

In 2015, there were 1.37 million people living with disability in New South Wales. Access to transport is critical to ensuring that people can engage in all aspects of community life, including education, employment and recreation. People with disability can encounter barriers when accessing public transport services. 

The social model of disability, outlined in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, views people with disability as not disabled by their impairment but by the barriers in the community and environment that restrict their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others. 

Accessible public transport is more than the provision of physical access to premises and conveyances, it provides barrier-free access for people who have vision, hearing or cognitive impairments. All users, not just people with disability, benefit from improvements to the accessibility and inclusiveness of transport services.

According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the main types of difficulties experienced by people with disability when using public transport relate to steps (39.9 per cent), difficulty getting to stops and stations (25 per cent), fear and anxiety (23.3 per cent) and lack of seating or difficulty standing (20.7 per cent).

Transport for NSW has a Disability Inclusion Action Plan (the Action Plan) 2018-2022 that sets an overall framework for planning, delivering and reporting on initiatives to increase accessibility of the transport network. It covers all elements of the journey experienced when using public transport, including journey planning, staff training, customer services and interaction between the physical environment and modes of transport. Appendix five outlines the guiding principles of the Action Plan.

Transport for NSW's Transport Social Policy branch developed the Action Plan in consultation with internal and external stakeholders. The director of the Transport Social Policy branch is a member of the TAP executive steering committee, which supports alignment between the Action Plan and TAP.

Transport for NSW's Disability Inclusion Action Plan describes a customer focussed approach to accessibility

One of the guiding principles of the Action Plan is ‘intelligent compliance’. Transport for NSW describes this as compliance that prioritises customer-focused outcomes over a narrow focus on legal compliance with accessibility standards. As well as being compliant, infrastructure should be practical, usable, fit for purpose and convenient. 

The TAP prioritisation and selection methodology reflects Transport for NSW’s focus on intelligent compliance. We consider this a reasonable approach as had Transport for NSW focussed exclusively on achieving compliance with the DSAPT targets by upgrading the most affordable infrastructure, some locations, that are used by more customers, would remain inaccessible to people with disability. However, this approach should not be seen as an alternative to Transport for NSW meeting its DSAPT compliance obligations.

TAP program staff consult with the Accessible Transport Advisory Committee

The Accessible Transport Advisory Committee (ATAC) has representatives from disability and ageing organisations, who provide expert guidance to Transport for NSW on access and inclusion. The ATAC provide guidance and feedback on projects and project solutions, including user testing where appropriate. TAP program staff provide regular updates at ATAC meetings, which include briefings on progress. The ATAC also provides feedback and suggestions to TAP program staff, which is considered and sometimes included in current and future projects.For example, in March 2017 the TAP program team briefed the ATAC on the challenges with respect to a number of ferry wharves and sought support for DSAPT exemptions proposed in the TAP 3 strategic business case.

Case study: Feedback on Braille lettering for lift buttons
In June 2018, the Program team sought feedback on a variety of lift button options to improve accessibility on future TAP projects. In September 2018, during the ATAC meeting attended by the Audit Office, the program team sought feedback on the standard designs for TAP 3. Some ATAC members noted that the standard design included Braille lettering on the lift buttons, and that this was not good practice because people can accidently press the button while reading it. As a result, Transport for NSW are incorporating this feedback into design requirements for the lifts for TAP 3, which will consider larger buttons, clearer Braille and Braille signage adjacent to the button.

Transport for NSW has not briefed the Advisory Committee on the outcome of the prioritisation and selection process

TAP program staff briefed the Advisory Committee about the prioritisation and selection methodology, after the Minister approved it in 2016. However, Transport for NSW have not briefed or consulted the Advisory Committee on the outcome of the prioritisation process. Infrastructure NSW noted this issue during its review of the strategic business case. 

Transport for NSW advised us that it established the ATAC as an advisory group, and that Transport for NSW does not disclose sensitive information to it. Transport for NSW intends to share the outcome of the prioritisation process following the completion of the TAP 3 development stage and final investment decision.

The TAP communication plan does not fully meet the requirements of the Disability Inclusion Action Plan

The Disability Inclusion Action Plan includes an action item to ‘provide a listing of stations and wharves to be upgraded with estimated time of construction as each new tranche of the Transport Access Program is announced’ The TAP Communication Plan that we reviewed does not include this provision instead focussing on communication on a per project basis. Given the long timeframes associated with improving transport infrastructure, this information is important as it allows people to make informed decisions about where they live, work or study.

Published

Actions for Property Asset Utilisation

Property Asset Utilisation

Finance
Asset valuation
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Project management

Property NSW’s effectiveness in managing NSW Government owned and leased commercial office property is limited in three areas according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford.

At 30 June 2018, the NSW Government owned $160 billion worth of land and buildings. The NSW Treasury predicts this figure will rise over the coming years. Property NSW manages more than 900 leased office properties across the state. Approximately 250 of these are owned by Property NSW. Other NSW Government agencies maintain ownership and control of properties considered essential for service provision, such as schools, prisons and hospitals. Between 2012–13 and 2017–18 sales of property assets across the whole of the NSW Government have raised $10 billion, of which Property NSW has sold property assets of approximately $2 billion.

In September 2012, the Property Asset Utilisation Taskforce (the Taskforce) released its report on ‘real property asset management across government’ and concluded that the government has accumulated, over time, ‘a real property asset portfolio it cannot afford to maintain or protect’. The Taskforce noted that ‘a lack of centralised information seriously inhibits any whole-of-government strategic asset planning’ and that maintaining under-utilised or unnecessary properties diverted funds from areas where they might be better used. The Taskforce’s key findings included:

  • the NSW Government should own property only as a means to deliver or enhance services
  • many government properties were under-utilised, poorly maintained and inappropriate to support service delivery.

The Taskforce recommended the creation of Property NSW, as a replacement for the State Property Authority, to improve property asset utilisation and to drive efficiencies in the government’s owned and leased property portfolio. Property NSW was to achieve these goals by:

  • collating property information across the whole-of-government
  • working with agencies on longer-term strategic real property asset planning to:
    • provide services to agencies as customers
    • bring a whole-of-government perspective to real property asset planning.

In response to the Taskforce report, in December 2012, the Premier's Memorandum M2012-20 (the Memorandum) established Property NSW to improve the management of the NSW Government's owned and leased real property portfolio.

Under the Memorandum, Property NSW is responsible for:

  • management of all leased and owned commercial office accommodation
  • acting as the central acquisition and disposal agency 
  • providing advice to the government on property matters and developing property policy 
  • conducting regular and ongoing reviews of agencies portfolios, working with agencies to identify efficiencies to improve service delivery, in relation to the review of capital planning1
  • maintaining the register of all government owned property.

The Memorandum states that ownership of all commercial office property should be vested in Property NSW. 

This audit assessed whether Property NSW is effective in the management of NSW Government owned and leased commercial office property. To do this we assessed whether NSW Government leased commercial office space is being effectively utilised and whether the Government Property Register, a register of all government owned property, is accurate and up-to-date.

Conclusion
Property NSW’s effectiveness in managing NSW Government owned and leased commercial office property is limited in three areas.
First, Property NSW has not comprehensively reviewed many agency property portfolios to help agencies identify assets, including commercial office properties, that could be better utilised or recycled. Second, the Government Property Register is not being actively maintained and contains incomplete and inaccurate information, limiting Property NSW’s ability to use it to support strategic decisions about the use of government property assets. Third, Property NSW's decisions are not well documented and its processes to reach decisions are not transparent to stakeholders. That said, property utilisation has improved by about 14 per cent since 2012, and Property NSW is actively moving properties out of the Sydney CBD in line with the ‘Decade of Decentralisation’ policy.
Property NSW’s role is to provide a strategic approach to property asset management. Under the 2012 Premier’s Memorandum, this includes a requirement that Property NSW undertake regular reviews of agency property portfolios to identify efficiencies to improve service delivery. Property NSW completed one comprehensive review of an agency, limited reviews of four other agencies, and some reviews of government property in regional towns, prior to 2017.

In December 2017, Property NSW started working across the NSW Government to help agencies identify real property assets, including commercial office properties, that are under-utilised or surplus and that could be recycled, repurposed, or vested to Property NSW.
Following the Memorandum, agencies were directed to vest their commercial office properties to Property NSW. However, without more comprehensive reviews, Property NSW does not know how many commercial properties are yet to be vested. Agencies can approach Property NSW for assistance in managing their property portfolios, and Property NSW arranges the recycling of under utilised and surplus properties that are brought to its attention. Property NSW is improving utilisation of government office space, according to agency self-reported information which Property NSW uses to calculate utilisation rates. 
The Property Asset Utilisation Taskforce report (2012) recommended that the NSW Government needed a ‘single source of truth’ to inform asset retention and disposal decisions, leasing decisions and ongoing strategic property decisions. It concluded that the Government Property Register (GPR) could perform this function ‘if populated appropriately’. However, the GPR is not comprehensively performing this function because it is still incomplete and out of date. Property NSW manages the GPR and NSW Government agencies are required to supply ‘accurate, relevant and useful information’ to populate it. Agencies are not always doing so in a timely manner, limiting its usefulness to support strategic decision making. Property NSW supplements the GPR with information from multiple other sources to assist its decisions, however, there is still no single, complete and accurate picture of the NSW Government property portfolio. 
The work Property NSW does to identify, shortlist and propose new lease and agency relocation options is not well documented. Property NSW records the outcome of the process without detailing how and why decisions were made. There is limited transparency in this process for stakeholders. Record keeping is also inconsistent and many of Property NSW’s divisions do not have procedures or guidelines.

1 Capital Planning was previously referred to as Total Asset Management (TAM).

In December 2017, the NSW Government announced the Property Infrastructure Policy to create a more collaborative approach between Property NSW and NSW Government agencies to review and identify efficiencies in their property portfolios. Before this, Property NSW did not have a plan to assist agencies to identify under-utilised properties for recycling or repurposing. It still does not know how many under-utilised properties exist and will not know until it has completed all of the portfolio reviews it is currently carrying out under the Property Infrastructure Policy.
Between 2013 and 2017, Property NSW had only completed one comprehensive review of an agency, limited reviews of four other agencies, and some regional towns. Outside this process Property NSW chose to rely on other agencies to identify surplus property for recycling, repurposing or vesting ownership to Property NSW.
Property NSW has a role to provide a strategic approach to property asset management and is required to undertake regular reviews of agency property portfolios under the Premier's Memorandum. Property NSW only recently started working to assist agencies to identify under-utilised and surplus properties, or properties to be vested. These reviews should improve the identification of surplus and under-utilised real property assets and assist whole-of-government decisions on the recycling, repurposing of under-utilised assets and vesting of owned office accommodation to Property NSW.
Recommendations
By December 2019, Property NSW should:
  1. combine the results of property portfolio reviews to produce a whole-of-government picture of the NSW Government property portfolio 
  2. devise a strategy and plan to recycle or repurpose under-utilised properties using a whole-of-government picture of the NSW Government property portfolio
  3. develop and report on indicators for progress in reducing the number and value of under-utilised properties at the whole-of-government level, referencing progress against an accurate baseline stocktake.
Property NSW needs to be more proactive in its management of the GPR and in encouraging agencies to provide the information needed to improve this register. In 2012, the Property Asset Utilisation Taskforce report recommended there be a single source of truth on property assets owned by the NSW Government. The GPR is intended to fulfil this role but it is out of date and incomplete.
Without a complete and accurate central register of property, Property NSW cannot provide the NSW Government with a comprehensive picture of its property portfolio, or make whole-of-government decisions about the property portfolio. Property NSW currently supplements the GPR with information from other systems in order to make decisions about leasing, relocations, and property recycling and repurposing. Agencies are required to provide ‘accurate, relevant and useful information’ but are not consistently doing so.
Recommendations
By December 2019, Property NSW should:

4. improve the data held on government owned and leased properties by combining and automating data feeds to construct a single, consolidated and accurate whole-of-government property data set.
Property NSW documents the outcome of decisions about relocations, lease renewals, and utilisation but is unable to provide evidence of how these decisions are reached. Property NSW is also unable to provide evidence of documented guidance for its staff on how decisions should be made. Whilst some level of subjectivity will play a part in such decisions, the lack of documentation and guidance raises issues of consistency, accountability and transparency in decision-making. Property NSW states that it makes decisions based on whole-of-government outcomes rather than equitable and consistent outcomes for client agencies, which is inconsistent with the criteria it reports that it uses when making decisions about leases and relocations.
Recommendations
By December 2019, Property NSW should:

5. document and communicate to stakeholders how its assessment criteria inform key decisions including agency relocations, lease renewals and rectifying under-utilisation
6. include customer satisfaction measures in its annual reports and reviews, in accordance with the requirements set out in the Premier's Memorandum M2012-20
7. improve record-keeping and compliance with the State Records Act 1998 and the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation Records Management Policy.

Published

Actions for Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program

Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program

Transport
Planning
Compliance
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management

The urban renewal projects on former railway land in the Newcastle city centre are well targeted to support the objectives of the Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program), according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the government. However, the evidence that the cost of the light rail will be justified by its contribution to the Program is not convincing.

The Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program) is an urban renewal and transport program in the Newcastle city centre. The Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation (HCCDC) has led the Program since 2017. UrbanGrowth NSW led the Program from 2014 until 2017. Transport for NSW has been responsible for delivering the transport parts of the Program since the Program commenced. All references to HCCDC in this report relate to both HCCDC and its predecessor, the Hunter Development Corporation. All references to UrbanGrowth NSW in this report relate only to its Newcastle office from 2014 to 2017.

This audit had two objectives:

  1. To assess the economy of the approach chosen to achieve the objectives of the Program.
  2. To assess the effectiveness of the consultation and oversight of the Program.

We addressed the audit objectives by answering the following questions:

a) Was the decision to build light rail an economical option for achieving Program objectives?
b) Has the best value been obtained for the use of the former railway land?
c) Was good practice used in consultation on key Program decisions?
d) Did governance arrangements support delivery of the program?

Conclusion
1. The urban renewal projects on the former railway land are well targeted to support the objectives of the Program. However, there is insufficient evidence that the cost of the light rail will be justified by its contribution to Program objectives.

The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the Government. HCCDC, and previously UrbanGrowth NSW, identified and considered options for land use that would best meet Program objectives. Required probity processes were followed for developments that involved financial transactions. Our audit did not assess the achievement of these objectives because none of the projects have been completed yet.

Analysis presented in the Program business case and other planning documents showed that the light rail would have small transport benefits and was expected to make a modest contribution to broader Program objectives. Analysis in the Program business case argued that despite this, the light rail was justified because it would attract investment and promote economic development around the route. The Program business case referred to several international examples to support this argument, but did not make a convincing case that these examples were comparable to the proposed light rail in Newcastle.

The audited agencies argue that the contribution of light rail cannot be assessed separately because it is a part of a broader Program. The cost of the light rail makes up around 53 per cent of the total Program funding. Given the cost of the light rail, agencies need to be able to demonstrate that this investment provides value for money by making a measurable contribution to the Program objectives.

2. Consultation and oversight were mostly effective during the implementation stages of the Program. There were weaknesses in both areas in the planning stages.

Consultations about the urban renewal activities from around 2015 onward followed good practice standards. These consultations were based on an internationally accepted framework and met their stated objectives. Community consultations on the decision to close the train line were held in 2006 and 2009. However, the final decision in 2012 was made without a specific community consultation. There was no community consultation on the decision to build a light rail.

The governance arrangements that were in place during the planning stages of the Program did not provide effective oversight. This meant there was not a single agreed set of Program objectives until 2016 and roles and responsibilities for the Program were not clear. Leadership and oversight improved during the implementation phase of the Program. Roles and responsibilities were clarified and a multi-agency steering committee was established to resolve issues that needed multi-agency coordination.
The light rail is not justified by conventional cost-benefit analysis and there is insufficient evidence that the indirect contribution of light rail to achieving the economic development objectives of the Program will justify the cost.
Analysis presented in Program business cases and other planning documents showed that the light rail would have small transport benefits and was expected to make a modest contribution to broader Program objectives. Analysis in the Program business case argued that despite this, the light rail was justified because it would attract investment and promote economic development around the route. The Program business case referred to several international examples to support this argument, but did not make a convincing case that these examples were comparable to the proposed light rail in Newcastle.
The business case analysis of the benefits and costs of light rail was prepared after the decision to build light rail had been made and announced. Our previous reports, and recent reports by others, have emphasised the importance of completing thorough analysis before announcing infrastructure projects. Some advice provided after the initial light rail decision was announced was overly optimistic. It included benefits that cannot reasonably be attributed to light rail and underestimated the scope and cost of the project.
The audited agencies argue that the contribution of light rail cannot be assessed separately because it is part of a broader Program. The cost of the light rail makes up around 53 per cent of the total Program funding. Given the high cost of the light rail, we believe agencies need to be able to demonstrate that this investment provides value for money by making a measurable contribution to the Program objectives.

Recommendations
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should support economical decision-making on infrastructure projects by:
  • providing balanced advice to decision makers on the benefits and risks of large infrastructure investments at all stages of the decision-making process
  • providing scope and cost estimates that are as accurate and complete as possible when initial funding decisions are being made
  • making business cases available to the public.​​​​​​
The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the government.

The planned uses of the former railway land align with the objectives of encouraging people to visit and live in the city centre, creating attractive public spaces, and supporting growth in employment in the city. The transport benefits of the activities are less clear, because the light rail is the major transport project and this will not make significant improvements to transport in Newcastle.

The processes used for selling and leasing parts of the former railway land followed industry standards. Options for the former railway land were identified and assessed systematically. Competitive processes were used for most transactions and the required assessment and approval processes were followed. The sale of land to the University of Newcastle did not use a competitive process, but required processes for direct negotiations were followed.

Recommendation
By March 2019, the Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation should:
  • work with relevant stakeholders to explore options for increasing the focus on the heritage objective of the Program in projects on the former railway land. This could include projects that recognise the cultural and industrial heritage of Newcastle.
Consultations about the urban renewal activities followed good practice standards, but consultation on transport decisions for the Program did not.

Consultations focusing on urban renewal options for the Program included a range of stakeholders and provided opportunities for input into decisions about the use of the former railway land. These consultations received mostly positive feedback from participants. Changes and additions were made to the objectives of the Program and specific projects in response to feedback received. 

There had been several decades of debate about the potential closure of the train line, including community consultations in 2006 and 2009. However, the final decision to close the train line was made and announced in 2012 without a specific community consultation. HCCDC states that consultation with industry and business representatives constitutes community consultation because industry representatives are also members of the community. This does not meet good practice standards because it is not a representative sample of the community.

There was no community consultation on the decision to build a light rail. There were subsequent opportunities for members of the community to comment on the implementation options, but the decision to build it had already been made. A community and industry consultation was held on which route the light rail should use, but the results of this were not made public. 

Recommendation
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should consult with a wide range of stakeholders before major decisions are made and announced, and report publicly on the results and outcomes of consultations. 

The governance arrangements that were in place during the planning stages of the Program did not provide effective oversight. Project leadership and oversight improved during the implementation phase of the Program.

Multi-agency coordination and oversight were ineffective during the planning stages of the Program. Examples include: multiple versions of Program objectives being in circulation; unclear reporting lines for project management groups; and poor role definition for the initial advisory board. Program ownership was clarified in mid-2016 with the appointment of a new Program Director with clear accountability for the delivery of the Program. This was supported by the creation of a multi-agency steering committee that was more effective than previous oversight bodies.

The limitations that existed in multi-agency coordination and oversight had some negative consequences in important aspects of project management for the Program. This included whole-of-government benefits management and the coordination of work to mitigate impacts of the Program on small businesses.

Recommendations
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should: 

  • develop and implement a benefits management approach from the beginning of a program to ensure responsibility for defining benefits and measuring their achievement is clear
  • establish whole-of-government oversight early in the program to guide major decisions. This should include:
    • agreeing on objectives and ensuring all agencies understand these
    • clearly defining roles and responsibilities for all agencies
    • establishing whole-of-government coordination for the assessment and mitigation of the impact of major construction projects on businesses and the community.

By March 2019, the Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation should update and implement the Program Benefits Realisation Plan. This should include:

  • setting measurable targets for the desired benefits
  • clearly allocating ownership for achieving the desired benefits
  • monitoring progress toward achieving the desired benefits and reporting publicly on the results.

Appendix one - Response from agencies    

Appendix two - About the audit

Appendix three - Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #310 - released 12 December 2018

Published

Actions for Health 2018

Health 2018

Health
Financial reporting

The Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford, released a report today on the New South Wales Health Cluster. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial audits of thirty health entities in New South Wales. Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all health entities’ financial statements. However, assessing the fair value of health entities’ property, plant and equipment created challenges, particularly for local health districts.

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Health cluster for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report provides parliament and other users of the Health cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Health cluster for 2018.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
2.1 Quality of financial reporting
We issued unqualified audit opinions for all health entities. We identified fewer misstatements than last year, but they were more significant. The Ministry of Health sets significant accounting policies centrally and provides a template for the preparation of health entities' financial statements. These processes promote consistent quality in the financial reports of health entities.

Significant errors identified in 2017–18 predominantly related to revaluations of property, plant and equipment.
 
2.2 Timeliness of financial reporting
Entities' continue to bring forward financial statement procedures to 31 March where possible. All entities submitted their financial statements on time. Health entities continue to meet statutory deadlines. 
2.3 Financial and sustainability analysis
NSW Health recorded an operating surplus of $377.7 million in 2017–18. Fewer health entities recorded operating deficits in 2017–18. The operating surplus was $123 million less than budgeted, and $29.0 million less than the surplus recorded for 2016–17. NSW Health budgets for surpluses to help it invest in new facilities, upgrades and redevelopments.
Expenses across NSW Health increased by 5.5 per cent in 2017–18 (4.4 per cent in 2016–17). The expense growth rate for NSW Health is 0.5 percentage points lower than the projected long-term annual expense growth rate of six per cent.
The capital replacement ratio (investment in new assets divided by depreciation) for NSW Health is 2.0. NSW Health's high capital replacement ratios for ten health entities in 2017–18 is driven by its substantial ongoing investment in hospitals and other assets.
2.4 Performance against budget
This year, four out of 17 (ten out of 17 in 2016–17) local health districts and specialty networks reported a budget variance outside of performance expectations. Health entities' budgets are revised frequently throughout the year by the Ministry of Health. In 2017–18 the budgeted expenses of health entities were incrementally increased throughout the year by a total of $807 million.

The Ministry of Health expects health entities not to exceed their revised budgeted expenses by more than 0.5 per cent. Four of the local health districts did not meet this requirement.
 
2.5 Financial impact of health entity employees
Thirty-four per cent of NSW Health’s workforce has excess annual leave balances, compared to 35 per cent in 2016–17.

Managing excess annual leave continues to challenge health entities.
Recommendation: Health entities should further review the approach to managing excess annual leave in 2018–19, and:

  • monitor current and projected leave balances to the end of the financial year on a monthly basis
  • agree formal leave plans with employees to reduce leave balances over an acceptable timeframe
  • encourage staff that perform key control functions to take a minimum of two consecutive weeks' leave a year as a fraud mitigation strategy.
The Ambulance Service of NSW reported an average sick leave rate of 88.9 hours per FTE in 2017–18, an increase from 85.2 hours per FTE in 2016–17. Managing sick leave continues to challenge the Ambulance Service of NSW.
Recommendation: The Ambulance Service of NSW should further implement and monitor targeted human resource strategies to address the high rates of sick leave taken.
The Ambulance Service of NSW reported overtime payments of $74.8 million ($74.6 million in 2016–17). This continues to be significantly higher than other health entities. Recommendation: The Ambulance Service of NSW should further review the effectiveness of its rostering practices to identify strategies to reduce excessive overtime payments.
Weak timesheet approval controls mean unapproved employee timesheets continue to be a problem for health entities. Recommendation: Health entities should, as part of the benefits realisation of HealthRoster, continue to rectify time and leave recording control weaknesses, to reduce the risk of timesheet errors and fraud.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:

  • our financial statement audits of agencies in the Health cluster for 2018
  • the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office annual work program.

The Audit Office Annual Work Program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each of the NSW Government clusters.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
3.1 Internal control deficiencies
The number of internal control deficiencies decreased. However, almost a quarter of control deficiencies are repeat issues and over a quarter relate to managing employees' leave and time recording. Control deficiencies that relate to managing employees' leave, employees' time recording or information system limitations can be difficult for entities to resolve in a timely manner. Nonetheless, the longer the deficiency remains unaddressed the more likely the vulnerability will contribute to error or fraud.
 
3.2 Audit Office annual work program
Revaluation of property, plant and equipment
Three health entities did not effectively oversee the asset revaluations performed by the experts they engaged in 2017–18. All three entities made material adjustments to their draft financial statements. Valuation of health property, plant and equipment is complex and subjective. Health entities and the Ministry of Health rely on the experts they engage, but needed to do more to review and oversee their work.
Capital projects
NSW Health manages a significant capital program ($1.7 billion in 2017–18). We noted significant revisions to completion dates and budgeted costs for some projects. NSW Health complied with approval requirements for business cases, initial budgets and budget variations for the projects we reviewed. For some projects revisions to planned completion dates and budgeted costs impact on the ability to assess the timeliness and cost effectiveness of projects. Combining stages of projects for simplicity of reporting, as a project progresses also makes it difficult to see how the project is tracking to the original plan.
Asset maintenance
The five health entities with the highest maintenance expense used different methods to estimate budgets for maintenance expense. Entities that calculated maintenance budgets by applying CPI factors to prior year expenses were less likely to deliver within budget. Maintenance budgets are more accurately predicted when estimates are made of expected costs and prepared with the input of asset maintenance staff.
 
Two of the five entities recorded significantly higher unplanned maintenance expenditure. Planned maintenance expenditure for these entities was lower than other entities.

The entities plan to address this by performing condition audits of their assets, increasing planned maintenance and replacing assets.

All five of the entities were using assets that have been fully depreciated. The replacement cost of each entities' fully depreciated assets represented between 3–7 per cent total replacement cost. While entities are now regularly reassessing the useful lives of their assets, they continue to use some assets that were fully depreciated prior to the implementation of these processes.

Published

Actions for Family and Community Services 2018

Family and Community Services 2018

Community Services
Compliance
Financial reporting
Information technology
Management and administration
Project management
Risk
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford released her report today on the Family and Community Services cluster. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial audits of agencies in the cluster. Cluster entities received unqualified audit opinions for their 30 June 2018 financial statements. Opportunities to improve the quality of financial reporting were identified and reported to management.

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Family and Community Services cluster for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report provides NSW Parliament and other users of the financial statements of Family and Community Services' agencies with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations
  • service delivery.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Family and Community Services cluster for 2018.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
2.1 Quality of financial reporting
Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all cluster agencies' financial statements. Conclusion: Sufficient audit evidence was obtained to conclude the financial statements were free of material misstatement.
Agencies complied with NSW Treasury’s mandatory early close requirements.

Completing other early close procedures was inconsistent and not always supported by adequate evidence.
Conclusion: There are opportunities for agencies to improve the quality of financial reporting by:
  • documenting all significant judgements and assumptions used when preparing the financial statements
  • regularly reconciling inter-agency balances and transactions
  • reconciling key account balances on a timely basis
  • quantifying the impact of new and revised accounting standards.
2.2 Timeliness of financial reporting
Agencies completed revaluations of property, plant and equipment and submitted 31 March 2018 financial statements by the due date as required by NSW Treasury.

Agencies submitted year-end financial statements by the statutory deadline.
Conclusion: Early revaluations of property, plant and equipment contributes to agencies meeting the year-end statutory reporting deadline.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:

  • our financial statement audits of agencies in the Family and Community Services cluster for 2018
  • the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office annual work program.

The Audit Office Annual Work Program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each NSW Government cluster.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
3.1 Internal controls
The 2017–18 audits reported 47 internal control weaknesses. While none were high risk, there were 15 repeat issues.

Conclusion: Management accepted audit findings and advised they are actioning recommendations. Timely action is important to ensure internal controls operate effectively.

Twenty-two of these internal control weaknesses related to information technology processes and control environment. Conclusion: Control weaknesses in information systems may compromise the integrity and security of financial data used for decision making and financial reporting.

Recommendation: Agencies should strengthen user access administration to prevent inappropriate access to key IT systems by:
  • ensuring privileged user access is limited to those requiring access to maintain the IT systems
  • monitoring privileged user access to address risks from unauthorised activity
  • ensuring IT password settings comply with password policies
  • ensuring timely removal of access to business systems for terminated and casual employees.
The Department, NSW Land and Housing Corporation (LAHC) and three other cluster agencies’ contract registers are incomplete and/or inaccurate. Recommendation: Agencies should ensure their contract registers are complete and accurate so they can more effectively govern contracts and manage compliance obligations.
3.2 Audit Office annual work program
Financial impact of the commissioning approach.

The transfer of disability services to the National Disability Insurance Scheme and other commissioning of service delivery has contributed to a 36 per cent decrease in frontline employee numbers since 2015–16. Similarly, corporate services’ employee numbers reduced by 34 per cent.

The Department’s salary costs have reduced by $232 million or 18 per cent from 2016–17.
Conclusion: The ratio of corporate services employee numbers to support frontline and support services has remained at 1:10 since 2015–16, which indicates restructures have been planned to align with the transfer of disability services.
Impact of the new social housing maintenance contract

Maintenance expenses have increased by about 40 per cent since the new maintenance contract commenced in April 2016. LAHC measures the benefits of the new maintenance contract such as improved tenant satisfaction.
Conclusion: The new maintenance contract has contributed to some positive social outcomes such as tenants being employed by the contractors to conduct maintenance, as call centre operators and in administration. However, more can be done to ensure value for money is being achieved.
ChildStory IT Project

Whilst phase one of the ChildStory IT project went 'live' in 2017–18, the planned timetable has not been met and the revised date for full implementation is end of 2018.

According to the 2014–15 NSW Budget, the budget for ChildStory was $100 million over a four-year period. During the design and implementation stage, this amount was revised to $128 million, with approval of the Expenditure Review Committee. The actual cost incurred over the four years until 30 June 2018, is approximately $131 million.

We identified issues with the data migration from the legacy systems to ChildStory.
Conclusion: To inform future IT projects, we understand the Department is capturing our findings, along with the findings from the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation’s ‘Healthchecks’.

This chapter outlines certain service delivery outcomes for 2017–18. The data on activity levels and performance is provided by Cluster agencies. The Audit Office does not have a specific mandate to audit performance information. Accordingly, the information in this chapter is unaudited.

In our recent performance audit, Progress and measurement of Premier's Priorities, we identified 12 limitations of performance measurement and performance data. We recommended that the Department of Premier and Cabinet ensure that processes to check and verify data are in place for all agency data sources.

Published

Actions for Central Agencies 2018

Central Agencies 2018

Treasury
Premier and Cabinet
Finance
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released her report today on the results of the financial audits of NSW Government central agencies. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet, and Finance, Services and Innovation clusters. While clear audit opinions were issued on all agency financial statements, the report notes that some complex accounting requirements caused significant errors in agency financial statements submitted for audit, which were corrected before the financial statements were approved. 

This report analyses the results of our audits of the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Finance, Services and Innovation cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report provides parliament and other users of the NSW Government's central agencies and their cluster agencies financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations
  • liquidity risk management
  • government financial services.

The central agencies and their key responsibilities are set out below.

Central agencies Key central agency responsibilities Cluster responsibilities
The Treasury
  • Financial and economic advisor to NSW Government
  • Manages the NSW Government’s financial resources.

The cluster:

  • provides investment and debt management services though TCorp
  • manages residual business arising from privatisation of government businesses
  • provides insurance and compensation cover, including workers compensation insurance
  • includes NSW Government superannuation funds.
Department of Premier and Cabinet
  • Drives NSW Government’s objectives and sets targets
  • Works with clusters to coordinate policy and achieve NSW Government priorities.

The cluster:

  • includes integrity agencies, such as the Independent Commission Against Corruption, Audit Office of NSW and Ombudsman’s Office
  • other agencies, such as Barangaroo Delivery Authority and Infrastructure NSW.
Department of Finance, Services and Innovation
  • Supports agency service delivery in relation to the key enabling functions of NSW Government, including procurement, property and asset management, ICT and digital innovation.

The cluster:

  • is responsible for state revenue and rental bond administration
  • regulates statutory insurance schemes, workplace safety and consumer protection
  • provides access to a range of NSW Government services via Service NSW
  • manages the NSW Government communications network.
Public Service Commission
  • Works to promote and maintain a strong ethical culture across the government sector and improve the capabilities, performance and configuration of the sector’s workforce to deliver better services to the public.
  • The Public Service Commission is an independent agency within the Premier and Cabinet cluster.

Note: The Audit Office of NSW is an independent agency included in the Premier and Cabinet cluster for administrative purposes, but not commented on in this report.


A full list of agencies that this report covers by relevant cluster is included in Appendix three.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Finance, Services and Innovation clusters for 2018.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
2.1 Quality of financial reporting
Unqualified opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements submitted to the Audit Office.

Complex accounting requirements caused significant errors in some agency financial statements, which were corrected before the financial statements were approved.
Sufficient audit evidence was obtained to conclude the financial statements were free of material misstatement.
Recommendation: Agencies should respond to key accounting issues when they are identified by preparing accounting papers and engaging with Treasury, the Audit Office and their Audit and Risk Committee when these matters are identified.
2.2 Timeliness of financial reporting
Most agencies complied with the statutory timeframe for completion of early close procedures, 48 agencies in the Treasury cluster did not comply with the statutory requirement to prepare financial statements, and the audits of nine agencies in the Treasury cluster were not completed within the statutory timeframe.
All financial statement information of the 48 agencies that did not prepare financial statements has been captured in the consolidated financial statements of their parent entity, which was subject to audit.
Early close procedures allow financial reporting issues and risks to be addressed early in the audit process. The timeliness of financial reporting can be improved by performing more robust early close procedures.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:

  • our financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Finance, Services and Innovation cluster for 2018
  • the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office work program.

The Audit Office work program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each of the NSW Government clusters.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
3.1 Internal controls
The 2017–18 audits found one high risk issue and 83 moderate risk issues across the agencies. Nineteen per cent of all issues were repeat issues. Agencies should focus on rectifying repeat issues.
The high risk issue at Service NSW related to several deficiencies in procurement and contract management processes. Service NSW may not be achieving value-for-money
from their procurement and contract management activities. The high risk issue should be rectified as a matter of priority. This includes updating and implementing its procurement, vendor and contract management frameworks and delivering training to key staff involved in procurement and contract management activities.
Property NSW has implemented several controls during the year to rectify the high risk issue identified last year related to its transition to a new property and facility management service provider. However, the service providers performance remains below expectations and there are further opportunities to improve oversight and lift performance. Property NSW can better define roles and accountabilities with the service provider and formalise policies and processes associated with its monitoring and oversight of the service provider.

Implementing relevant KPIs, receiving timely reports and providing timely review and feedback to the service provider may help to lift performance.
GovConnect received unqualified opinions from their service auditor on all business process controls, except for information technology controls provided by Unisys, where a qualified opinion was received from the service auditor. A qualified opinion was received because of several deficiencies in user access controls. These internal control deficiencies increase the risk of unauthorised access to key business systems, and increase audit effort and costs associated with addressing the risks arising from the deficiencies.
3.2 Audit Office annual work program

Remediation of the Barangaroo site is now estimated to cost the Barangaroo Delivery Authority in excess of net $400 million.
 
The increase in the estimate over the last five years is mainly due to the extent of remediation required, as more evidence of contamination has become known.

Measuring the remaining costs to remediate requires the use of estimation techniques and judgements, making the actual outcome inherently uncertain. We reviewed evidence to support the provision for remediation, including future costs estimates and this evidence supported management’s estimate.
The State Insurance Regulatory Authority have administered the refund of $138 million in Green slip refunds to policy holders through Service NSW during 2017–18. At 30 June 2018, $112 million in refunds are yet to be claimed.
 
We reviewed the systems and processes supporting the refund process. While we found that this supports the disbursement of refunds to policyholders there were some deficiencies in Service NSW’s project controls when the program was being developed.

 
Service NSW should apply the lessons learnt from this program to other programs it is delivering or will be delivering for agencies.
Revenue NSW recorded $30.4 billion from taxes, fines and fees in 2017–18 ($30.0 billion in 2016–17) to support the State’s finances. 
 
Crown revenue has steadily increased over the last five years predominately driven by rises in payroll tax and land tax and responsibility for collection of the Emergency Services Levy transferring to Revenue NSW under the Emergency Services Levy Act 2017 effective from July 2017. 
3.3 Managing maintenance
Place Management NSW manages significant commercial and retail leases and maintains public domain spaces and other assets around the harbour foreshore. It has consistently underspent its asset maintenance budget. In 2017–18, asset maintenance expenses were only 34 per cent of budgeted maintenance expense.

Currently, Place Management NSW does not use any ratios or benchmarks to determine the adequacy of its maintenance spend or to monitor whether it is achieving its budgeted maintenance program. 
This may be contributing to a high proportion of unplanned maintenance, which Place Management NSW reports was 38 per cent of total maintenance expense in 2017–18.

Place Management NSW is outsourcing its property and facilities management function from 1 December 2018 to an external service provider. 
 

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations specific to NSW Government agencies providing financial services.

Observation Conclusions and recommendation
5.1 Superannuation funds
The SAS Trustee Corporation (STC) Pooled Fund and the Parliamentary Contributory Superannuation (PCS) Fund are not required to comply with the prudential and reporting standards issued by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA). 
However, legislation allows the responsible Minister to prescribe prudential standards, reporting and audit requirements. 
Structured and comprehensive prudential oversight of these Funds is important as they operate in a volatile financial sector, have 103,000 members and manage investments of $43.3 billion.
Recommendation: Treasury should consult with the Trustees of the STC Pooled Fund and PCS Fund to prescribe appropriate prudential standards and requirements, including oversight arrangements.
5.2 Insurance and compensation
Nominal Insurer and NSW Self Insurance Corporation investment performance marginally exceeded benchmark over the past five years. Investment returns can impact on the premiums required to maintain an adequate funding ratio in addition to other factors such as claims experience and discount rates.
The Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer (Nominal Insurer) and NSW Self Insurance Corporation's net collected premiums and contributions decreased over the past five years.  The insurance schemes' investment performance and stable claim payments have enabled less reliance on net collected premiums and contributions as a source of funding, over the past five years. 
Reforms were introduced to manage the Home Warranty Scheme's financial sustainability risks.  The Home Warranty Scheme has not collected sufficient premiums to fund expected claims costs, since commencing operations in 2011. In 2017–18, the Crown contributed $181 million for historical shortfalls. New reforms started on 1 January 2018 enabling the Scheme to price premiums based on risk.