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Actions for Acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia

Acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia

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The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, has today released a report on Transport for NSW’s (TfNSW) acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue in Camellia.

This audit, which was requested on 17 November 2020 by the Hon. Andrew Constance MP, the Minister for Transport and Roads, examined:

  • whether TfNSW conducted an effective process to purchase 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia
  • whether TfNSW has effective processes and procedures to identify and acquire property required to deliver the NSW Government’s major infrastructure projects.

The audit found that TfNSW conducted an ineffective process when it purchased 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia. The audit also found that TfNSW’s internal policies and procedures to guide the transaction were, and continue to be, insufficient.

The Auditor-General has made seven recommendations to address the issues identified in the report.

On 17 November 2020, the Hon. Andrew Constance MP, the Minister for Transport and Roads, requested this audit under section 27B(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983.

On 15 June 2016, Transport for New South Wales (TfNSW) acquired 6.3 hectares of land at 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia, by agreement from Grand 4 Investments Pty Ltd. Grand 4 Investments was a business entity established by the owners of Billbergia Pty Ltd, a property development and investment company.

TfNSW paid Grand 4 Investments $53.5 million and assumed liability for addressing environmental issues and contamination associated with the site. This took place seven months after the vendor acquired the land as part of a competitive Expression of Interest process, in which TfNSW also participated, for $38.15 million.

TfNSW is the NSW Government agency responsible for most major transport infrastructure projects in New South Wales. TfNSW acquired the Camellia site for use as a stabling and maintenance depot to support the Parramatta Light Rail (PLR) project.

Consistent with the minister’s request, this audit assessed:

  • whether TfNSW conducted an effective process to purchase 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia
  • whether TfNSW has effective processes and procedures to identify and acquire property required to deliver the NSW Government’s major infrastructure projects.

In considering the effectiveness of the processes for this purchase, the audit considered:

  • the requirements of the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (the Act)
  • the application of sound processes to manage risk to the NSW Government and to achieve value for money
  • the application of disciplines associated with complex procurement, such as probity, in a NSW Government context.
The acquisition of the 4–6 Grand Avenue site in Camellia was consistent with a 2014 feasibility study for the PLR, but occurred before the completion of detailed project planning or an acquisition strategy.

TfNSW made two attempts to acquire the 4–6 Grand Avenue site in Camellia, and was successful on the second attempt. TfNSW recognised the risks associated with early acquisition and had high-level strategies in place should the site not be required.

The specific site had been identified in a feasibility study for the PLR commissioned by TfNSW in 2014 as one of several options in Camellia for a stabling and maintenance depot. However, TfNSW had not done any substantive analysis of the various options to identify a preferred location before the two opportunities to acquire 4–6 Grand Avenue were brought to TfNSW’s attention by the landowners (or their agents). On both occasions, TfNSW chose to actively pursue acquisition in advance of any such analysis.

The acquisition was also not informed by a Property Acquisition Strategy, which TfNSW policy recommends in order to guide the process and manage acquisition specific risks.

In 2015, TfNSW identified that it would require a stabling and maintenance depot in the Camellia area for the Parramatta Light Rail

In 2014, TfNSW commissioned an external engineering consultancy to undertake a feasibility design study for the Parramatta Light Rail - the Parramatta Transport Corridor Strategy Feasibility Design study (herein referred to as ‘the feasibility study’). In early 2015, TfNSW received the feasibility study, which was one of several key sources that informed the development of business cases for the PLR.

The feasibility study recommended that TfNSW should consolidate the maintenance and cleaning operations with overnight stabling facilities on one site. The study noted that the optimal location for any such site would be in close proximity to the proposed network, and noted that the site must have access to road connections to accommodate access for cars and trucks.

The study found that a centrally located stabling and maintenance facility would be required for all routes serving the Parramatta CBD, and that the Camellia industrial area was a preferred location for such a facility. The study noted that the Camellia area was contaminated.

The feasibility study notes that its conclusions were based on assumptions about the light rail system adopted and decisions made by the future operator of the system, who had not yet been selected or appointed.

TfNSW's decision to progress a potential acquisition in 2015 considered the risk that the site may not be required

TfNSW's FIC was responsible for making decisions on funding allocations at a whole of program level within TfNSW. FIC was also responsible for approving ‘high-risk/high-value’ variations to program budgets. Members of the FIC included:

  • Secretary of Transport for NSW
  • Deputy Secretary, Infrastructure and Services
  • Deputy Secretary, Freight, Strategy and Planning
  • Deputy Secretary, Customer Services
  • Deputy Secretary Finance and Investment
  • Deputy Secretary People and Corporate Services.

An April 2015 submission, from the then Deputy Director-General to the agency’s FIC, sought authorisation and funding approval to participate in an Expression of Interest sale process. It noted the risk that the project may not go ahead. The submission advised that:

By acquiring a strategic site now, it reduces the risk of having to pay an improved value or a value that may be subject to rapidly improving land values due to changes in land use and rezoning.

The property can be acquired for the project, held strategically and income generated by leasing the site as hardstand 1 space until the project requires the land for the Parramatta Light Rail project.

If the project does not proceed in the medium to longer term, the property can be sold at a premium to what has been paid today as property fundamentals improve.

This submission acknowledged the risks associated with environmental contamination and proposed that these risks would be managed by negotiating a contract where the remediation and associated expenses would be at the landowner’s cost. 

TfNSW assessed the 4–6 Grand Avenue site as one of several sites in Camellia that was a feasible location for a stabling and maintenance facility

The Departmental feasibility study assessed six potential sites for a stabling and maintenance facility, including 4–6 Grand Avenue, noting strengths and weaknesses of each site. A different site on Grand Avenue was assessed as the ‘base case’ option (1 Grand Avenue). The study’s comments on the 4–6 Grand Avenue site included the following:

With an area of approximately 63,000m2, this site has sufficient space for a depot with the required stabling yard and maintenance facilities. The location allows for good road access and LRT [light rail transit] access would be from Grand Avenue, which may require a road crossing or signalised intersection. The site has been used for general industrial uses; however the land has been cleared and is currently undergoing remediation 2. The site is not affected by flooding based on one in 100-year flood data.

In early 2015, once the opportunity to acquire 4–6 Grand Avenue emerged, TfNSW commissioned a specific feasibility study of the 4–6 Grand Avenue site. The feasibility studies clearly documented the existence of environmental contamination. In April 2015, the report concluded:

Given the limitations of this report and within the parameters that have been set it is concluded that from a spatial and geographic perspective the site at 6 Grand Avenue would be suitable as a stabling and maintenance depot for the Parramatta light rail project. There are few engineering and environmental constraints that would affect the feasibility level analysis of this site and all issues identified, within this desk study, are considered to be resolvable. However this being said there is a significant amount of work necessary to reach the final layout and definition of the stabling and maintenance depot. There are numerous items which require further consideration and conformation; planning approvals could impose restrictions on building heights, noise mitigation measures, light and visual impact requirements all of which can have significant impacts on the spatial requirements of any stabling and maintenance depot. 

The acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue was not informed by a Property Acquisition Strategy

For major projects, TfNSW typically requires the project team to complete a Property Acquisition Strategy, which is intended to guide both process as well as specific acquisition issues expected to be faced during the project. The Property Acquisition Strategy is not a mandated document but is a recommended tool to support property acquisition as part of major projects.

TfNSW did not have a Property Acquisition Strategy in place to guide the 2015 Expression of Interest process. On 6 November 2015, the then Project Director for the PLR project emailed the property team, noting a need to develop a Property Acquisition Strategy to close off the scoping design and preliminary business case.

In January 2016, TfNSW developed a draft Property Acquisition Strategy for the Parramatta Light Rail Project, although it was silent on the potential sites for the stabling and maintenance facility.

TfNSW focussed on 4–6 Grand Avenue because it was available and aligned to TfNSW's strategic interests

In early 2015, officials commenced monitoring the market for industrial real estate in the Camellia area and surrounds for possible sites for a stabling and maintenance facility.

In March 2015, then owner of the site, Akzo Nobel Pty Limited released the 4–6 Grand Avenue site through an Expression of Interest process managed by CBRE.

TfNSW’s then Deputy Director-General, Planning, sought approval from FIC to lodge an Expression of Interest up to $30.0 million. Approval was sought on the basis that it would ‘provide certainty for the Parramatta Light Rail project by allowing for a depot site in a suitable location and potentially avoid higher costs or longer timeframes associated with compulsory acquisition following completion of the project’s business case’. FIC approved the request at its meeting on 9 April 2015.

At this time, TfNSW had not conducted any analysis of financial or operational benefits and costs of the potential sites identified in earlier feasibility studies. TfNSW staff advised us that the decision to participate in the Expression of Interest process for 4–6 Grand Avenue was because it was available. There is no documentation substantiating this statement, which TfNSW staff provided verbally as part of this audit.

In November 2015, TfNSW was advised that it was unsuccessful in the Expression of Interest process and that Grand 4 Investments (a related entity of Billbergia) had purchased 4–6 Grand Avenue. TfNSW did not conduct any further analysis of alternative potential sites in Camellia between this date and commencing discussions with Grand 4 Investments in April 2016. In that time there had been some movement on other properties that were included in the feasibility study, including 37–39a Grand Avenue being under offer in September 2015.

In March 2016, TfNSW approached CBRE to organise a meeting with Grand 4 Investments. On 1 April 2016, TfNSW met with Grand 4 Investments.

TfNSW advises that a perceived benefit of the 4–6 Grand Avenue site was that it was not subject to other uses or leaseholds that would increase the cost of compulsory acquisition. Officers involved in the acquisition advised that other nominated sites in the feasibility study were subject to other uses or leaseholds. 


1  A hardstand space is a large, paved area to store cars, heavy vehicles and machinery.
2  Officers familiar with the acquisition could not confirm the nature of remediation being undertaken, but noted that the previous landowner had cleared buildings from the site, which may have been considered part of remediation.
TfNSW's independent valuation, which it commissioned and received after the acquisition, specifically excluded consideration of environmental contamination risk. As a result, TfNSW is exposed to the risk that the acquisition was not fully compliant with the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (the Act) because it did not use an accurate estimate of market value during negotiations. That said, the acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue by agreement was consistent with preferred processes described in the Act.

TfNSW acquired the site from the landowner by agreement, and this is consistent with provisions in the Act. Obtaining approval for compulsory acquisition should negotiations for agreement break down is also consistent with the Act. That said, TfNSW did not at any time assess whether a compulsory acquisition could have resulted in acquisition at a lower cost than what was negotiated by agreement.

Despite the high risks associated with the acquisition, TfNSW did not commission a formal valuation in time to inform the negotiation and purchase. Instead, TfNSW relied on internal advice to estimate market value, but did not obtain a formal valuation from those advisors. For high-risk transactions, the greater expertise and arm's-length independence of an external specialist valuer should be preferred over an agency's own staff.

On 15 June 2016, the settlement date for the acquisition, TfNSW commissioned a formal independent valuation of the site. On 23 November 2016, TfNSW received the final formal valuation report. By not obtaining a formal independent valuation of the property in advance of acquisition to inform the acquisition value, TfNSW exposed itself to non-compliance with the Act by not establishing the market value as the basis for the acquisition price. TfNSW also breached its own internal policies.

TfNSW instructed the valuer to conduct its valuation within the following parameters:

  • Market valuation on an ‘as is’ basis – market value based on the methodology described in the Act. This approach valued the site at $25.0 million.
  • Market valuation on a speculative development basis – market value based on the financial value of the vendor's intended use of the site which, in this case, involved leasing the site for industrial use. This approach valued the site at $52.0 million, and TfNSW advised us this valuation supported the purchase price.
  • Disregard the impact of environmental contamination – TfNSW specifically instructed the independent valuer to disregard any known (or unknown) site contamination. As TfNSW knew of the significant environmental contamination affecting the site, this parameter resulted in a valuation that overstated the value of the site as it did not consider the cost of environmental remediation. The valuer applied this assumption for both market valuation approaches.

Additionally, as the independent valuer completed the valuation after the purchase was finalised, there is a risk that the valuation may have been influenced by the known purchase price.

TfNSW's failure to acquire a formal valuation and an assessment of the financial impact of environmental remediation before it purchased 4–6 Grand Avenue represents ineffective administration and governance.
TfNSW acquired the site at a time when there was demand and increasing prices for industrial property in the area. However, TfNSW did not effectively assess and manage the risks associated with the acquisition, and gaps in process led to increased risk. Briefings to decision-makers did not contain important information, and we found no evidence that gaps in advice were queried or explored by decision-makers.

TfNSW did not have plans or advice in place to assist in managing risk, such as:

  • a property acquisition plan
  • a comprehensive and up-to-date risk management plan
  • a negotiation strategy, or any authorisation limit or minimal acceptable position
  • an independent professional evaluation
  • external expert advice (with the exception of legal advice relating to the contract of sale).

TfNSW was aware of contamination issues affecting the land and had access to considerable information about the environmental conditions, such as site environmental audit reports and information on the NSW Environment Protection Authority's contaminated land register. However, TfNSW had not analysed specific technical information about the contamination and therefore was not aware of the risk implications and cost for remediation. Despite this, TfNSW changed its position from not accepting the risks and costs of contamination, to acquiring the site unconditionally. The basis for this decision is unclear and undocumented.

Briefing to senior leaders on the acquisition was silent on a number of important matters that would have been important for approvers to consider, including:

  • an explanation of the 40 per cent increase in purchase price between November 2015 and May 2016, and a 165 per cent increase from TfNSW’s offer in April 2015
  • the contamination risks associated with the site and an evidence-based estimate of potential costs to remediate the site
  • advice that an independent valuation had not been obtained, inconsistent with TfNSW policy.

Consideration of the acquisition by FIC was based on a summary business paper and was managed out-of-session, thereby removing the ability for comprehensive consideration of the acquisition proposal and its risks.

The probity management controls and assurances in place for the acquisition of the 4–6 Grand Avenue site were insufficient. These insufficiencies were exacerbated by the probity risk profile of the transaction.

The 4–6 Grand Avenue acquisition was a high-risk/high-value transaction, undertaken in a volatile property market in a short timeframe under pressure from Grand 4 Investments. TfNSW was engaging in a direct negotiation in advance of detailed planning for the acquisition, or the PLR as a whole. These circumstances contribute to heightened probity risk.

TfNSW did not establish a probity plan and sought no probity support throughout the acquisition. Also, with one exception, the staff involved in the acquisition did not complete conflict of interest declarations.

TfNSW was aware of the potential for probity or integrity issues with the transaction when it commissioned an internal audit in connection with the transaction in 2019. Internal discussions considered whether a misconduct investigation may be more appropriate, however no such investigation was undertaken.

TfNSW's insufficient probity practices, in addition to its failure to keep complete or comprehensive records of negotiations or decisions, reduce transparency of the process and its outcome and expose TfNSW to a greater risk of misconduct, corruption and maladministration.

At the time of the transaction, the TfNSW policy framework was not sufficiently risk-focussed and did not provide clarity on when officers ought to apply specific guidance or procedures. TfNSW's policies and procedures are more focussed on acquiring land to meet project needs and timeframes, and less on assuring value for money and managing risks.

At the time of its acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue, TfNSW had property acquisitions policies and procedures in place. Each of these were broadly sound in their content and intent. However, they lacked specificity on how or when to apply guidance, and when risk levels should elevate the importance of recommended guidance.

TfNSW's key guidance was principles based and relied on agency staff using their experience and expertise to apply guidance according to the circumstances of an individual transaction. This guidance was not duly applied in the acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia. In addition, TfNSW does not have quality or control assurance to identify when TfNSW officers did not apply important policies or processes.

The primary focus of the TfNSW’s property acquisition guidance is to achieve vacant possession of land in a timeframe that meets the need of the relevant transport project. There is less specific focus on the need to meet the requirements of the NSW Government financial management framework.

Appendix one – Response from agency 

Appendix two – About the audit 

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

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Parliamentary reference - Report number #349 - released (18 May 2021).

Published

Actions for Delivering school infrastructure

Delivering school infrastructure

Education
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Project management

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining the planning and delivery of new, redeveloped and upgraded public schools.

School Infrastructure NSW has identified the need to accommodate an additional 180,000 enrolments in public schools by 2039 with a large portion of this growth expected in metropolitan Sydney. It has also identified that around 34,000 teaching spaces will require upgrading to be fit-for-purpose.

Although School Infrastructure NSW has developed a long-term strategic plan that advises government of ongoing funding requirements, it has not presented a list of priorities to meet those needs. Developing a longer-term list of priorities would help signal the areas of greatest need and allow more time to develop the best options to meet those needs.

The audit found that School Infrastructure NSW has focused on delivering existing projects, election commitments and other government announcements. This has diverted attention from identifying and delivering projects that would have better met present and future needs. 

The report makes eight recommendations to improve long-term planning for future needs, strengthen the quality of estimated project costs and benefits, and embed a continuous improvement program. 

In 2016, the Department of Education prepared a School Assets Strategic Plan (2016 SASP) which outlined long-term funding needs to support the expected growth in enrolments to 2031. Following the release of the 2016 SASP, the NSW Government substantially increased funding for new and upgraded schools from $2.4 billion in the 2016–17 State Budget to $4.2 billion in 2017–18.

In 2017, the Department of Education established School Infrastructure NSW (SINSW) to lead the delivery of the 2016 SASP and the 123 new projects announced in the 2017–18 Budget. This significantly larger program of work required rapid development of internal capacity, governance arrangements, and project management systems. This needed to be done at the same time as scoping and planning for the list of announced projects.

As there are limited funds available to meet growing needs across the State, it is important that SINSW has effective methods to prioritise projects to communities with the greatest need. To ensure that projects deliver value for money, business cases need to have robust estimates of project costs and benefits. Business cases also need to account for the inherent risks in delivering infrastructure projects. Unplanned cost escalations can reduce the number of new or modernised classrooms SINSW can deliver. Unforeseen delays may also impact families who make significant life choices based on their expectations that a school will open at the beginning of the school year.

The objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness of planning and delivery of new, upgraded and redeveloped schools to meet demand for public school education in New South Wales. To address this objective, the audit examined whether the Department:

  • has effective procedures for planning and prioritising school capital works to meet present and future demands
  • develops robust business cases for school capital works that reliably inform decision-making
  • has effective program/project governance and management systems that support delivering projects on-time, within budget and achievement of intended benefits.

The audit examined business cases for 12 projects as case studies. These include a mix of projects initiated before and after the establishment of SINSW.

This audit commenced in June 2020 and examined strategies and demographic projections developed prior to the emergence of COVID-19. This audit did not examine potential longer-term impacts of COVID-19 on future demands for public school education.

Conclusion

School Infrastructure NSW has been focused on delivering existing projects, election commitments and other government announcements. This has diverted attention from identifying and delivering projects that would have better met present and future student and classroom needs. While it has developed a long-term strategic plan that advises government of ongoing funding requirements, it has not presented a list of priorities to meet these needs.

In its first years of operation, SINSW has focused on delivering existing projects and the 123 new projects announced in the 2017–18 Budget. Further NSW Government announcements in the 2018–19 Budget, election commitments in the 2019–20 Budget, and announcements in the 2020–21 Budget, made up the majority of new projects, rather than projects prioritised by SINSW. 

In early 2020, SINSW advised the NSW Government that the currently funded infrastructure program would not meet forecast classroom requirements for 2023 and beyond. The School Asset Strategic Plan 2020 estimates the annual level of investment needed over the next 20 years to meet growth, update and upgrade facilities to meet compliance obligations. However, SINSW’s ten-year Capital Investment Plans for 2018–19, 2019–20 and 2020–21 only identified priorities over a two-year horizon.

Developing a longer-term pipeline of priorities would signal the areas of greatest need and allow greater scope to consider a range of options to best meet those needs.

SINSW has made progress in planning across geographic areas but needs to better prioritise which projects move forward.

Given the current and projected needs for new classrooms, it is vital that SINSW provides long-term advice based on thorough state-wide analysis to help prioritise projects that best meet this demand.

SINSW has improved its capabilities, processes, and systems to support planning in ‘School Community Groups’, which are clusters of between 5 to 15 schools in a geographic area. This addresses a key direction identified in the School Assets Strategic Plan 2016. It has developed a planning tool which allows it to prioritise School Community Groups based on weighted criteria. It has also developed an approach to identify potential projects within School Community Groups but has not yet put in place a structured process to prioritise which projects move to the business case stage to seek funding for delivery.

Business cases we examined established service needs, but several had shortcomings in scope definition, cost estimation and risk identification.

Most business cases we examined demonstrated the service need and consultation with stakeholders helped to incorporate educational requirements. Common templates and specific cost-benefit guidance developed in partnership with NSW Treasury has helped to promote consistency across business cases.

However, there were shortcomings in several business cases we reviewed. Business cases for projects already announced by government presented a limited number of options, and the process for eliminating other options was not transparent. Cost increases and contingency drawdowns for several projects indicate that scoping, costing and risk assessments could be improved, especially for complex projects.

Standard program management systems and governance arrangements support project delivery, however, there is scope for better ongoing oversight of benefits.

SINSW applies standard governance arrangements to projects based on their size. Higher value projects have executive oversight while lower value projects are overseen on a regional basis. SINSW has improved its project management systems to provide more consistent data and greater transparency to senior management over project status, cost and use of contingencies.

SINSW has worked with NSW Treasury to define a consistent set of benefits for new and redeveloped schools. Estimated benefits are currently based on international contexts but SINSW advises it is undertaking further research to improve the evidence base in this area. The current approach to ongoing monitoring, reporting and evaluation of project benefits places responsibility on the infrastructure delivery team. This team is not the most appropriate area to monitor ongoing benefits, which are expected to accrue many years after delivery and depend on actions in other areas of the Department.

1. Key findings

SINSW delivered projects against an established program of works in its first years of operation

At establishment, SINSW inherited a portfolio of existing projects and 123 new projects announced as part of the 2017–18 Budget (to commence over 2017–18 and 2018–19). It has progressively worked through individual project planning to deliver against these projects.

The 2018–19 Budget funded two new projects that had not already been announced. Both projects were identified by SINSW as a priority. The 2018–19 Budget also allocated funding for 'planning' 22 new projects. Seventeen of the 22 projects had been identified by SINSW as a priority.

SINSW identified 31 new priority projects in its Capital Investment Plan for 2019–20. Thirteen of these projects were funded in that year with a further 27 projects included as election commitments. SINSW identified 20 new projects in its Capital Investment Plan for 2020–21 but only two of these were funded. SINSW advised this was due to a constrained budget environment.

There is an anticipated shortfall of classrooms based on the current funded program

Despite increased funding since 2017–18, SINSW advised the NSW Government in early 2020 that the currently funded infrastructure program would not meet forecast classroom requirements for 2023 and beyond. Accordingly, it is vital that new funding is prioritised to projects which best meet demand.

SINSW only identified specific priorities over a two-year horizon in its Capital Investment Plans for 2018–19, 2019–20 and 2020–21. The School Assets Strategic Plan 2016 and the 2020 update make the case for sustained funding for school building and redevelopment. These plans estimate annual funding requirements and show geographic areas with increasing forecast enrolments. Detailing how priorities over a ten-year timeframe fit within a ten-year capital planning limit would create more certainty about meeting growth demands.

There has been progress in formalising prioritisation frameworks, data tools and supporting governance arrangements

SINSW committed to planning for new and redeveloped schools in 'School Community Groups' in the School Assets Strategic Plan 2016. This is a new way of planning which considers the educational needs over a defined geographical area. It has developed a planning tool to prioritise School Community Groups based on weighted criteria. It has also established governance frameworks to improve transparency over decisions to reprioritise this list.

SINSW has refined its approach to planning in School Community Groups over the past four years. It now prepares Service Needs Reports to investigate needs, identify projects, prioritise, determine scope and timing, and assess non-capital options. SINSW has yet to finalise arrangements for how needs identified in Service Needs Reports progress to the strategic business case stage.

Projects announced prior to developing a business case have less opportunity to consider a range of options to meet the service needs

Business cases for projects already announced by government (or announced for planning) go through the same process of determining the service need and impacts on surrounding schools. However, for some announced projects, the range of options considered in the business case is influenced by the parameters of the announcement. This makes it more difficult to genuinely pursue alternate options that could better meet the identified service need.

Projects identified by SINSW have a more rigorous process of considering options. Service Needs Reports explore a wide range of asset and non-asset interventions across the School Community Group. Options are narrowed as the projects move through the strategic and final business case stages. SINSW uses its Investment Review Committee to engage key stakeholders early in the process so that they are informed about how non-asset solutions have been considered and why SINSW is progressing the business case for a capital solution for particular projects.

Several business cases underestimated project costs and risks, leading to scope and budget increases

Several business cases we reviewed did not adequately identify the initial scope requirements, project-specific risks or the likely project cost. For two business cases, this appeared to be due to an attempt to fit the project within a predetermined amount. Announcing a project’s scope, budget and timeframe before proper planning increases risks to successful delivery against expectations.

Several of the projects we examined required drawdowns on contingency funds due to inadequate consideration of scope, costs and project risks at the planning stage. Contingency funds are intended for unanticipated extra costs rather than those that could have or should have been identified at the planning stage.

Guidance on benefit calculations has provided a consistent framework for business cases

Business cases we examined presented a consistent set of benefits based on guidance developed in partnership with NSW Treasury. Following this guidance helps to compare cost-benefit analyses across business cases. However, the evidence for the estimated benefits is based on contexts outside of NSW. SINSW has the tools and data sources to calculate benefits more suited to the context of particular schools. Doing so would improve the accuracy of cost-benefit analyses. SINSW advised that it is currently updating the guidance in partnership with NSW Treasury.

SINSW involves school principals, executives and teaching staff in developing education rationales when commencing projects. These documents help align projects with education outcomes. They also provide a baseline for post-occupancy evaluation, which is important to determine whether the new school infrastructure is being used in the ways that were anticipated in the business case.

SINSW could elevate its existing assurance review process to consolidate lessons learned

SINSW engages external peer reviewers to conduct assurance reviews on its projects at multiple stages of planning and delivery. It has established a Community of Practice for external reviewers to keep them up to date on new developments and requirements. Higher value projects are also subject to review by Infrastructure NSW under the Investor Assurance Framework.

By looking at all projects at all stages, assurance reviews can identify systematic issues across the full portfolio of projects. A recent assurance review analysed common findings from reviews of strategic and final business cases. This provides a helpful way to improve internal processes. SINSW advised that it is implementing a continuous improvement program, which will be able to take findings from assurance reviews to build organisational capabilities.

2. Recommendations

By September 2021, the Department of Education should:

  1. finalise the investment prioritisation approach with agreement from key stakeholders
  2. finalise and update on an ongoing basis a ten-year list of priorities to meet the forecast demand for new classrooms and contemporary fit for purpose learning environments, which identifies individual projects and programs in the short-term and priority geographic areas and programs in the medium-term
  3. seek a ten-year Capital Planning Limit from NSW Treasury to ensure the needs identified in the ten-year list of priorities are met and are coordinated with the forward capital programs of other agencies
  4. improve the quality of data on cost benchmarks that underpin the annual ten-year Capital Investment Plan and updates to the School Assets Strategic Plan
  5. embed an evidence-based cost benefit analysis framework for school investment, in consultation with NSW Treasury, by:
    • validating benefits estimated in previous business cases with actual results
    • building the evidence base in relation to contemporary learning environments
  6. regularly share data on forecast needs with relevant planning agencies to promote strategic opportunities for servicing education needs
  7. implement the continuous improvement program for service planning, options assessment, business case development, project delivery and handover. The program should be informed by findings from assurance reviews, post-occupancy evaluations and project lessons learned
  8. establish benefits realisation processes and practices that:
    • ensure business cases set baselines and targets for benefits
    • review benefits during delivery, prior to handover and as part of Post Occupancy Evaluations
    • identify which part(s) of the Department are best placed to develop, manage and evaluate benefits on an ongoing basis.

Note:

The Department's formal response to this report at Appendix one states that while it 'supports the recommendations, it considers the proposed six-month timeframe to be an unreasonably short period for a large and complex organisation to effectively implement many of these recommendations'. It suggests 12 months would be needed to implement the recommendations.

The recommendations stemming from this audit are core business for SINSW. The Audit Office considers it important for SINSW to place priority on implementing the recommendations in time to inform the 2022–23 budget cycle. Extending the deadline to April 2022 would place action outside of that budget cycle.

There have been significant increases in funding for education infrastructure since the 2017–18 Budget and further growth in demand for places in schools is forecast. SINSW has the challenge, not only of meeting the need for new classrooms due to population growth, but also upgrading facilities to enable modern teaching techniques. In addition, community expectations of what constitutes a vibrant and successful school community continues to increase.

Given growing demand and budget constraints, projects must be selected to best meet the needs of the community and planning and prioritisation are vital. SINSW has been progressing planning for announced projects as well as implementing a new type of strategic state-wide planning and prioritisation, cluster planning, where options are developed for School Community Groups.

The primary role of a business case is to reliably inform an investment and/or policy decision. Over the period of review, the NSW Government's guidelines for business cases have established this requires recommendations based on convincing arguments, sufficient evidence, and accurate costing of alternatives and expected benefits. Business case guidelines are underpinned by guides for economic appraisal and cost-benefit analysis.

As SINSW moves to prioritise business cases for interventions in School Community Groups, it will increasingly need to demonstrate rigour in its assessment of all options. It will also need to ensure that scope identification, cost and risk planning and the setting of contingencies are accurate. This will help decision-makers better understand, plan for and manage the investment required to meet the demand for school infrastructure.

For this audit, we examined business cases and related documentation for 12 projects. Several of these projects were developed before School Infrastructure NSW was established in mid-2017.

Over the period of review, NSW Government policies for business case development and submission have emphasised that effective governance arrangements are critical to a proposal's successful implementation.

SINSW's guidance similarly highlight the importance of effective governance and project management for achieving good outcomes. It prescribes a general governance structure managed by SINSW that can be tailored to the planning and delivery of school infrastructure projects.

Appendix one – Response from agency
 
Appendix two – About the audit 

Appendix three – Performance auditing 


Copyright Notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #347 - released (8 April 2021).

Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament on Delivering School Infrastructure 

This corrigendum has been prepared to amend the following text within my Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament on Delivering School Infrastructure, dated 8 April 2021. 

On page two, the original text was as follows: 

Further NSW Government announcements in the 2018–19 Budget and election commitments in the 2019–20 Budget made up the majority of new projects, rather than projects prioritised by SINSW. 

The original text has now been changed to 

Further NSW Government announcements in the 2018–19 Budget, election commitments in the 2019–20 Budget, and announcements in the 2020–21 Budget, made up the majority of new projects, rather than projects prioritised by SINSW. 

On page three, the original text was as follows: 

The 2018–19 Budget funded three new projects that had not already been announced. One of the three projects was identified by SINSW as a priority. 

The original text has now been changed to: 

The 2018–19 Budget funded two new projects that had not already been announced. Both projects were identified by SINSW as a priority. 

On page three the original text was as follows: 

SINSW identified 33 priority projects in its Capital Investment Plan for 2019–20.

The original text has now been changed to  

SINSW identified 31 new priority projects in its Capital Investment Plan for 2019–20. 

On page eleven, in Exhibit 4, the original text was as follows: 

The 2018–19 NSW Budget announced funding for an additional 43 new and upgraded schools to commence works in 2018–19. Of the 43 projects: 

•    1 was identified by SINSW as a priority in its Capital Investment Plan (SINSW requested funding for one new project)
•    40 had already been announced
•    2 were new announcements (not identified as a priority by SINSW in its Capital Investment Plan).

The original text has now been changed to: 

The 2018–19 NSW Budget announced funding for an additional 42 new and upgraded schools to commence works in 2018–19. Of the 42 projects: 

•    2 were identified by SINSW as a priority in its Capital Investment Plan (SINSW requested funding for two new projects)
•    40 had already been announced.

On page eleven, the original text was as follows: 

The 2019–20 NSW Budget announced funding for an additional 40 new and upgraded schools as election commitments. Of the 40 election commitment projects: 

•    13 were identified by SINSW as priorities in its Capital Investment Plan (SINSW requested funding for a total of 33 new projects)
•    27 were new announcements (not identified as a priority by SINSW in its Capital Investment Plan).

The original text has now been changed to: 

The 2019–20 NSW Budget announced funding for an additional 40 new and upgraded schools as election commitments. Of the 40 election commitment projects: 

•    13 were identified by SINSW as priorities in its Capital Investment Plan (SINSW requested funding for a total of 31 new projects)
•    27 were new announcements (not identified as a priority by SINSW in its Capital Investment Plan).

The above changes will be reflected in the version of the report published on the Audit Office website and should be considered the true and accurate version.  

 

Published

Actions for Procurement management in Local Government

Procurement management in Local Government

Local Government
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Regulation
Service delivery

The Auditor‑General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining procurement management in Local Government.

The audit assessed the effectiveness of procurement management practices in six councils. All six councils had procurement management policies that were consistent with legislative requirements, but the audit found compliance gaps in some councils. The audit also identified opportunities for councils to address risks to transparency and accountability, and to ensure value for money is achieved when undertaking procurement.

The Auditor‑General recommended that the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment review the Local Government (General) Regulation 2005 and publish updated and more comprehensive guidance on procurement management for the Local Government sector. The report also generated insights for the Local Government sector on opportunities to strengthen procurement practices.

Effective procurement is important in ensuring councils achieve their objectives, demonstrate value for money and deliver benefits to the community when purchasing goods and services. Procurement also comes with risks and challenges in ensuring the purchased goods and services deliver to expectations. The risks of fraud and conflicts of interest also need to be mitigated.

The legislative requirements related to procurement in the Local Government sector are focused on sourcing and assessing tender offers. These requirements are included in the Local Government Act 1993 (the Act), the Local Government Amendment Act 2019 (the Amendment), the Local Government (General) Regulation 2005 (the Regulation), the Tendering Guidelines for NSW Local Government 2009 (the Tendering Guidelines), the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (the GIPA Act) and the State Records Act 1998.

General requirements and guidance relevant to councils are also available in the Model Code of Conduct for Local Councils in NSW 2018 (the Model Code), the NSW Government Procurement Policy Framework 2019 and in publications by the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC).1

Individual councils have developed their own procurement policies and procedures to expand on the legislative requirements. Understandably, these vary to reflect each council’s location, size and procurement needs. Nevertheless, the general principles of effective procurement management (such as transparency and accountability) and risk-mitigating practices (such as segregation of duties and the provision of training) are relevant to all councils.

The Audit Office of New South Wales Report on Local Government 2018 provided a sector-wide summary of aspects of procurement management in Local Government (see Section 2.1 of this report). This audit builds on this state-wide view by examining in detail the effectiveness of procurement management practices in six councils. This report also provides insights on opportunities to strengthen procurement management in the sector.

The selected councils for this audit were Cumberland City Council, Georges River Council, Lockhart Shire Council, Tweed Shire Council, Waverley Council and Wollongong City Council. They were selected to provide a mix of councils of different geographical classifications, sizes, priorities and levels of resourcing.

Conclusion

All six councils had procurement management policies and procedures that were consistent with the legislative requirements for sourcing and assessing tender offers. Their policies and procedures also extended beyond the legislative requirements to cover key aspects of procurement, from planning to completion. In terms of how these policies were applied in practice, the six councils were mostly compliant with legislative requirements and their own policies and procedures, but we found some gaps in compliance in some councils and made specific recommendations on closing these gaps.

There were also opportunities for councils to improve procurement management to mitigate risks to transparency, accountability and value for money. Common gaps in the councils’ procurement management approaches included not requiring procurement needs to be documented at the planning stage, not providing adequate staff training on procurement, not requiring procurement outcomes to be evaluated, and having discrepancies in contract values between contract registers and annual reports. These gaps expose risks to councils’ ability to demonstrate their procurements are justified, well managed, delivering to expectations, and achieving value for money. Chapter three of this report provides insights for the audited councils and the Local Government sector on ways to address these risks

Recommendations

  1. By June 2022, the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment should:
    1. publish comprehensive and updated guidance on effective procurement practices – including electronic tender submissions and procurements below the tender threshold
    2. review and update the Local Government (General) Regulation 2005 to reflect the increasing use of electronic tender submissions rather than paper copies.
  2. By December 2021, the six audited councils should consider the opportunities to improve procurement management in line with the improvement areas outlined in chapter three of this report.
  3. Cumberland City Council should immediately:
    1. ensure contract values are consistent between the contract register and the annual report
    2. introduce procedures to ensure supplier performance reviews are conducted as per the council’s policy
  4. Georges River Council should immediately:
    1. ensure contract values are consistent between the contract register and the annual report
    2. introduce procedures to ensure all the steps up to the awarding of a contract are documented as per the council’s policy
    3. introduce procedures to ensure outcome evaluations are conducted as per the council’s policy.
  5. Lockhart Shire Council should immediately:
    1. include additional information in the council’s contract register to ensure compliance with Section 29(b), (f), (g), (h) and (i) of the GIPA Act
    2. ensure contract values are consistent between the contract register and the annual report.
  6. Waverley Council should immediately ensure contracts are disclosed in the annual report as per Section 217(1)(a2) of the Regulation.

(1) The relevant ICAC publications include: Corruption Risks in NSW Government Procurement – The Management Challenge (2011), Corruption Risks in NSW Government Procurement – Suppliers’ Perception of Corruption (2011) and Corruption Risks in NSW Government Procurement – Recommendations to Government (2011).

While all six councils had procurement policies in place and were generally compliant with legislative requirements, this report has identified common gaps in processes and practices that expose risks to transparency, accountability and value for money.

This section discusses how councils can mitigate risks and ensure the best outcomes are achieved from their procurements.

Documented justification of procurement needs

The ICAC notes that determining what goods and services an agency requires is the first step of procurement, and the scope for corruption in how need is determined is significant. Without documenting how procurement needs have been justified, councils cannot demonstrate that they fulfill business needs, nor how the procurements may link to the councils’ strategic plans to deliver to the community.

This audit found that none of the six councils’ policies required them to document justification of procurement needs, and none did so consistently in practice. Councils can address this gap by building into their procurement planning process a requirement for staff to document the justification of procurement needs. For higher value procurements, this could be extended to include analysis of options, an assessment of risks and defining intended outcomes. Similarly, clearly establishing and documenting how relevant procurements relate to a council’s community strategic plans or operational plans helps ensure transparency.

Although a formal business case may not be required for many procurements (for example, low-value procurements or routine replacements), some form of documented justification for the expenditure should still be kept on record to demonstrate that the procurement relates to business purposes and is needed.

Segregation of duties

Segregation of duties is an effective control for reducing risks of error, fraud and corruption in procurement. It works on the principle that one person should not have end-to-end control of a procurement. Effective segregation of duties also often involves managerial or independent oversight that is built into the process. Four of the audited councils (Cumberland City Council, Georges River Council, Lockhart Shire Council and Wollongong City Council) appropriately addressed segregation of duties in their procurement frameworks. For example:

  • All procurements in Cumberland City Council required a delegated officer’s approval before commencing, and the requisitioning department is responsible for ensuring the completion of the goods, works or services associated with each contract. For contracts over $50,000, a specific ‘Authority to Procure’ form had to be completed by the requesting staff, signed by an approver and then forwarded to the procurement team.

  • Reflecting its small size, all procurements in Lockhart Shire Council were managed by one senior staff member. Nevertheless, this staff member had to bring contract management plans to the rest of the Executive Leadership Team for review and discussion, with large contracts such as those above the tender threshold referred to Council for approval.

The ICAC notes that segregation of duties helps to control discretion, which has particular risk implications for some types of procurement.This includes those involving low-value and high-volume transactions, restricted tenders, long-standing procurements and ‘pet projects’ (projects advocated by individual staff members). In cases where corruption risks are low, ICAC notes that monitoring staff’s involvement in procurement may be a cost-effective alternative to total segregation of duties.

Assessment of supplier performance

Councils need to monitor and assess supplier performance to ensure suppliers deliver the goods and services as agreed. The audit found that all six councils consistently monitored progress in capital works and for externally funded projects. Contract monitoring in these cases included ensuring timelines, funding, and legislative requirements were met. This is positive, as capital works made up the bulk of procurements (in terms of volume) in all of the audited councils.

That said, in all six councils, the level of scrutiny was lower for other types of procurements, and there is scope for improvement. For instance, the approach to monitoring capital works or externally funded projects could be replicated across other procurements of a similar nature and value. Conducting assessments and keeping records of supplier performance on all procurements does not need to be onerous, but instead provides useful information to inform future decision-making—including by helping ensure supplier pricing remains competitive, and avoiding re-engaging underperforming suppliers.

The NSW Government Procurement Policy Framework requires that NSW Government agencies establish systems and processes jointly with the suppliers to ensure compliance with contract terms and performance requirements. It also advises that agencies should drive continuous improvement and encourage innovation in coordination with suppliers and key stakeholders.

Centralised contract register

Centrally registering a contract provides improved transparency of procurement activities and facilitates monitoring and compliance checks. While councils are already required to maintain a contract register for all contracts above the reporting threshold (as per the GIPA Act), given the threshold is set at a relatively high benchmark ($150,000), there is merit in councils extending the practice to procurements below the reporting threshold. A central and comprehensive register of contracts helps avoid duplication of procurements and re-contracting of underperforming suppliers.

Three of the audited councils (Georges River Council, Tweed Shire Council and Wollongong City Council) had contract register policies that applied to procurements below the reporting threshold during the audited period. For example, Georges River Council required contracts valued at $10,000 or above to be registered with the procurement team, and Tweed Shire Council had a threshold of $50,000.

Evaluation of community outcomes and value for money

Councils may be progressing procurements to fulfill their strategic and business plans, or using them to fulfill commitments to the community. In these instances, outcomes evaluation is an important way to demonstrate to the community that the intended benefits and value for money have been delivered.

Five of the six audited councils did not require evaluations of community outcomes and value for money. While Georges River Council required contracts valued at $50,000 or more to be monitored, evaluated and reported on at least annually throughout the contract and also at its conclusion, in the procurements we examined the only ‘outcome evaluations’ that the council had conducted were community surveys that did not refer to individual procurements. Councils can miss opportunities to understand the impact of their work on the local community if evaluations of procurement outcomes are not completed. Evaluation findings are also valuable in guiding future resource allocation decisions.

Value for money in the procurement of goods and services is more than just having the specified goods delivered or services carried out. The NSW Government Procurement Policy Framework requires that state government agencies track and report benefits to demonstrate how value for money is being delivered. The framework notes that value for money is not necessarily the lowest price, nor the highest quality good or service, but requires a balanced assessment of a range of financial and non-financial factors, such as: quality, cost, fitness for purpose, capability, capacity, risk, total cost of ownership or other relevant factors.

Procurement training

Effective procurement management relies on the capability of staff involved in various stages of the process. Guidance can be provided through training, which is an important element of any procurement management framework. It ensures that staff members are aware of the councils' policies and procedures. If structured appropriately and provided in a timely manner, training can help to standardise practices, ensure compliance, reduce chances of error, and mitigate risks of fraud or corruption.

The ICAC notes that effective procurement management depends on the competence of staff undertaking procurements and the competence of those who oversee procurement activities. As the public sector is characterised by varying levels of procurement expertise, the ICAC notes that the sector would benefit from a structured approach to training and the application of minimum standards.3

At the time of this audit, only Wollongong City Council addressed staff training requirements in its procurement management framework. Exhibit 8 details its approach.

Exhibit 8: Wollongong City Council's approach to training
  • Wollongong City Council has a suite of procurement training available for staff, administered by a dedicated staff member who also monitors attendance and training needs
  • Staff must complete training before they can take part in a procurement or be a member of a tender assessment panel, and the council keeps a list of all accredited staff members.
  • Staff cannot access procurement files on the council's electronic records management system until they have received training and have been approved for access by the trainer.
  • Staff must be trained before they can receive a financial delegation.

Source: Audit Office of New South Wales analysis of Wollongong City Council's procurement policies and procedures 2020.
 

Two of the audited councils have now also introduced procurement training:

  • Georges River Council implemented online training, which is mandatory for new staff and serves as refresher training for existing staff. The council also provides in-person training for selected staff (covering contract management, contract specification writing and contractor relationship management) and has developed quick reference cards for all staff to increase awareness of the council's procurement processes.
  • Tweed Shire Council implemented mandatory online training for all staff members. The training covers the council's procurement policy and protocol as well as relevant legislation. It is linked to relevant council documents such as the Procurement Toolkit on the council's intranet, and includes a quiz for which training participants must score at least 80 per cent to have the training marked as completed.
(2) ICAC (2011) Corruption Risks in NSW Government Procurement – The Management Challenge.
(3) ICAC (2011) Corruption Risks in NSW Government Procurement – Recommendations to Government.

Appendix one – Responses from councils and the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment

Appendix two – Councils’ procurement contracts

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #345 - released 17 December 2020

Published

Actions for Transport 2020

Transport 2020

Transport
Asset valuation
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Information technology
Infrastructure
Project management

1. Financial Reporting

Audit opinion Unmodified audit opinions issued for the financial statements of all Transport cluster entities.
Quality and timeliness of financial reporting All cluster agencies met the statutory deadlines for completing the early close and submitting the financial statements.

Transport cluster agencies continued to experience some challenges with accounting for land and infrastructure assets. The former Roads and Maritime Services and Sydney Metro recorded prior period corrections to property, plant and equipment balances.
Impact of COVID-19 on passenger revenue and patronage Total patronage and revenue for public transport decreased by approximately 18 per cent in 2019–20 due to COVID-19.

The Transport cluster received additional funding from NSW Treasury during the year to support the reduced revenue and additional costs incurred such as cleaning on all modes of public transport and additional staff to manage physical distancing.
Completion of the CBD and South East Light Rail The CBD and South East Light Rail project was completed and commenced operations in this financial year. At 30 June 2020, the total cost of the project related to the CBD and South East Light Rail was $3.3 billion. Of this total cost, $2.6 billion was recorded as assets, whilst $700 million was expensed.

2. Audit Observations

Internal control While internal controls issues raised in management letters in the Transport cluster have decreased compared to the prior year, control weaknesses continue to exist in access security for financial systems. We identified 56 management letter findings across the cluster and 43 per cent of all issues were repeat issues. The majority of the repeat issues relate to information technology controls around user access management.

There were three high risk issues identified - two related to financial reporting of assets and one for implementation of TAHE (see below).
Agency responses to emergency events Transport for NSW established the COVID-19 Taskforce in March 2020 to take responsibility for the overall response of planning and coordination for the Transport cluster. It also implemented the COVIDSafe Transport Plan which incorporates guidance on physical distancing, increasing services to support social distancing and cleaning.
RailCorp transition to TAHE On 1 July 2020, RailCorp was renamed Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (TAHE) and converted to a for-profit statutory State-Owned Corporation. TAHE is a commercial for-profit Public Trading Entity with the intent to provide a commercial return to its shareholders.

A plan was established by NSW Treasury to transition RailCorp to TAHE which covered the period 1 July 2015 to 1 July 2019. A large portion of the planned arrangements were not implemented by 1 July 2020. As at the time of this report, the TAHE operating model, Statement of Corporate Intent (SCI) and other key plans and commercial agreements are not finalised. The State Owned Corporations Act 1989 generally requires finalisation of an SCI three months after the commencement of each financial year. However, under the Transport Administration Act 1988, TAHE received an extension from the voting shareholders, the Treasurer and Minister for Finance and Small Business, to submit its first SCI by 31 December 2020. In accordance with the original plan, interim commercial access arrangements were supposed to be in place with RailCorp prior to commencement of TAHE.

Under the transitional arrangements, TAHE is continuing to operate in accordance with the asset and safety management plans of RailCorp. The final operating model is expected to include considerations of safety, operational, financial and fiscal risks. This should include a consideration of the potential conflicting objectives of a commercial return, and maintenance and safety measures.

This matter has been included as a high risk finding in our management letter due to the significance of the financial reporting impacts and business risks for TAHE.

Recommendation: TAHE management should:
  • establish an operating model in line with the original intent of a commercial return
  • finalise commercial agreements with the public rail operators
  • confirm forecast financial information to assess valuation of TAHE infrastructure
  • finalise asset and safety management plans.

Resolution of the above matters are critical as they may significantly impact the financial reporting arrangements for TAHE for 2020–21, in particular, accounting policies adopted as well as measurement principles of its significant infrastructure asset base.

Completeness and accuracy of contracts registers Across the Transport cluster, contracts and agreements are maintained by the transport agencies using disparate registers.

Recommendation (repeat): Transport agencies should continue to implement a process to centrally capture all contracts and agreements entered. This will ensure:
  • agencies are fully aware of contractual and other obligations
  • appropriate assessment of financial reporting implications
  • ongoing assessments of accounting standards, in particular AASB 16 ‘Leases’, AASB 15 'Revenue from Contract with Customers', AASB 1058 'Income of Not-for-Profit Entities' and new accounting standard AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors' are accurate and complete.

 

This report provides parliament and other users of the Transport cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations
  • the impact of emergencies and the pandemic.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Transport cluster for 2020, including any financial implications from the recent emergency events.

Section highlights

  • Total patronage and revenue for public transport decreased by approximately 18 per cent in 2019–20 due to COVID-19.
  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all Transport agencies' financial statements.
  • Transport cluster agencies continued to experience challenges with accounting of land and infrastructure assets.

 

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our:

  • observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport cluster
  • assessment of how well cluster agencies adapted their systems, policies and procedures, and governance arrangements in response to recent emergencies.

Section highlights

  • While there was a decrease in findings on internal controls across the Transport cluster, 43 per cent of all issues were repeat issues. Many repeat issues related to information technology controls around user access management.
  • RailCorp transitioned to TAHE on 1 July 2020. TAHE's operating model and commercial arrangements with public rail operators has not been finalised despite government original plans to be operating from 1 July 2019. TAHE management should finalise its operating model and commercial agreements with public rail operators as they may significantly impact the financial reporting arrangements for TAHE for 2020–21.
  • Completeness and accuracy of contracts registers remains an ongoing issue for the Transport cluster.

Appendix one – List of 2020 recommendations

Appendix two – Status of 2019, 2018 and 2017 recommendations

Appendix three – Management letter findings

Appendix four – Financial data

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Waste levy and grants for waste infrastructure

Waste levy and grants for waste infrastructure

Planning
Environment
Management and administration
Regulation
Risk
Service delivery

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today that examined the effectiveness of the waste levy and grants for waste infrastructure in minimising the amount of waste sent to landfill and increasing recycling rates.  

The audit found that the waste levy has a positive impact on diverting waste from landfill. However, while the levy rates increase each year in line with the consumer price index, the EPA has not conducted a review since 2009 to confirm whether they are set at the optimal level. The audit also found that there were no objective and transparent criteria for which local government areas should pay the levy, and the list of levied local government areas has not been reviewed since 2014. 

Grant funding programs for waste infrastructure administered by the EPA and the Environmental Trust have supported increases in recycling capacity. However, these grant programs are not guided by a clear strategy for investment in waste infrastructure. 

The Auditor-General made six recommendations aimed at ensuring the waste levy is as effective as possible at meeting its objectives and ensuring funding for waste infrastructure is contributing effectively to recycling and waste diversion targets.

 

Overall, waste generation in New South Wales (NSW) is increasing. This leads to an increasing need to manage waste in ways that reduce the environmental impact of waste and promote the efficient use of resources. In 2014, the NSW Government set targets relating to recycling rates and diversion of waste from landfill, to be achieved by 2021–22. The NSW Waste and Resource Recovery (WARR) Strategy 2014–21 identifies the waste levy, a strong compliance regime, and investment in recycling infrastructure as key tools for achieving these waste targets.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the NSW Government in minimising waste sent to landfill and increasing recycling rates. The audit focused on the waste levy, which is paid by waste facility operators when waste is sent to landfill, and grant programs that fund infrastructure for waste reuse and recycling.

The waste levy is regulated by the Environment Protection Authority (EPA) and is generally paid when waste is disposed in landfill. The waste levy rates are set by the NSW Government and prescribed in the Protection of Environment Operations (Waste) Regulation 2014. As part of its broader role in reviewing the regulatory framework for managing waste and recycling, the EPA can provide advice to the government on the operation of the waste levy.

The purpose of the waste levy is to act as an incentive for waste generators to reduce, re-use or recycle waste by increasing the cost of sending waste to landfill. In 2019–20, around $750 million was collected through the waste levy in NSW. The government spends approximately one third of the revenue raised through the waste levy on waste and environmental programs.

One of the waste programs funded through the one third allocation of the waste levy is Waste Less, Recycle More (WLRM). This initiative funds smaller grant programs that focus on specific aspects of waste management. This audit focused on five grant programs that fund projects that provide new or enhanced waste infrastructure such as recycling facilities. Four of these programs were administered by the Environmental Trust and one by the EPA.

Conclusion

The waste levy has a positive impact on diverting waste from landfill. However, aspects of the EPA's administration of the waste levy could be improved, including the frequency of its modelling of the waste levy impact and coverage, and the timeliness of reporting. Grant funding programs have supported increases in recycling capacity but are not guided by a clear strategy for investment in waste infrastructure which would help effectively target them to where waste infrastructure is most needed. Data published by the EPA indicates that the NSW Government is on track to meet the recycling target for construction and demolition waste, but recycling targets for municipal solid waste and commercial and industrial waste are unlikely to be met.

Waste levy

The waste levy rate, including a schedule of annual increases to 2016, was set by the NSW Government in 2009. Since 2016, the waste levy rate has increased in line with the consumer price index (CPI). The EPA has not conducted recent modelling to test whether the waste levy is set at the optimal level to achieve its objectives. The waste levy operation was last reviewed in 2012, although some specific aspects of the waste levy have been reviewed more recently, including reviews of waste levy rates for two types of waste. The waste levy is applied at different rates across the state. Decisions about which local government areas (LGAs) are subject to the levy, and which rate each LGA pays, were made in 2009 and potential changes were considered but not implemented in 2014. Currently, there are no objective and transparent criteria for determining which LGAs pay the levy. The EPA collects waste data from waste operators. This data has improved since 2015, but published data is at least one year out of date which limits its usefulness to stakeholders when making decisions relating to waste management.

Grants for waste infrastructure

All state funding for new and enhanced waste infrastructure in NSW is administered through grants to councils and commercial waste operators. The government's Waste and Resource Recovery (WARR) Strategy 2014–21 includes few priorities for waste infrastructure and there is no other waste infrastructure strategy in place to guide investment. The absence of a formal strategy to guide infrastructure investment in NSW limits the ability of the State Government to develop a shared understanding between planners, councils and the waste industry about waste infrastructure requirements and priorities. The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment is currently developing a 20-year waste strategy and there is an opportunity for the government to take a more direct role in planning the type, location and timing of waste infrastructure needed in NSW.

The grants administration procedures used for the grant programs reviewed in this audit were well designed. However, we identified some gaps in risk management, record-keeping and consistency of information provided to applicants and assessment teams. In four of the five programs we examined, there was no direct alignment between program objectives and the NSW Government's overall waste targets.

Achievement of the 2014–21 state targets for waste and resource recovery (WARR targets) is reliant in part on the availability of infrastructure that supports waste diversion and recycling. The state WARR targets dependent on waste infrastructure are:

  • Increase recycling rates to 70 per cent for municipal solid waste and commercial and industrial waste, and 80 per cent for construction and demolition waste.
  • Increase waste diverted from landfill to 75 per cent.

A further target — manage problem waste better by establishing or upgrading 86 drop-off facilities or services for managing household problem wastes state-wide — is dependent on accessible community waste drop-off facilities across NSW.

Exhibit 7 identifies the five grant programs that provide funding for new or enhanced waste infrastructure to increase capacity for reuse or recycling of waste. All five of these programs were examined in the audit.
In addition to the grant programs shown in Exhibit 7, other programs provide funding for infrastructure, but at a smaller scale. Examples of these include:

  • Bin Trim which provides rebates to small businesses for small scale recycling equipment such as cardboard and soft plastic balers.
  • Litter grants which provide funding for litter bins.
  • Weighbridges grants for installation of a weighbridge at waste facilities.
  • Landfill consolidation and environmental improvement grants for rural councils to replace old landfills with transfer stations or to improve the infrastructure at landfill sites.

Appendix one – Responses from audited agencies

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #343 - released 26 November 2020

Published

Actions for Internal controls and governance 2020

Internal controls and governance 2020

Education
Environment
Community Services
Finance
Health
Industry
Justice
Premier and Cabinet
Transport
Treasury
Compliance
Cyber security
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford today released her report on the findings and recommendations from the 2019–20 financial audits that relate to internal controls and governance at 40 of the largest agencies in the NSW public sector.

The bushfire and flood emergencies and the COVID‑19 pandemic continue to have a significant impact on the people and public sector of New South Wales. The scale of the government response to these events has been significant. The report focuses on the effectiveness of internal controls and governance processes, including relevant agencies’ response to the emergencies. In particular, the report focuses on:

  • financial and information technology controls
  • business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements
  • procurement, including emergency procurement
  • delegations that support timely and effective decision-making.

Due to the ongoing impact of COVID‑19 agencies have not yet returned to a business‑as‑usual environment. ‘Agencies will need to assess their response to the recent emergencies and update their business continuity, disaster recovery and other business resilience frameworks to reflect the lessons learnt from these events’ the Auditor-General said.

The report noted that special procurement provisions were put in place to allow agencies to better respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Auditor-General recommended agencies update their procurement policies to reflect the current requirements of the NSW Procurement Framework and the emergency procurement requirements.

Read the PDF report

This report analyses the internal controls and governance of 40 of the largest agencies in the NSW public sector for the year ended 30 June 2020. These 40 agencies constitute an estimated 85 per cent of total expenditure for all NSW public sector agencies.

1. Internal control trends
New, repeat and high risk findings

Internal control deficiencies increased by 13 per cent compared to last year. This is predominately due to a seven per cent increase in new internal control deficiencies and 24 per cent increase in repeat internal control deficiencies. There were ten high risk findings compared to four last year.

The recent emergencies have consumed agency time and resources and may have contributed to the increase in internal control deficiencies, particularly repeat deficiencies.

Agencies should:

  • prioritise addressing high-risk findings
  • address repeat internal control deficiencies by re-setting action plans and timeframes and monitoring the implementation status of recommendations.
Common findings

A number of findings remain common across multiple agencies over the last four years, including:

  • out of date or missing policies to guide appropriate decisions
  • poor record keeping and document retention
  • incomplete or inaccurate centralised registers or gaps in these registers.
2. Information technology controls
IT general controls

We found deficiencies in information security controls over key financial systems including:

  • user access administration deficiencies relating to inadequate oversight of the granting, review and removal of user access at 53 per cent of agencies
  • privileged users were not appropriately monitored at 43 per cent of agencies
  • deficient password controls that did not align to the agency's own password policies at 25 per cent of agencies.

The deficiencies above increase the risk of non-compliance with the NSW Cyber Security Policy, which requires agencies to have processes in place to manage user access, including privileged user access to sensitive information or systems and remove that access once it is not required or employment is terminated.

3. Business continuity and disaster recovery planning
Assessing risks to business continuity and Scenario testing

The response to the recent emergencies and the COVID-19 pandemic has encompassed a wide range of activities, including policy setting, on-going service delivery, safety and availability of staff, availability of IT and other systems and financial management. Agencies were required to activate their business continuity plans in response, and with the continued impact of COVID-19 have not yet returned to a business-as-usual environment.

Our audits focused on the preparedness of agency business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

We identified deficiencies in agency business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements. Twenty-three per cent of agencies had not conducted a business impact analysis (BIA) to identify critical business functions and determine business continuity priorities. Agencies can also improve the content of their BIA. For example, ten per cent of agencies' BIAs did not include recovery time objectives and six per cent of agencies did not identify key IT systems that support critical business functions. Scenario testing improves the effectiveness with which a live crisis is handled, but 40 per cent of agencies had not conducted a business continuity scenario testing exercise in the period from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2019. There were also opportunities to improve the effectiveness of scenario testing exercises by:

  • involving key dependent or inter-dependent third parties who support or deliver critical business functions
  • testing one or more high impact scenarios identified in their business continuity plan
  • preparing a formalpost-exercise report documenting the outcome of their scenario testing.

Agencies have responded to the recent emergencies but addressing deficiencies will ensure agencies have adequate safeguards in their processes to again respond in the future, if required.

During 2020–21 we plan to conduct a performance audit on 'Business continuity and disaster recovery planning'. This audit will consider the effectiveness of agency business continuity planning arrangements to maintain business continuity through the recent emergencies and/or COVID-19 pandemic and return to a business-as-usual environment. We also plan to conduct a performance audit on whole-of-government 'Coordination of emergency responses'.

Responding to disruptions

We found agencies' governance functions could have been better informed about responses to disruptive incidents that had activated a business continuity or disaster recovery response between 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2019. For instance:

in 89 per cent of instances where a business continuity response was activated, a post-incident review had been performed. In 82 per cent of these instances, the outcomes were reported to a relevant governance or executive management committee

in 95 per cent of instances where a disaster recovery response was activated, a post incident review had been performed. In 86 per cent of these instances, the outcomes were reported to a relevant governance committee or executive management committee.

Examples of recorded incidents included extensive air quality issues and power outages due to bushfires, system and network outages, and infected and hijacked servers.

Agencies should assess their response to the recent emergencies and the COVID-19 pandemic and update business continuity, disaster recovery and other business resilience frameworks to incorporate lessons learned. Agencies should report to those charged with governance on the results and planned actions.

Management review and oversight Eighty-two per cent and 86 per cent of agencies report to their audit and risk committees (ARC) on their business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements, respectively. Only 18 per cent and five per cent of ARCs are briefed on the results of respective scenario testing. Briefing ARCs on the results of scenario testing exercises helps inform their decisions about whether sound and effective business continuity and disaster recovery arrangements have been established.
4. Procurement, including emergency procurement
Policy framework

Agency procurement policies did not capture the requirements of several key NSW Procurement Board Directions (the Directions), increasing the risk of non-compliance with the Directions. We noted: 

  • 67 per cent of agencies did specify that procurement above $650,000 must be open to market unless exempt or procured through an existing Whole of Government Scheme or contract
  • 36 per cent of agencies did specify that procurements above $500,000 payable in foreign currencies must be hedged
  • 69 per cent of agencies' policies did specify that the agency head or cluster CFO must authorise the engagement of consultants where the engagement of the supplier does not comply with the standard commercial framework.

Recommendation: Agencies should review their procurement policies and guidelines to ensure they capture the key requirements of the NSW Government Procurement Policy Framework, including NSW Procurement Board Directions.

Managing contracts

Eighty-eight per cent of agencies maintain a central contract register to record all details of contracts above $150,000, which is a requirement of GIPA legislation. Of the agencies that maintained registers, 13 per cent did not capture all contracts and eight per cent did not include all relevant contract details.

Sixteen per cent of agencies did not periodically review their contract register. Timely review increases compliance with GIPA legislation, and enhances the effectiveness with which procurement business units monitor contract end dates, contract extensions and commence new procurement.

Training and support

Ninety-three per cent of agencies provide training to staff involved in procurement processes, and a further 77 per cent of agencies provide this training on an on-going basis. Of the seven per cent of agencies that had not provided training to staff, we noted gaps in aspects of their procurement activity, including:

  • not conducting value for money assessments prior to renewing or extending the contract with their existing supplier
  • not obtaining approval from a delegated authority to commence the procurement process
  • procurement documentation not specifying certain key details such as the conditions for participation including any financial guarantees and dates for the delivery of goods or supply of services.

Training on procurement activities ensures there is effective management of procurement processes to support operational requirements, and compliance with procurement directions.

Procurement activities While agencies had implemented controls for tender activities above $650,000, 43 per cent of unaccredited agencies did not comply with the NSW Procurement Policy Framework because they had not had their procurement endorsed by an accredited agency within the cluster or by NSW Procurement. This endorsement aims to ensure the procurement is properly planned to deliver a value for money outcome before it commences.
Emergency procurement

As at 30 June 2020, agencies within the scope of this report reported conducting 32,239 emergency procurements with a total contract value of $316,908,485. Emergency procurement activities included the purchase of COVID-19 cleaning and hygiene supplies.

The government, through NSW Procurement released the 'COVID-19 Emergency procurement procedure', which relaxed procurement requirements to allow agencies to make COVID-19 emergency procurements. Our review against the emergency procurement measures found most agencies complied with requirements. For example:

  • 95 per cent of agencies documented an assessment of the need for the emergency procurement for the good and/or service
  • 86 per cent of agencies obtained authorisation of the emergency procurement by the agency head or the nominated employee under Public Works and Procurement Regulation 2019
  • 76 per cent of agencies reported the emergency procurement to the NSW Procurement Board.

Complying with the procedure helps to ensure government resources are being efficiently, effectively, economically and in accordance with the law.

Recommendation: Agency procurement frameworks should be reviewed and updated so they can respond effectively to emergency situations that may arise in the future. This includes:

  • updating procurement policies and guidelines to define an emergency situation, specify who can approve emergency procurement and capture other key requirements
  • using standard templates and documentation to prompt users to capture key requirements, such as needs analysis, supplier selection criteria, price assessment criteria, licence and insurance checks
  • having processes for reporting on emergency procurements to those charged with governance and NSW Procurement.
5. Delegations
Instruments of delegation

We found that agencies have established financial and human resources delegations, but some had not revisited their delegation manuals following the legislative and machinery of government changes. For those agencies impacted by machinery of government changes we noted:

  • 16 per cent of agencies had not updated their financial delegations to reflect the changes
  • 16 per cent of agencies did not update their human resources delegations to reflect the changes.

Delegations manuals are not always complete; 16 per cent of agencies had no delegation for writing off bad debts and 26 per cent of agencies had no delegation for writing off capital assets.

Recommendation: Agencies should ensure their financial and human resources delegation manuals contain regular set review dates and are updated to reflect the Government Sector Finance Act 2018, machinery of government changes and their current organisational structure and roles and responsibilities.

Compliance with delegations

Agencies did not understand or correctly apply the requirements of the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 (GSF Act), resulting in non-compliance with the Act. We found that 18 per cent of agencies spent deemed appropriations without obtaining an authorised delegation from the relevant Minister(s), as required by sections 4.6(1) and 5.5(3) of the GSF Act.

Further detail on this issue will be included in our Auditor-General's Reports to Parliament on Central Agencies, Education, Health and Stronger Communities, which will be tabled throughout December 2020.

Recommendation: Agencies should review financial and human resources delegations to ensure they capture all key functions of laws and regulations, and clearly specify the relevant power or function being conferred on the officer.

6. Status of 2019 recommendations
Progress implementing last year's recommendations

Recommendations were made last year to improve transparency over reporting on gifts and benefits and improve the visibility management and those charged with governance had over actions taken to address conflicts of interest that may arise. This year, we continue to note:

  • 38 per cent of agencies have not updated their gifts and benefits register to include all the key fields required under the minimum standards set by the Public Service Commission
  • 56 per cent of agencies have not provided training to staff and 63 per cent of agencies have not implemented an annual attestation process for senior management
  • 97 per cent of agencies have not published their gifts and benefits register on their website and 41 per cent of agencies are not reporting on trends in the gifts and benefits register to those charged with governance.

While we acknowledge the significance of the recent emergencies, which have consumed agency time and resources, we note limited progress has been made implementing these recommendations. Further detail on the status of implementing all recommendations is in Appendix 2.

Recommendation: Agencies should re-visit the recommendations made in last year's report on internal controls and governance and action these recommendations.

Internal controls are processes, policies and procedures that help agencies to:

  • operate effectively and efficiently
  • produce reliable financial reports
  • comply with laws and regulations
  • support ethical government.

This chapter outlines the overall trends for agency controls and governance issues, including the number of audit findings, the degree of risk those deficiencies pose to the agency, and a summary of the most common deficiencies we found across agencies. The rest of this report presents this year’s controls and governance findings in more detail.

Section highlights

We identified ten high risk findings, compared to four last year with two findings repeated from the previous year. There was an overall increase of 13 per cent in the number of internal control deficiencies compared to last year due to a seven per cent increase in new internal control deficiencies, and a 24 per cent increase in repeat internal control deficiencies. The recent emergencies have consumed agency time and resources and may have contributed to the increase in internal control deficiencies, particularly repeat deficiencies.

We identified a number of findings that remain common across multiple agencies over the last four years. Some of these findings related to areas that are fundamental to good internal control environments and effective organisational governance. Examples include:

  • out of date or missing policies to guide appropriate decisions
  • poor record keeping and document retention
  • incomplete or inaccurate centralised registers, or gaps in these registers.

Policies, procedures and internal controls should be properly designed, be appropriate for the current organisational structure and its business activities, and work effectively.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency controls to manage key financial systems.

Section highlights

Government agencies’ financial reporting is heavily reliant on information technology (IT). We continue to see a high number of deficiencies related to IT general controls, particularly those related to user access administration. These controls are key in adequately protecting IT systems from inappropriate access and misuse.

IT is also important to the delivery of agency services. These systems often provide the data to help monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of agency processes and services they deliver. Our financial audits do not review all agency IT systems. For example, IT systems used to support agency service delivery are generally outside the scope of our financial audit. However, agencies should also consider the relevance of our findings to these systems.

Agencies need to continue to focus on assessing the risks of inappropriate access and misuse and the implementation of controls to adequately protect their systems, focussing on the processes in place to grant, remove and monitor user access, particularly privileged user access.

 

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements.

Section highlights

We identified deficiencies in agency business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements and opportunities for agencies to enhance their business continuity management and disaster recovery planning arrangements. This will better prepare them to respond to a disruption to their critical functions, resulting from an emergency or other serious event. Twenty-three per cent of agencies had not conducted a business impact analysis (BIA) to identify critical business functions and determine business continuity priorities and 40 per cent of agencies had not conducted a business continuity scenario testing exercise in the period from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2019. Scenario testing improves the effectiveness with which a live crisis is handled.

This section focusses on the preparedness of agency business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. While agencies have responded to the recent emergencies, proactively addressing deficiencies will ensure agencies have adequate safeguards in their processes to again respond in the future, if required.

During 2020–21 we plan to conduct a performance audit on 'Business continuity and disaster recovery planning'. This audit will consider the effectiveness of agency business continuity planning arrangements to maintain business continuity through the recent emergencies and/or COVID-19 pandemic and return to a business-as-usual environment. We also plan to conduct a performance audit on whole-of-government 'Coordination of emergency responses'.

 

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of procurement agency procurement policies and procurement activity.

Section highlights

We found agencies have procurement policies in place to manage procurement activity, but the content of these policies was not sufficiently detailed to ensure compliance with NSW Procurement Board Directions (the Directions). The Directions aim to ensure procurement activity achieves value for money and meets the principles of probity and fairness.

Agencies have generally implemented controls over their procurement process. In relation to emergency procurement activity, agencies reported conducting 32,239 emergency procurements with a total contract value of $316,908,485 up to 30 June 2020. Our review of emergency procurement activity conducted during 2019–20 identified areas where some agencies did not fully comply with the 'COVID-19 Emergency procurement procedure'.

We also found not all agencies are maintaining complete and accurate contract registers. This not only increases the risk of non-compliance with GIPA legislation, but also limits the effectiveness of procurement business units to monitor contract end dates, contract extensions and commence new procurement in a timely manner. We noted instances where agencies renewed or extended contracts without going through a competitive tender process during the year.

 

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency compliance with financial and human resources delegations.

Section highlights
We found that agencies are not always regularly reviewing and updating their financial and human resources delegations when there are changes to legislation or other organisational changes within the agency or from machinery of government changes. For example, agencies did not understand or correctly apply the requirements of the GSF Act, resulting in non-compliance with the Act. We found that 18 per cent of agencies spent deemed appropriations without obtaining an authorised delegation from the relevant Minister(s), as required by sections 4.6(1) and 5.5(3) of the GSF Act.
In order for agencies to operate efficiently, make necessary expenditure and human resource decisions quickly and lawfully, particularly in emergency situations, it is important that delegations are kept up to date, provide clear authority to decision makers and are widely communicated.

Appendix one – List of 2020 recommendations 

Appendix two – Status of 2019 recommendations

Appendix three – Cluster agencies

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Support for regional town water infrastructure

Support for regional town water infrastructure

Industry
Environment
Local Government
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Regulation
Risk

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining whether the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment has effectively supported the planning for, and funding of, town water infrastructure in regional NSW.

The audit found that the department has not effectively supported or overseen town water infrastructure planning since at least 2014. It does not have a clear regulatory approach and lacks internal procedures and data to guide its support for local water utilities that service around 1.85 million people in regional NSW.

The audit also found that the department has not had a strategy in place to target investments in town water infrastructure to the areas of greatest priority. A state-wide plan is now in development.

The Auditor-General made seven recommendations to the department, aimed at improving the administration and transparency of its oversight, support and funding for town water infrastructure, and at strengthening its sector engagement and interagency coordination on town water planning issues and investments.

According to the Auditor-General, ‘A continued focus on coordinating town water planning, investments and sector engagement is needed for the department to more effectively support, plan for and fund town water infrastructure, and to work with local water utilities to help avoid future shortages of safe water in regional towns and cities.’ 

This report is part of a multi-volume series on the theme of water. Refer to ‘Water conservation in Greater Sydney’ and ‘Water management and regulation – undertaking in 2020-21’.

Read full report (PDF)

Safe and reliable water and sewer services are essential for community health and wellbeing, environmental protection, and economic productivity. In 2019, during intense drought, around ten regional New South Wales (NSW) cities or towns were close to ‘zero’ water and others had six to 12 months of supply. In some towns, water quality was declared unsafe.

Ensuring the right water and sewer infrastructure in regional NSW to deliver these services (known as 'town water infrastructure') involves a strategic, integrated approach to water management. The NSW Government committed to ‘secure long-term potable water supplies for towns and cities’ in 2011. In 2019, it reiterated a commitment to invest in water security by funding town water infrastructure projects.

The New South Wales’ Water Management Act 2000 (WM Act) aims to promote the sustainable, integrated and best practice management of the State’s water resources, and establishes the priority of town water for meeting critical human needs.

The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) is the lead agency for water resource policy, regulation and planning in NSW. It is also responsible for ensuring water management is consistent with the shared commitments of the Australian, State and Territory Governments under the National Water Initiative. This includes the provision of healthy, safe and reliable water supplies, and reporting on the performance of water utilities.

Ninety-two Local Water Utilities (LWUs) plan for, price and deliver town water services in regional NSW. Eighty-nine are operated by local councils under the New South Wales’ Local Government Act 1993, and other LWUs exercise their functions under the WM Act. The Minister for Water, Property and Housing is the responsible minister for water supply functions under both acts.

The department is the primary regulator of LWUs. NSW Health, the NSW Environment Protection Authority (EPA) and the Natural Access Resource Regulator (NRAR) also regulate aspects of LWUs' operations. The department’s legislative powers with respect to LWUs cover approving infrastructure developments and intervening where there are town water risks, or in emergencies. In this context, the department administers the Best Practice Management of Water Supply and Sewerage Guidelines (BPM Guidelines) to support its regulation and to assist LWUs to strategically plan and price their services, including their planning for town water infrastructure.

Under the BPM Guidelines, the department supports LWU’s town water infrastructure planning with the Integrated Water Cycle Management (IWCM) Checklist. The Checklist outlines steps for LWUs to prepare an IWCM strategy: a long-term planning document that sets out town water priorities, including infrastructure and non-infrastructure investments, water conservation and drought measures. The department's objective is to review and approve (i.e. give ‘concurrence to’) an IWCM strategy before the LWU implements it. In turn, these documents should provide the department with evidence of town water risks, issues and infrastructure priorities.

The department also assesses and co-funds LWU's town water infrastructure projects. In 2017, the department launched the $1 billion Safe and Secure Water Program to ensure town water infrastructure in regional NSW is secure and meets current health and environmental standards. The program was initially established under the Restart NSW Fund.

This audit examined whether the department has effectively supported the planning for and funding of town water infrastructure in regional NSW. It focused on the department’s activities since 2014. This audit follows a previous Audit Office of NSW report which found that the department had helped to promote better management practices in the LWU sector, up to 2012–13.

Conclusion

The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment has not effectively supported or overseen town water infrastructure planning in regional NSW since at least 2014. It has also lacked a strategic, evidence-based approach to target investments in town water infrastructure.

A continued focus on coordinating town water planning, investments and sector engagement is needed for the department to more effectively support, plan for and fund town water infrastructure, and work with Local Water Utilities to help avoid future shortages of safe water in regional towns and cities.

The department has had limited impact on facilitating Local Water Utilities’ (LWU) strategic town water planning. Its lack of internal procedures, records and data mean that the department cannot demonstrate it has effectively engaged, guided or supported the LWU sector in Integrated Water Cycle Management (IWCM) planning over the past six years. Today, less than ten per cent of the 92 LWUs have an IWCM strategy approved by the department.

The department did not design or implement a strategic approach for targeting town water infrastructure investment through its $1 billion Safe and Secure Water Program (SSWP). Most projects in the program were reviewed by a technical panel but there was limited evidence available about regional and local priorities to inform strategic project assessments. About a third of funded SSWP projects were recommended via various alternative processes that were not transparent. The department also lacks systems for integrated project monitoring and program evaluation to determine the contribution of its investments to improved town water outcomes for communities. The department has recently developed a risk-based framework to inform future town water infrastructure funding priorities.

The department does not have strategic water plans in place at state and regional levels: a key objective of these is to improve town water for regional communities. The department started a program of regional water planning in 2018, following the NSW Government’s commitment to this in 2014. It also started developing a state water strategy in 2020, as part of an integrated water planning framework to align local, regional and state priorities. One of 12 regional water strategies has been completed and the remaining strategies are being developed to an accelerated timeframe: this has limited the department’s engagement with some LWUs on town water risks and priorities.

Regional New South Wales (NSW) is home to about a third of the state's population. Infrastructure that provides safe and reliable water and sewer services (also known simply as 'town water infrastructure') is essential for community health and wellbeing, environmental protection, and economic productivity. Planning for and meeting these infrastructure needs, as well as identifying when non-infrastructure options may be a better solution, involves a strategic and integrated approach to water resource management in regional NSW.

We examined whether the department has effectively supported planning for town water infrastructure since 2014. This assessment was made in the context of its current approach to LWU sector regulation. The findings below focus on whether the department has an effective framework including governance arrangements for town water issues to inform state-wide strategic water planning, and whether (at the local level) the department has effectively overseen and facilitated town water infrastructure planning through its Integrated Water Cycle Management (IWCM) planning guidance to LWUs.

We examined whether the department has effectively targeted town water infrastructure funding to policy objectives, with a focus on the design and implementation of the Safe and Secure Water Program (SSWP) since its commencement in 2017. The program’s aim was to fund town water infrastructure projects that would deliver health, social and environmental benefits, and support economic growth and productivity. We also assessed the department’s capacity to demonstrate the outcomes of the SSWP funding and the contributions of its town water infrastructure investments more broadly. Finally, we identified risks to the effectiveness of the department’s work underway since 2018–19, which is intended to enhance its strategic water planning and approach to prioritising investments in reducing town water risks.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Key terms

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #341 - released 24 September 2020

Published

Actions for Governance and internal controls over local infrastructure contributions

Governance and internal controls over local infrastructure contributions

Local Government
Planning
Environment
Compliance
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Service delivery

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today on how well four councils managed their local infrastructure contributions during the 2017-18 and 2018-19 financial years. 

Local infrastructure contributions, also known as developer contributions, are collected from developers to pay for local infrastructure such as drainage, local roads, open space and community facilities. Controls over local infrastructure contributions help to ensure that all contributions owed are collected, funds are spent as intended, and any contributions paid in the form of works-in-kind or dedicated land are correctly valued.

The audit found that Blacktown City Council and City of Sydney Council provided effective governance over their local infrastructure contributions whereas Central Coast and Liverpool City Councils’ governance arrangements require improvement.

The audit found that three councils had spent local infrastructure contributions in accordance with approved contributions plans. Central Coast Council and the former Gosford City Council had spent $13.2 million on administration costs in breach of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979. These funds were repaid into the council’s local infrastructure fund during the course of the audit.

The Auditor-General made a number of recommendations for each council relating to improving controls over contributions and increasing transparency. 

Read full report (PDF)
 

This audit examined the effectiveness of governance and internal controls over local infrastructure contributions, also known as developer contributions, held by four councils during the 2017–18 and 2018–19 financial years.

This performance audit was conducted with reference to the legislative and regulatory planning framework that was in place during that period.

Our work for this performance audit was completed at the end of March 2020 when we issued the final report to the four audited councils and the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment. We received their respective formal responses to the report’s recommendations during April and May 2020.

Concurrently to this audit, we sought Crown Solicitor’s advice (the ‘Advice’) regarding the use of local infrastructure contributions collected by local councils under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (‘the EPA Act’) for our financial audit work. The Advice clarified the applicable legislative requirements with reference to the application, investment and pooling of local infrastructure contributions. The Advice is included in Appendix 2 of this report. The Advice has not impacted on the findings and recommendations of this report.

Councils collect Local Infrastructure Contributions (LICs) from developers under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act (1979), the Local Government Act (1993) and the City of Sydney Act (2000) (EP&A Act, LG Act and City of Sydney Act) to fund infrastructure required to service and support new development. At 30 June 2018, councils across NSW collectively held more than $3.0 billion in LICs collected from developers. Just over $1.37 billion in total was held by ten councils. Councils collecting LICs must prepare a contributions plan, which outlines how LICs will be calculated and apportioned across different types of infrastructure. Councils that deliver water and sewer services prepare a development servicing plan (DSP) which allows them to collect contributions for water and sewer infrastructure.

Development timeframes are such that there is often several years between when LICs are collected and the infrastructure is required. Good governance and internal controls are needed over these funds to ensure they are available when needed and spent appropriately.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of governance and internal controls over LICs collected by four councils during the 2017–18 and 2018–19 financial years: Blacktown City Council, Central Coast Council, City of Sydney Council and Liverpool City Council. As at June 2018 these councils held the four highest LIC balances, each in excess of $140 million.

Audit Conclusion

Three of the four councils audited were currently compliant with legislation, regulations and Ministerial Directions regarding LICs. All had gaps in governance and controls over LICs which limited effective oversight.

Three of the councils included in the audit complied with legislation, regulations and Ministerial Directions relating to LICs. Central Coast Council breached the EP&A Act between 2001 and 2019 when it used LICs for administration costs. These funds were repaid in late 2019.

While controls over the receipt and expenditure of contributions funds were largely in place at all councils, there were some exceptions relating to valuing work and land delivered in lieu of cash. Three councils do not provide probity guidance in policies relating to LICs delivered through works-in-kind. Three of the councils had contributions plans that were more than five years old.

Staff at all four councils are knowledgeable about LICs but not all councils keep procedures up to date. Three councils' governance frameworks operate effectively with senior officers from across the council involved in decisions about spending LICs, entering into voluntary planning agreements (VPAs) and reviewing contributions plans.

Transparency over key information relating to LICs is important for senior management so they can make informed decisions, and for the community who pay LICs and expect infrastructure to be provided. During the period of the audit, none of the councils included in the audit provided sufficient information to senior management or their councillors about the projected financial status of contributions plans. This information would be valuable when making broader strategic and financial decisions. Information about LIC levies and intended infrastructure is available to the community but not always easy to find.

A strong governance framework is important at each council to ensure that the funds are managed well, available when needed and spent as intended. The audit examined the following features of each council's governance framework as they apply to LICs:

  • decision-making by councillors and council officers relating to LICs
  • monitoring delivery of contributions plans and DSPs including:
    • reviewing assumptions underlying the plans
    • monitoring projected status of plans.

Internal controls over LICs are important to promote accountability, prevent fraud and deliver infrastructure to the required standard at the best possible price. If financial controls are weak or are not implemented well, there is a risk that LICs are misspent or that councils pay too much for infrastructure.

Not all councils' internal controls adequately addressed risks associated with the administration of LICs

The audit examined a number of internal controls that manage risks related to LICs. These included:

  • financial controls over receipt and expenditure of LIC funds
  • management of conflicts-of-interest when dealing with developers
  • independent valuations of works-in-kind and dedicated land
  • ensuring delivery and quality of works-in-kind, and obtaining security from developers in the event of non-delivery or poor quality work
  • management of variations to VPAs and works-in-kind agreements.

We reviewed controls included in policies and procedures and then checked samples of work to ensure that controls were implemented. We found variation in the controls that councils implemented, and some weaknesses in controls. It is a matter for each council to assess their financial risk and develop internal controls that support the collection, management, and expenditure of LICs. However, councils must be able to assure their communities and developers that they are doing everything possible to collect all LICs owing and that work conducted by developers in lieu of cash payments is properly valued and carried out to the required standard.

Further information about audit findings in relation to internal controls for each council are included in chapters five to eight. The exhibit below demonstrates variation in several controls implemented in the audited councils.

In a 2018 report, the Independent Commission Against Corruption noted that 'the appetite for transparency is expanding in both the public and private sectors'.

The Practice Note and S64 Guidance refer to transparency, including the importance of transparency over:

  • calculation and apportionment of LICs
  • funding of infrastructure, including where and when infrastructure is delivered
  • arrangements made with developers through VPAs.

The LIC system is largely transparent for community members who know where to look

Contributions plans and DSPs are public documents, exhibited to the public before being adopted by council. Councils included in the audit publish their contributions plans and DSPs on their websites and meet statutory requirements with regard to reporting and accessibility of information.

However, other public information relating to the LIC system is fragmented across different websites and reports and varies in detail across councils.

Exhibit 10: Published information about LICs at the four audited councils
  Blacktown City Council Central Coast Council City of Sydney Council Liverpool City Council
Financial details about contributions collected and spent Financial statements Financial statements Financial statements Financial statements
Implementation plans for spending LICs Contribution plans S64 implementation plans in DSPs. S7.11 & S7.12 implementation plans developed annually within capital works plan Contribution plans Developed annually within capital works plan
Capital works underway or completed, funded by LICs Capital works plan and annual report Not published Not published Capital works plan
Source: Audit Office analysis.

The Practice Note states that councils are accountable for providing the infrastructure for which contributions are collected. Demonstrating that infrastructure has been provided is difficult with fragmented information. As an example of transparent reporting, Blacktown City Council's 2018–19 annual report includes information about infrastructure that has been delivered for every contributions plan, providing transparency over how LICs have been spent.

Use of LICs collected under VPAs is not always transparent

Contributions collected under VPAs are not required to demonstrate the same relationship to a development as LICs collected under section 7.11 of the EP&A Act. VPAs are often negotiated because a developer requests a change to a planning instrument, and it is important that these arrangements, and their outcomes, are transparent to the community.

The EP&A Regulation includes mechanisms to ensure that VPAs are partially transparent. VPAs are exhibited to the public and approved by the elected council. Councils must maintain a VPA Register and make the VPA Deeds of Agreement available on request. However, there is no obligation on council to report on the outcomes or delivery of developers' obligations under VPAs. The four audited councils vary in transparency and accessibility of information available about VPAs.

Exhibit 11: Published information about VPAs at the four audited councils
  Blacktown City Council Central Coast Council City of Sydney Council Liverpool City Council
VPA Register Council website and annual report Annual report Annual report Council website and annual report
VPA Deeds of Agreement Council website Available on request Available on request Council website
Intended use of LICs collected under VPAs In Deeds of Agreement In Deeds of Agreement In VPA Register and most Deeds of Agreement In VPA Register and most Deeds of Agreement
Completion of work funded by cash collected under VPAs Not published Not published Not published Not published
Delivery of works-in-kind or land negotiated under VPAs Not published Not published In VPA Register Not published
Source: Audit Office analysis.

The Practice Note suggests that councils incorporate the intended use of LICs collected under VPAs in the Deed of Agreement, but there is no guidance relating to transparency over where and when funds have actually been spent. There is merit in councils providing greater transparency over public benefits delivered through VPAs to give communities confidence in VPAs as a planning tool.

Credit arrangements with developers are not always well documented or monitored

When levying LICs, section 7.11(6) of the EP&A Act requires councils to take into account land, money, or works-in-kind that the developer has contributed on other development sites over and above their LIC obligations. This section of the EP&A Act allows a developer to offset a LIC owed on one site against land or works contributed on another. This leads to some developers carrying 'credits' for work delivered to councils, to be paid back by reduced LICs on a future development. Blacktown City Council and Central Coast Council allow developers to carry credits. Liverpool City Council and City of Sydney Council do not permit credits and instead pay the developers for any additional work undertaken.

Councils should formally document credit arrangements and have a robust process to validate and keep track of credit balances and report on them. Central Coast Council does not keep good track of credit arrangements and neither Blacktown City Council or Central Coast Council aggregate or report on outstanding credit balances.

Blacktown City Council manages the largest LIC fund in NSW and negotiates more VPAs than any other council. Overall, Blacktown City Council demonstrates effective governance over the LIC funds but there is scope for improved oversight of the projected financial status of contributions plans and credit arrangements with developers. Blacktown City Council also needs to update its operating procedures relating to LICs and improve security over key information.

Blacktown City Council is managing areas with high growth. There is a risk that Blacktown City Council will be unable to collect sufficient LICs to fund the infrastructure required to support that growth. However, Blacktown City Council does not assess and report to senior management or its Audit, Risk and Improvement Committee about the projected financial status of contributions plans.

Blacktown City Council has policies in place to guide the management of LICs although management of credit arrangements with developers requires greater oversight. Policies relating to works-in-kind agreements provide no guidance about probity in negotiations with developers and valuations of works-in-kind are not independent as they are paid for by the developer. Blacktown City Council's S7.11 committee structure could act as a model for other councils. Blacktown City Council is spending LICs according to its contributions plans. Staff managing LICs demonstrate good knowledge of the regulatory environment. However, a number of administrative processes need attention such as outdated procedures, lack of security over key spreadsheets, and inappropriate retention of sensitive personal data.

Recommendations

By December 2020, Blacktown City Council should:

  1. regularly report to senior management on the projected financial status of contributions plans
  2. update council's works-in-kind policy to address probity risks during negotiations with developers
  3. mitigate risks associated with lack of independence in valuations of works-in-kind
  4. improve public reporting about expenditure of cash collected under VPAs
  5. improve management oversight of credit arrangements with developers
  6. update procedures for managing LICs
  7. implement security measures over critical or personal information and spreadsheets. 

Central Coast Council's governance and internal controls over LICs were not fully effective. Between 2001 and 2019, more than $13.0 million in LICs was misspent on administration costs in breach of the EP&A Act. There is scope for improved oversight of the projected financial status of contributions plans and credit arrangements with developers. Policies and procedures from the two former councils are not aligned.

In May 2016, the newly amalgamated Central Coast Council inherited 53 contributions plans from the former Gosford City and Wyong Shire Councils. Managing this number of contributions plans fragments the available funds and increases complexity. Central Coast Council is currently working on consolidating these plans. Between June 2016 and June 2019, its LIC balance doubled from $90.0 million to $196 million. Central Coast Council does not assess and report to senior management or its Audit, Risk and Improvement Committee about the projected financial status of contributions plans. Central Coast Council has a LIC committee but it has no formal charter and senior officers do not regularly attend meetings. This limits the committee's effectiveness as a decision-making body. A draft policy relating to works-in-kind agreements provide no guidance about probity in negotiations with developers. Valuations of works-in-kind and land dedications are not independent as they are paid for by the developer.

Central Coast Council has adjusted its accounts in 2018–19 by $13.2 million to repay the LIC fund for administration expenses that were not provided for in 40 contributions plans.

Recommendations

By June 2020, Central Coast Council should:

1. obtain independent validation of the adjustment made to the restricted asset accounts and general fund to repay LICs spent on administration, and adjustments made to each infrastructure category within the contributions plans

2. publish current contributions plans from the former Gosford City Council on the Central Coast Council website.

By December 2020, Central Coast Council should:

3. regularly report to senior management on the projected financial status of contributions plans

4. increase transparency of information available to the public about LIC works planned and underway, including intended use of contributions collected under VPAs

5. consolidate existing plans, ensuring the new contributions plans includes a regular review cycle

6. develop a formal charter for the developer contributions committee and increase the seniority of membership

7. complete and adopt council's works-in-kind policy currently under development, ensuring it addresses probity risks during negotiations with developers

8. mitigate risks associated with lack of independence in valuations of works-in-kind and dedicated land

9. improve public reporting about expenditure of cash collected under VPAs

10. improve management oversight of credit arrangements with developers

11. implement security measures to ensure the integrity of key spreadsheets used to manage LICs

12. align policies and procedures relating to LICs across the amalgamated council including developing policies and procedures for the management of S64 LICs

13. update council's VPA policy to address increased or indexed bank guarantees to accommodate cost increases.

City of Sydney Council manages a complex development environment across the Sydney CBD and inner suburbs. Overall, governance and internal controls over LICs are effective although there is scope for improved oversight of the projected financial status of contributions plans.

City of Sydney Council maintains a large balance of LICs, although not excessive relative to the annual level of LIC expenditure. Unspent contributions are largely associated with open space infrastructure that cannot be delivered until suitable land is available. Thirty per cent of cash contributions are collected under VPAs and there is limited transparency over how these funds are spent. City of Sydney Council does not assess and report to management or its Audit, Risk and Compliance Committee about the projected financial status of contributions plans.

In 2017–18 and 2018–19, LICs were spent in accordance with the corresponding contributions plans. City of Sydney Council staff are knowledgeable about the regulatory environment and are supported by up-to-date policies and procedures.

Recommendations

By December 2020, City of Sydney Council should:

  1. regularly report to senior management on the projected financial status of contributions plans
  2. improve public reporting about expenditure of cash collected under VPAs
  3. periodically review the risk of unpaid LICs associated with complying development certificates and assess whether additional controls are required
  4. implement security measures to ensure the integrity of key spreadsheets used to manage LICs. 

During the audit period 2017–18 and 2018–19, Liverpool City Council did not have effective governance and internal controls over LICs. Liverpool City Council is addressing deficiencies and risks identified through an internal audit published in December 2018 although further work is required. There is scope for improved oversight of the projected financial status of contributions plans.

In the two years to 30 June 2019, the balance of unspent LICs increased by more than 60 per cent against a relatively low pattern of expenditure. Prior to an internal audit completed in late 2018, there was no regular reporting on the status of LICs and a lack of transparency when prioritising the expenditure of LIC funds. During 2019, and following the internal audit, Liverpool City Council engaged additional skilled resources to improve focus and accountability for LICs. A LIC committee has been established to manage contributions plans and support business units to initiate relevant infrastructure projects, although it is too early to assess whether this committee is operating effectively. From February 2019, Liverpool City Council commenced monthly reporting to its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) about the point-in-time status of LIC funds, and to its Audit, Risk and Improvement Committee about risks associated with LICs and the implementation of internal audit recommendations. There is limited reporting to senior management about the projected financial status of some contributions plans. Our audit found no evidence of misuse of funds during the audited period. Methods for valuing work and land are not aligned with policies and procedures and are implemented inconsistently. In addition, valuations of works-in-kind and land dedications are not independent as they are paid for by the developer. The policy relating to works-in-kind provides no guidance about managing probity risks when negotiating with developers.

Recommendations

By December 2020, Liverpool City Council should:

  1. regularly report to senior management on the projected financial status of contributions plans
  2. update council's policies and procedures to provide consistent guidance about how works and land offered by developers should be valued
  3. update council's Works-in-Kind and Land Acquisition Policy to address probity risks during negotiations with developers
  4. improve public reporting about expenditure of cash collected under VPAs
  5. mitigate risks associated with lack of independence in valuations of works-in-kind and dedicated land
  6. implement security measures over critical or private information. 

Appendix one – Responses from councils and the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment

Appendix two – Advice from the Crown Solicitor

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #339 - released 17 August 2020

Published

Actions for CBD South East Sydney Light Rail: follow-up performance audit

CBD South East Sydney Light Rail: follow-up performance audit

Transport
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Risk
Service delivery

This is a follow-up to the Auditor-General's November 2016 report on the CBD South East Sydney Light Rail project. This follow-up report assessed whether Transport for NSW has updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits.

The audit found that Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public.

The Auditor-General reports that the total cost of the project will exceed $3.1 billion, which is above the revised cost of $2.9 billion published in November 2019. $153.84 million of additional costs are due to omitted costs for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays.

The report makes four recommendations to Transport for NSW to publicly report on the final project cost, the updated expected project benefits, the benefits achieved in the first year of operations and the average weekly journey times.

Read full report (PDF)

The CBD and South East Light Rail is a 12 km light rail network for Sydney. It extends from Circular Quay along George Street to Central Station, through Surry Hills to Moore Park, then to Kensington and Kingsford via Anzac Parade and Randwick via Alison Road and High Street.

Transport for NSW (TfNSW) is responsible for planning, procuring and delivering the Central Business District and South East Light Rail (CSELR) project. In December 2014, TfNSW entered into a public private partnership with ALTRAC Light Rail as the operating company (OpCo) responsible for delivering, operating and maintaining the CSELR. OpCo engaged Alstom and Acciona, who together form its Design and Construct Contractor (D&C).

On 14 December 2019, passenger services started on the line between Circular Quay and Randwick. Passenger services on the line between Circular Quay and Kingsford commenced on 3 April 2020.

In November 2016, the Auditor-General published a performance audit report on the CSELR project. The audit found that TfNSW would deliver the CSELR at a higher cost with lower benefits than in the approved business case, and recommended that TfNSW update and consolidate information about project costs and benefits and ensure the information is readily accessible to the public.

In November 2018, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) examined TfNSW's actions taken in response to our 2016 performance audit report on the CSELR project. The PAC recommended that the Auditor-General consider undertaking a follow-up audit on the CSELR project. The purpose of this follow-up performance audit is to assess whether TfNSW has effectively updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits for the CSELR project.

Conclusion

Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated CSLER project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public. In line with the NSW Government Benefits Realisation Management Framework, TfNSW intends to measure benefits after the project is completed and has not updated the expected project benefits since April 2015.

Between February 2015 and December 2019, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) regularly updated capital expenditure costs for the CSELR in internal monthly financial performance and risk reports. These reports did not include all the costs incurred by TfNSW to manage and commission the CSELR project.

Omitted costs of $153.84 million for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays will bring the current estimated total cost of the CSELR project to $3.147 billion.

From February 2015, TfNSW did not regularly provide the financial performance and risk reports to key CSELR project governance bodies. TfNSW publishes information on project costs and benefits on the Sydney Light Rail website. However, the information on project costs has not always been accurate or current.

TfNSW is working with OpCo partners to deliver the expected journey time benefits. A key benefit defined in the business plan was that bus services would be reduced owing to transfer of demand to the light rail - entailing a saving. However, TfNSW reports that the full expected benefit of changes to bus services will not be realised due to bus patronage increasing above forecasted levels.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Governance and reporting arrangements for the CSELR

Appendix three – 2018 CSELR governance changes

Appendix four – About the audit

Appendix five – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #335 - released 11 June 2020

Published

Actions for Report on Local Government 2019

Report on Local Government 2019

Local Government
Asset valuation
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Information technology
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

I am pleased to present my third report to the Parliament on the 2019 audits of local government councils in New South Wales.

This report notes that unqualified audit opinions were issued on the 2018–19 financial statements of 134 councils and 11 joint organisations. The opinion for one council was disclaimed and three audits are yet to complete.

The report also highlights improvements I have seen in financial reporting and governance arrangements across councils. Fewer errors were identified. More councils have audit, risk and improvement committees and internal audit functions. Risk management practices, including fraud control systems, have also improved.

These are very pleasing indicators of the gradual strengthening of governance and financial oversight of the sector. I want to acknowledge the investment councils have made in working with the Audit Office to improve consistency of practice and accountability generally.

Of course there is more work to do, particularly to prepare for new accounting standards and to strengthen controls over information technology and cyber security management. Asset management practices can also be improved. This report provides some guidance to council on these matters and we will continue to partner with the Office of Local Government in the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment to support good practice.

Margaret Crawford

Auditor-General
5 March 2020

This report focuses on key observations and findings from the 2018–19 financial audits of councils and joint organisations.

Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the financial statements for 134 councils and 11 joint organisations. The audit opinion for Bayside’s 2017–18 and 2018–19 financial statements were disclaimed. Three audits are still in progress and will be included in next year’s report.

The report highlights a number of areas where there has been improvement. There was a reduction in errors identified in council financial statements and high risk issues reported in audit management letters. More councils have audit, risk and improvement committees and internal audit functions. Risk management practices and fraud control systems have also improved.

The report also found that councils could do more to be better prepared for the new accounting standards, asset management practices could be strengthened, and information technology controls and cyber security management could be improved.

The Auditor-General recommended that the Office of Local Government within the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment develop a cyber security policy by 30 June 2021 to ensure a consistent response to cyber security risks across councils.

Read the PDF Report

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence in and transparency of public sector decision making is enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely. Strong financial performance provides the platform for councils to deliver services and respond to community needs.

This chapter outlines our audit observations on the financial reporting and performance of councils and joint organisations.

Section highlights
  • There was a reduction in the number and dollar value of errors identified in councils' financial statements.
  • We continue to identify prior period errors, which are predominantly asset-related.
  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued for 99 per cent of completed audits for councils and joint organisations.
  • Three audits remain outstanding, with the outcomes to be reported in next year's Report to Parliament.
  • Seventy-nine per cent of councils and joint organisations lodged their financial reports by 31 October 2019.
  • Councils that performed some early reporting procedures achieved better outcomes in terms of the quality and timeliness of financial reporting.
  • Councils are at various levels of preparedness to implement the new accounting standards for the 2019–20 financial year. Some have made the necessary modifications to systems and processes, but others are still assessing impacts.
  • Most councils met the prescribed benchmarks for the liquidity and working capital performance measures over the past three years.
  • More councils reported negative operating performance compared with the prior year, meaning their operating expenditure exceeded their operating revenue.

Strong governance systems and internal controls help councils to operate effectively and efficiently, produce reliable financial reports, comply with laws and regulations and support ethical government.

This chapter outlines the overall trends related to governance and internal control issues across councils and joint organisations for 2018–19.

Section highlights
  • While the total number of issues reported in our management letters increased compared with the prior year, the total number of high risk issues have decreased. Of the high-risk issues, 41 per cent were deficiencies in information technology controls.
  • More councils have established audit, risk and improvement committees and internal audit functions.
  • Councils have improved risk management practices, with over 75 per cent of councils now having a risk management policy and register.
  • While most councils have policies and processes to manage gifts and benefits, we identified some instances of non-compliance with the Model Code of Conduct.
  • Most councils have policies and processes to manage the use of credit cards.
  • Councils can strengthen policies and practices for managing fraud controls and legislative compliance.
  • There are further opportunities for councils to improve internal controls over revenue, purchasing, payroll, cash, financial accounting and governance processes.

Councils rely on information technology (IT) to deliver services and manage information. While IT delivers considerable benefits, it also presents risks that council needs to address.

In prior years, we reported that councils need to improve IT governance and controls to manage key financial systems. This chapter outlines the progress made by councils in the management of key IT risks and controls, with an added focus on cyber security.

Section highlights
  • We continue to report deficiencies in information technology controls, particularly around user access management. These controls are key to ensuring IT systems are protected from inappropriate access and misuse.
  • Many councils do not have IT policies and procedures and others do not identify, monitor or report on IT risks.
  • Cyber security management requires improvement, with some basic elements of governance not yet in place for many councils.

Councils are responsible for managing a significant range of assets to deliver services on behalf of the community.

This chapter outlines our asset management observations across councils and joint organisations.

Section highlights
  • There was an increase in the total number of issues reported in our management letters for asset management processes.
  • There were less high-risk issues reported compared to the previous year.
  • We continue to identify discrepancies between the council's Crown land asset records and the Crown Land Information Database (CLID) managed by the former Department of Industry (DOI).
  • Inconsistent practices remain across the Local Government sector in accounting for landfill sites.

Appendix one – Response from the Office of Local Government within the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment

Appendix two – Status of 2018 recommendations

Appendix three – Status of audits 

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.