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Published

Actions for Audit Insights 2018-2022

Audit Insights 2018-2022

Community Services
Education
Environment
Finance
Health
Industry
Justice
Local Government
Premier and Cabinet
Planning
Transport
Treasury
Universities
Whole of Government
Asset valuation
Cross-agency collaboration
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Fraud
Information technology
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Regulation
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

What the report is about

In this report, we have analysed the key findings and recommendations from our audit reports over the past four years.

This analysis includes financial audits, performance audits, and compliance audits of state and local government entities that were tabled in NSW Parliament between July 2018 and February 2022.

The report is framed by recognition that the past four years have seen significant challenges and emergency events.

The scale of government responses to these events has been wide-ranging, involving emergency response coordination, service delivery, governance and policy.

The report is a resource to support public sector agencies and local government to improve future programs and activities.

What we found

Our analysis of findings and recommendations is structured around six key themes:

  • Integrity and transparency
  • Performance and monitoring
  • Governance and oversight
  • Cyber security and data
  • System planning for disruption
  • Resource management.

The report draws from this analysis to present recommendations for elements of good practice that government agencies should consider in relation to these themes. It also includes relevant examples from recent audit reports.

In this report we particularly call out threats to the integrity of government systems, processes and governance arrangements.

The report highlights the need for balanced advice to government on options and risks, for transparent documentation and reporting of directions and decisions, and for early and open sharing of information with integrity bodies and audit.

A number of the matters highlighted in this report are similar to those described in our previous Insights Report, (Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018) specifically in relation to cyber and information security, to performance measurement, reporting and evaluation, and system and workforce planning and capability.

Fast facts

  • 72 audits included in the Audit Insights 2018–2022 analysis
  • 4 years of audits tabled by the Auditor-General for New South Wales
  • 6 key themes for Audit Insights 2018–2022.

picture of Margaret Crawford Auditor-General for New South Wales in black dress with city skyline as backgroundI am pleased to present the Audit Insights 2018–2022 report. This report describes key findings, trends and lessons learned from the last four years of audit. It seeks to inform the New South Wales Parliament of key risks identified and to provide insights and suggestions to the agencies we audit to improve performance across the public sector.

The report is framed by a very clear recognition that governments have been responding to significant events, in number, character and scale, over recent years. Further, it acknowledges that public servants at both state and council levels generally bring their best selves to work and diligently strive to deliver great outcomes for citizens and communities. The role of audit in this context is to provide necessary assurance over government spending, programs and services, and make suggestions for continuous improvement.

A number of the matters highlighted in this report are similar to those described in our previous Insights Report, (Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018) specifically in relation to cyber and information security, to performance measurement, reporting and evaluation, and system and workforce planning and capability.

However, in this report we particularly call out threats to the integrity of government systems, processes and governance arrangements. We highlight the need for balanced advice to government on options and risks, for transparent documentation and reporting of directions and decisions, and for early and open sharing of information with integrity bodies and audit. Arguably, these considerations are never more important than in an increasingly complex environment and in the face of significant emergency events and they will be key areas of focus in our future audit program.

While we have acknowledged the challenges of the last few years have required rapid responses to address the short-term impacts of emergency events, there is much to be learned to improve future programs. I trust that the insights developed in this report provide a helpful resource to public sector agencies and local government across New South Wales. I would be pleased to receive any feedback you may wish to offer.

Margaret Crawford
Auditor-General for New South Wales

Integrity and transparency Performance and monitoring Governance and oversight Cyber security and data System planning Resource management
Insufficient documentation of decisions reduces the ability to identify, or rule out, misconduct or corruption. Failure to apply lessons learned risks mistakes being repeated and undermines future decisions on the use of public funds. The control environment should be risk-based and keep pace with changes in the quantum and diversity of agency work. Building effective cyber resilience requires leadership and committed executive management, along with dedicated resourcing to build improvements in cyber security and culture. Priorities to meet forecast demand should incorporate regular assessment of need and any emerging risks or trends. Absence of an overarching strategy to guide decision-making results in project-by-project decisions lacking coordination. Governments must weigh up the cost of reliance on consultants at the expense of internal capability, and actively manage contracts and conflicts of interest.
Government entities should report to the public at both system and project level for transparency and accountability. Government activities benefit from a clear statement of objectives and associated performance measures to support systematic monitoring and reporting on outcomes and impact. Management of risk should include mechanisms to escalate risks, and action plans to mitigate risks with effective controls. In implementing strategies to mitigate cyber risk, agencies must set target cyber maturity levels, and document their acceptance of cyber risks consistent with their risk appetite. Service planning should establish future service offerings and service levels relative to current capacity, address risks to avoid or mitigate disruption of business and service delivery, and coordinate across other relevant plans and stakeholders. Negotiations on outsourced services and major transactions must maintain focus on integrity and seeking value for public funds.
Entities must provide balanced advice to decision-makers on the benefits and risks of investments. Benefits realisation should identify responsibility for benefits management, set baselines and targets for benefits, review during delivery, and evaluate costs and benefits post-delivery. Active review of policies and procedures in line with current business activities supports more effective risk management. Governments hold repositories of valuable data and data capabilities that should be leveraged and shared across government and non-government entities to improve strategic planning and forecasting. Formal structures and systems to facilitate coordination between agencies is critical to more efficient allocation of resources and to facilitate a timely response to unexpected events. Transformation programs can be improved by resourcing a program management office.
Clear guidelines and transparency of decisions are critical in distributing grant funding. Quality assurance should underpin key inputs that support performance monitoring and accounting judgements. Governance arrangements can enable input into key decisions from both government and non-government partners, and those with direct experience of complex issues.     Workforce planning should consider service continuity and ensure that specialist and targeted roles can be resourced and allocated to meet community need.
Governments must ensure timely and complete provision of information to support governance, integrity and audit processes.          
Read more Read more Read more Read more Read more Read more

 

This report brings together a summary of key findings arising from NSW Audit Office reports tabled in the New South Wales Parliament between July 2018 and February 2022. This includes analysis of financial audits, performance audits, and compliance audits tabled over this period.

  • Financial audits provide an independent opinion on the financial statements of NSW Government entities, universities and councils and identify whether they comply with accounting standards, relevant laws, regulations, and government directions.
  • Performance audits determine whether government entities carry out their activities effectively, are doing so economically and efficiently, and in accordance with relevant laws. The activities examined by a performance audit may include a selected program or service, all or part of an entity, or more than one government entity. Performance audits can consider issues which affect the whole state and/or the local government sectors.
  • Compliance audits and other assurance reviews are audits that assess whether specific legislation, directions, and regulations have been adhered to.

This report follows our earlier edition titled 'Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018'. That report sought to highlight issues and themes emerging from performance audit findings, and to share lessons common across government. In this report, we have analysed the key findings and recommendations from our reports over the past four years. The full list of reports is included in Appendix 1. The analysis included findings and recommendations from 58 performance audits, as well as selected financial and compliance reports tabled between July 2018 and February 2022. The number of recommendations and key findings made across different areas of activity and the top issues are summarised at Exhibit 1.

The past four years have seen unprecedented challenges and several emergency events, and the scale of government responses to these events has been wide-ranging involving emergency response coordination, service delivery, governance and policy. While these emergencies are having a significant impact today, they are also likely to continue to have an impact into the future. There is much to learn from the response to those events that will help the government sector to prepare for and respond to future disruption. The following chapters bring together our recommendations for core elements of good practice across a number of areas of government activity, along with relevant examples from recent audit reports.

This 'Audit Insights 2018–2022' report does not make comparative analysis of trends in public sector performance since our 2018 Insights report, but instead highlights areas where government continues to face challenges, as well as new issues that our audits have identified since our 2018 report. We will continue to use the findings of our Insights analysis to shape our future audit priorities, in line with our purpose to help Parliament hold government accountable for its use of public resources in New South Wales.

Appendix one – Included reports, 2018–2022

Appendix two – About this report

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Universities 2021

Universities 2021

Universities
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance

What the report is about

Results of the financial statement audits of the public universities in NSW for the year ended 31 December 2021.

What we found

Financial reporting

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all ten universities.

The University of Wollongong reported the retrospective correction of a prior period error relating to a $169 million contract termination liability.

All universities reported positive net results in 2021 (four in 2020) and each showed improvement from 2020. This was mainly due to expenditure decreasing by a combined $644 million (5.8%) from 2020. Universities implemented redundancy programs in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which resulted in a decrease of nearly 2,300 full-time equivalent staff in 2021.

All universities held an investment in Education Australia Limited, which paid to its shareholders a fully franked dividend comprising cash and shares in IDP Education Limited. This increased the combined investment revenues of the universities by $515 million in 2021. However, it affected each university's net result differently depending on elections made in their historical accounting treatment.

Government grants increased by $442 million from 2020, of which $297 million related to the Commonwealth's 2021 additional Research Support Program funding to the NSW universities which was a COVID-19 support measure to the sector.

Over 43% of universities' course fees revenue comes from three countries (39% in 2020). Students from China now represent over half of all overseas student enrolments. A high level of reliance on student revenue from a single country poses a concentration risk for universities.

Internal controls

We reported 105 findings to universities on internal control deficiencies (110 in 2020).

Four high-risk findings were identified (three in 2020), relating to:

  • the status of one university's work in assessing its liability for underpayment of staff
  • IT control deficiencies over privileged user access
  • control deficiencies that resulted in non-recognition of a liability in one university's prior year's financial statements
  • a detailed review of payroll compliance for casual staff, which remains outstanding at one university.

There were 45 repeat findings of control deficiencies in 2021 (45 in 2020). 

All universities have drafted or implemented a cybersecurity policy and established a governance committee accountable for cybersecurity. However, improvements could be made in:

  • recording and monitoring of attempted cyber incidents
  • assessing cyber risks relating to IT vendors
  • implementation of cybersecurity control measures for key systems. 

Four out of 13 entities experienced a significant cyber incident during 2021. 

What we recommended

  • Universities should prioritise actions to address repeat findings on internal control deficiencies, particularly where the issue has been repeated for a number of years.
  • Universities and controlled entities should prioritise improvements to their cybersecurity and resilience.

Fast facts

There are ten public universities in NSW, with 52 controlled entities in Australia and 22 overseas controlled entities.

  • $12b total combined adjusted revenue in 2021, an increase of $1.1 billion (10.5%) from 2020
  • $10.4b total combined expenditure in 2021, a decrease of $644 million (5.8%) from 2020
  • 79,134 overseas student enrolments in 2021, a decrease of 3,138 students (3.8%) from 2020
  • 209,018 domestic student enrolments in 2021, an increase of 1,622 students (0.8%) from 2020
  • 4 high-risk management letter findings were identified (3 in 2020) 
  • 43% of reported issues were repeat issues. 

This report provides Parliament with the results of our financial audits of universities in New South Wales and their controlled entities in 2021, including our analysis, observations and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • internal controls and governance
  • teaching and research.

Financial reporting is an important element of governance. Confidence and transparency in university sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations on the financial reporting of universities in NSW for 2021.

Section highlights
  • The 2021 financial statements of all ten universities received unmodified audit opinions.
  • All universities reported positive net results in 2021 and all showed improvement from 2020 results.
  • The change in universities' investments in Education Australia Limited resulted in a combined increase of $515 million in investment revenue. However, it affected each university's net result differently depending on elections made in their historical accounting treatment.
  • Forty-three per cent of universities' course fees revenue comes from three countries (up from 39% in 2020). Students from China now represent over half of all overseas student enrolments.

Appropriate and robust internal controls help produce reliable financial reports and reduce risks associated with managing finances, compliance and administration of universities.

This chapter outlines the internal controls related observations and insights across universities in NSW for 2021, including overall trends in findings, level of risk and implications.

Our audits do not review all aspects of internal controls and governance every year. The more significant issues and risks are included in this chapter. These along with the less significant matters are reported to universities for management to address.

Section highlights
  • The total number of internal control findings decreased from 110 in 2020 to 105 in 2021.
  • Four high-risk findings were identified in 2021 (three in 2020).
  • The number of repeat deficiencies remained the same with 45 reported in 2021 and 2020.
  • All entities have drafted or implemented a cybersecurity policy/framework and established a governance committee accountable for cybersecurity.
  • Four out of 13 entities experienced a significant cyber incident during 2021.

Universities' primary objectives are teaching and research. They invest most of their resources aiming to achieve quality outcomes in academia and student experience. Universities have committed to achieving certain government targets and compete to advance their reputation and their standing in international and Australian rankings.

This chapter outlines teaching and research outcomes for universities in NSW for 2021.

Section highlights
  • Seven universities were reported as having full-time employment rates of their undergraduates in 2021 that were greater than the national average.
  • Enrolments at universities in NSW decreased the most in Management and Commerce courses. The largest increase in enrolments was in Science courses.
  • On average, universities delivered 59% of their courses primarily through online means in 2021.
  • Five universities in 2020 were reported as meeting the target enrolment rate for students from low socio-economic status (SES) backgrounds.

Appendix one – List of 2021 recommendations

Appendix two – Status of 2020 recommendations

Appendix three – Universities' controlled entities

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for COVID-19: response, recovery and impact

COVID-19: response, recovery and impact

Community Services
Education
Health
Justice
Premier and Cabinet
Transport
Treasury
Whole of Government
Cross-agency collaboration
Financial reporting
Management and administration
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration

What the report is about

This report draws together the financial impact of COVID-19 on the agencies integral to responses across the state government sector of New South Wales.

What we found

Since the COVID-19 pandemic hit NSW in January 2020, and until 30 June 2021, $7.5 billion was spent by state government agencies for health and economic stimulus. The response was largely funded by borrowings.

The key areas of spending since the start of COVID-19 in NSW to 30 June 2021 were:

  • direct health response measures – $2.2 billion
  • personal protective equipment – $1.4 billion
  • small business grants – $795 million
  • quarantine costs – $613 million
  • increases in employee expenses and cleaning costs across most agencies
  • vaccine distribution, including vaccination hubs – $71 million.

The COVID-19 pandemic significantly impacted the financial performance and position of state government agencies.

Decreases in revenue from providing goods and services were offset by increases in appropriations, grants and contributions, for health and economic stimulus funding in response to the pandemic.

Most agencies had expense growth, due to additional operating requirements to manage and respond to the pandemic along with implementing new or expanded stimulus programs and initiatives.

Response measures for COVID-19 have meant the NSW Government is unlikely to meet targets in the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012 being:

  • annual expense growth kept below long-term average revenue growth
  • elimination of State’s unfunded superannuation liability by 2030.

 Fast facts

  • First COVID-19 case in NSW on 25 January 2020
  • COVID-19 vaccinations commenced on 21 February 2021
  • By 31 December 2021, 25.2 million PCR tests had been performed in NSW and 13.6 million vaccines administered, with 93.6% of the 16 and over population receiving two doses
  • During 2020–21, NSW Health employed an extra 4,893 full-time staff and incurred $28 million in overtime mainly in response to COVID-19
  • During 2020–21, $1.2 billion was spent on direct health COVID-19 response measures and $532 million was spent on quarantine for incoming international travellers

Section highlights

  • Up to 30 June 2021, $7.5 billion has been spent by state government agencies for health and economic stimulus.
  • Revenue increased for most agencies as falling revenue from providing goods and services was offset by additional funding from appropriations, grants and contributions.
  • Expenses increased as most agencies incurred additional costs to manage and respond to the pandemic along with delivering stimulus and support programs.
  • Borrowings of $7.5 billion over the last two years helped to fund the response to COVID-19.

Section highlights

  • NSW Government unlikely to meet targets in Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012.

Published

Actions for Facilitating and administering Aboriginal land claim processes

Facilitating and administering Aboriginal land claim processes

Planning
Environment
Industry
Local Government
Premier and Cabinet
Whole of Government
Cross-agency collaboration
Compliance
Management and administration

What the report is about

The Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW) (the Act) provides land rights over certain Crown land for Aboriginal Land Councils in NSW.

If a claim is made over Crown land (land owned and managed by government) and meets other criteria under the Act, ownership of that land is to be transferred to the Aboriginal Land Council.

This process is intended to provide compensation for the dispossession of land from Aboriginal people in NSW. It is a different process to the recognition of native title rights under Commonwealth law.

We examined whether relevant agencies are effectively facilitating and administering Aboriginal land claim processes. The relevant agencies are:

  • Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC)
  • Department of Planning and Environment (DPE)
  • NSW Aboriginal Land Council (NSWALC).

We consulted with Local Aboriginal Land Councils (LALCs) and other Aboriginal community representative groups to hear about their experiences.

What we found

Neither DPC nor DPE have established the resources required for the NSW Government to deliver Aboriginal land claim processes in a coordinated way, and which transparently commits to the requirements and intent of the Act.

Delays in determining land claims result in Aboriginal Land Councils being denied the opportunity to realise their statutory right to certain Crown land. Delays also create risks due to uncertainty around the ownership, use and development of Crown land.

DPC has not established governance arrangements to ensure accountability for outcomes under the Act, and effective risk management.

DPE lacks clear performance measures for the timely and transparent delivery of its claim assessment functions. DPE also lacks a well-defined framework for prioritising assessments.

LALCs have concerns about delays, and lack of transparency in the process.

Reviews since at least 2014 have recommended actions to address numerous issues and improve outcomes, but limited progress has been made.

The database used by DPC (Office of the Registrar) for the statutory register of land claims has not been upgraded or fully validated since the 1990s.

In 2020, DPE identified the transfer of claimable Crown land to LALCs to enable economic and cultural outcomes as a strategic priority. DPE has some activities underway to do this, and to improve how it engages with Aboriginal Land Councils – but DPE still lacks a clear, resourced strategy to process over 38,000 undetermined claims within a reasonable time.

What we recommended

In summary:

  • DPC should lead strategic governance to oversee a resourced, coordinated program that is accountable for delivering Aboriginal land claim processes
  • DPE should implement a resourced, ten-year plan that increases the rate of claim processing, and includes an initial focus on land grants
  • DPE and DPC should jointly establish operational arrangements to deliver a coordinated interagency program for land claim processes
  • DPC should plan an interagency, land claim spatial information system, and the Office of the Registrar should remediate and upgrade the statutory land claims register
  • DPC and NSWALC should implement an education program (for state agencies and the local government sector) about the Act and its operations
  • DPE should implement a five-year workforce development strategy for its land claim assessment function
  • DPE should finalise updates to its land claim assessment procedures
  • DPE should enhance information sharing with Aboriginal Land Councils to inform their claim making
  • NSWALC should enhance information sharing and other supports to LALCs to inform their claim making and build capacity.

Fast facts

  • 53,800 the number of claims lodged since the Act was introduced in 1983
  • 38,200 the number of claims awaiting DPE assessment and determination (about 70 per cent of all claims lodged)
  • 207 the number of claims granted by DPE in six months to December 2021
  • 120 LALCs, and the NSWALC, have the right to make a claim and have it determined
  • +5 years around 60 per cent of claims have been awaiting determination for more than five years
  • 22 years the time it will take DPE to determine existing claims, based on current targets

The return of land under the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW) (the Act) is intended to provide compensation for the dispossession of land from Aboriginal people in New South Wales. A claim on Crown land1 made by an Aboriginal Land Council that meets criteria under the Act is to be transferred to the claimant council as freehold title. The 2021 statutory review of the Act recognises the spiritual, social, cultural and economic importance of land to Aboriginal people.

The Minister for Aboriginal Affairs administers the Act, with support from Aboriginal Affairs NSW (AANSW) in the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC). AANSW also leads the delivery of Opportunity, Choice, Healing, Responsibility and Empowerment (OCHRE), the NSW Government's plan for Aboriginal affairs, and assists the Minister to implement the National Agreement on Closing the Gap – which includes a target for increasing the area of land covered by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people's legal rights or interests.

The Act gives responsibility for registering land claims to an independent statutory officer, the Registrar of the Aboriginal Land Rights Act (the Registrar), whose functions are supported by the Office of the Registrar (ORALRA) which is resourced by AANSW.2

The Land and Environment Court of New South Wales has stated that there is an implied obligation for land claims to be determined within a reasonable time. The Minister administering the Crown Land Management Act 2016 (NSW) is responsible for determining land claims. This function is supported by the Department of Planning and Environment (DPE),3 whose staff assess and recommend claims for determination based on the criteria under section 36(1) of the Act. There is also a mechanism under the Act for land claims to be negotiated in good faith through an Aboriginal Land Agreement.

The NSW Aboriginal Land Council (NSWALC) is a statutory corporation constituted under the Act with a mandate to provide for the development of land rights for Aboriginal people in NSW, in conjunction with the network of 120 Local Aboriginal Land Councils (LALCs). LALCs are constituted over specific areas to represent Aboriginal communities across NSW. Both NSWALC and LALCs can make land claims.

DPC and DPE are responsible for governance and, in partnership with NSWALC, operational and information-sharing activities that are required to coordinate Aboriginal land claim processes. LALCs, statutory officers, government agencies, local councils, and other parties need to be engaged so that these processes are coordinated effectively and managed in a way that is consistent with the intent of the Act, and other legislative requirements.

The first land claim was lodged in 1983. The number of undetermined land claims has increased over time, and at 31 December 2021 DPE data shows 38,257 undetermined claims.

The issue of undetermined land claims has been publicly reported by the Audit Office since 2007. Recommendations to agencies to better facilitate processes and improve how functions are administered have been made in multiple reviews, including two Parliamentary inquiries in 2016.

The objective of this audit was to assess whether relevant agencies are effectively facilitating and administering Aboriginal land claim processes. In making this assessment, we considered whether:

  • agencies (DPE, DPC (AANSW and ORALRA) and NSWALC) coordinate information and activities to effectively facilitate Aboriginal land claim processes
  • agencies (DPE and DPC (ORALRA)) are effectively administering their roles in the Aboriginal land claim process.

We consulted with LALCs to hear about their experiences and priorities with respect to Aboriginal land claim processes and related outcomes. We have aimed to incorporate their insights into our understanding of their expectations of government with respect to delivering requirements, facilitating processes, and identifying opportunities for improved outcomes. 

Conclusion

The Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) and the Department of Planning and Environment (DPE) are not effectively facilitating or administering Aboriginal land claim processes. Neither agency has established the resources required for the NSW Government to operate a coordinated program of activities to deliver land claim processes in a way that transparently commits to the requirements and intent of the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW) (the Act). Arrangements to engage the NSW Aboriginal Land Council (NSWALC) in these activities have not been clearly defined.

There are more than 38,000 undetermined land claims that cover approximately 1.12 million hectares of Crown land. As such, DPE has not been meeting its statutory requirement to determine land claims nor its obligation to do so within a reasonable time. Over 60 per cent of these claims were lodged with the Registrar of the Aboriginal Land Rights Act, for DPE to determine, more than five years ago.

DPE’s Aboriginal Outcomes Strategy 2020–23 identifies transferring claimable Crown land to Local Aboriginal Land Councils (LALCs) as a priority to enable economic and cultural outcomes. Since mid-2020 DPE has largely focused on supporting LALCs to identify priority land claims for assessment and on negotiating Aboriginal Land Agreements. This work may support the compensatory intent of the Act but is in its early stages and is unlikely to increase the pace at which land claims are determined. Based on current targets, it will take DPE around 22 years to process existing undetermined land claims.

Delays in processing land claims result in Aboriginal Land Councils being denied the opportunity to realise their statutory right to certain Crown land in NSW. The intent of the Act to provide compensation to Aboriginal people for the dispossession of land has been significantly constrained over time.

Since 2014, numerous reviews have made recommendations to agencies to address systemic issues, improve processes, and enhance outcomes: but DPC and DPE have made limited progress with implementing these. Awareness of the intent and operations of the Act was often poor among staff from some State government agencies and local government representatives we interviewed for the audit.

DPC has not established culturally informed, interagency governance to effectively oversee Aboriginal land claim processes – and ensure accountability for outcomes consistent with the intent of the Act, informed by the expectations of the NSWALC and LALCs. Such governance has not existed since at least 2017 (the audited period) and we have not seen evidence earlier. DPE still does not have performance indicators for its land claim assessment function that are based on a clear analysis of resources, that demonstrate alignment to defined outcomes, and which are reported routinely to key stakeholders, including NSWALC and LALCs.

LALCs have raised strong concerns during our consultations, describing delays in the land claim process and the number of undetermined land claims as disrespectful. LALCs have also noted a lack of transparency in, and opportunity to engage with, Aboriginal land claim processes. DPE’s role in assessing Aboriginal land claims, and identifying opportunities for Aboriginal Land Agreements, requires specific expertise, evidence gathering and an understanding of the complex interaction between the Act and other legislative frameworks, including the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) and the Crown Land Management Act 2016 (NSW). In mid-2020, DPE created an Aboriginal Land Strategy Directorate within its Crown lands division, increased staffing in land claim assessment functions, and set a target to increase the number of land claims to be granted in 2021–22. In the six months to December 2021, DPE granted more land claims (207 claims) than in most years prior. DPE has also assisted some LALCs to identify priority land claims for assessment.

But the overall number of claims processed per year remains well below the historical (five-year) average number of claims lodged (2,506 claims). As such, DPE has not yet established an appropriately resourced workforce to assess the large number of undetermined land claims and engage effectively with Aboriginal Land Councils and other parties in the process. There also are notable gaps in DPE’s procedures that impact the transparency of the process, especially with respect to timeframes and the prioritisation of land claims for assessment.

DPC (the Office of the Registrar of the Aboriginal Land Rights Act, ORALRA) has not secured or applied resources that would assist the Registrar to use discretionary powers, introduced in 2015, not to refer certain land claims to DPE for assessment (those not on Crown land). This could have improved the efficiency and coordination of end-to-end land claim processes.

DPC (ORALRA) is also not effectively managing data and ensuring the functionality of the statutory Register of Aboriginal land claims. This contributes to inefficient coordination with DPE and NSWALC, and creates a risk of inconsistent information sharing with LALCs, government agencies, local councils and other parties. More broadly, responsibilities for sharing information about the location and status of land under claim are not well defined across agencies. These factors contribute to risks to Crown land with an undetermined land claim, which case law has found to establish inchoate property rights for the claimant Aboriginal Land Council.4 It can also lead to uncertainty around the ownership, use and development of Crown land, with financial implications for various parties.


1 Crown land is land that is owned and managed by the NSW Government.
 AANSW and ORALRA were previously part of the Department of Education, before the 1 July 2019 Machinery of Government changes.
 Previously, these functions were undertaken by the Department of Industry (2017–June 2019) and the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (July 2019 to December 2021). 
 The lodgement of a land claim creates an unformed property interest for the claimant Aboriginal Land Council over the claimed land. This interest will be realised if the Crown Lands Minister determines that the land is claimable.

Since 1983, 53,861 Aboriginal land claims have been lodged with the Registrar.25

The Land and Environment Court of New South Wales has stated there is an implied obligation on the Crown Lands Minister to determine land claims within a reasonable time.26

As at 31 December 2021, DPE has processed less than a third (31 per cent) of these land claims: 14,273 were determined by the Crown Lands Minister (that is, granted or refused, in whole or part) and 2,562 were withdrawn. This amounts to 16,835 claims processed, including the negotiated settlement of 15 claims through three Aboriginal Land Agreements. As a result, DPE reports that approximately 163,900 hectares of Crown land has been granted to Aboriginal Land Councils since 1983 up to 31 December 2021.

There are 38,257 land claims awaiting determination, which cover about 1.12 million hectares of Crown land.

The 2017 report on the statutory review of the Act noted that the land claims ‘backlog’ was one of the ‘Top 5’ priorities identified by LALCs during consultations. The importance of this issue is consistent with findings from our consultations with LALCs in 2021 (see Exhibit 7).

Exhibit 7: LALCs report that delays undermine the compensatory intent of the Act

LALCs raised concerns about delays in the Aboriginal land claim process, including waiting decades for claims to be assessed and years for land to be transferred once granted.

The large number of undetermined claims has been described by LALCs as disrespectful, and as reflecting under-resourcing by governments.

LALCs reported that these delays undermine the compensatory intent of the Act, including by creating uncertainty for their plans to support the social and economic aspirations of their communities.

Source: NSW Audit Office consultation with LALCs.

Delays in delivering on the statutory requirement to determine land claims, and limited use of other mechanisms to process claims in consultation or agreement with NSWALC and LALCs, undermines the beneficial and remedial intent of Aboriginal land rights under the Act. It also:

  • impacts negatively on DPE’s ability to comply with the statutory requirement to determine land claims, because often the older a claim becomes the more difficult it can be to gather the evidence required to assess it
  • creates uncertainty around the ownership, use and development of Crown land, which can have financial impacts on Aboriginal Land Councils, government agencies, local councils and developers.

Risks that arise in the context of undetermined claims are discussed further in section 3.3.


25 According to DPC (ORALRA) data in the ALC Register up to 31 December 2021. DPC (ORALRA) data indicates that the Registrar has refused to refer claims to DPE for assessment under section 36(4A) of the Act in a small number of cases – for example, seven times in 2017 and none since that time.
26 Jerrinja Local Aboriginal Land Council v Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act [2007] NSWLEC 577 at 125. The Court stated, ‘While a reasonable time may vary on a case-by-case basis, a delay of 15 to 20 years in determining claims does not accord with any idea of reasonableness’.

NSW Treasury describes public sector governance as providing strategic direction, ensuring objectives are achieved, and managing risks and the use of resources responsibly with accountability.

Consistent with the NSW Treasury’s Risk Management Toolkit (TPP-12-03b), governance arrangements for Aboriginal land claim processes should ensure their effective facilitation and administration. That is, arrangements are expected to contribute to and oversee the performance of administrative processes and service delivery towards outcomes, and ensure that legal and policy compliance obligations are met consistent with community expectations of accountability and transparency.

DPC and DPE are responsible for governance and, in partnership with NSWALC, operational and information-sharing activities required to coordinate Aboriginal land claim processes. LALCs, statutory officers, government agencies, local councils, and other parties (such as native title groups and those with an interest in development on Crown land) need to be engaged so that these processes are coordinated effectively with risks managed – consistent with the intent of the Act, and other legislative requirements.

Policy commitments to Aboriginal people and communities made by the NSW Government in the OCHRE Plan and Closing the Gap priority reforms establish an expectation for culturally informed governance.

Exhibit 12: LALCs want their voices to be heard and responded to by government

LALCs expressed a strong desire to have their voices heard so that outcomes in the Aboriginal land claim process are informed by LALC aspirations and consistent with the intent of the Act. The importance of respect and transparency were consistently raised.

The following quotes are from our consultations with LALCs during this audit which illustrate the inherent cultural value of land being returned, as well as the importance of its social and economic value and potential.

There’s batches of land in and around town. This land is significant…We want to get the land activated to encourage economic development, and promote the community…our job is to step up to create infrastructure, employment, maintenance and services and lead by example.

One of the best things we were able to do is develop a long term 20-year plan and where Crown Land could directly see where land was transferred to us and it was going to things like education, housing, health and other social programs…

There has been a claim lodged on a parcel of land that has long lasting cultural significance, a place that is very special to the Aboriginal community members and holds a lot of history. If the claim lodged was successful this land would be used to strengthen the cultural knowledge of the local youth, through placing signage that depicts stories that have been passed down by the Elders, cultural talks and tours and school group visits. This land, although not large in size, has a significant number of cultural trees and artefacts. Aboriginal families and members of the LALC that have lived in our town are very protective of the site and others surrounding it, respecting the importance of the cultural history of the site. There is one, which is a cultural one. We received a land claim that contained a cultural site. This is the high point: we were given back lands that contained rock engravings, carvings. A real diamond for us, especially as an urban based land council.

At the heart of the ALRA is the ability to claim Crown Land…The slow determination of claims gets in the way of us doing what we want to do, which is focus on our communities and address our real needs which are about health, wellbeing and culture. If we could realise these rights, we can address all sorts of socio-economic needs. We would become an economic benefit to the state…If it was operating well there could be more caring for Country too.

Note: Permission has been granted by LALC interviewees to use these quotes in this context.
Source: Excerpts from NSW Audit Office interviews with LALC representatives, facilitated by Indigenous consultants.

The Crown Lands Minister, supported by DPE, is required to determine whether Aboriginal land claims meet the criteria to be ‘claimable Crown lands’ under section 36(1) of the Act. DPE staff within its Crown Lands division are responsible for assessing land claims and preparing recommendation briefs to the Crown Lands Minister, or their delegate, on determination outcomes. That is, on whether to grant or refuse the claim.38 DPE staff also make decisions about which land claims within the large number of undetermined claims should be processed first.

 

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

Banner image used with permission.
Title: Forces of Nature
Artist: Lee Hampton – Koori Kicks Art
Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #365 - released 28 April 2022.

Published

Actions for Building regulation: combustible external cladding

Building regulation: combustible external cladding

Finance
Local Government
Planning
Compliance
Infrastructure
Regulation
Risk

What the report is about

The report focuses on how effectively the Department of Customer Service (DCS) and Department of Planning and Environment (DPE) led reforms addressing the unsafe use of combustible external cladding on existing residential and public buildings.

Nine local councils were included in the audit because they have responsibilities and powers needed to implement the NSW Government’s reforms.

What we found

After the June 2017 Grenfell Tower fire in London, the NSW Government committed to a ten-point action plan, which included establishing the NSW Cladding Taskforce, chaired by DCS, and with DPE as a key member. The Taskforce co-ordinates and oversees the implementation of the plan.

Depending on the original source of development approval, either individual local councils or DPE are responsible for ensuring that buildings are identified, assessed, and remediated. NSW Government-owned buildings are the responsibility of each department.

Identifying buildings potentially at risk was complex and resource intensive. However, on balance, it is likely that most affected buildings have now been identified.

By October 2021, around 40 per cent of assessed high-risk buildings that are the responsibility of local councils had either been remediated or found not to pose an unacceptable fire risk.

By February 2022, almost 50 per cent of affected NSW Government-owned buildings, and 90 per cent of buildings that are the responsibility of DPE, have either been cleared or are in the process of being remediated.

Earlier guidance on some key issues could have been provided by DCS and DPE in the two years after the Grenfell Tower fire. This may have reduced confusion and inconsistency across local councils we audited, and in some NSW Government departments. This especially relates to the application of the Fair Trading Commissioner's product use ban.

Given the inherent risks posed by combustible external cladding, buildings initially assessed as low-risk may also still warrant further action.

While most high-risk buildings have likely been identified, poor information handling makes it difficult to keep track of all buildings from identification, through to risk assessment and remediation.

What we recommended

DCS and DPE should:

  1. address the confusion surrounding the application of the Commissioner for Fair Trading's product use ban for aluminium composite panels with polyethylene content greater than 30 per cent
  2. develop an action plan to address buildings assessed as low-risk
  3. improve information systems to track all buildings from identification through to remediation.

Fast facts

Authority responsible for
ensuring that owners make
their buildings safe
Approximate number of
buildings referred for further
investigation*
Approximate percentage of
buildings remediated or
assessed to be safe
Local councils 1,200 40%
NSW Government owned 66 50%
DPE under delegation from
the Minister for Planning
137 90%
*After initial inspection by Fire and Rescue NSW, and/or preliminary inquiries by the consent authority, it was identified that the building may be at high-risk of
fire from combustible external cladding.

 

NSW Government's response to the risks posed by combustible external cladding

The NSW Government first became aware of the potential heightened risks posed by combustible external cladding on building exteriors after the 2014 Lacrosse Tower fire in Melbourne. However, it was the tragic loss of life from the Grenfell Tower fire in London, in June 2017, that gave added urgency to the need to address these risks.

Within six weeks of the London fire, the NSW Government committed to a ten-point plan of action for NSW to:

  • identify and remediate any buildings with combustible external cladding
  • ensure that regulation prevented the unsafe use of such cladding
  • ensure that experts involved in providing advice and certifying fire safety measures had the necessary skills and experience.

One of the actions in the ten-point plan was the creation of the NSW Government's Fire Safety and External Wall Cladding Taskforce (the Cladding Taskforce) chaired by the Department of Customer Service (DCS) and with the Department of Planning and Environment (DPE) as a key member.

The ten-point plan also specified that NSW Government departments would be responsible, in regard to buildings they owned to '…audit their buildings and determine if they have aluminium cladding'.

Local councils play a key role in implementing the Government's reforms, given their responsibilities and powers under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EPA Act) and Local Government Act 1993 (Local Government Act) to approve building works (as 'consent authorities'), as well as to ensure fire safety standards are met. DPE plays an equivalent role for a smaller number of 'State Significant Developments' for which it is the consent authority under delegation from the Minister for Planning.

Commissioner for Fair Trading's building product use ban

On 18 December 2017, the Building Products (Safety) Act 2017 (BPS Act) came into effect in NSW, introducing new laws to prevent the use of unsafe building products. Notably, the BPS Act gave the Secretary of DCS and the Commissioner for Fair Trading the power to ban unsafe uses of building products.

After an extensive consultative process, the Commissioner for Fair Trading used these powers to issue a product use ban on 15 August 2018. This banned the use of external wall cladding of aluminium composite panels with a core comprised of more than 30 per cent polyethylene by mass on new buildings, unless the proposed use was subject to independent fire propagation testing of the specific product and method of application to a building in accordance with relevant Australian Standards.

Buildings occupied before the product use ban came into force are not automatically required to have the banned product removed. Under the BPS Act, consent authorities may determine necessary actions to eliminate or minimise the risk posed by the banned material on existing buildings.

Project Remediate

Project Remediate is a three-year NSW Government program announced in November 2020. The program was designed by the NSW Government to assist building owners of multi-storey apartments (two storeys or more) with high-risk combustible cladding to remediate their building to a high standard and for a fair price.

The scheme is voluntary and includes government paying for the interest on ten-year loans, as well as incorporating assurance and project management services to provide technical and practical support to owners’ corporations and strata managing agents. Building remediations under the program are expected to commence in 2022.

About this audit

This audit assessed whether DCS and DPE effectively led reforms to manage the fire safety risk of combustible external cladding on existing residential and public buildings.

In making this assessment, we considered whether the expressed policy intent of the NSW Government's ten-point plan for fire safety reform had been achieved by asking:

  • are the fire safety risks of combustible external cladding on existing buildings identified and remediated?
  • is there a comprehensive building product safety scheme that prevents the dangerous use of combustible external cladding products on existing buildings?
  • is fire safety certification for combustible external cladding on existing buildings carried out impartially, ethically and in the public interest by qualified experts?

Consistent with the focus of the Cladding Taskforce on multi-storey residential buildings and public buildings, the scope of our audit is limited to buildings categorised under the Building Code of Australia (BCA) as class 2, 3 and 9. These classes are defined in detail in section 1.2, but include: multi-unit residential apartments, hotels, motels, hostels, back-packers, and buildings of a public nature, including health care buildings, schools, and aged care buildings. The scope was also limited to existing buildings, which is defined as buildings occupied by 22 October 2018.

Auditees

The Department of Customer Service chairs the NSW Government's Cladding Taskforce, which is responsible for coordinating the combustible external cladding reforms. The Commissioner of Fair Trading sits within DCS and DCS regulates the industry accreditation scheme for fire safety practitioners, as well as administering the BPS Act.

The Department of Planning and Environment administers the EPA Act and the Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulation 2000 (EPA Regulation), which regulate the building development process. As well as being the delegated consent authority for State Significant Developments, DPE is also responsible for maintaining the mandatory cladding register requiring building owners of multi-storey (BCA class 2, 3 or 9) buildings to register buildings with combustible external cladding on an online portal.

Functions and responsibilities between DCS and DPE varied over time. For example, in October 2019, the DPE building policy team responsible for co-ordinating the DPE response to the combustible cladding issue was transferred to DCS, following changes to agency responsibilities resulting from machinery of government changes. DPE advised this resulted in a lessening of DPE's subsequent policy work on combustible cladding and its involvement in the Cladding Taskforce.

While the focus of the audit was on the oversight and coordination provided by DCS and DPE, nine councils were also auditees for this performance audit. Councils play an essential part as consent authorities for building development approvals in NSW, as well as having responsibilities and powers to ensure fire safety standards. To fully understand how well their activities were overseen and coordinated, a sample of councils was included as auditees.

Nine councils were selected to represent both metropolitan and regional areas, noting that there are very few in-scope buildings in rural areas. The audited councils were:

  • Bayside Council
  • City of Canterbury Bankstown Council
  • Cumberland City Council
  • Liverpool City Council
  • City of Newcastle Council
  • City of Parramatta Council
  • City of Ryde Council
  • City of Sydney Council
  • Wollongong City Council.

Terminology

The two NSW Government department auditees have, over time, been subject to machinery of government changes, which have changed some of their functions and what the departments are called.

Relevant to this audit, the effect of these changes has been:

  • the Department of Finance, Services, and Innovation (DFSI) became the Department of Customer Services (DCS) on 1 July 2019
  • on 1 July 2019, the Department of Planning and Environment became the Department of Planning, Industry, and Environment (DPIE)
  • on 21 December 2021, DPIE became the Department of Planning and Environment (DPE).

To avoid confusion, we use the titles by which these departments are known at the date of this report: the Department of Customer Service and the Department of Planning and Environment.

Conclusion

At July 2017, immediately after the Grenfell Tower fire, there was no reliable source to identify buildings that may have had combustible external cladding. However, it is now likely that most high-risk buildings have been identified.

Following the 2014 Lacrosse Tower fire in Melbourne, the NSW Government recognised that there was a need to be able to identify buildings in NSW that could have combustible external cladding.

The process of identifying buildings that could have combustible external cladding has been complex, resource-intensive, and inefficient principally due to the lack of centralised and coordinated building records in NSW. In total, approximately 1,200 BCA class 2, 3 and 9 buildings have been brought to the attention of councils by either Fire and Rescue NSW (FRNSW), the Cladding Taskforce, or through councils' own inspection for possible further action. In addition, approximately 2,000 more buildings were inspected by FRNSW but not referred to local councils because they either had no combustible external cladding or had combustible external cladding not assessed as being high-risk.

A multi-pronged approach to identifying buildings has been used by the DCS and DPE, through the Cladding Taskforce. While it is impossible to know the full scope of potentially affected buildings, the approach appears thorough in having identified most relevant buildings.

The process of clearing buildings with combustible external cladding has been inconsistent.

In the more than four years since the NSW Government's ten-point plan was announced, around 40 per cent of the buildings brought to the attention of councils have been cleared by either rectification or being found not to pose an unacceptable fire risk. Also, around 50 per cent of NSW Government-owned buildings identified with combustible external cladding and almost 90 per cent of identified buildings for which DPE is consent authority have been cleared or remediation is underway.

While DCS and DPE did seek to work cooperatively with councils and provided high-level guidance on the NSW Government’s fire safety reforms, it took until September 2019 before a model process and other detailed advice was provided to councils to encourage consistent processes. DCS and DPE advice to councils and NSW Government-building owners should have been more timely on two key issues:

  • the use of experts in the process of assessing and remediating existing buildings, and
  • the implementation of the product use ban on aluminium composite panels with polyethylene content 30 per cent or greater.

Clarifying the application of the product use ban may require consent authorities and building owners to revisit how some buildings have been cleared.

The management of buildings assessed as low-risk by FRNSW, estimated to be over 500, has not been a priority of the Cladding Taskforce to date, despite those buildings potentially posing unacceptable fire risks.

Information management by the Cladding Taskforce is inadequate to provide a high-level of assurance that all known affected buildings have been given proper attention.

While most high-risk buildings have likely been identified, information management is not sufficiently robust to reliably track all buildings through the process from identification, through to risk assessment and, where necessary, remediation.

Reforms to certifier registration schemes are limited to new buildings and do not apply to the existing buildings covered by this audit.

While reforms are limited in application to new buildings, some consent authorities took steps to obtain greater assurance on the quality of the work done by fire safety experts regarding combustible external cladding on existing buildings. For example, by requiring fire safety experts to be appropriately qualified and requiring peer review of cladding risk assessments and proposed remediation plans.

 

This chapter considers the part played by DCS and DPE as key members of the Cladding Taskforce in ensuring that buildings with combustible external cladding were effectively identified and remediated through processes implemented by:

  • local councils or DPE, where those bodies were consent authorities under the EPA Act for the relevant buildings
  • in the case of NSW Government buildings, the departments that owned those buildings.

This chapter considers what has been done to deliver a comprehensive building product safety scheme that prevents the dangerous use of combustible external cladding products.

 

This chapter considers whether reforms have ensured that only people with the necessary skills and experience are certifying buildings and signing off on fire-safety.

Inspections of existing buildings and development of any subsequent action plans to address combustible external cladding are not activities covered by accreditation or registration schemes for building certifiers

Almost all the risk assessment and remediation work done on buildings in the scope of this audit have been undertaken under fire safety orders issued by consent authorities using their powers under the EPA Act. This has been the recommended approach by DPE and DCS since at least 2016 (that is, before the Grenfell Tower fire in London).

While there have been reforms to certifier registrations scheme, these were not intended to ensure that combustible cladding-remediation on existing buildings is supported by people with the necessary skills and experience in fire safety under the fire safety order process. Instead, they are focused on offering better assurance for work done in respect to new building projects where accredited experts certify that building work is carried out in accordance with BCA under the DCS managed certifier registration schemes.

No steps have been taken to ensure the quality of the work done by experts inspecting, assessing the fire risk and developing action plans to address combustible external cladding on existing buildings, other than where consent authorities have chosen to exercise their discretion. This includes requiring fire safety experts to be appropriately qualified and requiring peer review of some cladding risk assessments and remediation plans.

Consent authorities determine whether individuals with accreditation are required for combustible cladding inspection, risk assessments and remediation on existing buildings

Whether an individual with certifier accreditation participates in a cladding inspection, risk assessment, or remediation for an existing building will be determined by what councils as consent authorities specify in their fire safety orders unless building owners opt to use such experts without being directed to do so by the consent authority.

As discussed earlier, councils acting as consent authorities vary in whether they require building owners to engage individuals with certifier accreditation. In most of the councils we audited, A1 or C10 accredited experts were either required, or recommended, to perform functions such as auditing suspected combustible cladding, or conducting fire safety risk assessments and developing plans to rectify combustible cladding.

However, these types of work are not functions covered by the accreditation or registration schemes that apply to building and development certifiers.

Certifier accreditation schemes do not cover cladding remediation work done under fire safety orders

While councils may require or recommend that independent accredited A1 or C10 certifiers be engaged by building owners for cladding risk assessment and remediation, they are not performing those functions as certifiers — they are, in effect, more akin to expert consultants. Accordingly, how they perform their functions and duties is not covered by the legislation supporting the accreditation scheme for certifiers that was operated until July 2020 by the Building Professional Board.

Instead, their use in this process is a convenient and practical way for consent authorities to ensure that building owners use appropriate experts who have the qualifications, skills and experience needed to investigate and identify combustible cladding, and then to formulate appropriate action to deal with such cladding. However, these individuals are not performing regulated or accredited work, are not subject to regulatory oversight, and are not accountable to any accreditation body for the quality of the work they perform.

While councils could (and sometimes do) choose to decline poor quality or incomplete cladding-related work prepared by A1 or C10 certifiers, the burden of resolving poor quality would fall on the building owner, who would have to seek amended or additional risk assessments or rectification plans.

In the absence of regulatory oversight, disincentives for poor quality cladding-related work, may include litigation being commenced by the property owner, harm to the expert's reputation in a small and competitive market, and the potential impact on whether the individual could retain their professional indemnity insurance at a reasonable cost (especially in an environment when many insurance providers withdrew coverage for cladding related work).

Reforms impact on regulated experts doing work on new buildings

The reforms that commenced on 1 July 2020, replaced categories of accreditation with classes of registration, and varied the classes such that:

  • accredited building surveyor category A1 became registered building surveyor-unrestricted
  • accredited certifier—fire safety engineer category C10 became registered certifiers-fire safety.

The legislation that introduced these reforms, the Building and Development Certifiers Act 2018, also repealed the pre-existing Building Professionals Act 2005 and abolished the Building Professionals Board. The new Act was accompanied by the Building and Development Certifiers Regulation 2020.

While the scope of this audit is limited to existing buildings, we note that there are buildings with combustible external cladding that are yet to be remediated. Just as these processes previously drew on the expertise of A1 and C10 category certifiers, it seems inevitable that the remediation of existing buildings will continue to draw on the expertise of the equivalent new classes of registered building surveyor-unrestricted and registered certifier-fire safety.

 

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #364 - released 13 April 2022.

Published

Actions for COVID Intensive Learning Support Program

COVID Intensive Learning Support Program

Education
Management and administration
Project management
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

What the report is about

This audit examined a state-wide program to provide small-group tuition to students disadvantaged by the move to learning from home during 2020.

The audit assessed the design and implementation of the program.

What we found

The program design was based on research and data showing learning loss during 2020. 

The department rapidly planned and developed the policy design and guidelines for schools. 

Governance arrangements matured during program delivery.

The department changed the models for funding schools but did not clearly explain the reasons for doing so.

Government schools with over 900 students were disadvantaged by the funding model compared to smaller schools. 

Guidelines, resources and professional learning helped schools implement the program.

Staff eligibility for the program was expanded after reported difficulties in recruiting qualified teachers in some areas. 

Online tuition and third-party provider options were developed throughout the program.

There were issues with the quality and timeliness of data used to monitor school progress. 

Evaluation arrangements were developed early in the program.

Data limitations mean the evaluation will not be able to fully assess all program objectives.

What we recommended

  1. Distributing funds between schools more equitably and improving communication of the funding methods. 
  2. Clearer communication about the intended targeted group of students.
  3. Reviewing the time needed to administer the program.
  4. Improve support for educators other than qualified teachers.
  5. Offer the online tuition program to more schools.
  6. Analysis of the effects of learning from home during 2021 across equity groups and geographic areas.
  7. Working with universities to increase use of pre-service teachers in the program.

The report also identifies lessons learned for future programs.
 

Fast facts

  • $337m in total program funding. $289 million for government schools and $31 million for non government schools
  • 12 days to develop the policy and provide costings to Treasury 
  • 290,000 targeted students in government schools and 31,000 in non government schools
  • 80% of schools were providing small group tuition by the target start date of Week 6, Term 1
  • 2–4 months was the estimated student learning loss from the move to learning from home during 2020
  • 7,600 tutors engaged in the program as at September 2021.

The NSW Government announced the COVID Intensive Learning Support Program on 10 November 2020, as part of the 2020–21 NSW Budget. The primary goal of the $337 million program was to deliver intensive small group tuition for students who were disadvantaged by the move to remote and/or flexible learning, helping to close the equity gap. It included:

  • $306 million to provide small-group tuition for eligible students across every NSW Government primary, secondary and special purpose school
  • $31.0 million for around 400 non-government schools to provide small-group tuition to students with the greatest levels of need.

The objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness of the design and implementation of the COVID Intensive Learning Support Program (the program). To address this objective, the audit assessed whether the Department of Education (the department):

  • effectively designed the program and supporting governance arrangements
  • is effectively implementing the program.

This audit focuses on activities between October 2020 and August 2021, which aimed to address the first session of learning from home in New South Wales. From August to October 2021, students in many areas of New South Wales were learning from home again, but this second period has not been a focus of this audit. On 18 October 2021, the NSW Government announced the program would be extended into 2022.

Conclusion

The COVID Intensive Learning Support Program was effectively designed to help students catch up on learning loss due to the interruptions to schooling caused by COVID-19. The department rapidly stood up a taskforce to implement the program and then developed supporting governance arrangements during implementation.

Most students in New South Wales were required to learn from home for at least seven weeks during 2020 due to the impact of the Novel-Coronavirus (COVID-19). The department researched, analysed and advised government on several options to address the learning loss that resulted. It recommended small group tuition as the preferred option as it was supported by available evidence and could be rolled out at scale with speed. It identified risks of ensuring an adequate supply of educators and options to address those risks. Consistent with its analysis of where the impact of the learning loss was most severe, the department proposed to direct funding to schools with higher concentrations of students from the most disadvantaged backgrounds.

The department established a cross-functional taskforce to conduct detailed planning and support program implementation. Short timeframes meant the taskforce initially sought approval for key decisions from the program sponsor and existing oversight bodies on an as-needed basis before dedicated program governance arrangements were formalised. Once established, the governance body met regularly to oversee program delivery.

The COVID Intensive Learning Support Program is being effectively implemented. The department has refined the program during rollout to respond to risks, issues and feedback from schools. Issues with how schools enter data into department systems have affected the timeliness and accuracy of program monitoring information.

The department provided schools with guidelines, example models of delivery, systems to record student progress and professional learning. Around 80 per cent of schools had begun delivering tuition under the program by the target date. Schools reported issues with sourcing qualified teachers as a key reason they were unable to start the program by the expected date. In response, the department expanded the type of staff schools could employ, developed an online tuition program, and allowed schools to engage third-party providers to help schools that had difficulty finding qualified teachers for the program.

The department used existing systems to monitor school progress in implementing the program. This reduced the administrative burden on schools, but there were several issues with data quality and timeliness. The program included a mid-year review point to check whether schools were on track to spend their funding. This helped focus schools on ensuring funding would be spent and allowed for redistribution between schools.

The department considered program evaluation early in policy design and planning. It embedded an evaluator on the taskforce and expanded a key assessment program to help provide evidence of impact. A process and outcome evaluation is underway which will help inform future delivery. The evaluation will examine educational impacts for students participating in the program but it has not established methods to reliably assess the extent to which the program has met a goal to help 'close the equity gap' for students.

This chapter considers how effectively the COVID Intensive Learning Support Program (the program) was designed and planned for implementation.

This chapter considers how effectively the COVID Intensive Learning Support Program was implemented over our period of review (Terms 1 and 2, 2021).

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #358 - released (15 December 2021).

Published

Actions for Regional NSW 2021

Regional NSW 2021

Environment
Industry
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Service delivery

This report analyses the results of our audits of the Regional NSW cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2021.

Our preferred approach is to table the ‘Report on State Finances’ in Parliament before any other cluster report. This is because the 'Report on State Finances' focuses on the audit results and observations relating to the Total State Sector Accounts, in effect a consolidation of all government agencies. This year the 'Report on State Finances' has been delayed due to significant accounting issues being considered in the Total State Sector Accounts and which may impact the Treasury and Transport clusters.

As there are no outstanding matters relating to audits in the Regional NSW cluster impacting the Total State Sector Accounts we have decided to break with normal practice and table this cluster report ahead of the ‘Report on State Finances’.

What the report is about

The results of the Regional NSW cluster (the cluster) agencies’ financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all completed 30 June 2021 financial statement audits of cluster agencies. Four audits are ongoing.

The number of misstatements identified in the financial statements of cluster agencies decreased from 27 in 2019–20 to seven in 2020–21.

The Department corrected an understatement of $82.2 million in prepaid income related to the Bushfire Clean-up Program.

What the key issues were

Local Land Services (LLS) undertook a comprehensive revaluation of asset improvements on land reserves used for moving stock (travelling stock reserves).

The revaluation process identified that improvements on land reserves, with a value of $93.0 million, had not been previously recognised in the financial statements. LLS corrected this error by restating the 2019–20 comparative balances in its 2020–21 financial statements.

The Forestry Corporation of NSW revalued its biological assets that comprise approximately 225,000 hectares of softwood plantations and 34,000 hectares of hardwood forests. The current year valuation resulted in $71.4 million decrement in the total biological assets from $824.9 million in 2019–20 to $753.5 million in 2020–21.

The number of matters reported to management decreased from 36 in 2019–20 to 19 in 2020–21. Twelve moderate risk issues were identified and 47 per cent of reported issues were repeat issues.

What we recommended

Cluster agencies should prioritise and action recommendations to address internal control deficiencies.

 

Fast facts

The Regional NSW cluster plans and delivers regional programs and infrastructure to respond to regional issues, creating and preserving regional jobs, driving regional economy, growing existing and supporting emerging industries. There are 31 agencies in the cluster.

  • $2.3b of regional land and buildings as at 30 June 2021.

  • 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued for all completed 30 June 2021 financial statements audits.

  • monetary misstatements were reported in 2020–21.

  • $603m of grants and subsidies administered to the regional community in 2020–21.

  • 12 moderate risk management letter findings were identified and reported to management.

  • 47% of reported issues were repeat issues. 

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Regional NSW cluster agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Regional NSW cluster for 2021.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all completed 30 June 2021 financial statements audits of cluster agencies. Four audits are ongoing.
  • The number of monetary misstatements identified during the audit decreased from 27 in 2019–20 to seven in 2020–21.
  • Three cluster agencies could improve their early close process by completing all required procedures.
  • Local Land Services disclosed a prior period error relating to the completeness of asset improvements on travelling stock reserves.

 

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Regional NSW cluster.

Section highlights

  • The number of findings reported to management decreased from 36 in 2019–20 to 19 in 2020–21, and 47 per cent were repeat findings.
  • The 2020–21 audits identified 12 moderate risk and seven low risk issues across the cluster.
  • Four moderate risk issues and five low risk issues were repeat findings from
    2019–20.

 

Appendix one - Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two - Early close procedures

Appendix three - Financial data

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Managing climate risks to assets and services

Managing climate risks to assets and services

Planning
Environment
Treasury
Industry
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery

What the report is about

This report assessed how effectively the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (DPIE) and NSW Treasury have supported state agencies to manage climate risks to their assets and services.

Climate risks that can impact on state agencies' assets and services include flooding, bushfires, and extreme temperatures. Impacts can include damage to transport, communications and energy infrastructure, increases in hospital admissions, and making social housing or school buildings unsuitable.

NSW Treasury estimates these risks could have significant costs.

What we found

DPIE and NSW Treasury’s support to agencies to manage climate risks to their assets and services has been insufficient.

In 2021, key agencies with critical assets and services have not conducted climate risk assessments, and most lack adaptation plans.

DPIE has not delivered on the NSW Government commitment to develop a state-wide climate change adaptation action plan. This was to be complete in 2017.

There is also no adaptation strategy for the state. These have been released in all other Australian jurisdictions. The NSW Government’s draft strategic plan for its Climate Change Fund was also never finalised.

DPIE’s approach to developing climate projections is robust, but it hasn’t effectively educated agencies in how to use this information to assess climate risk.

NSW Treasury did not consistently apply dedicated resourcing to support agencies' climate risk management until late 2019.

In March 2021, DPIE and NSW Treasury released the Climate Risk Ready NSW Guide and Course. These are designed to improve support to agencies.

What we recommended

DPIE and NSW Treasury should, in partnership:

  • enhance the coordination of climate risk management across agencies
  • implement climate risk management across their clusters.

DPIE should:

  • update information and strengthen education to agencies, and monitor progress
  • review relevant land-use planning, development and building guidance
  • deliver a climate change adaptation action plan for the state.

NSW Treasury should:

  • strengthen climate risk-related guidance to agencies
  • coordinate guidance on resilience in infrastructure planning
  • review how climate risks have been assured in agencies’ asset management plans.

Fast facts

4 years

between commitments in the NSW Climate Change Policy Framework, and DPIE and NSW Treasury producing key supports to agencies for climate risk management.

$120bn

Value of physical assets held by nine NSW Government entities we examined that have not completed climate risk assessments.

Low capability to do climate risk assessment has been found across state agencies. The total value of NSW Government physical assets is $365 billion, as at 30 June 2020.

x3

NSW Treasury’s estimates of the annual fiscal and economic costs associated with natural disasters will triple by 2060–61.

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 2021, each of the last four decades has been successively warmer and surface temperatures will continue to increase until at least the mid-century. The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) and the Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) have reported that extreme weather across Australia is more frequent and intense, and there have been longer-term changes to weather patterns. They also report sea levels are rising around Australia increasing the risk of inundation and damage to coastal infrastructure and communities.

According to the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department), in New South Wales the impacts of a changing climate, and the risks associated with it, will be felt differently across regions, populations and economic sectors. The department's climate projections indicate the number of hot days will increase, rainfall will vary across the state, and the number of severe fire days will increase.

The NSW Government is a provider of essential services, such as health care, education and public transport. It also owns and manages around $365 billion in physical assets (as at June 2020). More than $180 billion of its assets are in major infrastructure such as roads and railway lines.

In NSW, climate risks that could directly impact on state agencies' assets and services include flooding, bushfires, and extreme temperatures. In recent years, natural hazards exacerbated by climate change have damaged and disrupted government transport, communications and energy infrastructure. As climate risks eventuate, they can also increase hospital admissions when people are affected by poorer air quality, and make social housing dwellings or schools unsafe and unusable during heatwaves. The physical impacts of a changing climate also have significant financial costs. Taking into account projected economic growth, NSW Treasury has estimated that the fiscal and economic costs associated with natural disasters due to climate change will more than triple per year by 2061.

The department and NSW Treasury advise that leading practice in climate risk management includes a process that explicitly identifies climate risks and integrates these into existing risk management, monitoring and reporting systems. This is in line with international risk management and climate adaptation standards. For agencies to manage the physical risks of climate change to their assets and services, leading practice identified by the department means that they need to:

  • use robust climate projection information to understand the potential climate impacts
  • undertake sound climate risk assessments, within an enterprise risk management framework
  • implement adaptation plans that reduce these risks, and harness opportunities.

Adaptation responses that could be planned for include: controlling development in flood-prone locations; ensuring demand for health services can be met during heatwaves; improving thermal comfort in schools to support student engagement; proactive asset maintenance to reduce disruption of essential services, and safeguarding infrastructure from more frequent and intense natural disasters.

According to NSW Treasury policy, agencies are individually responsible for risk management systems appropriate to their context. The department and NSW Treasury have key roles in ensuring that agencies are supported with robust information and timely, relevant guidance to help manage risks to assets and services effectively, especially for emerging risks that require coordinated responses, such as those posed by climate change.

This audit assessed whether the department and NSW Treasury are effectively supporting NSW Government agencies to manage climate risks to their assets and services. It focused on the management of physical risks to assets and services associated with climate change.

Conclusion

The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) has made climate projections available to agencies since 2014, but provided limited guidance to assist agencies to identify and manage climate risks. NSW Treasury first noted climate change as a contextual factor in its 2012 guidance on risk management. NSW Treasury only clarified requirements for agencies to integrate climate considerations into their risk management processes in December 2020.
The department has not delivered on a NSW Government commitment for a state-wide climate change adaptation action plan, which was meant to be completed in 2017. Currently many state agencies that own or manage assets and provide services do not have climate risk management in place.
Since 2019, the department and NSW Treasury have worked in partnership to develop a coordinated approach to supporting agencies to manage these risks. This includes guidance to agencies on climate risk assessment and adaptation planning published in 2021.
More work is needed to embed, sustain and lead effective climate risk management across the NSW public sector, especially for the state's critical infrastructure and essential services that may be exposed to climate change impacts.

The NSW Government set directions in the 2016 NSW Climate Change Policy Framework to 'manage the impact of climate change on its assets and services by embedding climate change considerations into asset and risk management’ and more broadly into 'government decision-making'.

The department released climate projections and has made information on projected climate change impacts available since 2014, but this has not been effectively communicated to agencies. The absence of a state-wide climate change adaptation action plan has limited the department's implementation of a coordinated, well-communicated program of support to agencies for their climate risk management.

NSW Treasury is responsible for managing the state's finances and providing stewardship to the public sector on financial and risk management, but it did not consistently apply dedicated resourcing to support agencies' climate risk management until late 2019. NSW Treasury estimates the financial costs of climate-related physical risks are significant and will continue to grow.

The partnership between the department and NSW Treasury has produced the 2021 Climate Risk Ready NSW Guide and Course, which aim to help agencies understand their exposure to climate risks and develop adaptation responses. The Guide maps out a process for climate risk assessment and adaptation planning and is referenced in NSW Treasury policy on internal audit and risk management. It is also referenced in NSW Treasury guidance to agencies on how to reflect the effects of climate-related matters in financial statements.

There is more work to be done by the department on maintaining robust, accessible climate information and educating agencies in its use. NSW Treasury will need to continue to update its policies, guidance and economic analyses with relevant climate considerations to support an informed, coordinated approach to managing physical climate risks to agencies' assets and services, and to the state's finances more broadly.

The effectiveness of the department and NSW Treasury's support involves the proactive and sustained take-up of climate risk management by state agencies. There is a key role for the department and NSW Treasury in monitoring this progress and its results.

Prior to 2021, support provided by the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) to agencies for managing physical climate risks to their assets and services has been limited. NSW Treasury has a stewardship role in public sector performance, including risk management, but has not had a defined role in working with the department on climate risk matters until mid-2019. The low capacity of agencies to undertake this work has been known to NSW Government through agency surveys by the department in 2015 and by the department and NSW Treasury in 2018.

The support delivered to agencies around climate risk management, including risk assessment and adaptation planning, has been slow to start and of limited impact. The department's capacity to implement a coordinated approach to supporting agencies has also been limited by the absence of a state-wide adaptation strategy and related action plan.

In 2021, products were released by the department and NSW Treasury with potential to improve support to agencies on climate risk assessment and adaption planning (that this, Climate Risk Ready NSW Guide and Course, which provides links to key NSW Treasury polices). The department and NSW Treasury are now leading work to develop a more coordinated approach to climate risk management for agencies' assets and services, and building the resilience of the state to climate risk more broadly.

Climate projections are a key means of understanding the potential impacts of climate change, which is an important step in the climate risk assessment process. The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) used a robust approach to develop its climate projections (NARCliM). The full version of NARCliM (v1.0) is based on 2007 models11 and while still relevant, this has limited its perceived usefulness and uptake. The process of updating these projections requires significant resourcing. The department has made recent updates to enhance the currency and usefulness of its climate projections. NARCliM (v2.0) should be available in 2022.

While climate projections have been available to agencies and the community more broadly since 2013–14, the department has not been effective in educating the relevant data users within agencies in how to use the information for climate risk assessments and adaptation planning.

The absence of a strategy focused on this is significant and has contributed to the current low levels of climate risk assessment uptake across agencies (see section 2). Agencies are required to use the climate projections developed by the department when developing long term plans and strategies as part of the NSW Government Common Planning Assumptions.


11 The department advises the 2007 global climate models were released to users by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 2010.
It is too soon to determine the impact of the 2021 Climate Risk Ready NSW (CRR) Guide and Course, produced by the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) and NSW Treasury. But there are opportunities for these agencies to progress these developments in partnership: especially with the establishment of senior executive steering and oversight committees related to climate risk.

For the department, key opportunities to embed climate risk management include leveraging land use planning policies and guidance to drive adaptation, which has potential to better protect the state's assets and services. NSW Treasury has a role in continuing to update its policies, guidance and economic analyses with relevant climate change considerations to support an informed, coordinated approach to addressing physical climate risks to agencies' assets and services, and to the state's finances more broadly.

There is currently no plan on how the department and NSW Treasury intend to routinely monitor the progress of agencies with implementing the CRR Guide or developing climate risk 'maturity' more broadly. As agencies are responsible for implementing risk management systems that meet NSW Treasury standards, which now clearly includes consideration of climate risk (TPP20-08), establishing effective monitoring, reporting and accountability around this progress should be a priority for the department and NSW Treasury.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – Timeline of key activities 

Appendix three – About the audit 

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #355 - released (7 September 2021).

Published

Actions for Fast-tracked Assessment Program

Fast-tracked Assessment Program

Planning
Industry
Environment
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Service delivery

What the report is about

This report examines the effectiveness of the Fast-tracked Assessment Program, administered by the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (DPIE) between April 2020 and October 2020. 

The program aimed to support the construction industry during the COVID-19 crisis by accelerating the final assessment stages for planning proposals and development applications. 

DPIE selected projects and planning proposals for fast tracked assessment that demonstrated the potential to:

  • deliver jobs
  • progress to the next stage of development within six months of determination
  • deliver public benefit.

The audit assessed whether the Fast-tracked Assessment Program achieved its objectives while complying with planning controls.

What we found

Through tranches three to six of the program, DPIE successfully accelerated the final stages of 53 assessments. DPIE reported that 89 per cent of these proceeded to the next stage of development within six months.

Assessment of projects and planning proposals was compliant with legislation and other requirements. However, the audit found gaps in DPIE's management of conflicts of interest.

DPIE has not evaluated or costed the program and is not able to demonstrate the extent to which it provided support to the construction industry during COVID-19. 

Aspects of the program have been incorporated into longer term reforms to create a new level of transparency over the progress and status of planning assessments. 

What we recommended

DPIE should:

  • strengthen controls over conflicts of interest 
  • evaluate the Fast-tracked Assessment Program.

Fast facts

Construction industry support 
  • The program aimed at providing immediate support to the construction industry during the COVID-19 crisis
59 fast-tracked projects 
  • 59 projects and 42 planning proposals projects were assessed in six tranches
89% of all fast-tracked assessments in tranches three to six progressed to the next stage of the planning process within six months of determination

In April 2020, the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (DPIE) introduced programs aimed at providing immediate support to the construction industry during the COVID-19 crisis. One of these was the Fast-tracked Assessment Program. This program identified planning proposals and development applications (DAs), across six tranches, that were partially-assessed and could be accelerated to determination.

In accordance with the program objectives, the planning proposals and DAs selected for fast-tracked assessment had to:

  • deliver jobs – particularly in the construction industry
  • be capable of progressing to the next stage of development within six months of determination
  • deliver public benefit.

At the same time, the Fast-tracked Assessment Program was to lay a foundation for future reform of the planning system by piloting changes in the assessment process that could be adopted in the medium to long term.

This audit assessed whether the Fast-tracked Assessment Program achieved its objectives while complying with planning controls. The audit focused on tranches three to six of the program, which were determined between July 2020 and October 2020. The rationale for focusing on these four tranches was that the program design had been slightly modified after the first two tranches to address identified risks.

Conclusion

Through tranches three to six of the Fast-tracked Assessment Program, DPIE successfully accelerated the final stages of 53 assessments. DPIE’s internal monitoring indicates that 31 DAs and 16 planning proposals selected in these tranches proceeded to the next stage of development within six months of determination. DPIE achieved this while also successfully managing the risk of non-compliance with planning controls arising from the accelerated process. While DPIE has incorporated components of the Fast-tracked Assessment Program into other longer-term reforms, it has not evaluated the program and is not able to demonstrate the extent to which the program provided support to the construction industry during COVID-19.

Between April and October 2020, DPIE adopted a case management approach to accelerate the final stages of assessment for 42 planning proposals and 59 DAs in six tranches. Tranches three to six were the focus of this audit and included 22 planning proposals and 31 DAs. Applicants involved in the program were expected to progress their projects to the next stage of development within six months of determination. While DPIE had no way of compelling applicants to do this and relied on non-binding commitments obtained from applicants, DPIE’s internal monitoring indicates that 47 of the 53 applicants selected in tranches three to six honoured this commitment.

Fast-tracked assessment only applied to the final stages of assessment and required DPIE staff and other stakeholders to work towards a determination deadline. DPIE effectively used a case management approach to manage the risk that the accelerated timeframe could result in planning controls not being fully compliant with legislation. There is some room for improvement in the process, as four of 28 staff assessing planning proposals and DAs had not lodged current conflict of interest declarations.

Based on the results of and learnings from the Fast-tracked Assessment Program, DPIE has incorporated some elements of the program into other longer-term reforms. There is now increased transparency about when applicants can expect to receive a planning determination and DPIE has also introduced a case management approach for strategic and high priority planning applications. Applicants benefiting from case-managed assessment are now required to commit to a formal service charter that specifies the obligations of both DPIE and the applicant.

DPIE has not evaluated the Fast-tracked Assessment Program to understand the costs and benefits of the program, nor which aspects of the program were most effective as a basis for future reform.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Planning determination pathways

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #354 - released (27 July 2021).

Published

Actions for Universities 2020 audits

Universities 2020 audits

Universities
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance

What the report is about

Results of the financial statement audits of the public universities in NSW for the year ended 31 December 2020.

What we found

Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all ten universities.

Two universities reported retrospective corrections of prior period errors.

Universities were impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic with student enrolments decreasing in 2020 compared to 2019 by 10,032 (3.3 per cent). Of this decrease 8,310 students were from overseas.

In response to the pandemic, each university provided welfare support, created student hardship funds, provided accommodation and flexibility on payment of course fees. State and Commonwealth governments provided additional support to the sector.

Six universities recorded negative net operating results in 2020 (two in 2019). The combined revenues of the ten universities from fees and charges decreased by $361 million (5.8 per cent).

Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, which will continue to impact the financial results of universities in 2021, enrolments of overseas students in semester one of 2021 increased at two universities. This growth meant that total overseas student enrolments increased by 7,944 or 5.8 per cent across the sector as a whole. However, eight universities experienced decreases in overseas student enrolments compared to semester one of 2020. All universities have experienced growth in domestic student enrolments.

What the key issues were

There were 110 findings reported to universities in audit management letters.

Three high risk findings were identified. One related to the continued work by the University of New South Wales to assess its liability for underpayment of casual staff entitlements. The other two deficiencies were at Charles Sturt University, relating to financial reporting implications of major contracts, and resolving issues identified by an internal review of its employment contracts to reliably quantify the university’s liability to its employees.

What we recommended

Universities should prioritise actions to address repeat findings. Forty-five findings were repeated from 2019, of which 23 related to information technology.

Fast facts

There are ten public universities in NSW with 51 local controlled entities and 23 overseas controlled entities.

  • $10.9bn Total combined revenue in 2020, a decrease of $538.5 million (4.7 per cent) from 2019.
  • 106,984 Overseas student enrolments in 2020, a decrease of 8,310 students (7.2 per cent) from 2019.
  • 3 High risk management letter findings were identified.
  • $11.0bn Total combined expenditure in 2020, a decrease of $147.8 million (0.9 per cent) from 2019.
  • 182,683 Domestic student enrolments in 2020, a decrease of 1,722 students (0.9 per cent) from 2019.
  • 41% Of reported issues were repeat issues.

Further information

Please contact Ian Goodwin, Deputy Auditor-General on 9275 7347 or by email.

This report analyses the results of our audits of the financial statements of the ten universities in NSW for the year ended 31 December 2020. The table below summarises our key observations.

1. Financial reporting

Financial reporting The 2020 financial statements of all ten universities received unmodified audit opinions.

Two universities reported retrospective corrections of prior period errors. The University of Sydney reported errors relating to the underpayment of staff entitlements and the fair value of buildings. Charles Sturt University reported an error relating to how it had calculated right‑of‑use assets and lease liabilities on initial application of the new leasing standard in the previous year.

Impacts of COVID‑19

Student enrolments decreased in 2020 compared to 2019 by 10,032 (3.3 per cent). Of this decrease, 8,310 students were from overseas.

The ongoing impact of COVID‑19 in the short‑term, on semester one enrolments for 2021 compared to semester one of 2020, has been mixed:

  • all universities in NSW experienced a growth in their domestic student enrolments
  • eight universities experienced decreases in overseas student enrolments.

During 2020, universities provided welfare support to students, created student hardship funds, provided accommodation, and flexibility on payment of course fees.

State and Commonwealth governments provided additional support to the sector:

  • those university controlled entities eligible to receive JobKeeper payments received a combined amount under the Commonwealth scheme totalling $47.6 million in 2020
  • the NSW Government launched a University Loan Guarantee scheme.
Financial results

Six universities recorded negative net operating results in 2020 (two in 2019). While most universities experienced decreased revenue in 2020, only four had reduced their expenses to a level that was less than revenue.

Revenue from operations

Universities' revenue streams were impacted in 2020 by the COVID‑19 pandemic, with fees and charges decreasing by $361 million (5.8 per cent).

Government grants as a proportion of total revenue increased for the first time in five years to 34 per cent in 2020.

Nearly 40 per cent of universities' total revenue from course fees in 2020 (40.9 per cent in 2019) came from overseas students from three countries: China, India and Nepal (same in 2019). Students from these countries of origin contributed $2.2 billion ($2.4 billion in 2019) in fees. Some universities continue to be dependent on revenues from students from these destinations and their results are more sensitive to fluctuations in demand as a result.

Other revenues

Overall philanthropic contributions to universities increased by 32.2 per cent in 2020 to $222 million ($167.9 million in 2019). The University of Sydney and the University of New South Wales attracted 75.2 per cent of the total philanthropic contributions in 2020 (69.5 per cent in 2019).

Total research income for universities was $1.4 billion in 20191, with the University of Sydney and the University of New South Wales attracting 66.5 per cent of the total research income of all universities in NSW (65.2 per cent in 2018).

Expenditure Universities initiated cost saving measures in response to the COVID‑19 pandemic. The cost of redundancy programs increased employee related expenses in 2020 by 4.4 per cent to $6.5 billion ($6.2 billion in 2019). The cost of redundancies offered in 2020 across the universities totalled $293.9 million. Combined other expenses decreased to $2.8 billion in 2020, a reduction of $436 million (13.4 per cent).

2. Internal controls and governance

Internal control findings One hundred and ten internal control deficiencies were identified in 2020 (108 in 2019). Forty‑five findings were repeated from 2019, of which 23 related to information technology.

Recommendation: Universities should prioritise actions to address repeat findings on internal control deficiencies in a timely manner. Risks associated with unmitigated control deficiencies may increase over time.

Three high risk internal control deficiencies were identified, namely:

  • The University of New South Wales should continue work to assess its liability for the underpayment of casual staff entitlements. This issue was also reported last year.
  • Two high risk deficiencies were identified at Charles Sturt University. One related to misunderstanding the requirements of the new accounting standard in relation to recognising grant funding revenue for construction work. The second related to resolving issues identified by an ongoing internal review of its employment contracts to enable a reliable quantification as to the university's liability to its employees.

Gaps in information technology (IT) controls comprised the majority of the remaining deficiencies. Deficiencies included a lack of sufficient privileged user access reviews and monitoring, payment files being held in editable formats and accessible by unauthorised persons, and password settings not aligning with the requirements of information security policies.

Business continuity and disaster recovery planning All universities have a business continuity policy supported with a business impact analysis.

Except for Macquarie University, all other universities had disaster recovery plans prepared for all of the IT systems that support critical business functions. Macquarie University’s disaster recovery plans were still in progress at 31 December 2020.

Only half of the universities' policies require regular testing of their business continuity plans and six universities' plans do not specify staff must capture, asses and report disruptive incidents.

3. Teaching and research

Graduate employment outcomes Eight out of ten universities were reported as having full‑time employment rates of their undergraduates in 2020 that were greater than the national average.

Six universities were reported as having full‑time employment rates of their postgraduates in 2020 that were greater than the national average.

Student enrolments by field of education Enrolments at universities in NSW decreased the most in Management and Commerce courses and Engineering and Related Technologies courses. The largest increase in enrolments was in Society and Culture courses.
Achieving diversity outcomes Five universities in 2019 were reported as meeting the target enrolment rate for students from low socio‑economic status (SES) backgrounds.

Seven universities were reported to have increased their enrolments of students from Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander backgrounds in 2019. The target growth rate for increases in enrolments of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander students (to exceed the growth rate of enrolments of non‑indigenous students by at least 50 per cent) was achieved in 2019.

 1 2020 data, which is compiled by the Australian Department of Education and Training, is not yet available.

This report provides Parliament with the results of our financial audits of universities in NSW and their controlled entities in 2020, including our analysis, observations and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • internal controls and governance
  • teaching and research.

Financial reporting is an important element of governance. Confidence and transparency in university sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations on the financial reporting of universities in NSW for 2020.

Financial results

The graph below shows the net results of individual universities for 2020.

Appropriate and robust internal controls help reduce risks associated with managing finances, compliance and administration of universities.

This chapter outlines the internal controls related observations and insights across universities in NSW for 2020, including overall trends in findings, level of risk and implications.

Our audits do not review all aspects of internal controls and governance every year. The more significant issues and risks are included in this chapter. These along with the less significant matters are reported to universities for management to address.

Universities' primary objectives are teaching and research. They invest most of their resources to achieve quality outcomes in academia and student experience. Universities have committed to achieving certain government targets and compete to advance their reputation and their standing in international and Australian rankings.

This chapter outlines teaching and research outcomes for universities in NSW for 2020.