What this report is about

In this report, we present findings and recommendations relevant to regulation from selected reports between 2018 and 2024.

This analysis includes performance audits, compliance audits and the outcomes of financial audits.

Effective regulation is necessary to ensure compliance with the law as well as to promote positive social and economic outcomes and minimise risks with certain activities.

The report is a resource for public sector leaders. It provides insights into the challenges and opportunities for more effective regulation.

Audit findings

The analysis of findings and recommendations is structured around four key themes related to effective regulation:

• governance and accountability
• processes and procedures
• data and information management
• support and guidance.

The report draws from this analysis to present insights for agencies to promote effective regulation. It also includes relevant examples from recent audit reports.

In this report, we also draw out insights for agencies that provide a public sector stewardship role.

The report highlights the need for agencies to communicate a clear regulatory approach. It also emphasises the need to have a consistent regulatory approach, supported by robust information about risks and accompanied with timely and proportionate responses.

The report highlights the need to provide relevant support to regulated parties to facilitate compliance and the importance of transparency through reporting of meaningful regulatory information.

Read the PDF report

What this report is about 

This report assesses how effectively SafeWork NSW, a part of the Department of Customer Service (DCS), has performed its regulatory compliance functions for work health and safety in New South Wales. 

The report includes a case study examining SafeWork NSW's management of a project to develop a realtime monitoring device for airborne silica in workplaces. 

Findings 

There is limited transparency about SafeWork NSW's effectiveness as a regulator. The limited performance information that is available is either subsumed within DCS reporting (or other sources) and is focused on activity, not outcomes. 

As a work health and safety (WHS) regulator, SafeWork NSW lacks an effective strategic and data-driven approach to respond to emerging WHS risks. 

It was slow to respond to the risk of respirable crystalline silica in manufactured stone. 

SafeWork NSW is constrained by an information management system that is over 20 years old and has passed its effective useful life. 

While it has invested effort into ensuring consistent regulatory decisions, SafeWork NSW needs to maintain a focus on this objective, including by ensuring that there is a comprehensive approach to quality assurance. 

SafeWork NSW's engagement of a commercial partner to develop a real-time silica monitoring device did not comply with key procurement obligations. 

There was ineffective governance and process to address important concerns about the accuracy of the real-time silica monitoring device. 

As such, SafeWork NSW did not adequately manage potential WHS risks. 

Recommendations 

The report recommended that DCS should: 

• ensure there is an independent investigation into the procurement of the research partner for the real-time silica detector 
• embed a formal process to review and set its annual regulatory priorities 
• publish a consolidated performance report 
• set long-term priorities, including for workforce planning and technology uplift 
• improve its use of data, and start work to replace its existing complaints handling system 
• review its risk culture and its risk management framework 
• review the quality assurance measures that support consistent regulatory decisions

Read the PDF report.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #390 - released 27 February 2024
 

What this report is about

Results of the Health portfolio of agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2023.

The audit found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all Health portfolio agencies' financial statements. 

The number of monetary misstatements increased in 2022–23, driven by key accounting issues, including the first-time recognition of paid parental leave and plant and equipment fair value adjustments. 

The key audit issues were 

NSW Health identified errors regarding the recognition and calculation of long service leave entitlements for employees with ten or more years of service that had periods of part time service in the first ten years, resulting in prior period restatements. 

Comprehensive revaluation of buildings at the Graythwaite Charitable Trust found errors in the previous year's valuation, resulting in prior period restatements. 

New parental leave legislation increased employee liabilities for portfolio agencies. The Ministry of Health corrected the consolidated financial statements to record parental leave liabilities for all agencies within the Health portfolio.   

A repeat high-risk issue relates to processing time records by administrators that have not been reviewed prior to running the pay cycle.   

Thirty per cent of reported issues were repeat issues. 

The audit recommended 

Portfolio agencies should ensure any changes to employee entitlements are assessed for their potential financial statements impact under the relevant Australian Accounting Standards. 

Portfolio agencies should address deficiencies that resulted in qualified reports on:   

• the design and operation of shared service controls
• prudential non-compliance at residential aged care facilities.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Health portfolio of agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

• financial reporting
• audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Health portfolio of agencies (the portfolio) for 2023.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Health portfolio.  

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

What this report is about

Around one-third of the state’s population lives in regional NSW, but deaths on regional roads make up around two-thirds of the state’s road toll.

Transport for NSW (TfNSW) is responsible for managing road safety outcomes across the NSW road network. This audit assessed the effectiveness of TfNSW’s delivery of road safety strategies, plans and policies in regional areas.

The NSW Road Safety Action Plan 2022–2026 has the stated goal of ‘no death or serious injury occurring on the road transport network’ by 2050.

What we found

There is a disproportionate amount of trauma on regional roads, but there are no specific road safety plans or trauma reduction targets for regional NSW.

TfNSW advises that the setting of state-wide road safety targets is consistent with other jurisdictions and international best practice. However, the proportion of road fatalities and serious injuries in regional NSW is almost the same as ten years ago.

There is no regional implementation plan to assist TfNSW to target the Road Safety Action Plan 2026 to regional areas.

TfNSW considers that local road safety outcomes should be managed by councils, but only 52% of regional councils participated in its Local Government Road Safety Program (LGRSP) in 2022–23. This program has not been updated since 2014, despite commitments to do so in 2021 and 2022.

TfNSW has not undertaken a systematic and integrated analysis of the combined impact of its road safety strategies and plans in regional NSW since 2012.

TfNSW reports against the Community Road Safety Fund (CRSF) annually but there is no consolidated, public reporting on total road safety funding allocated to regional NSW. The Fund underspend increased from 12% in 2019–20 to 20% in 2022–23.

What we recommended

We recommended TfNSW:

• develop a regional implementation plan to support the NSW Road Safety Action Plan, including a framework to annually measure, analyse and publicly report on progress
• develop a plan to measure and mitigate risks causing underspend in the CRSF
• expedite the review of the LGRSP including recommendations to increase involvement of regional councils.

Disclosure of confidential information

Under the Government Sector Audit Act 1983 (the Act), the Auditor-General may disclose confidential information if, in the Auditor-General’s opinion, the disclosure is in the public interest, and that disclosure is necessary for the exercise of the Auditor-General’s functions.

Confidential information in the Act means Cabinet information or information subject to legal privilege. This performance audit report contained confidential information.

The NSW Premier has certified that in his opinion the disclosure of the confidential information was not in the public interest.

The confidential information has been redacted from this report.

Under section 36A(2) of the Government Sector Audit Act 1983, the Auditor-General may authorise the disclosure of confidential information if, in the Auditor-General’s opinion, the disclosure is in the public interest and necessary for the exercise of the Auditor-General’s functions. Confidential information under the Government Sector Audit Act 1983 means Cabinet information, or information that could be subject to a claim of privilege by the State or a public official in a court of law. This performance audit report contained confidential information which, in the opinion of the Auditor-General, is in the public interest to disclose and that disclosure is necessary for the exercise of the Auditor-General’s functions.

On 26 October 2023, pursuant to section 36A(2)(b) of the Government Sector Audit Act 1983, the Auditor-General notified the NSW Premier of the intention to include this information in the published report, having formed the opinion that its disclosure is in the public interest and is necessary for the exercise of the Auditor-General’s functions.

On 23 November 2023, pursuant to section 36A(2)(c) of the Government Sector Audit Act 1983, the NSW Premier certified that, in his opinion, the proposed disclosure of the confidential information contained in this report was not in the public interest. The Premier’s certificate follows. Section 36A(4) states that a certificate of the Premier that it is not in the public interest to disclose confidential information is conclusive evidence of that fact.

The issuance of the certificate by the NSW Premier prevents the publication of this information. The relevant sections of the report containing confidential information have been redacted.

One-third of the New South Wales population resides in regional areas, but two-thirds of the state’s road crash fatalities take place on regional roads.

Between 2017 and 2021, the average number of fatalities for every 100,000 of the population living in regional New South Wales was 8.33 — approximately four times higher than the equivalent measure for Greater Sydney. Similarly, the average number of serious injuries in regional New South Wales over the same period was 75.24 per 100,000 of the population, compared with 50.53 in Greater Sydney. Further, more than 70% of people who lose their lives in accidents on regional roads are residents of regional areas.

Residents of regional areas face particular transport challenges. They often need to travel longer distances for work, health care, or recreation purposes, yet their public transport options are more limited than metropolitan residents. Vehicle safety is also an issue. According to the NSW Road Safety Progress Report 2021, of the light vehicles registered in New South Wales that were manufactured in or after 2000, 48.4% of light vehicles in regional areas had a five-star Australasian New Car Assessment Program (ANCAP) rating, compared to 54.8% in metropolitan areas. Road conditions in regional areas can also be more challenging for drivers.

Regional New South Wales covers 98.5% of the total area of the state. The road network in New South Wales is vast — spanning approximately 200,000 kilometres.

The road network includes major highways, state roads and local roads. Speed limits range from 10 km/hr in high pedestrian shared zones, up to 110 km/hr on high volume and critical road corridors. Eighty per cent of the network has a 100 km/h speed limit, which is mostly applied as a default speed limit, regardless of the presence of safety features and treatments.

Speed is the primary causal factor in more crashes in New South Wales than any other factor, and car crashes in regional areas are more likely to be fatal because of the higher average speeds involved.

The responsibility for managing road safety outcomes across the entire New South Wales road network lies with Transport for NSW (TfNSW), pursuant to Schedule 1 of the Transport Administration Act 1988.

While its safety responsibilities are state-wide, TfNSW does not own or directly manage all of the road network in regional New South Wales, which spans approximately 200,000 kilometres. Approximately 80% of the roads are classified as Local Roads and are administered and managed by local councils. Local councils also maintain Regional Roads that run through their local government areas. TfNSW is responsible for managing State Roads (approximately 20% of roads), which are major arterial roads. It also provides funding for councils to manage over 18,000 km (approximately 10%) of state-significant Regional Roads.

According to TfNSW, between 2016 and 2020, there were 9,776 people killed or seriously injured on roads in regional New South Wales. Adding to the tragic loss of life, according to TfNSW, the estimated cost to the community between 2016 and 2020 resulting from regional road trauma and fatalities was around $13.7 billion.

TfNSW also noted that the ‘risk of road trauma is pervasive, and a combination of effective road safety measures is required to systematically reduce this risk’.

TfNSW released its first long-term road-safety strategy in December 2012, which introduced the goal of ‘Vision Zero’ — a long-term goal of zero deaths or serious injuries on NSW roads. The terminology was changed to ‘Towards Zero’ in the 2021 Road Safety Plan and has been retained in the NSW Road Safety Action Plan 2022–2026. Towards Zero has the stated goal of ‘no death or serious injury occurring on the road transport network’ by 2050.

The objective of this audit is to assess the effectiveness of TfNSW’s delivery of ‘Towards Zero’ in regional areas.

In making this assessment, the audit examined whether TfNSW:

• is effectively reducing the number of fatalities and serious injuries on regional roads
• has an effective framework, including governance arrangements, for designing and refreshing the NSW Road Safety Strategy 2012–2021 and the NSW Road Safety Action Plan 2022–2026
• effectively makes use of whole-of-government and other relevant sources of data to support decision-making, and to evaluate progress and outcomes
• effectively manages accountabilities, including roles and responsibilities, with respect to road safety outcomes and the use of data.

This audit focused on the policies and strategies used by TfNSW for managing road safety outcomes in regional areas. We did not evaluate individual road safety projects, programs and initiatives as part of this audit.

Whilst Regional Roads and Local Roads (as defined by the Road Network Classifications) are owned and maintained by local councils, we included these roads in this audit as TfNSW may advise and assist councils to promote and improve road safety, as well as manage grant programs that focus on improving road safety outcomes on these roads. Hereafter, unless otherwise stated, references to ‘regional roads’ refer to all classifications of roads in the state which are in regional New South Wales, irrespective of their ownership.

Local councils in regional areas are key stakeholders for the purposes of this audit, and we interviewed eight as part of the audit process (noting that this was not intended to be a representative sample). Road asset management by local councils is also out of scope for this audit as it is the focus of a subsequent performance audit by the Audit Office of New South Wales.b

The Audit Office of New South Wales has undertaken several performance audits relating to road safety since 2009 and these have been referenced while undertaking this audit. They include:

• Condition of State Roads (August 2006)
• Improving Road Safety: Heavy Vehicles (May 2009)
• Improving Road Safety: School Zones (March 2010)
• Improving Road Safety: Speed Cameras (July 2011)
• Regional Assistance Programs (May 2018)
• Mobile speed cameras (October 2018)
• Rail freight and Greater Sydney (October 2021).

Appendix one – Response from Transport for NSW

Appendix two – The Safe Systems framework and NSW road safety strategies and plans

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #386 - released 30 November 2023

What this report is about

Results of the Education portfolio of agencies’ financial statements audits for the year ended 30 June 2023.

What we found

Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all Education portfolio agencies.

An ‘other matter’ paragraph was included in the TAFE Commission’s independent auditor’s report as it did not have a delegation or sub-delegation from the Minister for Education and Early Learning to incur expenditure on grants from other portfolio agencies.

What the key issues were

Comprehensive valuations of buildings at the Department of Education (the department) and at the TAFE Commission found that certain assumptions applied in previous years needed to be updated, resulting in prior period restatements.

The department prepaid a building contractor for early works on a project and some of the prepayment is in legal dispute.

The department duplicated a claim for project funding from Restart NSW in 2021.

New parental leave legislation increased employee liabilities for portfolio agencies. The department and the NSW Education Standards Authority (the Authority) updated their financial statements to record parental leave liabilities.

A high risk matter was raised for the Authority to improve the quality and timeliness of information to support their financial statement close process.

What we recommended

Portfolio agencies should ensure any changes to employee entitlements are assessed for their potential financial statements impact under the relevant Australian Accounting Standards.

The department should:

• improve processes to ensure project claims are not duplicated
• assess the risks associated with providing prepayments to contractors.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Education portfolio of agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

• financial reporting
• audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Education portfolio (the portfolio) for 2023.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Education portfolio.

Appendix one – Early close procedures

Appendix two – Financial data

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

What this report is about

Students in rural and remote areas of NSW face greater challenges compared to their metropolitan peers.

This report examined how the NSW Department of Education (the department) is ensuring that rural and remote students have access to the same quality of early childhood, school education, and skills pathways as metropolitan students.

What we found

A decade since the previous (2013) strategy to address educational disadvantage, there remain considerable gaps in access and outcomes between rural and remote students and metropolitan students.

The Rural and Remote Education Strategy (2021–24) is unlikely to address these longstanding and known issues of educational disadvantage in rural and remote areas.

Key enabling factors such as resourcing a dedicated team, setting performance measures, and establishing suitable governance arrangements were not put in place to support effective implementation of the 2021 strategy.

The department has programs aimed at addressing remoteness challenges, but does not know if these initiatives improve access or outcomes.

The department does not monitor or report on student access or outcomes according to geographic location.

What we recommended

The Department of Education should:

• develop a new strategy that addresses disadvantage in regional, rural and remote education
• establish and report publicly on regional, rural and remote key performance indicators
• improve data collection by using a standard remoteness classification
• improve governance arrangements for regional, rural and remote education
• review the resources provided for regional, rural and remote areas that recognises the additional costs
• develop an approach that ensures all students can access best practice modes of delivery.

In February 2021, the department of Education (the department) released the ‘Rural and Remote Education Strategy (2021–2024)’. The strategy sets a vision that ‘every child in regional New South Wales has access to the same quality of education as their metropolitan peers’. It recognises that students in rural and remote areas of New South Wales face greater challenges compared to students in metropolitan locations. These challenges contribute to regional, rural and remote students underperforming on major educational indicators compared to their metropolitan peers.

In recent years, regional, rural and remote communities experienced a series of natural disasters as well as the COVID-19 pandemic. In response to the pandemic and subsequent school closures, the department introduced new initiatives aimed at minimising the disruption to children including online learning and small group tuition.

The department established a regional, rural and remote education policy unit in 2021 to support delivery of the strategy and its vision.

The objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness of the department’s activities to ensure that regional, rural and remote students have access to the same quality of early childhood, school education, and skills pathways as their metropolitan peers.

In making this assessment, the audit examined whether:

• The department developed and implemented a strategy that enables regional, rural and remote students to access the same quality of early childhood education, school education, and skills pathways as students in metropolitan New South Wales.
• The department has been addressing the complexities and needs of regional, rural and remote early childhood education, school education, and skills pathways.

This chapter examines the process to develop the Rural and Remote Education Strategy (2021–2024). It considers whether there was a comprehensive program of stakeholder consultation, whether relevant research and evidence was incorporated and whether an effective performance monitoring system was established.

The department made genuine efforts to consult with stakeholders on the new strategy

The department had a clear process to engage and obtain feedback from key stakeholders during the development of the new strategy. It developed a range of documents to support the consultation process including a stakeholder engagement plan, communications plan, and presentation. The department used the International Association for Public Participation (IAP2) Spectrum of Public Participation principles to help ensure that relevant stakeholders were included in the planning and decision-making process.

In late 2019, the department began its first phase of consultations with internal and external stakeholders to get their views on rural and remote education. It consulted internally with department directors, advisory groups, and learning communities, and externally with government agencies, service providers, non-government schools, and universities.

In March 2020, the department developed a stakeholder engagement paper to test the key issues from stakeholder consultations. Four focus areas were identified and included in a consultation paper that went out to key stakeholders for the second round of consultations in May 2020.

In the third consultation phase, the department conducted a workshop with stakeholders to review the earlier feedback, prioritise issues, identify gaps, and provide further input.

This consultation process enabled the department to identify issues and challenges to inform the new strategy. However, it was already aware that the blueprint was having limited success, and had already identified potential focus areas, following the evaluation of the blueprint in 2019.

The department did not consider recent research when developing the new strategy

The department's guidance materials promote the importance of considering research during policymaking. The guidelines describe the need to understand a topic, consult with stakeholders, identify gaps in existing knowledge, and ensure future work is informed by current literature.

In 2013, the department published a literature review on rural and remote education to inform the blueprint. The literature review found that students in rural and remote schools were not performing as well as their metropolitan peers, and that this performance gap was widening. The review attributed this to the higher number of children from low socio-economic backgrounds attending rural and remote schools. The review also identified several other factors that could negatively impact performance outcomes for rural and remote students. The department used the findings of the literature review to develop the key focus areas in the 2013 blueprint.

When the department began developing the new rural and remote education strategy in 2019, it recognised the need to review the literature on recent international initiatives. However, it has not yet released this review. This means that the department could have missed important new developments since it last examined the literature in 2013. Incorporating up-to-date research is important where past strategies have not met all their intended outcomes.

A national review into rural and remote education in 2018 examined Australian and international literature to inform its findings. The review made 11 recommendations to the Australian and state governments. While the NSW Government was not required to formally respond to the review, it could have considered the work done by that review when developing the new strategy. Several review recommendations are addressed in the strategy, while several others are only partly addressed. Gaps between review recommendations and specific strategy actions include improving the availability of quality accommodation, substantially reducing the waiting times for specialist assessments of students with learning difficulties and disabilities and increasing access to high quality distance education.

In 2019, the department commissioned a rural and remote project to contribute a research and evidence base to the new strategy. The main aim of the project was to help the department understand how it could better support rural and remote schools to increase educational outcomes. There was not enough time for this review to be completed prior to the release of the strategy. As of June 2023, the research project had not yet been released.

The strategy did not address all findings and recommendations from a recent evaluation

In 2020, the department's Centre for Education Statistics and Evaluation (CESE) published an evaluation of the blueprint. The evaluation examined how the actions in the blueprint were implemented. It recommended that a new strategy be developed, and made recommendations for things that should be incorporated into the strategy.

The blueprint aimed to ensure students in rural and remote areas could access the same quality of education as their metropolitan peers. The blueprint identified four focus areas to meet that aim:

• quality early childhood education
• great teachers and school leaders
• curriculum access for all
• effective partnerships and connections.

The department developed several initiatives to help meet the objectives of each of the four focus areas. These initiatives are described in Exhibit 5 below.

The evaluation found that initiatives in two of the four focus areas – Quality early childhood education and Curriculum access for all – had performed well. However, the evaluation found that initiatives in the other two focus areas – Great teachers and school leaders and Effective partnerships and connections – did not achieve intended outcomes.

On the whole, the evaluation found that the 'remoteness gap' between rural and remote students and metropolitan students had not reduced since the blueprint was introduced. It recommended that the department continue its focus on rural and remote education by developing a new evidence-based strategy that focused on student outcomes and clear measures of success.

Objectives and actions in the new strategy were similar to those in the blueprint

The 2021 strategy sets an overall vision that 'every child in regional New South Wales has access to the same quality of education as their metropolitan peers'. It also states that the department 'is committed to ensuring all rural and remote students have equitable access to educational opportunities'.

Four areas in the blueprint remained a focus in the new strategy – early childhood education, teacher recruitment and retention, curriculum, and student wellbeing support services. Each focus area identifies a goal, as well as the aims and actions that contribute to those goals.

While this shows the department identified that these areas required continued attention, most actions were to 'increase', 'expand' or 'improve' existing programs and resources. The new strategy did not propose any new ideas or solutions, despite the blueprint achieving limited success in improving outcomes for rural and remote students.

There were no baseline or target measures set to monitor progress of the new strategy

The blueprint evaluation recommended that the department develop a new evidence-based strategy which focused on improving student outcomes. It also recommended the department use a program logic methodology to ensure there was a clear definition of success, adequate measures of success, and continual monitoring to ensure success.

Program logic models are a visual representation of the various components of a program. They can be used to illustrate program priorities, inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, and assumptions. Logic models are used to explain how a proposed solution will address a specific problem. They are important because they can help test assumptions, build business cases, and identify potential enablers or barriers that could impact the project.

The department did not complete a program logic model during development of the new strategy, nor did it define measures to monitor whether the strategy's overall vision for quality education or the commitment to equitable access was on track to be achieved.

The department has not comprehensively monitored changes in educational outcomes in regional, rural and remote areas since the evaluation of the blueprint in 2020. This evaluation had seven indicators of educational outcomes by remoteness. The measures used in the evaluation could have provided a starting point given the similarity in focus areas between the blueprint and the new strategy. Not addressing past review recommendations increases risks that issues will be repeated.

The policy unit advised it has plans to set up a dashboard to monitor performance across the department's business plan measures by remoteness. This is intended to identify areas where system-wide improvements are required. This is not a comprehensive account of the strategy outcomes because the business plan measures don't capture all the goals of the strategy.

There were no timeframes or resources identified for implementing new strategy actions

The strategy has an overall timeframe of 2021–2024 but does not clarify when it expects the vision, goals, or aims to be achieved, or actions to be implemented.

The department's guidance on policymaking sets out how projects should be transitioned between the policy and implementation teams. This guidance is intended to help ensure the policy intent and scope of the project are not lost during the delivery of the project. The guidance highlights that the policy team should establish clear project implementation timeframes. It is important to have clear timeframes because it enables teams to measure progress, manage resources, and prioritise actions to ensure project outcomes are achieved.

The strategy states that there is a further $1 billion of investment planned over the next three years for rural and remote education but does not identify how this is allocated across its focus areas. It is important to identify the resources required to support the implementation of a program so that program objectives are met in a timely and cost-effective manner. The previous blueprint identified much lower funding of $80 million but more clearly showed how it would be allocated for identified actions across the four focus areas.

In response to our requests, the department separately identified $1.286 billion in expenditure for regional, rural and remote schools referenced in the strategy. Most of this expenditure related to existing department programs and activities rather than new initiatives. The total amount included:

• $576.9 million for new and upgraded schools
• $365.8 million for upgraded information technology equipment and resources
• $120 million for school facility upgrades to be co-funded by schools
• $60 million to replace school roofs
• $60 million for the COVID Intensive Learning Support Program
• $32 million for the Early Action for Success program
• $29.7 million for staffing incentives
• $21.7 million for literacy and numeracy interventions
• $18.8 million in school location allowances
• $1.45 million for the Rural Learning Exchange Pilot
• $0.4 million for Rural and Remote Network initiatives.

This chapter examines the arrangements in place to implement the strategy. It considers whether effective governance arrangements are in place and how progress is monitored and reported.

This chapter considers the effectiveness of arrangements to ensure regional, rural and remote students have access to quality early childhood education, school education, and post‑school transitions.

This chapter considers the department's arrangements to monitor educational and wellbeing outcomes of students by remoteness. It reports on differences in outcomes between students in metropolitan areas and those in regional, rural and remote areas.

Those living in regional, rural and remote areas can have greater difficulty in accessing government services, often needing to travel long distances, or facing lower service levels than provided in major cities. This context is important when considering educational and wellbeing outcomes, given the disruptive effects of waiting or missing out on important services.

The rest of this chapter details key measures in the department's outcome and business plan.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #385 - released 10 August 2023

What the report is about

Effective radio communications are crucial to NSW's emergency services organisations.

The Critical Communications Enhancement Program (CCEP) aims to deliver an enhanced public safety radio network to serve the five emergency services organisations (ESOs), as well as a range of other users.

This report assesses whether the NSW Telco Authority is effectively managing the CCEP.

What we found

Where it has already been delivered (about 50% of the state), the enhanced network meets most of the requirements of ESOs.

The CCEP will provide additional infrastructure for public safety radio coverage in existing buildings agreed to with ESOs. However, radio coverage inside buildings constructed after the CCEP concludes will be at risk because building and fire regulations do not address the need for in-building public safety radio coverage.

Around 98% of radios connected to the network can be authenticated to protect against cloning, though only 42% are.

The NSW Telco Authority has not settled with ESOs on how call encryption will be used across the network. This creates the risk that radio interoperability between ESOs will not be maximised.

When completed, the public safety radio network will be the only mission critical radio network for ESOs. It is unclear whether governance for the ongoing running of the network will allow ESOs to participate in future network operational decisions.

The current estimated capital cost for the NSW Telco Authority to complete the CCEP is $1.293 billion. This is up from an estimated cost of $400 million in 2016. The estimated capital cost was not publicly disclosed until $1.325 billion was shown in the 2021–22 NSW Budget Papers.

We estimate that the full cost to government, including costs to the ESOs, of implementing the enhanced network is likely to exceed $2 billion.

We made recommendations about

• The governance of the enhanced Public Safety Network (PSN) to support agency relationships.
• The need to finalise a Traffic Mitigation Plan for when the network is congested.
• The need to provide advice to the NSW Government about the regulatory gap for ensuring adequate network reach in future buildings.
• The need to clarify how encryption and interoperability will work on the enhanced network.
• The need for the NSW Telco Authority to comply with its policy on Infrastructure Capacity Reservation.
• Expediting measures to protect against the risk of cloning by unauthenticated radios.

Public safety radio networks are critical for operational communications among Emergency Services Organisations (ESOs), which in New South Wales include:

• NSW Ambulance
• Fire and Rescue NSW
• NSW Police Force
• NSW Rural Fire Service
• NSW State Emergency Service.¹

Since 1993, these five ESOs have had access to a NSW Government owned and operated radio communications network, the Public Safety Network (PSN), to support their operational communications. Around 60 to 70 other entities also have access to this network, including other NSW government entities, Commonwealth government entities, local councils, community organisations, and utility companies.

Pursuant to the Government Telecommunications Act 2018 ('the Act'), the New South Wales Government Telecommunications Authority ('NSW Telco Authority') is responsible for the establishment, control, management, maintenance and operation of the PSN.²

Separate to the PSN, all ESOs and other government entities have historically maintained their own radio communication capabilities and networks. Accordingly, the PSN has been a supplementary source of operational radio communications for these entities.

These other radio networks maintained by ESOs and other entities are of varying size and capability, with many ageing and nearing their end-of-life. There was generally little or no interoperability between networks, infrastructure was often co-located and duplicative, and there were large gaps in geographic coverage.

In 2016, the NSW Telco Authority received dedicated NSW Government funding to commence the Critical Communications Enhancement Program (CCEP).

According to NSW Telco Authority's 2021–22 annual report, the CCEP is a transformation program for operational communications for NSW government agencies. The CCEP '…aims to deliver greater access to public safety standard radio communications for the State’s first responders and essential service agencies'. The objective of CCEP is to consolidate the large number of separate radio networks that are owned and operated by various NSW government entities and to enhance the state’s existing shared PSN. The program also aims to deliver increased PSN coverage throughout New South Wales.

The former NSW Government intended that as the enhanced PSN was progressively rolled-out across NSW, ESOs would migrate their radio communications to the enhanced network, before closing and decommissioning their own networks.

About this Audit

This audit assessed whether the CCEP is being effectively managed by the NSW Telco Authority to deliver an enhanced PSN that meets ESOs' requirements for operational communications.

We addressed the audit objective by answering the following two questions:

1. Have agreed ESO user requirements for the enhanced PSN been met under day-to-day and emergency operational conditions?
2. Has there been adequate transparency to the NSW Government and other stakeholders regarding whole-of-government costs related to the CCEP?

In answering the first question, we also considered how the agreed user requirements were determined. This included whether they were supported by evidence, whether they were sufficient to meet the intent of the CCEP (including in considering any role for new or alternative technologies), and whether they met any relevant technical standards and compliance obligations (including for cyber security resilience).

While other NSW government agencies and entities use the PSN, we focused on the experience of the five primary ESOs because these will be the largest users of the enhanced PSN.

Both the cost and time required to complete the CCEP roll-out have increased since 2016. While it was originally intended to be completed in 2020, this is now forecast to be 2027. Infrastructure NSW has previously assessed the reasons for the increases in time and cost. A summary of the findings made by Infrastructure NSW is presented in Chapter 1 of this report. Accordingly, as these matters had already been assessed, we did not re-examine them in this performance audit.

The auditee for this performance audit is the NSW Telco Authority, which is a statutory authority within the Department of Customer Service portfolio.

In addition to being responsible for the operation of the PSN, section 5 of the Act also prescribes that the NSW Telco Authority is:

• to identify, develop and deliver upgrades and enhancements to the government telecommunications network to improve operational communications for government sector agencies
• to develop policies, standards and guidelines for operational communications using telecommunications networks.

The NSW Telco Authority Advisory Board is established under section 10 of the Act. The role of the board is to advise the NSW Telco Authority and the minister on any matter relating to the telecommunications requirements of government sector agencies and on any other matter relating to the functions of the Authority. As of 2 June 2023, the responsible minister is the Minister for Customer Service and Digital Government.

The five identified ESOs are critical stakeholders of the CCEP and therefore they were consulted during this audit. However, the ESOs were not auditees for this performance audit.

The NSW Telco Authority established and tracked its own costs for the CCEP

Over the course of the program from 2016, the NSW Telco Authority prepared a series of business cases and program reviews that estimated its cost of implementing the program in full, including those shown in Exhibit 6 below.

In response to the 2016 CCEP business case, the then NSW Government approved the NSW Telco Authority implementing the CCEP in full, with funding provided in stages. The NSW Telco Authority tracked its costs against approved funding, with monthly reports provided to the multi-agency Program Steering Committee

Throughout the program, the NSW Government was informed of increasing costs being incurred by the NSW Telco Authority for the CCEP

The various business cases, program updates, and program reviews prepared by the NSW Telco Authority were provided to the NSW Government through the required Cabinet process when seeking approval for the program proceeding and requests for both capital and operational funding. These provided clear indication of the changing overall cost of the CCEP to the NSW Telco Authority, as well as the delays that were being experienced.

There was no transparency to the Parliament and community about changes in the capital cost of the CCEP until the 2021–22 NSW Budget

As the business cases for the CCEP were not publicly available, the only sources of information about capital cost were NSW Budget papers and media releases. The information provided in the annual Budget papers prior to the 2021–22 NSW Budget provided no visibility of the estimated full capital cost to complete all stages of the CCEP. As shown in Exhibit 7 below, this information was fragmented and complex.

Media releases about the progress of the CCEP did not provide the estimated total cost to the NSW Telco Authority of $1.325 billion to complete all stages of the CCEP until June 2021. Prior to this date, media releases only provided funding for the initial stages of the program or for the stages subject to a funding announcement.

Even during the September 2019 and March 2020 Parliamentary Estimate Committee hearings where the costings and delays to the CCEP were raised, the estimated full cost of the CCEP was not revealed.

The original business case for the CCEP included estimated ESO costs, though these costs were not tracked throughout the program

Estimates for ESO costs for operating and maintaining their own radio networks over the four years from 2016–17 were included in the original March 2016 business case. They included $75.2 million for capital expenditure and $95 million for one-off operating costs. These costs, as well as costs incurred by ESOs due to the delay in the program, were not subsequently tracked by the NSW Telco Authority.

In January 2017, Infrastructure NSW reviewed the CCEP business case of March 2016. In this review, Infrastructure NSW recommended that the NSW Telco Authority identify combined and apportioned costs and cashflow for all ESOs over the CCEP funding period reflecting all associated costs to deliver the CCEP. These to include additional incidental capital costs accruing to ESOs, transition and migration to the new network and the cost (capital and operational) of maintaining existing networks. This recommendation was implemented in the November 2017 program review, with ESO capital costs estimated as $183 million.

In 2019, Infrastructure NSW conducted a Deep Dive Review on the progress of the CCEP. In this review, Infrastructure NSW made what it described as a 'critical recommendation' that the NSW Telco Authority:

It should be noted that the delay to CCEP completion now is seven years and that further ‘operational bridging solutions’ have been needed by the ESOs.

'Stay Safe and Keep Operational' costs incurred by ESOs will be significantly higher than originally estimated

Stay Safe and Keep Operational (SSKO) funding was established to provide funding to ESOs to maintain their legacy networks while the CCEP was refreshing and enhancing the PSN. This recognised that much of the network infrastructure relied on by ESOs had reached – or was reaching – obsolescence and would either require extensive maintenance or replacement before the PSN was available for ESOs to migrate to it. ESOs may apply to NSW Treasury for SSKO funding, with their specific proposals being reviewed (and endorsed, where appropriate) by the NSW Telco Authority. Accordingly, SSKO expenditure does not fall within the CCEP budget allocation.

As shown in the table below, extracted from the March 2016 CCEP business case, the total expected cost for SSKO purposes over the course of the CCEP was originally $40 million, assuming the enhanced PSN would be fully available by 2020.

In October 2022, the expected completion date for the CCEP was re-baselined to August 2027. Accordingly, ESOs will be required to continue to maintain their radio networks using legacy equipment for seven years longer than the original 2020 forecast. This will likely become progressively more expensive and require additional SSKO funding. For example, NSW Telco Authority endorsed SSKO bids for 2022–23 exceeded $35 million for that year alone.

Compared to the original forecast made in the March 2016 CCEP business case of $40 million, we found ESOs had estimated SSKO spending to 2027 will be $292.5 million.

A refresh of paging network used by ESOs and the decommissioning of redundant sites were both removed from the original 2016 scope of the CCEP

Paging

A paging network is considered an important user requirement by the Fire and Rescue NSW, NSW Rural Fire Service, and NSW State Emergency Service. The 2016 CCEP business case included a paging network refresh within the program scope of works. This was reiterated in the November 2017 internal review of the program. These documents did not estimate a cost for this refresh. The March 2020 and October 2020 business cases excluded paging from the program scope. The audit is unable to identify when, why or by whom the decision was made to remove paging from the program scope, something that was also not well communicated to the affected ESOs.

In 2021, after representations from the affected ESOs, the NSW Telco Authority prepared a separate business case for a refresh of the paging network at an estimated capital cost of $60.31 million. This program was subsequently approved by the NSW Government and included in the 2022–23 NSW Budget.

In determining an estimated full whole-of-government cost of delivering the enhanced PSN, we have included the budgeted cost of the paging network refresh on the basis that:

• it was expressly included in the original approved March 2016 business case
• the capability is deemed essential to the needs of three ESOs.

Decommissioning costs

The 2016 CCEP business case included cost estimates for decommissioning surplus sites (whether ‘old’ GRN sites or sites belonging to ESOs’ own networks). These estimates were provided for both the NSW Telco Authority ($38 million) and for the ESOs ($55 million). However, while these estimates were described, they were not included as part of the NSW Telco Authority's estimated capital cost ($400 million) or (more relevantly) operating cost ($37.3 million) for the CCEP. This is despite decommissioning being included as one of eight planned activities for the rollout of the program.

In the October 2020 business case, an estimate of $201 million was included for decommissioning agency networks based on a model whereby:

• funding would be coordinated by the NSW Telco Authority
• scheduling and reporting through an inter-agency working group and
• where appropriate, agencies would be appointed as the most appropriate decommissioning party.

This estimated cost is not included in the CCEP budget.

In determining an estimated full whole-of-government cost of the enhanced PSN, we have included the estimated cost of decommissioning on the basis that:

• decommissioning was included in the 2016 CCEP business case as one of eight 'planned activities for the rollout of the program'
• effective decommissioning of surplus sites and equipment (including as described in the business case as incorporating asset decommissioning, asset re-use, and site make-good) is an inherent part of the program management for an enhanced PSN
• costs incurred in decommissioning are entirely a consequence of the CCEP program.

The estimated minimum cost of building an enhanced PSN consistent with the original proposal is over $2 billion

We have derived two estimated minimum whole-of-government costs for delivering an enhanced PSN. These are:

• $2.04 billion when calculated from NSW Telco Authority data – shown as estimate A in Exhibit 9 below.
• $2.26 billion when calculated from ESO supplied data – shown as estimate B in Exhibit 9.

Both totals include:

• budgeted amounts for both CCEP capital expenditure ($1,292.8 million) and operating expenditure ($139 million)
• the NSW Telco Authority's 2020 estimated cost for decommissioning ($201 million)
• the NSW Telco Authority's approved funding for paging refresh ($60.3 million).

The two estimated totals primarily vary around the capital expenditure of ESOs (particularly SSKO funding). To determine these costs, we used ESO provided actual SSKO costs to date, as well as their estimates for maintaining their legacy radio networks through to 2027.

The equivalent cost estimates from the NSW Telco Authority were sourced from the November 2017 internal review and the October 2020 business case for CCEP. It should be noted that the amounts for both estimates are not audited, or verified, but do provide an indication of how whole-of-government costs have grown over the course of the program.

The increase in and reasons for the increase in total CCEP costs (capital and one-off operating) incurred or forecast by the NSW Telco Authority (from $437.3 million in 2016 to $1,431.8 million in 2022) have been provided to the NSW Government through various business cases and reviews prepared by the NSW Telco Authority, as well as by reviews conducted by Infrastructure NSW as part of its project assurance responsibilities.

However, the growth in ESO costs and other consequential costs, such as paging and decommissioning, from around $263 million in the 2016 CCEP business case to between $600 million and $800 million, has to a large degree remained invisible and unexplained to the NSW Government and other stakeholders

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Trunked public safety radio networks

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #383 - released 23 June 2023

What the report is about

The Government Advertising Act 2011 requires the Auditor-General to undertake a performance audit on government advertising activities each financial year.

This audit examined whether TAFE NSW's annual advertising campaign in 2021–22:

1. was carried out effectively, economically, and efficiently
2. complied with regulatory requirements and the Government Advertising Guidelines.

What we found

TAFE NSW complied with Section 6 of the Act, prohibiting political content.

It also complied with most other advertising requirements.
 
An important exception was that the Managing Director certified that the campaign complied with regulatory requirements and was an efficient and cost-effective means of achieving its public purpose, before a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) was completed.

We have found issues with agencies complying with CBA requirements in previous government advertising audits. This includes the failure to complete them before signing compliance certificates.

The policy owner, the Department of Customer Service (DCS), does not consider oversight of CBAs to be within the scope of their peer review process.  

TAFE NSW evaluated this advertising campaign by surveying a population significantly broader than the target audience. As such, survey results may not accurately reflect the views of the intended audience.

What we recommended

By 30 June 2023, TAFE NSW should:

1. implement processes that ensure:
   1. CBAs are completed before the launch of campaigns over $1 million
   2. compliance certificates are completed only after all regulatory requirements are met
2. consider adding to its current evaluation methods by surveying a population which closely reflects the age profile of its intended target audience.

By June 2023, DCS should:

3. improve whole‑of‑government reporting and monitoring processes to provide the NSW Government with a central view of compliance, including the completion of CBAs by agencies.

The Government Advertising Act 2011 (the Act) sets out requirements that must be followed by a government agency when it carries out a government advertising campaign. The requirements include an explicit prohibition on political advertising, as well as a need to complete a peer review and cost-benefit analysis before the campaign commences. The accompanying Government Advertising Regulation 2018 (the Regulation) and Government Advertising Guidelines (the Guidelines) address further matters of detail.

The Act also requires the Auditor-General to conduct a performance audit on the activities of one or more government agencies in relation to government advertising campaigns in each financial year. The performance audit must assess whether a government agency (or agencies) has carried out activities in relation to government advertising campaigns in an effective, economical and efficient manner. It also assesses compliance with the Act, the Regulation, other laws and the Guidelines.

This audit examined TAFE NSW's advertising campaign for the 2021–22 financial year. TAFE NSW is the NSW Government's public provider of vocational education and training. TAFE NSW carries out an advertising campaign every year. In 2021–22, it spent $15.16 million on developing and implementing advertising. TAFE NSW used channels such as television, radio, internet and social media, press, and out of home advertising in public settings such as bus stops. The advertising aimed to increase the percentage of people considering TAFE NSW for training or education, grow the percentage of people who consider TAFE NSW to be the preferred education provider in NSW, and maintain the proportion of people who are aware of TAFE NSW more generally.

There are a range of private service providers helping to deliver vocational education and training in NSW.

This part of the report sets out key aspects of TAFE NSW's compliance with the government advertising regulatory framework. It considers whether TAFE NSW complied with the:

• Government Advertising Act 2011
• Government Advertising Regulation 2018
• NSW Government Advertising Guidelines 2012 and other relevant policy.

This part of the report considers whether TAFE NSW's advertising program for 2021–22 was carried out in an effective, efficient, and economical manner.

Appendix one – Responses from agencies

Appendix two – About the campaign

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #377 - released 28 February 2023

What the report is about

Result of Health cluster (the cluster) agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2022.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for the financial statements for all Health cluster agencies.

The COVID-19 pandemic continued to increase the complexity and number of accounting matters faced by the cluster. The total gross value of corrected misstatements in 2021–22 was $353.3 million, of which $186.7 million related to an increase in the impairment provision for Rapid Antigen Tests (RATs).

A qualified audit opinion was issued on the Annual Prudential Compliance Statement related to five residential aged care facilities. There were 20 instances (19 in 2020–21) of non-compliance with the prudential responsibilities within the Aged Care Act 1997.

What the key issues were

The total number of matters we reported to management across the cluster decreased from 116 in 2020–21 to 67 in 2021–22. Of the 67 issues raised, four were high risk (three in 2020-21) and 37 were moderate risk (57 in 2020–21). Nearly half of all control deficiencies reported in 2021–22 were repeat issues.

Three unresolved high-risk issues were:

• COVID-19 inventories impairment – we continued to identify issues relating to management’s impairment model which relies on anticipated future consumption patterns. RATs had not been assessed for impairment.

• Asset capitalisation threshold – management has not reviewed the appropriateness of the asset capitalisation threshold since 2006.

• Forced-finalisation of HealthRoster time records – we continued to observe unapproved rosters being finalised by system administrators so payroll can be processed on time. 2.6 million time records were processed in this way in 2021–22.

What we recommended

• COVID-19 inventories impairment – ensure consumption patterns are supported by relevant data and plans.

• Assets capitalisation threshold – undertake further review of the appropriateness of applying a $10,000 threshold before capitalising expenditure on property, plant and equipment.

• Forced-finalisation of HealthRoster time records – develop a methodology to quantify the potential monetary value of unapproved rosters being finalised.

This report provides Parliament and other users of Health cluster (the cluster) agencies' financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

• financial reporting

• audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Health cluster (the cluster) for 2022.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the cluster.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

What the report is about

The Australian Government led and implemented the Australian COVID-19 vaccine rollout, with the support of state and territory governments. As part of the Australian Government's vaccine rollout, NSW Health launched its vaccination program on 22 February 2021, with responsibility for distributing and administering COVID-19 vaccine stock provided by the Australian Government.

This audit examined the period 1 January 2021 to 31 December 2021 and focused on NSW Health's contribution to the Australian Government led vaccine roll out in four Local Health Districts (LHDs), in particular the administration of two doses of vaccine to people aged 16 and over.

What we found

On 16 October 2021, NSW Health, in partnership with the Australian Government's vaccination program, achieved its first objective to fully vaccinate 80% of people in NSW aged 16 and over. Demand for the vaccine reduced in December 2021, and NSW Health did not reach its target of 95% fully vaccinated for people aged 16 and over until June 2022.

Despite challenges such as uncertain supply and changes to clinical advice affecting vaccine eligibility, NSW Health's overall delivery of vaccination services was effective and efficient.

During the audit period, NSW Health implemented effective strategies to allocate vaccines and reduce wastage to optimise the number of vaccines available.

NSW Health implemented its own booking system after it identified that the Australian Government's system would not manage bookings. There were problems with NSW Health's interim vaccine booking system, and NSW Health fully resolved these issues by September 2021.

As at 19 October 2022, vaccination rates for Aboriginal peoples and culturally and linguistically diverse people remained below the 95% target.

What we recommended

By June 2023, NSW Health should conduct a comprehensive review of the COVID-19 vaccine rollout and incorporate lessons learned into pandemic response plans.

The first three cases of COVID-19 in New South Wales were diagnosed in January 2020. By 30 June 2021, 128 people were being treated in hospital and one person was in intensive care. By the end of December 2021, 187,504 total cases and 663 deaths were reported in New South Wales. As at 27 October 2022, NSW Health reported more than three million total cases and 5,430 deaths.

The COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on the people and the health sector of New South Wales. The Australian, state, territory, and local governments have directed significant resources towards health responses and economic recovery.

On 13 November 2020, National Cabinet (comprised of the Australian, state, and territory governments) endorsed the Australian COVID-19 Vaccination Policy. Australia's vaccination program was launched on 21 February 2021 with the goal of providing safe and effective vaccines to the people who most needed them as quickly as possible, to support the physical, mental and economic wellbeing of the nation.

The Australian Government led and implemented the Australian vaccine rollout, with the support of state and territory governments. As part of the Australian Government's vaccine rollout, NSW Health launched its vaccination program on 22 February 2021, with responsibility for distributing and administering COVID-19 vaccine stock provided by the Australian Government.

The overall objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of NSW Health’s contribution to the Australian COVID-19 vaccine rollout. It is important to note that in New South Wales, primary care providers (GPs and pharmacies) and aged care providers administered the majority of vaccines. Primary care providers and aged care providers are the responsibility of the Australian Government.

The audit had a particular focus on whether NSW Health:

• set clear vaccination targets underpinned and/or guided by evidence
• managed the rollout of the vaccination program effectively and efficiently
• managed demand of vaccines effectively and efficiently.

The audit examined the period 1 January 2021 to 31 December 2021 and focused on NSW Health's contribution to the Australian Government led vaccine rollout in four Local Health Districts (LHDs), in particular the administration of two doses of vaccine to people aged 16 and over. We did not audit the subsequent rollout for ages five to 15, or the booster rollout (third and fourth doses) as these activities mostly occurred outside the date of our review.

This audit also did not assess the Australian Government’s allocation of vaccine supplies to New South Wales because we do not audit the Australian Government's activities. On 17 August 2022, the Australian National Audit Office completed a performance audit which assessed the Australian Department of Health and Aged Care's effectiveness in the planning and implementation of Australia's COVID-19 vaccine rollout.

This audit is one of a series of audits that have been completed or are in progress regarding the New South Wales COVID-19 emergency response. This includes the planned performance audit ‘Coordination of the response to COVID-19 (June to November 2021)’, and financial audit assurance activities focusing on Local Health District processes and controls to manage the receipt, distribution and inventory management of vaccine stock. The Audit Office New South Wales '2022–25 Annual Work Program' details the ongoing focus our audits will have on providing assurance on the effectiveness of emergency responses.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Australian audits on the vaccine rollouts

Appendix three – Committee members 

Appendix four – About the audit 

Appendix five – Performance auditing 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #369 - released 7 December 2022