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Actions for Managing native vegetation

Managing native vegetation

Environment
Management and administration
Project management
Regulation
Service delivery

The report found the clearing of native vegetation on rural land is not effectively regulated and managed. The processes supporting the regulatory framework are weak and there is no evidence-based assurance that clearing of native vegetation is carried out in accordance with approvals. 

In 2014 an expert panel completed a review of biodiversity legislation in NSW. The panel’s recommendations included repealing the Native Vegetation Act 2003, proposing a new Act with the goal of maintaining a healthy, productive and resilient environment for the greatest wellbeing of the community, and recommending that management of native vegetation in the context of existing agricultural management would be assisted and supervised by Local Land Services (LLS).

Following the panel report, the NSW Government undertook major biodiversity conservation and land management reforms which saw the introduction of the Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016 (NSW) and the Local Land Services Amendment Act 2016 (NSW). The reforms commenced in August 2017. The Native Vegetation Act 2003, the Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995, the Nature Conservation Trust Act 2001, and parts of the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 were repealed.

Under the legislative reforms, the Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016 and Local Land Services Amendment Act 2016, which amended the Local Land Services Act 2013, aim to ensure a balanced approach to land management and biodiversity conservation in NSW.

A core objective of the Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016 is to conserve biodiversity at bioregional and state scales. A core objective of the Local Land Service Act 2013 is to ensure the proper management of natural resources in the social, economic and environmental interests of the state, consistently with the principles of ecologically sustainable development.

The integrated package of reforms included:

  • new arrangements that allow land owners to improve productivity while responding to environmental risks
  • new ways to assess and manage the biodiversity impacts of development
  • a new state Environmental Planning Policy for managing impacts on native vegetation in urban areas
  • significant investment in conservation of private land
  • a risk-based system for regulating human and business interactions with native plants and animals
  • streamlined approvals and dedicated resources to help reduce the regulatory burden.

Transition to this land management framework began on 25 August 2017 with the commencement of the Land Management (Native Vegetation) Code.

The overall objectives of the reforms are:

  • to arrest and ultimately reverse the current decline in the state’s biodiversity while facilitating ecologically sustainable development, in particular efficient and sustainable agricultural development
  • enable landholders to improve the efficiency of their agricultural systems and take a more active role in providing incentive and supporting landholders to improve the condition and function of their ecological systems. 

The objective of this audit is to assess whether the clearing of native vegetation in rural areas is effectively regulated and managed by the Office of Environment and Heritage (OEH) and LLS under these legislative frameworks. The audit also examined the progress of the Biodiversity Conservation Trust in implementing the Biodiversity Conservation Investment Strategy as a counterbalance to rural land clearing. 

At the time of this audit OEH was responsible for preparing the Native Vegetation Regulatory map and for compliance enforcement in relation to unlawful land clearing. Post 1 July 2019, under machinery of government changes, OEH will be abolished and its activities relevant to this audit will be moved to the new Department of Planning, Industry and Environment. For the purposes of this audit we will continue to refer to it as OEH. 

Conclusion
The clearing of native vegetation on rural land is not effectively regulated and managed because the processes in place to support the regulatory framework are weak. There is no evidence-based assurance that clearing of native vegetation is being carried out in accordance with approvals. Responses to incidents of unlawful clearing are slow, with few tangible outcomes. Enforcement action is rarely taken against landholders who unlawfully clear native vegetation. 

There are processes in place for approving land clearing but there is limited follow-up to ensure approvals are complied with.
Procedures and systems are in place for assessing applications and issuing approvals for land clearing. Approvals contain conditions for managing clearing and setting aside land for conservation as a counterbalance to permitted clearing. 
There is limited follow-up or capacity to gauge whether landholders are complying with the conditions of approvals and effectively managing areas of their land that have been set aside for conservation (i.e. 'set asides'). 
Certificate assessments are used to grant landholders permission to clear. All assessments we reviewed generally complied with the Land Management (Native Vegetation) Code 2018 (the Code). 
The rules around land clearing may not be responding adequately to environmental risks.
The Code, which contains conditions under which the thinning or clearing of native vegetation can be approved on regulated land, is intended to allow landholders to improve productivity while responding to environmental risks. That said, it may not be achieving this balance. For example, the Code allows some native species to be treated as ‘invasive’ when they may not be invading an area, provides little protection for groundcover and limited management requirements for set asides. There is also limited ability under the Code to reject applications for higher risk clearing proposals.
The release of the Native Vegetation Regulatory (NVR) map has been delayed, limiting landholders' ability to determine if their plans for clearing are lawful.
OEH has applied significant effort in developing a native vegetation regulatory map to guide landholders on which land they can and can’t clear without approval. However, in November 2016 the then Minister for Primary Industries advised Parliament that the two largest land categories of the NVR map will not come into effect until the relevant Ministers are satisfied stakeholders have sufficient confidence in the maps’ accuracy. Not releasing the map has made it harder for landholders to identify the portions of their land that are regulated and ensure they comply with land clearing rules. It has also limited OEH’s ability to consult on and improve the accuracy of the map.
There are significant delays in identifying unlawful clearing and few penalties imposed.
Unexplained land clearing can take over two years to identify and analyse, making it difficult to minimise environmental harm or gather evidence to prosecute unlawful clearing. Despite around 1,000 instances of unexplained clearing identified by OEH and over 500 reports to the environmental hotline each year, with around 300 investigations in progress at any one time, there are only two to three prosecutions, three to five remediation orders and around ten penalty notices issued each year for unlawful clearing. Further, OEH is yet to commence any prosecutions under the current legislation which commenced in August 2017.
Land clearing and private land conservation investment have both increased.
Clearing of native vegetation has increased in recent years. At the same time, the government is also investing in properties with high environmental value with a focus on improving the mix of endangered ecological communities conserved in perpetuity. Processes are in place for identifying and prioritising areas of land for investment but the funding provided to each region is not always consistent with these priorities. 

Local Land Services (LLS) is responsible for processing notifications and issuing certificates to landholders for managing the thinning or clearing of native vegetation on rural land through the ‘Land Management (Native Vegetation) Code 2018’ (the Code). This work includes monitoring and reporting on the implementation of the Code, including the establishment and management of set asides.

OEH is responsible for compliance and enforcement in relation to unlawful land clearing. It is also responsible for producing the NVR map, designed to show landholders where land clearing can occur without approval, where approval is required, and where land clearing is not permitted. Post 1 July 2019, under machinery of government changes, OEH will be abolished and its activities relevant to this audit will be moved to the new Department of Planning, Industry and Environment.

Appendix one - Response from agencies

Appendix two - Authorisations for thinning and clearing, and restoration initiatives under the Native Vegetation Act 2003

Appendix three - About the audit

Appendix four - Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary Reference: Report number #324 - released 27 June 2019

Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Transport Access Program

Transport Access Program

Transport
Infrastructure
Project management
Service delivery

The following report is available in an Easy English version that is intended to meet the needs of some people with lower literacy skills, some people with an intellectual disability and some people from different cultural backgrounds.

View the Easy English version of the Transport Access Program report

Transport for NSW’s process for selecting and prioritising projects for the third stage of its Transport Access Program balanced compliance with national disability standards with broader customer outcomes. Demographics, deliverability and value for money were also considered. However, Transport for NSW does not know the complete scope of work required for full compliance, limiting its ability to demonstrate that its approach is effective, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford.

Access to transport is critical to ensuring that people can engage in all aspects of community life, including education, employment and recreation. People with disability can encounter barriers when accessing public transport services. In 2015, there were 1.37 million people living with disability in New South Wales.

Accessible public transport is about more than physical accessibility. It also means barrier-free access for people who have vision, hearing or cognitive impairments. All users, not just people with disability, benefit from improvements to the accessibility and inclusiveness of transport services. 

Transport for NSW has an obligation under Australian Government legislation to provide accessible services to people with disabilities in a manner which is not discriminatory. Under the Disability Standards for Accessible Public Transport 2002 (the DSAPT - an instrument of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (the Act) (Commonwealth)), there is a requirement to modify and develop new infrastructure, means of transport and services to provide access for people with disabilities. All public transport operators are required to ensure that at least 90 per cent of their networks met DSAPT by December 2017 and the networks will need to be 100 per cent compliant with all parts of the standards by 31 December 2022. Trains are not required to be fully compliant with DSAPT until December 2032. 

The Transport Access Program (TAP) is Transport for NSW's largest program with a specific focus on improving access to public transport for people with disability. The TAP is a series of projects to upgrade existing public transport infrastructure across four networks: Sydney Trains, Intercity Trains, Regional Trains and Sydney Ferries. Transport for NSW established the TAP as a rolling program and, to date, it has delivered the first tranche of TAP (TAP 1) and is completing the final projects for the second tranche (TAP 2). NSW budget papers estimate that by 30 June 2018, Transport for NSW had spent $1.2 billion in the TAP since its commencement in 2011-12.

After the completion of TAP 1 and TAP 2 (as well as through other transport infrastructure programs), Transport for NSW estimates that 58.5 per cent of the Sydney Trains, Regional Trains and Intercity Trains networks, and 66 per cent of the Sydney Ferries network, will be accessible. To close the significant gap in compliance with the DSAPT target, the objective for TAP 3 is ‘to contribute to Disability Discrimination Act 1992 related targets through DSAPT compliance upgrades’. 

The audit assessed whether Transport for NSW has an effective process to select and prioritise projects as part of the TAP, with a specific focus on the third tranche of TAP funding.

In August 2018, at the commencement of this audit, Transport for NSW intended to complete the selection of projects for the TAP 3 final business case in December 2018. Transport for NSW advise that it now intends to complete the development stage and final business case in the first quarter of 2019, prior to the final investment decision of the TAP program. This report is based on the TAP 3 strategic business case and information provided by Transport for NSW up to December 2018.

Conclusion
Transport for NSW’s process for selecting and prioritising projects for TAP 3 balanced DSAPT compliance goals with broader customer outcomes. It also considered demographics, deliverability and value for money. However, Transport for NSW does not know the complete scope of work required for full DSAPT compliance, and this limits its ability to demonstrate that its approach is effective. 
Transport for NSW has applied most of the external review recommendations from previous funding rounds to the implementation of the third round of TAP funding (TAP3), with positive results. Changes made include a clear objective for TAP 3 to focus on improving compliance, improved governance arrangements, and better consideration of deliverability and design during project planning. 
Through TAP 3, Transport for NSW is also trying to better address disability access in a way that balances DSAPT compliance with other considerations - such as population demographics, access to services and value for money. Transport for NSW developed an objective prioritisation and selection methodology to assess projects for TAP 3 funding. 
Transport for NSW cannot quantify the work needed to meet DSAPT compliance targets across the rail and ferry networks as it has not completed a comprehensive audit of compliance. This information is needed to ensure the effective targeting of funding, and to measure the contribution of TAP 3 work to meeting the DSAPT compliance targets. Instead, Transport for NSW has undertaken a phased approach to completing a comprehensive audit of compliance across the networks, with a focus on first assessing compliance at locations that are not wheelchair accessible. This creates two problems. First, Transport for NSW does not know the complete scope of work required to achieve DSAPT compliance. Second, not all wheelchair accessible locations fully meet DSAPT standards.
Transport for NSW's proposed communication plan for the schedule of TAP 3 funded works does not align with its Disability Inclusion Action Plan 2018-2022. The Disability Inclusion Action Plan commits Transport for NSW to providing a full list of stations and wharves to be upgraded with their estimated time of construction when the next round of funding, TAP 3, is announced. Given the long timeframes associated with improving transport infrastructure, this information is important as it allows people to make informed decisions about where they live, work or study. Instead, Transport for NSW plans to communicate information to customers on a project by project basis.

In 2015, there were 1.37 million people living with disability in New South Wales. Access to transport is critical to ensuring that people can engage in all aspects of community life, including education, employment and recreation. People with disability can encounter barriers when accessing public transport services. 

The social model of disability, outlined in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, views people with disability as not disabled by their impairment but by the barriers in the community and environment that restrict their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others. 

Accessible public transport is more than the provision of physical access to premises and conveyances, it provides barrier-free access for people who have vision, hearing or cognitive impairments. All users, not just people with disability, benefit from improvements to the accessibility and inclusiveness of transport services.

According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the main types of difficulties experienced by people with disability when using public transport relate to steps (39.9 per cent), difficulty getting to stops and stations (25 per cent), fear and anxiety (23.3 per cent) and lack of seating or difficulty standing (20.7 per cent).

Transport for NSW has a Disability Inclusion Action Plan (the Action Plan) 2018-2022 that sets an overall framework for planning, delivering and reporting on initiatives to increase accessibility of the transport network. It covers all elements of the journey experienced when using public transport, including journey planning, staff training, customer services and interaction between the physical environment and modes of transport. Appendix five outlines the guiding principles of the Action Plan.

Transport for NSW's Transport Social Policy branch developed the Action Plan in consultation with internal and external stakeholders. The director of the Transport Social Policy branch is a member of the TAP executive steering committee, which supports alignment between the Action Plan and TAP.

Transport for NSW's Disability Inclusion Action Plan describes a customer focussed approach to accessibility

One of the guiding principles of the Action Plan is ‘intelligent compliance’. Transport for NSW describes this as compliance that prioritises customer-focused outcomes over a narrow focus on legal compliance with accessibility standards. As well as being compliant, infrastructure should be practical, usable, fit for purpose and convenient. 

The TAP prioritisation and selection methodology reflects Transport for NSW’s focus on intelligent compliance. We consider this a reasonable approach as had Transport for NSW focussed exclusively on achieving compliance with the DSAPT targets by upgrading the most affordable infrastructure, some locations, that are used by more customers, would remain inaccessible to people with disability. However, this approach should not be seen as an alternative to Transport for NSW meeting its DSAPT compliance obligations.

TAP program staff consult with the Accessible Transport Advisory Committee

The Accessible Transport Advisory Committee (ATAC) has representatives from disability and ageing organisations, who provide expert guidance to Transport for NSW on access and inclusion. The ATAC provide guidance and feedback on projects and project solutions, including user testing where appropriate. TAP program staff provide regular updates at ATAC meetings, which include briefings on progress. The ATAC also provides feedback and suggestions to TAP program staff, which is considered and sometimes included in current and future projects.For example, in March 2017 the TAP program team briefed the ATAC on the challenges with respect to a number of ferry wharves and sought support for DSAPT exemptions proposed in the TAP 3 strategic business case.

Case study: Feedback on Braille lettering for lift buttons
In June 2018, the Program team sought feedback on a variety of lift button options to improve accessibility on future TAP projects. In September 2018, during the ATAC meeting attended by the Audit Office, the program team sought feedback on the standard designs for TAP 3. Some ATAC members noted that the standard design included Braille lettering on the lift buttons, and that this was not good practice because people can accidently press the button while reading it. As a result, Transport for NSW are incorporating this feedback into design requirements for the lifts for TAP 3, which will consider larger buttons, clearer Braille and Braille signage adjacent to the button.

Transport for NSW has not briefed the Advisory Committee on the outcome of the prioritisation and selection process

TAP program staff briefed the Advisory Committee about the prioritisation and selection methodology, after the Minister approved it in 2016. However, Transport for NSW have not briefed or consulted the Advisory Committee on the outcome of the prioritisation process. Infrastructure NSW noted this issue during its review of the strategic business case. 

Transport for NSW advised us that it established the ATAC as an advisory group, and that Transport for NSW does not disclose sensitive information to it. Transport for NSW intends to share the outcome of the prioritisation process following the completion of the TAP 3 development stage and final investment decision.

The TAP communication plan does not fully meet the requirements of the Disability Inclusion Action Plan

The Disability Inclusion Action Plan includes an action item to ‘provide a listing of stations and wharves to be upgraded with estimated time of construction as each new tranche of the Transport Access Program is announced’ The TAP Communication Plan that we reviewed does not include this provision instead focussing on communication on a per project basis. Given the long timeframes associated with improving transport infrastructure, this information is important as it allows people to make informed decisions about where they live, work or study.

Published

Actions for Mobile speed cameras

Mobile speed cameras

Transport
Compliance
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Regulation
Service delivery

Key aspects of the state’s mobile speed camera program need to be improved to maximise road safety benefits, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. Mobile speed cameras are deployed in a limited number of locations with a small number of these being used frequently. This, along with decisions to limit the hours that mobile speed cameras operate, and to use multiple warning signs, have reduced the broad deterrence of speeding across the general network - the main policy objective of the mobile speed camera program.

The primary goal of speed cameras is to reduce speeding and make the roads safer. Our 2011 performance audit on speed cameras found that, in general, speed cameras change driver behaviour and have a positive impact on road safety.

Transport for NSW published the NSW Speed Camera Strategy in June 2012 in response to our audit. According to the Strategy, the main purpose of mobile speed cameras is to reduce speeding across the road network by providing a general deterrence through anywhere, anytime enforcement and by creating a perceived risk of detection across the road network. Fixed and red-light speed cameras aim to reduce speeding at specific locations.

Roads and Maritime Services and Transport for NSW deploy mobile speed cameras (MSCs) in consultation with NSW Police. The cameras are operated by contractors authorised by Roads and Maritime Services. MSC locations are stretches of road that can be more than 20 kilometres long. MSC sites are specific places within these locations that meet the requirements for a MSC vehicle to be able to operate there.

This audit assessed whether the mobile speed camera program is effectively managed to maximise road safety benefits across the NSW road network.

Conclusion

The mobile speed camera program requires improvements to key aspects of its management to maximise road safety benefits. While camera locations have been selected based on crash history, the limited number of locations restricts network coverage. It also makes enforcement more predictable, reducing the ability to provide a general deterrence. Implementation of the program has been consistent with government decisions to limit its hours of operation and use multiple warning signs. These factors limit the ability of the mobile speed camera program to effectively deliver a broad general network deterrence from speeding.

Many locations are needed to enable network-wide coverage and ensure MSC sessions are randomised and not predictable. However, there are insufficient locations available to operate MSCs that meet strict criteria for crash history, operator safety, signage and technical requirements. MSC performance would be improved if there were more locations.

A scheduling system is meant to randomise MSC location visits to ensure they are not predictable. However, a relatively small number of locations have been visited many times making their deployment more predictable in these places. The allocation of MSCs across the time of day, day of week and across regions is prioritised based on crash history but the frequency of location visits does not correspond with the crash risk for each location.

There is evidence of a reduction in fatal and serious crashes at the 30 best-performing MSC locations. However, there is limited evidence that the current MSC program in NSW has led to a behavioural change in drivers by creating a general network deterrence. While the overall reduction in serious injuries on roads has continued, fatalities have started to climb again. Compliance with speed limits has improved at the sites and locations that MSCs operate, but the results of overall network speed surveys vary, with recent improvements in some speed zones but not others.
There is no supporting justification for the number of hours of operation for the program. The rate of MSC enforcement (hours per capita) in NSW is less than Queensland and Victoria. The government decision to use multiple warning signs has made it harder to identify and maintain suitable MSC locations, and impeded their use for enforcement in both traffic directions and in school zones. 

Appendix one - Response from agency

Appendix two - About the audit

Appendix three - Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #308 - released 18 October 2018

Published

Actions for Regulation of water pollution in drinking water catchments and illegal disposal of solid waste

Regulation of water pollution in drinking water catchments and illegal disposal of solid waste

Environment
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Regulation
Risk

There are important gaps in how the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) implements its regulatory framework for water pollution in drinking water catchments and illegal solid waste disposal. This limits the effectiveness of its regulatory responses, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford.

The NSW Environment Protection Authority (the EPA) is the State’s primary environmental regulator. The EPA regulates waste and water pollution under the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (the Act) through its licensing, monitoring, regulation and enforcement activities. The community should be able to rely on the effectiveness of this regulation to protect the environment and human health. The EPA has regulatory responsibility for more significant and specific activities which can potentially harm the environment.

Activities regulated by the EPA include manufacturing, chemical production, electricity generation, mining, waste management, livestock processing, mineral processing, sewerage treatment, and road construction. For these activities, the operator must have an EPA issued environment protection licence (licence). Licences have conditions attached which may limit the amount and concentrations of substances the activity may produce and discharge into the environment. Conditions also require the licensee to report on its licensed activities.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the EPA’s regulatory response to water pollution in drinking water catchments and illegal solid waste disposal. The findings and recommendations of this review can be reasonably applied to the EPA’s other regulatory functions, as the areas we examined were indicative of how the EPA regulates all pollution types and incidents.

 
Conclusion
There are important gaps in how the EPA implements its regulatory framework for water pollution in drinking water catchments and illegal solid waste disposal which limit the effectiveness of its regulatory response. The EPA uses a risk-based regulatory framework that has elements consistent with the NSW Government Guidance for regulators to implement outcomes and risk-based regulation. However, the EPA did not demonstrate that it has established reliable practices to accurately and consistently detect the risk of non compliances by licensees, and apply consistent regulatory actions. This may expose the risk of harm to the environment and human health.
The EPA also could not demonstrate that it has effective governance and oversight of its regulatory operations. The EPA operates in a complex regulatory environment where its regional offices have broad discretions for how they operate. The EPA has not balanced this devolved structure with an effective governance approach that includes appropriate internal controls to monitor the consistency or quality of its regulatory activities. It also does not have an effective performance framework that sets relevant performance expectations and outcome-based key performance indicators (KPIs) for its regional offices. 
These deficiencies mean that the EPA cannot be confident that it conducts compliance and enforcement activities consistently across the State and that licensees are complying with their licence conditions or the Act.
The EPA's reporting on environmental and regulatory outcomes is limited and most of the data it uses is self reported by industry. It has not set outcome-based key result areas to assess performance and trends over time. 
The EPA uses a risk-based regulatory framework for water pollution and illegal solid waste disposal but there are important gaps in implementation that reduce its effectiveness.
Elements of the EPA’s risk-based regulatory framework for water pollution and illegal solid waste disposal are consistent with the NSW Government Guidance for regulators to implement outcomes and risk-based regulation. There are important gaps in how the EPA implements its risk-based approach that limit the effectiveness of its regulatory response. The EPA could not demonstrate that it effectively regulates licensees because it has not established reliable practices that accurately and consistently detect licence non compliances or breaches of the Act and enforce regulatory actions.
The EPA lacks effective governance arrangements to support its devolved regional structure. The EPA's performance framework has limited and inconclusive reporting on regional performance to the EPA’s Chief Executive Officer or to the EPA Board. The EPA cannot assure that it is conducting its regulatory responsibilities effectively and efficiently. 
The EPA does not consistently evaluate its regulatory approach to ensure it is effective and efficient. For example, there are no set requirements for how EPA officers conduct mandatory site inspections, which means that there is a risk that officers are not detecting all breaches or non-compliances. The inconsistent approach also means that the EPA cannot rely on the data it collects from these site inspections to understand whether its regulatory response is effective and efficient. In addition, where the EPA identifies instances of non compliance or breaches, it does not apply all available regulatory actions to encourage compliance.
The EPA also does not have a systematic approach to validate self-reported information in licensees’ annual returns, despite the data being used to assess administrative fees payable to the EPA and its regulatory response to non-compliances. 
The EPA does not use performance frameworks to monitor the consistency or quality of work conducted across the State. The EPA has also failed to provide effective guidance for its staff. Many of its policies and procedures are out-dated, inconsistent, hard to access, or not mandated.
Recommendations
By 31 December 2018, to improve governance and oversight, the EPA should:
1. implement a more effective performance framework with regular reports to the Chief Executive Officer and to the EPA Board on outcomes-based key result areas that assess its environmental and regulatory performance and trends over time
By 30 June 2019, to improve consistency in its practices, the EPA should:
2. progressively update and make accessible its policies and procedures for regulatory operations, and mandate procedures where necessary to ensure consistent application
3. implement internal controls to monitor the consistency and quality of its regulatory operations. 
The EPA does not apply a consistent approach to setting licence conditions for discharges to water.
The requirements for setting licence conditions for water pollution are complex and require technical and scientific expertise. In August 2016, the EPA approved guidance developed by its technical experts in the Water Technical Advisory Unit to assist its regional staff. However, the EPA did not mandate the use of the guidance until mid-April 2018. Up until then, the EPA had left discretion to regional offices to decide what guidance their staff use. This meant that practices have differed across the organisation. The EPA is yet to conduct training for staff to ensure they consistently apply the 2016 guidance.
The EPA has not implemented any appropriate internal controls or quality assurance process to monitor the consistency or quality of licence conditions set by its officers across the State. This is not consistent with good regulatory practice.
The triennial 2016 audit of the Sydney drinking water catchment report highlighted that Lake Burragorang has experienced worsening water quality over the past 20 years from increased salinity levels. The salinity levels were nearly twice as high as in other storages in the Sydney drinking water catchment. The report recommended that the source and implication of the increased salinity levels be investigated. The report did not propose which public authority should carry out such an investigation. 
To date, no NSW Government agency has addressed the report's recommendation. There are three public authorities, the EPA, DPE and WaterNSW that are responsible for regulating activities that impact on water quality in the Sydney drinking water catchment, which includes Lake Burragorang. 
Recommendation
By 30 June 2019, to address worsening water quality in Lake Burragorang, the EPA should:
4. (a) review the impact of its licensed activities on water quality in Lake Burragorang, and
  (b) develop strategies relating to its licensed activities (in consultation with other relevant NSW Government agencies) to improve and maintain the lake's water quality.
The EPA’s risk-based approach to monitoring compliance of licensees has limited effectiveness. 
The EPA tailors its compliance monitoring approach based on the performance of licensees. This means that licensees that perform better have a lower administrative fee and fewer mandatory site inspections. 
However, this approach relies on information that is not complete or accurate. Sources of information include licensees’ annual returns, EPA site inspections and compliance audits, and pollution reports from the public. 
Licensees report annually to the EPA on their performance, including compliance against their licence conditions. The Act contains significant financial penalties if licensees provide false and misleading information in their annual returns. However, the EPA does not systematically or consistently validate information self-reported by licensees, or consistently apply regulatory actions if it discovers non-compliance. 
Self-reported compliance data is used in part to assess a licensed premises’ overall environmental risk level, which underpins the calculation of the administrative fee, the EPA’s site inspection frequency, and the licensee’s exposure to regulatory actions. It is also used to assess the load-based licence fee that the licensee pays.
The EPA has set minimum mandatory site inspection frequencies for licensed premises based on its assessed overall risk level. This is a key tool to detect non-compliance or breaches of the Act. However, the EPA has not issued a policy or procedures that define what these mandatory inspections should cover and how they are to be conducted. We found variations in how the EPA officers in the offices we visited conducted these inspections. The inconsistent approach means that the EPA does not have complete and accurate information of licensees’ compliance. The inconsistent approach also means that the EPA is not effectively identifying all non-compliances for it to consider applying appropriate regulatory actions.
The EPA also receives reports of pollution incidents from the public that may indicate non-compliance. However, the EPA has not set expected time frames within which it expects its officers to investigate pollution incidents. The EPA regional offices decide what to investigate and timeframes. The EPA does not measure regional performance regarding timeframes. 
The few compliance audits the EPA conducts annually are effective in identifying licence non-compliances and breaches of the Act. However, the EPA does not have a policy or required procedures for its regulatory officers to consistently apply appropriate regulatory actions in response to compliance audit findings. 
The EPA has not implemented any effective internal controls or quality assurance process to check the consistency or quality of how its regulatory officers monitor compliance across the State. This is not consistent with good regulatory practice.
Recommendations
To improve compliance monitoring, the EPA should implement procedures to:
5. by 30 June 2019, validate self-reported information, eliminate hardcopy submissions and require licensees to report on their breaches of the Act and associated regulations in their annual returns
6. by 31 December 2018, conduct mandatory site inspections under the risk-based licensing scheme to assess compliance with all regulatory requirements and licence conditions.
 
The EPA cannot assure that its regulatory enforcement approach is fully effective.
The EPA’s compliance policy and prosecution guidelines have a large number of available regulatory actions and factors which should be taken into account when selecting an appropriate regulatory response. The extensive legislation determining the EPA’s regulatory activities, and the devolved regional structure the EPA has adopted in delivering its compliance and regulatory functions, increases the risk of inconsistent compliance decisions and regulatory responses. A good regulatory framework needs a consistent approach to enforcement to incentivise compliance. 
The EPA has not balanced this devolved regional structure with appropriate governance arrangements to give it assurance that its regulatory officers apply a consistent approach to enforcement.
The EPA has not issued standard procedures to ensure consistent non-court enforcement action for breaches of the Act or non-compliance with licence conditions. Given our finding that the EPA does not effectively detect breaches and non-compliances, there is a risk that it is not applying appropriate regulatory actions for many breaches and non-compliances.
A recent EPA compliance audit identified significant non-compliances with incident management plan requirements. However, the EPA has not applied regulatory actions for making false statements on annual returns for those licensees that certified their plans complied with such requirements. The EPA also has not applied available regulatory actions for the non-compliances which led to the false or misleading statements.
Recommendation
By 31 December 2018 to improve enforcement, the EPA should:
7. Implement procedures to systematically assess non-compliances with licence conditions and breaches of the Act and to implement appropriate and consistent regulatory actions.
The EPA has implemented the actions listed in the NSW Illegal Dumping Strategy 2014–16. To date, the EPA has also implemented four of the six recommendations made by the ICAC on EPA's oversight of Regional Illegal Dumping Squads.
The EPA did not achieve the NSW Illegal Dumping Strategy 2014–16 target of a 30 per cent reduction in instances of large scale illegal dumping in Sydney, the Illawarra, Hunter and Central Coast from 2011 levels. 
In the reporting period, the incidences of large scale illegal dumping more than doubled. The EPA advised that this increase may be the result of greater public awareness and reporting rather than increased illegal dumping activity. 
By June 2018, the EPA is due to implement one outstanding recommendation made by the ICAC but has not set a time for the other outstanding recommendation.  

Published

Actions for Signal failures on the metropolitan rail network

Signal failures on the metropolitan rail network

Transport
Information technology
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Project management
Risk
Service delivery

Between 2004 and 2006, the number of signalling failures, signalling downtime and the number of trains delayed as a result of signal failures all fell. RailCorp’s on-time running performance improved over the same period. The fall in failures is a clear indication of improved performance. Changes in the definition of on-time and to the timetable during 2005 and 2006 however make it difficult to determine whether improvements in response downtime and signalling delays are due to a true performance improvement. To build upon this strong base, RailCorp needs to determine with more confidence the number and duration of signalling failures the network can tolerate without impacting on service levels.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #170 - released 15 August 2007

Published

Actions for Connecting with public transport

Connecting with public transport

Transport
Information technology
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Project management
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

We see considerable potential for the Ministry of Transport to plan and manage interchanges more effectively, so as to make better use of our public transport network. We believe that the Ministry now needs to focus more on multi-modal transport planning and interchange performance. It needs to assign responsibility for the coordination and oversight of inter-modal operations to an entity resourced for the purpose. Without this it will continue to be very difficult to identify and address unmet needs, seek and secure stakeholder funding, and monitor and evaluate system performance.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #168 - released 6 June 2007