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Actions for Audit Insights 2018-2022

Audit Insights 2018-2022

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What the report is about

In this report, we have analysed the key findings and recommendations from our audit reports over the past four years.

This analysis includes financial audits, performance audits, and compliance audits of state and local government entities that were tabled in NSW Parliament between July 2018 and February 2022.

The report is framed by recognition that the past four years have seen significant challenges and emergency events.

The scale of government responses to these events has been wide-ranging, involving emergency response coordination, service delivery, governance and policy.

The report is a resource to support public sector agencies and local government to improve future programs and activities.

What we found

Our analysis of findings and recommendations is structured around six key themes:

  • Integrity and transparency
  • Performance and monitoring
  • Governance and oversight
  • Cyber security and data
  • System planning for disruption
  • Resource management.

The report draws from this analysis to present recommendations for elements of good practice that government agencies should consider in relation to these themes. It also includes relevant examples from recent audit reports.

In this report we particularly call out threats to the integrity of government systems, processes and governance arrangements.

The report highlights the need for balanced advice to government on options and risks, for transparent documentation and reporting of directions and decisions, and for early and open sharing of information with integrity bodies and audit.

A number of the matters highlighted in this report are similar to those described in our previous Insights Report, (Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018) specifically in relation to cyber and information security, to performance measurement, reporting and evaluation, and system and workforce planning and capability.

Fast facts

  • 72 audits included in the Audit Insights 2018–2022 analysis
  • 4 years of audits tabled by the Auditor-General for New South Wales
  • 6 key themes for Audit Insights 2018–2022.

picture of Margaret Crawford Auditor-General for New South Wales in black dress with city skyline as backgroundI am pleased to present the Audit Insights 2018–2022 report. This report describes key findings, trends and lessons learned from the last four years of audit. It seeks to inform the New South Wales Parliament of key risks identified and to provide insights and suggestions to the agencies we audit to improve performance across the public sector.

The report is framed by a very clear recognition that governments have been responding to significant events, in number, character and scale, over recent years. Further, it acknowledges that public servants at both state and council levels generally bring their best selves to work and diligently strive to deliver great outcomes for citizens and communities. The role of audit in this context is to provide necessary assurance over government spending, programs and services, and make suggestions for continuous improvement.

A number of the matters highlighted in this report are similar to those described in our previous Insights Report, (Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018) specifically in relation to cyber and information security, to performance measurement, reporting and evaluation, and system and workforce planning and capability.

However, in this report we particularly call out threats to the integrity of government systems, processes and governance arrangements. We highlight the need for balanced advice to government on options and risks, for transparent documentation and reporting of directions and decisions, and for early and open sharing of information with integrity bodies and audit. Arguably, these considerations are never more important than in an increasingly complex environment and in the face of significant emergency events and they will be key areas of focus in our future audit program.

While we have acknowledged the challenges of the last few years have required rapid responses to address the short-term impacts of emergency events, there is much to be learned to improve future programs. I trust that the insights developed in this report provide a helpful resource to public sector agencies and local government across New South Wales. I would be pleased to receive any feedback you may wish to offer.

Margaret Crawford
Auditor-General for New South Wales

Integrity and transparency Performance and monitoring Governance and oversight Cyber security and data System planning Resource management
Insufficient documentation of decisions reduces the ability to identify, or rule out, misconduct or corruption. Failure to apply lessons learned risks mistakes being repeated and undermines future decisions on the use of public funds. The control environment should be risk-based and keep pace with changes in the quantum and diversity of agency work. Building effective cyber resilience requires leadership and committed executive management, along with dedicated resourcing to build improvements in cyber security and culture. Priorities to meet forecast demand should incorporate regular assessment of need and any emerging risks or trends. Absence of an overarching strategy to guide decision-making results in project-by-project decisions lacking coordination. Governments must weigh up the cost of reliance on consultants at the expense of internal capability, and actively manage contracts and conflicts of interest.
Government entities should report to the public at both system and project level for transparency and accountability. Government activities benefit from a clear statement of objectives and associated performance measures to support systematic monitoring and reporting on outcomes and impact. Management of risk should include mechanisms to escalate risks, and action plans to mitigate risks with effective controls. In implementing strategies to mitigate cyber risk, agencies must set target cyber maturity levels, and document their acceptance of cyber risks consistent with their risk appetite. Service planning should establish future service offerings and service levels relative to current capacity, address risks to avoid or mitigate disruption of business and service delivery, and coordinate across other relevant plans and stakeholders. Negotiations on outsourced services and major transactions must maintain focus on integrity and seeking value for public funds.
Entities must provide balanced advice to decision-makers on the benefits and risks of investments. Benefits realisation should identify responsibility for benefits management, set baselines and targets for benefits, review during delivery, and evaluate costs and benefits post-delivery. Active review of policies and procedures in line with current business activities supports more effective risk management. Governments hold repositories of valuable data and data capabilities that should be leveraged and shared across government and non-government entities to improve strategic planning and forecasting. Formal structures and systems to facilitate coordination between agencies is critical to more efficient allocation of resources and to facilitate a timely response to unexpected events. Transformation programs can be improved by resourcing a program management office.
Clear guidelines and transparency of decisions are critical in distributing grant funding. Quality assurance should underpin key inputs that support performance monitoring and accounting judgements. Governance arrangements can enable input into key decisions from both government and non-government partners, and those with direct experience of complex issues.     Workforce planning should consider service continuity and ensure that specialist and targeted roles can be resourced and allocated to meet community need.
Governments must ensure timely and complete provision of information to support governance, integrity and audit processes.          
Read more Read more Read more Read more Read more Read more

 

This report brings together a summary of key findings arising from NSW Audit Office reports tabled in the New South Wales Parliament between July 2018 and February 2022. This includes analysis of financial audits, performance audits, and compliance audits tabled over this period.

  • Financial audits provide an independent opinion on the financial statements of NSW Government entities, universities and councils and identify whether they comply with accounting standards, relevant laws, regulations, and government directions.
  • Performance audits determine whether government entities carry out their activities effectively, are doing so economically and efficiently, and in accordance with relevant laws. The activities examined by a performance audit may include a selected program or service, all or part of an entity, or more than one government entity. Performance audits can consider issues which affect the whole state and/or the local government sectors.
  • Compliance audits and other assurance reviews are audits that assess whether specific legislation, directions, and regulations have been adhered to.

This report follows our earlier edition titled 'Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018'. That report sought to highlight issues and themes emerging from performance audit findings, and to share lessons common across government. In this report, we have analysed the key findings and recommendations from our reports over the past four years. The full list of reports is included in Appendix 1. The analysis included findings and recommendations from 58 performance audits, as well as selected financial and compliance reports tabled between July 2018 and February 2022. The number of recommendations and key findings made across different areas of activity and the top issues are summarised at Exhibit 1.

The past four years have seen unprecedented challenges and several emergency events, and the scale of government responses to these events has been wide-ranging involving emergency response coordination, service delivery, governance and policy. While these emergencies are having a significant impact today, they are also likely to continue to have an impact into the future. There is much to learn from the response to those events that will help the government sector to prepare for and respond to future disruption. The following chapters bring together our recommendations for core elements of good practice across a number of areas of government activity, along with relevant examples from recent audit reports.

This 'Audit Insights 2018–2022' report does not make comparative analysis of trends in public sector performance since our 2018 Insights report, but instead highlights areas where government continues to face challenges, as well as new issues that our audits have identified since our 2018 report. We will continue to use the findings of our Insights analysis to shape our future audit priorities, in line with our purpose to help Parliament hold government accountable for its use of public resources in New South Wales.

Appendix one – Included reports, 2018–2022

Appendix two – About this report

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Grants administration for disaster relief

Grants administration for disaster relief

Treasury
Finance
Compliance
Fraud
Management and administration
Project management

What the report is about

The report examined whether NSW Treasury, Service NSW and the Department of Customer Service effectively administered grants programs funded under the $750 million Small Business Support Fund, including:

  • $10,000 Small Business Support Grant
  • $3,000 Small Business Recovery Grant.

What we found

The agencies effectively implemented the grants within required timeframes, reflecting the NSW Government’s decision to deliver urgent financial support to small businesses impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic.

NSW Treasury met urgent timeframes to design the grants and Service NSW made timely payments in line with the grants' objectives and eligibility criteria.

Service NSW and the Department of Customer Service strengthened processes to detect and minimise fraud in response to identified external fraud risks, and to investigate suspected fraudulent applications.

Fraud security checks and investigations are ongoing, and the agencies will not know the full extent of fraud across the grants until these processes have been completed.

The agencies regularly monitored and reported on the timeliness of payments to small business applicants but have not yet measured all benefits of the grants programs.

The $10,000 Support Grant and the $3,000 Recovery Grant have provided around $630 million in one off grant payments to eligible small businesses.

What we recommended

NSW Treasury should finalise and implement an evaluation of both grants programs, including obtaining feedback from businesses.

Service NSW should develop a framework that documents expected controls for how it administers grants, including business processes, fraud control and governance and probity requirements.

Service NSW should publish information on all grants programs, including grants distribution and uptake.

The Department of Customer Service should ensure its processes for managing conflicts of interest meets its policy requirements.

Upcoming performance audit

The Audit Office is conducting a further performance audit into grants administration for disaster relief focussing on bushfire grants. This is planned to complete in 2021-22.

Fast facts

Small Business Support Fund
  • $630m Grant payments made to small businesses under two grants administered
  • Over 52,500 Applications received a $10,000 Grant payment
  • Over 23,000 Businesses paid both $10,000 Support Grant and $3,000 Recovery Grant
  • 36,700 Applications received a $3,000 grant payment
Grant program administration
  • 11 Days taken to deliver the $10,000 Small Business Support Grant application website
  • 26 Days taken to deliver the $3,000 Small Business Recovery Grant application website

Further information

Please contact Ian Goodwin, Deputy Auditor-General on 9275 7347 or by email.

The NSW Government responded to the partial shutdown of the NSW economy caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 by, among other measures, announcing on 3 April 2020 that it would place $750 million into the Small Business Support Fund (the Fund).

Under the Fund, the NSW Government would pay one-off grants of up to $10,000 to small business impacted by the shutdown. The objectives of the $10,000 Small Business Support Grant ($10,000 Support Grant) were to:

  • ease the pressure on small businesses that have been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic
  • support the ongoing operations of small businesses highly impacted by the COVID-19 restrictions
  • deliver cash-flow into small businesses as soon as possible so that small businesses could meet pressing financial needs.

Grant applications were assessed against eligibility criteria that were determined by the NSW Government. The eligibility criteria for the $10,000 Support Grant required an employing small business to demonstrate it was significantly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic by self-declaring or demonstrating a significant decline of 75 per cent or more in turnover compared to 2019. Documentation requirements were relaxed for small businesses within highly impacted industries.

In June 2020, the NSW Government announced a second round of one-off grants of up to $3,000 to small businesses that were highly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic ($3,000 Recovery Grant). The objective of the $3,000 Recovery Grant was to help small businesses in 'highly impacted industries' — those directly impacted by the restrictions and closures put in place under the Public Health Orders — to meet the costs of safely reopening or scaling up operations.

The eligibility criteria for the $3,000 Recovery Grant required that a small business be in a highly impacted industry, demonstrate that it was significantly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic by declaring a significant decline in turnover, and had costs associated with reopening under the 'COVID-Safe' requirements.

NSW Treasury and Service NSW implemented both grants on behalf of the NSW Government. The process of applying for a grant was intended to be quick and easy, with Service NSW using automated assessments and simple online application forms to process applications. Applicants applied for the $10,000 Support Grant through the Service NSW website between 14 April 2020 to 30 June 2020 and applied for the $3,000 Small Business Recovery Grant between 1 July 2020 and 31 August 2020.

At May 2021, around $520 million has been paid to over 52,500 grant applicants under the $10,000 Support Grant and around $109 million had been paid to around 36,700 grant applicants under the $3,000 Recovery Grant.

The Audit Office plans to undertake a performance audit into grants administration for disaster relief focussing on bushfire grants in 2021–22.

This audit assessed whether the grants funded under the $750 million Small Business Support Fund were effectively administered and implemented to provide disaster relief. It addressed the following questions:

  • Were funded grants programs planned, designed and targeted effectively?
  • Were funded grants programs implemented in line with the objectives and criteria and delivery requirements?
  • Have agencies established measures to monitor intended benefits and outcomes?

This audit did not seek to assess the effectiveness of any other grant programs or stimulus measures. It also did not seek to assess the impact of the funding on applicants, or the future prospects of small businesses that received support.

Conclusion

NSW Treasury and Service NSW effectively implemented two grants within required timeframes reflecting the NSW Government's decision to deliver urgent financial support to small businesses impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. The $10,000 Support Grant and the $3,000 Recovery Grant have provided around $630 million in one-off grant payments to eligible small businesses.
NSW Treasury met urgent timeframes to design the grants and Service NSW made timely payments in line with the grants' objectives and eligibility criteria.

NSW Treasury met urgent timeframes to provide advice to the NSW Government on the grant design, proposed delivery partner, expected numbers of eligible businesses and the suitability of the proposed grant payment amount within the required timeframes. This was achieved within one day for the $10,000 Support Grant and within four days for the $3,000 Support Grant. In the context of the complex and changing pandemic and economic conditions between March and July 2020, NSW Treasury's advice to government outlined the risk, feasibility, expected demand estimates and assumptions for the grants.

NSW Treasury's demand projections were limited by uncertainty as to the pandemic's economic impact. Estimated demand for the grants was not met, resulting in around $120 million from the Small Business Support Fund remaining unspent.

Service NSW met urgent timeframes to stand-up both grants: 11 days for the $10,000 Support Grant and 26 days for the $3,000 Recovery Grant. It met agreed delivery requirements and made timely payments to small businesses in line with the grants' objectives and eligibility criteria. Over 65,000 businesses have received a payment under either grant, and over 23,000 businesses received both grants.

Gaps in project and risk management processes were expected given the tight timeframe to implement the grants.

The tight timeframe in which the agencies had to implement the grants contributed to gaps in project and risk management. The agencies advised that compromises were understood by both parties and were a necessary trade-off to ensure payments were made quickly.

Service NSW and the Department of Customer Service have acted to strengthen their processes to detect and minimise fraud in response to identified external fraud risks and to investigate suspected fraudulent applications since the grants commenced. Service NSW intends to further enhance fraud controls for grants applications and payments for future grants by implementing a fraud control framework by December 2021.

The agencies regularly monitored and reported on the timeliness of payments to small business applicants but have not yet measured all benefits of the grants programs.

Service NSW and NSW Treasury established processes to monitor and report on the timeliness of payments to grant applicants.

NSW Treasury has not yet measured all intended impacts of the grants, nor undertaken processes to obtain detailed feedback from grant recipients. Without these measures, there is limited insight into the extent to which the grants helped to support small businesses or ability to capture lessons which could be applied in future grants programs. NSW Treasury advises that an evaluation will commence from mid-2021.

1. Key findings

Around $630 million in timely one-off grant payments have been made to small businesses

Service NSW and NSW Treasury have paid around $630 million in one-off grant payments to small businesses via two grants administered under the $750 million Small Business Support Fund. At May 2021:

  • around $520 million has been paid to over 52,500 grant applications received for the $10,000 Small Business Support Grant ($10,000 Support Grant)
  • around $109 million has been paid to 36,700 grant applications received for the $3,000 Small Business Recovery Grant ($3,000 Recovery Grant).

Across both grants, over 65,000 small businesses received a payment across either grant, and over 23,000 businesses received payments under both grants.

NSW Treasury advise that, while no data was collected on the time to pay applicants for the $10,000 Support Grant, from its monitoring of the grants' outputs it was satisfied that payment timeframes met its expectations. Service NSW met its targeted time to pay applicants with payments made within ten days for the $3,000 Recovery Grant.

Funds for both grants were not fully spent due to limitations in data and uncertainty of the COVID-19 pandemic's impact. At May 2021, the final demand for the $10,000 Support Grant was around 30 per cent less than initially anticipated and the final demand for the $3,000 Recovery Grant was around 40 per cent less than initially anticipated.

NSW Treasury developed proposals establishing high level design and delivery expectations within rapid timeframes

NSW Treasury put forward proposals to the NSW Government for the two grants administered under the $750 million Small Business Support Fund. It met rapid timeframes for producing this advice: within one day for the $10,000 Support Grant and within four days for the $3,000 Recovery Grant. NSW Treasury's advice to the NSW Government on how to best target the total funding, eligibility criteria and the feasibility of delivering the grants through Service NSW was based on comparable grants programs – including the $10,000 Small Business Bushfire Support Grant – which at that time were ongoing.

The proposals established, at a high-level, the rationale for the grants, expected financial costs, risks and analysis on budget impacts, and confirmation that Service NSW could deliver the grants applications platform. NSW Treasury's demand projections were uncertain due to limited data in the early stages of the pandemic regarding potential economic impact.

Given the tight timeframes, the proposals did not fully consider all planning and design aspects for both grants. For example, there was minimal identification of the costs and benefits of the programs, and a lack of detailed design and delivery requirements. The proposals outlined that arrangements to finalise the risk management, controls, and auditing plan would be agreed by Service NSW and NSW Treasury before implementation.

In future circumstances where urgent advice on program design is required, NSW Treasury could set clearer expectations for the delivery agency, including fully considering costs, benefits and delivery requirements that could be carried through to project governance and implementation.

Service NSW implemented both grants in line with delivery expectations

Service NSW met urgent timeframes to stand-up both grants: 11 days for the $10,000 Support Grant and 26 days for the $3,000 Recovery Grant. Delivery expectations for each grant were established under a grant project agreement (grant agreement). Service NSW delivered the online application platform, assessment of applications, payments and reporting of the grants' uptake as per the grant agreements.

The urgent timeframes to deliver the grants contributed to gaps in Service NSW's project and risk management processes throughout the lifecycle of both grants. For example, the requirement to meet pressing timeframes for the $10,000 Support Grant launch meant agencies had reduced time to achieve sign-off on key documentation. As a result, important documents and processes – including the grant agreement, risk documentation and key business process and quality assurance processes – were not finalised ahead of launch.

Quality assurance and compliance processes for detecting fraud were not settled until after the conclusion of the applications for the $10,000 Support Grant, and were not completed until late 2020. Some project documents, including risk registers, communication plans and project briefs are still not finalised.

The longer timeframe to develop the $3,000 Recovery Grant meant that agencies were able to build on their understanding of the implementation requirements from the $10,000 Support Grant, and better document these expectations and understanding while ensuring that key documents and sign-offs were in place prior to launch.

Service NSW tightened its risk management and controls in response to evidence of fraudulent applications

In May 2020, Service NSW and the Department of Customer Service (DCS) were alerted to suspected fraudulent activity within grants administered by Service NSW. Initially, Service NSW anticipated that up to $8.8 million of the $10,000 Support Grant was at risk of exposure to fraudulent applications. However, Service NSW reported that, at April 2021, $1.9 million for the $10,000 Support Grant and $254,000 for the $3,000 Recovery Grant from paid applications were at risk of fraud exposure.

Following an internal review of the potential exposure to fraudulent or ineligible applications, Service NSW implemented additional automated security checks on applications, increased manual assessments of grant applications, established a dedicated taskforce for grants administration and engaged a unit within DCS to manage high-risk investigations.

Service NSW and DCS's increased governance and oversight has resulted in an established case management function, increased referrals to law enforcement, prioritised investigations of suspicious applications and the development of a 'Fraud Control Framework' aimed at addressing external fraud risks. Given Service NSW had limited experience in these processes in context of administering grant payments, such actions were an appropriate response.

Security checks and investigations of suspicious applications are ongoing. Service NSW will not know the full extent of fraud across the grants until these processes have been fully completed.

Service NSW and Department of Customer Service can improve how conflicts of interest are managed for future programs

Compliance with agency policies and processes to manage conflicts of interest and financial subdelegations demonstrates that investment decisions are being made by appropriately skilled and experienced staff, allowing agencies to operate efficiently, and reducing the risk of internal fraud.

DCS was unable to produce employee conflicts of interest declarations for the $10,000 Support Grant. Therefore, it is not known how many employees had completed conflicts of interest declarations for this round.

DCS provided information on conflicts of interest declarations for the $3,000 Recovery Grant. Twenty-nine per cent of declarations provided for employees undertaking grant assessments for the $3,000 Recovery Grant were incomplete at March 2021, and a further nine per cent were not finalised even though they indicated a real, potential or perceived conflict.

For future grants programs, ensuring compliance with conflicts of interest policies would help DCS and Service NSW to have greater confidence that conflicts of interest are appropriately identified and managed.

NSW Treasury has not yet measured all benefits or outcomes of the grants

In April 2021, NSW Treasury updated its evaluation plan for the $10,000 Support Grant and $3,000 Recovery Grant in support of an economic evaluation to commence from mid-2021. The updated evaluation plan outlines inputs, activities, and outputs as well as immediate, short term and medium term outcomes for both grants.

The evaluation will consider the extent to which both grants achieved their intended outcomes, and whether the economic benefits exceeded the costs to help inform decisions about the nature and design of any future small business support programs. This will complement, and feed into a broader review of all NSW Government COVID-19 stimulus measures.

Service NSW rapidly developed an approach to administer the grants

Over recent disasters, such as the 2019–20 bushfires and the COVID-19 pandemic, Service NSW has been responsible for administering grant programs on behalf of other government agencies.

Service NSW implemented both grants under its Project Management Framework and under each grant agreement with NSW Treasury as it does not have its own grants administration framework. To address the risks that emerged during delivery, Service NSW developed an approach to standardise and monitor the administration of the grants while they were being implemented.

Service NSW now has an opportunity to establish a grants administration framework, based on the processes, lessons and outcomes captured under the grants administration taskforce and in developing its fraud control framework. Embedding these processes into business as usual for grants administration will enable Service NSW to have a consistent set of expectations for controls, business processes and governance and probity requirements for future grants it implements.

2. Recommendations

By December 2021, NSW Treasury should:

1. finalise and implement an evaluation of the $10,000 Support Grant and $3,000 Recovery Grant, including obtaining direct feedback from businesses on how grant funds achieved the grant objectives.

By December 2021, Service NSW should:

2. develop a grants administration framework, which documents expected controls – including fraud controls – business processes and governance and probity requirements

3. publish information on all grants programs, including grants distribution and uptake.

By December 2021, the Department of Customer Service should:

4. ensure its process for managing conflicts of interest meets policy requirements by:

  • ensuring employees promptly declare any real, potential or perceived conflicts of interest
  • annually producing a list of conflicts of interest for records retention purposes
  • requiring a separate register of conflicts of interest declarations where a grant program is deemed as high risk.

3. Lessons for grants administered within urgent timeframes

The two grants this audit examined were administered within a context of urgent timeframes, and increased complexity and uncertainty about the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The following lessons are shared to assist sponsor and delivery agencies in administering future grants where rapid implementation is required.

Sponsor agencies should consider the following lessons:

1. develop an approach to define and measure benefits for rapidly developed programs and projects where a full business case and cost-benefit analysis is not feasible

2. establish common processes and expectations for co-administered grants:

  • periodically assure agencies' capability to deliver grants programs
  • agree and establish risk appetite statements with administering agencies
  • clearly establish expected performance levels and targets under any agreement

3. review the processes and outcomes of rapidly developed programs, capture lessons learned, and apply these in planning and delivering future programs.

Delivery agencies should consider the following lessons:

1. risk management and risk appetite:

  • perform robust assessment procedures to ensure risks associated with delivery of the project are identified
  • ensure the controls implemented adequately address identified risks
  • agree and document the acceptable risk appetite at the outset
  • review risk management processes after the grants are issued when unable to finalise risk management processes ahead of launch

2. grant agreements between NSW public sector agencies:

  • ensure agreements are finalised in a timely manner
  • ensure agreements clearly outline:
    • roles and responsibilities of both parties,
    • changes in scope of services provided
    • fees and charges applicable

3. frameworks for grants administration:

  • ensure that there is a common set of expectations in place to guide grants administration including standard controls and processes for managing risk, capturing lessons learned and reporting on outcomes.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – Summary of other COVID‑19 Stimulus and Support for small businesses in NSW in April 2020

Appendix three – Public Health Orders

Appendix four – Highly impacted industries

Appendix five – About the audit

Appendix six – Performance auditing

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #352 - released (24 June 2021).

 

Published

Actions for Acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia

Acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia

Transport
Asset valuation
Compliance
Fraud
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Risk

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, has today released a report on Transport for NSW’s (TfNSW) acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue in Camellia.

This audit, which was requested on 17 November 2020 by the Hon. Andrew Constance MP, the Minister for Transport and Roads, examined:

  • whether TfNSW conducted an effective process to purchase 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia
  • whether TfNSW has effective processes and procedures to identify and acquire property required to deliver the NSW Government’s major infrastructure projects.

The audit found that TfNSW conducted an ineffective process when it purchased 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia. The audit also found that TfNSW’s internal policies and procedures to guide the transaction were, and continue to be, insufficient.

The Auditor-General has made seven recommendations to address the issues identified in the report.

On 17 November 2020, the Hon. Andrew Constance MP, the Minister for Transport and Roads, requested this audit under section 27B(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983.

On 15 June 2016, Transport for New South Wales (TfNSW) acquired 6.3 hectares of land at 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia, by agreement from Grand 4 Investments Pty Ltd. Grand 4 Investments was a business entity established by the owners of Billbergia Pty Ltd, a property development and investment company.

TfNSW paid Grand 4 Investments $53.5 million and assumed liability for addressing environmental issues and contamination associated with the site. This took place seven months after the vendor acquired the land as part of a competitive Expression of Interest process, in which TfNSW also participated, for $38.15 million.

TfNSW is the NSW Government agency responsible for most major transport infrastructure projects in New South Wales. TfNSW acquired the Camellia site for use as a stabling and maintenance depot to support the Parramatta Light Rail (PLR) project.

Consistent with the minister’s request, this audit assessed:

  • whether TfNSW conducted an effective process to purchase 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia
  • whether TfNSW has effective processes and procedures to identify and acquire property required to deliver the NSW Government’s major infrastructure projects.

In considering the effectiveness of the processes for this purchase, the audit considered:

  • the requirements of the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (the Act)
  • the application of sound processes to manage risk to the NSW Government and to achieve value for money
  • the application of disciplines associated with complex procurement, such as probity, in a NSW Government context.
The acquisition of the 4–6 Grand Avenue site in Camellia was consistent with a 2014 feasibility study for the PLR, but occurred before the completion of detailed project planning or an acquisition strategy.

TfNSW made two attempts to acquire the 4–6 Grand Avenue site in Camellia, and was successful on the second attempt. TfNSW recognised the risks associated with early acquisition and had high-level strategies in place should the site not be required.

The specific site had been identified in a feasibility study for the PLR commissioned by TfNSW in 2014 as one of several options in Camellia for a stabling and maintenance depot. However, TfNSW had not done any substantive analysis of the various options to identify a preferred location before the two opportunities to acquire 4–6 Grand Avenue were brought to TfNSW’s attention by the landowners (or their agents). On both occasions, TfNSW chose to actively pursue acquisition in advance of any such analysis.

The acquisition was also not informed by a Property Acquisition Strategy, which TfNSW policy recommends in order to guide the process and manage acquisition specific risks.

In 2015, TfNSW identified that it would require a stabling and maintenance depot in the Camellia area for the Parramatta Light Rail

In 2014, TfNSW commissioned an external engineering consultancy to undertake a feasibility design study for the Parramatta Light Rail - the Parramatta Transport Corridor Strategy Feasibility Design study (herein referred to as ‘the feasibility study’). In early 2015, TfNSW received the feasibility study, which was one of several key sources that informed the development of business cases for the PLR.

The feasibility study recommended that TfNSW should consolidate the maintenance and cleaning operations with overnight stabling facilities on one site. The study noted that the optimal location for any such site would be in close proximity to the proposed network, and noted that the site must have access to road connections to accommodate access for cars and trucks.

The study found that a centrally located stabling and maintenance facility would be required for all routes serving the Parramatta CBD, and that the Camellia industrial area was a preferred location for such a facility. The study noted that the Camellia area was contaminated.

The feasibility study notes that its conclusions were based on assumptions about the light rail system adopted and decisions made by the future operator of the system, who had not yet been selected or appointed.

TfNSW's decision to progress a potential acquisition in 2015 considered the risk that the site may not be required

TfNSW's FIC was responsible for making decisions on funding allocations at a whole of program level within TfNSW. FIC was also responsible for approving ‘high-risk/high-value’ variations to program budgets. Members of the FIC included:

  • Secretary of Transport for NSW
  • Deputy Secretary, Infrastructure and Services
  • Deputy Secretary, Freight, Strategy and Planning
  • Deputy Secretary, Customer Services
  • Deputy Secretary Finance and Investment
  • Deputy Secretary People and Corporate Services.

An April 2015 submission, from the then Deputy Director-General to the agency’s FIC, sought authorisation and funding approval to participate in an Expression of Interest sale process. It noted the risk that the project may not go ahead. The submission advised that:

By acquiring a strategic site now, it reduces the risk of having to pay an improved value or a value that may be subject to rapidly improving land values due to changes in land use and rezoning.

The property can be acquired for the project, held strategically and income generated by leasing the site as hardstand 1 space until the project requires the land for the Parramatta Light Rail project.

If the project does not proceed in the medium to longer term, the property can be sold at a premium to what has been paid today as property fundamentals improve.

This submission acknowledged the risks associated with environmental contamination and proposed that these risks would be managed by negotiating a contract where the remediation and associated expenses would be at the landowner’s cost. 

TfNSW assessed the 4–6 Grand Avenue site as one of several sites in Camellia that was a feasible location for a stabling and maintenance facility

The Departmental feasibility study assessed six potential sites for a stabling and maintenance facility, including 4–6 Grand Avenue, noting strengths and weaknesses of each site. A different site on Grand Avenue was assessed as the ‘base case’ option (1 Grand Avenue). The study’s comments on the 4–6 Grand Avenue site included the following:

With an area of approximately 63,000m2, this site has sufficient space for a depot with the required stabling yard and maintenance facilities. The location allows for good road access and LRT [light rail transit] access would be from Grand Avenue, which may require a road crossing or signalised intersection. The site has been used for general industrial uses; however the land has been cleared and is currently undergoing remediation 2. The site is not affected by flooding based on one in 100-year flood data.

In early 2015, once the opportunity to acquire 4–6 Grand Avenue emerged, TfNSW commissioned a specific feasibility study of the 4–6 Grand Avenue site. The feasibility studies clearly documented the existence of environmental contamination. In April 2015, the report concluded:

Given the limitations of this report and within the parameters that have been set it is concluded that from a spatial and geographic perspective the site at 6 Grand Avenue would be suitable as a stabling and maintenance depot for the Parramatta light rail project. There are few engineering and environmental constraints that would affect the feasibility level analysis of this site and all issues identified, within this desk study, are considered to be resolvable. However this being said there is a significant amount of work necessary to reach the final layout and definition of the stabling and maintenance depot. There are numerous items which require further consideration and conformation; planning approvals could impose restrictions on building heights, noise mitigation measures, light and visual impact requirements all of which can have significant impacts on the spatial requirements of any stabling and maintenance depot. 

The acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue was not informed by a Property Acquisition Strategy

For major projects, TfNSW typically requires the project team to complete a Property Acquisition Strategy, which is intended to guide both process as well as specific acquisition issues expected to be faced during the project. The Property Acquisition Strategy is not a mandated document but is a recommended tool to support property acquisition as part of major projects.

TfNSW did not have a Property Acquisition Strategy in place to guide the 2015 Expression of Interest process. On 6 November 2015, the then Project Director for the PLR project emailed the property team, noting a need to develop a Property Acquisition Strategy to close off the scoping design and preliminary business case.

In January 2016, TfNSW developed a draft Property Acquisition Strategy for the Parramatta Light Rail Project, although it was silent on the potential sites for the stabling and maintenance facility.

TfNSW focussed on 4–6 Grand Avenue because it was available and aligned to TfNSW's strategic interests

In early 2015, officials commenced monitoring the market for industrial real estate in the Camellia area and surrounds for possible sites for a stabling and maintenance facility.

In March 2015, then owner of the site, Akzo Nobel Pty Limited released the 4–6 Grand Avenue site through an Expression of Interest process managed by CBRE.

TfNSW’s then Deputy Director-General, Planning, sought approval from FIC to lodge an Expression of Interest up to $30.0 million. Approval was sought on the basis that it would ‘provide certainty for the Parramatta Light Rail project by allowing for a depot site in a suitable location and potentially avoid higher costs or longer timeframes associated with compulsory acquisition following completion of the project’s business case’. FIC approved the request at its meeting on 9 April 2015.

At this time, TfNSW had not conducted any analysis of financial or operational benefits and costs of the potential sites identified in earlier feasibility studies. TfNSW staff advised us that the decision to participate in the Expression of Interest process for 4–6 Grand Avenue was because it was available. There is no documentation substantiating this statement, which TfNSW staff provided verbally as part of this audit.

In November 2015, TfNSW was advised that it was unsuccessful in the Expression of Interest process and that Grand 4 Investments (a related entity of Billbergia) had purchased 4–6 Grand Avenue. TfNSW did not conduct any further analysis of alternative potential sites in Camellia between this date and commencing discussions with Grand 4 Investments in April 2016. In that time there had been some movement on other properties that were included in the feasibility study, including 37–39a Grand Avenue being under offer in September 2015.

In March 2016, TfNSW approached CBRE to organise a meeting with Grand 4 Investments. On 1 April 2016, TfNSW met with Grand 4 Investments.

TfNSW advises that a perceived benefit of the 4–6 Grand Avenue site was that it was not subject to other uses or leaseholds that would increase the cost of compulsory acquisition. Officers involved in the acquisition advised that other nominated sites in the feasibility study were subject to other uses or leaseholds. 


1  A hardstand space is a large, paved area to store cars, heavy vehicles and machinery.
2  Officers familiar with the acquisition could not confirm the nature of remediation being undertaken, but noted that the previous landowner had cleared buildings from the site, which may have been considered part of remediation.
TfNSW's independent valuation, which it commissioned and received after the acquisition, specifically excluded consideration of environmental contamination risk. As a result, TfNSW is exposed to the risk that the acquisition was not fully compliant with the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (the Act) because it did not use an accurate estimate of market value during negotiations. That said, the acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue by agreement was consistent with preferred processes described in the Act.

TfNSW acquired the site from the landowner by agreement, and this is consistent with provisions in the Act. Obtaining approval for compulsory acquisition should negotiations for agreement break down is also consistent with the Act. That said, TfNSW did not at any time assess whether a compulsory acquisition could have resulted in acquisition at a lower cost than what was negotiated by agreement.

Despite the high risks associated with the acquisition, TfNSW did not commission a formal valuation in time to inform the negotiation and purchase. Instead, TfNSW relied on internal advice to estimate market value, but did not obtain a formal valuation from those advisors. For high-risk transactions, the greater expertise and arm's-length independence of an external specialist valuer should be preferred over an agency's own staff.

On 15 June 2016, the settlement date for the acquisition, TfNSW commissioned a formal independent valuation of the site. On 23 November 2016, TfNSW received the final formal valuation report. By not obtaining a formal independent valuation of the property in advance of acquisition to inform the acquisition value, TfNSW exposed itself to non-compliance with the Act by not establishing the market value as the basis for the acquisition price. TfNSW also breached its own internal policies.

TfNSW instructed the valuer to conduct its valuation within the following parameters:

  • Market valuation on an ‘as is’ basis – market value based on the methodology described in the Act. This approach valued the site at $25.0 million.
  • Market valuation on a speculative development basis – market value based on the financial value of the vendor's intended use of the site which, in this case, involved leasing the site for industrial use. This approach valued the site at $52.0 million, and TfNSW advised us this valuation supported the purchase price.
  • Disregard the impact of environmental contamination – TfNSW specifically instructed the independent valuer to disregard any known (or unknown) site contamination. As TfNSW knew of the significant environmental contamination affecting the site, this parameter resulted in a valuation that overstated the value of the site as it did not consider the cost of environmental remediation. The valuer applied this assumption for both market valuation approaches.

Additionally, as the independent valuer completed the valuation after the purchase was finalised, there is a risk that the valuation may have been influenced by the known purchase price.

TfNSW's failure to acquire a formal valuation and an assessment of the financial impact of environmental remediation before it purchased 4–6 Grand Avenue represents ineffective administration and governance.
TfNSW acquired the site at a time when there was demand and increasing prices for industrial property in the area. However, TfNSW did not effectively assess and manage the risks associated with the acquisition, and gaps in process led to increased risk. Briefings to decision-makers did not contain important information, and we found no evidence that gaps in advice were queried or explored by decision-makers.

TfNSW did not have plans or advice in place to assist in managing risk, such as:

  • a property acquisition plan
  • a comprehensive and up-to-date risk management plan
  • a negotiation strategy, or any authorisation limit or minimal acceptable position
  • an independent professional evaluation
  • external expert advice (with the exception of legal advice relating to the contract of sale).

TfNSW was aware of contamination issues affecting the land and had access to considerable information about the environmental conditions, such as site environmental audit reports and information on the NSW Environment Protection Authority's contaminated land register. However, TfNSW had not analysed specific technical information about the contamination and therefore was not aware of the risk implications and cost for remediation. Despite this, TfNSW changed its position from not accepting the risks and costs of contamination, to acquiring the site unconditionally. The basis for this decision is unclear and undocumented.

Briefing to senior leaders on the acquisition was silent on a number of important matters that would have been important for approvers to consider, including:

  • an explanation of the 40 per cent increase in purchase price between November 2015 and May 2016, and a 165 per cent increase from TfNSW’s offer in April 2015
  • the contamination risks associated with the site and an evidence-based estimate of potential costs to remediate the site
  • advice that an independent valuation had not been obtained, inconsistent with TfNSW policy.

Consideration of the acquisition by FIC was based on a summary business paper and was managed out-of-session, thereby removing the ability for comprehensive consideration of the acquisition proposal and its risks.

The probity management controls and assurances in place for the acquisition of the 4–6 Grand Avenue site were insufficient. These insufficiencies were exacerbated by the probity risk profile of the transaction.

The 4–6 Grand Avenue acquisition was a high-risk/high-value transaction, undertaken in a volatile property market in a short timeframe under pressure from Grand 4 Investments. TfNSW was engaging in a direct negotiation in advance of detailed planning for the acquisition, or the PLR as a whole. These circumstances contribute to heightened probity risk.

TfNSW did not establish a probity plan and sought no probity support throughout the acquisition. Also, with one exception, the staff involved in the acquisition did not complete conflict of interest declarations.

TfNSW was aware of the potential for probity or integrity issues with the transaction when it commissioned an internal audit in connection with the transaction in 2019. Internal discussions considered whether a misconduct investigation may be more appropriate, however no such investigation was undertaken.

TfNSW's insufficient probity practices, in addition to its failure to keep complete or comprehensive records of negotiations or decisions, reduce transparency of the process and its outcome and expose TfNSW to a greater risk of misconduct, corruption and maladministration.

At the time of the transaction, the TfNSW policy framework was not sufficiently risk-focussed and did not provide clarity on when officers ought to apply specific guidance or procedures. TfNSW's policies and procedures are more focussed on acquiring land to meet project needs and timeframes, and less on assuring value for money and managing risks.

At the time of its acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue, TfNSW had property acquisitions policies and procedures in place. Each of these were broadly sound in their content and intent. However, they lacked specificity on how or when to apply guidance, and when risk levels should elevate the importance of recommended guidance.

TfNSW's key guidance was principles based and relied on agency staff using their experience and expertise to apply guidance according to the circumstances of an individual transaction. This guidance was not duly applied in the acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia. In addition, TfNSW does not have quality or control assurance to identify when TfNSW officers did not apply important policies or processes.

The primary focus of the TfNSW’s property acquisition guidance is to achieve vacant possession of land in a timeframe that meets the need of the relevant transport project. There is less specific focus on the need to meet the requirements of the NSW Government financial management framework.

Appendix one – Response from agency 

Appendix two – About the audit 

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Copyright Notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #349 - released (18 May 2021).

Published

Actions for Service NSW's handling of personal information

Service NSW's handling of personal information

Premier and Cabinet
Finance
Cyber security
Fraud
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining the effectiveness of Service NSW’s handling of customers’ personal information to ensure its privacy.

The audit found that Service NSW is not effectively handling personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy. Service NSW continues to use business processes that pose a risk to the privacy of personal information. This includes the routine emailing of personal information between Service NSW service centres and other agencies, which is one of the processes that contributed to the data breach earlier this year. The audit found that previously identified risks and recommended solutions had not been implemented on a timely basis.

The Auditor-General made eight recommendations aimed at ensuring improved processes, technologies, and governance arrangements for how Service NSW handles customers’ personal information.

The Hon. Victor Dominello, MP, Minister for Customer Service, requested this audit under section 27(B)(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 following public reports in May 2020 of a cyber security attack which had led to a breach of Service NSW customer information. This audit also included the Department of Customer Service which supports Service NSW with privacy, risk and governance functions.

Service NSW was established in 2013 with the intention that it would, over time, 'become the primary interaction point for customers accessing New South Wales Government transaction services'.

Service NSW's functions are set out in the Service NSW (One stop Access to Government Services) Act 2013. This legislation allows for other NSW Government agencies to delegate to and enter into agreements with the Chief Executive Officer of Service NSW in order for Service NSW to undertake service functions for the agency.

Service NSW now has agreements with 36 NSW Government client agencies to facilitate over 1,200 types of interactions and transactions for the community.

The nature of each agreement between Service NSW and its client agencies varies. Some client agencies have delegated authority to allow Service NSW staff to conduct transactions on their behalf in the agencies' systems. Other arrangements do not include the same degree of delegation. In these cases, Service NSW provides services such as responding to enquiries and validating documents.

In addition, Service NSW conducts transactions for its own programs, such as the Seniors Card. Personal information for these programs, as well as information for customers' MyServiceNSW accounts, are stored by Service NSW on its Salesforce Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system.

In March 2020, Service NSW suffered two cyber security attacks in short succession. Technical analysis undertaken by the Department of Customer Service (DCS) concluded that these attacks resulted from a phishing exercise through which external threat actors gained access to the email accounts of 47 staff members. These attacks resulted in the breach of a large amount of personal customer information that was contained in these email accounts. See Section 1.1 for further details.

This audit is being conducted in response to a request from the Hon. Victor Dominello, Minister for Customer Service, under section 27B(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983. Minister Dominello requested that the Auditor General conduct a performance audit in relation to Service NSW's handling of sensitive customer and business information.

This audit assessed how effectively Service NSW handles personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy.

It addressed the following:

  • Does Service NSW have processes and governance in place to identify and manage risks to the privacy of personal customer and business information?
  • Does Service NSW have policies, processes and systems in place that support the effective handling of personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy?
  • Has Service NSW effectively implemented its policies, processes and systems for managing personal customer and business information?

Conclusion

Service NSW is not effectively handling personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy. It continues to use business processes that pose a risk to the privacy of personal information. These include routinely emailing personal customer information to client agencies, which is one of the processes that contributed to the March 2020 data breach. Previously identified risks and recommended solutions had not been implemented on a timely basis.

Service NSW identifies privacy as a strategic risk in both its Risk Management Guideline and enterprise risk register and sets out a zero level appetite for privacy risk in its risk appetite statement. That said, the governance, policies, and processes established by Service NSW to mitigate privacy risk are not effective in ensuring the privacy of personal customer and business information. While Service NSW had risk identification and management processes in place at the time of the March 2020 data breach, these did not prevent the breach occurring.

Some of the practices that contributed to the data breach are still being followed by Service NSW staff. For example, business processes still require Service NSW staff to scan and email personal information to some client agencies.

The lack of multi factor authentication has been identified as another key contributing factor to the March 2020 data breach as this enabled the external threat actors to gain access to staff email accounts once they had obtained the user account details through a phishing exercise. Service NSW had identified the lack of multi factor authentication on its webmail platform as a risk more than a year prior to the breach and had committed to addressing this by June 2019. It was not implemented until after the breach occurred.

There are weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system, which holds the personal information of over four million NSW residents.

Internal audits carried out by Service NSW, including one completed in August 2020, have identified significant weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce CRM system. These include deficiencies in the management of role based access, monitoring and audit of user access, and partitioning of program specific transaction information. These deficiencies create an increased risk of unauthorised access to the personal information of over four million customers held in the system.

Lines of responsibility for meeting privacy obligations are not clearly drawn between Service NSW and its client agencies.

Service NSW has agreements in place with client agencies. However, the agreements lack detail and clarity about the roles and responsibilities of the agencies in relation to the collection, storage and security of customer's personal information. This lack of clarity raises the risk that privacy obligations will become confused and missed between the agencies.

Service NSW carries out privacy impact assessments for major new projects but does not routinely review existing processes and systems.

Service NSW carries out privacy impact assessments as part of its routine processes for implementing major new projects, ensuring that privacy management is considered as part of project design. Service NSW does not regularly undertake privacy impact assessments or reviews of existing or legacy processes and systems, which has resulted in some processes continuing despite posing significant risks to the privacy of personal information, such as the scanning, emailing, and storing of identification documents.

1. Key findings

Service NSW identifies privacy risks, but the controls and processes it put in place to mitigate these privacy risks were not adequate to prevent or limit the extent of the data breach that occurred in March 2020

Service NSW’s approach to risk management is framed by its Risk Management Guideline, which defines 'privacy and compliance' as one of the key types of risk for the agency. Service NSW's enterprise risk register identifies four strategic privacy related risks. Service NSW has set out a zero level appetite for privacy risk in its risk appetite statement.

Service NSW has assessed the adequacy of its controls for privacy risks as needing improvement. To be fully effective, the Risk Management Guideline says that these controls should have a focus that is ‘largely preventative and address the root causes’.

One of the business processes that was a key contributing factor to the data breach was the emailing of personal information by Service NSW staff to client agencies.

This process had been identified as a risk prior to the breach and some steps had been put in place to mitigate the risk. In particular, staff were required to manually delete emails that contained personal information. However, these measures were ineffective in preventing the breach, as the external threat actors still gained access to 47 staff email accounts that contained a large amount of personal information.

It is unclear why Service NSW did not effectively mitigate this risk prior to the breaches. However, Service NSW has advised that it implemented measures in June and October 2020 to automatically archive emails likely to contain personal information. This is expected to limit the quantity of information retained in email accounts for extended periods.

Service NSW has not put in place any technical or other solutions to avoid Service NSW staff having to scan and email personal information to some client agencies. Urgent action is needed to remove the requirement for staff to email personal information to client agencies, thereby mitigating the risk inherent in sending and storing this information using email.

There are weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce CRM system, which holds the personal information of over four million customers

There are weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce CRM system. These weaknesses include deficiencies in governance of role based access, monitoring and audit of staff access, and partitioning of program specific transaction information. These deficiencies create an increased risk of unauthorised access to the personal information of over four million customers which is stored in this system.

In addition, there is an absence of important controls to safeguard customers' privacy, such as multi factor authentication and reviewable logs of access history to their information. Such controls, when properly implemented, would enhance the control that customers are able to exercise over their personal information.

A privacy impact assessment conducted on Service NSW’s Salesforce CRM system in 2015 recommended that the system include the ability for customers to review access history to their personal information, as well as the option for customers to apply multi factor authentication to their accounts. While both these recommendations appeared positively received by Service NSW, neither have been implemented.

Since its inception, Service NSW’s use of Salesforce has extended to storing transaction data, particularly for transactions for which Service NSW is responsible, such as the Seniors Card. It also holds details of over four million MyServiceNSW account holders, including name, email address and phone number, and optional address details. It was not originally intended for the system to hold this volume and nature of customer information.

Lines of responsibility for meeting privacy obligations are unclear between Service NSW and its client agencies

Service NSW's privacy management plan does not clearly set out the privacy obligations of Service NSW and its client agencies. It sets out that 'compliance with the privacy principles will primarily be the responsibility of that [client] agency'. However, Service NSW has its own obligations under the security principles of the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (PPIP Act) to take reasonable steps to prevent unauthorised access to personal information, which is not made clear in the privacy management plan.

The agreements between Service NSW and client agencies reviewed for this audit only include general and high level references to privacy. Most do not include details of each parties' privacy responsibilities such as: which agency will provide the customer with a privacy notice explaining how their personal information will be handled, how personal information will be kept secure, how long Service NSW will retain information, what processes will be followed for internal reviews, and what specific planning is in place to respond to data breaches.

Service NSW's privacy management plan has not been updated to include new programs and governance changes

Service NSW's privacy management plan includes most of the matters required by law or good practice, with some exceptions. It does not explain any exemptions that the agency commonly relies on under the PPIP Act and does not address any health information that Service NSW may handle. It had also not been updated to reflect governance changes and the fact that, at the time this audit commenced, Service NSW was disclosing the content of internal review applications (the formal expression for 'complaints') to the Department of Customer Service (DCS). These governance changes were part of the centralisation of Service NSW's corporate support functions into DCS in late 2019, though internal review staff were seconded back into Service NSW during the course of this audit.

The current July 2019 privacy management plan has also not been updated since the rollout of a number of major new initiatives in 2020. These include 2019–20 bushfire emergency recovery initiatives (such as small business grants) and COVID 19 pandemic response initiatives (such as small business grants, border permits and the COVID safe check in app).

Service NSW routinely conducts privacy impact assessments for new initiatives, though privacy risks remain in legacy systems and processes

Service NSW routinely conducts privacy impact assessments for major new initiatives and the assessments reviewed for this audit largely accorded with good practice guidance.

Service NSW does not routinely review existing processes and systems to ensure that they are effective in ensuring the privacy of customer personal information. Business processes that create the highest risk to privacy, such as emailing of personal information, are more common in these longstanding legacy systems.

Service NSW's significant and rapid growth has outpaced the establishment of a robust control environment which has exacerbated privacy risks

Since it was established in 2013, Service NSW has experienced significant growth in the number and diversity of the types of transactions it provides, as well as the number of client agencies with which it works. The pace and extent of this growth has contributed to important controls not being properly implemented on a timely basis, which has heightened privacy risks, particularly in regard to existing, legacy systems and processes.

The pace of change and increasing demand for new program implementation has limited the opportunity for Service NSW, in collaboration with its client agencies, to revisit and redesign legacy business practices which pose a greater privacy risk. This includes the scanning and emailing of personal information.

While 2019–20 has seen additional demands placed on Service NSW in responding to the 2019–20 bushfire emergency and COVID 19 pandemic, it is the nature of the agency’s work that it operates in a fast paced and complex environment, where it is required to respond to multiple client agencies and stakeholders. Ensuring customer privacy should be integral to Service NSW’s business as usual operations.

2. Recommendations

Service NSW commissioned a number of external reviews and investigations stemming from the data breaches. The Auditor General's recommendations below have taken these other reviews into account. In order to offer assurance that it is appropriately protecting the privacy of its customers, Service NSW should address the full breadth of findings and recommendations made across all relevant reviews.

As a matter of urgency, Service NSW should:

1. in consultation with relevant client agencies and the Department of Customer Service, implement a solution for a secure method of transferring personal information between Service NSW and client agencies

2. review the need to store scanned copies of personal information and, if still required, implement a more secure method of storing this information and regular deletion of material.

By March 2021, Service NSW should:

3. ensure that all new agreements entered into with client agencies from 1 April 2021 address the deficiencies identified in this audit, including that they provide clarity on:

  • the content and provision of privacy collection notices
  • the terms by which personal information will be retained, stored, archived, and disposed of when no longer required
  • steps that will be taken by each agency to ensure that personal information is kept secure
  • the circumstances in which, and processes by which, applications for internal review will be referred by one agency to the other
  • how identified breaches of privacy will be handled between agencies

4. in collaboration with the Department of Customer Service, review its privacy management plan to address the deficiencies raised in this audit, including:

  • to clarify Service NSW's understanding of how responsibility for meeting privacy obligations are delineated between Service NSW and client agencies
  • to better reflect the full scope and complexity of personal information handled by Service NSW
  • to better explain how applications for internal review are handled between Service NSW and the Department of Customer Service
  • to ensure regular ongoing review, either according to a schedule or when Service NSW experiences substantial change to its programs and handling of personal information

5. in consultation with the Department of Customer Service, review its policies and processes for the management of privacy risks, including to:

  • ensure that there are appropriate mechanisms to escalate identified privacy risks from business units to the Executive Leadership Team
  • ensure that there are action plans to address strategic privacy risks that are assessed as having ineffective controls.
By June 2021, Service NSW should:

6. address deficiencies in the controls over, and security for, its Salesforce customer relationship management and related systems that hold customer personal information, including:

  • establish policies and processes for regular access reviews and monitoring of user activity in these systems, including for privileged users
  • enable partitioning and role based access restrictions to personal information collected for different programs
  • provide customers the choice to use multi factor authentication to further secure their MyServiceNSW accounts
  • enable customers to view the transaction history of their personal information to detect possible mishandling.
By December 2021, Service NSW should:

7. ensure that all existing agreements with client agencies address the deficiencies identified in this audit, including that they provide clarity on:

  • the content and provision of privacy collection notices
  • the terms by which personal information will be retained, stored, archived, and disposed of when no longer required
  • steps that will be taken by each agency to ensure that personal information is kept secure
  • the circumstances in which, and processes by which, applications for internal review will be referred by one agency to the other
  • how identified breaches of privacy will be handled between agencies

8. carry out a risk assessment of all processes, systems and transactions that involve the handling of personal information and undertake a privacy impact assessment for those that:

  • are identified as high risk and have not previously had a privacy impact assessment
  • have had major changes or updates since the privacy impact assessment was completed.

Appendix one – Responses from agencies

Appendix two – About the audit

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Health 2019

Health 2019

Health
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Fraud
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management

This report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial audits of the Ministry of Health, local health districts, specialty health networks, health corporations and independent health agencies in New South Wales. The report also summarises self-reported performance measures across the network.

The number and value of adjustments to financial statements of entities in the Health Cluster decreased from the prior year. And unqualified audit opinions were issued for all heath entities’ financial statements.

Audit findings relating to internal controls deficiencies increased across health entities. Contributing to this increase were deficiencies in information system controls, which accounted for nearly a quarter of all control deficiencies. Repeat audit findings also accounted for more than a quarter of all control deficiencies.

The report notes health entities continued to experience challenges with managing employees’ excessive annual leave and time recording practices. The Ambulance Service of New South Wales continued to report high overtime payments to its employees. 

Download Health 2019 report (PDF).

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the agencies comprising the Health cluster for the year ended 30 June 2019. The table below summarises our key observations.

1. Machinery of Government changes

Cluster changes Machinery of Government (MoG) changes refer to how the government reorganises agency structures and functions and realigns ministerial responsibilities. The Health cluster was not impacted by the MoG changes.

2. Financial reporting

Financial reporting

The financial statements of NSW Health and its controlled entities received unqualified audit opinions before the legislative deadline.

The number of corrected and uncorrected misstatements decreased from the prior year.

Management implemented more robust processes for its oversight of complex asset revaluations in 2018–19. We found no significant errors in 2018–19.

Financial performance Overall, NSW Health recorded an operating surplus of $1.1 billion in 2018–19, an increase of $699 million from 2017–18. This was the result of additional funding received for capital expenditure on the construction of new facilities, upgrades and redevelopments.

Budgeted expense for the 15 local health districts and two speciality networks increased from $18.3 billion to $19.4 billion in 2018–19. The 15 health entities recorded unfavourable variances between actual and budgeted expenses.
Excess annual leave

Managing excess annual leave remains a challenge for NSW Health, 36.9 per cent of the workforce have excess annual leave balances.

Recommendation: Health entities should further review their approach to managing excess annual leave in 2019–20, and:

  • monitor current and projected leave balances to the end of the financial year on a monthly basis
  • agree formal leave plans with employees to reduce leave balances over an acceptable timeframe
  • encourage staff who perform key control functions to take at least two consecutive weeks’ leave a year to mitigate fraud risks.
Overtime payments NSW Health entities generally manage overtime well. The Ambulance Service of NSW’s overtime payments of $83.1 million (9.8 per cent of total salaries and wages), remain significantly higher than other health entities.

Recommendation: The Ambulance Service of NSW should further review the effectiveness of its rostering practices to identify strategies to reduce overtime payments.

3. Audit observations

Internal control deficiencies We identified more internal control deficiencies in 2018–19. The number of repeat issues from prior years also remains high with more than one quarter of issues having been previously reported. More than a quarter of deficiencies related to information system controls.
Infrastructure delivery NSW Health defines projects with a budgeted cost greater than $50.0 million as 'major projects'. There were significant revisions to planned financial completion dates and budgeted costs of these projects. The revised total budgets for the 30 ongoing major capital projects at 30 June 2019 is $10.2 billion, $2.2 billion more than the original budget.
Health Infrastructure completed three major capital projects during 2018–19.
Asset maintenance The total cost of maintaining the health entities’ $19.8 billion of assets was $635 million for 2018–19. Health entities' approaches to setting maintenance budgets vary. Most entities are addressing their backlog maintenance, although many were not able to quantify the full extent of their backlog maintenance. Although health entities continue to use fully depreciated assets, the replacement cost of these assets is decreasing.

 

 

This report provides parliament and other users of the financial statements of agencies within the Health cluster with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas for the year ended 30 June 2019:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations. 

 The Health cluster was not impacted by the Machinery of Government changes on 1 July 2019. 

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the health cluster for 2019.

Section highlights

  • We issued unqualified audit opinions for all health entities’ financial statements and identified fewer misstatement than last year. Health entities continue to meet statutory deadlines.
  • The Ministry of Health sets significant accounting policies centrally and provides a template for the preparation of health entities’ financial statements. These processes promote consistent quality in the financial reports of health entities and reduce the number of misstatements we identify.
  • NSW Health recorded an operating surplus of $1.1 billion, an increase of $699 million from 2017–18. This is because of additional capital grants for new facilities, upgrades and redevelopments. The capital replacement ratio (investment in new assets divided by depreciation) for NSW Health is 2.6.
  • NSW Health’s expenses increased by 7.0 per cent in 2018–19 (5.5 per cent in 2017–18). This is one percentage point higher than the projected long-term annual expense growth rate of six per cent. The primary causes for the growth in expenses are increased:
    • employee related expenses because provisions for employee benefits increased when the discount rate decreased
    • operating expenses associated with the opening of Northern Beaches Hospital.
  • Excess annual leave balances continue to increase for the NSW Health workforce, with excess annual leave balances impacting 37 per cent of employees (34 per cent in 2017–18).
  • Health entities should further review their approach to managing excess annual leave in 2019–20 by monitoring current and projected leave balances on a regular basis, agreeing formal leave plans with employees and encouraging staff that perform key control functions to take a minimum of two consecutive weeks’ leave a year as a fraud mitigation strategy.
  • The Ambulance Services continued to report overtime payments higher than other health entities. The Ambulance Service paid its employees $83.1 million in overtime payments in 2018–19 ($74.8 million in 2017–18).
  • We issued a qualified audit opinion for the Ministry of Health's Annual Prudential Compliance Statement for aged care facilities operated by NSW Health. We identified 40 instances of material non-compliance with the Fees and Payments Principles 2014 (No. 2) (the Principles) in 2018–19 (17 in 2017–18).

Audit opinions 

We issued unqualified audit opinions for all health entities and quality of financial reporting continues to improve

We identified fewer misstatements this year, and the errors were less significant. In 2018–19 no errors exceeded $5.0 million (eight errors recorded in 2017–18). Ten health entities conducted a full revaluation of their land, buildings and infrastructure systems in 2018–19, but more robust processes avoided the errors identified in the previous year.

Number of misstatements
Year ended 30 June 2019 2018 2017
  green circle with white tick red circle with white exclamation mark green circle with white tick red circle with white exclamation mark green circle with white tick red circle with white exclamation mark
Less than $50,000 -- -- -- 6 3 3
$50,000 to $249,999 -- 1 -- -- 2 3
$250,000 to $999,999 1 -- -- -- 1 3
$1 million to $4,999,999 -- 2 -- 2 1 5
$5 million and greater -- -- 6 2 1 2
Total number of misstatements 1 3 6 10 8 16

green circle white tick Corrected mistatements. red circle white exclamation mark Uncorrected statements.
Source: Statutory Audit Reports issued by the Audit Office.

We issued a qualified audit opinion for our compliance audit of the Ministry of Health's Annual Prudential Compliance Statement

The Ministry of Health operates eight aged care facilities in NSW and is required to comply with the Fees and Payments Principles 2014 (No. 2) (the Principles) when entering into agreements with and managing payments to and from care recipients. The Principles are set by the Commonwealth Assistant Minister for Social Services. We identified 40 instances of material non-compliance in 2018–19, including:

  • not agreeing maximum accommodation amounts payable with aged care recipients before they entered the residential care services
  • not entering into accommodation agreements with care recipients within the specified period
  • charging incorrect fees for activities or services to one care recipient
  • not refunding two bond balances within the statutory framework
  • not paying the correct amount of interest for 14 care recipients’ bonds refunded during the year.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the health cluster.

Section highlights

  • The number of internal control deficiencies has increased since 2017–18. More than a quarter of control deficiencies are repeat issues and almost a quarter relate to information system controls. Both employee time recording and leave management remain as repeat issues in 2018–19.
  • Control deficiencies that relate to managing employees' leave, employees’ time recording or information system limitations can be difficult for entities to resolve in a timely manner.
  • Agreements for the treatment of New South Wales residents while they are interstate, and interstate residents while they are in New South Wales, are unsigned for Queensland, Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory for 2016–17, 2017–18 and 2018–19.
  • NSW Health recorded $113.6 million in revenue from fees charged to Medicare ineligible patients during 2018–19 but has received payment for less than half of this.
  • NSW Health reported that they completed three major capital projects during 2018–19.
  • As at 30 June 2019 there were 30 ongoing major capital health projects in NSW. The revised capital budget for these projects in total was $2.2 billion more than the original budget of $8.0 billion.
  • Health entities spent $635 million maintaining assets with a fair value of $19.8 billion of assets. Almost all entities were working through backlog maintenance during 2018–19, although several were unable to quantify the backlog.
  • While entities are now regularly reassessing the useful lives of their assets, entities are still using a high volume of assets that are fully depreciated. Due to the age and nature of these assets the impact was not material.

Appendix one – List of 2019 recommendations

Appendix two – Status of 2018 recommendations

Appendix three – Financial data 

Appendix four – Analysis of financial indicators

Appendix five – Analysis of performance against budget

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Internal Controls and Governance 2019

Internal Controls and Governance 2019

Education
Community Services
Finance
Health
Industry
Justice
Planning
Premier and Cabinet
Transport
Treasury
Whole of Government
Compliance
Cyber security
Fraud
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management

This report covers the findings and recommendations from the 2018–19 financial audits that relate to internal controls and governance at 40 of the largest agencies in the NSW public sector. The 40 agencies selected for this report constitute around 84 per cent of total expenditure for all NSW public sector agencies.

The report provides insights into the effectiveness of controls and governance processes across the NSW public sector. It evaluates how agencies identify, mitigate and manage risks related to:

  • financial controls
  • information technology controls
  • gifts and benefits
  • internal audit
  • contingent labour
  • sensitive data.

The Auditor-General recommended that agencies do more to prioritise and address vulnerabilities in their internal controls and governance. The Auditor-General also recommended agencies increase the transparency of their management of gifts and benefits by publishing their registers on their websites.

This report analyses the internal controls and governance of 40 of the largest agencies in the NSW public sector for the year ended 30 June 2019.

1. Internal control trends

New, repeat and high risk findings

There was an increase in internal control deficiencies of 12 per cent compared to last year. The increase is predominately due to a 100 per cent increase in repeat financial and IT control deficiencies.

Some agencies attributed the delay in actioning repeat findings to the diversion of staff from their regular activities to implement and operationalise the recent Machinery of Government changes. As a result, actions to address audit recommendations have been deferred or re prioritised, as the changes are implemented.

Agencies need to ensure they are actively managing the risks associated with having these vulnerabilities in internal control systems unaddressed for extended periods of time.

Common findings

A number of findings were common to multiple agencies. These findings often related to areas that are fundamental to good internal control environments and effective organisational governance, such as:

  • out of date policies or an absence of policies to guide appropriate decisions
  • poor record keeping and document retention
  • incomplete or inaccurate centralised registers or gaps in these registers
  • policies, procedures or controls no longer suited to the current organisational structure or business activities.

2. Information technology controls

IT general controls

We examined information security controls over key financial systems that support the preparation of agency financial statements. We found:

  • user access administration deficiencies at 58 per cent of agencies related to granting, review and removal of user access
  • an absence of privileged user activity reviews at 35 per cent of agencies
  • password controls that did not align to password policies at 20 per cent of agencies.

We also found 20 per cent of agencies had deficient IT program change controls, mainly related to segregation of duties in approval and authorisation processes, and user acceptance testing of program changes prior to deployment into production environments. User acceptance testing helps identify potential issues with software incompatibility, operational workflows, absent controls and software issues, as well as areas where training or user support may be required.

3. Gifts and benefits

Gifts and benefits registers

All agencies had a gifts and benefits policy and 90 per cent of agencies maintain a gifts and benefits register. However, 51 per cent of the gifts and benefits registers we examined contained incomplete declarations, such as missing details for the approving officer, value of the gift and/or benefit offered and reasons supporting the decision.

In some cases, gaps in recorded information meant the basis for decisions around gifts and benefits was not always clear, making it difficult to determine whether decisions in those instances were appropriate, compliant with policy and were not direct or indirect inducements to the recipients to favour suppliers or service providers.

Agencies should ensure their gifts and benefits register includes all key fields specified in the Public Service Commission's minimum standards for gifts and benefits. Agencies should also perform regular reviews of the register to ensure completeness and ensure any gift or benefit accepted by a staff member meets the public's expectations for ethical behaviour.

Managing gifts and benefits

We found opportunities to improve gifts and benefits processes and enhance transparency. For example, only three per cent of agencies publish their gifts and benefits registers on their websites.

Agencies can improve management of gifts and benefits by:

  • ensuring agency policies comprehensively cover the elements necessary to make it effective in an operational environment, such as identifying risks specific to the agency and actions that will be taken in the event of a policy breach
  • establishing and publishing a statement of business ethics on the agency's website to clearly communicate expected behaviours to clients, customers, suppliers and contractors
  • providing on-going training, awareness activities and support to employees, not just at induction
  • publishing their gifts and benefits registers on their websites to demonstrate a commitment to a transparently ethical environment.
Reporting and monitoring

Only 35 per cent of agencies reported trends in the number and nature of gifts and benefits recorded in their registers to the agency's senior executive management and/or a governance committee.

Agencies should regularly report to the agency executive or other governance committee on trends in the offer and acceptance of gifts and benefits.

4. Internal audit

Obtaining value from the internal audit function

Agencies have established and maintained internal audit functions to provide assurance on the effectiveness of agency controls and governance systems. However, we identified areas where agencies' internal audit functions could improve their processes to add greater value. For example, only 73 per cent of CAEs regularly attend meetings of the agency board or executive management committee.

Internal audit functions can add greater value by involving the CAE more extensively in executive forums as an observer.

Internal audit functions should also consider producing an annual report on internal audit. An annual report allows the internal audit function to report on their performance and add value by drawing to the attention of audit and risk committees and senior management strategic issues, thematic trends and emerging risks.

Role of the Chief Audit Executive

Forty-five per cent of agencies assigned responsibilities to the Chief Audit Executive (CAE) that were broader than internal audit, but 17 per cent of these had not documented safeguards to protect the independence of the CAE.

The reporting lines and status of the CAE at some agencies also needs review. At two agencies, the CAE reported to the CFO.

Agencies should ensure:

  • the reporting lines for the CAE comply with the NSW Treasury policy, and the CAE does not report functionally or administratively to the finance function or other significant recipients of internal audit services
  • the CAE's duties are compatible with preserving their independence and where threats to independence exist, safeguards are documented and approved.
Quality assurance and improvement program

Thirty-five per cent of agencies did not have a documented quality assurance and improvement program for its internal audit function.

The policy and the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing require agencies to have a documented quality assurance and improvement program. The results of this program should be reported annually.

Agencies should ensure there is a documented and operational Quality Assurance and Improvement Program for the internal audit function that covers both internal and external assessments.

5. Managing contingent labour

Obtaining value for money from contingent labour

According to NSW Procurement data, spend on contingent labour has increased by 75 per cent over the last five years, to $1.5 billion in 2018–19. Improvements in internal processes and a renewed focus on agency monitoring and oversight of contingent labour can help ensure agencies get the best value for money from their contingent workforces.

Agencies can improve their management of contingent labour by:

  • preparing workforce plans to inform their resourcing strategy and ensure that engaging contingent labour aligns with the strategy and best meets business needs
  • involving agency human resources units in decisions about engaging contingent labour
  • regularly reporting on contingent labour use and tenure to agency executive teams
  • strengthening on-boarding and off-boarding processes.

We also found 57 per cent of the 23 agencies we examined with contingent labour spend of more than $5 million in 2018–19 have implemented the government's vendor management system and service provider 'Contractor Central'.

6. Managing sensitive data

Identifying and assessing sensitive data

Sixty-eight per cent of agencies maintain an inventory of their sensitive data and where it resides. However, these inventories are not always complete and risks may be overlooked.

Agencies can improve processes to manage sensitive data by:

  • identifying and maintaining an inventory of sensitive data through a comprehensive and structured process
  • assessing the criticality and sensitivity of the data so that protection of high risk data can be prioritised.
Managing data breaches

Eighty-eight per cent of agencies have established policies to respond to potential data breaches when they are identified and 70 per cent of agencies maintain a register to record key information in relation to identified data breach incidents.

Agencies should maintain a data breach register to effectively manage the actions undertaken to contain, evaluate and remediate each data breach.

 

This report covers the findings and recommendations from our 2018–19 financial audits that relate to internal controls and governance at 40 of the largest agencies (refer to Appendix three) in the NSW public sector. The 40 agencies selected for this volume constitute around 84 per cent of total expenditure for all NSW public sector agencies.

Although the report includes several agencies that have changed as a result of the Machinery of Government changes that were effective from 1 July 2019, its focus on sector wide issues and insights means that its findings remain relevant to NSW public sector agencies, including newly formed agencies that have assumed the functions of abolished agencies.

This report offers insights into internal controls and governance in the NSW public sector

This is the third report dedicated to internal controls and governance at NSW State Government agencies. The report provides insights into the effectiveness of controls and governance processes in the NSW public sector by:

  • highlighting the potential risks posed by weaknesses in controls and governance processes
  • helping agencies benchmark the adequacy of their processes against their peers
  • focusing on new and emerging risks, and the internal controls and governance processes that might address those risks.

Without strong governance systems and internal controls, agencies increase the risks associated with effectively managing their finances and delivering services to citizens. For example, if they do not have strong information technology controls, sensitive information may be at risk of unauthorised access and misuse.

Areas of specific focus of the report have changed since last year

Last year's report topics included transparency and performance reporting, management of purchasing cards and taxi use, and fraud and corruption control. We are reporting on new topics this year and re-visiting agency management of gifts and benefits, which we first covered in our 2017 report. Re-visiting topics from prior years provides a baseline to show the NSW public sectors’ progress implementing appropriate internal controls and governance processes to mitigate existing, new and emerging risks in the public sector.

Our audits do not review all aspects of internal controls and governance every year. We select a range of measures and report on those that present heightened risks for agencies to mitigate. This year the report focusses on:

  • internal control trends
  • information technology controls, including access to agency systems
  • protecting sensitive information held within agencies
  • managing large and diverse workforces (controls around employing and managing contingent workers)
  • maintaining an ethical culture (management of gifts and benefits)
  • effectiveness of internal audit function and its oversight by Audit and Risk Committees.

The findings in this report should not be used to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of individual agency control environments and governance arrangements. Specific financial reporting, internal controls and audit observations are included in the individual 2019 cluster financial audit reports, which will be tabled in parliament from November to December 2019.

Internal controls are processes, policies and procedures that help agencies to:

  • operate effectively and efficiently
  • produce reliable financial reports
  • comply with laws and regulations
  • support ethical government.

This chapter outlines the overall trends for agency controls and governance issues, including the number of audit findings, the degree of risk those deficiencies pose to the agency, and a summary of the most common deficiencies we found across agencies. The rest of this report presents this year’s controls and governance findings in more detail.

Key conclusions and sector wide learnings

We identified four high risk findings, compared to six last year. None of the findings are common with those in the previous year. There was an overall increase of 12 per cent in the number of internal control deficiencies compared to last year. The increase is predominately due to a 100 per cent increase in the number of repeat financial and IT control deficiencies.
 
Some agencies attributed the delay in actioning repeat findings to the diversion of staff from their regular activities to implement and operationalise the recent Machinery of Government changes. As a result, actions to address audit recommendations have been deferred or re-prioritised, as the changes are implemented. Agencies need to ensure they are actively managing the risks associated with having these vulnerabilities in internal control systems unaddressed for extended periods of time.
 
We also identified a number of findings that were common to multiple agencies. These common findings often related to areas that are fundamental to good internal control environments and effective organisational governance. Examples include:
  • out of date policies or an absence of policies to guide appropriate decisions
  • poor record keeping and document retention
  • incomplete or inaccurate centralised registers or gaps in these registers.

Policies, procedures and internal controls should be properly designed, be appropriate for the current organisational structure and its business activities, and work effectively.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency controls to manage key financial systems.

Key conclusions and sector wide learnings
Government agencies’ financial reporting is heavily reliant on information technology (IT). We continue to see a high number of deficiencies related to IT general controls, particularly those related to user access administration. These controls are key in adequately protecting IT systems from inappropriate access and misuse.
IT is also important to the delivery of agency services. These systems often provide the data to help monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of agency processes and services they deliver. Our financial audits do not review all agency IT systems. For example, IT systems used to support agency service delivery are generally outside the scope of our financial audit. However, agencies should also consider the relevance of our findings to these systems.
Agencies need to continue to focus on assessing the risks of inappropriate access and misuse and the implementation of controls to adequately protect their systems, focussing on the processes in place to grant, remove and monitor user access, particularly privileged user access.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency controls to manage gifts and benefits. 

Key conclusions and sector wide learnings

We found most agencies have implemented the Public Service Commission's minimum standards for gifts and benefits. All agencies had a gifts and benefits policy and 90 per cent of agencies maintained a gifts and benefits register and provided some form of training to employees on the treatment of gifts and benefits.

Based on our analysis of agency registers, we found some areas where opportunities existed to make processes more effective. In some cases, gaps in recorded information meant the basis for decisions around gifts and benefits was not always clear, making it difficult to determine whether decisions in those instances were appropriate and compliant with policy. Fifty-one per cent of the gifts and benefits registers reviewed contained declarations where not all fields of information had been completed. Seventy-seven per cent of agencies that maintained a gifts and benefits register did not include all key fields suggested by the minimum standards.

Areas where agencies can improve their management of gifts and benefits include:

  • ensuring agency policies comprehensively cover the elements necessary to make it effective in an operational environment, such as identifying risks specific to the agency and actions that will be taken in the event of a policy breach
  • establishing and publishing a statement of business ethics on the agency's website to clearly communicate expected behaviours to clients, customers,suppliers and contractors
  • updating gifts and benefits registers to include all key fields suggested by the minimum standards, as well as performing regular reviews of the register to ensure completeness
  • providing on-going training, awareness activities and support to employees, not just at induction
  • regularly reporting gifts and benefits to executive management and/or a governance committee such as the audit and risk committee, focussing on trends in the number and types of gifts and benefits offered to and accepted by agency staff
  • publishing their gifts and benefits registers on their websites to demonstrate a commitment to a transparently ethical environment.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency internal audit functions.

Key conclusions and sector wide learnings 

We found agencies have established and maintained internal audit functions to provide assurance on the effectiveness of agency controls and governance systems as required by TPP15-03 'Internal Audit and Risk Management Policy for the NSW Public Sector'. However, we identified areas where agencies' internal audit functions could improve their processes to add greater value, including: 

  • documenting and implementing safeguards to address conflicting roles performed by the Chief Audit Executive (CAE)
  • ensuring the reporting lines for the CAE comply with the NSW Treasury policy, and the CAE reports neither functionally or administratively to the finance function or other significant recipients of internal audit services
  • involving the CAE more extensively in executive forums as an observer
  • documenting a Quality Assurance and Improvement Program for the internal audit function and performing both internal and external performance assessments to identify opportunities for continuous improvement
  • reporting against key performance indicators or a balanced scorecard and producing an annual report on internal audit to bring to the attention of the audit and risk committee and senior management strategic issues, thematic trends and emerging risks that may require further attention or resources.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency controls to on-board, manage and off-board contingent labour.

Key conclusions and sector wide learnings

Agencies have implemented controls to manage contingent labour and most agencies have some level of reporting and oversight of contingent labour at an executive level. However, the increasing trend in spend on contingent labour warrants a renewed focus on agency monitoring and oversight of their use of contingent labour. Over the last five years spend on contingent labour has increased by 75 per cent, to $1.5 billion in 2018–19.

There are also some key gaps that limit the ability of agencies to effectively manage contingent labour. Key areas where agencies can improve their management of contingent labour include: 

  • preparing workforce plans to inform their resourcing strategy, and confirm prior to engaging contingent labour, that this solution aligns with the strategy and best meets business needs
  • involving agency human resources units in decisions about engaging contingent labour
  • regularly reporting on contingent labour use to agency executive teams, particularly in terms of trends in agency spend, tenure and compliance with policies and procedures
  • strengthening on-boarding and off-boarding processes, including establishing checklists to on-board and off-board contingent labour, making provisions for knowledge transfer, and assessing, documenting and capturing performance information.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of governance and processes in relation to the management of sensitive data.

Key conclusions and sector wide learnings

Information technology risks are rapidly increasing. More interfaces between agencies and greater connectivity means the amounts of data agencies generate, access, store and share continue to increase. Some of this information is sensitive information, which is protected by the Privacy Act 1988.

It is important that agencies understand what sensitive data they hold, the risks associated with the inadvertent release of this information and how they are mitigating those risks. We found that agencies need to continue to identify and record their sensitive data, as well as expand the methods they use to identify sensitive data. This includes data held in unstructured repositories, such as network shared drives and by agency service providers.

Eighty-eight per cent of agencies have established policies to respond to potential data breaches when they are identified and 70 per cent of agencies maintain a register to record key information in relation to identified data breach incidents.

Key areas where agencies can improve their management of sensitive data include:

  • identifying sensitive data, based on a comprehensive and structured process and maintaining an inventory of the data
  • assessing the criticality and sensitivity of the data so that the protection of high risk data can be prioritised
  • developing comprehensive data breach management policies to ensure data breaches are appropriately managed
  • maintaining a data breach incident register to record key information in relation to identified data breaches incidents, including the estimated cost of the breach
  • providing on-going training and awareness activities to employees in relation to sensitive data and managing data breaches.

Appendix one – List of 2019 recommendations 

Appendix two – Status of 2018 recommendations

Appendix three – In-scope agencies

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Contracting non-government organisations

Contracting non-government organisations

Community Services
Compliance
Fraud
Management and administration
Procurement
Regulation
Service delivery

This report found the Department of Family and Community Services (FACS) needs to do more to demonstrate it is effectively and efficiently contracting NGOs to deliver community services in the Permanency Support Program (a component of out-of-home-care services) and Specialist Homelessness Services. It notes that FACS is moving to an outcomes-based commissioning model and recommends this be escalated consistent with government policy.

Government agencies, such as the Department of Family and Community Services (FACS), are increasingly contracting non-government organisations (NGOs) to deliver human services in New South Wales. In doing so, agencies are responsible for ensuring these services are achieving expected outcomes. Since the introduction of the Commissioning and Contestability Policy in 2016, all NSW Government agencies are expected to include plans for customer and community outcomes and look for ways to use contestability to raise standards.

Two of the areas receiving the greatest funding from FACS are the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services. In the financial year 2017–18, nearly 500 organisations received $784 million for out-of-home care programs, including the Permanency Support Program. Across New South Wales, specialist homelessness providers assist more than 54,000 people each year and in the financial year 2017–18, 145 organisations received $243 million for providing short term accommodation and homelessness support, including Specialist Homelessness Services.

In the financial year 2017–18, FACS entered into 230 contracts for out-of-home care, of which 49 were for the Permanency Support Program, representing $322 million. FACS also entered into 157 contracts for the provision of Specialist Homelessness Services which totalled $170 million. We reviewed the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services for this audit.

This audit assessed how effectively and efficiently FACS contracts NGOs to deliver community services. The audit could not assess how NGOs used the funds they received from FACS as the Audit Office does not have a mandate that could provide direct assurance that NGOs are using government funds effectively.

Conclusion
FACS cannot demonstrate it is effectively and efficiently contracting NGOs to deliver community services because it does not always use open tenders to test the market when contracting NGOs, and does not collect adequate performance data to ensure safe and quality services are being provided. While there are some valid reasons for using restricted tenders, it means that new service providers are excluded from consideration - limiting contestability. In the service delivery areas we assessed, FACS does not measure client outcomes as it has not yet moved to outcomes-based contracts. 
FACS' procurement approach sometimes restricts the selection of NGOs for the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services
FACS has a procurement policy and plan which it follows when contracting NGOs for the provision of human services. This includes the option to use restricted tenders, which FACS sometimes uses rather than opening the process to the market. The use of restricted tenders is consistent with its procurement plan where there is a limited number of possible providers and the services are highly specialised. However, this approach perpetuates existing arrangements and makes it very difficult for new service providers to enter the market. The recontracting of existing providers means FACS may miss the opportunity to benchmark existing providers against the whole market. 
FACS does not effectively use client data to monitor the performance of NGOs funded under the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services
FACS' contract management staff monitor individual NGO performance including safety, quality of services and compliance with contract requirements. Although FACS does provide training materials on its intranet, FACS does not provide these staff with sufficient training, support or guidance to monitor NGO performance efficiently or effectively. FACS also requires NGOs to self-report their financial performance and contract compliance annually. FACS verifies the accuracy of the financial data but conducts limited validation of client data reported by NGOs to verify its accuracy. Instead, FACS relies on contract management staff to identify errors or inaccurate reporting by NGOs.
FACS' ongoing monitoring of the performance of providers under the Permanency Support Program is particularly limited due to problems with timely data collection at the program level. This reduces FACS' ability to monitor and analyse NGO performance at the program level as it does not have access to ongoing performance data for monitoring service quality.
In the Specialist Homelessness Services program, FACS and NGOs both provide the data required for the National Minimum Data Set on homelessness and provide it to the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, as they are required to do. However, this data is not used for NGO performance monitoring or management.
FACS does not yet track outcomes for clients of NGOs
FACS began to develop an approach to outcomes-based contracting in 2015. Despite this, none of the contracts we reviewed are using outcomes as a measure of success. Currently, NGOs are required to demonstrate their performance is consistent with the measures stipulated in their contracts as part of an annual check of their contract compliance and financial accounts. NGOs report against activity-based measures (Key Performance Indicators) and not outcomes.
FACS advises that the transition to outcomes-based contracting will be made with the new rounds of funding which will take place in 2020–2021 for Specialist Homelessness Services and 2023 for the Permanency Support Program. Once these contracts are in place, FACS can transition NGOs to outcomes based reporting.
Incomplete data limits FACS' effectiveness in continuous improvement for the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services
FACS has policies and procedures in place to learn from past experiences and use this to inform future contracting decisions. However, FACS has limited client data related to the Permanency Support Program which restricts the amount of continuous improvement it can undertake. In the Specialist Homelessness Support Program data is collected to inform routine contract management discussions with service providers but FACS is not using this data for continuous improvement. 

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary Reference: Report number #323 - released 26 June 2019

Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Internal Controls and Governance 2018

Internal Controls and Governance 2018

Education
Community Services
Finance
Health
Industry
Justice
Planning
Premier and Cabinet
Transport
Treasury
Whole of Government
Environment
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Fraud
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management

The Auditor-General for New South Wales Margaret Crawford found that as NSW state government agencies’ digital footprint increases they need to do more to address new and emerging information technology (IT) risks. This is one of the key findings to emerge from the second stand-alone report on internal controls and governance of the 40 largest NSW state government agencies.

This report analyses the internal controls and governance of the 40 largest agencies in the NSW public sector for the year ended 30 June 2018.

This report covers the findings and recommendations from our 2017–18 financial audits that relate to internal controls and governance at the 40 largest agencies (refer to Appendix three) in the NSW public sector.

This report offers insights into internal controls and governance in the NSW public sector

This is our second report dedicated to internal controls and governance at NSW State Government agencies. The report provides insights into the effectiveness of controls and governance processes in the NSW public sector by:

  • highlighting the potential risks posed by weaknesses in controls and governance processes
  • helping agencies benchmark the adequacy of their processes against their peers
  • focusing on new and emerging risks, and the internal controls and governance processes that might address those risks.

Without strong governance systems and internal controls, agencies increase the risks associated with effectively managing their finances and delivering services to citizens. The way agencies deliver services increasingly relies on contracts and partnerships with the private sector. Many of these arrangements deliver front line services, but others provide less visible back office support. For example, an agency may rely on an IT service provider to manage a key system used to provide services to the community. The contract and service level agreements are only truly effective where they are actively managed to reduce risks to continuous quality service delivery, such as interruptions caused by system outages, cyber security attacks and data security breaches.

Our audits do not review all aspects of internal controls and governance every year. We select a range of measures, and report on those that present heightened risks for agencies to mitigate. This report divides these into the following five areas:

  1. Internal control trends
  2. Information technology (IT), including IT vendor management
  3. Transparency and performance reporting
  4. Management of purchasing cards and taxis
  5. Fraud and corruption control.

The findings in this report should not be used to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of individual agency control environments and governance arrangements. Specific financial reporting, controls and service delivery comments are included in the individual 2018 cluster financial audit reports, which will be tabled in Parliament from November to December 2018.

The focus of the report has changed since last year

Last year's report topics included asset management, ethics and conduct, and risk management. We are reporting on new topics this year. We plan to introduce new topics and re-visit our previous topics in subsequent reports on a cyclical basis. This will provide a baseline against which to measure the NSW public sectors’ progress in implementing appropriate internal controls and governance processes to mitigate existing, new and emerging risks in the public sector.

Agencies selected for the volume account for 95 per cent of the state's expenditure

While we have covered only 40 agencies in this report, those selected are a large enough group to identify common issues and insights. They represent about 95 per cent of total expenditure for all NSW public sector agencies.

Internal controls are processes, policies and procedures that help agencies to:

  • operate effectively and efficiently
  • produce reliable financial reports
  • comply with laws and regulations
  • support ethical government.

This chapter outlines the overall trends for agency controls and governance issues, including the number of findings, level of risk and the most common deficiencies we found across agencies. The rest of this volume presents this year’s controls and governance findings in more detail.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
2.1 High risk findings
We found six high risk findings (seven in 2016–17), one of which was repeated from both last year and 2015–16. Recommendation: Agencies should reduce risk by addressing high risk internal control deficiencies as a priority.
2.2 Common findings
We found several internal controls and governance findings common to multiple agencies. Conclusion: Central agencies or the lead agency in a cluster can play a lead role in helping ensure agency responses to common findings are consistent, timely, efficient and effective.
2.3 New and repeat findings
Although internal control deficiencies decreased over the last four years, this year has seen a 42 per cent increase in internal control deficiencies. The increase in new IT control deficiencies and repeat IT control deficiencies signifies an emerging risk for agencies.
IT control deficiencies feature in this increase, having risen by 63 per cent since last year. The number of repeat IT control deficiencies has doubled and is driven by the increasing digital footprint left by agencies as government prioritises on-line interfaces with citizens, and the number of transactions conducted through digital channels increases

Recommendation: Agencies should reduce IT risks by:

  • assigning ownership of recommendations to address IT control deficiencies, with timeframes and actions plans for implementation
  • ensuring audit and risk committees and agency management regularly monitor the implementation status of recommendations.

 

Government agencies’ financial reporting is now heavily reliant on information technology (IT). IT is also increasingly important to the delivery of agency services. These systems often provide the data to help monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of agency processes and services they deliver. Our audits reviewed whether agencies have effective controls in place to manage both key financial systems and IT service contracts.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
3.1 Management of IT vendors
Contract management framework 
Although 87 per cent of agencies have a contract management policy to manage IT vendors, one fifth require review.
 

Conclusion: Agencies can more effectively manage IT vendor contracts by developing policies and procedures to ensure vendor management frameworks are kept up to date, plans are in place to manage vendor performance and risk, and compliance with the framework is monitored by:

  • internal audit focusing on key contracting activities
  • experienced officers who are independent of contract administration performing spot checks or peer reviews
  • targeted analysis of data in contract registers.
Contract risk management
Forty-one per cent of agencies are not using contract management plans and do not assess contract risks. Half of the agencies that did assess contract risks, had not updated the risk assessments since the commencement of the contract.
 
Conclusion: Instead of applying a 'set and forget' approach in relation to management of contract risks, agencies should assess risk regularly and develop a plan to actively manage identified risks throughout the contract lifecycle - from negotiation and commencement, to termination.

Performance management
Eighty-six per cent of agencies meet with vendors to discuss performance. 

Only 24 per cent of agencies sought assurance about the accuracy of vendor reporting against KPIs, yet sixty-seven per cent of the IT contracts allow agencies to determine performance based payments and/or penalise underperformance.

Conclusion: Agencies are monitoring IT vendor performance, but could improve outcomes and more effectively manage under-performance by:

  • a more active, rigorous approach to both risk and performance management
  • checking the accuracy of vendor reporting against those KPIs and where appropriate seeking assurance over their accuracy
  • invoking performance based payments clauses in contracts when performance falls below agreed standards.

Transitioning services
Forty-three per cent of the IT vendor contracts did not contain transitioning-out provisions.

Where IT vendor contracts do make provision for transitioning-out, only 28 per cent of agencies have developed a transitioning-out plan with their IT vendor.

Conclusion: Contract transition/phase out clauses and plans can mitigate risks to service disruption, ensure internal controls remain in place, avoid unnecessary costs and reduce the risk of 'vendor lock-in'.
Contract Registers
Eleven out of forty agencies did not have a contract register, or have registers that are not accurate and/or complete.

Conclusion: A contract register helps to manage an agency’s compliance obligations under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (the GIPA Act). However, it also helps agencies more effectively manage IT vendors by:

  • monitoring contract end dates and contract extensions, and commence new procurements through their central procurement teams in a timely manner
  • managing their contractual commitments, budgeting and cash flow requirements.

Recommendation: Agencies should ensure their contract registers are complete and accurate so they can more effectively govern contracts and manage compliance obligations.

3.2 IT general controls
Governance
Ninety-five per cent of agencies have established policies to manage key IT processes and functions within the agency, with ten per cent of those due for review.
 
Conclusion: Regular review of IT policies ensures risks are considered and appropriate strategies and procedures are implemented to manage these risks on a consistent basis. An absence of policies can lead to ad-hoc responses to risks, and failure to consider emerging IT risks and changes to agency IT environments. 

User access administration
Seventy-two deficiencies were identified related to user access administration, including:

  • thirty issues related to granting user access across 43 per cent of agencies
  • sixteen issues related to removing user access across 30 per cent of agencies
  • twenty-six issues related to periodic reviews of user access across 50 per cent of agencies.
Recommendation: Agencies should strengthen the administration of user access to prevent inappropriate access to key systems.
Privileged access
Forty per cent of agencies do not periodically review logs of the activities of privileged users to identify suspicious or unauthorised activities.

Recommendation: Agencies should:

  • review the number of, and access granted to privileged users, and assess and document the risks associated with their activities
  • monitor user access to address risks from unauthorised activity.
Password controls
Twenty-three per cent of agencies did not comply with their own policy on password parameters.
Recommendation: Agencies should ensure IT password settings comply with their password policies.
Program changes
Fifteen per cent of agencies had deficient IT program change controls mainly related to segregation of duties and authorisation and testing of IT program changes prior to deployment.
Recommendation: Agencies should maintain appropriate segregation of duties in their IT functions and test system changes before they are deployed.

 

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations from our review of how agencies reported their performance in their 2016–17 annual reports. The Annual Reports (Statutory Bodies) Regulation 2015 and Annual Reports (Departments) Regulation 2015 (annual reports regulation) currently prescribes the minimum requirements for agency annual reports.

Observation Conclusion or recommendation
4.1 Reporting on performance

Only 57 per cent of agencies linked reporting on performance to their strategic objectives.

The use of targets and reporting performance over time was limited and applied inconsistently.

Conclusion: There is significant disparity in the quality and consistency of how agencies report on their performance in their annual reports. This limits the reliability and transparency of reported performance information.

Agencies could improve performance reporting by clearly linking strategic objectives to reported outcomes, and reporting on performance against targets over time. NSW Treasury may need to provide more guidance to agencies to support consistent and high-quality performance reporting in annual reports.

There is no independent assurance that the performance metrics agencies report in their annual reports are accurate.

Prior performance audits have noted issues related to the collection of performance information. For example, our 2016 Report on Red Tape Reduction highlighted inaccuracies in how the dollar-value of red tape reduction had been reported.

Conclusion: The ability of Parliament and the public to rely on reported information as a relevant and accurate reflection of an agency's performance is limited.

The relevance and accuracy of performance information is enhanced when:

  • policies and guidance support the consistent and accurate collection of data
  • internal review processes and management oversight are effective
  • independent review processes are established to provide effective challenge to the assumptions, judgements and methodology used to collect the reported performance information.
4.2 Reporting on reports

Agency reporting on major projects does not meet the requirements of the annual reports regulation.

Forty-seven per cent of agencies did not report on costs to date and estimated completion dates for major works in progress. Of the 47 per cent of agencies that reported on major works, only one agency reported detail about significant cost overruns, delays, amendments, deferments or cancellations.

NSW Treasury produce an annual report checklist to help agencies comply with their annual report obligations.

Recommendation: Agencies should comply with the annual reports regulation and report on all mandatory fields, including significant cost overruns and delays, for their major works in progress.

The information the annual reports regulation requires agencies to report deals only with major works in progress. There is no requirement to report on completed works.

Sixteen of 30 agencies reported some information on completed major works.

Conclusion: Agencies could improve their transparency if they reported, or were required to report:

  • on both works in progress and projects completed during the year
  • actual costs and completion dates, and forecast completion dates for major works, against original and revised budgets and original expected completion dates
  • explanations for significant cost overruns, delays and key project performance metrics.

 

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency preventative and detective controls over purchasing card and taxi use for 2017–18.

Observation Conclusion or recommendation
5.1 Management of purchasing cards
Volume of credit card spend
Purchasing card expenditure has increased by 76 per cent over the last four years in response to a government review into the cost savings possible from using purchasing cards for low value, high volume procurement.
 
Conclusion: The increasing use of purchasing cards highlights the importance of an effective framework for the use and management of purchasing cards.
Policy framework
We found all agencies that held purchasing cards had a policy in place, but 26 per cent of agencies have not reviewed their purchasing card policy by the scheduled date, or do not have a scheduled revision date stated within their policy.
Recommendation: Agencies should mitigate the risks associated with increased purchasing card use by ensuring policies and purchasing card frameworks remain current and compliant with the core requirements of TPP 17–09 'Use and Management of NSW Government Purchasing Cards'.
Preventative controls
We found that:
  • all agencies maintained purchasing card registers
  • seventy-six per cent provided training to cardholders prior to being issued with a card
  • eighty-nine per cent appointed a program administrator, but only half of these had clearly defined roles and responsibilities
  • thirty-two per cent of agencies place merchant blocks on purchasing cards
  • forty-seven per cent of agencies place geographic restrictions on purchasing cards.

Agencies have designed and implemented preventative controls aimed at deterring the potential misuse of purchasing cards.

Conclusion: Further opportunities exist for agencies to better control the use of purchasing cards, such as:

  • updating purchasing card registers to contain all mandatory fields required by TPP17–09
  • appointing a program administrator for the agency's purchasing card framework and defining their role and responsibility for the function
  • strengthening preventive controls to prevent misuse.

Detective controls
Ninety-two per cent of agencies have designed and implemented at least one control to monitor purchasing card activity.

Major reviews, such as data analytics (29 per cent of agencies) and independent spot checks (49 per cent of agencies) are not widely used.

Agencies have designed and implemented detective controls aimed at identifying potential misuse of purchasing cards.

Conclusion: More effective monitoring using purchasing card data can provide better visibility over spending activity and can be used to:

  • detect misuse and investigate exceptions
  • analyse trends to highlight cost saving opportunities.
5.2 Management of taxis
Policy framework
Thirteen per cent of agencies have not developed and implemented a policy to manage taxi use. In addition:
  • a further 41 per cent of agencies have not reviewed their policies by the scheduled revision date, or do not have a scheduled revision date
  • more than half of all agencies’ policies do not offer alternative travel options. For example, only 36 per cent of policies promoted the use of general Opal cards.
Conclusion: Agencies can promote savings and provide more options to staff where their taxi use policies:
  • limit the circumstances where taxi use is appropriate
  • offer alternate, lower cost options to using taxis, such as general Opal cards and rideshare.
Detective controls
All agencies approve taxi expenditure by expense reimbursement, purchasing card and Cabcharge, and have implemented controls around this approval process. However, beyond this there is minimal monitoring and review activity, such as data monitoring, independent spot checks or internal audit reviews.
Conclusion: Taxi spend at agencies is not significant in terms of its dollar value, but it is significant from a probity perspective. Agencies can better address the probity risk by incorporating taxi use into a broader purchasing card or fraud monitoring program.

 

Fraud and corruption control is one of the 17 key elements of our governance lighthouse. Recent reports from ICAC into state agencies and local government councils highlight the need for effective fraud control and ethical frameworks. Effective frameworks can help protect an agency from events that risk serious reputational damage and financial loss.

Our 2016 Fraud Survey found the NSW Government agencies we surveyed reported 1,077 frauds over the three year period to 30 June 2015. For those frauds where an estimate of losses was made, the reported value exceeded $10.0 million. The report also highlighted that the full extent of fraud in the NSW public sector could be higher than reported because:

  • unreported frauds in organisations can be almost three times the number of reported frauds
  • our 2015 survey did not include all NSW public sector agencies, nor did it include any NSW universities or local councils
  • fraud committed by citizens such as fare evasion and fraudulent state tax self-assessments was not within the scope of our 2015 survey
  • agencies did not estimate a value for 599 of the 1,077 (56 per cent) reported frauds.

Commissioning and outsourcing of services to the private sector and the advancement of digital technology are changing the fraud and corruption risks agencies face. Fraud risk assessments should be updated regularly and in particular where there are changes in agency business models. NSW Treasury Circular TC18-02 NSW Fraud and Corruption Control Policy now requires agencies develop, implement and maintain a fraud and corruption control framework, effective from 1 July 2018. 

Our Fraud Control Improvement Kit provides guidance and practical advice to help organisations implement an effective fraud control framework. The kit is divided into ten attributes. Three key attributes have been assessed below; prevention, detection and notification systems.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency fraud and corruption controls for 2017–18.

Observation Conclusion or recommendation
6.1 Prevention systems

Prevention systems
Ninety-two per cent of agencies have a fraud control plan in place, 81 per cent maintain a fraud database and 79 per cent report fraud and corruption matters as a standing item on audit and risk committee agendas.

Only 54 per cent of agencies have an employment screening policy and all agencies have IT security policies, but gaps in IT security controls could undermine their policies.

Conclusion: Most agencies have implemented fraud prevention systems to reduce the risk of fraud. However poor IT security along with other gaps in agency prevention systems, such as employment screening practices heightens the risk of fraud and inappropriate use of data.

Agencies can improve their fraud prevention systems by:

  • completing regular fraud risk assessments, embedding fraud risk assessment into their enterprise risk management process and reporting the results of the assessment to the audit and risk committee
  • maintaining a fraud database and reviewing it regularly for systemic issues and reporting a redacted version of the database on the agency's website to inform corruption prevention networks
  • developing policies and procedures for employee screening and benchmarking their current processes against ICAC's publication ‘Strengthening Employment Screening Practices in the NSW Public Sector’
  • developing and maintaining up to date IT security policies and monitoring compliance with the policy.
Twenty-three per cent of agencies were not performing fraud risk assessments and some agency fraud risk assessments may not be as robust as they could be.  Conclusion: Agencies' systems of internal controls may be less effective where new and emerging fraud risks have been overlooked, or known weaknesses have not been rectified.
6.2 Detection systems
Detection systems
Several agencies reported they were developing a data monitoring program, but only 38 per cent of agencies had already implemented a program.
 

Studies have shown data monitoring, whereby entire populations of transactional data are analysed for indicators of fraudulent activity, is one of the most effective methods of early detection. Early detection decreases the duration a fraud remains undetected thereby limiting the extent of losses.

Conclusion: Data monitoring is an effective tool for early detection of fraud and is more effective when informed by a comprehensive fraud risk assessment.

6.3 Notification systems
Notification system
All agencies have notification systems for reporting actual or suspected fraud and corruption. Most agencies provide multiple reporting lines, provide training and publicise options for staff to report actual or suspected fraud and corruption.
Conclusion: Training staff about their obligations and the use of fraud notification systems promotes a fraud-aware culture

 

Published

Actions for Health 2017

Health 2017

Health
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Fraud
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management

The following report highlights results of the financial audits of entities in the NSW health cluster. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent audits of these entities.

The report also includes a range of findings on service delivery. Overall, NSW Health is achieving most of their targets. Some local health districts are continuing to experience increased demand for their services and are finding it more difficult to meet their targets. For example, three local health districts had not achieved some emergency department response time targets for three consecutive years.

1. Financial reporting and controls

Financial Reporting

All health cluster entities received unqualified audit opinions and the quality of financial reporting remains high across the cluster.

Early close procedures were largely completed and all financial statements were submitted by the deadlines.

Financial performance

Overall, NSW Health recorded an operating surplus of $407 million in 2016–17. Eleven local health districts/specialty networks recorded operating deficits in 2016–17, four more than 2015–16.

Expenses across NSW Health increased by 4.4 per cent in 2016–17 (6.0 per cent in 2015–16), lower than the expected long term annual expense growth rate.

Excess annual leave Managing excess annual leave is a continual challenge for NSW Health, with thirty–five per cent of the workforce having excess balances.
Overtime payments NSW Health entities are generally managing overtime well; however NSW Ambulance’s overtime payments, $74.6 million in 2016–17, remain significantly higher than other health entities.
Time and leave recording practices Unapproved employee timesheets continue to be a problem for health entities. Weak timesheet approval controls increase the risk of staff claiming and being paid for hours they have not worked. There is also an increased risk of high volumes of roster adjustments, manual pays, salary overpayments and leave not being recorded accurately.

2. Service Delivery

Service Agreements Most of the service agreements between the Secretary of NSW Health and health entities were signed earlier than prior years.
Performance monitoring Five NSW Health entities are not meeting the Ministry of Health’s performance expectations at 30 June 2017.
Emergency department performance Data provided by the Ministry indicates NSW Health, on average, met emergency department triage response time targets across all triage categories for the fourth consecutive year.
Ambulance response times Data provided by the Ministry shows NSW Ambulance response times for imminently life‑threatening incidents of 7.5 minutes in 2016–17 was within the Ministry’s target of 10.0 minutes.

Data provided by the Ministry indicates NSW Ambulance response times for potentially life‑threatening incidents did not improve in 2016–17. The median response time of 11.1 minutes in 2016–17 was similar to 2015–16 (11.0 minutes). This is despite the number of Priority 1 responses reducing by 4.3 per cent.
Unplanned hospital re-admissions Data provided by the Ministry shows eight local health districts achieved the Ministry of Health’s unplanned hospital re‑admissions target in 2016–17. The target is for local health districts to reduce re‑admission rates from the previous financial year.

This report sets out the results of the 30 June 2017 financial statement audits of Health cluster entities.

The report has been structured into two chapters focusing on:

  • Financial reporting and controls
  • Service delivery.

This chapter outlines audit observations, conclusions and recommendations related to financial reporting and internal controls of entities for 2016-17.

Observation Conclusion or recommendation

2.1 Quality of financial reporting

All cluster entities received unqualified audit opinions and misstatements identified in financial statements fell. The quality of financial reporting remains high across the cluster.

2.2 Timeliness of financial reporting

Early close procedures were largely completed and all financial statements were submitted by the deadlines. Health entities controlled by the Ministry of Health continued submitting their financial statements well ahead of the statutory deadlines.

2.4 Financial and sustainability analysis

NSW Health recorded an operating surplus of $407 million in 2016–17.



Eleven local health districts/specialty networks recorded operating deficits in 2016–17, four more than 2015–16.


Expenses across NSW Health increased by 4.4 per cent in 2016–17 (6.0 per cent in
2015–16).

The capital replacement ratio of local health districts/specialty networks ranged from 0.5 to 5.7 in 2016–17. Seven local health districts had capital replacement ratio higher than one.

The statewide operating surplus was $84 million higher than 2015–16. Net surpluses contribute to NSW Health’s ability to invest in new facilities, upgrades and redevelopments.

The 2016–17 financial results were once again impacted by the NSW Government initiative to improve cash management across the sector.

The expense growth rate for NSW Health is 1.6 percentage points lower than the expected long term annual expense growth rate.

Substantial ongoing investment in hospitals and other assets across NSW Health is evidenced by high capital replacement ratios for some health entities in 2016–17.

2.5 Performance against budget
Ten local health districts/specialty networks’ expense budget variance was outside performance expectations agreed with the Ministry at the beginning of 2016–17. The Ministry continues to manage performance across NSW Health to improve the accuracy of budgeting practices.
2.7 Human Resources    

Thirty-five per cent of NSW Health’s workforce have excess annual leave balances.

 

 

 

 

 

 

NSW Ambulance had the highest average sick leave rate in NSW Health of 85.2 hours per FTE in 2016–17 (78.7 hours in 2015–16). This was higher than the statewide average of 62.1 hours (62.0 hours in 2015–16).

NSW Ambulance’s overtime payments in 2016–17 totalled $74.6 million; $2.8 million more than 2015–16 and significantly higher than other health entities

Other NSW Health entities are generally managing overtime well.

 

Unapproved employee timesheets continue to be a problem for health entities. Weak timesheet approval controls increase the risk of staff claiming and being paid for hours they have not worked.

 

Managing excess annual leave is a continual challenge for health entities.

Recommendation: Health entities should further review the approach to managing excess annual leave in 2017–18. They should:

  • monitor current and projected leave balances to the end of the financial year on a monthly basis
  • agree formal leave plans with employees to reduce leave balances over an acceptable timeframe.


NSW Ambulance continues to face significant challenges in managing sick leave.

Recommendation: NSW Ambulance should further implement and monitor targeted human resource strategies to address the high rates of sick leave taken

Recommendation: NSW Ambulance should further review the effectiveness of its rostering practices to identify strategies to reduce excessive overtime payments.

Recommendation: Health entities should conduct a risk‑based review of time and leave recording practices to ensure control weaknesses are identified and fixed.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations relating to service delivery for 2016–17.

Observation Conclusion or recommendation
3.1 Service agreements in NSW Health

Most of the service agreements between the Secretary of NSW Health and health entities were signed earlier than prior years.

Thirteen local health districts/specialty networks signed their service agreements by the 31 July 2017 due date. This is a significant improvement with only seven local health districts/specialty networks meeting the date in 2015–16.

Having service agreements signed as close as possible to the start of each year provides the Ministry and NSW Health entities with clarity around roles, responsibilities, performance measures, budgets, and service volumes and levels.
3.2 Performance of NSW Health entities
Five NSW Health entities were not meeting the Ministry’s performance expectations at 30 June 2017. The Ministry is managing the five entities in accordance with its performance review process.
3.4 Emergency department response times

Data provided by the Ministry indicates NSW Health again, on average, met emergency department triage response time targets across all triage categories for the fourth consecutive year.

The Ministry manages performance across NSW Health to ensure patients presenting at emergency departments receive care in a clinically appropriate timeframe.

Based on the Ministry’s data, local health districts/specialty networks are, on average, meeting triage targets despite increasing emergency department attendances.

The data shows eleven local health districts met all triage targets in 2016–17, compared to eight in
2015–16. 

3.5 Emergency treatment performance

The Ministry manages public patient access to emergency services in public hospitals.

It has an emergency treatment performance target of 81 per cent of patients leaving emergency departments within four hours.

Data provided by the Ministry indicates NSW Health maintained its overall emergency treatment performance in 2016–17, but did not achieve its target. The State average emergency treatment performance was 74.2 per cent (74.2 per cent in 2015–16).

Based on the Ministry’s data, only four local health districts achieved the target in 2016–17, five in
2015–16.

3.6 Ambulance response times
NSW Ambulance has a response time target of 10.0 minutes for imminently life‑threatening incidents in New South Wales. Data provided by the Ministry indicates NSW Ambulance response times for imminently life-threatening incidents of 7.5 minutes in 2016–17 was within the Ministry’s target.
 
3.7 Transfer of care
The Ministry has a target of 90 per cent for the number of ambulance arrivals within a 30 minute ‘transfer of care’ timeframe. Data provided by the Ministry indicates the rate of ambulance arrivals within a 30 minute 'transfer of care' timeframe improved from 87.6 per cent in
2015–16 to 91.7 per cent in 2016–17, exceeding the Ministry’s target.
3.8 Average length of stay in hospital
Based on the Ministry’s 2016–17 data, the average length of stay for acute episodes was 3.0 days. The average length of stay in New South Wales hospitals is lower than the national average of 3.2 days (in 2015–16). The Ministry’s data shows the average length of stay by patients for acute episodes has remained stable in New South Wales hospitals for four years. 
3.9 Elective surgery access performance
Data provided by the Ministry indicates NSW Health continues to manage waiting times for elective surgery in public hospitals. The Ministry’s data shows NSW Health improved on‑time admission of patients for elective surgery in 2016–17 despite a 1.8 per cent increase in admissions. While the result improved, only one of the three targets for elective surgery waiting times was met in 2016–17.
3.10 Unplanned hospital re-admissions

Data provided by the Ministry indicates NSW Health, on average, did not reduce the rate of unplanned hospital re‑admissions in 2016–17. The Ministry has a target of reducing unplanned hospital re‑admissions compared to the previous financial year.

Low re‑admission rates may indicate good patient management practices and post-discharge care.

The Ministry’s data shows eight local health district met the target to reduce the rate of re‑admissions compared to the previous financial year. The statewide average rate increased from 6.3 per cent to 6.4 per cent.
3.11 Post discharge care for acute mental health patients
NSW Health has a goal to increase community-based care to acute mental health patients after they are discharged. Continuity of care in the community can lead to reduced symptom severity, lower re‑admission rates, and improved quality of life. The Ministry’s 2016–17 data shows the statewide average for post discharge follow-up of acute mental health patients within seven days was 70.0 per cent (66.0 per cent in 2015–16). The statewide average improved and met the NSW Health target of 70 per cent. Nine local health districts exceeded the NSW Health target.
3.12 Mental health acute re-admissions
NSW Health has a goal to reduce acute public sector mental health re-admissions. High re‑admission rates may indicate deficiencies in inpatient treatment and follow up care. The Ministry’s data shows twelve local health districts did not achieve the NSW Health target of 13 per cent mental health acute re‑admissions in 2016–17.
3.13 Unplanned and emergency re‑presentations

NSW Health aims to reduce the number of unplanned and emergency re‑presentations to emergency departments.

The Ministry’s 2016–17 data shows the State average of emergency department re‑presentations decreased marginally from 5.0 per cent in 2015–16 to 4.9 per cent.

Patients attending rural emergency departments are more likely to re‑present within 48 hours of being discharged than those in regional or metropolitan emergency departments.
3.14 Healthcare associated infection
The national target for the rate of Staphylococcus aureus (golden staph) bloodstream infection is two cases per 10,000 bed days. Data provided by the Ministry indicates the rate of golden staph bloodstream infection in New South Wales hospitals continues to be well below the target and national benchmark at 0.72 cases per 10,000 bed days in 2016–17 (0.75 in 2015–16).
3.15 Patient experience and satisfaction

The Bureau of Health Information analyses and reports on the results of patient surveys.

The Bureau’s survey shows 65 per cent of adult admitted patients rated the care they received in hospital as ‘very good’ and 29 per cent rated it as ‘good’.

NSW Health recognises that patient surveys are an important feedback mechanism on the health care system that can only come from personal experiences.

Published

Actions for Central Agencies 2017

Central Agencies 2017

Finance
Premier and Cabinet
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Fraud
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Project management

This report highlights the results of the financial audits of NSW Government central agencies. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet, and Finance, Services and Innovation clusters.

The report includes a range of findings in respect to service delivery. One repeat finding is that while the Government regularly reports on the 12 Premier's priorities, there is no comprehensive reporting on the 18 State priorities. 

1. Financial reporting and controls

Audit Opinions Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' 30 June 2017 financial statements.
Early close Early close procedures continue to facilitate the timely preparation of financial statements and completion of audits, but agencies can make further improvement.
Deficient user administration access User access administration over financial systems remains an area of weakness. Agencies need to strengthen user access administration to critical systems.
Transitioning to outsourced service providers Transitioning of services to outsourced service providers can be improved. Outsourcing services can lead to better outcomes, which may include lower transaction costs and improved services, but it also introduces new risks.

2. Service delivery

Premier and State Priorities   A comprehensive report of performance against the 18 State Priorities is yet to be published. While some measures are publicly reported through agency annual reports or other sources, a comprehensive report of performance against the 18 State Priorities would ensure all State Priorities are publicly reported, provide a single and easily accessible source of reference and improve transparency.
ICT and digital government The Digital Government Strategy was released in May 2017. Targets will need to be set to assess and monitor progress against the Strategy.
Digital information security Not all agencies are complying with the NSW Government's information security policy. This increases the risk of noncompliance with legislation, information security breaches and difficulty restoring data or maintaining business continuity in the event of a disaster or disruption.
Property and asset utilisation Property NSW's performance reporting would be enhanced by developing and reporting on customer satisfaction, reporting against set targets and benchmarking cost of service to the private sector.

3. Government financial services

Prudential oversight
of NSW Government superannuation
funds  
Prudential oversight of SAS Trustee Corporation Pooled Fund and Parliamentary Contributory Superannuation Fund has not been prescribed. Structured and comprehensive prudential oversight of these funds remains important as they operate in a specialised, complex and continuously changing investment market sector, have over 106,000 members and manage investments in excess of $42.4 billion.
Green slip scheme affordability Currently, Green Slips in NSW are the most expensive in Australia. However, CTP reforms are expected to reduce the cost of Green Slips.

This report sets out the results of the 30 June 2017 financial statement audits of NSW Government's central agencies and their cluster agencies.

Central agencies play a key role in ensuring policy coordination, good administrative and people management practices and prudent fiscal management. The central agencies and their key responsibilities are set out below.

Confidence in public sector decision‑making and transparency is enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely. Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions or recommendations related to financial reporting and controls of agencies for 2016–17.

Observation Conclusion or recommendation
2.1 Quality of financial reporting
Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agency financial statements. The quality of financial reporting continues to remain strong across the clusters.
2.2 Timeliness of financial reporting
Most agencies complied with the statutory timeframes for completion of early close procedures and preparation and audit of financial statements. Early close procedures continue to facilitate the timely preparation of financial statements and completion of audits, but agencies can make further improvement.
2.3 Financial performance and sustainability
We assessed the performance of agencies listed in Appendix six against some key financial sustainability indicators. This highlighted two agencies with negative operating margins of more than ten per cent and one agency with a liquidity ratio of less than 0.5. These agencies have strategies in place to remain financially sustainability and manage their liquidity. Our analysis found that, overall, the agencies are not at high risk of sustainability concerns.
2.4 Internal Controls

User access administration over financial systems remains an area of weakness. Sixteen moderate risk and ten low risk issues related to user access administration across eight agencies were identified. 

Recommendation: Agencies should review user access administration to critical systems to ensure:

  • policies for user access creation, modification and deactivation are documented
  • approval is being obtained to establish, modify or delete user accounts
  • regular user access reviews are performed and highly privileged user account activity is logged and monitored
  • evidence of review is maintained.

Transitioning of services to outsourced service providers can be improved. Our 2016–17 audits identified one high risk issue relating to Property NSW's outsourcing of property and facility management services to the private sector.

While a high risk issue was identified in 2015–16 from the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation's outsourcing of transactional and information technology services to GovConnect there has been an improvement in GovConnect's internal control environment throughout
2016–17.

Outsourcing services can lead to better outcomes, which may include lower transaction costs and improved services, but it also introduces new risks. The transition needs to be carefully managed and requires thorough planning and effective project governance. This should be supported by oversight and direction from senior management and independent project assurance.
2.5 Human Resources    
The percentage of full‑time equivalent staff with annual leave greater than 30 days in the Finance, Services and Innovation, Premier and Cabinet and the Treasury clusters is 7.9 per cent, 17.1 per cent and 18.4 per cent respectively. Agencies have strategies in place to reduce annual leave balances that are greater than 30 days. The effectiveness of these strategies will need to be monitored to ensure they are helping to achieve the desired outcome.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations relating to service delivery for 2016–17. 

Observation Conclusion or recommendation
3.1 Premier and State priorities

The Department of Premier and Cabinet monitors the achievement of targets and the implementation of initiatives to deliver the 12 Premier’s Priorities.

Responsible ministers and agencies manage the 18 State Priorities. A comprehensive report of performance against the 18 State Priorities is yet to be published.

While some measures are publicly reported through agency annual reports or other sources, a comprehensive report of performance against the 18 State Priorities would ensure all State Priorities are publicly reported, provide a single and easily accessible source of reference and improve transparency.
Where possible, independent sources are used to measure performance, however without independent assurance there is an increased risk that the target measures are inaccurate, not relevant or do not fairly represent actual performance.

Performance against the State Priority to make NSW the easiest state to start a business is not currently published.

A key aspect of making NSW the easiest state to start a business is making regulatory obligations easier to understand and implement.

Initiatives, such as easy to do business and red tape reduction are in place to help achieve this priority.

The regulatory policy framework is under review following an October 2016 performance audit on ‘Red tape reduction’ that found the regulatory burden of legislation had increased.
3.2 Financial management
Revenue NSW earned record crown revenue of $30.0 billion in 2016–17 to support the state's finances. Record crown revenue has been driven by the sustained increase in duties revenue, which has increased by 93.7 per cent over the last five years. This is a consequence of the continued strength in the property market over this time and large one off NSW Government business asset sales and leases.
3.3 ICT and digital government
The Digital Government Strategy (the Strategy) was released in May 2017 to build on reforms set out in previous ICT strategies. The Strategy’s priorities and enablers aim to support digital innovation. Targets and measures will need to be set to assess and monitor progress against the Strategy.
The Digital Information Security Policy (DISP) is a key tool that helps ensure a minimum set of information security controls are implemented across NSW Government agencies.

A review of 2016 annual reports found 15 agencies (13 in 2015) did not attest to compliance with the DISP and of the agencies that attested to compliance, 34 reported issues associated with their compliance.

The Strategy’s priorities and enablers aim to support digital innovation. Targets and measures will need to be set to assess and monitor progress against the Strategy.

Failure to comply with the DISP increases the risk of noncompliance with legislation, information security breaches and difficulty restoring data or maintaining business continuity in the event of a disaster or disruption.

3.4 Property and asset utilisation

Property NSW's performance reporting could be
improved. M2012-20 'Government Property NSW
and Government Property Principles' required
Property NSW to set key performance indicators
to measure property and asset utilisation
performance.
 

Property NSW's performance reporting would be enhanced by developing and reporting on customer satisfaction, reporting against set targets and benchmarking cost of service to the private sector.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations specific to NSW Government agencies providing financial services.

Observation Conclusion or recommendation
4.1 Key issues

The SAS Trustee Corporation (STC) Pooled Fund and the Parliamentary Contributory Superannuation (PCS) Fund are not required to comply with the prudential and reporting standards issued by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA). Amendments to relevant legislation allows the Minister for Finance, Services and Property to prescribe applicable prudential standards and audit requirements.

Structured and comprehensive prudential oversight of these funds remains important as they operate in a specialised, complex and continuously changing investment market sector, have over 106,000 members and manage investments of more than $42.4 billion.

Recommendation: The Treasury should liaise with
the respective Trustees to implement appropriate
prudential standards and oversight arrangements for
the exempt public sector superannuation funds.

Currently, Green Slips in NSW are the most expensive in Australia. Average premiums for Sydney Metropolitan vehicles increased by 10.4 per cent between 1 January 2016 and 31 December 2016.

CTP reforms are expected to reduce the cost of Green Slips. The State Insurance Regulatory Authority will need to ensure it has appropriate processes in place to track and report against the expected benefits.
4.2 Financial performance and sustainability
Net unfunded superannuation liabilities were $15.0 billion at 30 June 2017.

Under the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012, the NSW Government’s target is to eliminate unfunded superannuation liabilities by 2030.
The superannuation funds’ strategic asset allocation and investment strategies are monitored and adjusted to help achieve a fully funded position by 2030.
The Home Warranty Scheme commenced in 2011. Over this time total premiums collected have not been sufficient to cover expected claim costs. Funding arrangements introduced during 2016–17 allow the Home Building Compensation Fund to apply to the Crown for reimbursement of unfunded realised losses from under-pricing of premiums.

Other reforms are planned to address the long term sustainability of the home building compensation scheme.
4.3 Investment performance
The NSW Government’s main superannuation funds have maintained the management expense ratio (MER) at consistent levels over the past two years. The Parliamentary Contributory Superannuation (PCS) Fund does not set an MER target. MER is an industry recognised ratio to measure the performance of funds and investment managers.

Recommendation: The Fund Secretary for the PCS Fund, in conjunction with the Trustee, should consider establishing an appropriate management expense ratio target to measure performance.