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Published

Actions for Driver vehicle system

Driver vehicle system

Transport
Finance
Cyber security
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Project management
Service delivery

What this report is about

Transport for NSW (TfNSW) uses the Driver vehicle System (DRIVES) to support its regulatory functions. The system covers over 6.2 million driver licences and over seven million vehicle registrations.

DRIVES first went live in 1991 and has been significantly extended and updated since, though is still based around the same core system. The system is at end of life but has become an important service for Service NSW and the NSW Police Force.

DRIVES now includes some services to other parts of government and non-government entities which have little or no connection to transport. There are 141 users of DRIVES in total, including commercial insurers, national regulators, and individual citizens.

This audit assessed whether TfNSW is effectively managing DRIVES and planning to transition it to a modernised system.

Audit findings

TfNSW has not effectively planned the replacement of DRIVES.

It is now working on its third business case for a replacement system but has failed to learn lessons from its past attempts.

In the meantime, TfNSW has not taken a strategic approach to managing DRIVES’ growth.

TfNSW has been slow to reduce the risk of misuse of personal information held in DRIVES. With its delivery partner Service NSW, TfNSW has also been slow to develop and implement automatic monitoring of access.

TfNSW uses recognised processes for managing most aspects of DRIVES, but has not kept the system consistently available for users. TfNSW has lacked accurate service availability information since June 2022, when it changed its technology support provider.

TfNSW needs to significantly prioritise cyber security improvements to DRIVES. TfNSW is seeking to lift DRIVES’ cyber defences, but it will not achieve its stated target safeguard level until December 2025.

Even then, one of the target safeguards will not be achieved in full until DRIVES is modernised.

Audit recommendations

TfNSW should:

  • implement a service management framework including insight into the views of DRIVES users, and ensuring users can influence the service
  • ensure it can accurately and cost effectively calculate when DRIVES is unavailable due to unplanned downtime
  • ensure implementation of a capability to automatically detect anomalous patterns of access to DRIVES
  • ensure that DRIVES has appropriate cyber security and resilience safeguards in place as a matter of priority
  • develop a clear statement of the future role in whole of government service delivery for the system
  • resolve key issues currently faced by the DRIVES replacement program including by:
    • clearly setting out a strategy and design for the replacement
    • preparing a specific business case for replacement.

Read the PDF report

Parliamentary reference - Report number #388 - released 20 February 2024

Published

Actions for Treasury 2023

Treasury 2023

Treasury
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Regulation
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration

What this report is about

Result of the Treasury portfolio of agencies’ financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2023.

The results of the audit of the NSW Government’s consolidated Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA), which are prepared by NSW Treasury, will be reported separately in our report on ‘State Finances 2023’.

The audit found

Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all general purpose financial statement audits.

Qualified audit opinions were issued on two of the 24 other engagements prepared by portfolio agencies. These related to payments made from Special Deposit Accounts that did not comply with the relevant legislation.

The number of monetary misstatements identified in our audits increased from 29 in 2021–22 to 39 in 2022–23.

The new parental leave policy impacted agencies across all portfolios. NSW Treasury should perform annual assessments to identify changes in legislation and regulation and provide timely guidance to the sector.

Transport for NSW and Sydney Metro have capitalised over $300 million of tender bid costs paid to unsuccessful tender bidders relating to significant infrastructure projects. Whilst NSW Treasury policy provides clarity on the reimbursement of unsuccessful bidders’ costs, clearer guidance on how to account for these costs in agencies’ financial statements is required.

The key audit issues were

Five high-risk issues were reported in 2022–23. Three were new findings on contract management, accounting treatments for workers compensation renewal premium adjustments and the management and oversight of a Special Deposit Account. Two repeat issues referred to the need to improve quality review processes over financial reporting and the timely approval of administration costs.

Portfolio agencies should prioritise and action recommendations to address internal control deficiencies.

 

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Treasury portfolio of agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Treasury portfolio of agencies (the portfolio) for 2023.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all Treasury portfolio agencies’ 2022–23 financial statements.
  • Two qualified audit opinions were issued on special purpose financial reports, relating to whether payments from the Electricity Retained Interest Corporation – Ausgrid (ERIC-A) Fund and the Electricity Retained Interest Corporation – Endeavour (ERIC-E) Fund, complied with the relevant legislation.
  • The total number of errors (both corrected and uncorrected) in the financial statements increased from 29 in 2021–22 to 39 in 2022–23.
    Reported corrected misstatements increased from 15 in 2021–22 to 25 with a gross value of $7.1 billion in 2022–23. Reported uncorrected misstatements increased from 13 in 2021–22 to 14 in 2022–23, with a gross value of $277.6 million in 2022–23.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury portfolio.

Section highlights

  • Five high-risk issues were reported in 2022–23. Three were new findings on contract management, accounting treatments for workers compensation renewal premium adjustments and the management and oversight of a Special Deposit Account.
  • A further 35 moderate risk findings were reported in 2022–23, of which ten were repeat findings.
  • Some agencies have again spent monies without an authorised delegation.
  • The quality of information provided for audit purposes needs to improve.

 

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

Appendix five – Acquittals and other opinions

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Customer Service 2023

Customer Service 2023

Finance
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Regulation
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration

What this report is about

Result of the Customer Service portfolio agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2023.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all completed 30 June 2023 financial statements audits of Customer Service portfolio agencies. Two audits are ongoing.

What the key issues were

The total number of misstatements in the financial statements and findings reported to management decreased compared to the prior year.

For the first time since its establishment in 2015, GovConnect NSW received unqualified audit opinions for business process internal controls and information technology general controls managed by service providers.

The department controls Finance Co Trust (Fin Co), a special purpose trust created as part of its project to replace flammable cladding for eligible residential apartment buildings. Fin Co did not prepare financial statements which is a breach of the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 (GSF Act).

The department's land titling database was overstated by $42.5 million due to errors in the valuation model.

The New South Wales Government Telecommunications Authority corrected a prior period error of $10.2 million overstatement of property, plant and equipment.

A high-risk finding was reported to Service NSW regarding gaps in policies, systems and processes for administering and financial reporting on grant programs.

Recommendations were made to address these deficiencies.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Customer Service portfolio of agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Customer Service portfolio of agencies (the portfolio) for 2023.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all completed 30 June 2023 financial statements audits of the portfolio agencies. Two audits are ongoing.
  • The total number of errors (including corrected and uncorrected) in the financial statements decreased compared to the prior year.
  • Financial statements were not prepared for Finance Co Trust (Fin Co), a special purpose trust created by the department as part of its project to replace flammable cladding for eligible residential apartment buildings. This is a breach of the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 (GSF Act).
  • The department overstated the value of its land titling database, a service concession asset by $42.5 million. This was due to errors in the valuation data and calculation errors in the valuation model.
  • Service NSW’s late resolution of the accounting assessment of grant programs funding resulted in delays to financial reporting and audit.
  • The New South Wales Government Telecommunications Authority (the authority) corrected a prior period error retrospectively to write off assets that could not be physically verified. 

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Customer Service portfolio.

Section highlights

  • The 2022–23 audits identified one high risk and 26 moderate risk issues across the portfolio.
  • The high-risk matter was related to Service NSW’s revenue assessment of its grant programs.
  • The total number of findings decreased from 64 to 41, which mainly related to deficiencies in financial reporting, information technology, payroll and purchasing controls.
  • Fifty-one per cent of the issues were repeat issues. Many repeat issues related to weakness in information technology (IT) controls around access to systems and data and disaster recovery testing.
  • For the first time since its establishment in 2015, GovConnect NSW received unqualified audit opinions for business processes internal controls and information technology general controls managed by service providers. 

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit 

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Regional, rural and remote education

Regional, rural and remote education

Education
Management and administration
Project management
Service delivery

What this report is about

Students in rural and remote areas of NSW face greater challenges compared to their metropolitan peers.

This report examined how the NSW Department of Education (the department) is ensuring that rural and remote students have access to the same quality of early childhood, school education, and skills pathways as metropolitan students.

What we found

A decade since the previous (2013) strategy to address educational disadvantage, there remain considerable gaps in access and outcomes between rural and remote students and metropolitan students.

The Rural and Remote Education Strategy (2021–24) is unlikely to address these longstanding and known issues of educational disadvantage in rural and remote areas.

Key enabling factors such as resourcing a dedicated team, setting performance measures, and establishing suitable governance arrangements were not put in place to support effective implementation of the 2021 strategy.

The department has programs aimed at addressing remoteness challenges, but does not know if these initiatives improve access or outcomes.

The department does not monitor or report on student access or outcomes according to geographic location.

What we recommended

The Department of Education should:

  • develop a new strategy that addresses disadvantage in regional, rural and remote education
  • establish and report publicly on regional, rural and remote key performance indicators
  • improve data collection by using a standard remoteness classification
  • improve governance arrangements for regional, rural and remote education
  • review the resources provided for regional, rural and remote areas that recognises the additional costs
  • develop an approach that ensures all students can access best practice modes of delivery.

In February 2021, the department of Education (the department) released the ‘Rural and Remote Education Strategy (2021–2024)’. The strategy sets a vision that ‘every child in regional New South Wales has access to the same quality of education as their metropolitan peers’. It recognises that students in rural and remote areas of New South Wales face greater challenges compared to students in metropolitan locations. These challenges contribute to regional, rural and remote students underperforming on major educational indicators compared to their metropolitan peers.

In recent years, regional, rural and remote communities experienced a series of natural disasters as well as the COVID-19 pandemic. In response to the pandemic and subsequent school closures, the department introduced new initiatives aimed at minimising the disruption to children including online learning and small group tuition.

The department established a regional, rural and remote education policy unit in 2021 to support delivery of the strategy and its vision.

The objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness of the department’s activities to ensure that regional, rural and remote students have access to the same quality of early childhood, school education, and skills pathways as their metropolitan peers.

In making this assessment, the audit examined whether:

  • The department developed and implemented a strategy that enables regional, rural and remote students to access the same quality of early childhood education, school education, and skills pathways as students in metropolitan New South Wales.
  • The department has been addressing the complexities and needs of regional, rural and remote early childhood education, school education, and skills pathways.
Conclusion

The department's rural and remote education strategy is unlikely to achieve its vision that every child in regional New South Wales has access to the same quality of education as their metropolitan peers. Shortcomings in the design and implementation of the strategy have meant there is little to report on its impact after more than two years since its release.

The department did not take on board lessons learned from the previous strategy. The department did not provide additional resources to meet the strategy aims, establish strong central coordination, set timeframes, set measures of success, or identify new programs to address gaps in regional and remote access and outcomes. Instead, the department relied on matching existing programs and activities across its business areas to meet the stated actions and goals of the strategy.

There was not enough work put in to plan for successful implementation. A changeover in staff responsible for coordinating implementation of the strategy and lack of fit-for-purpose governance arrangements slowed its momentum. The department took one year to recruit a central team and almost two years to set up governance that gives relevant department executives oversight of the strategy. This was not fast enough to support a four-year strategy with an ambitious vision.

The department did not establish a program logic model, set baseline measures or develop an evaluation plan to assess the impact of the strategy. Consequently, it has not adequately monitored changes in access or outcomes for regional, rural and remote students. Two years after its release, there has not been any public reporting against the actions or outcomes of the strategy.

The department is not addressing the complexities of delivering regional, rural and remote early childhood, school education and skills pathways. There are a range of programs targeted to overcoming challenges of remoteness, but the department does not monitor data to determine whether these programs are sufficient to close the persistent gaps in access and outcomes for regional, rural and remote students.

A decade after the Rural and Remote Education Blueprint was launched in 2013, there remain considerable gaps in access and outcomes between metropolitan and regional, rural and remote areas. The department identifies 'equity' as a key value in its strategic plan but does not monitor or report on performance against key indicators according to geographic location. Data produced in response to our requests for this report demonstrate that previously identified gaps in access and outcomes remain.

Different areas of the department recognise the challenges of delivering services in regional, rural and remote locations and have developed specific programs or approaches aimed at addressing these challenges. The department does not know whether these interventions are sufficient to close the gaps in access or outcomes. Schools we spoke with as part of the audit reported significant ongoing challenges with attracting and retaining staff, providing a full curriculum and accessing support services when needed. 

This chapter examines the process to develop the Rural and Remote Education Strategy (2021–2024). It considers whether there was a comprehensive program of stakeholder consultation, whether relevant research and evidence was incorporated and whether an effective performance monitoring system was established.

The department made genuine efforts to consult with stakeholders on the new strategy

The department had a clear process to engage and obtain feedback from key stakeholders during the development of the new strategy. It developed a range of documents to support the consultation process including a stakeholder engagement plan, communications plan, and presentation. The department used the International Association for Public Participation (IAP2) Spectrum of Public Participation principles to help ensure that relevant stakeholders were included in the planning and decision-making process.

In late 2019, the department began its first phase of consultations with internal and external stakeholders to get their views on rural and remote education. It consulted internally with department directors, advisory groups, and learning communities, and externally with government agencies, service providers, non-government schools, and universities.

In March 2020, the department developed a stakeholder engagement paper to test the key issues from stakeholder consultations. Four focus areas were identified and included in a consultation paper that went out to key stakeholders for the second round of consultations in May 2020.

In the third consultation phase, the department conducted a workshop with stakeholders to review the earlier feedback, prioritise issues, identify gaps, and provide further input.

This consultation process enabled the department to identify issues and challenges to inform the new strategy. However, it was already aware that the blueprint was having limited success, and had already identified potential focus areas, following the evaluation of the blueprint in 2019.

The department did not consider recent research when developing the new strategy

The department's guidance materials promote the importance of considering research during policymaking. The guidelines describe the need to understand a topic, consult with stakeholders, identify gaps in existing knowledge, and ensure future work is informed by current literature.

In 2013, the department published a literature review on rural and remote education to inform the blueprint. The literature review found that students in rural and remote schools were not performing as well as their metropolitan peers, and that this performance gap was widening. The review attributed this to the higher number of children from low socio-economic backgrounds attending rural and remote schools. The review also identified several other factors that could negatively impact performance outcomes for rural and remote students. The department used the findings of the literature review to develop the key focus areas in the 2013 blueprint.

When the department began developing the new rural and remote education strategy in 2019, it recognised the need to review the literature on recent international initiatives. However, it has not yet released this review. This means that the department could have missed important new developments since it last examined the literature in 2013. Incorporating up-to-date research is important where past strategies have not met all their intended outcomes.

A national review into rural and remote education in 2018 examined Australian and international literature to inform its findings. The review made 11 recommendations to the Australian and state governments. While the NSW Government was not required to formally respond to the review, it could have considered the work done by that review when developing the new strategy. Several review recommendations are addressed in the strategy, while several others are only partly addressed. Gaps between review recommendations and specific strategy actions include improving the availability of quality accommodation, substantially reducing the waiting times for specialist assessments of students with learning difficulties and disabilities and increasing access to high quality distance education.

In 2019, the department commissioned a rural and remote project to contribute a research and evidence base to the new strategy. The main aim of the project was to help the department understand how it could better support rural and remote schools to increase educational outcomes. There was not enough time for this review to be completed prior to the release of the strategy. As of June 2023, the research project had not yet been released.

The strategy did not address all findings and recommendations from a recent evaluation

In 2020, the department's Centre for Education Statistics and Evaluation (CESE) published an evaluation of the blueprint. The evaluation examined how the actions in the blueprint were implemented. It recommended that a new strategy be developed, and made recommendations for things that should be incorporated into the strategy.

The blueprint aimed to ensure students in rural and remote areas could access the same quality of education as their metropolitan peers. The blueprint identified four focus areas to meet that aim:

  • quality early childhood education
  • great teachers and school leaders
  • curriculum access for all
  • effective partnerships and connections.

The department developed several initiatives to help meet the objectives of each of the four focus areas. These initiatives are described in Exhibit 5 below.

Exhibit 5: Key initiatives in the Rural and Remote Education Blueprint (2013)
Key focus area Initiative
Quality early childhood education
  • Funding model to help vulnerable and disadvantaged children access preschool.
Great teachers and school leaders
  • Rental subsidy to help attract and retain teachers.
Curriculum access for all
  • Virtual school to provide a varied curriculum for high potential and gifted students.
Effective partnerships and connections
  • Education networks for teachers and school leaders to access expert advice to support student learning.
  • Networked specialist centres to bring together services to support student health and wellbeing.

Source: Department of Education, Rural and remote education: A blueprint for action 2013.

The evaluation found that initiatives in two of the four focus areas – Quality early childhood education and Curriculum access for all – had performed well. However, the evaluation found that initiatives in the other two focus areas – Great teachers and school leaders and Effective partnerships and connections – did not achieve intended outcomes.

On the whole, the evaluation found that the 'remoteness gap' between rural and remote students and metropolitan students had not reduced since the blueprint was introduced. It recommended that the department continue its focus on rural and remote education by developing a new evidence-based strategy that focused on student outcomes and clear measures of success.

Objectives and actions in the new strategy were similar to those in the blueprint

The 2021 strategy sets an overall vision that 'every child in regional New South Wales has access to the same quality of education as their metropolitan peers'. It also states that the department 'is committed to ensuring all rural and remote students have equitable access to educational opportunities'.

Exhibit 6: Comparison of objectives in the blueprint and the new strategy
Rural and Remote Education Blueprint (2013) Rural and Remote Education Strategy (2021–24)
Provide more children with access to quality early child education in the year before school. Ensure all students have access to quality preschool in the year before school.
Ensure rural and remote schools have greater capacity to attract and retain quality teachers and leaders. Increase supply of high-quality educators in rural and remote communities.
Build the capacity of teachers and leaders in rural and remote schools. Better develop rural and remote teachers to deliver quality learning opportunities.
Address wellbeing needs through effective partnerships and connections. Address wellbeing needs through connections with local communities.
Develop partnerships so that rural and remote students have access to quality pathways into further education, training, or employment. Build partnerships to increase student access to post-school opportunities.

Source: Audit Office summary of Department of Education information.

Four areas in the blueprint remained a focus in the new strategy – early childhood education, teacher recruitment and retention, curriculum, and student wellbeing support services. Each focus area identifies a goal, as well as the aims and actions that contribute to those goals.

While this shows the department identified that these areas required continued attention, most actions were to 'increase', 'expand' or 'improve' existing programs and resources. The new strategy did not propose any new ideas or solutions, despite the blueprint achieving limited success in improving outcomes for rural and remote students.

There were no baseline or target measures set to monitor progress of the new strategy

The blueprint evaluation recommended that the department develop a new evidence-based strategy which focused on improving student outcomes. It also recommended the department use a program logic methodology to ensure there was a clear definition of success, adequate measures of success, and continual monitoring to ensure success.

Program logic models are a visual representation of the various components of a program. They can be used to illustrate program priorities, inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, and assumptions. Logic models are used to explain how a proposed solution will address a specific problem. They are important because they can help test assumptions, build business cases, and identify potential enablers or barriers that could impact the project.

The department did not complete a program logic model during development of the new strategy, nor did it define measures to monitor whether the strategy's overall vision for quality education or the commitment to equitable access was on track to be achieved.

The department has not comprehensively monitored changes in educational outcomes in regional, rural and remote areas since the evaluation of the blueprint in 2020. This evaluation had seven indicators of educational outcomes by remoteness. The measures used in the evaluation could have provided a starting point given the similarity in focus areas between the blueprint and the new strategy. Not addressing past review recommendations increases risks that issues will be repeated.

The policy unit advised it has plans to set up a dashboard to monitor performance across the department's business plan measures by remoteness. This is intended to identify areas where system-wide improvements are required. This is not a comprehensive account of the strategy outcomes because the business plan measures don't capture all the goals of the strategy.

There were no timeframes or resources identified for implementing new strategy actions

The strategy has an overall timeframe of 2021–2024 but does not clarify when it expects the vision, goals, or aims to be achieved, or actions to be implemented.

The department's guidance on policymaking sets out how projects should be transitioned between the policy and implementation teams. This guidance is intended to help ensure the policy intent and scope of the project are not lost during the delivery of the project. The guidance highlights that the policy team should establish clear project implementation timeframes. It is important to have clear timeframes because it enables teams to measure progress, manage resources, and prioritise actions to ensure project outcomes are achieved.

The strategy states that there is a further $1 billion of investment planned over the next three years for rural and remote education but does not identify how this is allocated across its focus areas. It is important to identify the resources required to support the implementation of a program so that program objectives are met in a timely and cost-effective manner. The previous blueprint identified much lower funding of $80 million but more clearly showed how it would be allocated for identified actions across the four focus areas.

In response to our requests, the department separately identified $1.286 billion in expenditure for regional, rural and remote schools referenced in the strategy. Most of this expenditure related to existing department programs and activities rather than new initiatives. The total amount included:

  • $576.9 million for new and upgraded schools
  • $365.8 million for upgraded information technology equipment and resources
  • $120 million for school facility upgrades to be co-funded by schools
  • $60 million to replace school roofs
  • $60 million for the COVID Intensive Learning Support Program
  • $32 million for the Early Action for Success program
  • $29.7 million for staffing incentives
  • $21.7 million for literacy and numeracy interventions
  • $18.8 million in school location allowances
  • $1.45 million for the Rural Learning Exchange Pilot
  • $0.4 million for Rural and Remote Network initiatives.

This chapter examines the arrangements in place to implement the strategy. It considers whether effective governance arrangements are in place and how progress is monitored and reported.

This chapter considers the effectiveness of arrangements to ensure regional, rural and remote students have access to quality early childhood education, school education, and post‑school transitions.

This chapter considers the department's arrangements to monitor educational and wellbeing outcomes of students by remoteness. It reports on differences in outcomes between students in metropolitan areas and those in regional, rural and remote areas.

Those living in regional, rural and remote areas can have greater difficulty in accessing government services, often needing to travel long distances, or facing lower service levels than provided in major cities. This context is important when considering educational and wellbeing outcomes, given the disruptive effects of waiting or missing out on important services.

The rest of this chapter details key measures in the department's outcome and business plan.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #385 - released 10 August 2023

Published

Actions for Management of the Critical Communications Enhancement Program

Management of the Critical Communications Enhancement Program

Finance
Health
Justice
Whole of Government
Cyber security
Information technology
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Project management
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration

What the report is about

Effective radio communications are crucial to NSW's emergency services organisations.

The Critical Communications Enhancement Program (CCEP) aims to deliver an enhanced public safety radio network to serve the five emergency services organisations (ESOs), as well as a range of other users.

This report assesses whether the NSW Telco Authority is effectively managing the CCEP.

What we found

Where it has already been delivered (about 50% of the state), the enhanced network meets most of the requirements of ESOs.

The CCEP will provide additional infrastructure for public safety radio coverage in existing buildings agreed to with ESOs. However, radio coverage inside buildings constructed after the CCEP concludes will be at risk because building and fire regulations do not address the need for in-building public safety radio coverage.

Around 98% of radios connected to the network can be authenticated to protect against cloning, though only 42% are.

The NSW Telco Authority has not settled with ESOs on how call encryption will be used across the network. This creates the risk that radio interoperability between ESOs will not be maximised.

When completed, the public safety radio network will be the only mission critical radio network for ESOs. It is unclear whether governance for the ongoing running of the network will allow ESOs to participate in future network operational decisions.

The current estimated capital cost for the NSW Telco Authority to complete the CCEP is $1.293 billion. This is up from an estimated cost of $400 million in 2016. The estimated capital cost was not publicly disclosed until $1.325 billion was shown in the 2021–22 NSW Budget Papers.

We estimate that the full cost to government, including costs to the ESOs, of implementing the enhanced network is likely to exceed $2 billion.

We made recommendations about

  • The governance of the enhanced Public Safety Network (PSN) to support agency relationships.
  • The need to finalise a Traffic Mitigation Plan for when the network is congested.
  • The need to provide advice to the NSW Government about the regulatory gap for ensuring adequate network reach in future buildings.
  • The need to clarify how encryption and interoperability will work on the enhanced network.
  • The need for the NSW Telco Authority to comply with its policy on Infrastructure Capacity Reservation.
  • Expediting measures to protect against the risk of cloning by unauthenticated radios.

Public safety radio networks are critical for operational communications among Emergency Services Organisations (ESOs), which in New South Wales include:

  • NSW Ambulance
  • Fire and Rescue NSW
  • NSW Police Force
  • NSW Rural Fire Service
  • NSW State Emergency Service.1

Since 1993, these five ESOs have had access to a NSW Government owned and operated radio communications network, the Public Safety Network (PSN), to support their operational communications. Around 60 to 70 other entities also have access to this network, including other NSW government entities, Commonwealth government entities, local councils, community organisations, and utility companies.

Pursuant to the Government Telecommunications Act 2018 ('the Act'), the New South Wales Government Telecommunications Authority ('NSW Telco Authority') is responsible for the establishment, control, management, maintenance and operation of the PSN.2

Separate to the PSN, all ESOs and other government entities have historically maintained their own radio communication capabilities and networks. Accordingly, the PSN has been a supplementary source of operational radio communications for these entities.

These other radio networks maintained by ESOs and other entities are of varying size and capability, with many ageing and nearing their end-of-life. There was generally little or no interoperability between networks, infrastructure was often co-located and duplicative, and there were large gaps in geographic coverage.

In 2016, the NSW Telco Authority received dedicated NSW Government funding to commence the Critical Communications Enhancement Program (CCEP).

According to NSW Telco Authority's 2021–22 annual report, the CCEP is a transformation program for operational communications for NSW government agencies. The CCEP '…aims to deliver greater access to public safety standard radio communications for the State’s first responders and essential service agencies'. The objective of CCEP is to consolidate the large number of separate radio networks that are owned and operated by various NSW government entities and to enhance the state’s existing shared PSN. The program also aims to deliver increased PSN coverage throughout New South Wales.

The former NSW Government intended that as the enhanced PSN was progressively rolled-out across NSW, ESOs would migrate their radio communications to the enhanced network, before closing and decommissioning their own networks.

About this Audit

This audit assessed whether the CCEP is being effectively managed by the NSW Telco Authority to deliver an enhanced PSN that meets ESOs' requirements for operational communications.

We addressed the audit objective by answering the following two questions:

  1. Have agreed ESO user requirements for the enhanced PSN been met under day-to-day and emergency operational conditions?
  2. Has there been adequate transparency to the NSW Government and other stakeholders regarding whole-of-government costs related to the CCEP?

In answering the first question, we also considered how the agreed user requirements were determined. This included whether they were supported by evidence, whether they were sufficient to meet the intent of the CCEP (including in considering any role for new or alternative technologies), and whether they met any relevant technical standards and compliance obligations (including for cyber security resilience).

While other NSW government agencies and entities use the PSN, we focused on the experience of the five primary ESOs because these will be the largest users of the enhanced PSN.

Both the cost and time required to complete the CCEP roll-out have increased since 2016. While it was originally intended to be completed in 2020, this is now forecast to be 2027. Infrastructure NSW has previously assessed the reasons for the increases in time and cost. A summary of the findings made by Infrastructure NSW is presented in Chapter 1 of this report. Accordingly, as these matters had already been assessed, we did not re-examine them in this performance audit.

The auditee for this performance audit is the NSW Telco Authority, which is a statutory authority within the Department of Customer Service portfolio.

In addition to being responsible for the operation of the PSN, section 5 of the Act also prescribes that the NSW Telco Authority is:

  • to identify, develop and deliver upgrades and enhancements to the government telecommunications network to improve operational communications for government sector agencies
  • to develop policies, standards and guidelines for operational communications using telecommunications networks.

The NSW Telco Authority Advisory Board is established under section 10 of the Act. The role of the board is to advise the NSW Telco Authority and the minister on any matter relating to the telecommunications requirements of government sector agencies and on any other matter relating to the functions of the Authority. As of 2 June 2023, the responsible minister is the Minister for Customer Service and Digital Government.

The five identified ESOs are critical stakeholders of the CCEP and therefore they were consulted during this audit. However, the ESOs were not auditees for this performance audit.

Conclusion

In areas of New South Wales where the enhanced Public Safety Network has been implemented under the Critical Communications Enhancement Program, the NSW Telco Authority has delivered a radio network that meets most of the agreed requirements of Emergency Services Organisations for routine and emergency operations.
In April 2023, the enhanced Public Safety Network (PSN) was approximately 50% completed. In areas where it is used by Emergency Services Organisations (ESOs), the PSN generally meets agreed user requirements. This is demonstrated through extensive performance monitoring and reporting, which shows that agreed performance standards are generally achieved. Reviews by the NSW Government and the NSW Telco Authority found that the PSN performed effectively during major flood events in 2021 and 2022.

Where it is completed, PSN coverage is generally equal to or better than each ESO's individual pre-existing coverage. The NSW Telco Authority has a dedicated work program to address localised coverage gaps (or 'blackspots') in those areas where coverage has otherwise been substantively delivered. Available call capacity on the network far exceeds demand in everyday use. Any operational issues that may occur with the PSN are transparent to ESOs in real time.

The NSW Telco Authority consulted extensively with ESOs on requirements for the enhanced PSN, with relatively few ESO requirements not being included in the specifications for the enhanced PSN. Lessons from previous events, including the 2019–20 summer bushfires, have informed the design and implementation of the enhanced PSN (such as the need to ensure adequate backup power supply to inaccessible sites). The network is based on the Project 25 technical standards for mission-critical radio communications, which is widely-accepted in the public safety radio community throughout Australia and internationally.

There is no mechanism to ensure adequate radio coverage within new building infrastructure after the CCEP concludes, but the NSW Telco Authority and ESOs have agreed an approach to prioritise existing in-building sites for coverage for the duration of the CCEP.
The extent to which the PSN works within buildings and other built structures (such as railway tunnels) is of crucial importance to ESOs, especially the NSW Police Force, NSW Ambulance, and Fire and Rescue NSW. This is because a large proportion of their operational communications occurs within buildings.

There is no mechanism to ensure the adequacy of future in-building coverage for the PSN in new or refurbished buildings after the CCEP concludes. Planning, building, and fire regulations are silent on this issue. We note there are examples in the United States of how in-building coverage for public safety radio networks can be incorporated into building or fire safety codes.

In regard to existing buildings, it is not possible to know whether a building requires its own in-building PSN infrastructure until nearby outside radio sites, including towers and antennae, have been commissioned into the network. Only then can it be determined whether their radio transmissions are capable of penetrating inside nearby buildings. Accordingly, much of this work for in-building coverage cannot be done until outside radio sites are finished and operating.

In March 2023, the NSW Telco Authority and ESOs agreed on a list of 906 mandatory and 7,086

non-mandatory sites for in-building PSN coverage. Most of these sites will likely be able to receive radio coverage via external antennae and towers, however this cannot be confirmed until those nearby external PSN sites are completed. The parties also agreed on an approach to prioritising those sites where coverage is needed but not provided by antennae and towers. Available funding will likely only extend to ensuring coverage in sites deemed mandatory, which is nonetheless expected to meet the overall benchmark of achieving 'same or better' coverage than what ESOs had previously.

There is a risk that radio interoperability between ESOs will not be maximised because the NSW Telco Authority has not settled with ESOs how encryption will be used across the enhanced PSN.
End-to-end encryption of radio transmissions is a security feature that prevents radio transmissions being intercepted or listened to by people who are not meant to. The ability of the PSN to provide end-to-end encryption of operational communications is of critical importance to the two largest prospective users of the PSN: the NSW Police Force and NSW Ambulance. Given that encryption excludes other parties that do not have the requisite encryption keys, its use creates an obstacle to achieving a key intended benefit of the CCEP, that is a more interoperable PSN, where first responders are better able to communicate with other ESOs.

Further planning and collaboration between PSN participants are necessary to consider how these dual benefits can be achieved, including in what operational circumstances encrypted interoperability is necessary or appropriate.

The capital cost to the NSW Telco Authority of the CCEP, originally estimated at $400 million in 2016, was not made public until the 2021–22 NSW Budget disclosed an estimate of $1.325 billon.
The estimated capital cost to complete all stages of the CCEP increased over time. This increasing cost was progressively disclosed to the NSW Government through Cabinet processes between 2015–16 and 2021–22.

In 2016, the full capital cost to the NSW Telco Authority of completing the CCEP was estimated to be $400 million. This estimated cost was not publicly disclosed, nor were subsequent increases, until the cost of $1.325 billion was publicly disclosed in the 2021–22 NSW Budget (revised down in the 2022–23 NSW Budget to $1.293 billion).

There has been no transparency about the whole-of-government cost of implementing the enhanced PSN through the CCEP.
In addition to the capital costs incurred directly by the NSW Telco Authority for the CCEP, ESOs have incurred costs to maintain their own networks due to the delay in implementing the CCEP. The ESOs will continue to incur these costs until they are able to fully migrate to the enhanced PSN, which is expected to be in 2027. These costs have not been tracked or reported as part of transparently accounting for the whole-of-government cost of the enhanced PSN. This is despite Infrastructure NSW in 2019 recommending to the NSW Telco Authority that it conduct a stocktake of such costs so that a whole-of-government cost impact is available to the NSW Government.

1 The definition of 'emergency services organisation' is set out in the State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989 (NSW). In addition to the five ESOs discussed in this report, the definition also includes: Surf Life Saving New South Wales; New South Wales Volunteer Rescue Association Inc; Volunteer Marine Rescue NSW; an agency that manages or controls an accredited rescue unit; and a non-government agency that is prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this definition.
2 Section 15(1) of the Government Telecommunications Act 2018 (NSW).

The NSW Telco Authority established and tracked its own costs for the CCEP

Over the course of the program from 2016, the NSW Telco Authority prepared a series of business cases and program reviews that estimated its cost of implementing the program in full, including those shown in Exhibit 6 below.

Exhibit 6: Estimated costs to fully implement the CCEP
Source Capital cost ($ million) Operating cost
($ million)
Completion date
March 2016 business case 400 37.3 2020
November 2017 internal review 476.7 41.7 2022
March 2020 business case 950–1,050 -- 2025
October 2020 business case 1,263.1 56.1 2026

Source: CCEP business cases as identified.

In response to the 2016 CCEP business case, the then NSW Government approved the NSW Telco Authority implementing the CCEP in full, with funding provided in stages. The NSW Telco Authority tracked its costs against approved funding, with monthly reports provided to the multi-agency Program Steering Committee

Throughout the program, the NSW Government was informed of increasing costs being incurred by the NSW Telco Authority for the CCEP

The various business cases, program updates, and program reviews prepared by the NSW Telco Authority were provided to the NSW Government through the required Cabinet process when seeking approval for the program proceeding and requests for both capital and operational funding. These provided clear indication of the changing overall cost of the CCEP to the NSW Telco Authority, as well as the delays that were being experienced.

There was no transparency to the Parliament and community about changes in the capital cost of the CCEP until the 2021–22 NSW Budget

As the business cases for the CCEP were not publicly available, the only sources of information about capital cost were NSW Budget papers and media releases. The information provided in the annual Budget papers prior to the 2021–22 NSW Budget provided no visibility of the estimated full capital cost to complete all stages of the CCEP. As shown in Exhibit 7 below, this information was fragmented and complex.

Media releases about the progress of the CCEP did not provide the estimated total cost to the NSW Telco Authority of $1.325 billion to complete all stages of the CCEP until June 2021. Prior to this date, media releases only provided funding for the initial stages of the program or for the stages subject to a funding announcement.

Even during the September 2019 and March 2020 Parliamentary Estimate Committee hearings where the costings and delays to the CCEP were raised, the estimated full cost of the CCEP was not revealed.

Exhibit 7: CCEP funding in NSW Budget papers from 2015–16 to 2022–23
Financial year Type of major work Description of expenditure Forecast estimate to complete ($ million) Estimated duration
2015–16 New work Infrastructure Rationalisation Program: Planning and Pilot 18.3 2015–16
2016–17 Work in progress CCEP Planning and Pilot 18.3 2015–17
New work CCEP 45 2016–17
2017–18 New work CCEP 190.75 2017–21
2018–19 Work in progress CCEP North Coast and State-wide Detailed Design 190.75 2017–21
New work CCEP Greater Metropolitan Area 236 2018–22
2019–20 Work in progress CCEP 426.9 2018–22
2020–21 Work in progress CCEP 664.8 2018–22
2021–22 Work in progress CCEP 1,325 2018–26
2022–23 Work in progress CCEP 1,292.8 2018–26

Source: NSW Treasury, Annual State Budget Papers.

The original business case for the CCEP included estimated ESO costs, though these costs were not tracked throughout the program

Estimates for ESO costs for operating and maintaining their own radio networks over the four years from 2016–17 were included in the original March 2016 business case. They included $75.2 million for capital expenditure and $95 million for one-off operating costs. These costs, as well as costs incurred by ESOs due to the delay in the program, were not subsequently tracked by the NSW Telco Authority.

In January 2017, Infrastructure NSW reviewed the CCEP business case of March 2016. In this review, Infrastructure NSW recommended that the NSW Telco Authority identify combined and apportioned costs and cashflow for all ESOs over the CCEP funding period reflecting all associated costs to deliver the CCEP. These to include additional incidental capital costs accruing to ESOs, transition and migration to the new network and the cost (capital and operational) of maintaining existing networks. This recommendation was implemented in the November 2017 program review, with ESO capital costs estimated as $183 million.

In 2019, Infrastructure NSW conducted a Deep Dive Review on the progress of the CCEP. In this review, Infrastructure NSW made what it described as a 'critical recommendation' that the NSW Telco Authority:

…coordinate a stocktake of the costs of operational bridging solutions implemented by PSAs [ESOs] as a result of the 18-month delay, so that a whole-of-government cost impact is available to the NSW Government.  

It should be noted that the delay to CCEP completion now is seven years and that further ‘operational bridging solutions’ have been needed by the ESOs.

'Stay Safe and Keep Operational' costs incurred by ESOs will be significantly higher than originally estimated

Stay Safe and Keep Operational (SSKO) funding was established to provide funding to ESOs to maintain their legacy networks while the CCEP was refreshing and enhancing the PSN. This recognised that much of the network infrastructure relied on by ESOs had reached – or was reaching – obsolescence and would either require extensive maintenance or replacement before the PSN was available for ESOs to migrate to it. ESOs may apply to NSW Treasury for SSKO funding, with their specific proposals being reviewed (and endorsed, where appropriate) by the NSW Telco Authority. Accordingly, SSKO expenditure does not fall within the CCEP budget allocation.

As shown in the table below, extracted from the March 2016 CCEP business case, the total expected cost for SSKO purposes over the course of the CCEP was originally $40 million, assuming the enhanced PSN would be fully available by 2020.

Exhibit 8: Stay Safe and Keep Operational forecast costs, 2017 to 2020
Year 2017 2018 2019 2020 Total
SSKO forecast ($ million) 12.5 15 10 2.5 40

Source: March 2016 CCEP business case.

In October 2022, the expected completion date for the CCEP was re-baselined to August 2027. Accordingly, ESOs will be required to continue to maintain their radio networks using legacy equipment for seven years longer than the original 2020 forecast. This will likely become progressively more expensive and require additional SSKO funding. For example, NSW Telco Authority endorsed SSKO bids for 2022–23 exceeded $35 million for that year alone.

Compared to the original forecast made in the March 2016 CCEP business case of $40 million, we found ESOs had estimated SSKO spending to 2027 will be $292.5 million.

A refresh of paging network used by ESOs and the decommissioning of redundant sites were both removed from the original 2016 scope of the CCEP

Paging

A paging network is considered an important user requirement by the Fire and Rescue NSW, NSW Rural Fire Service, and NSW State Emergency Service. The 2016 CCEP business case included a paging network refresh within the program scope of works. This was reiterated in the November 2017 internal review of the program. These documents did not estimate a cost for this refresh. The March 2020 and October 2020 business cases excluded paging from the program scope. The audit is unable to identify when, why or by whom the decision was made to remove paging from the program scope, something that was also not well communicated to the affected ESOs.

In 2021, after representations from the affected ESOs, the NSW Telco Authority prepared a separate business case for a refresh of the paging network at an estimated capital cost of $60.31 million. This program was subsequently approved by the NSW Government and included in the 2022–23 NSW Budget.

In determining an estimated full whole-of-government cost of delivering the enhanced PSN, we have included the budgeted cost of the paging network refresh on the basis that:

  • it was expressly included in the original approved March 2016 business case
  • the capability is deemed essential to the needs of three ESOs.

Decommissioning costs

The 2016 CCEP business case included cost estimates for decommissioning surplus sites (whether ‘old’ GRN sites or sites belonging to ESOs’ own networks). These estimates were provided for both the NSW Telco Authority ($38 million) and for the ESOs ($55 million). However, while these estimates were described, they were not included as part of the NSW Telco Authority's estimated capital cost ($400 million) or (more relevantly) operating cost ($37.3 million) for the CCEP. This is despite decommissioning being included as one of eight planned activities for the rollout of the program.

In the October 2020 business case, an estimate of $201 million was included for decommissioning agency networks based on a model whereby:

  • funding would be coordinated by the NSW Telco Authority
  • scheduling and reporting through an inter-agency working group and
  • where appropriate, agencies would be appointed as the most appropriate decommissioning party.

This estimated cost is not included in the CCEP budget.

In determining an estimated full whole-of-government cost of the enhanced PSN, we have included the estimated cost of decommissioning on the basis that:

  • decommissioning was included in the 2016 CCEP business case as one of eight 'planned activities for the rollout of the program'
  • effective decommissioning of surplus sites and equipment (including as described in the business case as incorporating asset decommissioning, asset re-use, and site make-good) is an inherent part of the program management for an enhanced PSN
  • costs incurred in decommissioning are entirely a consequence of the CCEP program.

The estimated minimum cost of building an enhanced PSN consistent with the original proposal is over $2 billion

We have derived two estimated minimum whole-of-government costs for delivering an enhanced PSN. These are:

  • $2.04 billion when calculated from NSW Telco Authority data – shown as estimate A in Exhibit 9 below.
  • $2.26 billion when calculated from ESO supplied data – shown as estimate B in Exhibit 9.

Both totals include:

  • budgeted amounts for both CCEP capital expenditure ($1,292.8 million) and operating expenditure ($139 million)
  • the NSW Telco Authority's 2020 estimated cost for decommissioning ($201 million)
  • the NSW Telco Authority's approved funding for paging refresh ($60.3 million).

The two estimated totals primarily vary around the capital expenditure of ESOs (particularly SSKO funding). To determine these costs, we used ESO provided actual SSKO costs to date, as well as their estimates for maintaining their legacy radio networks through to 2027.

The equivalent cost estimates from the NSW Telco Authority were sourced from the November 2017 internal review and the October 2020 business case for CCEP. It should be noted that the amounts for both estimates are not audited, or verified, but do provide an indication of how whole-of-government costs have grown over the course of the program.

The increase in and reasons for the increase in total CCEP costs (capital and one-off operating) incurred or forecast by the NSW Telco Authority (from $437.3 million in 2016 to $1,431.8 million in 2022) have been provided to the NSW Government through various business cases and reviews prepared by the NSW Telco Authority, as well as by reviews conducted by Infrastructure NSW as part of its project assurance responsibilities.

However, the growth in ESO costs and other consequential costs, such as paging and decommissioning, from around $263 million in the 2016 CCEP business case to between $600 million and $800 million, has to a large degree remained invisible and unexplained to the NSW Government and other stakeholders

Exhibit 9: Estimated whole-of-government costs of the enhanced PSN
  Estimated whole-of-government cost, over time
Cost type 20161 20172 20203 2023–Estimate A4 2023–Estimate B5
$ million $ million $ million $ million $ million
CCEP capital expenditure 400a 476.7b 1,263.1c 1,292.8d 1,292.8d
CCEP operating expenditure 37.3a 41.7b 41.5e 139d 139d
CCEP total 437.3 518.4 1,304.6 1,431.8 1,431.8
ESO capital expenditure 75.2a,f 183b,e 75.4e 258.4g 292.5
ESO one-off operating expenditure 93a n.a.l 86.5e 86.5h 273
ESO total 168.2 183 161.9 344.9 565.5
Paging n.a.i n.a.i n.a.j 60.3k 60.3k
Decommissioning 93 n.a.l 201.0 201h 201
Paging and decommissioning total 93 n.a. 201 261.3 261.3
Whole-of-government total 698.5 701.4 1,667.5 2,038 2,258.6

Notes:
  1. Financial year 2016 to Financial year 2020.
  2. Financial year 2016 to Financial year 2021.
  3. Financial year 2016 to Financial year 2025.
  4. Financial year 2016 to Financial year 2026.
  5. Financial year 2022 to Financial year 2025.
  6. Stay Safe and Keep Operational (SSKO) costs plus terminals costs.
  7. November 2017 internal review and October 2020 Business case.
  8. October 2020 Business case.
  9. Included in CCEP capital expenditure at that time.
  10. By 2020, a refresh of the paging network had been removed from the CCEP scope.
  11. A separate business case for a refresh of the paging network was approved by government in 2022.
  12. Figure not included in the source document.
Sources:
  1. March 2016 CCEP business case.
  2. November 2017 Internal Review conducted by the NSW Telco Authority.
  3. October 2020 CCEP business case.
  4. Derived from business cases, with ESO costs drawn from NSW Telco Authority data.
  5. Derived from business cases, with ESO costs based on data provided to the Audit Office of New South Wales by each of the five ESOs.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Trunked public safety radio networks

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #383 - released 23 June 2023

 

Published

Actions for Natural disasters

Natural disasters

Community Services
Environment
Finance
Local Government
Planning
Transport
Treasury
Whole of Government
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Regulation
Risk
Service delivery

What this report is about

This report draws together the financial impact of natural disasters on agencies integral to the response and impact of natural disasters during 2021–22.

What we found

Over the 2021–22 financial year $1.4 billion from a budget of $1.9 billion was spent by the NSW Government in response to natural disasters.

Total expenses were less than the budget due to underspend in the following areas:

  • clean-up assistance, including council grants
  • anticipated temporary accommodation support
  • payments relating to the Northern Rivers Business Support scheme for small businesses.

Natural disaster events damaged council assets such as roads, bridges, waste collection centres and other facilities used to provide essential services. Additional staff, contractors and experts were engaged to restore and repair damaged assets and minimise disruption to service delivery.

At 30 June 2022, the estimated damage to council infrastructure assets totalled $349 million.

Over the first half of the 2022–23 financial year, councils experienced further damage to infrastructure assets due to natural disasters. NSW Government spending on natural disasters continued with a further $1.1 billion spent over this period.

Thirty-six councils did not identify climate change or natural disaster as a strategic risk despite 22 of these having at least one natural disaster during 2021–22.

Section highlights

  • $1.4 billion from a budget of $1.9 billion was spent by the NSW Government in response to natural disasters during 2021–22.
  • Budget underspent for temporary housing and small business support as lower than expected need.

Section highlights

  • 83 local council areas were impacted by natural disasters during 2021–22, with 58 being impacted by more than one type of natural disaster.
  • $349 million damage to council infrastructure assets at 30 June 2022.

 

Published

Actions for Design and implementation of the Transport Asset Holding Entity

Design and implementation of the Transport Asset Holding Entity

Transport
Treasury
Asset valuation
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Procurement
Risk
Service delivery

What the report is about

The Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE) is the State's custodian of rail assets. It is a state owned corporation and commenced operating on 1 July 2020.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies' design and implementation of TAHE. We audited TAHE, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) and NSW Treasury.

Separate and related audits on TAHE are reported in 'State Finances 2022', 'State Finances 2021' and 'Transport and Infrastructure 2022' reports.

What we found

The design and implementation of TAHE, which spanned seven years, was not effective.

The process was not cohesive or transparent. It delivered an outcome that is unnecessarily complex in order to support an accounting treatment to meet the NSW Government's short-term Budget objectives, while creating an obligation for future governments.

The benefits of TAHE were claimed in the 2015–16 NSW Budget before the enabling legislation was passed by Parliament in 2017. This committed the agencies to implement a solution that justified the 2015–16 Budget impacts, regardless of any challenges that arose.

Rail safety arrangements were a priority throughout TAHE's design and implementation, and risks were raised and addressed.

Agencies relied heavily on consultants on matters related to the creation of TAHE, but failed to effectively manage these engagements. Agencies failed to ensure that consultancies delivered independent advice as an input to decision-making. A small number of firms were used repeatedly to provide advice on the same topic. The final cost of TAHE-related consultancies was $22.6 million compared to the initial estimated cost of $12.9 million.

What we recommended

We recommended that the audited agencies should:

  • improve accountability and transparency for major new fiscal transformation initiatives
  • ensure entities do not reflect the financial impact of significant initiatives in the Budget when there is uncertainty, or it creates perverse incentives
  • review record keeping practices, systems and policies to ensure compliance with the State Records Act 1998, and the NSW Government Information Classification, Labelling and Handling Guidelines
  • review procurement policies to ensure that consultant use complies with all NSW Government policy requirements.

The NSW Government established the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE), a statutory State Owned Corporation (SOC), on 1 July 2020 to replace the former rail infrastructure owner – RailCorp. It is the State's custodian of rail network assets, including rail tracks and other infrastructure, rolling stock, land, train stations and facilities, retail space, and signal and power systems, within metropolitan and regional New South Wales. It is responsible for $2.8 billion of major capital projects in 2022–23.

TAHE was established under Part 2 of the Transport Administration Act 1988 and is governed by a decision-making board. The Treasurer and the Minister for Finance and Employee Relations are the Shareholding Ministers of TAHE, and they annually agree performance expectations articulated in a Statement of Corporate Intent.

Whereas TAHE is the custodian of rail assets, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains operate public rail services. TAHE does not have responsibility for the operation of the heavy rail network or train services, nor does it have network control functions. TAHE, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains are in the Transport and Infrastructure cluster in the public sector (formerly the Transport cluster and renamed in April 2022), which also includes Sydney Metro and Transport for NSW (TfNSW).

TfNSW leads the Transport and Infrastructure cluster. Its role is to set the strategic direction for transport across the State. This involves the shaping of planning, policy, strategy, regulation, resource allocation and other service and non-service delivery functions for all modes of transport.

TAHE's Operating Licence is granted by the Portfolio Minister and authorises the entity to perform the functions required to acquire, develop, finance, divest and hold assets, pursuant to the Transport Administration Act 1988. The Portfolio Minister also issues a Statement of Expectations which outlines the government’s expectation for the business for the next three to five years.

TAHE's original Portfolio Minister was the Minister for Transport who approved, on 30 June 2020, the issuing of an interim 12-month Operating Licence to enable TAHE to commence operating on 1 July 2020. The Portfolio Minister then granted TAHE's current Operating Licence in 2021. After TAHE requested a 12-month extension to its current Operating Licence, its next Operating Licence is due on 1 July 2024. The current Portfolio Minister is the Minister for Infrastructure, Cities and Active Transport.

About this audit

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies' design and implementation of TAHE. In making this assessment, we considered whether: 

  • the process of designing and implementing TAHE was cohesive and transparent, and delivered an effective outcome
  • agencies' roles and responsibilities were clear in the planning of TAHE
  • agencies effectively identified and managed certain risks.

Conclusion

The design and implementation of TAHE was not effective. The process was not cohesive or transparent. It delivered an outcome that is unnecessarily complex in order to meet the NSW Government's short-term Budget objectives, while creating an obligation for future governments to sustain TAHE through continuing investment, and funding of the state owned rail operators. The ineffective process to design TAHE delivered a model that entails significant uncertainty as to whether the anticipated longer-term financial improvements to the Budget position can be achieved or sustained.

NSW Treasury and TfNSW had different objectives for TAHE

Up to June 2013, RailCorp had been the owner and operator of rail services and maintainer of the metropolitan rail network for almost a decade. It had been operating as a not-for-profit Public Non-Financial Corporation (PNFC).

In 2012, NSW Treasury (hereafter Treasury) decided there was a risk that the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) would reclassify RailCorp to the General Government Sector (GGS), meaning depreciation expenses of approximately $870 million would be reflected in the GGS Budget. Treasury wanted to avoid this impact on the GGS Budget, and considered the establishment of a transport asset holding entity as a means to do so. Capital grants to RailCorp were being treated as an expense to the GGS Budget.

TfNSW also wanted an asset holding entity – but one that would be a non-trading ‘shell’ company with no staff that would hold and manage all public transport assets. TfNSW's concept envisaged the entity would have a structure that would enable future public transport reforms and strategic directions while ensuring vertical integration of operations between asset owners and the rail operators to maintain rail safety.

However, Treasury pursued its objective to improve the GGS Budget result, and sought to expand on TfNSW's 'shell' asset holding entity concept. Treasury wanted an entity that could generate a return on investment, as this meant that government investment in transport assets could be treated as equity investments, rather than a Budget expense, and in turn improve the GGS Budget position. As an example of the potential impact of creating this new entity, capital grants of $2.3 billion were paid to RailCorp in 2013–14. If Treasury's objective was met, grants of this significance would then be treated as an equity investment, rather than an expense in the GGS Budget.

In 2017, Treasury's preferred option was progressed through legislation, but both agencies' central objectives for the proposed asset holding entity would continue to prove difficult to reconcile. To achieve Treasury's objective to improve the Budget result, the entity would need to generate a return on investment (this is further discussed below). However, TfNSW expressed concerns that the prioritisation of rail safety, and the effective management of governance, regulation and operations would be more complex in an entity with commercial imperatives.

Asset holding entities are a common approach to the management of transport assets in Australia and internationally, and there are a range of approaches to how they are structured and used. Such structures should be driven by the goal of improved asset management. Ultimately, TfNSW's objectives could have been delivered through a simpler entity structure. However, reconciling TfNSW's objectives with Treasury's imperative to deliver and justify a Budget improvement in the short-term resulted in an overly lengthy process and an unnecessarily complex outcome that places an obligation on future governments to sustain. There is still significant uncertainty as to whether the short-term improvements to the Budget can continue to be realised in the longer-term.

The Budget benefits of TAHE were claimed before the entity was legislated, committing the agencies to deliver, regardless of the complexities that subsequently arose

The 2015–16 GGS Budget treated the government's investment in TAHE (still known at this time as RailCorp) as an equity contribution. This had the immediate impact of improving the Budget result by $1.8 billion per annum. However, the legislation to enable the establishment of TAHE had not yet been passed by Parliament, key elements of the operating model were still under development, and imminent changes in accounting standards had the potential to impact TAHE's financial model. The decision to book the benefits in the Budget early committed the involved agencies to implement a solution that justified the 2015–16 Budget impacts, irrespective of the challenges that arose. 

TAHE's financial structure requires circular government investment to work

For the NSW Government to continue to treat its investment in TAHE as an equity contribution, rather than an expense to the Budget, there must be a reasonable expectation that TAHE will generate a sufficient rate of return as required by the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) framework. In doing so, it needs to recover a revaluation loss created by a $20.3 billion reduction in the value of its assets which was incurred in its first full year of operation. This loss occurred as a result of a revaluation of TAHE's assets when RailCorp (a not-for profit entity) became TAHE (a for-profit commercial entity) – and is discussed further in the 'Key findings' below.

TAHE generates a small portion of its income from transactions with the private sector but, as noted in our report 'State Finances 2021', TAHE receives the majority of its revenue (more than 80%) from access and licence fee agreements with Sydney Trains and NSW Trains. Both of these entities are funded by grants (a Budget expense) to TfNSW from the GGS Budget.

Based on Treasury’s correspondence with the ABS in 2015, TAHE was initially expected to pay a return on equity of 7% in 2016–17. The assumption of a 7% return persisted through to 2018, after the legislation enabling the establishment of TAHE was passed by Parliament. However, when the initial access and licence fees were agreed on 1 July 2020, this figure had been revised to an expected rate of return of 1.5% excluding the revaluation loss. This was below the long-term inflation target and did not include the recovery of the revaluation loss – risking the government's ability to treat its investment in TAHE as an equity contribution. Importantly, as TAHE is primarily reliant on fees paid by the state owned rail operators that, in turn, are funded by the GGS Budget (as an expense), the decision to change the returns model from 7% to 1.5% would in its own right have had a positive impact on the GGS Budget. However, the decision to use a 1.5% return would ultimately be problematic as it made it difficult to treat the government's contributions to TAHE as an equity investment, as discussed below.

On 14 December 2021, to avoid a qualified audit opinion, the NSW Government made the decision to increase TAHE's expected rate of return to 2.5%, equal to the Reserve Bank’s long-term inflation target.

In 2021-22, TAHE needed to start charging rail operators higher access and licence fees in order to generate a return of 2.5%, so as to support the government's treatment of its investment in TAHE as an equity contribution in the GGS Budget. This meant the government needed to provide additional grant (expense) funding to the state owned rail operators so they could pay the increased access and licence fees to TAHE. Based on current projections, TAHE is not expected to recover the revaluation loss until 2046.

There remains a risk that TAHE will not be able to generate a sufficient return on the NSW Government's investment without relying on increased funding to state owned rail operators so that they can in turn pay the higher access and licence fees. TAHE's ability to generate returns on government investment from other sources are uncertain and may not be achievable or sustainable. Current modelling highlights that TAHE remains largely reliant, through to 2046, on increasing fees (which are assumed to increase at 2.5% per annum from 2031 onwards when the current 10 year contracts with rail operators expire) paid by the state owned rail operators that remain principally reliant on GGS Budget grants.

The process of designing and implementing TAHE was not transparent to independent scrutiny

Our report 'State Finances 2021' commented that Treasury did not always provide this Office with information relating to TAHE on a timely basis. Similarly, during this performance audit, there were also multiple instances where auditees were unable to provide documentation regarding key activities in the process to deliver TAHE. Agencies also applied higher sensitivity classifications to large tranches of documents than was justified or required by policy. Of particular concern is the incorrect classification of documents as Cabinet sensitive information. The incorrect or over-classification of documentation as Cabinet sensitive delayed this Office's ability to provide scrutiny or independent assurance.

There was a lack of clarity around the roles and responsibilities of governance structures set up to oversee the design and implementation of TAHE

From 2014, multiple workstreams and advisory committees were established to progress the design and implementation of TAHE. For some of these committees and workstreams, there is limited information on what they were tasked to do and what they achieved. Most had ceased meeting by 2018, before significant work needed to deliver TAHE was completed.

The lack of clarity around the roles and responsibilities of these governance structures reduced opportunities for TfNSW and Treasury to reconcile their differing objectives for TAHE, and resolve key questions earlier in the process.

There was a heavy reliance on consulting firms throughout the process to establish TAHE, and the management of consultant engagements failed to ensure that agencies received independent advice to support objective decision-making

In 2020, Treasury and TfNSW failed to prevent, identify, or adequately manage a conflict of interest when they engaged the same 'Big 4' consulting firm to work on separate TAHE-related projects. Both agencies used the firm's work to further their respective views with regard to the financial implications of TAHE's operating model. At this time those views were still unreconciled.

Treasury engaged the firm to provide a fiscal risk management strategy and advice on the impact of changes to accounting standards. TfNSW engaged the same firm to develop operating and financial models for TAHE, which raised concerns regarding the viability of TAHE. Disputes arose around the findings of these reports. Treasury disagreed with some of the outcomes of the work commissioned by TfNSW, relating to accounting treatment and fiscal advice.

The management of this conflict (real or perceived) was left to the 'Big 4' consulting firm when it was more appropriate for it to be managed by Treasury and TfNSW. If these agencies had communicated more effectively, used available governance structures consistently, and shared information openly about their use of the firm and the nature of their respective engagements, these disputes might have been avoided. This issue, coupled with deficiencies in procurement by both agencies, reflected and further perpetuated the lack of cohesion in the design and implementation of TAHE.

More broadly, over the period 2014 – 2021, 16 separate consulting firms were employed to work on 36 contracts, valued at over $22.56 million, relating to TAHE ranging from accounting and legal advice, project management, and the provision of administrative support and secretariat services.

Consultants are legitimately used by agencies to provide advice on how to achieve the outcomes determined by government, including advising agencies on the risks and challenges in achieving those outcomes. Similarly, consultants can provide expert knowledge in the service of achieving those outcomes and managing the risks. However, the heavy reliance on consulting firms during the design and implementation of TAHE heightened the risk that agencies were not receiving value for money, were outsourcing tasks that should be performed by the public service, and did not mitigate the risk that the advice received was not objective and impartial. The risk that the role of consultants could have been blurred between providing independent advice to government on options and facilitating a pre-determined outcome was not effectively treated or mitigated. This risk was amplified because a small number of firms were used repeatedly to provide advice on one topic. The effective procurement and management of consultants is an obligation of government agencies.

Appendix one – Responses from audited agencies, and Audit Office clarification of matters raised in the TAHE formal response 

Appendix two – Classification of government entities 

Appendix three – About the audit 

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #372 - released 24 January 2023

 

Published

Actions for Treasury 2022

Treasury 2022

Treasury
Asset valuation
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Regulation
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration

What the report is about

Results of the Treasury cluster agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2022.

The results of the audit of the NSW Government's consolidated Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA), which is prepared by NSW Treasury, are reported separately in our report on 'State Finances 2022'.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued on all 30 June 2022 general purpose financial statement audits.

Qualified audit opinions were issued on three of the 25 other engagements prepared by cluster agencies. These related to payments made from Special Deposit Accounts (SDA) that did not comply with the relevant legislation.

What the key issues were

Commercial agreements were signed between TAHE, the operators and Transport for NSW in June 2022, which reflected an expected rate of return of 2.5% on contributed equity. However, it remains critical that the government continue to provide sufficient funding to the operators so they can pay for access and use TAHE assets. These findings are reported in our report on 'State Finances 2022'.

Eight high-risk issues were raised in 2021–22, of which five relate to NSW Treasury.

A number of previously reported audit findings and recommendations with respect to icare continue to be ongoing issues. This includes the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer continuing to hold less assets than the estimated present value of its future payment obligations, when measured in accordance with the accounting framework.

What we recommended

Our report on 'State Finances 2022' made several recommendations to improve NSW Treasury's processes.

In this report, we recommended icare should ensure:

  • it has sufficient controls in place over claim payments, including an effective quality assurance program, to minimise claim payment errors
  • that documentation to support PIAWE calculations is appropriately maintained, and that the minimum documentation requirements are set out in a policy.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Treasury cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Treasury cluster (the cluster) for 2022.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the general purpose financial statements of all cluster agencies.
  • A qualified opinion was issued on the NSW Government's consolidated Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA), which are prepared by NSW Treasury. This is reported separately in our 'State Finances 2022' NSW Auditor-General's Report to Parliament.
  • Three qualified audit opinions were issued on special purpose financial reports, relating to whether payments from the funds complied with the relevant legislation.
  • Reported corrected misstatements increased from seven in 2020–21 to ten in 2021–22 with a gross value of $808.6 million. Reported uncorrected misstatements decreased from 17 in 2020–21 to 11 in 2021–22 with a gross value of $85.7 million.
  • Nine of 15 cluster agencies either did not submit or did not complete certain mandatory early close procedures on time.
  • NSW Treasury corrected a $39.7 million prior period error retrospectively in the financial statements as it overstated its accrual at 30 June 2021 relating to hotel quarantine costs.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury cluster.

Section highlights

  • Eight high-risk issues were identified in 2021–22, an increase from four high-risk and one extreme risk in 2020–21. A further 31 moderate risk findings were reported in 2021–22, of which 12 were repeat findings.
  • Inconsistencies in the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 (GSF Act) and Government Sector Audit Act 1983 (GSA Act) relating to key statutory timeframes have been addressed.
  • Further to last year's reporting, some agencies have again spent moneys without an authorised delegation. 
  • There was a lack of quality review of submissions for audit by NSW Treasury.
  • The Nominal Insurer's net assets decreased from a $2.5 billion surplus at 30 June 2018, to a $1.2 billion deficiency at 30 June 2022.
  • The Nominal Insurer's return-to-work rates stabilised, but remain below the performance levels prior to the COVID-19 pandemic.
  • The Nominal Insurer paid $29.5 million in 2021–22 to remediate historical underpayment of compensation benefits to workers (Pre-Injury Average Weekly Earnings (PIAWE) payments), and a further $8.5 million was payable at 30 June 2022.
  • During its review of historical PIAWE errors, icare found that indexation may have been incorrectly applied, or failed to have been applied when determining injured worker entitlements within the Nominal Insurer between 2012 and 2019. Based on calculations provided by icare, the Audit Office reported an uncorrected judgemental misstatement of $28.5 million (understatement).

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

Appendix five – Acquittals and other opinions

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Coordination of the response to COVID-19 (June to November 2021)

Coordination of the response to COVID-19 (June to November 2021)

Premier and Cabinet
Community Services
Health
Justice
Whole of Government
Internal controls and governance
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration

What the report is about

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies’ coordination of the response to COVID-19, with a focus on the Delta variant outbreak in the Dubbo and Fairfield Local Government Areas (LGA) between June and November 2021. We audited five agencies - the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Health, the NSW Police Force, Resilience NSW and the Department of Customer Service.

The audit also considered relevant planning and preparation activities that occurred prior to June 2021 to examine how emergency management and public health responses learned from previous events.

What we found

Prior to Delta, agencies developed capability to respond to COVID-19 related challenges.

However, lessons learned from prior reviews of emergency management arrangements, and from other jurisdictions, had not been implemented when Delta emerged in June 2021. As a result, agencies were not as fully prepared as they could have been to respond to the additional challenges presented by Delta.

Gaps in emergency management plans affected agencies' ability to support individuals, families and businesses impacted by restrictions to movement and gathering such as stay-at-home orders. In LGAs of concern, modest delays of a few days had a significant impact on people, especially those most vulnerable.

On 23 July 2021, the NSW Government established a cross-government coordinating approach, the Delta Microstrategy, which complemented existing emergency management arrangements, improved coordination between NSW Government agencies and led to more effective local responses.

Where possible, advice provided to government was supported by cross-government consultation, up-to-date evidence and insights. Public Health Orders were updated as the response to Delta intensified or to address unintended consequences of previous orders. The frequency of changes hampered agencies' ability to effectively communicate changes to frontline staff and the community in a rapidly evolving situation.

The NSW Government could provide greater transparency and accountability over decisions to apply Public Health Orders during a pandemic.

What we recommended

The audit made seven recommendations intended to improve transparency, accountability and preparedness for future emergency events.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies’ coordination (focused on the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Health, the NSW Police Force, Resilience NSW and the Department of Customer Service) of the COVID-19 response in selected Local Government Areas (Fairfield City Council and Dubbo Regional Council) between June and November 2021.

As noted in this report, Resilience NSW was responsible for the coordination of welfare services as part of the emergency management arrangements. On 16 December 2022, the NSW Government abolished Resilience NSW.

During the audited period, Resilience NSW was tasked with supporting the needs of communities subject to stay-at-home orders or stricter restrictions and it provided secretariat support to the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC). The SEMC was, and remains, responsible for the coordination and oversight of emergency management policy and preparedness.

Our work for this performance audit was completed on 15 November 2022, when we issued the final report to the five audited agencies. While the audit report does not make specific recommendations to Resilience NSW, it does include five recommendations to the State Emergency Management Committee. On 8 December 2022, the then Commissioner of Resilience NSW provided a response to the final report, which we include as it is the formal response from the audited entity at the time the audit was conducted.

The community of New South Wales has experienced significant emergency events during the past three years. COVID-19 first emerged in New South Wales after bushfire and flooding emergencies in 2019–20. The pandemic is now into its third year, and there have been further extreme weather and flooding events during 2021 and 2022.

Lessons taken from the experience of these events are important to informing future responses and reducing future risks to the community from emergencies.

This audit focuses on the NSW Government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and in particular, the Delta variant (Delta) that occurred between June and November 2021. The response to the Delta represents six months of heightened challenges for the NSW Government.

Government responses to emergencies are guided by legislation. The State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989 (SERM Act) establishes emergency management arrangements in New South Wales and covers:

  • coordination at state, regional and local levels through emergency management committees
  • emergency management plans, supporting plans and functional areas including the State Emergency Management Plan (EMPLAN)
  • operations centres and controllers at state, regional and local levels.

This audit focuses on the activities of five agencies during the audit period:

  • The NSW Police Force led the emergency management response and was responsible for coordinating agencies across government in providing the tactical and operational elements that supported and enhanced the health response to the pandemic. The NSW Police Force also led the compliance response which enforced Public Health Orders and included household checks on those required to isolate at home after testing positive to COVID-19. In some parts of NSW, they were supported by the Australian Defence Force in this role.
  • NSW Health was responsible for leading the health response which coordinated all parts of the health system, initially to prevent, and then to manage, the pandemic.
  • Resilience NSW coordinated welfare services as part of the emergency management arrangements and provided secretariat support to the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC). The SEMC is responsible for the coordination and oversight of emergency management policy and preparedness. Resilience NSW was also tasked with supporting the needs of communities subject to stay-at-home orders or stricter restrictions.
  • The Department of Customer Service (DCS) was responsible for the statewide strategic communications response.
  • The Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) held a key role in providing policy and legal services, as well as supporting the coordination of activity across a range of functional areas and decision-making by our State’s leaders.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies’ coordination (focused on the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Health, the NSW Police Force, Resilience NSW and the Department of Customer Service) of the COVID-19 response in selected Local Government Areas (LGA) (Fairfield City Council and Dubbo Regional Council) after June 2021.

The audit investigated whether:

  • government decisions to apply LGA-specific Public Health Orders were supported by effective crisis management governance and planning frameworks
  • agencies effectively coordinated in the communication (and enforcement) of Public Health Orders.

While focusing on the coordination of NSW Government agencies’ response to the Delta variant in June through to November 2021, the audit also considered relevant planning and preparation activities that occurred prior to June 2021 to examine how emergency management and public health responses learned from previous events.

This audit does not assess the effectiveness of other specific COVID-19 responses such as business support. It refers to the preparedness, planning and delivery of these activities in the context of supporting communities in selected LGAs. NSW Health's contribution to the Australian COVID-19 vaccine rollout was also subject to a separate audit titled 'New South Wales COVID-19 vaccine rollout' tabled in NSW Parliament on 7 December 2022. 

This audit is part of a series of audits which have been completed, or are in progress, regarding the New South Wales COVID-19 emergency response. The Audit Office of New South Wales '2022–2025 Annual Work Program' details the ongoing focus our audits will have on providing assurance on the effectiveness of emergency responses.

In this document Aboriginal refers to the First Nations peoples of the land and waters now called Australia, and includes Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.

Conclusion

Prior to June 2021, agencies worked effectively together to adapt and refine pre-existing emergency management arrangements to respond to COVID-19. However, lessons learned from prior reviews of emergency management arrangements, and from other jurisdictions, had not been implemented when Delta emerged in June 2021. As a result, agencies were not as fully prepared as they could have been to respond to the additional challenges presented by Delta.

In the period March 2020 to June 2021, the State's Emergency Management (EM) arrangements coordinated the New South Wales emergency response to COVID-19 with support from the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) which led the cross-government COVID-19 Taskforce. NSW Government agencies enhanced the EM arrangements, which until then had typically been activated in response to natural disasters, to meet the specific circumstances of the pandemic.

However, the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC), supported by Resilience NSW, did not address relevant recommendations arising from the 2020 Bushfires Inquiry before June 2021 and agencies did not always integrate lessons learned from other jurisdictions or scenario training exercises into emergency management plans or strategies before Delta. As a result, deficiencies in the EM arrangements, including representation of vulnerable communities on EM bodies, well-being support for multicultural communities in locked down environments and cross-agency information sharing, persisted when Delta emerged in June 2021.

It should be noted that for the purposes of this audit there is no benchmark, informed by precedent, that articulates what level of preparation would have been sufficient or proportionate. However, the steps required to address these gaps were reasonable and achievable, and the failure to do so meant that agencies were not as fully prepared as they could have been for the scale and escalation of Delta’s spread across the State.

The Delta Microstrategy complemented the EM arrangements to support greater coordination and agencies are working to improve their capability for future events

The Delta Microstrategy (the Microstrategy) led to innovations in information sharing and collaboration across the public service. Agencies involved in the response have completed, or are completing, reviews of their contribution to the response. That said, none of these reviews includes a focus on whole-of-government coordination.

On 23 July 2021, the NSW Government approved the establishment of the Microstrategy to respond to the additional challenges presented by Delta including the need to support communities most impacted by restrictions to movement and gathering in the LGAs of concern. An extensive range of government agencies were represented across eight Microstrategy workstreams, which coordinated with the existing EM arrangements to deliver targeted strategies to communities in high-risk locations and improve data and information sharing across government. This enhanced the public health, compliance, income and food support, communications and community engagement aspects of the response.

Agencies also leveraged learnings from early weeks of the Delta wave and were able to replicate those lessons in other locations. The use of pre-staging hubs in Fairfield to support food and personal hamper distribution was used a month later in Dubbo which acted as a central hub for more remote parts of the State.

Emergency management plans did not enable government to respond immediately to support vulnerable communities in high-risk LGAs or regional NSW

There are gaps in the emergency management plans relating to the support for individuals, families and businesses impacted by the stay-at-home orders and other restrictions to movement and gathering. These gaps affected agencies' ability to respond immediately when the need arose during Delta.

Emergency management plans and supporting instruments did not include provision for immediate relief for households, which meant arrangements for isolation income support and food security measures had to be designed in the early stages of Delta before it could be approved and deployed.

There were delays – sometimes only days, on occasion, weeks - in providing support to affected communities. In particular, there were delays to the provision of income support and in scaling up efforts to coordinate food and grocery hampers to households in isolation. In LGAs of concern, modest delays of a few days had a significant impact on people, especially those most vulnerable.

Although government issued stricter restrictions for workers in the Fairfield LGA on 14 July 2021, it only approved targeted income support for people in LGAs of concern on 16 August 2021.

Overall, agencies coordinated effectively to provide advice to government but there are opportunities to learn lessons to improve preparedness for future events

Agencies coordinated in providing advice to government. The advice was supported by timely public health information, although this was in the context of a pandemic, where data and information about the virus and its variants was changing regularly. However, agencies did not always consider the impact on key industries or supply chains when they provided advice to government, which meant that Public Health Orders would sometimes need to be corrected.

Public Health Orders were also updated as the response to Delta intensified or to address unintended consequences of previous orders. The frequency of changes hampered agencies' ability to effectively communicate changes to frontline staff and the community in a rapidly evolving situation.

The audit identified several occasions where there were delays, ranging from three to 21 days, between the provision of advice to government and subsequent decision-making (which we have not detailed due to the confidentiality of Cabinet deliberations). Agency officers advised of instances where they were not provided sufficient notice of changes to Public Health Orders to organise local infrastructure (such as traffic support for testing clinics) to support compliance with new requirements.

The COVID-19 pandemic arrived in Australia in late January 2020 as the bushfire and localised flooding emergencies were in their final stages. Between 2020 and mid-2021, agencies responded to the initial variants of COVID-19, managed a border closure with Victoria that lasted nearly four months and dealt with localised ‘flare-ups’ that required postcode-based restrictions on mobility in northern parts of Sydney and regional New South Wales. During this period, New South Wales had the opportunity to learn from events in Victoria which imposed strict restrictions on mobility across the State and the growing emergence of the Delta variant (Delta) across the Asia Pacific.

This section of the report assesses how emergency management and public health responses adapted to these lessons and determined preparedness for, and responses to, widespread community transmission of Delta in New South Wales.

The previous chapter discusses how agencies had refined the existing emergency management arrangements to suit the needs of a pandemic and describes some gaps that were not addressed. This chapter explores the first month of Delta (mid-June to mid-July 2021). It explores the areas where agencies were prepared and responses in place for the outbreak. It also discusses the impact of the gaps that were not addressed in the period prior to Delta and other issues that emerged.

NSW Health provided advice on the removal of restrictions based on up-to-date advice

The NSW Government discussed the gradual process for removing restrictions using the Doherty Institute modelling provided to National Cabinet on 10 August 2021. NSW Health highlighted the importance of maintaining a level of public health and safety measure bundles to further suppress case numbers. This was based on additional modelling from the Doherty Institute.

The Department of Regional NSW led discussion and planning around reopening with a range of proposal through August and September 2021. The Department of Premier and Cabinet and NSW Health jointly developed a paper to provide options on the restrictions when the State reached a level of 70% double dose vaccinations.

The roadmap to reopening was originally published on 9 September 2021. However, by 11 October 2021, the restrictions were relaxed when the 70% double dose threshold was reached to allow:

  • up to ten fully vaccinated visitors to a home (increased from five)
  • up to 30 fully vaccinated people attending outdoor gatherings (increased from 20)
  • weddings and funerals limits increased to 100 people (from 50)
  • the reopening of indoor pools for training, exercise and learning purposes only.

On the same day, the NSW Government announced further relaxation of restrictions once the 80% double dose threshold was reached. These restrictions were further relaxed on 8 November 2021. This included the removal of capacity restrictions to the number of visitors to a private residence, indoor pools to reopen for all purposes and density limits of one person for every two square metres, dancing allowed in nightclubs and 100% capacity in major stadia.

The NSW Government allowed workers in regional areas who received one vaccination dose to return to their workplace from 11 October 2021.

The Premier extended the date of easing of restrictions for unvaccinated people aged over 16 from 1 December to 15 December 2021.

Many agencies have undertaken reviews of their response to the Delta outbreak but a whole-of-government review has yet to be conducted

Various agencies and entities associated with the response to the Delta outbreak conducted after-action review processes. These processes assessed the achievements delivered, lessons learned and opportunities for improvement. However, a whole-of-government level review has not been conducted. This limits the New South Wales public service's ability to improve how it coordinates responses in future emergencies.

The agencies/entities that conducted reviews included:

  • South West Metropolitan region, Western NSW region, Fairfield Local Emergency Management Committee (LEMC), Dubbo Local Emergency Operations Controller (LEOCON), which were collated centrally by the State Emergency Operations Centre (SEOC)
  • Aboriginal Affairs NSW assessed representation and relevance of the emergency management arrangements for Aboriginal communities following the 2019 bushfires
  • Resilience NSW developed case studies to capture improved practice with regard to food security and supply chains
  • a community support and empowerment-focused after-action review undertaken by the Pillar 5 workstream of the Microstrategy.

Key lessons collated from the after-action reviews include:

  • the impact of variation in capability across agencies on the management of key aspects of the response including welfare support and logistics
  • issues with boundary differences between NSW Police Force regions, local government areas (LGA and local health districts (LHD) caused issues in delivering and coordinating services in an emergency situation 
  • the need to improve relationships between state and local Government outside of acute emergency responses to improve service delivery 
  • issues arising from impediments to information sharing between agencies and jurisdictions, such as:
    • timeliness and accuracy of data used to direct compliance activities
    • the impact of insufficient advance notice on changes to Public Health Orders
    • timely access to data across public sector agencies and other jurisdictions to inform decision-making, analysis and communications
    • gaps in data around ethnicity, geolocation of recent positive cases and infection/vaccination rates in Aboriginal communities.
  • the lack of Aboriginal community representation on many LEMCs
  • compared with the response to COVID-19 in 2020, improved coordination of communications with Culturally and Linguistically Diverse (CALD) populations with a reduction in overlapping messages and over-communication
  • improved attendance from agency representatives in LEMCs, and regional emergency operations centres (REOC) to improve interagency communications, planning, capability development and community engagement issues
  • deficiencies in succession planning and fatigue management practices
  • the potential for REOC Welfare/Well-being subgroups to be included as part of the wider efforts to community needs during emergencies.

NSW Health commenced a whole of system review of its COVID-19 response in May 2022. At the time of writing, the completion due date for the debrief is 7 November 2022. This debrief is expected to explore:

  • governance
  • engagement 
  • innovation and technology 
  • community impact 
  • workforce impact
  • system impact and performance.

NSW Health is also undertaking a parallel Intra-Action Review that is focused on the public health aspects of the response with finalisation estimated for the end of November 2022. At the time of completing this performance audit report, NSW Health had not finalised these reviews and, as a result, we cannot validate their findings against our own observations.

Recent inquiries are likely to impact the governance of emergency management in New South Wales

In March 2022, the NSW Government established an independent inquiry to examine and report on the causes of, preparedness for, response to and recovery from the 2022 floods. The Flood Inquiry report made 28 recommendations, which the NSW Government supported in full or in principle. Some of the recommendations relate directly to the governance and leadership of emergency management arrangements in New South Wales. 

The State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC) will likely be involved in, and impacted by, the recommendations arising from the Flood Inquiry with potential changes to its membership and reshaping of functional areas and agencies. At the same time, the SEMC may have a role in overseeing the changes that emerge from the SEOC consolidated after-action reviews. This can also extend to ensuring local and regional bodies have incorporated the required actions. There is a risk that the recommendations from the pandemic-based after-action reviews may not be considered due to the priority of action resulting from the Flood Inquiry.

Furthermore, there is potential for the SEMC to work with NSW Health during its system-wide review. Such an approach is likely to improve preparedness for future events.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – Chronology 2020–2021

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #371 - released 20 December 2022

Published

Actions for Development applications: assessment and determination stages

Development applications: assessment and determination stages

Planning
Local Government
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Service delivery

What the report is about

Local councils in New South Wales are responsible for assessing local and regional development applications.

Most development applications are assessed and determined by council staff under delegated authority. However, some development applications must be referred to independent local planning panels or Sydney and regional planning panels for determination.

Councils provide support to local planning panels. The Department of Planning and Environment provides support to Sydney and regional planning panels.

This audit assessed whether Byron Shire Council, Northern Beaches Council and The Hills Shire Council had effectively assessed and determined development applications in compliance with legislative and other requirements.

It also assessed whether The Hills Shire Council, Northern Beaches Council and the Department of Planning and Environment had provided effective support to relevant independent planning panels.

What we found

All councils had established clear roles, responsibilities and delegations for assessment and determination of development applications and had also established processes to ensure quality of assessment reports.

Northern Beaches Council and The Hills Shire Council have established comprehensive approaches to considering and managing risks related to development assessment.

Northern Beaches Council's approach to publishing its assessment reports promotes transparency.

Across a sample of development applications assessed and determined between 2020–22:

  • Northern Beaches Council and The Hills Shire Council had assessed and determined applications in compliance with legislative and other requirements. However, The Hills Shire Council could do more to transparently document any conflicts of interest within assessment reports.
  • Byron Shire Council had assessed most applications in compliance with legislative and other requirements. However, we found opportunities for the Council to:
    • ensure determinations were made in line with delegations
    • strengthen its approach to transparent management of conflicts of interest and quality review of assessments.

The Hills Shire Council and Northern Beaches Council had effectively supported their respective local planning panels.

The Department of Planning and Environment had processes that meet requirements for supporting regional planning panels but could do more to promote consistency in approach, share information across panels and measure the effectiveness of its support.

What we recommended

We made recommendations to Byron Shire Council, The Hills Shire Council and the Department of Planning and Environment to address the gaps identified and improve the transparency of processes.

Local councils in New South Wales are responsible for assessing local and regional development applications under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EP&A Act).

In assessing development applications, councils consider:

  • whether the proposed development application is compliant with legislation and environmental planning instruments
  • whether the proposed development meets local planning controls and objectives
  • any environmental, social and economic impacts
  • any submissions from impacted properties, neighbours and interested parties
  • the public interest.

Once assessed, a development application will be determined by council staff under delegated authority, the elected council, or an independent planning panel.1 

The involvement of a particular independent planning panel is established under legislative and policy instruments, and depends on the type and value of the proposed development. Most development applications are assessed and determined by council staff under delegated authority.

In determining development applications, independent planning panels must manage any potential, real or perceived conflicts of interest of panel members for a given development application, meet and vote on development applications, and publish their decisions and reasons.

Under the EP&A Act, and as required by statutory instruments and procedures, councils and the Department of Planning and Environment (DPE) must provide secretariat and other support functions to independent planning panels.

Previous reviews and inquiries have identified several significant risks that are present within the processes involved in the assessment and determination of development applications. These risks include possible non-compliance with complex legal and policy requirements, potential improper influence from developers and other stakeholders, and a perceived lack of transparency within the planning system and planning outcomes.

There are several planning pathways for development in New South Wales. This audit focuses on local and regional development that requires assessment and determination by a local council and/or an independent local planning panel or Sydney or regional planning panel in three Local Government Areas (LGAs): Byron Shire Council, Northern Beaches Council, The Hills Shire Council.

Audited councils were selected from a range of criteria, including:

  • the number, value and types of development applications determined in 2018–19
  • average determination timeframes
  • appeals against determinations and Land and Environment Court outcomes
  • LGA demographics.

The audit also avoided councils that had previously been subject to a performance audit.

The objective of this audit was to assess whether:

  • selected councils have effectively assessed and determined development applications in compliance with relevant legislation, regulations and government guidance
  • selected councils and DPE effectively support independent planning panels to determine development applications in compliance with relevant legislation, regulations and government guidance.

Conclusion – Byron Shire Council

Byron Shire Council has established clear roles, responsibilities and delegations for assessment and determination of development applications. However, the effectiveness of the Council's approach is limited by gaps in governance, risk management and internal controls.

Byron Shire Council has established clear roles, responsibilities and delegations for assessment and determination of development applications. However, the Council does not have a consolidated policy and procedure for development assessment, has not adequately followed up on the outcomes of internal reviews that identified opportunities to strengthen its assessment and determination procedures and approach, and has not demonstrated that it has managed relevant risks effectively.

The Council has not ensured that delegations have been consistently followed in the assessment of development applications.

Byron Shire Council's approach to managing conflicts of interest in development assessments does not provide transparency over potential conflicts of interest.

Byron Shire Council manages the risk of conflicts of interest for development assessment under its Code of Conduct. The Council has also implemented a separate policy that details additional requirements for managing conflicts of interest relevant to the development assessment process, but has not regularly updated this policy and requirements between it and the Code of Conduct have not been aligned. This creates a risk that planning staff may be following inconsistent or outdated advice in managing conflicts of interest.

Across the period of review, the Council did not require staff to provide a disclosure of interest for individual development applications to be contained within assessment reports. Including these disclosures would increase transparency and ensure that staff are sufficiently considering any conflicts of interest relevant to each separate assessment process.

Byron Shire Council has processes that promote compliance with legislation, regulation and government policy, but can improve how it undertakes some aspects of these that would ensure transparency, quality and consistency.

Our review of a sample of completed development applications from the Council indicated that most assessments were completed in compliance with relevant legislation, regulations and government guidance, but that there were some opportunities to improve elements of the assessment process, including: transparency of any conflicts of interest involved in the assessment process, ensuring compliance with delegated authority limits, and consideration of modification application provisions.

The Council has established templates to guide planners through relevant assessment considerations required by legislation, regulations and other guidance. However, it could do more to strengthen its approach to peer or manager review, monitoring legislative changes, and how it monitors the completion of relevant training by planning staff. 

 

Conclusion – Northern Beaches Council

Northern Beaches Council has established processes to support compliant and effective assessment and determination of development applications.

The Council has a clear governance and risk management framework for development assessment that sets out roles, responsibilities and delegations.

Northern Beaches Council has established clear roles, responsibilities and delegations for development application assessment and determination. The Council has identified development assessment related risks, and has put in place controls and mitigating actions to manage the risks to within risk tolerances.

Northern Beaches Council's approach to managing conflicts of interest promotes transparency.

Northern Beaches Council manages the risk of conflicts of interest for development assessment under its Code of Conduct. The Council has implemented an additional framework for planning staff to respond to the risk of conflicts of interest in development assessment processes. This framework requires its staff to disclose any conflicts of interest as a formal step in assessing development applications and includes declarations of any interests within assessment reports or planning panel minutes.

Our review of a sample of completed development applications indicated that the assessment reports had been compliant with the Council's approach to transparently documenting conflicts of interest.

Northern Beaches Council has established processes to deliver consistent, quality assessment of development applications.

Northern Beaches Council staff use an electronic development assessment tool that provides guidance, links to legislative and policy instruments and other applications that support assessment and drive consistency in approach. The Council applies a peer review process in which a manager or team member in a more senior position reviews an assessment report prior to determination to ensure that expected standards of quality and consistency have been met.

Our review of a sample of completed development applications indicated that assessments were undertaken in compliance with relevant legislation, regulations and government guidance.

Northern Beaches Council transparently documents assessment reports, supporting information and determination outcomes.

Northern Beaches Council has implemented a transparent approach to how it assesses and determines development applications. The Council publishes assessment reports, supporting technical reports, plans and submissions for all development applications. Notices of determination and final plans are also published alongside the assessment reports, allowing for greater transparency to the public.

Northern Beaches Council has established processes to effectively support the Northern Beaches Local Planning Panel.

Northern Beaches Council has established processes to support the Northern Beaches Local Planning Panel as required under legislative and policy instruments. The Council has processes to ensure that development applications required to be referred to a planning panel are identified and monitored, supports identification and documentation of any conflicts of interest, and transparently documents decisions of the panel.

Our review of a sample of meeting records held across the audit period of review indicated that these requirements were met and were transparently documented. 

 

Conclusion – The Hills Shire Council

The Hills Shire Council has established processes to support compliant and effective assessment and determination of development applications.

The Council has established a comprehensive governance and risk management framework for development assessment that sets out clear roles, responsibilities and delegations.

The Hills Shire Council has established a comprehensive framework for managing risks related to development assessment. Such risks are clearly identified and associated controls are in place to reduce or mitigate the risks. The Council has undertaken regular internal audits of development assessments, including reviewing completed applications to ensure compliance with relevant legislative and policy requirements.

The Council has established clear roles, responsibilities and delegations, and its staff assessing and determining development applications are supported by a standard set of policies and procedures for undertaking assessment and determination of applications.

The Hills Shire Council is managing conflicts of interest in line with Code of Conduct requirements but could more transparently document these.

The Hills Shire Council manages conflicts of interest for those involved in development application processes through provisions under its Code of Conduct. Under this Code of Conduct, staff must declare any conflicts of interest to their manager. However, the Council does not require staff to disclose any conflicts of interest in development application assessment reports which limits transparency to reviewing managers or any other determination bodies.

The Hills Shire Council has established processes to deliver consistent, quality assessment of development applications.

The Hills Shire Council has established templates to guide planners through relevant development assessment and determination considerations required by legislation, regulations and other guidance. The Council requires a peer review to occur prior to any determination which ensures a check on the compliance and quality of the assessment report prepared.

Our review of a sample of completed development applications from the Council indicated that assessments were performed in compliance with relevant legislation, regulations and government guidance.

The Hills Shire Council has established processes to effectively support The Hills Shire Local Planning Panel.

The Hills Shire Council has met requirements to provide secretariat and other support to The Hills Shire Local Planning Panel as required under legislative and policy instruments. It has processes to ensure that development applications required to be referred to a planning panel are identified and monitored, supports identification and documentation of any conflicts of interest, and transparently documents decisions of the panel.

Our review of a sample of meeting records held across the audit period of review indicated that these requirements were met and were transparently documented. 

 

Conclusion – Department of Planning and Environment

The Department of Planning and Environment (DPE) has established processes that meet its statutory and policy requirements to support Sydney and regional planning panels.

DPE has established processes to provide secretariat and other support to planning panels. It has met requirements to provide administrative support to the panels through its planning panels secretariat including undertaking administrative functions, supporting recruitment of panel members, and addressing complaints about the panel processes.

DPE has not ensured collection of annual pecuniary interest declarations for all panel members for the three Sydney and regional planning panels in scope for this audit. DPE could not provide annual pecuniary interest declarations for part of the audit period for three of the 47 members of these panels, as is required by DPE's Code of Conduct for Regional Planning Panels.

DPE does not formally measure its effectiveness in providing support to panels, but panel chairs consulted as part of this audit advised that they had no concerns with the level of secretariat support provided by DPE.

DPE could do more to facilitate information sharing between panels and could formalise how it provides comparative information to panels to improve consistency and standardisation in approach and share good practice. DPE has identified these gaps in reviews of its services and functions and has a plan in place to address them.

DPE has effectively documented planning panel decisions and made them available to all stakeholders. It also effectively documented interests declared as part of consideration of development applications for in-scope panels. 


1 Prescribed councils within designated Sydney districts are required to refer contentious development applications to local planning panels for determination. If the proposed development is above a threshold for estimated cost of works, or meets other prescribed criteria, the EP&A Act may require it to be referred to a Sydney or regional planning panel.

This audit continues a series of audits examining the development assessment process in NSW local councils and is focused on the assessment and determination stages.

The Audit Office of New South Wales previously considered local government development assessments in our 2019 performance audit: 'Development assessment: pre-lodgement and lodgement in Camden Council and Randwick City Council'.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – Council profile: Byron Shire Council

Appendix three – Council profile: Northern Beaches Council

Appendix four – Council profile: The Hills Shire Council

Appendix five – About the audit 

Appendix six – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #370 - released 12 December 2022