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Actions for Governance and internal controls over local infrastructure contributions

Governance and internal controls over local infrastructure contributions

Local Government
Planning
Environment
Compliance
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Service delivery

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today on how well four councils managed their local infrastructure contributions during the 2017-18 and 2018-19 financial years. 

Local infrastructure contributions, also known as developer contributions, are collected from developers to pay for local infrastructure such as drainage, local roads, open space and community facilities. Controls over local infrastructure contributions help to ensure that all contributions owed are collected, funds are spent as intended, and any contributions paid in the form of works-in-kind or dedicated land are correctly valued.

The audit found that Blacktown City Council and City of Sydney Council provided effective governance over their local infrastructure contributions whereas Central Coast and Liverpool City Councils’ governance arrangements require improvement.

The audit found that three councils had spent local infrastructure contributions in accordance with approved contributions plans. Central Coast Council and the former Gosford City Council had spent $13.2 million on administration costs in breach of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979. These funds were repaid into the council’s local infrastructure fund during the course of the audit.

The Auditor-General made a number of recommendations for each council relating to improving controls over contributions and increasing transparency. 

Read full report (PDF)
 

This audit examined the effectiveness of governance and internal controls over local infrastructure contributions, also known as developer contributions, held by four councils during the 2017–18 and 2018–19 financial years.

This performance audit was conducted with reference to the legislative and regulatory planning framework that was in place during that period.

Our work for this performance audit was completed at the end of March 2020 when we issued the final report to the four audited councils and the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment. We received their respective formal responses to the report’s recommendations during April and May 2020.

Concurrently to this audit, we sought Crown Solicitor’s advice (the ‘Advice’) regarding the use of local infrastructure contributions collected by local councils under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (‘the EPA Act’) for our financial audit work. The Advice clarified the applicable legislative requirements with reference to the application, investment and pooling of local infrastructure contributions. The Advice is included in Appendix 2 of this report. The Advice has not impacted on the findings and recommendations of this report.

Councils collect Local Infrastructure Contributions (LICs) from developers under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act (1979), the Local Government Act (1993) and the City of Sydney Act (2000) (EP&A Act, LG Act and City of Sydney Act) to fund infrastructure required to service and support new development. At 30 June 2018, councils across NSW collectively held more than $3.0 billion in LICs collected from developers. Just over $1.37 billion in total was held by ten councils. Councils collecting LICs must prepare a contributions plan, which outlines how LICs will be calculated and apportioned across different types of infrastructure. Councils that deliver water and sewer services prepare a development servicing plan (DSP) which allows them to collect contributions for water and sewer infrastructure.

Development timeframes are such that there is often several years between when LICs are collected and the infrastructure is required. Good governance and internal controls are needed over these funds to ensure they are available when needed and spent appropriately.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of governance and internal controls over LICs collected by four councils during the 2017–18 and 2018–19 financial years: Blacktown City Council, Central Coast Council, City of Sydney Council and Liverpool City Council. As at June 2018 these councils held the four highest LIC balances, each in excess of $140 million.

Audit Conclusion

Three of the four councils audited were currently compliant with legislation, regulations and Ministerial Directions regarding LICs. All had gaps in governance and controls over LICs which limited effective oversight.

Three of the councils included in the audit complied with legislation, regulations and Ministerial Directions relating to LICs. Central Coast Council breached the EP&A Act between 2001 and 2019 when it used LICs for administration costs. These funds were repaid in late 2019.

While controls over the receipt and expenditure of contributions funds were largely in place at all councils, there were some exceptions relating to valuing work and land delivered in lieu of cash. Three councils do not provide probity guidance in policies relating to LICs delivered through works-in-kind. Three of the councils had contributions plans that were more than five years old.

Staff at all four councils are knowledgeable about LICs but not all councils keep procedures up to date. Three councils' governance frameworks operate effectively with senior officers from across the council involved in decisions about spending LICs, entering into voluntary planning agreements (VPAs) and reviewing contributions plans.

Transparency over key information relating to LICs is important for senior management so they can make informed decisions, and for the community who pay LICs and expect infrastructure to be provided. During the period of the audit, none of the councils included in the audit provided sufficient information to senior management or their councillors about the projected financial status of contributions plans. This information would be valuable when making broader strategic and financial decisions. Information about LIC levies and intended infrastructure is available to the community but not always easy to find.

A strong governance framework is important at each council to ensure that the funds are managed well, available when needed and spent as intended. The audit examined the following features of each council's governance framework as they apply to LICs:

  • decision-making by councillors and council officers relating to LICs
  • monitoring delivery of contributions plans and DSPs including:
    • reviewing assumptions underlying the plans
    • monitoring projected status of plans.

Internal controls over LICs are important to promote accountability, prevent fraud and deliver infrastructure to the required standard at the best possible price. If financial controls are weak or are not implemented well, there is a risk that LICs are misspent or that councils pay too much for infrastructure.

Not all councils' internal controls adequately addressed risks associated with the administration of LICs

The audit examined a number of internal controls that manage risks related to LICs. These included:

  • financial controls over receipt and expenditure of LIC funds
  • management of conflicts-of-interest when dealing with developers
  • independent valuations of works-in-kind and dedicated land
  • ensuring delivery and quality of works-in-kind, and obtaining security from developers in the event of non-delivery or poor quality work
  • management of variations to VPAs and works-in-kind agreements.

We reviewed controls included in policies and procedures and then checked samples of work to ensure that controls were implemented. We found variation in the controls that councils implemented, and some weaknesses in controls. It is a matter for each council to assess their financial risk and develop internal controls that support the collection, management, and expenditure of LICs. However, councils must be able to assure their communities and developers that they are doing everything possible to collect all LICs owing and that work conducted by developers in lieu of cash payments is properly valued and carried out to the required standard.

Further information about audit findings in relation to internal controls for each council are included in chapters five to eight. The exhibit below demonstrates variation in several controls implemented in the audited councils.

In a 2018 report, the Independent Commission Against Corruption noted that 'the appetite for transparency is expanding in both the public and private sectors'.

The Practice Note and S64 Guidance refer to transparency, including the importance of transparency over:

  • calculation and apportionment of LICs
  • funding of infrastructure, including where and when infrastructure is delivered
  • arrangements made with developers through VPAs.

The LIC system is largely transparent for community members who know where to look

Contributions plans and DSPs are public documents, exhibited to the public before being adopted by council. Councils included in the audit publish their contributions plans and DSPs on their websites and meet statutory requirements with regard to reporting and accessibility of information.

However, other public information relating to the LIC system is fragmented across different websites and reports and varies in detail across councils.

Exhibit 10: Published information about LICs at the four audited councils
  Blacktown City Council Central Coast Council City of Sydney Council Liverpool City Council
Financial details about contributions collected and spent Financial statements Financial statements Financial statements Financial statements
Implementation plans for spending LICs Contribution plans S64 implementation plans in DSPs. S7.11 & S7.12 implementation plans developed annually within capital works plan Contribution plans Developed annually within capital works plan
Capital works underway or completed, funded by LICs Capital works plan and annual report Not published Not published Capital works plan
Source: Audit Office analysis.

The Practice Note states that councils are accountable for providing the infrastructure for which contributions are collected. Demonstrating that infrastructure has been provided is difficult with fragmented information. As an example of transparent reporting, Blacktown City Council's 2018–19 annual report includes information about infrastructure that has been delivered for every contributions plan, providing transparency over how LICs have been spent.

Use of LICs collected under VPAs is not always transparent

Contributions collected under VPAs are not required to demonstrate the same relationship to a development as LICs collected under section 7.11 of the EP&A Act. VPAs are often negotiated because a developer requests a change to a planning instrument, and it is important that these arrangements, and their outcomes, are transparent to the community.

The EP&A Regulation includes mechanisms to ensure that VPAs are partially transparent. VPAs are exhibited to the public and approved by the elected council. Councils must maintain a VPA Register and make the VPA Deeds of Agreement available on request. However, there is no obligation on council to report on the outcomes or delivery of developers' obligations under VPAs. The four audited councils vary in transparency and accessibility of information available about VPAs.

Exhibit 11: Published information about VPAs at the four audited councils
  Blacktown City Council Central Coast Council City of Sydney Council Liverpool City Council
VPA Register Council website and annual report Annual report Annual report Council website and annual report
VPA Deeds of Agreement Council website Available on request Available on request Council website
Intended use of LICs collected under VPAs In Deeds of Agreement In Deeds of Agreement In VPA Register and most Deeds of Agreement In VPA Register and most Deeds of Agreement
Completion of work funded by cash collected under VPAs Not published Not published Not published Not published
Delivery of works-in-kind or land negotiated under VPAs Not published Not published In VPA Register Not published
Source: Audit Office analysis.

The Practice Note suggests that councils incorporate the intended use of LICs collected under VPAs in the Deed of Agreement, but there is no guidance relating to transparency over where and when funds have actually been spent. There is merit in councils providing greater transparency over public benefits delivered through VPAs to give communities confidence in VPAs as a planning tool.

Credit arrangements with developers are not always well documented or monitored

When levying LICs, section 7.11(6) of the EP&A Act requires councils to take into account land, money, or works-in-kind that the developer has contributed on other development sites over and above their LIC obligations. This section of the EP&A Act allows a developer to offset a LIC owed on one site against land or works contributed on another. This leads to some developers carrying 'credits' for work delivered to councils, to be paid back by reduced LICs on a future development. Blacktown City Council and Central Coast Council allow developers to carry credits. Liverpool City Council and City of Sydney Council do not permit credits and instead pay the developers for any additional work undertaken.

Councils should formally document credit arrangements and have a robust process to validate and keep track of credit balances and report on them. Central Coast Council does not keep good track of credit arrangements and neither Blacktown City Council or Central Coast Council aggregate or report on outstanding credit balances.

Blacktown City Council manages the largest LIC fund in NSW and negotiates more VPAs than any other council. Overall, Blacktown City Council demonstrates effective governance over the LIC funds but there is scope for improved oversight of the projected financial status of contributions plans and credit arrangements with developers. Blacktown City Council also needs to update its operating procedures relating to LICs and improve security over key information.

Blacktown City Council is managing areas with high growth. There is a risk that Blacktown City Council will be unable to collect sufficient LICs to fund the infrastructure required to support that growth. However, Blacktown City Council does not assess and report to senior management or its Audit, Risk and Improvement Committee about the projected financial status of contributions plans.

Blacktown City Council has policies in place to guide the management of LICs although management of credit arrangements with developers requires greater oversight. Policies relating to works-in-kind agreements provide no guidance about probity in negotiations with developers and valuations of works-in-kind are not independent as they are paid for by the developer. Blacktown City Council's S7.11 committee structure could act as a model for other councils. Blacktown City Council is spending LICs according to its contributions plans. Staff managing LICs demonstrate good knowledge of the regulatory environment. However, a number of administrative processes need attention such as outdated procedures, lack of security over key spreadsheets, and inappropriate retention of sensitive personal data.

Recommendations

By December 2020, Blacktown City Council should:

  1. regularly report to senior management on the projected financial status of contributions plans
  2. update council's works-in-kind policy to address probity risks during negotiations with developers
  3. mitigate risks associated with lack of independence in valuations of works-in-kind
  4. improve public reporting about expenditure of cash collected under VPAs
  5. improve management oversight of credit arrangements with developers
  6. update procedures for managing LICs
  7. implement security measures over critical or personal information and spreadsheets. 

Central Coast Council's governance and internal controls over LICs were not fully effective. Between 2001 and 2019, more than $13.0 million in LICs was misspent on administration costs in breach of the EP&A Act. There is scope for improved oversight of the projected financial status of contributions plans and credit arrangements with developers. Policies and procedures from the two former councils are not aligned.

In May 2016, the newly amalgamated Central Coast Council inherited 53 contributions plans from the former Gosford City and Wyong Shire Councils. Managing this number of contributions plans fragments the available funds and increases complexity. Central Coast Council is currently working on consolidating these plans. Between June 2016 and June 2019, its LIC balance doubled from $90.0 million to $196 million. Central Coast Council does not assess and report to senior management or its Audit, Risk and Improvement Committee about the projected financial status of contributions plans. Central Coast Council has a LIC committee but it has no formal charter and senior officers do not regularly attend meetings. This limits the committee's effectiveness as a decision-making body. A draft policy relating to works-in-kind agreements provide no guidance about probity in negotiations with developers. Valuations of works-in-kind and land dedications are not independent as they are paid for by the developer.

Central Coast Council has adjusted its accounts in 2018–19 by $13.2 million to repay the LIC fund for administration expenses that were not provided for in 40 contributions plans.

Recommendations

By June 2020, Central Coast Council should:

1. obtain independent validation of the adjustment made to the restricted asset accounts and general fund to repay LICs spent on administration, and adjustments made to each infrastructure category within the contributions plans

2. publish current contributions plans from the former Gosford City Council on the Central Coast Council website.

By December 2020, Central Coast Council should:

3. regularly report to senior management on the projected financial status of contributions plans

4. increase transparency of information available to the public about LIC works planned and underway, including intended use of contributions collected under VPAs

5. consolidate existing plans, ensuring the new contributions plans includes a regular review cycle

6. develop a formal charter for the developer contributions committee and increase the seniority of membership

7. complete and adopt council's works-in-kind policy currently under development, ensuring it addresses probity risks during negotiations with developers

8. mitigate risks associated with lack of independence in valuations of works-in-kind and dedicated land

9. improve public reporting about expenditure of cash collected under VPAs

10. improve management oversight of credit arrangements with developers

11. implement security measures to ensure the integrity of key spreadsheets used to manage LICs

12. align policies and procedures relating to LICs across the amalgamated council including developing policies and procedures for the management of S64 LICs

13. update council's VPA policy to address increased or indexed bank guarantees to accommodate cost increases.

City of Sydney Council manages a complex development environment across the Sydney CBD and inner suburbs. Overall, governance and internal controls over LICs are effective although there is scope for improved oversight of the projected financial status of contributions plans.

City of Sydney Council maintains a large balance of LICs, although not excessive relative to the annual level of LIC expenditure. Unspent contributions are largely associated with open space infrastructure that cannot be delivered until suitable land is available. Thirty per cent of cash contributions are collected under VPAs and there is limited transparency over how these funds are spent. City of Sydney Council does not assess and report to management or its Audit, Risk and Compliance Committee about the projected financial status of contributions plans.

In 2017–18 and 2018–19, LICs were spent in accordance with the corresponding contributions plans. City of Sydney Council staff are knowledgeable about the regulatory environment and are supported by up-to-date policies and procedures.

Recommendations

By December 2020, City of Sydney Council should:

  1. regularly report to senior management on the projected financial status of contributions plans
  2. improve public reporting about expenditure of cash collected under VPAs
  3. periodically review the risk of unpaid LICs associated with complying development certificates and assess whether additional controls are required
  4. implement security measures to ensure the integrity of key spreadsheets used to manage LICs. 

During the audit period 2017–18 and 2018–19, Liverpool City Council did not have effective governance and internal controls over LICs. Liverpool City Council is addressing deficiencies and risks identified through an internal audit published in December 2018 although further work is required. There is scope for improved oversight of the projected financial status of contributions plans.

In the two years to 30 June 2019, the balance of unspent LICs increased by more than 60 per cent against a relatively low pattern of expenditure. Prior to an internal audit completed in late 2018, there was no regular reporting on the status of LICs and a lack of transparency when prioritising the expenditure of LIC funds. During 2019, and following the internal audit, Liverpool City Council engaged additional skilled resources to improve focus and accountability for LICs. A LIC committee has been established to manage contributions plans and support business units to initiate relevant infrastructure projects, although it is too early to assess whether this committee is operating effectively. From February 2019, Liverpool City Council commenced monthly reporting to its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) about the point-in-time status of LIC funds, and to its Audit, Risk and Improvement Committee about risks associated with LICs and the implementation of internal audit recommendations. There is limited reporting to senior management about the projected financial status of some contributions plans. Our audit found no evidence of misuse of funds during the audited period. Methods for valuing work and land are not aligned with policies and procedures and are implemented inconsistently. In addition, valuations of works-in-kind and land dedications are not independent as they are paid for by the developer. The policy relating to works-in-kind provides no guidance about managing probity risks when negotiating with developers.

Recommendations

By December 2020, Liverpool City Council should:

  1. regularly report to senior management on the projected financial status of contributions plans
  2. update council's policies and procedures to provide consistent guidance about how works and land offered by developers should be valued
  3. update council's Works-in-Kind and Land Acquisition Policy to address probity risks during negotiations with developers
  4. improve public reporting about expenditure of cash collected under VPAs
  5. mitigate risks associated with lack of independence in valuations of works-in-kind and dedicated land
  6. implement security measures over critical or private information. 

Appendix one – Responses from councils and the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment

Appendix two – Advice from the Crown Solicitor

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #339 - released 17 August 2020

Published

Actions for Their Futures Matter

Their Futures Matter

Justice
Community Services
Education
Health
Whole of Government
Cross-agency collaboration
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Project management

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining whether the Department of Communities and Justice had effective governance and partnership arrangements in place to deliver ‘Their Futures Matter’.

Their Futures Matter was intended to place vulnerable children and families at the heart of services, and direct investment to where funding and programs deliver the greatest social and economic benefits. It was a four-year whole-of-government reform in response to the 2015 Tune Review of out-of-home care.

The Auditor-General found that while important foundations were put in place, and new programs trialled, the key objective to establish an evidence-based whole-of-government early intervention approach for vulnerable children and families in NSW was not achieved.

Governance and cross-agency partnership arrangements to deliver Their Futures Matter were found to be ineffective. 'Their Futures Matter lacked mechanisms to secure cross portfolio buy‑in and did not have authority to drive reprioritisation of government investment', the Auditor-General said.

At the reform’s close, the majority of around $380 million in investment funding remains tied to existing agency programs, with limited evidence of their comparative effectiveness or alignment with Their Futures Matter policy objectives. The reform concluded on 30 June 2020 without a strategy or plan in place to achieve its intent.

The Auditor-General made four recommendations to the Department of Communities and Justice, aimed at improving implementation of outstanding objectives, revising governance arrangements, and utilising the new human services data set to address the intent of the reform. However, these recommendations respond only in part to the findings of the audit.

According to the Auditor-General, ‘Cross-portfolio leadership and action is required to ensure a whole-of-government response to delivering the objectives of Their Futures Matter to improve outcomes for vulnerable children, young people and their families in New South Wales.’

Read full report (PDF)

In 2016, the NSW Government launched 'Their Futures Matter' (TFM) - a whole-of-government reform aimed at delivering improved outcomes for vulnerable children, young people and their families. TFM was the government's key response to the 2015 Independent Review of Out of Home Care in New South Wales (known as 'the Tune Review').

The Tune Review found that, despite previous child protection reforms, the out of home care system was ineffective and unsustainable. It highlighted that the system was not client-centred and was failing to improve the long-term outcomes for vulnerable children and families. The review found that the greatest proportion of relevant expenditure was made in out of home care service delivery rather than in evidence-based early intervention strategies to support children and families when vulnerabilities first become evident to government services (such as missed school days or presentations to health services).

The then Department of Family and Community Services (FACS) designed the TFM reform initiatives, in consultation with central and human services agencies. A cross-agency board, senior officers group, and a new unit in the FACS cluster were established to drive the implementation of TFM. In the 2016–17 Budget, the government allocated $190 million over four years (2016–17 to 2019–20) to the reform. This resourced the design and commissioning of evidence-based pilots, data analytics work, staffing for the implementation unit and secretariat support for the board and cross-agency collaboration.

As part of the TFM reform, the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Treasury and partnering agencies (NSW Health, Department of Education and Department of Justice) identified various existing programs that targeted vulnerable children and families (such as the preceding whole-of-government ‘Keep Them Safe’ reform coming to an end in June 2020). Funding for these programs, totalling $381 million in 2019–20, was combined to form a nominal ‘investment pool’. The government intended that the TFM Implementation Board would use this pool to direct and prioritise resource allocation to evidence-based interventions for vulnerable children and families in NSW.

This audit assessed whether TFM had effective governance and partnership arrangements in place to enable an evidence-based early intervention investment approach for vulnerable children and families in NSW. We addressed the audit objective with the following audit questions:

  • Was the TFM reform driven by effective governance arrangements?
  • Was the TFM reform supported by effective cross-agency collaboration?
  • Has the TFM reform generated an evidence base to inform a cross-agency investment approach in the future?

The audit did not seek to assess the outcomes for children, young people and families achieved by TFM programs and projects.

Conclusion

The governance and cross-agency partnership arrangements used to deliver the Their Futures Matter reform were ineffective. Important foundations were put in place, and new programs trialled over the reform's four years. However, an evidence-based whole-of-government early intervention approach for vulnerable children and families in NSW − the key objective of the reform − was not established. The reform concluded in June 2020 without a strategy or plan in place to achieve its intent.

The governance arrangements established for the Their Futures Matter (TFM) reform did not provide sufficient independence, authority and cross-agency clout to deliver on the reform’s intent. This hindered delivery of the reform's key elements, particularly the redirection of funding to evidence-based earlier intervention supports, and limited the impact that TFM could have on driving system change.

TFM increased focus on the contribution that other agencies outside of the former Family and Community Services portfolio could make in responding to the needs of vulnerable children and families, and in reducing the demand costs of related government service delivery. Despite being a whole-of-government reform, TFM lacked mechanisms to secure cross-portfolio buy-in and lacked the powers to drive reprioritisation of government investment in evidence-based and earlier intervention supports across agencies. At the reform’s close, the majority of the reform's investment pool funding remained tied to existing agency programs, with limited evidence of their comparative effectiveness or alignment with Their Futures Matter policy objectives.

TFM began building an evidence base about ‘what works’, including piloting programs and creating a new dataset to identify risk factors for vulnerability and future costs to government. However, this evidence base does not yet comprehensively map how existing services meet needs, identify system duplications or gaps, nor demonstrate which government funded supports and interventions are most effective to make a difference to life outcomes for vulnerable children and families in NSW.
Despite these issues, the need, intent and vision for Their Futures Matter remains relevant and urgent, as issues identified in the Tune Review remain pertinent.

Their Futures Matter (TFM) is a whole-of-government reform to deliver improved outcomes for vulnerable children, young people and their families.

Supported by a cross-agency TFM Board, and the TFM Unit in the then Department of Family and Community Services (FACS), the reform aimed to develop whole-of-government evidence-based early intervention investment approaches for vulnerable children and families in NSW.

Governance refers to the structures, systems and practices that an organisation has in place to:

  • assign decision-making authorities and establish the organisation's strategic direction
  • oversee the delivery of its services, the implementation of its policies, and the monitoring and mitigation of its key risks
  • report on its performance in achieving intended results, and drive ongoing improvements.

We examined whether the TFM reform was driven by effective governance arrangements and cross-agency collaboration.

The reform agenda and timeframe set down for Their Futures Matter (TFM) were ambitious. This chapter assesses whether the TFM Board and TFM Unit had the capability, capacity and clout within government to deliver the reform agenda.

Creating a robust evidence base was important for Their Futures Matter, in order to:

  • identify effective intervention strategies to improve supports and outcomes for vulnerable children and families
  • make efficient use of taxpayer money to assist the maximum number of vulnerable children and families
  • inform the investment-based approach for future funding allocation.

This chapter assesses whether the TFM reform has developed an evidence base to inform cross-agency investment decisions.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – TFM governance entities

Appendix three – TFM Human Services Data Set

Appendix four – TFM pilot programs

Appendix five – About the audit

Appendix six – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #337 - released 24 July 2020

Published

Actions for Water conservation in Greater Sydney

Water conservation in Greater Sydney

Environment
Industry
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Regulation
Risk

This report examines whether the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment, and Sydney Water have effectively progressed water conservation initiatives in Greater Sydney.

The report found that the department and Sydney Water have not effectively investigated, implemented or supported water conservation initiatives in Greater Sydney. The agencies have not met key requirements of the current Metropolitan Water Plan and Sydney Water has not met all its operating licence requirements for water conservation. There has been little policy or regulatory reform, little focus on identifying new options and investments, and limited planning and implementation of water conservation initiatives.

As a result, Greater Sydney's water supply may be less resilient to population growth and climate variability, including drought.

The Metropolitan Water Plan states that water conservation, including recycling water, makes the drinking water supply go further. The plan also states that increasing water conservation efforts may be cheaper than building new large-scale supply options and can delay the timing of investment in new supply infrastructure.

The Auditor-General recommends the department develop a clear policy and regulatory position on water conservation options, improve governance and funding for water conservation, and work with Sydney Water to assess the viability of water conservation initiatives. The report also recommends improvements to Sydney Water’s planning for and reporting on water conservation, including the transparency of this information.

This report is part of a multi-volume series on the theme of water. Refer to ‘Support for regional town water infrastructure’ and ‘Water management and regulation – undertaking in 2020-21’.

Read full report (PDF)

The current, 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan states that water conservation, including recycling water, makes the drinking water supply go further. The plan also states that increasing water conservation efforts may be cheaper than building new large-scale supply options and can delay the timing of investment in new supply infrastructure.

Water conservation refers to water recycling, leakage management and programs to enhance water efficiency. Water recycling refers to both harvesting stormwater for beneficial use and reusing wastewater.

This audit examined whether water conservation initiatives for the Greater Sydney Metropolitan area are effectively investigated, implemented and supported. We audited the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the Department) and the Sydney Water Corporation (Sydney Water), with a focus on activities since 2016.

The Department is responsible for the integrated and sustainable management of the state’s water resources under the Water Management Act 2000, which includes encouraging ‘best practice in the management and use of water’ as an objective. The Department is also responsible for strategic water policy and planning for Greater Sydney, including implementing the Metropolitan Water Plan.

Sydney Water is a state-owned corporation and the supplier of water, wastewater, recycled water and some stormwater services to more than five million people in Greater Sydney. It is regulated by an operating licence that is issued by the Governor on the recommendation of the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART). The Tribunal determines Sydney Water’s maximum prices, reviews its operating licence and monitors compliance. Sydney Water's operating licence and reporting manual set out requirements for its planning, implementing and reporting of water conservation.

From 2007 to 2012, the Climate Change Fund was a source of funds for water conservation activities to be undertaken by the Department and Sydney Water. The Climate Change Fund was established under the Energy and Utilities Administration Act 1987. Four of its six objectives relate to water savings. Water distributors such as Sydney Water can be issued with orders to contribute funds for water-related programs. The Fund is administered by the Department.

In 2016, Sydney Water developed a method for determining whether and how much to invest in water conservation. Known as the ‘Economic Level of Water Conservation’ (ELWC), the method identifies whether it costs less to implement a water conservation initiative than the value of the water saved, in which case the initiative should be implemented.

Conclusion

The Department and Sydney Water have not effectively investigated, implemented or supported water conservation initiatives in Greater Sydney.

The agencies have not met key requirements of the Metropolitan Water Plan and Sydney Water has not met all its operating licence requirements for water conservation. There has been little policy or regulatory reform, little focus on identifying new options and investments, and limited planning and implementation of water conservation initiatives.

As a result, Greater Sydney's water supply may be less resilient to population growth and climate variability, including drought.

The Department has not undertaken an annual assessment of Sydney Water’s level of investment in water conservation against water security risks and the capacity to respond when drought conditions return, as required by the Metropolitan Water Plan. It did not complete identified research and planning activities to support the plan, such as developing and using a framework for assessing the potential for water conservation initiatives for Greater Sydney, and developing a long-term strategy for water conservation and water recycling. It also did not finalise a monitoring, evaluation, reporting and improvement strategy to support the plan.

Sydney Water has been ineffective in driving water conservation initiatives, delivering detailed planning and resourcing for ongoing initiatives, and in increasing its investment in water conservation during drought. These were requirements of the Metropolitan Water Plan. Sydney Water's reporting on water conservation has not met all its operating licence requirements and lacked transparency with limited information on key aspects such as planning for leakage management, how the viability of potential initiatives were assessed, and how adopted initiatives are tracking.

The Department and Sydney Water did not put in place sufficient governance arrangements, including clarifying and agreeing responsibilities for key water conservation planning, delivery and reporting activities. There has also been limited collaboration, capacity building and community engagement to support water conservation, particularly outside times of drought.

Appendix one – Responses from agencies

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Glossary

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #336 - released 23 June 2020

Published

Actions for Local Schools, Local Decisions: needs-based equity funding

Local Schools, Local Decisions: needs-based equity funding

Education
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Service delivery

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining the Department of Education’s (the department’s) support and oversight of school planning and use of needs-based funding under the Local Schools, Local Decisions reform.

The report found the department has not had adequate oversight of how schools are using needs-based funding to improve student outcomes since it was introduced in 2014.

The department had not set measures or targets for needs-based equity funding. It had also not been clear enough in how it expected schools to report on the outcomes of additional funding. This means it has not been able to effectively demonstrate the impact of funding at a school, or state-wide level.

To assist with the transition to greater local decision-making, the department provided schools with guidance materials, additional resources and systems support. However, guidance material was not clear enough on the purpose of funding, school budgeting systems were not fit-for-purpose when initially introduced, and support for schools was spread across different areas of the department.

The department has recently increased executive oversight of progress to improve educational outcomes for Aboriginal students and students from a low socio-economic background. It has also developed a consistent set of school-level targets to be implemented from 2020. This may help the department more reliably monitor progress in lifting outcomes for students with additional learning needs.

The report makes eight recommendations aimed at clarifying requirements of schools, better coordinating support and strengthening oversight of the use of needs-based equity funding.

Read full report (PDF)

The Local Schools, Local Decisions reform was launched in 2012 to give public schools more authority to make local decisions about how best to meet the needs of their students. A major element of the reform was the introduction of a new needs-based school funding model. Core elements of the model address staffing and operational requirements, while needs-based elements reflect the characteristics of schools and students within them. This includes equity funding designed to support students with additional needs. The four categories of equity funding are:

  • socio-economic background
  • Aboriginal background
  • English language proficiency
  • low-level adjustment for disability. 

Around $900 million in equity funding was allocated in 2019. School principals decide how to use these funds and account for them through their school annual reports. The Department of Education (the department) supports schools in making these choices with tools and systems, guidelines, and good practice examples.

The objective of this audit was to assess the department's support and oversight of school planning and use of needs-based funding under the Local Schools, Local Decisions reform. To address this objective, the audit examined whether:

  • effective accountability arrangements have been established
  • effective support is provided to schools.  

Conclusion

The department has not had adequate oversight of how schools are using needs-based equity funding to improve student outcomes since it was introduced in 2014. While it provides guidance and resources, it has not set measures or targets to describe the outcomes expected of this funding, or explicit requirements for schools to report outcomes from how these funds were used. Consequently, there is no effective mechanism to capture the impact of funding at a school, or state-wide level. The department has recently developed a consistent set of school-level targets to be implemented from 2020. This may help it to better hold schools accountable for progress towards its strategic goal of reducing the impact of disadvantage.

A significant amount of extra funding has been provided to schools over recent years in recognition of the additional learning needs of certain groups of students facing disadvantage. Under the Local Schools, Local Decisions reform, schools were given the ability to make decisions about how best to use the equity funding in combination with their overall school resources to meet their students’ needs. However, multiple guidelines provided to schools contain inconsistent advice on how the community should be consulted, how funding could be used, and how impact should be reported. Because of this, it is not clear how schools have used equity funding for the benefit of identified groups. School annual reports we reviewed did not fully account for the equity funding received, nor adequately describe the impact of funding on student outcomes.

To help in the transition to greater local decision-making, the department provided extra support by; establishing peer support for new principals, increasing the number of directors, developing data analysis and financial planning systems, targeted training and showcasing good practice. Multiple roles and areas of the department provide advice to schools in similar areas and this support could be better co-ordinated.

Financial planning systems designed to help schools budget for equity and other funding sources were not fit-for-purpose when originally introduced. Schools reported a lack of trust in their budget figures and so were not fully spending their allocated funding. Since then, the department developed and improved a budgeting tool in consultation with stakeholder and user groups. It provided extra funding for administrative support and one-to-one training to help schools develop their capabilities. Despite this, schools we spoke to reported they were not yet fully confident in using the system and needed ongoing training and support. 

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #331 - released 8 April 2020.

Published

Actions for Integrity of data in the Births, Deaths and Marriages Register

Integrity of data in the Births, Deaths and Marriages Register

Justice
Premier and Cabinet
Whole of Government
Cyber security
Fraud
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration

This report outlines whether the Department of Customer Service (the department) has effective controls in place to ensure the integrity of data in the Births, Deaths and Marriages Register (the register), and to prevent unauthorised access and misuse.

The audit found that the department has processes in place to ensure that the information entered in the register is accurate and that any changes to it are validated. Although there are controls in place to prevent and detect unauthorised access to, and activity in the register, there were significant gaps in these controls. Addressing these gaps is necessary to ensure the integrity of information in the register.

The Auditor-General made nine recommendations to the department, aimed at strengthening controls to prevent and detect unauthorised access to, and activity in the register. These included increased monitoring of individuals who have access to the register and strengthening security controls around the databases that contain the information in the register.

The NSW Registry of Births Deaths and Marriages is responsible for maintaining registers of births, deaths and marriages in New South Wales as well as registering adoptions, changes of names, changes of sex and relationships. Maintaining the integrity of this information is important as it is used to confirm people’s identity and unauthorised access to it can lead to fraud or identity theft.

Read full report (PDF)

The NSW Registry of Births Deaths and Marriages (BD&M) is responsible for maintaining registers of births, deaths and marriages in New South Wales. BD&M is also responsible for registering adoptions, changes of name, changes of sex and relationships. These records are collectively referred to as 'the Register'. The Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (the BD&M Act) makes the Registrar (the head of BD&M) responsible for maintaining the integrity of the Register and preventing fraud associated with the Register. Maintaining the integrity of the information held in the Register is important as it is used to confirm people's identity. Unauthorised access to, or misuse of the information in the Register can lead to fraud or identity theft. For these reasons it is important that there are sufficient controls in place to protect the information.

BD&M staff access, add to and amend the Register through the LifeLink application. While BD&M is part of the Department of Customer Service, the Department of Communities and Justice (DCJ) manages the databases that contain the Register and sit behind LifeLink and is responsible for the security of these databases.

This audit assessed whether BD&M has effective controls in place to ensure the integrity of data in the Births, Deaths and Marriages Register, and to prevent unauthorised access and misuse. It addressed the following:

  • Are relevant process and IT controls in place and effective to ensure the integrity of data in the Register and the authenticity of records and documents?
  • Are security controls in place and effective to prevent unauthorised access to, and modification of, data in the Register?

Conclusion

BD&M has processes and controls in place to ensure that the information entered in the Register is accurate and that amendments to the Register are validated. BD&M also has controls in place to prevent and detect unauthorised access to, and activity in the Register. However, there are significant gaps in these controls. Addressing these gaps is necessary to ensure the integrity of the information in the Register.

BD&M has detailed procedures for all registrations and amendments to the Register, which include processes for entering, assessing and checking the validity and adequacy of source documents. Where BD&M staff have directly input all the data and for amendments to the Register, a second person is required to check all information that has been input before an event can be registered or an amendment can be made. BD&M carries out regular internal audits of all registration processes to check whether procedures are being followed and to address non-compliance where required.

BD&M authorises access to the Register and carries out regular access reviews to ensure that users are current and have the appropriate level of access. There are audit trails of all user activity, but BD&M does not routinely monitor these. At the time of the audit, BD&M also did not monitor activity by privileged users who could make unauthorised changes to the Register. Not monitoring this activity created a risk that unauthorised activity in the Register would not be detected.

BD&M has no direct oversight of the database environment which houses the Register and relies on DCJ's management of a third-party vendor to provide the assurance it needs over database security. The vendor operates an Information Security Management System that complies with international standards, but neither BD&M nor DCJ has undertaken independent assurance of the effectiveness of the vendor's IT controls.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #330 - released 7 April 2020.

Published

Actions for Unsolicited proposal process for the lease of Ausgrid

Unsolicited proposal process for the lease of Ausgrid

Premier and Cabinet
Asset valuation
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration

In October 2016, the NSW Government accepted an unsolicited proposal from IFM Investors and AustralianSuper to lease 50.4 per cent of Ausgrid for 99 years. The deal followed the Federal Government’s rejection of two bids from foreign investors, for national security reasons.

A performance audit of the lease of Ausgrid has found shortcomings in the unsolicited proposal process. Releasing the audit findings today, the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford said ‘this transaction involved a $20 billion asset owned by the people of New South Wales. As such, it warranted strict adherence to established guidelines’.

Ausgrid is a distributor of electricity to eastern parts of Sydney, the Central Coast, Newcastle and the Hunter Region.

In June 2014, the then government announced its commitment to lease components of the state's electricity network as part of the Rebuilding NSW plan. Implementation of the policy began after the government was re-elected in 2015. Between November 2015 and August 2016, the NSW Government held a competitive tender process to lease 50.4 per cent of Ausgrid for 99 years. The NSW Government abandoned the process on 19 August 2016 after the Australian Treasurer rejected two bids from foreign investors, for national security reasons. That day, the Premier and Treasurer released a media statement clarifying the government's objective to complete the transaction via a competitive process in time to include the proceeds in the 2017–18 budget.

On 31 August 2016, the state received an unsolicited proposal from IFM Investors and AustralianSuper to acquire an interest in Ausgrid under the same terms proposed by the state during the tender process. In October 2016, the government accepted the unsolicited proposal. 

This audit examined whether the unsolicited proposal process for the partial long-term lease of Ausgrid was effectively conducted and in compliance with the government’s 2014 Unsolicited Proposals: Guide for Submission and Assessment (Unsolicited Proposals Guide or the Guide). 

The audit focused on how the government-appointed Assessment Panel and Proposal Specific Steering Committee assessed key requirements in the Guide that unsolicited proposals must be demonstrably unique and represent value for money. 

Conclusion

The evidence available does not conclusively demonstrate the unsolicited proposal was unique, and there were some shortcomings in the negotiation process, documentation and segregation of duties. That said, before the final commitment to proceed with the lease, the state obtained assurance that the proposal delivered value for money. 

It is particularly important to demonstrate unsolicited proposals are unique, in order to justify the departure from other transaction processes that offer greater competition, transparency and certainty about value for money.

The Assessment Panel and the Proposal Specific Steering Committee determined the Ausgrid unsolicited proposal was unique, primarily on the basis that the proponent did not require foreign investment approval from the Australian Treasurer, and the lease transaction could be concluded earlier than through a second tender process. However, the evidence that persuaded the Panel and Committee did not demonstrate that no other proponent could conclude the transaction in time to meet the government’s deadline. 

It is not appropriate to determine an unsolicited proposal is unique because it delivers an earlier outcome than possible through a tender process. The Panel and Committee did not contend, and it is not evident, that the unsolicited proposal was the only way to meet the government’s transaction deadline.

The evidence does not demonstrate that the proponent was the only party that would not have needed foreign investment approval to participate in the transaction. It also does not demonstrate that the requirement for foreign investment approval would have reduced the pool of foreign buyers to the degree that it would be reasonable to assume none would emerge. 

The Panel, Committee and financial advisers determined that the final price represented value for money, and that retendering offered a material risk of a worse financial outcome. However, an acceptable price was revealed early in the negotiation process, and doing so made it highly unlikely that the proponent would offer a higher price than that disclosed. The Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) and NSW Treasury were not able to provide a documented reserve price, bargaining strategy or similar which put the negotiations in context. It is not evident that the Panel or Committee authorised, justified or endorsed negotiations in advance. 

Key aspects of governance recommended by the Guide were in place. Some shortcomings relating to role segregation, record keeping and probity assurance weakened the effectiveness of the unsolicited proposal process adopted for Ausgrid.

The reasons for accepting that the proposal and proponent were unique are not compelling.

The Unsolicited Proposals Guide says the 'unique benefits of the proposal and the unique ability of the proponent to deliver the proposal' must be demonstrated. 

The conclusion reached by the Panel and Committee that the proposal offered a ‘unique ability to deliver (a) strategic outcome’ was primarily based on the proponent not requiring foreign investment approval from the Australian Treasurer, and allowing the government to complete the lease transaction earlier than by going through a second tender process. 

It is not appropriate to determine an unsolicited proposal is unique because it delivers an earlier outcome than possible through a tender process. The Panel and Committee did not contend, and it is not evident, that the unsolicited proposal was the only way to meet the government’s transaction deadline.

The evidence does not demonstrate that the proponent was the only party that would not have needed foreign investment approval to participate in the transaction. Nor does it demonstrate that the requirement for foreign investment approval would have reduced the pool of foreign buyers to the degree that it would be reasonable to assume none would emerge. 

That said, the Australian Treasurer’s decision to reject the two bids from the previous tender process created uncertainty about the conditions under which he would approve international bids. The financial advisers engaged for the Ausgrid transaction informed the Panel and Committee that:

  • it was not likely another viable proponent would emerge soon enough to meet the government’s transaction deadline
  • the market would be unlikely to deliver a better result than offered by the proponent
  • going to tender presented a material risk of a worse financial result. 

The Unsolicited Proposals Guide says that a proposal to directly purchase or acquire a government-owned entity or property will generally not be unique. The Ausgrid unsolicited proposal fell into this category. 

Recommendations:
DPC should ensure future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government business or asset:

  • recognise that when considering uniqueness they should: 
    • require very strong evidence to decide that both the proponent and proposal are the only ones of their kind that could meet the government’s objectives 
    • give thorough consideration to any reasonable counter-arguments against uniqueness.
  • rigorously consider all elements of the Unsolicited Proposals Guide when determining whether a proposal should be dealt with as an unsolicited proposal, and document these deliberations and all relevant evidence
  • do not use speed of transaction compared to a market process as justification for uniqueness.
The process to obtain assurance that the final price represented value for money was adequate. However, the negotiation approach reduced assurance that the bid price was maximised. 

The Panel and Committee concluded the price represented value for money, based on peer-reviewed advice from their financial advisers and knowledge acquired from previous tenders. The financial advisers also told the Panel and Committee that there was a material risk the state would receive a lower price than offered by the unsolicited proposal if it immediately proceeded with a second market transaction. 

The state commenced negotiations on price earlier than the Guide says they should have. Early disclosure of a price that the state would accept reduced the likelihood of achieving a price greater than this. DPC says the intent of this meeting was to quickly establish whether the proponents could meet the state’s benchmark rather than spending more time and resources on a proposal which had no prospect of proceeding.

DPC and NSW Treasury were not able to provide a documented reserve price, negotiation strategy or similar which put the negotiations and price achieved in context. It was not evident that the Panel or Committee authorised, justified or endorsed negotiations in advance. However, the Panel and Committee endorsed the outcomes of the negotiations. 

The negotiations were informed by the range of prices achieved for similar assets and the specific bids for Ausgrid from the earlier market process.

Recommendations:
DPC should ensure any future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government business or asset:

  • document a minimum acceptable price, and a negotiating strategy designed to maximise price, before commencing negotiations
  • do not communicate an acceptable price to the proponent, before the negotiation stage of the process, and then only as part of a documented bargaining strategy.
Key aspects of governance recommended by the Guide were in place, but there were some shortcomings around role segregation, record keeping and probity assurance.

The state established a governance structure in accordance with the Unsolicited Proposals Guide, including an Assessment Panel and Proposal Specific Steering Committee. The members of the Panel and Steering Committee were senior and experienced officers, as befitted the size and nature of the unsolicited proposal. 

The separation of negotiation, assessment and review envisaged by the Guide was not maintained fully. The Chair of the Assessment Panel and a member of the Steering Committee were involved in negotiations with the proponent. 

DPC could not provide comprehensive records of some key interactions with the proponent or a documented negotiation strategy. The absence of such records means the Department cannot demonstrate engagement and negotiation processes were authorised and rigorous. 

The probity adviser reported there were no material probity issues with the transaction. The probity adviser also provided audit services. This is not good practice. The same party should not provide both advisory and audit services on the same transaction.

Recommendations:
DPC should ensure any future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government entity or asset:
•    maintain separation between negotiation, assessment and review in line with the Unsolicited Proposals Guide
•    keep an auditable trail of documentation relating to the negotiation process
•    maintain separation between any probity audit services engaged and the probity advisory and reporting services recommended in the current Guide.

Published

Actions for Progress and measurement of the Premier's Priorities

Progress and measurement of the Premier's Priorities

Premier and Cabinet
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Project management
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

The Premier’s Implementation Unit uses a systematic approach to measuring and reporting progress towards the Premier’s Priorities performance targets, but public reporting needed to improve, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General of NSW, Margaret Crawford.

The Premier of New South Wales has established 12 Premier’s Priorities. These are key performance targets for government.

The 12 Premier's Priorities
  • 150,000 new jobs by 2019

  • Reduce the volume of litter by 40 per cent by 2020

  • 10 key projects in metro and regional areas to be delivered on time and on budget, and nearly 90 local infrastructure projects to be delivered on time

  • Increase the proportion of NSW students in the top two NAPLAN bands by eight per cent by 2019

  • Increase the proportion of women in senior leadership roles in the NSW Government sector from 33 to 50 per cent by 2025 and double the number of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in senior leadership roles in the NSW Government sector, from 57 to 114

  • Increase the proportion of young people who successfully move from Specialist Homelessness Services to long-term accommodation to more than 34 per cent by 2019

  • 61,000 housing completions on average per year to 2021

  • Reduce the proportion of domestic violence perpetrators reoffending by 25 per cent by 2021

  • Improve customer satisfaction with key government services every year, this term of government to 2019

  • Decrease the percentage of children and young people re-reported at risk of significant harm by 15 per cent by 2020

  • 81 per cent of patients through emergency departments within four hours by 2019

  • Reduce overweight and obesity rates of children by five percentage points by 2025


Source: Department of Premier and Cabinet, Premier’s Priorities website.

Each Premier’s Priority has a lead agency and minister responsible for achieving the performance target.

The Premier’s Implementation Unit (PIU) was established within the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) in 2015. The PIU is a delivery unit that supports agencies to measure and monitor performance, make progress toward the Premier’s Priorities targets, and report progress to the Premier, key ministers and the public.

This audit assessed how effectively the NSW Government is progressing and reporting on the Premier's Priorities.

 


The Premier’s Implementation Unit (PIU) is effective in assisting agencies to make progress against the Premier’s Priorities targets. Progress reporting is regular but transparency to the public is weakened by the lack of information about specific measurement limitations and lack of clarity about the relationship of the targets to broader government objectives.The PIU promotes a systematic approach to measuring performance and reporting progress towards the Premier’s Priorities’ performance targets. Public reporting would be improved with additional information about the rationale for choosing specific targets to report on broader government objectives.

The PIU provides a systematic approach to measuring performance and reporting progress towards the Premier's Priorities performance targets. Public reporting would be improved with additional information about the rationale for choosing specific targets to report on broader government objectives. The data used to measure the Premier’s Priorities comes from a variety of government and external datasets, some of which have known limitations. These limitations are not revealed in public reporting, and only some are revealed in progress reported to the Premier and ministers. This limits the transparency of reporting.

The PIU assists agencies to avoid unintended outcomes that can arise from prioritising particular performance measures over other areas of activity. The PIU has adopted a collaborative approach to assisting agencies to analyse performance using data, and helping them work across organisational silos to achieve the Premier’s Priorities targets.


 


Data used to measure progress for some of the Premier’s Priorities has limitations which are not made clear when progress is reported. This reduces transparency about the reported progress. Public reporting would also be improved with additional information about the relationship between specific performance measures and broader government objectives.

The PIU is responsible for reporting progress to the Premier, key ministers and the public. Agencies provide performance data and some play a role in preparing progress reports for the Premier and ministers. For 11 of the Premier's Priorities, progress is reported against measurable and time-related performance targets. For the infrastructure priority, progress is reported against project milestones.

Progress of some Priorities is measured using data that has known limitations, which should be noted wherever progress is reported. For example, the data used to report on housing completions does not take housing demolitions into account, and is therefore overstating the contribution of this performance measure to housing supply. This known limitation is not explained in progress reports or on the public website.

Data used to measure progress is sourced from a mix of government and external datasets. Updated progress data for most Premier’s Priorities is published on the Premier’s Priorities website annually, although reported to the Premier and key ministers more frequently. The PIU reviews the data and validates it through fieldwork with front line agencies. The PIU also assists agencies to avoid unintended outcomes that can arise from prioritising single performance measures. Most, but not all, agencies use additional indicators to check for misuse of data or perverse outcomes.

We examined the reporting processes and controls for five of the Premier’s Priorities. We found that there is insufficient assurance over the accuracy of the data on housing approvals.

The relationships between performance measures and broader government objectives is not always clearly explained on the Premier’s Priority website, which is the key source of public information about the Premier’s Priorities. For example, the Premier’s Priority to reduce litter volumes is communicated as “Keeping our Environment Clean.” While the website explains why reducing litter is important, it does not clearly explain why that particular target has been chosen to measure progress in keeping the environment clean.

By December 2018, the Department of Premier and Cabinet should:

  1. improve transparency of public reporting by:
    • providing information about limitations of reported data and associated performance
    • clarifying the relationship between the Premier’s Priorities performance targets and broader government objectives.
  2. ensure that processes to check and verify data are in place for all agency data sources
  3. encourage agencies to develop and implement additional supporting indicators for all Premier’s Priority performance measures to prevent and detect unintended consequences or misuse of data.

 


The Premier's Implementation Unit is effective in supporting agencies to deliver progress towards the Premier’s Priority targets.

The PIU promotes a systematic approach to monitoring and reporting progress against a target, based on a methodology used in delivery units elsewhere in the world. The PIU undertakes internal self-evaluation, and commissions regular reviews of methodology implementation from the consultancy that owns the methodology and helped to establish the PIU. However, the unit lacks periodic independent reviews of their overall effectiveness. The PIU has adopted a collaborative approach and assists agencies to analyse performance using data, and work across organisational silos to achieve the Premier’s Priorities targets.

Agency representatives recognise the benefits of being responsible for a Premier's Priority and speak of the value of being held to account and having the attention of the Premier and senior ministers.

By June 2019, the Department of Premier and Cabinet should:

  1. establish routine collection of feedback about PIU performance including:
    • independent assurance of PIU performance
    • opportunity for agencies to provide confidential feedback.

 

 

Published

Actions for Regulation of water pollution in drinking water catchments and illegal disposal of solid waste

Regulation of water pollution in drinking water catchments and illegal disposal of solid waste

Environment
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Regulation
Risk

There are important gaps in how the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) implements its regulatory framework for water pollution in drinking water catchments and illegal solid waste disposal. This limits the effectiveness of its regulatory responses, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford.

The NSW Environment Protection Authority (the EPA) is the State’s primary environmental regulator. The EPA regulates waste and water pollution under the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (the Act) through its licensing, monitoring, regulation and enforcement activities. The community should be able to rely on the effectiveness of this regulation to protect the environment and human health. The EPA has regulatory responsibility for more significant and specific activities which can potentially harm the environment.

Activities regulated by the EPA include manufacturing, chemical production, electricity generation, mining, waste management, livestock processing, mineral processing, sewerage treatment, and road construction. For these activities, the operator must have an EPA issued environment protection licence (licence). Licences have conditions attached which may limit the amount and concentrations of substances the activity may produce and discharge into the environment. Conditions also require the licensee to report on its licensed activities.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the EPA’s regulatory response to water pollution in drinking water catchments and illegal solid waste disposal. The findings and recommendations of this review can be reasonably applied to the EPA’s other regulatory functions, as the areas we examined were indicative of how the EPA regulates all pollution types and incidents.

 
Conclusion
There are important gaps in how the EPA implements its regulatory framework for water pollution in drinking water catchments and illegal solid waste disposal which limit the effectiveness of its regulatory response. The EPA uses a risk-based regulatory framework that has elements consistent with the NSW Government Guidance for regulators to implement outcomes and risk-based regulation. However, the EPA did not demonstrate that it has established reliable practices to accurately and consistently detect the risk of non compliances by licensees, and apply consistent regulatory actions. This may expose the risk of harm to the environment and human health.
The EPA also could not demonstrate that it has effective governance and oversight of its regulatory operations. The EPA operates in a complex regulatory environment where its regional offices have broad discretions for how they operate. The EPA has not balanced this devolved structure with an effective governance approach that includes appropriate internal controls to monitor the consistency or quality of its regulatory activities. It also does not have an effective performance framework that sets relevant performance expectations and outcome-based key performance indicators (KPIs) for its regional offices. 
These deficiencies mean that the EPA cannot be confident that it conducts compliance and enforcement activities consistently across the State and that licensees are complying with their licence conditions or the Act.
The EPA's reporting on environmental and regulatory outcomes is limited and most of the data it uses is self reported by industry. It has not set outcome-based key result areas to assess performance and trends over time. 
The EPA uses a risk-based regulatory framework for water pollution and illegal solid waste disposal but there are important gaps in implementation that reduce its effectiveness.
Elements of the EPA’s risk-based regulatory framework for water pollution and illegal solid waste disposal are consistent with the NSW Government Guidance for regulators to implement outcomes and risk-based regulation. There are important gaps in how the EPA implements its risk-based approach that limit the effectiveness of its regulatory response. The EPA could not demonstrate that it effectively regulates licensees because it has not established reliable practices that accurately and consistently detect licence non compliances or breaches of the Act and enforce regulatory actions.
The EPA lacks effective governance arrangements to support its devolved regional structure. The EPA's performance framework has limited and inconclusive reporting on regional performance to the EPA’s Chief Executive Officer or to the EPA Board. The EPA cannot assure that it is conducting its regulatory responsibilities effectively and efficiently. 
The EPA does not consistently evaluate its regulatory approach to ensure it is effective and efficient. For example, there are no set requirements for how EPA officers conduct mandatory site inspections, which means that there is a risk that officers are not detecting all breaches or non-compliances. The inconsistent approach also means that the EPA cannot rely on the data it collects from these site inspections to understand whether its regulatory response is effective and efficient. In addition, where the EPA identifies instances of non compliance or breaches, it does not apply all available regulatory actions to encourage compliance.
The EPA also does not have a systematic approach to validate self-reported information in licensees’ annual returns, despite the data being used to assess administrative fees payable to the EPA and its regulatory response to non-compliances. 
The EPA does not use performance frameworks to monitor the consistency or quality of work conducted across the State. The EPA has also failed to provide effective guidance for its staff. Many of its policies and procedures are out-dated, inconsistent, hard to access, or not mandated.
Recommendations
By 31 December 2018, to improve governance and oversight, the EPA should:
1. implement a more effective performance framework with regular reports to the Chief Executive Officer and to the EPA Board on outcomes-based key result areas that assess its environmental and regulatory performance and trends over time
By 30 June 2019, to improve consistency in its practices, the EPA should:
2. progressively update and make accessible its policies and procedures for regulatory operations, and mandate procedures where necessary to ensure consistent application
3. implement internal controls to monitor the consistency and quality of its regulatory operations. 
The EPA does not apply a consistent approach to setting licence conditions for discharges to water.
The requirements for setting licence conditions for water pollution are complex and require technical and scientific expertise. In August 2016, the EPA approved guidance developed by its technical experts in the Water Technical Advisory Unit to assist its regional staff. However, the EPA did not mandate the use of the guidance until mid-April 2018. Up until then, the EPA had left discretion to regional offices to decide what guidance their staff use. This meant that practices have differed across the organisation. The EPA is yet to conduct training for staff to ensure they consistently apply the 2016 guidance.
The EPA has not implemented any appropriate internal controls or quality assurance process to monitor the consistency or quality of licence conditions set by its officers across the State. This is not consistent with good regulatory practice.
The triennial 2016 audit of the Sydney drinking water catchment report highlighted that Lake Burragorang has experienced worsening water quality over the past 20 years from increased salinity levels. The salinity levels were nearly twice as high as in other storages in the Sydney drinking water catchment. The report recommended that the source and implication of the increased salinity levels be investigated. The report did not propose which public authority should carry out such an investigation. 
To date, no NSW Government agency has addressed the report's recommendation. There are three public authorities, the EPA, DPE and WaterNSW that are responsible for regulating activities that impact on water quality in the Sydney drinking water catchment, which includes Lake Burragorang. 
Recommendation
By 30 June 2019, to address worsening water quality in Lake Burragorang, the EPA should:
4. (a) review the impact of its licensed activities on water quality in Lake Burragorang, and
  (b) develop strategies relating to its licensed activities (in consultation with other relevant NSW Government agencies) to improve and maintain the lake's water quality.
The EPA’s risk-based approach to monitoring compliance of licensees has limited effectiveness. 
The EPA tailors its compliance monitoring approach based on the performance of licensees. This means that licensees that perform better have a lower administrative fee and fewer mandatory site inspections. 
However, this approach relies on information that is not complete or accurate. Sources of information include licensees’ annual returns, EPA site inspections and compliance audits, and pollution reports from the public. 
Licensees report annually to the EPA on their performance, including compliance against their licence conditions. The Act contains significant financial penalties if licensees provide false and misleading information in their annual returns. However, the EPA does not systematically or consistently validate information self-reported by licensees, or consistently apply regulatory actions if it discovers non-compliance. 
Self-reported compliance data is used in part to assess a licensed premises’ overall environmental risk level, which underpins the calculation of the administrative fee, the EPA’s site inspection frequency, and the licensee’s exposure to regulatory actions. It is also used to assess the load-based licence fee that the licensee pays.
The EPA has set minimum mandatory site inspection frequencies for licensed premises based on its assessed overall risk level. This is a key tool to detect non-compliance or breaches of the Act. However, the EPA has not issued a policy or procedures that define what these mandatory inspections should cover and how they are to be conducted. We found variations in how the EPA officers in the offices we visited conducted these inspections. The inconsistent approach means that the EPA does not have complete and accurate information of licensees’ compliance. The inconsistent approach also means that the EPA is not effectively identifying all non-compliances for it to consider applying appropriate regulatory actions.
The EPA also receives reports of pollution incidents from the public that may indicate non-compliance. However, the EPA has not set expected time frames within which it expects its officers to investigate pollution incidents. The EPA regional offices decide what to investigate and timeframes. The EPA does not measure regional performance regarding timeframes. 
The few compliance audits the EPA conducts annually are effective in identifying licence non-compliances and breaches of the Act. However, the EPA does not have a policy or required procedures for its regulatory officers to consistently apply appropriate regulatory actions in response to compliance audit findings. 
The EPA has not implemented any effective internal controls or quality assurance process to check the consistency or quality of how its regulatory officers monitor compliance across the State. This is not consistent with good regulatory practice.
Recommendations
To improve compliance monitoring, the EPA should implement procedures to:
5. by 30 June 2019, validate self-reported information, eliminate hardcopy submissions and require licensees to report on their breaches of the Act and associated regulations in their annual returns
6. by 31 December 2018, conduct mandatory site inspections under the risk-based licensing scheme to assess compliance with all regulatory requirements and licence conditions.
 
The EPA cannot assure that its regulatory enforcement approach is fully effective.
The EPA’s compliance policy and prosecution guidelines have a large number of available regulatory actions and factors which should be taken into account when selecting an appropriate regulatory response. The extensive legislation determining the EPA’s regulatory activities, and the devolved regional structure the EPA has adopted in delivering its compliance and regulatory functions, increases the risk of inconsistent compliance decisions and regulatory responses. A good regulatory framework needs a consistent approach to enforcement to incentivise compliance. 
The EPA has not balanced this devolved regional structure with appropriate governance arrangements to give it assurance that its regulatory officers apply a consistent approach to enforcement.
The EPA has not issued standard procedures to ensure consistent non-court enforcement action for breaches of the Act or non-compliance with licence conditions. Given our finding that the EPA does not effectively detect breaches and non-compliances, there is a risk that it is not applying appropriate regulatory actions for many breaches and non-compliances.
A recent EPA compliance audit identified significant non-compliances with incident management plan requirements. However, the EPA has not applied regulatory actions for making false statements on annual returns for those licensees that certified their plans complied with such requirements. The EPA also has not applied available regulatory actions for the non-compliances which led to the false or misleading statements.
Recommendation
By 31 December 2018 to improve enforcement, the EPA should:
7. Implement procedures to systematically assess non-compliances with licence conditions and breaches of the Act and to implement appropriate and consistent regulatory actions.
The EPA has implemented the actions listed in the NSW Illegal Dumping Strategy 2014–16. To date, the EPA has also implemented four of the six recommendations made by the ICAC on EPA's oversight of Regional Illegal Dumping Squads.
The EPA did not achieve the NSW Illegal Dumping Strategy 2014–16 target of a 30 per cent reduction in instances of large scale illegal dumping in Sydney, the Illawarra, Hunter and Central Coast from 2011 levels. 
In the reporting period, the incidences of large scale illegal dumping more than doubled. The EPA advised that this increase may be the result of greater public awareness and reporting rather than increased illegal dumping activity. 
By June 2018, the EPA is due to implement one outstanding recommendation made by the ICAC but has not set a time for the other outstanding recommendation.  

Published

Actions for Grants to non-government schools

Grants to non-government schools

Education
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration

The NSW Department of Education could strengthen its management of the $1.2 billion provided to non-government schools annually. This would provide greater accountability for the use of public funds, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford.

Non‑government schools educate 418,000 school children each year, representing 35 per cent of all students in NSW. The NSW Department of Education administers several grant schemes to support these schools, with the aim of improving student learning outcomes and supporting parent choice. To be eligible for NSW Government funding, non‑government schools must be registered with the NSW Education Standards Authority (NESA) and not operate 'for profit' as per section 83C of the NSW Education Act 1990 (the Act). Non‑government schools can either be registered as independent or part of a System Authority.

In 2017–18, non‑government schools in NSW will receive over $1.2 billion from the NSW Government, as well as $3.4 billion from the Australian Government. Recently, the Australian Government has changed the way it funds schools. The NSW Government is assessing how these changes will impact State funding for non‑government schools.

This audit assessed how effectively and efficiently NSW Government grants to non‑government schools are allocated and managed. This audit did not assess the use of NSW Government grants by individual non‑government schools or System Authorities because the Auditor‑General of New South Wales does not have the mandate to assess how government funds are spent by non‑government entities.

Conclusion

The Department of Education effectively and efficiently allocates grants to non‑government schools. Clarifying the objectives of grants, monitoring progress towards these objectives, and improving oversight, would strengthen accountability for the use of public funds by non‑government schools.

We tested a sample of grants provided to non‑government schools under all major schemes, and found that the Department of Education consistently allocates and distributes grants in line with its methodology. The Department has clear processes and procedures to efficiently collect data from schools, calculate the level of funding each school or System should receive, obtain appropriate approvals, and make payments.

We identified three areas where the Department could strengthen its management of grants to provide greater accountability for the use of public funds. First, the Department’s objectives for providing grants to non‑government schools are covered by legislation, intergovernmental agreements and grant guidelines. The Department could consolidate these objectives to allow for more consistent monitoring. Second, the Department relies on schools or System Authorities to engage a registered auditor to certify the accuracy of information on their enrolments and usage of grants. Greater scrutiny of the registration and independence of the auditors would increase confidence in the accuracy of this information. Third, the Department does not monitor how System Authorities reallocate grant funding to their member schools. Further oversight in this area would increase accountability for the use of public funds.

The Department effectively and efficiently allocates grants to non‑government schools. Strengthening its processes would provide greater assurance that the information it collects is accurate.

The Department provides clear guidelines to assist schools to provide the necessary census information to calculate per capita grants. Schools must get an independent external auditor, registered with ASIC, to certify their enrolment figures. The Department checks a sample of the auditors to ensure that they are registered with ASIC. Some other jurisdictions perform additional procedures to increase confidence in the accuracy of the census (for example, independently checking a sample of schools’ census data).

The Department accurately calculates and distributes per capita grants in accordance with its methodology. The previous methodology, used prior to 2018, was not updated frequently enough to reflect changes in schools' circumstances. Over 2014 to 2017, the Department provided additional grants to non‑government schools under the National Education Reform Agreement (NERA), to bring funding more closely in line with the Australian Department of Education and Training's Schooling Resource Standard (SRS). From 2018, the Department has changed the way it calculates per capita grants to more closely align with the Australian Department of Education and Training's approach.

The Department determines eligibility for grants by checking a school's registration status with NESA. However, NESA's approach to monitoring compliance with the registration requirements prioritises student learning and wellbeing requirements over the requirement for policies and procedures for proper governance. Given their importance to the appropriate use of government funding, NESA could increase its monitoring of policies and procedures for proper governance through its program of random inspections. Further, the Department and NESA should enter into a formal agreement to share information to more accurately determine the level of risk of non‑compliance at each school. This may help both agencies more effectively target their monitoring to higher‑risk schools.

By December 2018, the NSW Department of Education should:

  1. Strengthen its processes to provide greater assurance that the enrolment and expenditure information it collects from non‑government schools is accurate. This should build on the work the Australian Government already does in this area.
  2. Establish formal information‑sharing arrangements with the NSW Education Standards Authority to more effectively monitor schools' eligibility to receive funding.
     

By December 2018, the NSW Education Standards Authority should:

  1. Extend its inspection practices to increase coverage of the registration requirement for policies and procedures for the proper governance of schools.
  2. Establish formal information‑sharing arrangements with the NSW Department of Education to more effectively monitor schools' continued compliance with the registration requirements.

The Department’s current approach to managing grants to non‑government schools could be improved to provide greater confidence that funds are being spent in line with the objectives of the grant schemes.

The NSW Government provides funding to non‑government schools to improve student learning outcomes, and to support schooling choices by parents, but does not monitor whether these grants are achieving this. In addition, each grant program has specific objectives. The main objectives for the per capita grant program is to increase the rate of students completing Year 12 (or equivalent), and to improve education outcomes for students. While non‑government schools publicly report on some educational measures via the MySchool website, these measures do not address all the objectives. Strengthened monitoring and reporting of progress towards objectives, at a school level, would increase accountability for public funding. This may require the Department to formalise its access to student level information.

The Department has listed five broad categories of acceptable use for per capita grants, however, provides no further guidance on what expenditure would fit into these categories. Clarifying the appropriate use of grants would increase confidence that funding is being used as intended. Schools must engage an independent auditor, registered with ASIC, to certify that the funding has been spent. The Department could strengthen this approach by improving its processes to check the registration of the auditor, and to verify their independence.

The Department has limited oversight of funding provided to System Authorities (Systems). The Department provides grants to Systems for all their member schools. The Systems can distribute the grants to their schools according to their own methodology. Systems are not required to report to the Department how much of their grant was retained for administrative or centralised expenses. Increased oversight over how the Systems distribute this grant could provide increased transparency for the use of public funds by systems.

By December 2018, the NSW Department of Education should:

  1. Establish and communicate funding conditions that require funded schools to:
    • adhere to conditions of funding, such as the acceptable use of grants, and accounting requirements to demonstrate compliance
    • report their progress towards the objectives of the scheme or wider Government initiatives
    • allow the Department to conduct investigations to verify enrolment and expenditure of funds
    • provide the Department with access to existing student level data to inform policy development and analysis.
  1. Increase its oversight of System Authorities by requiring them to:
    • re‑allocate funds across their system on a needs basis, and report to the Department on this
    • provide a yearly submission with enough detail to demonstrate that each System school has spent their State funding in line with the Department's requirements.

Published

Actions for Managing risks in the NSW public sector: risk culture and capability

Managing risks in the NSW public sector: risk culture and capability

Finance
Health
Justice
Treasury
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk
Workforce and capability

The Ministry of Health, NSW Fair Trading, NSW Police Force, and NSW Treasury Corporation are taking steps to strengthen their risk culture, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford. 'Senior management communicates the importance of managing risk to their staff, and there are many examples of risk management being integrated into daily activities', the Auditor-General said.

We did find that three of the agencies we examined could strengthen their culture so that all employees feel comfortable speaking openly about risks. To support innovation, senior management could also do better at communicating to their staff the levels of risk they are willing to accept.

Effective risk management is essential to good governance, and supports staff at all levels to make informed judgements and decisions. At a time when government is encouraging innovation and exploring new service delivery models, effective risk management is about seizing opportunities as well as managing threats.

Over the past decade, governments and regulators around the world have increasingly turned their attention to risk culture. It is now widely accepted that organisational culture is a key element of risk management because it influences how people recognise and engage with risk. Neglecting this ‘soft’ side of risk management can prevent institutions from managing risks that threaten their success and lead to missed opportunities for change, improvement or innovation.

This audit assessed how effectively NSW Government agencies are building risk management capabilities and embedding a sound risk culture throughout their organisations. To do this we examined whether:

  • agencies can demonstrate that senior management is committed to risk management
  • information about risk is communicated effectively throughout agencies
  • agencies are building risk management capabilities.

The audit examined four agencies: the Ministry of Health, the NSW Fair Trading function within the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation, NSW Police Force and NSW Treasury Corporation (TCorp). NSW Treasury was also included as the agency responsible for the NSW Government's risk management framework.

Conclusion
All four agencies examined in the audit are taking steps to strengthen their risk culture. In these agencies, senior management communicates the importance of managing risk to their staff. They have risk management policies and funded central functions to oversee risk management. We also found many examples of risk management being integrated into daily activities.
That said, three of the four case study agencies could do more to understand their existing risk culture. As good practice, agencies should monitor their employees’ attitude to risk. Without a clear understanding of how employees identify and engage with risk, it is difficult to tell whether the 'tone' set by the executive and management is aligned with employee behaviours.
Our survey of risk culture found that three agencies could strengthen a culture of open communication, so that all employees feel comfortable speaking openly about risks. To support innovation, senior management could also do better at communicating to their staff the levels of risk they are willing to accept.
Some agencies are performing better than others in building their risk capabilities. Three case study agencies have reviewed the risk-related skills and knowledge of their workforce, but only one agency has addressed the gaps the review identified. In three agencies, staff also need more practical guidance on how to manage risks that are relevant to their day-to-day responsibilities.
NSW Treasury provides agencies with direction and guidance on risk management through policy and guidelines. Its principles-based approach to risk management is consistent with better practice. Nevertheless, there is scope for NSW Treasury to develop additional practical guidance and tools to support a better risk culture in the NSW public sector. NSW Treasury should encourage agency heads to form a view on the current risk culture in their agencies, identify desirable changes to that risk culture, and take steps to address those changes. 

In assessing an agency’s risk culture, we focused on four key areas:

Executive sponsorship (tone at the top)

In the four agencies we reviewed, senior management is communicating the importance of managing risk. They have endorsed risk management frameworks and funded central functions tasked with overseeing risk management within their agencies.

That said, we found that three case study agencies do not measure their existing risk culture. Without clear measures of how employees identify and engage with risk, it is difficult for agencies to tell whether employee's behaviours are aligned with the 'tone' set by the executive and management.

For example, in some agencies we examined we found a disconnect between risk tolerances espoused by senior management and how these concepts were understood by staff.

Employee perceptions of risk management

Our survey of staff indicated that while senior leaders have communicated the importance of managing risk, more could be done to strengthen a culture of open communication so that all employees feel comfortable speaking openly about risks. We found that senior management could better communicate to their staff the levels of risk they should be willing to accept.

Integration of risk management into daily activities and links to decision-making

We found examples of risk management being integrated into daily activities. On the other hand, we also identified areas where risk management deviated from good practice. For example, we found that corporate risk registers are not consistently used as a tool to support decision-making.

Support and guidance to help staff manage risks

Most case study agencies are monitoring risk-related skills and knowledge of their workforce, but only one agency has addressed the gaps it identified. While agencies are providing risk management training, surveyed staff in three case study agencies reported that risk management training is not adequate.

NSW Treasury provides agencies with direction and guidance on risk management through policy and guidelines. In line with better practice, NSW Treasury's principles-based policy acknowledges that individual agencies are in a better position to understand their own risks and design risk management frameworks that address those risks. Nevertheless, there is scope for NSW Treasury to refine its guidance material to support a better risk culture in the NSW public sector.

Recommendation

By May 2019, NSW Treasury should:

  • Review the scope of its risk management guidance, and identify additional guidance, training or activities to improve risk culture across the NSW public sector. This should focus on encouraging agency heads to form a view on the current risk culture in their agencies, identify desirable changes to that risk culture, and take steps to address those changes.