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Published

Actions for Stronger Communities 2020

Stronger Communities 2020

Justice
Community Services
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Service delivery

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the agencies comprising the Stronger Communities cluster for the year ended 30 June 2020. The table below summarises our key observations.

1. Financial reporting

Quality of financial reporting Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' 30 June 2020 financial statements.
Compliance with financial reporting requirements

The Treasury extended the statutory deadline for the submission of the 2019–20 financial statements. For agencies subject to Treasurer's Directions, Treasury required agencies to submit their 30 June 2020 financial statements by 5 August 2020. For other agencies, the deadline was extended to 31 October 2020. All agencies in the cluster met the revised statutory deadlines.

Cluster agencies substantially completed the mandatory early close procedures set by NSW Treasury. However, nine agencies including the Department of Communities and Justice (the department) did not complete one or more mandatory requirements, such as assessing the impact of new and updated accounting standards.

Financial implications of recent emergencies

Emergency events significantly impacted cluster agencies in 2019–20. Our review of seven cluster agencies most affected highlighted some had incurred additional expenditure because of the bushfires and floods. Others lost revenue due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

During the year these agencies collectively received additional funding of $1.1 billion from the State to respond to:

  • increased demand for homeless people seeking temporary accommodation
  • additional cleaning requirements
  • bushfire recovery efforts
  • emergency support for eligible small businesses.

The Sydney Cricket Ground Trust, Venues NSW and Office of Sport lodged insurance claims of $51.3 million with the Treasury Managed Fund with respect to lost revenues from the pandemic. The losses were mainly due to event cancellations and covered various periods ranging from mid-March to 31 December 2020.

The change in economic conditions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in the NSW Government cancelling the refurbishment of Stadium Australia it had previously approved in August 2019. Venues NSW wrote off $16.8 million of redevelopment costs during 2019–20.

Restatement of the Sydney Cricket Ground valuation The valuation of the Sydney Cricket Ground (the Stadium) included costs of $28.6 million which were not eligible for capitalisation. The financial statements were restated to reflect the reduction in the value of the Stadium and the asset revaluation reserve.
Unresolved data quality issues in the VS Connect system

The department continues to address significant data quality issues resulting from its implementation of the VS Connect system (the System) in 2019. The issues relate to the completeness and accuracy of the data transferred from the legacy system. The System is used by the department to manage its Victims Support Services (VSS) and for financial reporting purposes.

An independent actuary helps the department estimate its liability for VSS claims. The actuary's valuation at 30 June 2020 was again impacted by the data quality issues. Consequently, the actuary adopted a revised valuation methodology compared to previous years.

Recommendation (repeat issue):

The department should resolve the data quality issues in the VS Connect System before 31 March 2021.

AASB 16 'Leases' resulted in significant changes to agencies' financial position

Cluster agencies implemented three new accounting standards for the first time in 2019–20. Adoption of AASB 16 'Leases' resulted in cluster agencies collectively recognising right-of-use assets and lease liabilities of $1.7 billion and $1.1 billion respectively on 1 July 2019.

Significant misstatements in how lease related balances had been calculated were found in 17 of the 29 cluster agencies. The cluster outsources the management of most of its owned and leased property portfolio to Property NSW, but cluster agencies remain responsible for any deliverables under that arrangement. The misstatements were mainly caused by late revisions of key assumptions and issues with the accuracy and completeness of Property NSW's lease information.

2. Audit observations

Internal control deficiencies

Our 2019–20 financial audits identified 191 internal control issues. Of these, two were high risk and almost one-third were repeat findings from previous audits. While repeat findings reduced by 5.7 percentage points in 2019–20, the number remains high.

Recommendation (repeat issue):

Cluster agencies should action recommendations to address internal control weaknesses promptly. Focus should be given to addressing high risk and repeat issues.

Agencies response to recent emergencies

The severity of the recent bushfires and floods meant natural disaster expenses incurred by emergency services agencies rose from $67.4 million in 2018–19 to $497 million in 2019–20.

The COVID-19 pandemic presented unprecedented challenges for the cluster. Social distancing and other infection control measures disrupted the traditional means of delivering services. Agencies established committees or response teams to respond to these challenges.

The department introduced measures to minimise the risk of the spread of COVID-19 amongst inmates in custodial settings.

Managing excess annual leave

Managing excess annual leave was a challenge for cluster agencies directly involved in the government's response to the emergency events. Employees in frontline cluster agencies deferred leave plans and many have taken little or no annual leave during the reporting period.

Annual leave liabilities rose at the department, NSW Police Force, Fire and Rescue NSW, Office of the NSW Rural Fire Service, the Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales and the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions. The combined liabilities increased from $620 million to $692 million or 11.6 per cent between 30 June 2019 and 30 June 2020.

Implementation of Machinery of Government (MoG) changes

Administrative Arrangement Orders effective from 1 July 2019, created the department of Communities and Justice and transferred functions and staff, together with associated assets and liabilities into the department from the former departments of Justice and Family and Community Services.

The department continues to establish its governance arrangements following the MoG changes.

Recommendation:

The department should finalise appropriate governance arrangements for its new organisational structure as soon as possible. This includes:

  • harmonising policies and procedures to ensure a unified approach across the department
  • finalising risk management and monitoring processes across the department
  • updating its delegation instruments to reflect the current organisational structure, delegation limits and roles and responsibilities.
Delivery of the Prison Bed Capacity Program

The department continued to expand prison system capacity through the NSW Government's $3.8 billion Prison Bed Capacity Program. The department reported it spent $480 million on the Program in 2019–20. Six prison expansion projects were completed during the year, which added 1,660 new and 395 refurbished beds to the NSW prison system.

Data from the department shows the number of adult inmates in the NSW prison system reached a maximum of 14,165 during the year. Operational capacity was 16,096 beds on 19 August 2020.

 

This report provides parliament and other users of the financial statements of agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations.

Agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster were significantly impacted by the bushfires, floods and the COVID-19 pandemic in 2019–20. Our 2019–20 financial audits of the seven cluster agencies most significantly impacted by the recent emergency events considered:

  • the financial implications of the emergency events
  • changes to agencies' operating models and control environments
  • delivery of new or expanded projects, programs or services at short notice.

Our findings on these seven agencies' responses to the recent emergencies are included throughout this report. These agencies are:

  • Department of Communities and Justice
  • Fire and Rescue NSW
  • NSW Police Force
  • Office of the NSW Rural Fire Service
  • Office of the NSW State Emergency Service
  • Sydney Cricket and Sports Ground Trust
  • Venues NSW.

The Department of Communities and Justice is the principal agency of the cluster. The names of all agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster are included in Appendix one.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster for 2020, including any financial implications from the recent emergency events.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' 30 June 2020 financial statements. All agencies met the revised statutory deadlines for completing early close procedures and submitting their financial statements.
  • Emergency events significantly impacted cluster agencies in 2019–20. Agencies received additional funding of $1.1 billion to respond to the emergencies.
  • Cluster agencies implemented three new accounting standards in 2019–20. Adoption of AASB 16 'Leases' resulted in significant changes to agencies' financial statements.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our:

  • observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster
  • assessment of how well cluster agencies adapted their systems, policies and procedures, and governance arrangements in response to recent emergencies
  • review of how the cluster agencies managed the increased risks associated with new programs aimed at stemming the spread of COVID-19 and stimulating the economy.

Section highlights

  • Almost one-third of internal control issues reported were repeat findings. Cluster agencies should address these issues more promptly.
  • The severity of the recent bushfires and floods meant natural disaster expenses incurred by emergency services agencies increased by $430 million in 2019–20.
  • The department continues to establish its governance arrangements following Machinery of Government changes effective 1 July 2019.

 

Appendix one – Timeliness of financial reporting by agency

Appendix two – Management letter findings by agency

Appendix three – List of 2020 recommendations 

Appendix four – Status of 2019 recommendations 

Appendix five – Selected agencies for review of response to emergency events 

Appendix six – Financial data 

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for CBD South East Sydney Light Rail: follow-up performance audit

CBD South East Sydney Light Rail: follow-up performance audit

Transport
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Risk
Service delivery

This is a follow-up to the Auditor-General's November 2016 report on the CBD South East Sydney Light Rail project. This follow-up report assessed whether Transport for NSW has updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits.

The audit found that Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public.

The Auditor-General reports that the total cost of the project will exceed $3.1 billion, which is above the revised cost of $2.9 billion published in November 2019. $153.84 million of additional costs are due to omitted costs for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays.

The report makes four recommendations to Transport for NSW to publicly report on the final project cost, the updated expected project benefits, the benefits achieved in the first year of operations and the average weekly journey times.

Read full report (PDF)

The CBD and South East Light Rail is a 12 km light rail network for Sydney. It extends from Circular Quay along George Street to Central Station, through Surry Hills to Moore Park, then to Kensington and Kingsford via Anzac Parade and Randwick via Alison Road and High Street.

Transport for NSW (TfNSW) is responsible for planning, procuring and delivering the Central Business District and South East Light Rail (CSELR) project. In December 2014, TfNSW entered into a public private partnership with ALTRAC Light Rail as the operating company (OpCo) responsible for delivering, operating and maintaining the CSELR. OpCo engaged Alstom and Acciona, who together form its Design and Construct Contractor (D&C).

On 14 December 2019, passenger services started on the line between Circular Quay and Randwick. Passenger services on the line between Circular Quay and Kingsford commenced on 3 April 2020.

In November 2016, the Auditor-General published a performance audit report on the CSELR project. The audit found that TfNSW would deliver the CSELR at a higher cost with lower benefits than in the approved business case, and recommended that TfNSW update and consolidate information about project costs and benefits and ensure the information is readily accessible to the public.

In November 2018, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) examined TfNSW's actions taken in response to our 2016 performance audit report on the CSELR project. The PAC recommended that the Auditor-General consider undertaking a follow-up audit on the CSELR project. The purpose of this follow-up performance audit is to assess whether TfNSW has effectively updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits for the CSELR project.

Conclusion

Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated CSLER project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public. In line with the NSW Government Benefits Realisation Management Framework, TfNSW intends to measure benefits after the project is completed and has not updated the expected project benefits since April 2015.

Between February 2015 and December 2019, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) regularly updated capital expenditure costs for the CSELR in internal monthly financial performance and risk reports. These reports did not include all the costs incurred by TfNSW to manage and commission the CSELR project.

Omitted costs of $153.84 million for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays will bring the current estimated total cost of the CSELR project to $3.147 billion.

From February 2015, TfNSW did not regularly provide the financial performance and risk reports to key CSELR project governance bodies. TfNSW publishes information on project costs and benefits on the Sydney Light Rail website. However, the information on project costs has not always been accurate or current.

TfNSW is working with OpCo partners to deliver the expected journey time benefits. A key benefit defined in the business plan was that bus services would be reduced owing to transfer of demand to the light rail - entailing a saving. However, TfNSW reports that the full expected benefit of changes to bus services will not be realised due to bus patronage increasing above forecasted levels.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Governance and reporting arrangements for the CSELR

Appendix three – 2018 CSELR governance changes

Appendix four – About the audit

Appendix five – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #335 - released 11 June 2020

Published

Actions for Train station crowding

Train station crowding

Transport
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

This report focuses on how Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains manage crowding at selected metropolitan train stations.

The audit found that while Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, it does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. Sydney Trains 'do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed’, the Auditor-General said.

Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or station entries before crowding reaches unsafe levels or when it impacts on-time running. Assuming rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, causing customer delay. ‘Restricting customer access to platforms or station entries is not a sustainable approach to manage station crowding’, said the Auditor-General.

The Auditor-General made seven recommendations to improve Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains' management of station crowding. Transport for NSW have accepted these recommendations on behalf of the Transport cluster.

Public transport patronage has been impacted by COVID-19. This audit was conducted before these impacts occurred.

Read full report (PDF)

Sydney Trains patronage has increased by close to 34 per cent over the last five years, and Transport for NSW (TfNSW) expects the growth in patronage to continue over the next 30 years. As patronage increases there are more passengers entering and exiting stations, moving within stations to change services, and waiting on platforms. As a result, some Sydney metropolitan train stations are becoming increasingly crowded.

There are three main causes of station crowding:

  • patronage growth exceeding the current capacity limits of the rail network
  • service disruptions
  • special events.

Crowds can inhibit movement, cause discomfort and can lead to increased health and safety risks to customers. In the context of a train service, unmanaged crowds can affect service operation as trains spend longer at platforms waiting for customers to alight and board services which can cause service delays. Crowding can also prevent customers from accessing services.

Our 2017 performance audit, ‘Passenger Rail Punctuality’, found that rail agencies would find it hard to maintain train punctuality after 2019 unless they significantly increased the capacity of the network to carry trains and people. TfNSW and Sydney Trains have plans to improve the network to move more passengers. These plans are set out in strategies such as More Trains, More Services and in the continued implementation of new infrastructure such as the Sydney Metro. Since 2017, TfNSW and Sydney Trains have introduced 1,500 more weekly services to increase capacity. Additional network capacity improvements are in progress for delivery from 2022 onwards.

In the meantime, TfNSW and Sydney Trains need to use other ways of managing crowding at train stations until increased capacity comes on line.

This audit examined how effectively TfNSW and Sydney Trains are managing crowding at selected metropolitan train stations in the short and medium term. In doing so, the audit examined how TfNSW and Sydney Trains know whether there is a crowding problem at stations and how they manage that crowding.

TfNSW is the lead agency for transport in NSW. TfNSW is responsible for setting the standard working timetable that Sydney Trains must implement. Sydney Trains is responsible for operating and maintaining the Sydney metropolitan heavy rail passenger service. This includes operating, staffing and maintaining most metropolitan stations. Sydney Trains’ overall responsibility is to run a safe rail network to timetable.

Conclusion

Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, but does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. TfNSW and Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers, but do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed. TfNSW is delivering a program to influence demand for transport in key precincts but the effectiveness of this program and its impact on station crowding is unclear as Transport for NSW has not evaluated the outcomes of the program.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. Data and observation on dwell time, which is the time a train waits at a platform for customers to get on and off trains, inform the development of operational approaches to manage crowding at stations. Sydney Trains has KPIs on reliability, punctuality and customer experience and use these to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. TfNSW and Sydney Trains only formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events.

Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for crowd management to Customer Area Managers, who rely on frontline Sydney Trains staff to understand how crowding affects individual stations. Station staff at identified key metropolitan train stations have developed customer management plans (also known as crowd management plans). However, Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring and evaluation of these plans and does not systematically collect data on when station staff activate crowding interventions under these plans.

Sydney Trains stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services. Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or stations before crowding reaches unsafe levels, or when it impacts on-time running. As rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will need to increase its use of interventions to manage crowding. As Sydney Trains restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, it is likely these customers will experience delays caused by these interventions.

Since 2015, TfNSW has been delivering the 'Travel Choices' program which aims to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services in key precincts. TfNSW is unable to provide data demonstrating the overall effectiveness of this program and the impact the program has on distributing public transport usage out of peak AM and PM times. TfNSW and Sydney Trains continue to explore initiatives to specifically address crowd management.

Conclusion

TfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. There are no key performance indicators directly related to station crowding. Sydney Trains uses performance indicators on reliability, punctuality and customer experience to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. Sydney Trains does not have a routine process for identifying whether crowding contributed to minor safety incidents. TfNSW and Sydney Trains formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events.

 

Conclusion

Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a strategic risk but does not have an overarching strategy to manage station crowding. Sydney Trains' stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services.

Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers but does not have sufficient oversight to know that station crowding is effectively managed. Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring or evaluation of crowd management plans at key metropolitan train stations. The use of crowding interventions is likely to increase due to increasing patronage, causing more customers to experience delays directly caused by these activities.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains have developed interventions to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services but are yet to evaluate these interventions. As such, their impact on managing station crowding is unclear.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Sydney rail network

Appendix three – Rail services contract

Appendix four – Crowding pedestrian modelling

Appendix five – Airport Link stations case study

Appendix six – About the audit

Appendix seven – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #333 - released 30 April 2020

 

Published

Actions for Family and Community Services 2018

Family and Community Services 2018

Community Services
Compliance
Financial reporting
Information technology
Management and administration
Project management
Risk
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford released her report today on the Family and Community Services cluster. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial audits of agencies in the cluster. Cluster entities received unqualified audit opinions for their 30 June 2018 financial statements. Opportunities to improve the quality of financial reporting were identified and reported to management.

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Family and Community Services cluster for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report provides NSW Parliament and other users of the financial statements of Family and Community Services' agencies with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations
  • service delivery.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Family and Community Services cluster for 2018.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
2.1 Quality of financial reporting
Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all cluster agencies' financial statements. Conclusion: Sufficient audit evidence was obtained to conclude the financial statements were free of material misstatement.
Agencies complied with NSW Treasury’s mandatory early close requirements.

Completing other early close procedures was inconsistent and not always supported by adequate evidence.
Conclusion: There are opportunities for agencies to improve the quality of financial reporting by:
  • documenting all significant judgements and assumptions used when preparing the financial statements
  • regularly reconciling inter-agency balances and transactions
  • reconciling key account balances on a timely basis
  • quantifying the impact of new and revised accounting standards.
2.2 Timeliness of financial reporting
Agencies completed revaluations of property, plant and equipment and submitted 31 March 2018 financial statements by the due date as required by NSW Treasury.

Agencies submitted year-end financial statements by the statutory deadline.
Conclusion: Early revaluations of property, plant and equipment contributes to agencies meeting the year-end statutory reporting deadline.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:

  • our financial statement audits of agencies in the Family and Community Services cluster for 2018
  • the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office annual work program.

The Audit Office Annual Work Program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each NSW Government cluster.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
3.1 Internal controls
The 2017–18 audits reported 47 internal control weaknesses. While none were high risk, there were 15 repeat issues.

Conclusion: Management accepted audit findings and advised they are actioning recommendations. Timely action is important to ensure internal controls operate effectively.

Twenty-two of these internal control weaknesses related to information technology processes and control environment. Conclusion: Control weaknesses in information systems may compromise the integrity and security of financial data used for decision making and financial reporting.

Recommendation: Agencies should strengthen user access administration to prevent inappropriate access to key IT systems by:
  • ensuring privileged user access is limited to those requiring access to maintain the IT systems
  • monitoring privileged user access to address risks from unauthorised activity
  • ensuring IT password settings comply with password policies
  • ensuring timely removal of access to business systems for terminated and casual employees.
The Department, NSW Land and Housing Corporation (LAHC) and three other cluster agencies’ contract registers are incomplete and/or inaccurate. Recommendation: Agencies should ensure their contract registers are complete and accurate so they can more effectively govern contracts and manage compliance obligations.
3.2 Audit Office annual work program
Financial impact of the commissioning approach.

The transfer of disability services to the National Disability Insurance Scheme and other commissioning of service delivery has contributed to a 36 per cent decrease in frontline employee numbers since 2015–16. Similarly, corporate services’ employee numbers reduced by 34 per cent.

The Department’s salary costs have reduced by $232 million or 18 per cent from 2016–17.
Conclusion: The ratio of corporate services employee numbers to support frontline and support services has remained at 1:10 since 2015–16, which indicates restructures have been planned to align with the transfer of disability services.
Impact of the new social housing maintenance contract

Maintenance expenses have increased by about 40 per cent since the new maintenance contract commenced in April 2016. LAHC measures the benefits of the new maintenance contract such as improved tenant satisfaction.
Conclusion: The new maintenance contract has contributed to some positive social outcomes such as tenants being employed by the contractors to conduct maintenance, as call centre operators and in administration. However, more can be done to ensure value for money is being achieved.
ChildStory IT Project

Whilst phase one of the ChildStory IT project went 'live' in 2017–18, the planned timetable has not been met and the revised date for full implementation is end of 2018.

According to the 2014–15 NSW Budget, the budget for ChildStory was $100 million over a four-year period. During the design and implementation stage, this amount was revised to $128 million, with approval of the Expenditure Review Committee. The actual cost incurred over the four years until 30 June 2018, is approximately $131 million.

We identified issues with the data migration from the legacy systems to ChildStory.
Conclusion: To inform future IT projects, we understand the Department is capturing our findings, along with the findings from the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation’s ‘Healthchecks’.

This chapter outlines certain service delivery outcomes for 2017–18. The data on activity levels and performance is provided by Cluster agencies. The Audit Office does not have a specific mandate to audit performance information. Accordingly, the information in this chapter is unaudited.

In our recent performance audit, Progress and measurement of Premier's Priorities, we identified 12 limitations of performance measurement and performance data. We recommended that the Department of Premier and Cabinet ensure that processes to check and verify data are in place for all agency data sources.

Published

Actions for Transport 2018

Transport 2018

Transport
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Procurement
Risk
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford released her report today on key observations and findings from the 30 June 2018 financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport cluster. Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements. However, assessing the fair value of the broad range of transport related assets creates challenges.

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Transport cluster for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Transport cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Transport cluster for 2018.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
2.1 Quality of financial reporting
Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements Sufficient audit evidence was obtained to conclude the financial statements were free of material misstatement.
2.2 Key accounting issues
Valuation of assets continues to create challenges. Although agencies complied with the requirements of the accounting standards and Treasury policies on valuations, we identified some opportunities for improvements at RMS.

RMS incorporated data from its asset condition assessments for the first time in the valuation methodology which improved the valuation outcome. Overall, we were satisfied with the valuation methodology and key assumptions, but we noted some deficiencies in the asset data in relation to asset component unit rates and old condition data for some components of assets. 

Also, a bypass and tunnel were incorrectly excluded from RMS records and valuation process since 2013. This resulted in an increase for these assets’ value by $133 million.

The valuation inputs for Wetlands and Moorings were revised this year to better reflect the assets' characteristics resulting in a $98.0 million increase.

2.3 Timeliness of financial reporting
Residual Transport Corporation did not submit its financial statements by the statutory reporting deadline. Residual Transport Corporation remained a dormant entity with no transactions for the year ended 30 June 2018.
With the exception of Residual Transport Corporation, all agencies completed early close procedures and submitted financial statements within statutory timeframes. Early close procedures allow financial reporting issues and risks to be addressed early in the reporting and audit process.
2.4 Financial sustainability
NSW Trains and the Chief Investigator of the Office of Transport Safety Investigations reported negative net assets of $75.7 million and $89,000 respectively at 30 June 2018.  NSW Trains and the Chief Investigator of the Office of Transport Safety Investigations continue to require letters of financial support to confirm their ability to pay liabilities as they fall due. 
2.5 Passenger revenue and patronage
Transport agencies revenue growth increased at a higher rate than patronage. Public transport passenger revenue increased by $114 million (8.3 per cent) in 2017–18, and patronage increased by 37.1 million (5.1 per cent) across all modes of transport based on data provided by TfNSW. 
Negative balance Opal Cards resulted in $3.8 million in revenue not collected in 2017–18 and $7.8 million since the introduction of Opal. A total of 1.1 million Opal cards issued since its introduction have negative balances. Transport for NSW advised it is liaising with the ticketing vendor to implement system changes and are investigating other ways to reduce the occurrences.
2.6 Cost recovery from public transport users
Overall cost recovery from users has decreased. Overall cost recovery from public transport users (on rail and bus services by STA) decreased from 23.2 per cent to 22.4 per cent between 2016–17 and 2017–18. The main reason for the decrease is due to expenditure increasing at a faster rate than revenue in 2017–18.


 

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:

  • our financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport cluster for 2018
  • the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office annual work program.

The Audit Office Annual Work Program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each of the NSW Government clusters. 

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
3.1 Internal controls 
There was an increase in findings on internal controls across the Transport cluster. Key themes related to information technology, employee leave entitlements and asset management. Eighteen per cent of all issues were repeat issues.
3.2 Audit Office Annual work program
The Transport cluster wrote-off over $200 million of assets which were replaced by new assets or technology.

Majority of this write-off was recognised by RMS, with $199 million relating to the write-off of existing assets which have been replaced during the year. 

RailCorp is expected to convert to TAHE from 1 July 2019. Several working groups are considering different aspects of the TAHE transition including its status as a for-profit Public Trading Enterprise and which assets to transfer to TAHE. We will continue to monitor developments on TAHE for any impact to the financial statements.
RMS' estimated maintenance backlog at 30 June 2018 of $3.4 billion is lower than last year. Sydney Trains' estimated maintenance backlog at 30 June 2018 increased by 20.6 per cent to $434 million. TfNSW does not quantify its backlog maintenance. TfNSW advised it is liaising with Infrastructure NSW to develop a consistent definition of maintenance backlog across all transport service providers. 
Not all agencies monitor unplanned maintenance across the Transport cluster. Unplanned maintenance can be more expensive than planned maintenance. TfNSW should develop a consistent approach to define, monitor and track unplanned maintenance across the cluster.

This chapter outlines certain service delivery outcomes for 2017–18. The data on activity levels and performance is provided by Cluster agencies. The Audit Office does not have a specific mandate to audit performance information. Accordingly, the information in this chapter is unaudited. 

We report this information on service delivery to provide additional context to understand the operations of the Transport cluster and to collate and present service information for different modes of transport in one report. 

In our recent performance audit, Progress and measurement of Premier's Priorities, we identified 12 limitations of performance measurement and performance data. We recommended that the Department of Premier and Cabinet ensure that processes to check and verify data are in place for all agency data sources.

Published

Actions for Mobile speed cameras

Mobile speed cameras

Transport
Compliance
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Regulation
Service delivery

Key aspects of the state’s mobile speed camera program need to be improved to maximise road safety benefits, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. Mobile speed cameras are deployed in a limited number of locations with a small number of these being used frequently. This, along with decisions to limit the hours that mobile speed cameras operate, and to use multiple warning signs, have reduced the broad deterrence of speeding across the general network - the main policy objective of the mobile speed camera program.

The primary goal of speed cameras is to reduce speeding and make the roads safer. Our 2011 performance audit on speed cameras found that, in general, speed cameras change driver behaviour and have a positive impact on road safety.

Transport for NSW published the NSW Speed Camera Strategy in June 2012 in response to our audit. According to the Strategy, the main purpose of mobile speed cameras is to reduce speeding across the road network by providing a general deterrence through anywhere, anytime enforcement and by creating a perceived risk of detection across the road network. Fixed and red-light speed cameras aim to reduce speeding at specific locations.

Roads and Maritime Services and Transport for NSW deploy mobile speed cameras (MSCs) in consultation with NSW Police. The cameras are operated by contractors authorised by Roads and Maritime Services. MSC locations are stretches of road that can be more than 20 kilometres long. MSC sites are specific places within these locations that meet the requirements for a MSC vehicle to be able to operate there.

This audit assessed whether the mobile speed camera program is effectively managed to maximise road safety benefits across the NSW road network.

Conclusion

The mobile speed camera program requires improvements to key aspects of its management to maximise road safety benefits. While camera locations have been selected based on crash history, the limited number of locations restricts network coverage. It also makes enforcement more predictable, reducing the ability to provide a general deterrence. Implementation of the program has been consistent with government decisions to limit its hours of operation and use multiple warning signs. These factors limit the ability of the mobile speed camera program to effectively deliver a broad general network deterrence from speeding.

Many locations are needed to enable network-wide coverage and ensure MSC sessions are randomised and not predictable. However, there are insufficient locations available to operate MSCs that meet strict criteria for crash history, operator safety, signage and technical requirements. MSC performance would be improved if there were more locations.

A scheduling system is meant to randomise MSC location visits to ensure they are not predictable. However, a relatively small number of locations have been visited many times making their deployment more predictable in these places. The allocation of MSCs across the time of day, day of week and across regions is prioritised based on crash history but the frequency of location visits does not correspond with the crash risk for each location.

There is evidence of a reduction in fatal and serious crashes at the 30 best-performing MSC locations. However, there is limited evidence that the current MSC program in NSW has led to a behavioural change in drivers by creating a general network deterrence. While the overall reduction in serious injuries on roads has continued, fatalities have started to climb again. Compliance with speed limits has improved at the sites and locations that MSCs operate, but the results of overall network speed surveys vary, with recent improvements in some speed zones but not others.
There is no supporting justification for the number of hours of operation for the program. The rate of MSC enforcement (hours per capita) in NSW is less than Queensland and Victoria. The government decision to use multiple warning signs has made it harder to identify and maintain suitable MSC locations, and impeded their use for enforcement in both traffic directions and in school zones. 

Appendix one - Response from agency

Appendix two - About the audit

Appendix three - Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #308 - released 18 October 2018

Published

Actions for Managing Antisocial behaviour in public housing

Managing Antisocial behaviour in public housing

Community Services
Asset valuation
Infrastructure
Regulation
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

The Department of Family and Community Services (FACS) has not adequately supported or resourced its staff to manage antisocial behaviour in public housing according to a report released today by the Deputy Auditor-General for New South Wales, Ian Goodwin. 

In recent decades, policy makers and legislators in Australian states and territories have developed and implemented initiatives to manage antisocial behaviour in public housing environments. All jurisdictions now have some form of legislation or policy to encourage public housing tenants to comply with rules and obligations of ‘good neighbourliness’. In November 2015, the NSW Parliament changed legislation to introduce a new approach to manage antisocial behaviour in public housing. This approach is commonly described as the ‘strikes’ approach. 

When introduced in the NSW Parliament, the ‘strikes’ approach was described as a means to:

  • improve the behaviour of a minority of tenants engaging in antisocial behaviour 
  • create better, safer communities for law abiding tenants, including those who are ageing and vulnerable.

FACS has a number of tasks as a landlord, including a responsibility to collect rent and organise housing maintenance. FACS also has a role to support tenants with complex needs and manage antisocial behaviour. These roles have some inherent tensions. The FACS antisocial behaviour management policy aims are: 

to balance the responsibilities of tenants, the rights of their neighbours in social housing, private residents and the broader community with the need to support tenants to sustain their public housing tenancies.

This audit assessed the efficiency and effectiveness of the ‘strikes’ approach to managing antisocial behaviour in public housing environments.

We examined whether:

  • the approach is being implemented as intended and leading to improved safety and security in social housing environments
  • FACS and its partner agencies have the capability and capacity to implement the approach
  • there are effective mechanisms to monitor, report and progressively improve the approach.
Conclusion

FACS has not adequately supported or resourced its staff to implement the antisocial behaviour policy. FACS antisocial behaviour data is incomplete and unreliable. Accordingly, there is insufficient data to determine the nature and extent of the problem and whether the implementation of the policy is leading to improved safety and security

FACS management of minor and moderate incidents of antisocial behaviour is poor. FACS has not dedicated sufficient training to equip frontline housing staff with the relevant skills to apply the antisocial behaviour management policy. At more than half of the housing offices we visited, staff had not been trained to:

  • conduct effective interviews to determine whether an antisocial behaviour complaint can be substantiated

  • de escalate conflict and manage complex behaviours when required

  • properly manage the safety of staff and tenants

  • establish information sharing arrangements with police

  • collect evidence that meets requirements at the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal

  • record and manage antisocial behaviour incidents using the information management system HOMES ASB.

When frontline housing staff are informed about serious and severe illegal antisocial behaviour incidents, they generally refer them to the FACS Legal Division. Staff in the Legal Division are trained and proficient in managing antisocial behaviour in compliance with the policy and therefore, the more serious incidents are managed effectively using HOMES ASB. 


FACS provides housing services to most remote townships via outreach visits from the Dubbo office. In remote townships, the policy is not being fully implemented due to insufficient frontline housing staff. There is very limited knowledge of the policy in these areas and FACS data shows few recorded antisocial behaviour incidents in remote regions. 


The FACS information management system (HOMES ASB) is poorly designed and has significant functional limitations that impede the ability of staff to record and manage antisocial behaviour. Staff at most of the housing offices we visited were unable to accurately record antisocial behaviour matters in HOMES ASB, making the data incorrect and unreliable.

Published

Actions for Administering Domestic Waterfront Tenancies

Administering Domestic Waterfront Tenancies

Planning
Transport
Management and administration
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration

The audit’s overall conclusion is that Lands and Maritime are broadly achieving outcomes consistent with the IPART report on administering domestic waterfront tenancies. But a lack of collaboration between the agencies is contributing to poor customer service. Inconsistencies with the IPART report recommendations and operational differences between the two agencies result in different rents and conditions for tenants in the two agencies. The differences are having a significant impact on customer service.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #191 - released 23 September 2009

Published

Actions for Improving Road Safety: Heavy Vehicles

Improving Road Safety: Heavy Vehicles

Transport
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Regulation
Risk

The RTA (Roads and Traffic Authority) approach to detecting and enforcing heavy vehicle safety has produced mixed results. There have been overall decreases in the number of crashes and people killed and injured in crashes involving heavy vehicles between 2002 and 2007. However, the number of crashes and the number of people injured have increased between 2006 and 2007.

We recognise that the RTA is unable to prevent all crashes. However, we consider that the RTA could do more to improve its ability to detect and respond to high risk heavy vehicles travelling on our roads.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #187 - released 13 May 2009

Published

Actions for Grants Administration

Grants Administration

Premier and Cabinet
Treasury
Health
Community Services
Planning
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Risk

We found no significant difference in the funding of government and opposition electorates. However, more money was given to electorates that were safely held by the major parties. These seats received $1.29 for every dollar given to marginal and independent seats with government marginals getting the least. Electorates also receive different levels of funding according to which region they are in. Such variations may reflect valid agency objectives such as meeting State Plan targets or addressing socio-economic disadvantage.

But while agencies publish who gets what, they do not adequately evaluate or explain what grant programs have achieved. As a result, there is a risk that New South Wales may not get the best value for its spending. We recommend that agencies regularly evaluate their grant programs and publish the results.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #186 - released 6 May 2009